FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003]

BENITO
ASTORGA, petitioner,
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

vs.

PEOPLE

OF

THE

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5,
2001, as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.
[1]

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Information
against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men for
Arbitrary Detention:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto,
at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with unidentified
persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who were
armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz,
Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the
Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legal and
valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine
(9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[2]

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City
sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering
and forest protection operations in line with the governments campaign against illegal
logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo
Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with
Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team

leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian.
[3]

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where
they saw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with the
local barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael
Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the time, the team left Brgy.
Bagacay.
[4]

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats
being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:305:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante
disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and proceeded to the site of the boat
construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor,
Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of
Mayor Astorga.
[5]

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian,
approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was
suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed,
Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa
ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha
misencounter. (I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can
box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a misencounter?) Mayor
Astorga then ordered someone to fetch reinforcements, and forty-five (45) minutes
later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them
dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they
promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team members. At this, Simon tried
to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission. He then took out his handheld
ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan
to inform them of the teams whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed
Simons radio, saying, Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina
kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig. (Its better if you have no radio so that
your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help).
Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon, adding, Kong siga kamo ha
Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo puwede ha akon. (If you are tough
guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not tolerate it here.) Simon then
asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted
that they would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to
Daram. Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, Kon magdakop man la
kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida
ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon. (If you really want to confiscate
anything, you start with the big-time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy.
Bagacay, I will surrender mine.) Simon then tried to reiterate his request for
permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said,
Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya. (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have
many things to discuss there.)
[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served
dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and
the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1
Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the barangay.
On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m.
when the team was finally allowed to leave.
[14]

[15]

[16]

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor

Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not
guilty to the offenses charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint Affidavit. However, the
presentation of Simons testimony was not completed, and none of his fellow team
members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR
RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.
[17]

[18]

[19]

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the

case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correctional as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.

[20]

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 2001 which was
denied by the Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001. A Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 2001 was also filed, and this was
similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002.
[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary
Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code,
based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the
Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses wherein the
latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime charged.
[25]

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, especially in light of the fact that the private
complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. Petitioner asserts that nowhere
in the records of the case is there any competent evidence that could sufficiently
establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons of the team members.
[26]

[27]

Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at the scene does not
qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of the
team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. LucobLucob.
[28]

[29]

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without

legal grounds, detains a person. The elements of the crime are:
[30]

1.

That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2.
That he detains a person.
3.
That the detention is without legal grounds.
[31]

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor
of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that
the offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts
were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were
motivated by his instinct for self-preservation and the feeling that he was being
singled out. The detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third
element enumerated above.
[32]

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually
detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta, which involved the illegal detention of a child, we
found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to
show that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the
victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the
accused-appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could
not leave because of his fear to violate such instruction.
[33]

[34]

In the case of People v. Cortez, we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive
the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an
enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended
party in said case was found outside talking to the owner of the house where she had
been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that
the kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled
therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and
they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him
on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to render people immobile and
that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are
equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.
[35]

[36]

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the

curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the
victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the
mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is

compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the
accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas,
the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. This
refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen
reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the
team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. Given such
circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was not safe
to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders. It was not just the presence of the armed men, but
also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that
fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the
complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
[37]

[38]

[39]

Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants,

suffice it to say that the principles governing the use of such instruments in the
adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it was
held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the
defenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There
must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance,
create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances. Indeed, the belated
claims made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the incident
was the result of a misunderstanding and that the team acceded to Mayor Astorgas
orders out of respect, are belied by petitioners own admissions to the contrary. The
Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainants is evidently not a clear
repudiation of the material points alleged in the information and proven at the trial, but a
mere expression of the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the case. This
conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
[40]

[41]

11.

That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and
improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and other
official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and project can be
effectively implemented through the support of the local officials for the
betterment of the residence living conditions who are facing difficulties
and are much dependent on government support.
[42]

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing
out that the Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is
misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants
in the case. He also makes much of the fact that prosecution witness SPO1
Capoquian was allegedly not exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of, what exactly
transpired between herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon,
from their alleged confrontation, until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early
morning of 2 September 1997.
[43]

[44]

It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings are conclusive and
binding upon appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. Nothing in the
case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1
Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal
law nor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively supplied by
the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor Astorgas
claim that SPO1 Capoquian was not exactly privy to what transpired between Simon
and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian testified that he accompanied
Simon when the latter went to talk to petitioner. He heard all of Mayor Astorgas
threatening remarks. He was with Simon when they were encircled by the men
dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles. In sum, SPO1 Capoquian
witnessed all the circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the
hands of Mayor Astorga.
[45]

[46]

[47]

[48]

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from
leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to while away the time
and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused. On the contrary, SPO3
Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply whiling away the time
between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following
morning. SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did not use the
time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to enjoy the place and that, given a choice, they would have gone home.
[49]

[50]

[51]

Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold neutrality of an impartial judge,
because the ponente of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate and advocate
when he propounded very extensive clarificatory questions on the witnesses. Surely,
the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a trial. It can propound
clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the
court cannot be assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions were asked during
the trial.
[52]

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that, where the detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall
be arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
which has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum
term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4)
months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the indeterminate penalty
of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his
concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by public
officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the intensification of
efforts towards bringing them to justice:

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by

government officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect during
the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued in effect
under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not repealed.
The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic
of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations
of said provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted
due to the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same government
to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high time that every one must do his
duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold
shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal
detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton
trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible officials
should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right to the indemnity to
which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.

[53]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding
petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.

[1]

Records, p. 255; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by Associate Justices
Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

[2]

Records, p. 1 (italics and emphasis in the original).

[3]

TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 6; Exhibit B, p. 1.

[4]

Id., pp. 7-8; Exhibit B, p. 1.

[5]

Id., pp. 8-9; Exhibit B, p. 1.

[6]

Id., pp. 10-12; Exhibit B, p. 1; TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 6.

[7]

Id., pp. 14-16; Exhibit B, p. 1.

[8]

Exhibit B, p. 2.

[9]

TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 13; Exhibit B, p. 2.

[10]

Exhibit B, p. 2.

[11]

TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 19.

[12]

Exhibit B, p. 2.

[13]

Id.

[14]

TSN, August 15, 2000, pp. 7, 39.

[15]

Id., pp. 9, 22.

[16]

Id., pp. 25, 36.

[17]

Records, pp. 129, 135.

[18]

TSN, August 14-15, 2000; Exhibit B.

[19]

Records, p. 158.

[20]

Id., p. 265 (emphasis in the original).

[21]

Id., p. 271.

[22]

Id., p. 306; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by Associate Justices
Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

[23]

Id., p. 315.

[24]

Id., p. 370; penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, concurred in by Associate Justices
Narciso S. Nario and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.

[25]

Rollo, p. 18.

[26]

Id., pp. 18-19.

[27]

Id., p. 35; Records, p. 158.

[28]

Id., pp. 25-26.

[29]

Id., p. 27.

[30]

REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 124.

[31]

II REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 43 (14th ed. 1998); citing U.S. v. Braganza, 10 Phil. 79 [1908]
and Milo v. Salanga, G.R. No. 37007, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 113 (emphasis in the original).

[32]

Rollo, pp. 30-31.

[33]

107 Phil. 360 [1960].

[34]

Id.; emphasis supplied.

[35]

381 Phil. 345 [2000]; citing People v. Dela Cruz, 342 Phil. 854 [1997] and People v. Ramos, 358 Phil.
261 [1998].

[36]

Id.; citing People v. Hope, 177 N.E. 402, 257 N.Y. 147.

[37]

TSN, August 14, 2000, pp. 19-20; TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 17.

[38]

Id., pp. 14-16; Exhibit B, p. 1.

[39]

TSN, August 15, 2000, pp. 19-20.

[40]

People v. Ballabare, 332 Phil. 384 [1996].

[41]

Records, p. 158; Rollo, pp. 27, 30-31, 32-33, 41.

[42]

Id., p. 159.

[43]

Rollo, pp. 28-29.

[44]

Id., p. 20.

[45]

People v. Torellos, G.R. No. 143084, 1 April 2003; citing People v. Daramay, G.R. Nos. 140235 &
142748, 9 May 2002.

[46]

TSN, August 14, 2000, p. 10; Exhibit B, p.1.

[47]

Id., pp. 10-14, Exhibit B, pp.1-2.

[48]

Id., p. 15; Exhibit B, p.1.

[49]

Rollo, pp. 24-25.

[50]

TSN, August 15, 2000, p. 36.

[51]

Id., p. 26.

[52]

People v. Pinuela, G.R. Nos. 140727-28, 31 January 2003.

[53]

Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 983 [1947]; concurring opinion of Justice Perfecto.

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

BENITO ASTORGA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154130

Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
August 20, 2004

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming

petitioners conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention. Petitioner now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.
The facts are briefly restated as follows:
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo
Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional
Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3
Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police
Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to
conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around
4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5
meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met
petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of
the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR
team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten
armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was
then brought to petitioners house in Daram, where they had dinner and
drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m.
On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and
convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
24986. On petition for review, we rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.,
dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality
on January 12, 2004.[1] Petitioner then filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to File
Second Motion for Reconsideration[2] with attached Motion for
Reconsideration,[3] wherein he makes the following submissions:
1.

THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR

THE PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED
PARTIES;

2.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS

INSISTED ON LEAVING THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE
SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;

3.

THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE

INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;

4.

CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY

WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE.[4]

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for

Reconsideration.[5]
The prosecution was required to comment on petitioners second Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration welltaken.[6]
While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited
pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided
it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served
thereby.
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the
court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical

rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been,
as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a
particular case from its operation.[7]

The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:

1.
2.
3.

That the offender is a public officer or employee.

That he detains a person.
That the detention is without legal grounds.[8]

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual

physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find
no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties.
Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1
Rufo Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their
mission. On the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then a municipal
mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his
house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus:
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q

After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram?

We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we
saw a boat being constructed there so we proceeded to Barangay
Lucodlucod (sic).

And you arrived at 5:00 oclock?

Yes sir.

And you left at 2:00 oclock in the morning of September 2?

Yes sir.

And you ate dinner between 5:00 oclock to 2:00 oclock in the morning
of September 2, is that correct?

Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.

And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?

Yes sir.

And of course you also partook of wine?

I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

AJ NARIO:
q

While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 oclock Mayor Astorga
was with you having dinner?

Yes Your Honor.

You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters,
the complainants here?

I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.
xxx

xxx

xxx

AJ PALATTAO:
q

And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this
laughter?

Probably they were talking of something humorous.[9]

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint
imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that
they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he
admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner
prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel
by boat.
ATTY. JUMAMIL:
q

It was raining at that time, is that correct?

Yes sir it was raining.

And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time
that you were in Lucoblucob, Daram?

I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.

What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in
Lucoblucob?

The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at
that time.

But it was raining the whole day?

It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.

It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 oclock in the
morning is that correct?

A little bit hard I dont know when the rain stopped, sir.

It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 oclock in the morning
of September 2?

I dont remember sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

AJ PALATTAO:
q

Were you told not to go away from the place?

No Your Honor.

Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go
somewhere?

They did not say anything sir.

Where did you go after that?

Just down until it rained.

If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part,
was there somebody prevented you to go to another place?

I dont know Your Honor.

But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent
you to go somewhere else?

What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to
leave the barangay.

In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not
supposed to leave that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?

Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.

On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in
your impression you cannot leave the barangay. How about the other
companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the place?

No Your Honor.

Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case
of those I have enumerated they cannot, why?

If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.[10]

Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness
stand on August 16, 2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack
of material time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not touch
on the circumstances of the alleged detention.[11]
On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E.
Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo
Maniscan, executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent part:
xxx
6.

xxx

xxx;

That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation

aggravated by the exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores of the
small islands of Samar for several days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have
also been confronted with the same predicament, hence our confrontation
resulted to a heated argument and the eventual misunderstanding;

7.

Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of

Daram, Samar our respect for him prevailed when he ordered us to take
dinner with him and other local residents thereat, so we capitulated whose
invitation was misinterpreted by us;

8.

That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team

and the group of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually
allowed to leave Daram, Samar;

9.

That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the
incident to our supervisors who required us to submit our affidavit;

10.

That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both
parties had already express apologies and are personally no longer
interested to pursue the case against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of
desistance;
xxx

xxx

xxx.[12]

Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to
testify. This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime
of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and
SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquians testimony negate the element of
detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily subjective.
[13]
Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by any hardand-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the crime. [14] As such, SPO1 Capoquian and
SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify on whether or not
fear existed in the minds of the private offended parties herein. It was thus error
for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their testimonies in convicting petitioner.
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a
reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their
consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two
interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended
parties were taken to petitioners house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m.
the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his

hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house. He could have
advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by
the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended parties and even laughed
with them while conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a
hostile confrontation between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor
also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at
2:00 a.m. the following morning.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.[15] He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[16]
As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven
with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be
sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the prosecutions
evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [17] Furthermore, where
the evidence for the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for
defense is also weak, the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in
view of the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When
the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of
which is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is
compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court
must acquit. It is better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.[18]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1,
2003 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed judgment of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito
Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

[1]

Rollo, p. 197.
Id., pp. 198-199.
[3]
Id., pp. 202-216.
[4]
Id., pp. 204-213.
[5]
Id., pp. 217-223.
[6]
The Court En Banc resolved to allow the Special First Division to consider and resolve the
Second Motion for Reconsideration.
[7]
Fulgencio, et al. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 141600, 12 September 2003.
[8]
Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, 1 October 2003.
[9]
TSN, 15 August 2000, pp. 6-7, 9-10, 21.
[10]
Id., pp. 8-9, 22-23.
[11]
TSN, 16 August 2000, pp. 6-13.
[12]
Record, p. 158.
[13]
People v. Servano, G.R. Nos. 143002-03, 17 July 2003.
[14]
People v. Lustre, G.R. No. 134562, 6 April 2000, 330 SCRA 189, 196.
[15]
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).
[16]
Rules of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 2.
[17]
People v. Sodsod, G.R. Nos. 141280-81, 16 June 2003.
[18]
People v. Batoctoy, G.R. Nos. 137458-59, 24 April 2003.
[2]