Aesthetic Experience:

A Review
V. K. CHARI
The problem of aesthetic experience is twofold: (i) to establish that
aesthetic experience is qualitatively distinct iTom nonaesthetic experiences, such
as religious, sexual, etc., and (ii) to show that it is in some way relevant to critical
discourse-to
our analysis and appreciation of art works. Critical attitudes
towards the concept have shown extreme reactions-from
the one that denies
that there is an experience called the aesthetic to that which says that it is useless
to standardize it and talk about it, sinc.e it is altogether too'subjective and variable
to be of any use in our di.scourse concerning the arts. Contemporary aesthetics
has, in fact, called in question the very ,notion of the "aesthetic" (Sparshott 1982,
467-86). The protagonists of aesthetic experience insist, however, that there is
a peculiarly distinct sort of experience that arises only in the context of our
encounter with aesthetic objects.
Sure enough, there is some experienceexperience, too, of a pleasurable nature-that
we all derive from works of art
and objects of nature, for otherwise, why would anybody attend to them at all?
But then, there are difficulties in identifying and defining aesthetic objects.
Artworks may be easier to isolate since they are the product of human intention
and purpose, and they are often put out into the world with the label "art" attached
to diem. However, there are also a vast number of crafts or products of human
skill that may be regarded as artworks-regarded,
that is, tor their perceptual
interests. But can they be said to generate aesthetic experience?
The case of
natural objects is even more difficult to deal with. But inasmuch as some of
them evoke feeling in use their identity as aesthetic objects has to be established
purely in terms of the experience they evoke. Even accredited artworks do not
produce the same kind or measure ofi-espouse in all people. with the result that
we do not seam to have a stable entity called aesthetic experience to talk about.

LI__
-'--1 "/.C_pGrtlt/fle

tDtdAull.tlu.

IW. XXIII:

N.,. 1-1 :1_

Be that as it may, we could still perhaps give a description of the kind

of experience that some of us may be believed to derive from aesthetic objects
. and

what happens in it. But we would have a hard time, purely in terms of it's

internal properties, demarcating the boundaries between it and other related

expel'iences, between one kind of pleasure and anothet. An easier way to
distinguish it may be to start with the aesthetic object and define aesthetic
experience as the kind of experience that arises from the object and that is
appropriate to it. Since every experience must be an experience of something
and there can be no experience without an object and since the content (and the
character-pleasant,
unpleasant, etc., too) of an experience is to a large extent
determined by the nature of the object, it would seem to be the right step first to
identify the aesthetic object before we discourse about the experience relating
to it.
What then is an aesthetic object'? This of course is a tantamount of
asking "What is beauty'?" "What is art?" - A question that has bedeviled
philosophers over the ages and that proves to be particularly difficult in our age
w~en any object whatever, any contraption or even a pile of junk items can be
regarded as aesthetic objects provided they come with an institutional stamp or
are backed up with a theory of art. However, for convenience, we may confine
our discussion to those objects only that are widely agreed to be beautiful and
worth while, and attempt an answer to the question in the following ways. The
answer would range from the object-pole of the question to its subject-pole.
I. In objectivist terms, an aesthetic object may be defined as any object,
natural or man-made, possessing certain qualities that arrest our attention and
evoke in us a pleasurable or gratifying feeling that is marked out in some respects
from other sorts of experiences. This is a view maintained by Beardsley, among
others, although his theory is confined largely to artworks or intentional objects.
For Beardsley, there is such a thing as an aesthetic point of view and an aesthetic
experience, which can be distinguished from nonaesthetic experiences in terms
of its own internal properties and which derives from an objective field of
observation, namely, the artwork characterized
by certain value-grounding
Qualities or aesthetic qualities. Corresponding to these "phenomenally obiective"
qualities are the "phenomenally subjective" features characterizing the aesthetic
experience.
A work of art, in his definition, is any perceptual (sensuously
presented) or intentional (imaginatively intended) object that is deliberately
regarded from the aesthetic point of view. The aesthetic point of view is not,
8

however, a special mode of perception but simply the capacity to perceive the
various elements of the artwork "synoptically" in their Il'I.utual relationships.
n. In subjectivist terms, an aesthetic object is any object, natural or
man-made, to which we bring a special kind of attention-different
trom ordinary
kinds in that it focuses on the object for its own sake and not for any practical/
utilitarian reasons. This is the root take by the "aesthetic attitude" theorists
from Kant down to our own time, although these theorists would seen to assume
that the object must, in some unspecified way, be worthy of contemplation in
virtue of its qualities.
Now, the first approach assumes that qualities are phenomenally object
and hence available for critical analysis. The second makes the perception of an
object as an aesthetic object dependent upon the percipient's adopting a particular
attitude towards it. The aesthetic is a mode of perception, not an aspect of the
object.
On this view, any material thing whatever-a
blackbird
or a
wheelbarrow-is,
at least theoretically, capable of becoming an object of aesthetic
appreciation. III. An attempt to mediate dialectically between the two poles is
that of the phenoIl'l.enologists-Ingarden,
Dufrenne, Iser, etc., (ignoring marginal
ditfererices)-an
approach that is consistently applied to aesthetic questions ably
defended by Mitias (1988 A, 1988 B). According to this, the putative aesthetic
object becomes so both in virtue of certain qualities or properties possessed by
il and lhe percepliun uf lhe percipienl which, in severai ways, cuwpiiwenls,
contributes to, and thus" constitutes the object of appreciation.
In dialectical
terms, there is tirst the artwork which, mediated by perception, emerges as an
aesthetic object. A distinction is made here between what are strictly the material,
objective teatures ofthe art object and the perception ofthem as value-grounding
qualities or aesthetic qualities, between the artwork and the aesthetic object (a
distinction also observed by John Dewey). The aesthetic object is then, on this
view, both objective and subjective in terms onts ontic status. While the complete
idealist would say with Coleridge that "We received but what we give, " the
phenomenologists
would go with Wordsworth in saying that we "half receive

and half create. ..

Severai probiems emerge out of this brief profiie of views on aesthetic

experience; first, a definition of the aesthetic object and it ontic status: second,
a clarification of the terms "aesthetic qualities," "aesthetic values," "aesthetic
point of view," and "aesthetic attitude": and finally, an examination of aesthetic
experience or "aesthetic emotion" and its psychological lineaments.
9

I. The aesthetic object; its mode of existence

The problems involved in this concept are; is an aesthetic object an object
out in the world as any other object, ready made an found, or does it become so
under certain perceptual conditions', Uthe latter is the case, then, what precisely
is the nature of its transformation from one condition to another, or in other
words, what was it before, and what is it after, the transformation? And again,is
there a real metamorphosis of the object? A material change in the object under
any perceptual conditions is of course inconceivable. Hence the change can
only be in the viewers perception, under ideal conditions of observation, and
validated inter-subjectively. But perceiving an object as an aesthetic object
required not merely certain perceptual conditions, but also innate capacity in the
perceiver to recognize or project, as the case may be, the aesthetic character of
the object-since any object by. itself is a neutral entity and can be viewed in
nonaesthetic ways or put it alien uses. This capacity may be one that is acquired
through training and cultivated or it may be a distinct faculty called "taste" (in
terms ollaculty psychology), or a disposition in the humans to appreciate
whatever is aesthetic about an object. In any case, unless the perceiver is the
kind tbattakes interest in nature or in art objects and brings' to them the proper

attention these things will not be seen as aesthetic objects. Much depends then
on the perceiver or connoisseur (rasika or sahrdaya in Sanskrit). It is in and by
his percepiion ihai a nUIl-aesiheiic objecL-thai is, an objeci ihai was noi aesiheiic
before-is
transformed into an aesthetic object. But this transformation is not a
real event in the world; it is an appearance. The tog in tbe sea, the painting, the
piece of music or whatever remains just what it was before I perceived i.t as
aesthetic or discovered in it. or projected onto it. some special signiticance or
value. This conclusion is implicit in the aesthetic attitude theory. Even according
to Beardsley's
"aesthetic point of view" theory, it is only when an object is
viewed from that point ol view that it will be recognized as an aesthetic object
. and will come to light in its ovw'Ilcharacter. Here of course the implications that
the object is that the object was already aesthetic (remember that Beardsley is
talking about artkind instances mainly) and it is only perceived fOTwhat it is,
whereas the aesthetic attitude theory assumes that the attitude aione does the
whole work and posits the aesthetic object.
But here the question is whether anything that is not intrinsically what it
is seen to be or regarded as can become what it is not except by an act of the
creative imagination or delusional vision, in which a rope can be seen as a serpent,
10

inanimate objects humanized

and profound

meanings read into 8 sunset, trees,

hiHs, and cataracts, as in Wordsworth '5 nature poetry. Natural objects. obviously
not being aesthetic by irttention (Amheim ~s "weeping willow" is obviously a
case of pathetic filllacy),need
to be looked at with a special attitude or in a
particular frame of mind in order that they tnay be regarded as aesthetic at a11regarded, that is. for their own sake, for tbe perceptual or imaginative pleasure
that they are capable of yielding. The aesthetic attitude theory, as conceived by
Kant, is based primarily on the model of mute natura} objects which.are innocent
of any aesthetic purpose and which depend on the view~'s perceptual ~ttitude
or point of view to give them any significance aesthetically. . And since the Attitude

is what confers aestheticity on 1he object. the object byitse1fhas no role in the
aesthetic experience. In this case then, *he principle of di$tinction between the
aesthetic and the nonaesthetic should be sought. not in tbeooject,- bunii.
.

interest taken.
But the same is not the case with intentional objects or objects that are
deliberately designed as aestbetic objects or artworks. A poem, a painting. a
sculpture, .8piece of music, a building with decorative motifs, etc. has no other
use to function than to be viewed aestheticaUy.
Thee objects are deliberately
put together in a purposeful manner so that their objective form atone, as an
~embodied intentio~," should be able to reveal the purpose for which they are
iniended. Even where an ariwork is expn:ssiy inbmueu fur sume other purpuse,
such as religious or moral, in its own identity as a formal organization it'.is first
an artwork and then, secoudarily, and instrument of use: tirst.a poem. then a
message~ first a sculpture, then a sacred image. and so on. Works of art are
aesthetic objects in their own constitution and .identiliable by certain built-in
features-such
as, formal devices, presentational or performance context.1:tc..
which serve as markers. They do not, like natural ()bjects, need theesemplastic
imagination of the perceiver for their being what they are perceived to be. Hence
Beardsley understands the term "aesthetic object" as synonymous with "work of
art, .. but insists that unless one regards it nom the aesthetic point of view :one is
not likely to see it for what it is-a demand that is justly made. because an artwork
can go unnoticed Qua artwork with our the awareness or a percipient. it appears
from this that the conditions of what is called aesthetic object are not the same
ina11 cases. and that in defining it we have to draw a line between natural .objects
and J.1lan-made works that are expressly designed as aesthehc objects.

11

A further distinction is also necessary among the art objects themselves

on the basis of the mediums in which they are embodied. While all art forms
require an aesthetic point of view or sensibility to be fully apprehended for
their significance. some of them call for the viewer's or percipient's
own
imaginative capabilities in a greater degree than others to provide them with
any significance or meaning at all. Thus the verbal and dramatic arts-poems.
plays. novel, stage drama, and expressive dance, and the visual arts of the
representational type-are
fully objective and autonomous in so far as their
meanings are contained within their own formal bodies. These may be termed
"self-expressive" as they all carry their meaning on the face-they are pictorial
representations of objects, persons. actions. etc.. or they employ signs-words,
gestures. and movements expressive ofinner feelings and thoughts. On the other
hand. instrumental D1usic~ and among the visual arts, abstract painting and
sculpture. and architecture depend. much like natural objects, entirely on the
listen~r/viewer for their aesthetic significance to be realized. although they can
be readily recognized by any person as art objects by virtue oftheir artifactuality.
Even in the self-expressive category. no doubt. the meanings of shapes. words,
gestures. and actions may not be readily apparent: there \viii be problems of
interpretation and need for elaborate construal-filling
the gaps, supplying of
missing connections. drawing out the implications. etc. But such problems can
at: Ult:i.successfuily witil i.ile ilt:ip uf tile weil-knuwn canuns uf interpretation
and artistic conventions. At any rate. it should be admitted that the meanings of
any human action. or handiwork in the seU:'expressive mode are utterly contained
in the mediums in which they take form. although the perceiver too may have to
exert his mind in interpretating them. But interpretation is always of a tinished
product. of a stable and reidentifiable entity, not of an "emergent" object.
The aesthetic attitude theory has no doubt come under fire from the
objectivists. But there is something to be said for the basic premise from which
it stems and which it shares with Beardsley's "aesthetic point of view." namely,
that there are certain values that may fairly be called aesthetic and that people
generally perceive in aspects of external and human nature. and in art creations,
and that move them. Poets. painters, song writers. actors. dancers. and so on
love to recreate such aspects. in various ways in art mediums and the general
public tend to appreciate them when they recognize them in artworks. Love of
nature and the mimetic instinct are common to both the artist and the audience.
An art object of the representationaLor
self-expressive type may therefore be
12

said to consist of a representation of an object, situation, or any element or aspect

of human perception, experience or consciousness that is of common human
interest and that appears significant or arresting to the artist, who tries to capture
it in a medium other than that in which it exists in nature (painting, poetry,
sculpture, etc.), or in the same medium under simulated conditions, mimetically,
that is-music,
dance, acting. Some might even go so far as to argue that even
nonobjective art must ultimately draw its categorical traits from natural or human
models--:colours, sounds, shapes, angles, and kinaesthetic elements. But we need
not press this point for our present purposes.
At any rate, when an object
possessing certain discernible value-bearing qualities is sufficiently entrancing,
then the aesthetic attitude or point of view plays its role: a disinterested attention
will help active participation in and enjoyment of the properties of the object.
But it is not often the case that one enters into an attitude volitionally in order to
be drawn to the object. The object itself. if it is worth its salt, may be expected
to dictate the kind of attention that is required for its appreciation.
II. Work of Art vs. Aesthetic Object: Aesthetic Qualities vs. Aesthetic Values
Let us now examine the distinction maintained by the phenomenologist
between the 'work of art and the aesthetic object, setting aside the question of
natural objects for convenience.
This distinction is perhaps also implied by
Beardsley's "aesthetic point of view" to the extent that it says that an art object
must b~ St:~11from a c~riaill poini of vi~w in onj~r io be discovered for its aesiheiic
significance.
The perception from the aesthetic point of view i~ simply a
perception of those qualities in the object tbat are intrinsically interesting to
humans-such
as, harmony, balance, order. proportion. expressiveness,
etc.,
which are regionally emergent qualities and which it is possible for anyone to
sec. This perception is thus anaesthetic quality (A-Quality) perception or
"regional perception."
But, as we noted above. Beardsley's A-Qualities are
"phenomenally
objective" and reside in the artwork; it is just that they are
recognized as value-bearers from the aeSthetic point of view. It follows from
this that aesthetic perception is value perception.
For the phenomenologist,
on the other hand, the work of art is but the
material basis or "the perduring structural foundation" (Dufrenne, trans., xxiii),
which can be put to any number of nonaesthetic uses, but which becomes
metamorphosed into an aesthetic object when realized in perception. Its material
.character consists of paints, stone, sounds, or words, as the case may be, or lines,
colours, figures, tunes, or meanings. when the same are formally organized. And
13

they become aesthetic through a specific act of perception and are contingent
on that act for their aestheticity.
The aesthetic character of the artwork, fo~
Dufrenne, is its felt dimension or its affective quality, which is realized only in
the consciousness of the spectator.
For Dufrenne then, neither the formal organization nor the expressed
content of the artwork is yet aesthetic: the meaning of the poem, the melodicrhythmic structure of the music. the representation in the painting or sculpture
are stilI its sensory material body. They lack the "felt dimension" which alone
makes them aesthetic objects. The aesthetic object has a double existence:
as
an art object and as an object aesthetically-that
is, subjectively-realized.
It
is suspended between the formal/objective
structure of the artwork and the
subjective consciousness of the percipient. or better still, it is a tertium quid, a
new reality or creation arising from the union of the two. The dialectical structure
of this argument is obvious and it stems from the phenomenological
premise
that knowledge is at once sub-objective or inter-involved.
The identity of the
object depends on a perceiving subject; there is no object without a subject.
This line of reasoning is applied consistently by Mitias to the question
of aesthetic "qualities. which, he observes. are the real principle of aesthetic
distinction (Mitias 1988b). The aesthetic object, like any material object, may
be broken down into a complex, or more accurately, a congeries of qualities or
properlies.
Dul a uisliuclion may oe math:, aioeii aroilrnriiy, for our purpose,
between the terms "properties,"
and "qualities,"
let us say, has objectivist
implications:
A property is what belongs to the object and what goes into its
constitution,
whereas
a quality-aesthetic
quality,
that is-in
the
phenomenological
view, is that property of the object which is perceived as
being aesthetic, i.e. as having aesthetic value. Mitias does not make this
distinction,
but it is implied in his argument throughout.
Discussing the
ontological status of aesthetic qualities. He argues that aesthetic qualities are
not readymades or the objective properties of the work, but that they "emerge in
perception" as values (1988b,29).
The contemplative look on the tace of da
Vinci's A Musician, the sadness of Valse Triste by Siblius, or the tragicalness of
Anna Karanina, or the look of peace and dignity on the face of Vermeer's Kitchen
Maid are not altogether in the work although they are anchored in it and
determined by its material medium, its ontic base. They are there only as
potentialities
to be actualized
or realized as values in the perceiver's
consciousness.
Consequently they have their locus in aesthetic perception. The

14

objective properties of the work are, on the other hand, such things as the bright
patch of colour representing the flood light streaming through the window in the
Kitchen Maid, the organized notes in a musical piece, or the linguistic structure
and the described events (}f Anna Karanina-and
they form ,the physical base
for the perception of the corresponding aesthetic qualities.
At this point it will be instructive to probe a little into the question of
aesthetic qualities. A review of the scholarly discussion on the subject will reveal
the following (Beardsley 1982; Hermeren): (i)Aesthetic qualities (A-Qualities)
or aesthetic attributions are not all of the same t"jpe: Some are evaluative and
others are descriptive or objective properties perceived as value-grounding or
VG qualities, while yet others are variable depending on the circumstances. (ii)
Some may be attributed literally to artworks, while others (affective or purely
value-based terms) are imputed to artworks and can only apply to them by
metamorphic extension. (Hi) An A-Quality must be some aspect of the object
that is perceived as a value or as being capable of providing aesthetic
gratification.
An aesthetic value may be defined as any property of an object
that is held to be a source of contemplative pleasure to a perceiver and that bears
.
repeated contemplation.
Thus, qualities like "delicate" (meaning, having thin fine lines or
contours), somber (dark-of
colours and landscape), vivid-are
phenomenally
objecii ve or descripLi ve properLies.
"U uilled,"
'<cohereni,'" "~ompieie,'"
"Balanced," "tightly knit," "harmonious"-are
gestalt or structural or "regional"
qualities. "Tragic," 'joyful," "serene," "solemn," "sad," "cheerful, "-are emotion
qualities or expressive qualities, perceived directly in art forms of the self.
.
signit)ring type (literature, tigurative painting and sculpture, expressive dance
and stage acting), but imputed to pure music, landscape, and nonobjective painting
and sculpture, in the nonself-expressive
medium. "Bold," "nervous," "tense,"
"impatient,"
"relaxed,"
"restle.ss,"
are behaviour
qualities,
ascribed
metaphorically to artworks. "Shocking," "stirring," "funny," "trite," "boring,"
''beautiful,'' "impressive." are reaction qualities and value-loaded, and designate
affective responses to artworks. Tbey are applied metaphorically to art works.
it aiso roiiows from (iii)aoove that the so-caiied A-Quaiities-whether
objective or purely evaluative/affective-are
aesthetic values, perceived as such
by a viewer or a community of viewers. Value perception takes someone to
discover tor himsel!"the values in things. Aesthetic judgement is then necessarily
a judgement of values, and to that extent it may be allowed that the percipient

15

plays an active, creative role in the perception.

He interprets the qualities
residing in the object as value-bearing
and capable. of yielding aesthetic
enjoyment. And these qualities should include, not only the formal qualities of
the medium, like colours, shapes, and sounds, but also the representational
elements-meanings,
pictures, and the like. What then are potential in the object
and are "actualized" in the perceiver's consciousness are aesthttic values. 1IOt
the value-bearing properties themselves. Values come into beiAi in and by the
act of perception.
An observed property, when seen as a value, becomes an
aesthetic quality. As an event in consciousness, an aesthetic quality cannot be
deemed to belong to the artwork. What belongs to the artwork is some perceptible
property-visual.
auditory, or cognitive (perceived as meaning). While thus all
values depend on a perceiver for their realization, there seem to be different
degrees of this realization and different ways in which it is effected. In some
art forms, the values themselves may be said to be given in some sense and not
merely perceived. In the case of the verbal and dramatic arts, and in other
forms oUhe seU:"expressive medium, qualities like "sad," "cheerful/' "comical,"
etc. are descrlptive properties. The art form consists of them. Moreover. these
may be, not oilly objective properties. but also the values expressed by the work.
Tho tragicalness of Hamlet or King Lear, the serenity on the face of the Buddha
image, the erotic gestures and movements of a dancer are palpably manifested
in lhe wurk us vaiues. They du lIul emerge ill percepliun or uwaii aciuaii:Laiiun
by the ~,ercipient. They are there insofar as they can be expressed at all, in life
or in art. Perceiving the look of peace on the face of an actual person is the
same as perceiving it on the face of a painted image of him, except that the
latter is an imitative reproduction or representation.
We just see it tor what it
is, recognizing it by its tokens.
But, can they stilI be said to be expressed as values by the work itself!
The tragicalness (pity and grief) of King Lear is a feeling registered by Lear
and other characters in the play. But it is not a "pleasure-yielding"
aesthetic
value to them: it is an insutlerable condition. The spectator. however. takes
pleasure in reliving and empathizing with that condition and hence it is a value
10 him. Simiiariy. rhe iook of agony on the face of Christ in a crucifixion painting.
On the other hand, the joy of reunion of lovers in a romantic comedy drama is a
valuable experience both to the characters and the spectator, who is happy in
their happiness. Buddha's serenity. if you know his story. was a value to him.
which he cultivated and. presumably. also relished. and hence a value in the
16

imaged person in that the image exhibits it. The erotic behavidur of a dancer or
stage actor is even more manifestly an "expressed value," a valuable experience
equally to the performer and the spectator. In such cases, we can say that the
already actualized affective values of" the artwork are: simply replicated or
reverberated in the consciousness of the spectator. YdU feel what Buddha felt,
or more accurately, what the image "feels," in a manner of saying. But here one
could make a hair-splitting distinction and say that the feeling felt by the spectator
is not the same raw emotion that is expressed by the character or exhibited in the
image. What the spectator feels is "aesthetic emotion" (rasa, in Indian poetics),
and 1tCcordingiy,"om: cou1d give it a 1im~fi1: nomenclature.
wr.Ue this may
hold true of the disagreeable
or painful emotions-like
grief, anger, fear,
disgust-which
turn out to be pleasurable in life as in art. But are ndt even the
disagreeable emotions-Lear's
grief or Christ's agony-qualitatively
the same
as those felt by me wben I identify with those characters-except
that they are
distanced and imaginatively recalled? A maxim in Sanskrit has it that the pdetic
or dramatic experience is the same for the poet, tbe bero, and the audience.
However, you may wish to call these very distanced or "imagined" feelings "art
emotions" arid hence aesthetic values. Hut even so, they can be'seen as already
manifested in the work, at least in their substantial forms.
There is another sense in which aesthetic values may 'be said to be
expressed by lhe arlwurk, nOl existing wereiy as a basis for potenliai reaii~alion.
The artwork, as an iIlocutionary act, was made with the purport of conveying
certain values-valuable
insights or experiences-and
it does so in the only way
possible, namely, through the medium of the art form and the properties
appertaining to it. The serene look of Buddha and the agony of Christ on the
cross are the expressed content of the respective images-expressed
through
visible, objective signs-and
at the same time they are the values purported by
the expressions and found worthy of contemplation by the art lover. In the other
self-expressive mediums too, the work occasions sad or cheerful feelings in the
reader or spectator because the dancer, the actor, the speaker, the poet himself in
his own person or his persona expresses those feelings. These feelings, when
they are repiicated or echded in the reader's or spectator's consciousness are
different from those expressed in the artwork only in the sense that they appear
in a different substratum, where of course they will become intermixed with
subjective elements. Hut they should still be deemed to remain unchanged in
their qualitative essence. Otherwise, they could not even be traced back to the

17

work that endangered

them.

them, not to say that we can have a shared experience of

.

These affective values, it may be admitted, are "realized" in their affective

depth only in the experience ofthe percipient; They are grasped nom the artwork
cognitively or perceptually (as the case may be) and then realized affectively.
And in that sense, they are potential in the work. But they are potential only in
the way that certain food values, like protein and vitamins, are said to be contained
in certain varieties of food. The value of these elements is realized only wen the
food stuff containing them is consumed.and takes affect on the body. But what
precisely is the nature of this realization in the case of art? The values conveyed
by the artwork produce certain reactions in the perceiver-they
evoke certain
affective responses in him. It is the perlocutionary end of the communication
act. Considered as communication,
art is no different from other kinds of
communication. Someone makes an art object for the purpose of evoking a certain
response in the viewer. The viewer responds and has an aesthetic experience.
Beardsley's theory supports such a causal explanation of aesthetic experience.
The phenomenally objective features of the work of art (82). This being the
case~ the beholder's role consists only in recognizing the values residing in the
form and content of the work and responding to them in wise passiveness. He
does not have to reshape or in any way complement .or complete the work, as the
piu:nomenuiogisi ciaims. The vaiue of course takes effeci in his consciousuess;
and in this sense it is potential in the art work, as it is in any cause-effect situation.
But the artwork, as a meaningtul structure, has discharged itself whether the
response (perlocutionary effect) takes place or not, just as a command given is
complete in its meaning whether the perlocutionary action ensues or not. Hence
its objectivity.
In the nonself-expressive
, nonobjective forms-music,
architecture,
abstract painting, abstract dance (if ever there was such a thing)-the
values
cannot be said to exist even as potentialities in any constant or defmite way as
they are not amenable to objective tests. There the sound structure, shape, mass,
colour, steps, geometrical figures, etc. cannot be said to be value-bearers except
(a) by convention, or (b) when regarded as imentionai obiecrs whose purport is
to convey certain values-sheer
perceptual pleasure or some arbitrarily imposed
symbolic or expressive significance. Even so, in the absence of any specifiable
signitication, such as a title, declared theme, or narrative context, one cannot
say that aesthetic qualities or values, like sadness, cheerfulness, etc. "emerge"
IS

out of the forma! elements of these arts. Thus the sadness of a musical piece is
actually projected onto it and hence metaphorically ascribed, for the music has
no potentiality to occasion sadness in the absence of an invariable relation to
overt expressions of sadness. To say with Langer that it is iconic of forms of
feeling (the appeal to inner happenings).
However, it could arouse emotions in
virtue of some formal features ("Contours," Peter Kivy calls them) that are
isomorphic with features of behaviour expressive of them-such
as,tonality,
rhythm, tempo, etc. (the Bowasma thesis}-in
which case, such features w()uld
be descriptive qualities or properties oftne object, not C<aestheticqualities"arising
out of the contact of the listener's consciousness with the object." The same
argument holds for abstract dance. But the recognition of such values will be, to
a large extent, contingent upon the Hsten~'s personai attunement and cultural
exposure. An Indian audi~nce would not be able to feel any deep appreciation
for Western music or banet, although they can still identify the sounds as music
and the movements as dance movements. But non genuine aesthetic experience
m~y be expected trom such encounters.
In any case, it is only instances of the nonself-expressive
category that
the percipient has to add to the artwork, bringing to it experiential m'aterial from
the storehouse of his consciousness.
But in instances of the other category-in
the self-expressive
mediums-there
is no need for supplementation
by the
iUlligillaiioll. Th~ir illt:auillgs art: cOlltaim:u in tht:ir forms. Ont: pC:fct:ivc:s such
objects, makes out their form and their meaning, and then one may be ~ffected
by them in some way. Hut the objective reality ofthe thing remains unchanged.
There is'no interinanimation or cooperative effort between the art object and the
percipient.
But here the phenomenologist
may point out that what the words of a
poem, the gestures and actions of a performing artist, or the representation in a
painting may be said to contain is only an Hid,eal signification" (Dutrenne, 21 IS)
or a "schema" (Mitias 1988b,32), not the sensuous body of the experience itself,
and that in this sense the aesthetic object is realized and "completed in the
consciousness of the spectator" (Dufrenne. 204). There is the objective reality
of the anwork and then there is the subiective com em which the work siirs up in
the mind-emotions,
images, memories, sensations-the
effects that bring the
object to life as an aesthetic object. Here we must remind ourselves that any
artwork or any act of expression , for that matter, in the verbal, physical, or
plastic medium can go only so far and not hand over experience in the body. 1t
19

can only be a schema. Moreover. the meaning of any sign or sememe (meaning
-bearing entity) comes to light only when there is an uptake. But the meaning is
always there, situated in its context. whether someone decodes it or not. But
this is not the sense intended by the phenomenologist.
The meaning, he would
say. acquires its identity in being experienced. However, the case of the dramatic
arts-stage
acting and dance-which
are in the action medium-is
somewhat
different.
There the contents of the experience are presented directly and
immediately as a live spectacle, as a "happening," not merely as a schema. So
--~~at
the audie~~
only to vibrate in sympathy or relive the event
---..-empathetically.
Even so, no doubt. the numuer .of raiizing the spectacle will
vary from individual to individual. each person bringing to his experience a
wealth of meanings drawn from his personal psyche and his cultural frame of
rcfnence.
But over sucb subjectivereacrions
the art object has no. contr.ot
Much less do tbesereactions
form part of the meaning of the work. Fer all
-CAU.:;;t;,": ~!I that is supported by a semantics-a
sign-signifie,~presser.
expressed (vacya-vacako, in Sans
-re!ation-is
by ~efinition limited and
def"tnite. The elaborations or extensions of meaning, imaginative and conceptual
proliferations, that a'Mona Lisa ora poem by Keats may' spur in the inind ola
person with a fertile imagination, although they no doubt my flow trom the object,
cannot with any justice be called the meaning of that object. No doubt, too, that
invariaOly the object is realized in this subjective fashiou and is, in the process,
enriched by what the individual adds to it in terms of his own constructive
imagination.
aut I should argue that all this does not strictly tall ~ithin the
bounds of what the work itself purports to convey. At any rate, the spectator
cannot be said to be "'constituting," or "'completing" the aesthetic object through
his act of perception.
He can only be extending its meaning, value, or
significance.
For the work itself, as a finished product-whether
a poem, a
play, a picture, or a dance-contains
its own significance, is seU:'complete and
self-revealing (inasmuch as any such thing can be said to be) even without the
mediation olthe spectator's consciousness. Hence its objectivity, its autonomous
status.
We nave seen mat an artifact-regaraiess
of whetner it is com1>ieteiy
objective or partly actualized in consciousness-is
distinguishable from the rest
of the phenomenalworld
by virtue ofits artifactuality. It is either an imitative
reproduction of nature or a tormulation, shaping, or organization ol its elements
(categorical traits), or an expression of ideas and feelings in a conventional

20

medium, although many other artifact~ (machines, tools, etc.) would also qualify
for this designation.
But is the experience generated by it so distinguishable
from other kinds of experiences?
It has been argued by the critics of aesthetic
experience and aesthetic attitude that art is continuous or coextensive with like,
that there are no elementary aesthetic interests or emotions,and
that all the
interests, emotions, and urges that prompt people in real life appear in art as
well. However, something like an aesthetic interest or aesthetic seD,Secan perhaps
be isolated from other life interests-from
the utilitarian, heuristic, religious,
intellectual and the like. First, people enjoy making pictures of things or
producing imitations of objects and actions. This is Aristotle's mimetic instinct.
Second, they like to create shapes. make formal patterns of objects, sounds,
movements, weave structures of different kinds, and so on. This is Aristotle's
instinct for harmony and rhythm. Third, they also like a pleasurable exercise of
their emotions, what HazIitt called ~gusto" (rasa, in Sanskrit), or an excitation
of their senses by colours, sounds, and the like. Fourth, there is the instinct for
ornamentation (alamkarana, in Sanskrit), which is amply demonstrated by all
sorts of decorative motifs appearing in traditional architecture-temples,
churches, aDd mosques-:"'and on images, and by costumes,jewelry,
and "the like,
which serve no other function than simply beautifying the appearance of things
and persons. In both Indian and Western poetics, rhetorical figures are held to
be ornamental additions to the poetic idea, a means of enhancing the meaning.
Artistic activity as well as aesthetic appreciation may be traced to these urges.
There is no need to explain the whys and wherefores of this phenomenon.
So
one can conclude that there is a thing called pure aesthetic value that is distinct
from practical, theoretical, and other values. And if there is such a value, the
experience resulting from the pursuit or contemplation of it must also be distinct
from experiences resulting from other sorts of activities and objects. Aesthetic
activity may be called a self-rewarding activity or play, and an end in itself. But
this feature of the aesthetic experience niay nofbe a sufficient condition for its
being a distinct kind of experience,
since there are evidently many other
activities-games
and sports, for example-there
are also self-rewarding,
in
which case, we can only say that aesthetic activity is but part of a larger family
of autotelic activities.
Besides, as pointed out by Dickie and other objectors,
one may not value an art object' for its aesthetic interest alone. The aesthetic
interest may coexist with the practical, acquisitive, intellectual,
and other
interests. While this may be granted, it is possible to argue that, in its purest
21

state, albeit maybe for a short duration, the aesthetic interest can be isolated and
that the quintessential function of the object that provokes that interest is to
gratify that aesthetic in the viewer, and not to provide sOIne other kinds of
satisfaction.
In nay case, it is necessary to outline the character of this experience
before we can make out a case for it in terms of its possibility and worthwhileness.
Contemporary discussions of this subject have generally followed Beardsley's
formulation-which
has its source in the tradition of Kant and Schopenhaver.
According to Beardsley, the five characteristics
or "internal properties" of
aesthetic experience are: object-directedness,
felt freedom. detached affect,
active discovery, and wholeness.
Attentional focus on the aesthetic object.
disinterestedness
and psychical distance. and the consequent freedom from
mundane. cOnc"..-ert1S
are also common to the phenomenological
and aesthetic
attitude theorists. Both Beardsley and the phenomenologist also emphasize the
affective character of this experience. But for Beardsley, the affective element
is strictly under the control of tbe perceptual elements of the artwork.
Much the same account can be heard from the ancient Indian th~odsts,
chiefly Abhinavagupta
whose formulations of the "Rasa" theory, following
Bharata's NaJya-sasJra. have been taken as canonical over the ages (Abhinava
BharaJi, I & VI). Although the rasa experience is generally equated with aesthetic
experience by scholars, it must be noted that in its original intent it related mainly
to poetry and stage drama and not to the plastic arts or even to music and dance
in their abstract form, taken in isolation from the theatrical context. Poetry was
considered separately as a verbal art and the theatrical spectacle was a mix of
dialogue, action, song, and dance (both pure and expressive). The rasa experience
.

was the total experience of the dramatic spectacle. Both Bharata and his
commentators, including Abhinavagupta, recognize that music and abstract dance
are powerful affective tools, especially in the theatre, but they argue that they
possess no definite emotive significance as they have no semantic or cognitive
content-a
situation consisting of the objects and behavioural expressions of an
emotion. In latter day literature, the rasa concept was applied to the figurative
arts, namely, painting and sculpture (cUra and silpa), and expressiveness was
held to be of the very essence of the art of portraiture, as it was of stage acting
and expressive dance. The association of music with rasa was taken as axiomatic
though it was recognized that musical notes and tunes (ragas) had by themselves
22

no exact signification. Emotions can be expressed only in two mediums: speech

(vodka) and bodily action and gesture (angika), which are self-signifying
vehicles. while musical sounds, dance steps, and abstract figures have no
expressi ve power of' their own and are parasitic on the concrete emoti ve situation
for their evocative function.
Understood in the context of the theatre-poetry too is a dramatization
of the emotions, according to Abhinavagupta-rasa
is an affective experience,
not merely a cognitive perception. The primary object of art is not referential,
to convey information or to yield any new knowledge, but to evoke pleasurable
responses in the spectator. On the much debated question of whether aesthetic
experience is a conceptual or a nonconceptual, nondiscursive state, the rasa theory
maintains that the essence of this experience is an affective quality provoked in
the artist as well as in the spectator by whatever is the subject matter of human
experience-an object, person, thought, or situation. Rasa is an emotionalized
perception of the world as opposed to tbe purely intellectual or theoretical.
Representational art is no doubt made up ot"reference to objects and states ot
affairs. But mere referentiality or exemplification does not confer value on the
art object (contra uoodman). Wbat is aesthetically valuable can be detennined
only by the quality (specifically emotive quaHty)of what is referred to or
exemplified. The rasa theory assumes that affective states (emotions or bhavas),
iike the tragic, ihe cumic, iue eruiic, iue:serene, etc. Kl'egiven a priori-ihey are
embedded in human consciousness as latent traces or impressions, to be sparked
into action at the least touch ot their objects. (Ct". Duftenne. 437-0439 on
"aesthetic a priori.) Rasa experience is no doubt still a cognitive process-the
instruments of empirical knowledge (pramanas) do operate in so far as it involves
the construal. of the data of the presented object or spectacle, and it draws upon
sense perception, inference, and memory as in ordinary cognition. But the
resultant ot"these processes is a pleasurable thrill termed cama/kara, spanda,
while the cognitive activity is the penultimate stage of aesthetic perception. In
its ultimate stage of enjoyment, Abhinavagupta insists, rasa is a variety of
apperception or self-reflexive activity, in which the mind oversteps all the
cognitive ba~ga~e and rests in its own consciousness. Moreover. the obiectiveiy
presented emotions are not so much cognized as they are "recognized" (cf.
Dufrenne: Ube reconnaissance). In terms of his own idealistic epistemology,
Abhinavagupta holds that all knowledge is a recognition oUhe world as oneself.
23

If rasa can be called "aesthetic emotion" it is not, however, in the sense

in which it is understood in Western aesthetics-a
pure etherealized feeling,
such as even the colours and lines of an abstract painting, or the sounds of a
musical piece, <fIlII'thefigure, rhythm, and movement in an abstract dance are
believed to evoke, an "art emotion" pertinent to the so-called aesthetic surface
(as Clive Bell, Beardsley, Peter Kivy, and others waul$! have it). The implication
is that it is a full-blooded emotion of the: ordinary sort (the "garden variety," if
you like), but occurring in a characteristic way in the context of art (particularly
in poetry and drama). That is to say that emotions like love, anger, fear, etc. are t
the very substance of the rasa experience, but they are experienced differently
from emotions in real life owing to the peculiarity of the situation-call
it the
aesthetic situation-in
which they occur, and they are all savoured, become
objects of gustation in a way that they.are not in real life. Love wonder, heroism,
humour, and sere~ity, which are relished in real life, unlike fear, grief, anger,
and disgust, are transformed in art even while retaining their own distinctive
flavours. Even the disagreeable emotions arecsavoured when they are presented
through the medium of art (cf. Aristotle).
What differentiates life emotions
ttOin aesthetic emotions and bestows value on them is the tact that when they
are artistically represented they are rendered relishable and capable of being
enjoyed repeatedly (punah-punar-anusandhanalma).
Rasa experience is a
cugnitiun tincturc::d by (rusii(l-viicuipu-sumveciunum)
and uf tilt: :>amc ua,lure as
the mental states like joy and sorrow, which are ihe stuff of poetry and drama.
However, Abhinavagupta insists that the aesthetic emotion is distinct
from life emotions and that it is of quite another order-unique
and nonordinary
(alaulcika). And he adduces the tollowing reasons on supporLofhis claim: .
.
(i) It is different from ordinary modes of consciousness as is not subject .!
to obstacles,
such as practical,
utilitarian
concerns, or a compl~e sun:ender to
.
the objects of desire (visayavesa-vaivasya).
It is also distinct .ttom Yogic
conciousness in which there is a complete turning away from sensuous objects.
In the poetic or dramatic experience, on the other hand, the mind is entranced
by the object, although it is not totally immersed in it, as in some blind appetite,
but retains a aegree of comempiative aetachment
such that it enaDies one to
turn the object over, so to say, and savour it. (cf. Dufrenne, 358.) Rasa
experience consists of the relishing of the contents of the dramatic or other
presentation.

24

(ii) One of the central tenets of the rasa doctrine is "Genrealizarion"

(sadharani-karana).
The dramatic or poetic emotions, presented as being
undergone by the character or by the speaker in the poem in particular situations,
take on a generic stgnificance and are felt by the spectator/readers if they were
his owo. They are divested of their diectics (determinations of person, place,
time, and gender) in the spectator's apprehension and enjoyed for their general
human significance. The spectator has no thought of ascertaining the veracity of
the events, for the events are departicularized
in the spectator's cognition and
freed of their ontic determinations.
Rasa is simply the life emotion freed of its
limiting factors.
This generalization
of the emotions. together with their
situational setting, is due to the very nature of the context in which they are
experienced. namely, a) the objects of the emotions are not those ofthe spectator,
b) the characters undergoing the emotions are not related to the spectator in any
intimate way, nor are they actual personages, but' projections of human types.
Similarly, the actor too is taken to be sucb.a projection as the situation in which
he is acting out his feelings through word, gesture, and movement is entirely
fictitious. The lyrical voice of the poet, too, even ifhe were voicing the emotions
actually felt by'bim, is in term~ of the verbal presentation, that 'of an imaginal
person.
Thus the whole experience of poetry and drama is a visualization
(anuvyavasaya) or imaginative projection. In other words, the very fictionality
and disiance ur ihe pueiic ur dramaiic siiuaiiull win aci as a oar iu tuu ciuse a
personal identification with the presented persons and happenings.
However,
there is yet a degree of identitication due to the power olsympatby, in wbich tbe
spectator's own personal being is involved as if the events of the drama were
happening to him. lIe imagines himself being in a similar situation with persons
whose lives touch him most intimately. This peculiar' state of mind during the
experience of the drama is described by a commentator as follows: "This is
another's (experience); no, this is not another's, this is mine. No this is not
mine. Here in the savouring.ofthe
events of the drama. no such discrimination
..
eXists.
The dramatic or the poetic situations therefore necessarily distanced from
the practicai or personaiconcerns
of the spectator. Toe poem or piay does not
convey any specific injunctions to the speotator as to his actions or duties. Its
emotions too are generalized in the way mentioned, so as to prevent wrong
identification. The mechanics oftbe stage presentation, togetberwith tbe various
theatrical conventions will also aid the necessary "break with reality" so that the
25

spectator becomes immersed in the world of the drama to the extent that all his
worldly interests and concerns are suspended for the time being. Hence
Abhinavagur;ta calls. the dramatic experience other-worldly. This is how
"disinterestedness" and "aesthetic or physical distance," which are a necessary,
if not a sufficient, condition of aesthetic experience, are to be understood. In
terms of the rasa theory, aesthetic detaclunent is detaclunent, not from human
concerns, as Dickie understands it, but from concerns of a practical or
immediately personal nature. The pleasure of rasa experience is born of our
deep involvement in matters of life that are equally our own and of the rest of
the world, but appearing at a remove from actual life because of the assumed
otherness and imaginariness of the presentation. There is the awareness in tho
spectator back of his mind that the whole drama is an imaginative exercise or
play. As Dufrenne put it, the world of the artwork is "derealized" .by its being a

representation of the real world (360).

Abhinavagupta maintains that the rasa experience is, in the ultimate

analysis, a subjective event-the
locus of the experience is the spectator's
consciousness, which is a repository of all kinds of memories and residual traces,
so much so that what the spectator savours is his own consciousness~ the artWork
merely serving to awaken it. But he says there is also a sense in which the rasa
is in the poem or play, since it is the emotive apparatus presented in it that is the
basis for tieiuciaiion liDUihe object of cuuielllpiaiiun. Aisu, ihe rasa experience
lasts only as long as contemplation is fixed exclusively on the object with no
sense of cause and etlect. The objective presentation is thus inextricable trom
that state, although what is objectively presented is quickly internalized and
assimilated into the subjective consciousness or appropriated to the self, with
the result that the subject-object distinction seems to disappear for the moment.
Abhinavagupta characterizes this as the "state of being filled with the (aesthetic)
object" (tanmayibhava), in which the object blossoms in the consciousness like
some wonderful flower (adbhutpuspavat).
Several features of this account of rasa may suggest resemblances to
the phenomenological account of aesthetic experience, especially in its emphasis
on the affective character of the experience and its freedom from ontic
determinations, and in its focus on the consciousness of the reader/spectator.
But the important difference is that the rasa theory does not conceive of the
aesthetic object as in any way being a creation or "emergent" oUhe percipient's
comciQusness.
The sense of "thatness" is never lost in the experience.
The
26

work. of ,,~~itse;fcs an entirely accomplished thing, the experience being in the

nature 1.0fe-envisioning or re-enactmem (tJrjusandhana). The poetic Of dramatic
emotions are tho~e that are Drought into being by the poem or play (kovyena
bhavya1Jte). Abhinavagupta
no doubt writes elaborately
about the deeper
dimensions of the rasa experience, waxing lyrical on its blissful natill";;;. But he
never forgets for a moment the objective character efthe thing that givc$ rise to
that experience. While be maintains the uniqu:mess and other-worldliness of the
experience, he comments that as the rasa excitement of the spectator is mconstant
and variable, the work has to be judged only by its obje~tive presentatiol1 as this
is only fit for discourse. Abhinavagupta wo"Uldthus fully agree "NitBeardsley's
emphasis on the itfbject-directedncss of aesthetic experience as well as wit the
other criteria laid down by him. suen as urif;;y,f~l frcedem, ~ched
meet.
Both these critics are one in stating that aesthetic experience is a derivative of
an already completed aesthetic object. Its course is dictated by the object. The
object itself must of course possess some virtues, must be sufficiently enticing
in order that it may cause in the qualified viewer the experience appropriate to
it. Thus, is first the initial perceptual/imaginative
hook-up, then the disinterested
attention, then the 'cognitive. analytic discrimination of the objective properties.
followed by the enjoyment of the object in a synoptic perception. although these
stages may not always seem perceptible.
Bui u~iiha Abhinavagupia nor B~arusi~y succeeds in showing ihai. ihese
features of aesthetic experience are sufficient to differentiate
it froID; other
experiences marked by a measure ot"intensity. such as religious or sexual ecstasy.
In fact, Beardsley admits that experiences with an aesthetic character may be
found to overlap with other kinds (292). Some of Abhinavagupta's critics raised
the same objection. Again, if. as BMrdsley argues, the experience and the object
share !he same set o.f features, although in two different existential modes (one
being phenomenally
subjective and the other objective), what is the use of
elaborating on the subjective field. especially',when the concern ofthe critic and
the aesthete is with the objective n~atures of the work rather than with what
happens when he encounten an art object? Abhinavagupta too does not work
out a satisractOry iusdfical:iofl ror his excursions imo the mystique oCr.asa
experience, except that he seems to suggest thzt art experience should be .held in
the highest esteem as it is comparable to the supernal joy of realizing th~ supreme
reality (Brahman or the world-soul).
27

The attempt to show the interdependence of the phenomenally objective

and phenomenally subjective aspects of the aesthetic encounter comes from the
phenomenologist.
But even he, as I have shown above, fails to account for the
autonomous character of art objects that are in the se'.signifying
mode. The
phenomenological
approach would work well with the vaturalobjects
and art
forms in the nons elf-expressive mode depend on the percipient's realization for
th,eir status as aesthetic objects, he runs against the common perception of their
givenness, their objective c~acter.
The argument that the aesth~tic object is
objective
in some Tespects~nd
subjective
in others is at best dubi.ous
epistemology. In trying to ensure'a place for the reader/perceiver in the aesthetic
encounter, the phenomenologist may be guilty of wanting to eat his cake and
..

.--

nave it too!

.-

.'

It cannot of -course be denied that there is an aesthetic 'kiird of experience

that is intrinsically gratifying and that people derive from art works. But this

experience can vary in intensity depending on individual taste and sensibility,

and on, the nature of the art form-some people find greater exci.tement in drama,
music', and dance than in painting, and so on. It is doubtful, too, that all art
forms are capable ot\enerating
the same'sort ot' excitement that AbhiIiavagupta
attributes to the dramatic arts. or even that the experience generated by them is
of the affective kind at all. Some artworks, like an abstract painting or a musical
eiaburdliull perfunned by an indian virtuusu, win pruvuke a criiicai/anaiytic
awareness in the connoisseur rather than a profound affective experience. One
might, however., say with Beardsley that in such cases the sense ot' active
discovery-of
form and meaning-is
the reward. But then, such discoveries or
"eureka" experiences are common to nonaesthetic situations as well. Again, as
Dickie and others have argued, artworks may be valued for many reasons-for
cognitive, moral, and other values-not
only for aesthetic pleasure. But it can
still be maintained that in most cases-in dance, portrait painting, music, and
arguably in literature too, pleasure rather than information is the immediate aim
ot' art. However, pleasurability cannot be used as a criterion ot' aesthetic merit
because it is not accessible to critical analysis; there are no tools to measure it.
'What it an boils down to is that aesthetic experience is a subjective matter and
known only by acquaintance-it
must be felt in order to be known. Therefore
the Indian theorists appeal to its introspective validity and aver that, in the
ultimate analysis, rasa is its own proot'(svatah-pramana)
like direct perception,
and beyond the limits of discourse. (It is perhaps best to keep it that way!)

,28
n.

.\

The real issue then is not whether there is an aesthetic experience, but
wh:Uts usefulness is for critical discourse. . In evaluating artWorks, we no doubt
judge their goodness in terms of their efficacy to communicate a valuable
experience, and we judge certain1artistit devices or compositional features for
their effectiveness in delivering specific effects. It may also be granted (contra
Dickie) that unity and its family of related qualities, dependently or independently
valuable in works of art, can be predicated of aesthetic experience, although
they are not exclusive to it. But they can be taken as axiomatic and artWorks
analyzed in terms of them, without having to expatiate on their effective or
phenomenally
s~bjective
counterparts,
even as the laws of identity,
noncontradiction, unity of meaning, and so on are the norms in logic and semantic
analysis, but one does not dwell on the states of mind corresponding to these
objective features. thus, in saying that a poem or a play is unified, has a complex
organization,
or that it exhibits emotional tension one has said it all. The
corresponding affects at the subjective level may be expected to follow. Since
any talk about the phenomenally subjective fe~tures will only push us back into
the work, the work alone ought to be our concern, first and last. Here one must

agree with Dickie.

~FERENCES
1. Abhinavagupta.

"Abhinavabharatf,1~iitBbarata,
~.
1971
"5

University,
2.

NQtYQ$Qstra. Vol. 1. Varanasi:

Beardsley, Monroe C. "The Aesthetic Point of View," "Aesthetic

is an Aesthetic

Quality?"

"Aesthetic

Experience."

Experience

In The Aesthetic

Banaras Hindu

Regained," "What

Point of View: Selected

Essays. Ed. Michael J. Wren and Donald M. Callen. Ithaca and London:

Cornell V.P., 1982

C
3.

Dickie, George. Evaluating

4.

Dufrenne,

Michael.

al. Evanston:

Art. Philadelphia:'

The Phenomenology

Temple U.P., 1988

of Aesthetic Experience.

Trans. Edward S. Casey, ct

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V. K. Chari
121 Norice Street
Nepean, Ontario K2G 2Y1
Cana'da

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