Document Number: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Replacement Research Reactor Project

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A

COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY REPORT

Prepared By
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

18 May 2006
Page 1 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

ANSTO
Replacement Reactor Project

Document N: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A
Revision: A
Document Title: OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND
STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY REPORT

Ref No:
REVISION SHEET
Revision
Letter
0

Description of Revision

Prepared

Original issue for submission to

ARPANSA

AFX

Print name, date and sign or initial

Checked/
Approved
Reviewed

GDW

MSX

RMX

Notes: 1. Revision must be verified in accordance with the Quality Plan for the job.

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOC

Revision: A 17-05-2006

RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Page 2 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3
3.1

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................4
SUMMARY OF VERIFICATION PROCESSES .....................................................................4
Detailed Engineering Phase ................................................................................................4
Construction Phase..............................................................................................................5
Pre-Commissioning Phase ..................................................................................................6
Stage A Commissioning Phase ..........................................................................................6
SUMMARY OF KEY ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS .................................................................7
Construction Phase..............................................................................................................7
3.1.1
Civil Works ......................................................................................................................8
3.1.2
Mechanical / Process Systems.......................................................................................9
3.1.3
Electrical Systems.........................................................................................................10
3.1.4
Instrumentation and Control Systems...........................................................................10
3.2
Pre-Commissioning Phase ................................................................................................10
3.2.1
Electrical Systems.........................................................................................................11
3.2.2
Building Service Systems .............................................................................................11
3.2.3
Process Systems ..........................................................................................................11
3.2.4
Instrumentation, Control and Shutdown Systems ........................................................12
3.2.5
Containment Systems...................................................................................................13
3.2.6
Radioisotope Handling and Neutron Beam Systems ...................................................13
3.3
Stage A Commissioning Phase ........................................................................................14
3.3.1
Instrumentation and Control Systems Tests.................................................................14
3.3.2
Reactor State Tests ......................................................................................................14
3.3.3
Containment Systems Tests.........................................................................................15
3.3.4
Control Rooms & Emergency Preparedness Tests......................................................15
3.3.5
Electrical Power System Tests .....................................................................................15
3.3.6
Other Stage A Commissioning Tests............................................................................16
4
FINAL CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................16

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOC

Revision: A

RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Page 3 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The ARPANSA Construction Authorisation for the OPAL Reactor covers four project phases:
1. Detailed Engineering Phase
2. Construction Phase (including civil construction, procurement, manufacture and
installation works)
3. Pre-Commissioning Phase
4. Stage A Commissioning Phase
This report summarises the activities conducted under the Construction Authorisation and
consists of two substantive sections: Section 2, which summarises the verification processes
which were applied to ensure the reactor was constructed in accordance with specified
requirements and which have produced the documentation that allows ANSTO to demonstrate
this; and Section 3, which summarises the major activities and events which occurred under the
Construction Authorisation. Full details of the verification processes and all activities and events
are contained in the OPAL Construction Report (RRRP-7033-EBEAN-001) and the OPAL
Stage A Commissioning Report (RRRP-7311-EDEIN-004).

2 SUMMARY OF VERIFICATION PROCESSES

The verification processes which were applied to ensure the OPAL Reactor was constructed in
accordance with specified requirements are summarised in the following subsections for the
Detailed Engineering, Construction, Pre-Commissioning and Stage A Commissioning Phases.
These verification processes form part of the Quality Management Systems (QMS) of both
ANSTO and INVAP, which are both certified to ISO 9000:2000. The verification processes
summarised below are those which have produced the documentation that allows ANSTO to
demonstrate that the OPAL Reactor has been constructed in accordance with specified
requirements. It should be noted that many other verification processes were also in place
throughout the various phases of the project as part of the certified Quality Management
Systems, including processes for design change control, non-conformance control, measuring
and test equipment control, quality management system auditing, etc.

2.1 DETAILED ENGINEERING PHASE

During the Detailed Engineering phase, the design of structures, systems and components was
established through the preparation of design documentation including drawings, specifications,
calculations and analyses. This documentation was subject to a thorough review, verification
and acceptance process by ANSTO in accordance with project procedures prior to the
commencement of construction activities. During the OPAL design phase, over 10,000 detailed
engineering documents were reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO. In addition, for Safety
Category 1 and 2 structures, systems and components, this documentation was used to support
requests to ARPANSA for approval to construct items important to safety to meet the
requirements of ARPANS Regulation 54 and Licence Condition 4.6. During the OPAL
Construction Phase, over 120 approvals to construct were obtained from ARPANSA prior to
commencement of construction of items important to safety. Where a relevant change was

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 4 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

made which had significant implications for safety, ARPANSA approval was also obtained in
accordance with ARPANS Regulation 51 prior to implementing the change.

2.2 CONSTRUCTION PHASE

During the Construction Phase, activities were controlled through the preparation and
implementation of Specific Inspection and Test Plans (SITPs), in accordance with the project
Construction Inspection and Test Plan (CITP). This verification process was applied to all
Construction Phase works, including civil, mechanical / process, electrical, and instrumentation
and control systems. Each SITP comprised a sequential list of the activities involved in the
performance of a task, including inspection and test activities, specifying for each activity the
relevant reference documentation, acceptance criteria, control points and requirements for
records/reports generation.
Each SITP proforma used during construction was subject to review, verification and acceptance
by ANSTO in accordance with project procedures prior to its implementation. As part of this
process, control points, in the form of witness and hold points, were nominated by ANSTO and
other relevant organisations, on key SITP activities to ensure that the reactor was being
constructed in accordance with specified requirements.
Each SITP included a final inspection/review hold point which was not released until each
organisation involved was satisfied that all SITP activities had been satisfactorily completed and
documented. Deviations from specified requirements were dealt with through non-conformance
control procedures, or, for relatively minor issues, through the generation of punch-lists. These
processes ensured that all deviations were appropriately identified, documented and
subsequently corrected.
Upon completion of all activities on an SITP and release of the final hold point, the completed
SITP, and all supporting records and reports, were compiled into a document termed a History
Docket, which forms the final record of the procurement, manufacture, installation and / or
construction of an item. During the Construction Phase, around 650 SITP proformas were
reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO, from which over 2500 individual SITPs were
implemented and final hold points released.
Once all SITPs for a system (or in some cases certain parts of a system) were completed, a
System Construction Release Certificate (SCRC) was issued listing all completed SITPs
involved in construction of the system. SCRCs were signed off by both INVAP and ANSTO, and
signified the completion of construction of a system, allowing pre-commissioning activities to
proceed on that system. The SCRCs also reference the History Dockets which contain the
relevant SITP records.
Once all SCRCs had been issued for those parts of the facility necessary to have been
completed in order to commence Stage B commissioning, a Facility Construction Release
Certificate (FCRC), listing all of the completed SCRCs, was issued. The FCRC was signed off
by both INVAP and ANSTO, and signified the completion of the construction phase as relevant
to the commencement of Stage B commissioning. A second FCRC will be issued at a later date
to cover the remainder of the facility, but these activities are not required prior to commencement
of Stage B Commissioning.
Details on the specific activities to which the SITP process described above was applied for
each system, as well as the SCRCs which were issued for each system and the FCRC which
was issued for the facility, are contained in the OPAL Construction Report (RRRP-7033-EBEAN-

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 5 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

001). This documentation demonstrates that the reactor has been constructed in accordance
with all specified codes and standards, and design, safety and regulatory requirements.

2.3 PRE-COMMISSIONING PHASE

Pre-Commissioning inspection and testing activities were controlled primarily through the
preparation and implementation of pre-commissioning test procedures, which describe in detail
the activities involved in pre-commissioning of a system, along with relevant reference
documentation, acceptance criteria and requirements for records generation. In addition, each
pre-commissioning test procedure was accompanied by an SITP used in a similar manner to
those of the Construction Phase.
As for the Construction Phase, all pre-commissioning test documentation, including procedures,
SITPs and check-sheets, was reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO in accordance with
project procedures prior to implementation, with control points nominated as required. In
general, all pre-commissioning activities were witnessed by ANSTO, with hold points specified at
key points to ensure that all requirements were met prior to certain activities proceeding.
Similar to Construction Phase SITPs, each Pre-Commissioning Phase SITP included a final
inspection/review hold point which was not released until each organisation involved was
satisfied that all pre-commissioning activities had been satisfactorily completed and
documented. Processes for documentation of deviations, preparation of History Dockets and
issue of system release certificates during the Pre-Commissioning Phase also mirrored those for
the Construction Phase, with a System Test Release Certificate (STRC) issued upon completion
of pre-commissioning activities for a system, and a Facility Test Release Certificate (FTRC)
issued once all relevant STRCs had been issued for the facility.
During the Pre-Commissioning Phase, around 115 pre-commissioning procedures were
reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO. Two FTRCs have been issued, the first prior to
commencement of Stage A Commissioning (at which point about 80% of the pre-commissioning
procedures had been completed and released), and the second prior to commencement of
Stage B commissioning (at which point about 90% of the procedures had been implemented and
released). This second FTRC signifies the completion of the pre-commissioning phase as
relevant to the commencement of Stage B commissioning. A third FTRC will be issued at a later
date to cover the remainder of the facility, but these activities are not required prior to
commencement of Stage B Commissioning.
Details on the pre-commissioning procedures completed for each system, the STRCs which
were issued for each system, the FTRCs which were issued for the facility and a summary of the
key results obtained during the pre-commissioning activities for each system are also contained
in the OPAL Construction Report (RRRP-7033-EBEAN-001). This documentation demonstrates
that the reactor has been pre-commissioned in accordance with all specified codes and
standards, and design, safety and regulatory requirements.

2.4 STAGE A COMMISSIONING PHASE

Stage A Commissioning was the first of three stages of commissioning planned for the OPAL
reactor. It involved testing the facility without nuclear fuel, its objectives being to verify the
functionality and performance of safety systems and the integrated functioning of reactor
systems.
The overall arrangements for the management of the Stage A Commissioning phase were
specified in the overall Commissioning Plan and the Stage A Commissioning Specific Plan.
File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A
Revision: A

Page 6 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

These plans were prepared by INVAP and reviewed, verified and accepted by ANSTO in
accordance with project procedures prior to commencement of Stage A Commissioning.
In June 2004, a request for approval relating to Stage A Commissioning of items important to
safety was submitted to ARPANSA to meet the requirements of Facility Licence: Construction
Authorisation, License Condition 4.7. This request for approval was based on the above
commissioning plans, although it also covered the final commissioning testing of a number of
safety-related systems to be undertaken during the Pre-commissioning Phase. In January 2005,
the CEO of ARPANSA revised License Condition 4.7 so that it required ARPANSA approval of
the Stage A Commissioning program as a whole, rather than requiring separate approvals for
the commissioning of the various safety-related items of plant. He also approved the Stage A
Commissioning program for items important to safety, provided certain conditions were met
during implementation of the program, including a number of ARPANSA control points imposed
on specific commissioning activities.
Stage A Commissioning activities were controlled through the preparation and implementation of
commissioning procedures for the various systems and subsystems of the OPAL Reactor and
overseen by the Commissioning Management Group. Commissioning procedures were
prepared in accordance with the commissioning plans, and described in detail the
commissioning activities, including the objective of the activities, acceptance criteria, reference
documentation, responsibilities, prerequisites, step by step instructions and requirements for
records generation. Those commissioning procedures were reviewed, verified and accepted by
ANSTO in accordance with project procedures prior to commencement of the relevant
commissioning activities. Stage A Commissioning activities were controlled by INVAP, but
involved significant participation by ANSTO. This included ANSTO reactor operators performing
all plant operations under the direction of INVAP.
During Stage A Commissioning, the Commissioning Quality Assurance Group conducted quality
assurance audits of the various commissioning activities, while the Commissioning Safety
Review Committee conducted reviews and provided advice on safety issues as requested by the
Commissioning Management Group.
A total of 47 commissioning test procedures were implemented during the Stage A
Commissioning Phase. Upon completion of all Stage A Commissioning procedures, a Stage A
Commissioning report was prepared, providing the final record of the Stage A Commissioning.
This report was prepared in accordance with the commissioning plan, and includes a summary
of the tests carried out, including reference to the relevant Stage A Commissioning procedures,
a description of the limitations, problems or deficiencies observed during commissioning and
their resolution; references to data collected, analyses and deviations, and the conclusions and
recommendations drawn from the testing. The Stage A Commissioning report signified the
completion of Stage A Commissioning, and has been approved by both INVAP and ANSTO.

3 SUMMARY OF KEY ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS

The key activities and events which occurred during the Construction, Pre-Commissioning and
Stage A Commissioning Phases of the project are summarised in the following subsections.

3.1 CONSTRUCTION PHASE

The Construction Licence was issued by the CEO of ARPANSA on 4 April 2002. On 8 April
2002, the Acting Director-General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office
(ASNO) advised the CEO of ARPANSA that he was satisfied with the construction site protective
File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A
Revision: A

Page 7 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

security measures. On 10 April 2002, the Minister for Environment and Heritage advised the
Minister for Science that he was satisfied with the arrangements covered by the conditions
arising from the EIS process relating to the design and construction of the reactor. These
approvals allowed construction to commence. Excavation works on the OPAL site commenced
on 10 April 2002.
The following subsections provide a summary of the key activities and events relevant to works
in the areas of civil works, mechanical systems, electrical systems and instrumentation / control
systems during the Construction Phase.

3.1.1

Civil Works

The civil works program commenced with bulk excavation works in April 2002. On 20 June
2002, this work was suspended following the discovery of two geological faults during bulk
excavation. A significant geological investigation was undertaken by independent consultants
with expertise in fault dating and structural geology, and involved several hundred metres of
deep trenching in rock in the immediate vicinity of the excavated site. Those investigations
revealed that the faults were not significant in terms of any future seismic events. The
suspension of site construction work was revoked on 23 October 2002 following the CEO of
ARPANSAs decision that the faulting on the site was not capable of resulting in surface
displacement and that there was no change in the basis for his earlier conclusions on the
reactors seismic design.
Construction of the Reactor Building, including construction of the Reactor Building concrete
structure and the high density concrete Reactor Block which surrounds the Reactor and Service
Pools, took place over the period between November 2002 and February 2005. Concrete
pouring activities were strictly controlled, and concrete testing carried out in accordance with
relevant codes and standards. The aircraft impact grillage was assembled and mounted on top
of the Reactor Building in July 2004. Fit-out and installation of building services proceeded in
parallel with and following completion of the Reactor Building structure, including installation of
cranes, fire systems, water supply systems, compressed air and gas supply systems and
communications systems. Civil works activities were strictly controlled in accordance with the
SITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance with relevant codes and standards,
design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participated in this verification process
by witnessing key activities, conducting inspections and reviews, and providing final acceptance
of the works.
Other facility buildings, including the Neutron Guide Hall and the Main Entry Building, were
constructed in parallel with the Reactor Building.
During September 2003, waterproofing problems were encountered at levels -7 and -5 of the
Reactor Building due to cracking in the concrete wall and floor slabs. The cracking was caused
by concrete shrinkage, coupled with stress concentrations and restraint formed by the
foundation rock. Upon detection of the problem, investigations were performed and
comprehensive remedial measures were devised and implemented to seal all detected leaks. All
remedial works were undertaken in accordance with approved procedures and SITPs. Remedial
works have been completed in a significant portion of the affected area with all leaks
successfully sealed and released. However, work in a small number of areas has not yet been
completed. Whilst waterproofing works in some areas of the Reactor Building are ongoing, the
works have no significant effect on the building structure and INVAP and ANSTO have accepted
it as fit for purpose.

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 8 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

3.1.2

Mechanical / Process Systems

Construction of mechanical/process systems included manufacture and installation of the

Reactor and Service Pools, reactor core components, process piping systems and components,
ventilation systems (including containment ventilation and energy removal systems), neutron
beam and cold neutron source (CNS) components, radioisotope handling components and
radiation shielding components.
The largest single mechanical components to be manufactured were the Reactor and Service
Pool liners, the manufacture of which commenced off-site in 2002. In March 2003, manufacture
of the Reactor Pool liner was suspended after it was determined that the heavy water
penetrations in the bottom of the Reactor Pool liner had been cut out without the approval of the
CEO of ARPANSA. In April 2003, ARPANSA granted conditional permission to continue with
the manufacture of the Reactor Pool liner with the heavy water penetration cut-outs in the
bottom of the liner as is. In May 2003, a non-conformance in the manufacture of the Reactor
Pool liner, in which 22 of the wall penetrations were mistakenly positioned due to a
manufacturing error, was identified. An investigation was undertaken, and a report outlining the
findings of this investigation together with a set of corrective and preventive measures, and an
overall strategy for the repair of the Reactor Pool liner incorporating appropriate tests and mock
up qualifications, was prepared and submitted to ARPANSA. In August 2003, the CEO of
ARPANSA decided that the repairs to the Reactor Pool liner were consistent with his original
authorisation to construct that item. The manufacture was then completed, with the liner
delivered to the site during December 2003 and installed in January 2004. Manufacture of the
Service Pool liner was completed in February 2004 and installed in April 2004 without problems.
Process piping systems and components were manufactured and installed in parallel with
construction of the Reactor Building and the Reactor Block. Key items of plant, such as the
main primary and secondary cooling pumps, were subject to factory acceptance testing.
Reactor core components, including the reflector vessel, control rods, core supporting
components, flap valves and Reactor Pool internal piping, were manufactured by INVAP in
Argentina and delivered to the site in May 2005. The control rod drives, also manufactured by
INVAP in Argentina, were subject to significant factory testing to verify the reliability of their
reactor control and shutdown functions. Components such as flap valves and control rod drives
were also subject to qualification tests to verify compliance with seismic and operational
requirements. Fuel Assemblies were manufactured by CNEA in Argentina, with the first
shipment scheduled to be delivered to site in May 2006. The CNS refrigeration / cryogenics
equipment was manufactured by Air Liquide in France and was subject to full factory acceptance
testing before being delivered to site in May 2004. The in-pile components of the CNS, including
the CNS vacuum containment, were manufactured by PNPI in Russia and delivered to site in
August 2005.
Manufacture and installation of all mechanical components was strictly controlled in accordance
with the SITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance with relevant codes and
standards, design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participated in this
verification process by witnessing key activities such as factory acceptance tests, conducting
inspections and reviews, and providing final acceptance of the manufacture and installation of
systems and components. In particular, ANSTO applied significant resources and expertise to
verifying the quality assurance of welding and fabrication processes, to ensure that systems and
components were manufactured to a high level of quality in full compliance with relevant codes
and standards.

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 9 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

3.1.3

Electrical Systems

Construction of electrical systems included manufacture and installation of electrical

switchboards, uninterruptible power supplies and diesel generators, as well as installation of
cabling, cable raceways and electrical fittings throughout the facility. Factory acceptance testing
was carried out for all switchboards, uninterruptible power supplies and diesel generators.
Qualification testing was also performed on switchboards and uninterruptible power supplies to
ensure compliance with seismic and other design requirements.
Manufacture and installation of all electrical components was strictly controlled in accordance
with the SITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance with relevant codes and
standards, design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participated in this
verification process by witnessing key activities such as factory acceptance tests, conducting
inspections and reviews, and providing final acceptance of the manufacture and installation of
systems and components.

3.1.4

Instrumentation and Control Systems

Construction of instrumentation and control systems included manufacture and installation of the
First and Second Reactor Protection Systems (FRPS/SRPS), Post Accident Monitoring System
(PAM), Reactor and Facilities Control and Monitoring Systems (RCMS/FCMS), nucleonics
instrumentation, radiation monitoring instrumentation and control room consoles, as well as
installation of cabling, cable raceways and field instruments throughout the facility.
Instrumentation and control systems, particularly those involving software based digital systems,
were subject to rigorous verification and validation programs by both the manufacturer and
INVAP. These activities culminated in the integrated instrumentation and control factory
acceptance test conducted by INVAP in Argentina during 2004. In that test, the FRPS, SRPS,
RCMS, FCMS, nucleonics instrumentation and control room consoles were fully integrated and
tested before being delivered to the OPAL Reactor site. Radiation monitoring instrumentation
was also subject to factory acceptance testing in Argentina prior to shipment. Where necessary,
instrumentation was subject to qualification testing to ensure compliance with IEEE standards for
qualification of safety-related instrumentation.
Manufacture and installation of all instrumentation and control components was strictly controlled
in accordance with the SITP process described in Section 2.2 to ensure compliance with
relevant codes, standards, design, safety and regulatory requirements. ANSTO fully participated
in this verification process by witnessing key activities such as factory acceptance tests,
conducting inspections and reviews, and providing final acceptance of the manufacture and
installation of systems and components.

3.2 PRE-COMMISSIONING PHASE

The Pre-Commissioning Phase involved complete testing of the OPAL Reactor facility on a
system by system basis.
Tests were carried out in accordance with approved precommissioning procedures and SITPs, with tests commencing on a system once all construction
activities for the system were completed and released. ANSTO participated fully in the precommissioning program by witnessing pre-commissioning activities, reviewing precommissioning results, and providing final acceptance of systems.
The following sections provide a summary of the key activities and events relevant to precommissioning of the various system types: process systems, electrical systems, containment
systems, building service systems, instrumentation/control/shutdown systems and radioisotope
File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A
Revision: A

Page 10 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

handling and neutron beam systems. The order of sections follows approximately the order in
which pre-commissioning activities were undertaken during the Pre-Commissioning Phase.

3.2.1

Electrical Systems

Electrical pre-commissioning activities commenced in June 2004 with testing of the electrical
earthing system and subsequent energisation and testing of the facilitys high voltage
switchboard and six electrical power transformers. This was followed by energisation and noload testing of the six Main Distribution Switchboards and the downstream distribution system,
including safety-related standby switchboards, motor control centres and distribution boards. Noload pre-commissioning of the distribution system included full functional testing, verification of
electrical protective devices and electrical inspections/tests required by Australian Standards
and the electrical power supplier, Energy Australia.
Pre-commissioning of the diesel generators commenced in November 2004, and comprised a
comprehensive set of starting and loading tests to verify the capability and reliability of the diesel
generator units, including a 24 hour full load run test. The tests revealed some problems
relating to priming of the diesel generator fuel supply lines, which were rectified by modifying the
lines to prevent the occurrence of air pockets in the lines. Following pre-commissioning of the
diesel generators, a no-load integration test of the standby power system (SPS) was performed
to verify the automatic operation of the SPS to connect the diesel generators on loss of normal
power supply (NPS).
Uninterruptible power supplies, including those which supply the FRPS, SRPS, RCMS and
FCMS were also subject to full functional testing including loading tests and mains failure
simulation tests.
Pre-commissioning of the electrical system culminated in a series of full load system tests
conducted in December 2005 once sufficient electrical equipment was available to provide
electrical load. These tests verified the operation of both the NPS and the SPS while supplying
the full facility electrical load.

3.2.2

Building Service Systems

Building service systems include the radioactive liquid waste management system, compressed
and breathing air systems, gas supply systems, water supply systems, fire detection and
suppression systems, ventilation and air conditioning systems, cranes and hoists,
communications systems, lifts, surveillance CCTV systems and security systems. Each of these
systems was subject to one or more pre-commissioning procedures to demonstrate that the
operation of the system is in accordance with design specifications and relevant codes and
standards. In addition, ASIO T4 will conduct inspections and a performance demonstration of
the integrated security system to demonstrate that it meets the specified performance
requirements. The ASIO T4 report on security system performance will be transmitted to ASNO
and if deemed satisfactory, ASNO will issue a report to the CEO of ARPANSA that confirms the
security system is suitable for reactor operation.

3.2.3

Process Systems

Process systems include the primary cooling system (PCS), the reactor and service pools
cooling system, the reflector cooling and purification system, the emergency make-up water
system, the hot water layer system, the reactor water purification systems and associated resins
handling system, the secondary cooling system and the demineralised water supply system.

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 11 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

Each of these systems was subject to a comprehensive pre-commissioning procedure involving

testing of all system equipment and verification of system performance. As there was no nuclear
fuel in the core during pre-commissioning, fuel assembly dummies were used to simulate the
presence of the core. The performance of each process system was shown to meet specified
acceptance criteria, with any deviations dealt with through non-conformance control procedures,
and supported by additional analysis and testing, where required.
An occurrence of note during the pre-commissioning of the PCS was an event in which the
primary cooling flap valves opening time during pump coast down was outside the specified
acceptance criteria. In summary, this early opening of the PCS flap valves was determined to
be caused by a pressure transient generated by the starting or stopping of secondary cooling
system pumps, which was transmitted to the PCS via the heat exchanger plates. As the
pressure transient could not be eliminated, additional safety analysis and testing was performed
to examine whether early opening of the PCS flap valves compromises the safety of the reactor.
The conclusion of that analysis and testing was that the safety of the reactor is not compromised
and this was transmitted to the CEO of ARPANSA in May 2006.
Other pre-commissioning testing related to process systems included testing of reactor and
service pool internal components. This included testing of the fuel assembly clamps (which
clamp the fuel in the reactor core) and testing of the siphon effect breakers (which prevent
draining of the pools in the event of a leak in one of the reactor cooling systems). Those tests
showed that those components performed as per the design. In addition, leak testing of the
control rod drive room, which is designed to be sufficiently leak-tight to contain water in the event
of a leak through the reactor pool bottom penetrations, demonstrated compliance with the
relevant acceptance criteria.

3.2.4

Instrumentation, Control and Shutdown Systems

Pre-commissioning of instrumentation and control systems included testing of the FRPS, SRPS,
PAM, RCMS, FCMS, nucleonics instrumentation systems and radiation monitoring systems.
Pre-commissioning of these systems involved testing of the main system functions and
verification of all field and control room connections by testing every system input and output for
correct operation. In addition, for radiation monitoring systems, radiation sources were used to
simulate high radiation conditions in order to verify correct system operation.
Pre-commissioning of shutdown systems included testing of both the First Shutdown System
(FSS), designed to shutdown the reactor by rapid insertion of control rods, and the Second
Shutdown System (SSS), designed to shutdown the reactor by rapid draining of the heavy water
reflector. Pre-commissioning of the FSS involved testing of the control rod withdrawal and
insertion times, as well as trip tests including measurement of the control rods insertion time
following a reactor trip for various system conditions. The testing also included verification of the
operation of the control rod movement protection interlock, which prevents the simultaneous
movement of more than one control rod and limits the control rod withdrawal speed. Precommissioning of the SSS included performance tests to measure the rate of drainage of the
heavy water reflector following a reactor trip for various system conditions. Acceptance criteria
associated with these tests of both the FSS and SSS were satisfied.
An event of note which occurred during pre-commissioning testing of the FRPS and the FSS
was a number of spurious actuations of the SRPS and SSS. Investigations determined that this
was caused by the control rods bouncing slightly when they were dropped, which in turn resulted
in the control rod bottom position indication incorrectly showing that more than one control rod
was not fully inserted in the period immediately following the trip. This condition is interpreted by
File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A
Revision: A

Page 12 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

the SRPS as a failure of the FRPS and thus actuates the SSS. To prevent this spurious
actuation of the SRPS and SSS, modifications were made to the SRPS instrumentation.

3.2.5

Containment Systems

Pre-commissioning of the reactor containment system included testing of the Reactor

Containment Ventilation System (RCVS), Containment Energy Removal System (CERS),
Containment Pressure and Vacuum Relief System (CPVRS), and containment isolation system,
as well as containment permeability testing.
The RCVS and CERS were subject to several comprehensive pre-commissioning procedures
involving testing of all system equipment and verification of system performance. This included
testing of the containment pressure control system, which ensures the containment is
maintained at negative pressure with respect to atmosphere, and full functional tests including
verification of system response to abnormal conditions. Testing of the CPVRS included tests to
verify that the system successfully relieves containment pressure in the event of simulated over
and under pressure conditions. In addition, pre-commissioning included verification of the
efficiency of all particulate and charcoal filters in the facilitys ventilation systems. The
performance of the RCVS, CERS and CPVRS was shown to meet specified acceptance criteria,
with any deviations dealt with through non-conformance control procedures, and supported by
additional analysis and testing, where required.
Pre-commissioning of the containment isolation system involved testing of all containment
isolation provisions to ensure correct operation in response to containment isolation signals.
In order to verify the integrity of the reactor containment boundary, a containment permeability
test was conducted. This test involved pressurising the containment and calculating the
permeability based on measurements of the input air flows required to maintain the containment
pressure. This test effectively verified that the overall permeability of the containment boundary,
including the reactor building concrete structure and its embedded penetrations, the containment
air-lock doors and the containment service hatches, was within the safety criterion. In addition,
leak tests were performed on individual containment penetrations to verify the correct sealing of
containment closures in the event of containment isolation.

3.2.6

Radioisotope Handling and Neutron Beam Systems

Pre-commissioning of radioisotope handling systems involved testing of irradiation rigs and

associated process systems, hot cells and associated radioisotope transport systems, and other
radioisotope handling equipment. Pre-commissioning activities on these components and
systems have not been fully completed; however, their completion is not required in order to
commence Stage B commissioning.
Pre-commissioning of neutron beam systems involved testing the CNS and its associated
process systems, the neutron beam primary and secondary shutters, the neutron guide helium
cooling system and the neutron guide vacuum system. Tests consisted of equipment operation
tests and system functional tests. For the CNS this included integrated functional tests with the
CNS in-pile thermosiphon connected (without deuterium) including transitions between standby
operation (warm) and normal operation (cold) modes with simulated heat load, thermal balance
tests and CNS protection and control system tests. Pre-commissioning activities on all these
components and systems, with the exception of the neutron guide vacuum system, have been
completed, with acceptance criteria satisfied. Pre-commissioning of the neutron guide vacuum
system is not required to have been completed in order to commence Stage B commissioning.

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 13 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

3.3 STAGE A COMMISSIONING PHASE

Stage A Commissioning commenced in February 2006, once the Commissioning Management
Group was satisfied that sufficient construction and pre-commissioning works had been
successfully completed. Stage A Commissioning consisted of a series of facility integration
tests, each carried out in accordance with an approved Commissioning Procedure. ANSTO was
fully involved in the Stage A Commissioning program through active participation in
commissioning activities, and review, verification and acceptance of commissioning results.
The following subsections provide a summary of the key activities and events relevant to the
various types of commissioning tests: instrumentation and control systems tests; reactor state
tests; containment systems tests; control rooms and emergency preparedness tests; electrical
systems tests; CNS tests; facility cold run and health physics tests.

3.3.1

Instrumentation and Control Systems Tests

Stage A Commissioning tests included a group of integration tests on specific instrumentation

and control systems, namely the FRPS, SRPS, PAM, RCMS, nucleonics instrumentation and
radiation monitoring instrumentation, to verify their functionality.
These tests included
verification of interfaces with the operators, interactions with the power supply systems and the
triggering of protective actions. In addition, instrumentation and control systems were tested
concurrently with testing of other systems throughout the Stage A Commissioning Phase, as
described in the following subsections. The safety settings of the FRPS and SRPS, as well as
set points for automatic RCMS limitation actions, were verified to be as per specified
requirements, and the nucleonics instrumentation was verified to be functional through the use
of a neutron source. Stage A Commissioning results for instrumentation and control systems
demonstrated that the systems are fully operative and integrate in a consistent manner with
other plant systems.
One non-conformance report was raised during Stage A Commissioning of instrumentation and
control systems. This report covered an event in which the FRPS did not operate correctly due
to inhibitions being mistakenly left in the FRPS. Following this event, a full verification of the
FRPS hardware and software was undertaken to ensure that no inhibitions or bypasses
remained in the system, and the FRPS Stage A Commissioning procedure was repeated in its
entirety to verify functionality of the system.

3.3.2

Reactor State Tests

The OPAL reactor has four defined operating states, known as the Power State, Physics Test
State, Shutdown State and Re-fuelling State. Each state defines a particular reactor operating
environment, with specific rules, interlocks and alarms, as well as requirements relating to
configuration of plant systems in order to either allow or preclude the performance of certain
tasks.
The bulk of the Stage A Commissioning test procedures involved testing to demonstrate the
correct operation of the reactors safety and plant systems for each of the four reactor operating
states. This included verification of the operation of reactor cooling systems, hot water layer
system, electrical system, instrumentation and control systems and reactor shutdown systems.
As there was no nuclear fuel in the core during Stage A Commissioning, fuel assembly dummies
were used to simulate the presence of the core, and nucleonic signals were simulated where
necessary. For each reactor operating state, the systems were operated and configured
accordingly in order to verify that the reactors systems are able to perform their assigned
File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A
Revision: A

Page 14 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

functions and that plant parameters remain within acceptable limits. Trial tests of plant operation
manual procedures, including those for transitions between the various reactor operating states,
were included in this series of tests.
Reactor state tests included coolant flow distribution measurements which demonstrated that the
coolant flow rates within the reactor core and irradiation rig positions comply with the specified
acceptance criteria. Also, a blocked fuel assembly simulation which demonstrated that this
occurrence would be detected by the FRPS instrumentation was performed.
The operation of the PCS flap valves to initiate the transition from forced to natural convection
cooling of the reactor core following a reactor shutdown was also tested and found to comply
with the specified acceptance criteria.

3.3.3

Containment Systems Tests

Stage A Commissioning included tests of the reactor containment and associated containment
ventilation systems in both normal mode and containment isolated mode. The test for normal
mode verified that containment conditions, including pressure, temperature and humidity,
remained within acceptable limits and that system instrumentation and interlocks relevant to
normal mode were functional. The test for containment isolated mode verified the triggering of
the various groups of containment isolation closures, the correct operation of containment
systems (including the CERS and RCVS) during and following containment isolation, that
containment conditions remained within acceptable limits and that system instrumentation and
interlocks relevant to isolated mode were functional. The tests demonstrated that the reactor
containment and associated containment ventilation systems function correctly.

3.3.4

Control Rooms & Emergency Preparedness Tests

Stage A Commissioning included testing of procedures for evacuation of the Main Control Room
to the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) and tests of the operation of the ECC Ventilation and
Pressurisation System, which is designed to protect reactor operators from radiation during
occupancy of the ECC. An emergency drill was also conducted in order to verify emergency
preparedness, including the effectiveness of the reactor systems, emergency plans and
procedures, and reactor operations staff in responding to simulated accident scenarios. The
results of these tests demonstrated an adequate level of emergency preparedness within the
reactor and its operating organisation.

3.3.5

Electrical Power System Tests

Stage A Commissioning included tests to verify the behaviour of the facility following a loss of
NPS and to verify the ability of the SPS to provide power to the various reactor systems
following loss of normal electrical power. The tests included verification of the effect of loss of
NPS on the reactor protection systems, shutdown systems, reactor control and monitoring
system, control room consoles and wall panels, heat removal systems, containment and
ventilation systems and CNS systems. Also verified was the automatic operation of the SPS in
response to loss of the NPS and its ability to supply essential loads including the containment
systems, emergency lighting and ventilation, reactor cooling systems and instrumentation and
control systems.

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 15 of 16

INVAP

ANSTO
Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation

OPAL CONSTRUCTION AND STAGE A COMMISSIONING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT

3.3.6

Other Stage A Commissioning Tests

Other Stage A Commissioning Tests consisted of an entire facility cold run test, CNS tests and
health physics tests.
The entire facility cold run test involved the reactor being operated in Power State at simulated
full power for a period of 36 hours, with dummy fuel assemblies in the core, irradiation rigs
loaded with dummy irradiation targets, and the CNS and hot cells facilities in operation. The test
also trialled procedures for control room shift arrangements and hand-overs, as well as
procedures for plant surveillance and in-service inspections. The tests demonstrated that the
reactor facility is capable of operating with high availability over an extended period and the
plant operating documentation is appropriate. Some tests originally planned for the cold run test
relating to operation of irradiation facilities could not be completed due to incomplete installation
of some items. However, this did not prevent the tests ability to demonstrate operation of the
reactor systems.
CNS tests involved CNS instrumentation and controls systems functionality verification, system
manoeuvring tests, and integrated functional tests, similar to those conducted during precommissioning, but with deuterium loaded.
Health physics tests conducted during Stage A Commissioning consisted of a health physics
walk-through and conducting radiological measurements to provide a baseline on radiation
levels prior to fuel loading. The result of the health physics walk-through was that health physics
provisions, including radiation shielding, signage, monitoring equipment, personal protective
equipment and decontamination facilities are in place and adequate.

4 FINAL CONCLUSIONS
This report has outlined the activities conducted under the Construction Authorisation, including
the verification processes applied to ensure the reactor was constructed in accordance with
specified requirements and the major activities and events which occurred under the
Construction Authorisation. The activities and verification processes completed during the
Construction Authorisation have demonstrated that the OPAL Reactor has been constructed in
accordance with design, safety, quality assurance and regulatory requirements, and that the
facility is in a state suitable for commencement of Stage B Commissioning activities.

File Name: RRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A.DOCRRRP-7200-EBEAN-011-A

Revision: A

Page 16 of 16