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BNA Insights
F O R E N S I C P S Y C H I AT R Y

USE OF EXPERTS
Forensic psychiatry seeks to determine what is objectively true about a plaintiffs diagnosis and possible injury, using neurocognitive and psychological testing, interviewing, and a
review of documentary data, Michael L. Fox and Mark I. Levy say in this BNA Insight.
The authorsone an attorney, the other a forensic psychiatristoffer a primer on the use
of forensic psychiatric evidence in catastrophic injury and mass tort claims, including advice on the practical, legal and ethical issues that arise in these cases.

The Use of Forensic Psychiatry in Catastrophic Injury and Multi-Party Litigation

BY MICHAEL L. FOX

AND

MARK I. LEVY

Michael L. Fox is a partner with Sedgwick

LLP in San Francisco. He represents energy
companies, chemical and equipment manufacturers, and construction companies in toxic
tort, environmental release, general liability,
and serious personal injury matters. Fox can
be reached at [email protected].
Mark I. Levy, M.D., is a distinguished life fellow of the American Psychiatric Association,
an assistant clinical professor at the department of psychiatry, School of Medicine, UCSF,
and is certified by the American Board of Psychiatry & Neurology in both adult and forensic psychiatry. Levy, medical director of
Forensic Psychiatric Associates Medical Corp.,
is available at [email protected].

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atastrophic accidents often lead to claims for severe emotional distress including allegations of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Similarly, allegations of acute neuropsychological disorders
and fear of cancer can follow environmental releases
and toxic exposures. So, too, with product liability
claims and even claims from entire classes of individual employees. A single incident or condition may
produce thousands of claims.
The many challenges to defending these claims include limited access to plaintiffs, privacy issues, and
treating physicians who often advocate for their patients, relying almost exclusively on their patients subjective reports of their experiences and symptoms,
rather than on objectively verifiable data.
In contrast, forensic psychiatry seeks to determine
what is objectively true about the plaintiffs diagnosis
and possible injury, using neurocognitive and psychological testing, in-depth interviewing, and a careful and
detailed review of all available relevant documentary
data. This article discusses the definition and unique
characteristics of forensic psychiatry (in contrast to
clinical psychiatry), the effective use of forensic psychiatric expertise in catastrophic injury and mass tort
claims, and the practical, legal and ethical issues that
frequently arise in these cases.

Definition of Forensic Psychiatry

and Credentials
Forensic Psychiatry is a medical subspecialty of psychiatry. Its focus is the interface between the law and
behavioral medicine. Like the law, forensic psychiatry
is divided into various sections.
According to the sole credentialing body for psychiatry and forensic psychiatry, the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (ABPN):
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Forensic psychiatry is a subspecialty that involves having

psychiatric focus on interrelationships with civil, criminal
and administrative law, evaluation and specialized treatment of individuals involved with the legal system, incarcerated in jails, prisons, and forensic psychiatry hospitals.

The ABPN offers subspecialty board certification in

this field. However, in order to even be eligible to take
the forensic psychiatry board examination, a candidate
must have completed a four-year residency in psychiatry, been examined and certified in psychiatry by the
ABPN, and then completed a rigorous one-year, fulltime, accredited post-residency fellowship in forensic
psychiatry.
At this time, less than six percent of the approximately 35,000 board-certified or board-eligible psychiatrists within the United States are also board-certified in
forensic psychiatry. Of this total, only a tiny group of
several hundred individuals are board certified in Adult,
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry.
Despite the clear paths to receiving training and obtaining credentials in forensic psychiatry, many psychiatrists who are neither forensically trained nor
board-certified in forensic psychiatry continue to offer
themselves to litigators as forensic psychiatric experts.
Too often, such untrained experts do not have a
clear understanding of the significant role distinctions
between functioning as a treating clinician on the one
hand, and providing independent forensic psychiatric
opinion on the other, and they often unwittingly slip
into the clinicians role of advocate, as if their relationship to the plaintiff examinee is identical to their relationship to a patient whom they are treating. As a result,
it is crucial that any attorney who is retaining, or crossexamining, a forensic psychiatric expert understands
the important differences between the role of a treating
psychiatric clinician versus an independent, forensic
psychiatric expert.

Treating Clinician v. Independent Forensic

Psychiatric Expert: Wearing Two Hats
The opinions of a forensic psychiatrist must be firmly
grounded in thorough clinical training combined with
substantial experience. Nevertheless, the roles of psychiatric clinicians and forensic psychiatric experts are
widely disparate.
Not infrequently, psychiatric experts and the attorneys who retain them do not appreciate the significant
differences between these two roles. The testifying psychiatrist may wear either the hat of a treating clinician
or that of an independent expert, but never both at
once. Why is that? The roles of a treating clinician and forensic psychiatric expert differ markedly in their mission,
method and ethical duty.
Like all treating physicians, the treating psychiatrist
in accordance with the Hippocratic Oath accepts as his
or her mission the alleviation of (emotional) suffering,
regardless of its cause.
The method of the treating clinician is to rely almost
exclusively upon the patients individual account of his
or her subjective experience.
For example, when treating symptoms of depression
and anxiety in an adult patient who reports that his father beat him when he was a child, the treating clinician
accepts the patients report as a factual statement of his
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subjective reality, without attempting to determine the

objective accuracy of the patients self-reported
memory by, for example, interviewing family members
or reviewing old medical records in order to determine
the accuracy of the patients claim.
Furthermore, there is an implicit treatment contract
between doctors and their patients: Patients seek treatment from doctors primarily to alleviate their suffering
and facilitate their recovery, not primarily to position
themselves for compensation via litigation for alleged
injuries. In contrast to patients, however, litigants generally have more complex and nuanced motivations.
With the infrequent exception of when there is a
genuine diagnostic uncertainty possibly delaying critical treatment decisions, for example, when a child or
adult is being evaluated for learning difficulties, or
when a patient appears to be cognitively impaired from
head trauma or a degenerative brain disease, treating
psychiatrists do not generally request psychological
testing of their patients.
Finally, treating psychiatrists, like all physicians, are
under an ethical duty in accordance with their Hippocratic Oath to act in what they regard as the best interest of their patient and to first do no harm (primum
non nocere). Generally, physicians align themselves
with their patients goals and objectives, as long as they
are safe and reasonable. Consequently, treating physicians are inclined to accommodate the wishes of their
patients, unless they believe that doing so might harm
them.

Attorneys must understand the important

differences between the role of a treating
psychiatric clinician and an independent, forensic
psychiatric expert.
Therefore, when a patient requests a letter excusing
him or her from work, or claims to be disabled, perhaps
due to having experienced an acutely distressing event,
most treating psychiatric physicians are inclined to accede to their patients request unless there are specific
factors that alert the doctors skepticism (such as a pattern of drug seeking behavior).
Accordingly, when treating doctors are asked to testify in litigation on their patients behalf, they appropriately advocate for whatever they believe to be in their
patients best interest. Treating doctors generally do not
approach testimony on behalf of a patient with the
same professional skeptical scrutiny that typically characterizes a forensic psychiatric experts opinion.
The primary reason for this advocacy is that treating
psychiatrists usually accept and rely upon their patients self-reporting of their experience. Thus, the
treating doctors diagnostic conclusions and prognostic
conclusions offered to the trier of fact may unwittingly
be colored by the litigating patients wishes and selective revelations, without reflecting an evidence-based,
objective medical opinion.
For example, it is common for treating doctors to testify inaccurately about causation, simply memorializing
what they have been told by their patient. This error is

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usually unwitting because they simply lack the wide array of data available to the forensic psychiatric expert,
which would provide them with a broader perspective
on the various options for causation and free them from
the confines of proximate cause, which is an artificial
contrivance of the law.
In fact, most conditions of emotional distress are
over-determined, the result of multiple influences along
a chain of causation. What is proximate and what is remote is usually in the eye of the beholder. Thus, treating clinicians may uncritically accept their patients
self-serving reports, including allegations of discrimination, employer retaliation and/or wrongful termination
when, more often than not, there are multiple causes
for events.
This is simply because the treating doctor usually has
no objective means by which to weigh the relevant factors and evaluate the patients attributions of causation.
Although the patients allegations may or may not ultimately be found to be accurate by the trier of fact, the
treating psychiatrist usually has insufficient information with which to reach a truly independent judgment
about causation.
Indeed, several courts have excluded treating doctors testimony as merely reciting the allegation of the
alleged victim under the guise of expert opinion. For example, in United States v. Whitted,1 the Eighth Circuit
found the doctors diagnosis of repeated sexual abuse
to rest solely on his acceptance of the victims account.
In United States v. Charley,2 the 10th Circuit found that
a doctors conclusion of abuse based on the girls allegations was merely vouching for the credibility of the
child complainants. And in Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co.,3
the Fifth Circuit excluded the opinion of a medical expert who (a) sought to attribute the plaintiffs depression and other ailments to his exposure to a chemical
based only on the plaintiffs statements, and (b) was unaware of a family history of depression and hypertension that could have explained the source of the symptoms.

The Mission, Methodology, and Ethical Duty

of Independent Forensic Psychiatric Experts
Contrast Starkly With Treating Doctors
The mission of the forensic psychiatric expert is not
the alleviation of suffering but rather the determination,
as accurately as possible, of what is objectively true, assuming a professionally skeptical point of view and
seeking firm evidence to support any conclusions while
always considering alternative hypotheses. Therefore,
the forensic psychiatric expert vigorously seeks objective data relevant to determining an accurate diagnosis,
recommending treatment, and offering opinions about
prognosis and causation.
The guiding standard to be achieved is akin to the
opinion of a ballistics expert who can state with reasonable scientific probability that a particular bullet was
fired by a particular weapon, or was not. Although forensic psychiatrists are clearly cognizant that determining what is objectively true in behavioral medicine is far
more complex and nuanced than in ballistic science,

625

this nevertheless remains the gold standard for the

opinions of any well-trained, independent forensic psychiatric expert.
The method of forensic psychiatric analysis is to review all available, possibly relevant data, including all
medical and legal records from time periods prior and
subsequent to the events giving rise to the litigation,
collateral information from deposition transcripts,
other testimony and declarations of key witnesses, as
well as psychological or neurocognitive test data.
Psychological tests are administered, interpreted and
reported by an experienced, well-trained, forensic psychologist in civil (and some criminal) matters. In addition to the psychological testing, the forensic psychiatrist conducts an in-depth, detailed, multi-hour interview of the plaintiff.
The psychological test data makes possible a statistical comparison of the individuals functioning to that of
other individuals of a similar demographic profile. In
fact, all testing in medicine (including blood testing, imaging and psychological testing) answers a simple
membership question, i.e., by statistically comparing
the examinees data derived from a given test instrument to analogous data obtained from a very large
population of individuals of similar background to determine whether an individuals pattern of test responses is similar or dissimilar to those of other persons
who present with similar symptoms.
Neurocognitive and psychological testing also provides solid, scientific evidence that can be used to form
evidence-based opinions about the likely veracity of the
plaintiffs claims regarding loss of cognitive functioning
or emotional distress, as well as the plaintiffs fitness to
function at work, at home, or in legal proceedings.
Thus, the method of forensic psychiatric practice is to
assess the examinees subjective narrative within a
much larger context of clinical evidence than is generally available to the treating psychiatrist.
Under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may order a party whose mental condition is in issue to submit to a mental examination by a
suitably licensed or certified examiner upon a showing
of good cause.4 Because courts distinguish between
emotional distress asserted as an element of damages
for other claims such as physical injury or harassment,
and independent claims of emotional distress, most
cases where mental examinations are allowed involve
separate tort claims for emotional distress or an allegation of ongoing severe mental injury or impairment.5
Many states have rules similar to Rule 35, although
California requires a showing of exceptional circumstances before ordering the mental examination of a
party who stipulates that no claim is being made for
mental and emotional distress over and above that usually associated with the physical injuries claimed.6
Courts also recognize the importance of testing and
often approve their administration as part of courtordered mental health examination. In Newman v. San
Joaquin Delta Community College,7 the defendant community college districts examiner was permitted to
conduct some of 26 psychological and neuropsychologi4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a).

See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products
Liability Litigation, 528 F. Supp. 2d 303, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
6
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 2032.320.
7
272 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
5

11 F.3d 782 (8th Cir.1993).

189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir.1999).
3
826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.1987).
2

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BNA INSIGHTS

cal tests he deemed necessary over the course of two

five-hours sessions to the plaintiff-student whose mental condition was in controversy in her ADA action arising from an alleged assault by college police officers.
Similarly, in Gavin v. Hilton Worldwide, Inc.,8 where
an employee brought an action against her former employer, alleging failure to accommodate her chronic, severe depression in violation of federal and state law, the
court ordered the plaintiff-employee to undergo a mental examination that included the assistance of a clinical psychologist to conduct psychological tests, including the entire Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
Fourth
Edition
(WAISIV),
the
Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2), and
the Rorschach Inkblot Test.
The forensic psychiatrists examination should also
be without interference or attendance by the plaintiffs
attorney or others because, regardless of their good intentions, they may contaminate an examination.9
Video recording the examination may not be permitted in some jurisdictions, although courts have recognized that such recording will provide the best evidence
of whether the retained expert conducted a fair examination and will also show whether plaintiff engaged in
any delay or misconduct.10 The ethical duty of the forensic psychiatric expert is only to the trier of fact, consistent with the role of the expert to assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.11
While the forensic psychiatric experts retention by
one side in a civil or criminal dispute may be alleged to
indicate that he or she plays the role of an advocate, the
opinions proffered must always be evidence-based,
which is also the modern standard for all best medical
practice. It should be agreed from the outset that the
only duty owed by the forensic expert to the retaining
attorney is a commitment to professionalism, honesty
and a fiduciary duty regarding payment for expert services.
Thus, a party should understand at the time the expert is retained that, after applying the most current scientific principles of data analysis, the experts conclusions may, or may not, support the retaining attorneys
theory of the case.
Finally, the forensic psychiatric expert is expected to
explain complex medical and behavioral information to
the trier of fact in readily understandable language,
without jargon or pretense. Thus, an ability to communicate clearly and directly in both written and spoken
contexts is the forensic psychiatrists most important
skill.
8

291 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Cal. 2013).

9
See, e.g., Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 605
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (denying third party observer where examiner
did not propose to use unorthodox or potentially harmful techniques in his exam); Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 4th 739 (2003) (finding mental
examination can be recorded but not attended by counsel).
10
See, e.g., Schaeffer v. Sequoyah Trading & Transp., 273
F.R.D. 662 (D. Kan. 2011) (videotaping ordered over plaintiffs
objection).
11
Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).
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Challenges in Assessing Populations of Litigants

and Advantages of Employing Cohesive Teams
to Conduct These Assessments
When many plaintiffs allege as part of their claim for
compensatory damages emotional and other intangible
injuries, the very nature of these damages necessarily
implicates the subjective differences of each plaintiffs
circumstances. This often precludes class certification.12
So-called Lone Pine case management orders may
be effective in mass tort cases to assure that plaintiffs
claiming emotional distress have prima facie expert
support for their claims.13 Such cases may require the
court to order individual mental exams when emotional
distress is an element of a plaintiffs claim, even if the
plaintiffs have stipulated that they will not support
those claims with medical evidence.14
There are two basic components to an effective and
scientifically sound independent medical evaluation:
the psychological (and/or neuropsychological) testing,
and the careful and detailed review of all available data
including a detailed psychiatric interview examination.

Lone Pine orders help identify the segment of the

population claiming impairment who should then
undergo independent psychiatric examinations.
In one sense, this is no different from the requirements for any competent forensic psychiatric assessment of a plaintiff who puts their mental status at issue,
whether the plaintiff is unique or a member of a group
of plaintiffs. On the other hand, there are unique dynamics that characterize the psychiatric assessment of
a population of litigants. For example, although it is always desirable for a forensic psychiatric defense expert
to obtain information from collateral informants in addition to the plaintiff when conducting any forensic psychiatric independent mental examination of an individual plaintiff, this is rarely possible due to predictable
objections from plaintiffs counsel.
However, in multi-plaintiff litigation when a cohesive
forensic team is assessing an entire population of litigants, each plaintiff is, in fact, a collateral witness to the
claims of every other plaintiff. This is a rich source of
data for the expert to mine. Another critical scientific
fact about the distribution of damages produced by a
catastrophic event, is that, like so many other
scientific phenomena, this distribution too follows a
12
Steering Committee v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598
(5th Cir. 2006) (class action seeking emotional distress damages following refinery explosion); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum
Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998) (class action seeking emotional distress damages for alleged employment discrimination).
13
See, e.g., In re: Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 388
Fed. Appx. 391 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Avila v. Willits Environmental Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 2011).
14
See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE)
Products Liability Litigation, 528 F. Supp. 2d 303 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).

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627

Gaussian (Normal) or Bell distribution curve:

In other words, given a sufficiently large sample, a

catastrophic event will cause extreme damage to a very
small segment of the population and no damage whatsoever to an equally small group, each about 2.15+ percent of the total population. The overwhelming segment
of the population (about 68.3 percent) falls within one
standard deviation of the mean of the Bell Curve, i.e.,
they are neither unscathed nor severely injured. Approximately 13.55 percent of the population are in the
second standard deviation on either side of the mean,
i.e., the first group has experienced some but only mild
damages, and the other has experienced serious but not
severe damages. Thus, about 15.7 percent of the population have experienced either none or only minor damages from the event. An equal percentage experienced
serious to severe emotional damages. The remainder,
almost 70 percent of the population, falls somewhere in
the middle of these two groups.
Understandably, in mass tort litigation, most plaintiffs attorneys want to argue that their particular clients
are among the most seriously affected by the damaging
event, that is two, three or more standard deviations beyond the mean of damaging effects caused by the event.
However, the unique advantage for the defense of using a team to evaluate the entire affected population is
that the forensic psychiatric expert can testify with considerable scientific credibility that while one plaintiff
may be injured another probably is not. In other words,
it is statistically highly improbable that even a substantial minority of the population would have been severely injured by a given event.
If the selection of test plaintiffs has left the parties
without this information, rather than the resulting
sample representing a scientifically valid normal distribution curve of damages within the affected population,
it would likely resemble an artificial barbell distribution of plaintiffs who resided outside of two standard
deviations on either side of the mean. A genuinely random selection of sample plaintiffs by the court would
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produce a far more statistically representative group of

sample plaintiffs whose injuries would have more accurately represented the distribution of damages across
the entire population of litigants.
Use of Lone Pine orders can help to identify the
segment of the population claiming (with evidentiary
support) mental suffering or impairment which should
then undergo independent forensic psychiatric examinations. Test plaintiffs can then be selected to accurately represent the overall population of claimants.
As discussed above, statistically speaking, the same
catastrophic event may produce genuine PTSD, or
symptoms of mild emotional distress, or even malingered symptoms in different individuals within the affected population. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (May
2013) (DSM-5), the following are the current diagnostic criteria for PTSD in adults and children older
than six years of age:
A. Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or
sexual violence in one (or more) of the following ways:
1. Directly experiencing the traumatic event(s).
2. Witnessing, in person, the event(s) as it occurred to
others.
3. Learning that the traumatic event(s) occurred to a
close family member or close friend. In cases of actual or
threatened death of a family member or friend, the event(s)
must have been violent or accidental.
4. Experiencing repeated or extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event(s) (e.g., first responders
collecting human remains; police officers repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse). Note: Criterion A.4 does
not apply to exposure through electronic media, television,
movies, or pictures, unless this exposure is work related.
B. Presence of one (or more) of the following intrusion
symptoms associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred:
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1. Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing

memories of the traumatic event(s). Note: In children older
than 6 years, repetitive play may occur in which themes or
aspects of the traumatic event(s) are expressed.
2. Recurrent distressing dreams in which the content
and/or affect of the dream are related to the traumatic
event(s). Note: In children, there may be frightening
dreams without recognizable content.
3. Dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks) in which the
individual feels or acts as if the traumatic event(s) were recurring. (Such reactions may occur on a continuum, with
the most extreme expression being a complete loss of
awareness of present surroundings.) Note: In children,
trauma-specific reenactment may occur in play.
4. Intense or prolonged psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble
an aspect of the traumatic event(s).
5. Marked physiological reactions to internal or external
cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic
event(s).
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning after the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by one or both of the following:
1. Avoidance of or efforts to avoid distressing memories,
thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the
traumatic event(s).
2. Avoidance of or efforts to avoid external reminders
(people, places, conversations, activities, objects, situations) that arouse distressing memories, thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the traumatic event(s).
D. Negative alterations in cognitions and mood associated
with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening after
the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by two (or
more) of the following:
1. Inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event(s) (typically due to dissociative amnesia and
not to other factors such as head injury, alcohol, or drugs).
2. Persistent and exaggerated negative beliefs or expectations about oneself, others, or the world (e.g., I am bad,
No one can be trusted, The world is completely dangerous, My whole nervous system is permanently ruined).
3. Persistent, distorted cognitions about the cause or consequences of the traumatic event(s) that lead the individual
to blame himself/herself or others.
4. Persistent negative emotional state (e.g., fear, horror,
anger, guilt, or shame).
5. Markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities.
6. Feelings of detachment or estrangement from others.
7. Persistent inability to experience positive emotions
(e.g., inability to experience happiness, satisfaction, or loving feelings).
E. Marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated
with the traumatic event(s), beginning or worsening after
the traumatic event(s) occurred, as evidenced by two (or
more) of the following:
1. Irritable behavior and angry outbursts (with little or no
provocation) typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression toward people or objects.
2. Reckless or self-destructive behavior.
3. Hypervigilance.
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4. Exaggerated startle response.

5. Problems with concentration.
6. Sleep disturbance (e.g., difficulty falling or staying
asleep or restless sleep).
F. Duration of the disturbance (Criteria B, C, D, and E) is
more than 1 month.
G. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
H. The disturbance is not attributable to the physiological
effects of a substance (e.g., medication, alcohol) or another
medical condition.
Specify whether:
With dissociative symptoms: The individuals symptoms
meet the criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder, and in
addition, in response to the stressor, the individual experiences persistent or recurrent symptoms of either of the following:
1. Depersonalization: Persistent or recurrent experiences
of feeling detached from, and as if one were an outside observer of, ones mental processes or body (e.g., feeling as
though one were in a dream; feeling a sense of unreality of
self or body or of time moving slowly).
2. Derealization: Persistent or recurrent experiences of
unreality of surroundings (e.g., the world around the individual is experienced as unreal, dreamlike, distant, or distorted).
3. Note: To use this subtype, the dissociative symptoms
must not be attributable to the physiological effects of a
substance (e.g., blackouts, behavior during alcohol intoxication) or another medical condition (e.g., complex partial
seizures).
Specify if:
With delayed expression: If the full diagnostic criteria are
not met until at least 6 months after the event (although the
onset and expression of some symptoms may be immediate).

The DSM-5 notes that [t]he essential feature of

PTSD is the development of characteristic symptoms
following exposure to one or more traumatic events, although the clinical presentation often varies. It is well
established within contemporary research literature
that the likelihood of developing PTSD increases with
the severity of the stressor.
A driver involved in a minor collision is far less likely
to develop PTSD than a victim of a violent crime. However, even among the population of those victims, not
all develop PTSD. Why a particular individual develops
a serious emotional response to a traumatic event and
why another does not has been the focus of increasing
scientific study, examining whether vulnerability and
resiliency factors affect the likelihood that one will develop PTSD. The point being that the event criterion
alone does not establish PTSD, highlighting the need in
mass tort and multi-plaintiff litigation to use case management orders and rules of procedure and evidence to
differentiate the plaintiffs and evaluate them individu-

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ally utilizing the skills of trained forensic psychiatrists

and their teams.

Conclusion
Catastrophic events will not cause the same emotional response or injury to occur among all persons
who experience the same or similar events. In multiplaintiff litigation, challenges to class certification and
utilization of case management tools such as Lone
Pine orders can help distinguish those plaintiffs seek-

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629

ing to recover for emotional distress rather than garden

variety pain and suffering.
Forensic psychiatric examinations including psychological testing early in the process can help validate or
disprove plaintiffs claims and, in mutli-plaintiff actions,
better identify the representative subgroup of bellwether plaintiffs. Regardless of whether the action involves one plaintiff, hundreds or thousands, the forensic psychiatrists mission, methods and duty will help
the trier of fact ascertain the relationship, if any at all,
between the alleged disorder and defendants alleged
wrongdoing.

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