Rubicon theory - Russia

I will first of all try to establish the grounds on which I can

demonstrate that Russia was in a deliberative mind set before the
emergence of the first World War. The data shows that between the
1904 and 1912 Russia was in a very unprepared position as it went
through a lot of protests due to the lack of resources given to the
public by the poor governance.
By the turn of the century, Russia was suffering from
unemployment in the towns, and mass peasant unrest after the
difficult years of famine. In the period between 1900 and 1904, 1,205
peasant disturbances were recorded. Many of the intelligentsia also
clamored for reforms. The revolution of 1905 began with a strike
movement, something quite common in the Russian Empire during this
period. Working conditions were extremely difficult. Employers
generally ignored a flurry of laws issued in the later part of the 19th
century to reduce working hours and improve labor conditions.
However, the demands of the strikers at the outset suggest that there
was already a political dimension to the protests. The strike began on
January 3 at the giant Putilov munitions factory in St. Petersburg, and
spread to several other factories throughout the week. The strikers
demanded an eight-hour working day, a rise in wages, and the
cessation of indirect taxes, but also the transfer of lands to the
peasants and the convocation of an assembly based on equal and
general voting rights. Less than a week later, a large group of
demonstrators took their protests directly to the Tsar, with a peaceful
procession to the Winter Palace.
Also, Russia was in a bad place as it was just recovering from the
defeat in the Russo-Japanese war from 1094-1905. The Russians were
poorly organized and the Japanese defeated them in a series of battles
on land and at sea.
In the period 19061912, the revolutionary movement ostensibly
faded, and the possibility of the emergence of more democratic parties
increased. The Bolshevik Party determined to go its own route. In
19121913, the empire again seemed to be engulfed in strikes and
protests. The Bolsheviks now had six deputies in the Fourth Duma, but
there was little common ground between the Duma and the
government.
In 1912, I.V. Stalin first emerged as a Bolshevik
theoretician with a rambling pamphlet entitled Marxism and the
National Question, in which the native Georgian stressed the right of
non-Russians to self-determination within the empire.
Because of the international situation the Anglo-Russian Entente
of 1907 in effect formed a triple alliance, as both countries already had
agreements in place with France. Russia also signed an agreement with
Japan. From Russias perspective, the most important factor about the

alliance system was the tension in the Balkans. In 19071908, it

seemed possible that an Austro-Russian compromise would be reached
on several key questions Austria agreed that Russia should have the
right to send its naval vessels through the Dardanelles, and in return
Russia supported Austrias wish to annex the territory of BosniaHerzegovina and incorporate it into its empire. In practice, nothing
went right for Russia. This is an example that before the war started
the leaders were thinking in different terms and trying to see the broad
view. Their attitude toward their enemies was more objective and
administrated in such a way that it would provide benefits for both. In
1909, S.D. Sazonov was appointed Russian Foreign Minister. Sazonov
saw Germany as the main impediment to Russias interests and tried to
solidify the Triple Entente. Once war had started, Sazonov was at the
forefront of demands for Russias territorial expansion at the expense
of Austria and Turkey. Germany, in turn, supported Austrian interests in
the Balkans
Before the war Russia was more receptive to information and
better at processing it as it was considering to avoid the threat of a
two-front war. The Tsar visited Berlin in November 1910 for talks with
his cousin, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the two countries reached an
agreement at Potsdam the following year, in which Russia accepted the
German request to build a railway to Baghdad, while the Germans
recognized Russian control over northern Iran. This type of decision
making showed the ability to analize decisions and a focus on the
distant future.
It was known that Russia had the least to gain from the outbreak
of a new war. Russian prestige was at stake, however; the Austrian
decision to punish Serbia after the assassination at Sarajevo of the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, followed two
setbacks for Russian diplomacy during the Balkan Wars of 19121913,
when the Serbs were unable to fulfill their demands for an outlet to the
sea.
In the deliberative stage the officials at St Petersburg had put
forward their doubts about Russias readiness for war warning Tsar
Nicholas II about the dangers that his country would face if drawn into
a conflict with Germany. In February 1914 Peter Durnovo, who had
served as Minister of the Interior during the revolutionary disturbances
that swept Russia in 1905-6, sent the Tsar a memorandum. Durnovo
cautioned that a war between Britain and Germany was almost
inevitable. He also suggested that the war was likely to spread to the
other European powers. He was convinced that Russia should maintain
friendly relations with Germany since the vital interests of the two
countries were not in conflict.
Durnovo also warned in his memorandum that war with Germany
might be a catalyst for revolution in Russia. He expressed doubts about
whether his country was ready to fight successfully, given the

disorganized system of supply that would be used to support troops in

the field. Durnovos fears were shared by many within the Russian
political and military elite. Britain was widely disliked in St Petersburg
because it was Russias imperial rival in Asia. Moreover, it was seen as
the natural exemplar of liberal political principles; principles which
continued to be rejected by many who had yet to come to terms with
the liberalizing reforms that had taken place in Russia since 1906. Even
though the 1907 Anglo-Russian bond had theoretically ended the two
nations rivalry in central Asia Russias many anglophiles before 1914
could never be certain of commanding the Tsars attention.
When Austrian artillery bombarded Belgrade on July 29, 1914,
before it had mobilized its army, Russia responded with a general
mobilization on July 30, following a period when it had tried to mobilize
forces against Austria, but not against Germany. The Tsar still hoped to
come to terms with the Kaiser, and a flurry of notes was exchanged.
The outbreak of war is almost always a time of confusion and
uncertainty. It was some time, though, before it became clear that
Russia would come to the aid of Serbia against Austria. There were
many voices in St Petersburg warning against such an eventuality.
Nicholas II himself had no desire to see his country go to war. The czar
vacillated between full mobilization, which would make retreat very
difficult, and partial mobilization which left some room of maneuver.
When informed of the Austrian bombardament of Belgrade on the
afternoon of July 29, he decided to order full mobilization. That evening
however Wilhelms telegram arrived which he plead with the czar not
to take military measures that would precipitate a calamity. Pondering
the telegram the czar now felt that he had made a mistake in signing
the ukase for general mobilization. He decided to cancel the order and
substitute another one for partial mobilization. At this point the
generals became extremely alarmed. Minister of war Sukhomlinov,
Chief of Staff General Ianushkevich and chief of Mobilization general
General Dobrorolski were all convinced that this would give the enemy
the opportunity to mobilize more quickly than Russia. The czar
remained firm and toward midnight of july 29 the order for partial
mobilization was released. The three generals were upset and won
Sazonov on their side. He promised to win over the czar and he did so
that on July 30 general mobilization was ordered. This decision was
with no doubt made under pressure and gave no time for further
consideration. It was perhaps at this moment that the mind set
switched to implementation mood. Because the dice was thrown the
only solution was to boost the confidence and ignore the setbacks.
Mobilization, however, made war far more likely. Hence once the
Russians mobilized, it became essential that Germany do the same,
unless the Russians could be persuaded to desist. When the Russians
did not respond to a German ultimatum, Germany declared war on
Russia on August 1, 1914.

The decision, however, was part of a complex diplomatic crisis in

which considerations of international prestige and narrow self-interest
both played a part. The decision-making process was confused and
based on uncertain assumptions and imperfect information as the
model suggests as the war draws closer the decisions are taken faster
and with less consideration to the information than before. It is easy
now to look back and see that war was always likely to be disastrous
for Russia, and wonder why the warnings of so seasoned an observer
as Durnovo did not have more impact. The Russian government went
to war believing that there was no real alternative despite the many
risks that would result from a Europe-wide conflict.
The overconfidence that it showed after the beginning of war is
not based on reality as it has often been said that Russia was
unprepared for war in 1914.
First of all, the Russian Army lay in its inadequate transportation
infrastructure, which was not able to supply and maintain Russian field
formations at wartime establishments. Also, the country had the
largest army in the world of 5,000,000 soldiers but to no use because
at the outset of war Russia could not arm all its soldiers, having a
supply of 4.6 million rifles. The leaders knew this but failed to take it
into calculation due to the vulnerability of self serving evaluations.
In the midst of the July Crisis Sukhomlinov assured Tsar Nicholas
II of the combat readiness of the Russian army, in the face of all known
facts. He further recommended that the full weight of the army be
thrown simultaneously against both Germany and Austria-Hungary. He
remained convinced that the war would be a short one.
But this overconfidence was Russias main weakness because it
meant it was to start the war quickly and mobilize troops. It had
planned for both a defensive and offensive operation, depending on
German action. For example the Russian army, under the Grand Duke
Nikola did not assign clear priority to any campaign against Germany,
though once the German army began to move through Belgium, the
French Ambassador in Petrograd requested an immediate Russian
attack on East Prussia. The area was a difficult one to tackle as it
consisted of forests, swampy land, and numerous lakes, and Russian
communication was amateurish, being made over open radio. The East
Prussian operation lasted from August 17 to September 15, 1914, and
from Russias perspective, it was an unmitigated disaster.
After that came an even bigger unseen disaster because of the
narrowness of the implementation mindset. The the physical loss of
such prodigious numbers of men was nothing compared to the
psychological devastation. Dennis E. Showalter, in Tannenberg: Clash
of Empires (1991), noted that such psychological damage was
apparent as early as Tannenberg: the commanders and troops of the
Northwest Front had marched into East Prussia confident in their twoto-one numerical superiority and believed in their forthcoming

overwhelming victory. Therefore the disaster at Tannenberg was even

more devastating to the Russian psyche than the physical loss alone.
Before Nicholas assumed command, replacements were rushed
into combat without sufficient training, and frequently without
weapons. Not surprisingly, these raw troops retreated rapidly before
the well-oiled military machine of Germany. How they retreated
revealed their commanders' (not the tsar's) incompetence.
Finally, Russias position at the end of 1916 was far from secure.
Its troops were suffering from supply problems, heavy casualty rates,
and disillusionment with the war. At home, there were already long
lines for food and acute shortages in the towns. Furthermore, the
people began to believe rumors of pro-German sentiment at the
Russian court, with Aleksandra widely regarded as treacherous to the
Russian cause. Such suspicions were fuelled by the retirement of
Sazonov in the summer of 1916 and his replacement by Boris
Vladimirovich Strmer.