G.R. No.

46727 September 27, 1939

PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES' UNION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, composed to Honorables Francisco
Zulueta, Leopoldo Rovira, and Jose Generoso, and PAMPANGA BUS
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Jose Alejandrino for petitioner.
Manuel Escudero for respondent court.
L.D. Lockwood for respondent Pampanga Bus Co., Inc.
LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations promulgated on January 14, 1939, denying the demands of the
Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc.
The following are the pertinent facts which have given occasion to this industrial
dispute: On March 26, 1938, the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., addressed a
thirteen- point petition to the management of the Pampanga Bus Co. Upon the
failure of the company officials to act upon the petition, a strike was declared by the
workers on April 14, 1938. However, through the timely mediation of the
Department of Labor, a provisional agreement was reached, by virtue of which the
strike was called off, eight demands were granted, and the remaining five were
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement. One of these demands,
in the language of the petitioner, is that the respondent Pampanga Bus Co. "pay to
all Company drivers affiliated with the Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc., all the
back overtime pay due them under the law." After trial on the disputed demands,
the Court of Industrial Relations decided inter alia that the claim for back overtime
pay could not be allowed.
The pertinent portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations
is as follows:
The evidence is clear that even before the final approval of Act No. 4242 amending
Act No. 4123, the Eight Hour Labor Law, by extending the provisions of the latter to
other class of laborers including drivers of public service vehicles, a petition was
addressed by 44 drivers of the company to the Governor-General asking him to veto
the bill amending the law extending it to drivers for the reason stated in their
petition (Exhibit 5 and 5-a). About the 6th day of September, 1935, a petition was
again addressed by 97 drivers of the company to the Commissioner of Labor
requesting adjustment of working hours to permit them to retain their present
status with the company as nearly as possible under the law (Exhibits 4, 4-a, 4-b, 4c, 4-d and 4-e). This petition was prepared after a meeting of the employees was
held and was drawn with the help of the manager of the respondent about the last

days of August, 1935. In September, 1937, about 347 employees of the different
departments of the company again addresses a petition to the Director of Labor
expressing their satisfaction with the hours they work and the pay they receive for
their labor including the special bonuses and overtime pay they receive for extra
work, and asking, in view thereof, that the law be not applied to them (Exhibits 6, 6a to 6-g).
After the enactment of Act No. 4242 several transportation companies operating
motor buses filed with Commissioner of Labor petitions for a readjustment of the
hours of labor specified in section 1 of the Act on the basis of maintaining the status
quo as to the hours the drivers were required to be actually on duty in order to
enable them to make the prescribed hours daily that the exigencies of the service
required. The petitions were based on the impracticability of applying the provisions
of the law to drivers of public service vehicles without disrupting the public service
and causing pecuniary loss to both employers and employees alike, and the
resulting difficulties on the part of the drivers. The testimony of Atty. Carlos Alvear
on this point in uncontradicted. He testified that in 1935, he was president of the
Philippine Motor Association composed of bus operators operating in the Philippines,
of which the respondent is a member. Major Olson, who was at the time the
executive secretary of the association, and himself took up the matter with the
Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Labor after the passage of the Act
extending the operation of the Eight Labor Law to drivers. In their conference with
the Commissioner of Labor, they were told to take advantage of the provisions of
the law in which they may apply for the readjustment of the working hours, and in
conformity with that suggestion, the executive secretary of the association filed a
formal petition, Exhibit 10, on September 5, 1935. When this was filed the
Department of Labor further suggested that the drivers of each company file and
address a petition of similar nature designating their representatives who will
represent them in a conference that the Commissioner of Labor may call for the
purpose. With the filing of the petition, the conferees were assured by the UnderSecretary of Labor that the enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law in so far as the
drivers were concerned, will be held in abeyance until such time as the meeting or
investigations are held. It is not clear as to whether investigations and hearings
were finally made but the evidence indicates that the petition was never decided
and the companies continued its schedule of hours.
Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4123 read as follows:
"SEC. 3. The Commissioner of Labor, with the advice of two representatives of the
employers concerned, designated by the latter, and of two representatives of the
laborers concerned, designated by these, shall, at the request of an interested
party, decide in each case whether or not it is proper to increase or decrease the
number of hours of labor fixed in section one of this Act, either because the
organization or nature of the work require it, or because of lack or insufficiency of
competent laborers for certain work in a locality, or because the relieving of the

laborers must be done under certain conditions, or by reason of any other

exceptional circumstances or conditions of the work or industry concerned; but the
number of hours of labor shall in no case exceed twelve daily or seventy-two weekly.
"SEC. 4. Employees or laborers desiring an increase or decrease of the number of
hours of labor shall address an application to this effect to the Commissioner of
Labor, stating their reasons. Upon receipt of an application of this kind, the
Commissioner of Labor shall call a meeting of the employers and laborers of the
establishment or industry concerned, for the designation of advisers as provided in
the preceding section hereof. The Commissioner of Labor or his authorized
representative, together with the advisers, shall make an investigation of the facts,
giving special attention, in the first place, to the human aspect, and in the second
place, to the economic aspect of the matter, and he may for this purpose administer
oaths, take affidavits examine witnesses and documents and issue subpoenas and
subpoenas duces tecum. The decision of the Commissioner of Labor may be
reconsidered by him at any time."
It seems clear that the petitions of both employers and employees for the nonenforcement of the Eight Hour Labor Law were made in accordance with these
provisions of the law. Exhibit 9 of the respondent which is a communication
addressed by the Under-Secretary of Labor on September 6, 1935, to the A.L.
Ammen Transportation Company, Inc., defines the attitude taken by the Department
of Labor in connection with those petitions. It advises the company to submit an
application under sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 4123 above-quoted for an increase of
working hours of such laborers as may fall under the amendment and that pending
final solution of said application, the Department of Labor will not make any attempt
to enforce said amendment. As has already been stated it is not clear whether final
action or decision has been made on the applications with respect to the drivers of
the respondent; that it is undeniable fact that up to the outbreak of the dispute, the
law was not observed nor enforced in the company; and that upon mutual
agreement arrived at by the parties on April 14, 1938, the company worked out a
schedule beginning May 1, 1938, placing all its employees under an eight-hour
schedule.
In view of the foregoing fact, the court is the opinion that the drivers are not entitled
to the overtime pay demanded for the whole period the law was not observed or
enforced in the company. They are entitled to payment of wages for hours worked in
excess of the legal hours only beginning May 1, 1938.
On January 30, 1939, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, with the following
observations:
We have reviewed carefully the evidence on record with regard to the claim for back
overtime pay we find that it amply supports the findings and conclusions set forth in

support of the motion for reconsideration are virtually a repetition of the reasons
advanced in the memorandum of the petitioner filed before the case was decided
and were already discussed and considered in the decision. The evidence permits
no other conclusion than that the employees were not coerced not intimidated by
the respondent on the repeated occasions they signed and presented to the
Department of Labor their petitions for non-enforcement of the Eight Hour Labor
Law. The employees were indubitably aware of certain hardships the enforcement of
the law at that time would bring to them and these prompted their attitude of
preferring the continuation of the schedule of hours observed prior to the
enactment of the legislation extending the benefits of the Eight Hour Labor Law to
drivers of motor vehicles in public utility enterprises. Whatever pecuniary
advantage they would have gained by the strict observance of the law by the
company should they be made to work more than eight hours a day was apparently
waived or given up by them in exchange of their personal convenience and of the
additional monthly pay the respondent gave to those employees who were assigned
to routes where the daily working hours exceeded the maximum fixed by law. The
evidence that the company paid additional salaries not only to drivers but also to its
conductors who were assigned to such routes stands uncontradicted and no
attempt even was made by the petitioner to deny it. Without need of passing on the
question as to whether the provisions of the law are mandatory or not, in the light of
the above facts and applying the rules of equity invoked by the union, we are
constrained to hold that the petitioners are not rightly entitled to the payment
sought.
In Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Pantranco vs. Pangasinan Transportation Co.
(39 Off. Gaz., 1217), we have held that, to be entitled to the benefits of section 5 of
Act No. 4123, fulfillment of the mandate of the law is necessary, this being a matter
of public interest. Where both parties, as in this case, we have violated the law, this
court must decline to extend the strong arm of equity, as neither party is entitled to
its aid. This is especially true in view of the findings of fact made by the Court of
Industrial Relations which we should not disturb.
We are not, to be sure insensible to the argument that industrial disputes should be
decided with an eye on the welfare of the working class, who, in the inter-play of
economic forces, is said to find itself in the "end of the stick." In the case at bar,
however, we find no reason for disturbing the action taken by the respondent Court
of Industrial Relations, which is a special court enjoined to "act according to justice
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable" (sec. 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103).
The petition is dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.