oe ° “LANGUAGE, ® ® K Trutn AND ® @ SS __Locie ° ——"@ 6 FOUNDED LOGICAL POSI- TIVISM — AND MODERN THE CLASSIC TEXT WHICH BRITISH PHILOSOPHYpig PELICAN BOOKS LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC Sir Alfted Ayer was born in 910 and educated asa King’s Scholar at Eton and as a classical scholar at Christ Church, Oxford. After spending a short period at the University of Vienna, he became Lecturer in Philesophy at Christ Church in 1933. and Research Student in 1935. In 1940 he joined the Welsh Guards, but was employed for most of the War in Military Intelligence. He returned to Oxford in r945 as Fellow and Dean of Wadham College. From 1946 to 1959 he was Grote Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic in the University of London, He was Wykeham Professor of Logic in the University of Oxford, and was a Fellow of New College, Oxford, from 1959 until 1978. From 1978 to 1983 ‘he was a Fellow of Wolfson College, Oxford. In addition he is a Fellow of the British Academy, an Honorary Fellow of Wadham College and New College, Oxford, and University College. London, an Honorary Student of Christ Church and an Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; he holds an honorary degree from the univer- sities of East Anglia, London and Durham, as well as Trent in Ontario and Bard College in the U.S.A. His principal pub- cations are The Foundations of Eimpiricad Knowledge; Philo- sophical Essays; The Problem of Knowledge (Pelican): The Concept of a Person; The Origins of Pragmatism: Metaphysics und Common Serse; Russell and Moore: The Anelytical ‘Heritage; The Central Questions of Philosophy (Pelican); Proba- biltey ard Evidence, Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Rus- self; Hume; Freedom and Morality; Ludwig Wittgenstein (Pelican) and Voltaire, He has also published two volumes of autobiography and contributed articles to philosophical and literary journals. Sit Alfred was knighted in 1970 and is a Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur.LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC A. J. AYER PENGUIN BOOKSPENGUIN BOOKS Published by the Penguin Group, a7 Wilghts Lane. London w8 sr England ‘Viking Penguin inc, 40 West 23rd Stroct, New York, New Yurk za0ro, USA. Penguin looks Austeslia Lid, Ringwood, Wietucia, Australia Penguin Boos Canada Lud. 2801 Joba Street, Markham, Ontario, Canada t38 11g Penguin Books (Nz) Lad. 182-190 Walrau Read, Auckland ra, New Zealand Penguin Books Lid, Registered (flees: Hurmondswarth, Middlesex, England rst published by Vistar Gollonce 1936 Published in Pelican Rooks r971 13-15 17 19 20 18 16 14 02 Copyright 1936. 1946 by AJ. Ayer All eights reserved Printed and bound in Groat Beitain by Richard Clay Lad, Bungay. Sefale TO RA. Except In the United States of America, thi book Is sold sublect fo the condition that it shall no, by Way of trade oe otherwise, be lent, ee-sobd, hited out, or otherwise eiveutated ‘without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding a¢ cover cher than that in which It is Published and without a similar eondition including this condition being Imposed ‘on the sobsequent porchaserEe ey CONTENTS Preface 9 The Elimination of Metaphysics 13 Pp. 13: What is the purpose and method of philosophy? Rejec- tion of the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a transcendent reality. 14: Kant also rejected metaphysics In this sense, but whereas he accused meta physicians of ignoring the limits of the human understanding we accuse them of disobeying the rules which govern the significant use of language. 16: Adoption of verifiability as a criterion for testing the significance of putative statements of fact. 16: Distinction between conclusive and partial verifi- cation. No propositions can be conclusively verified. 19: Or conclusively confuted. 20: For a statement of fact to be genu- ine some possible observations must be relevant to the deter- mination of its truth or falsehood. 21: Examples of the kinds of assertions, familiar to philosophers, which are ruled out by our criterion. 24: Metaphysical sentences defined as sen- tences which express neither tautologies nor empirical hypo- theses, 24: Linguistic confusions the prime sources of meta- physics. 27: Metaphysies and Poetry. ‘The Function of Philosophy 30 p. 30: Philosophy is not a search for first principles, 30: Bar- renness of Descartes’ procedure. 33: The function of philo- sophy is wholly critical. But this does not mean that it can give an a priari justification of our scientific or common-sense assumptions. 3.4: There Is no genuine problem of induction, as ordinarily conceived. 36: Philosophising is an activity of analysis. 37: Most of those who are commonly thought to have been great philosophers were philosophers in our sense, rather than metaphysicians. 38: Locke, Berkeley, Hume as analysts. 39: We adopt Berkeley's phenomenalism without his theism. go: And take 2 Humean view of causation. 43: Philosophy in our sense is wholly independent of meta- physics. We are not committed to any doctrine of atomism. 44: The philosopher as an analyst is not concerned with the 5physical properties of things, but only with the way in which we speak about them. 45: Linguistic propositions disguised in factual terminology. 46: Philosophy issues in definitions. The Nature of Philosophical Analysis 48 p. 48: Philosophy provides not explicit definitions, such as are given in dictionaries, but definitions in use. Explanation of this distinction. 49: Russell's ‘theory of descriptions’ as an example of philosophical analysis. 52: Definition of an am- biguous symbol, 53: Definition of a logical construction. 54: Material things are logical constructions out of sense- contents. 54: By defining the notion of a material thing in terms of sense-contents we solve the so-called problem of per- ception. 55: A solution of this problem outlined as a further example of philosophical analysis. 59: Utility of such an- alyses, 59: Danger of saying that philosophy is concerned with meaning. 61: The propositions of philosophy are not empirical propositions concerning the way in which people actually use words. They are concerned with the logical con- sequences of linguistic conventions. 63: Rejection of the view that ‘every language has a structure concerning which in the language nothing can be said’, The A Priori 64 P. 64: As empiricists, we must deny that any general propo- sition concerning a matter of fact can be known. certainly to be valid. 64: How then are we to deal with the propositions of formal logic and mathematics?. 67: Rejection of Mill's view that these propositions are inductive generalisations. 71: ‘They are necessarily true because they are analytic. 74: Kant’s definitions of analytic and synthetic judgements. 73: Emendation of Kant's definitions. 74: Analytic propositions are tautological; they say nothing concerning any matter of fact. 74: But they give us new knowledge, inasmuch as they bring to light the implications of our linguistic usages. 76: Logic does not describe ‘the laws of thought’. 77: Nor geome- try the properties of physical space, 80; Our account of a priori truths undermines Kant's transcendental system. 81: How, if they are tautological, can there be in mathematics and logic the possibility of invention and discovery?ERE TL Truth and Probability 84 p. 84: What is trath? 85: Definition of a proposition. 85: The words ‘true’ and ‘false’ function in the sentence simply as assertion and negation signs, 87: The ‘problem of truth’ re- duced to the question. How are propositions validated? 83: ‘The criterion of the validity of empirical propositions is nat purely formal. &9: No empirical propositions are certain nat even those which refer to immediate experience. 93: Obser- vation confirms or discredits not Just a single hypothesls but a system of hypotheses. 94: The ‘facts of experience’ can never compel us to abandon a hypothesis. 96: Danger of mis- taking synthetic for analytic propositions. 97: Hypotheses as rules which govern our expectation of future experience, 101: Definition of rationality, 102; Definition of probability in. terms of rationality, 102: Propositions referring to the past. Critique of Ethics and Theology 104 P. 104: How does an empiricist deal with assertions of value? 105: Distinetion between various types of ethical enquiry. 106: Utilitarian and subjectivist theories of ethics consistent with empiricism, 207: But unacceptable on other grounds. 108: Distinction between normative and descriptive ethicel symbols. 109: Rejection of intuitionism. 210: Assertions of value are not scientific but ‘emotive’. 110: They are therefore neither true nor false. r1z: They are partly expressions of feeling, partly commands. 113: Distinction between ex- pressions and assertions of feeling. 113: Objection that this view makes it impossible to dispute about questions of value. 114: Actually, we never do dispute about questions of value, but always about questions of fact. 116: Ethics as a branch of knowledge comprehended ire the social sciences, rr: The same applies to aesthetics. 119: Impossibility of demonstrat ing the existence of a transcendent god. 120: Or even of prov- ing it probable. 120: That a transcendent god exists is a metaphysical assertion, and therefore not literally significant. Saying this does not make us atheists or agnostics in the ordinary sense. 122: The belief that men have immortal souls is also metaphysical. 123: There is no logical ground for con- flict between religion and science. 124: Our views supported by the statements of theists themselves, 125: Refutation of the argument from religious experience,The Self and the Common World 127 P. 127: The basis of knowledge. 129: Sense-contents as parts, rather than objects, of sensc-experiences. r30: Sense- contents neither mental nor physical. 130: Distinction be- tween the mental and the physical applies only to logical constructions, 132: The existence of epistemological and causal connections between minds and material things open to no a priori objections. 133: Analysis of the self in terms of sense-experiences. 133: A sense-experience cannot belong to the sense-history of more than one self. 134: The substantive ego a fictitious metaphysical entity. 235: Hume's definition of the self. 136: That the empirical self survives the dissolution of the body is a self-contradictory proposition. 136: Does our Phenomenalism involve: solipsism? 138: Our knowledge of other people, 142: How is mutual understanding possible? Solutions of Outstanding Philosophical Disputes 144 P. 144: The nature of philosophy docs not warrant the existence of conflicting philosophical ‘parties’. 245: The con- flict between rationalists and empiricists. 147: Our own log- ical empiricism to be distinguished from positivism. 148: We reject Hume's psychological, as opposed to his logical, doc- trines. 150: Realism and idealism. 151: To say that a thing exists is not to say that it is actually being perceived. 154: ‘Things as permanent possibilities of sensation. 155: What is perceived is not necessarily mental. 158: What exists need not necessarily be thought of. 158: Nor what is thought of exist. 159: Empirical grounds for supposing that things may ‘exist unperceived. 261: Monism and Pluralism. 161: Man- istic fallacy that all a thing’s properties are constitutive of is nature. 164: Illustrates the danger of expressing ling propositions in factual terminology. 165: Causality not a logical relation. 167: Empirical evidence against the monist's view that every event is causally connected with every other. 168: The unity of science. 168: Philosophy as the logic of science, Appendix Uyt Index 200PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION Tue views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiri- cism of Berkeley and David Hume. Like Hume, | divide all genuine propositions into two classes: those which, in his terminology, concern ‘relations of ideas’, and those which concer ‘matters of fact’, The former class comprises the @ priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics, and these | allow to be necessary and certain only because: ‘they are analytic, That is, I maintain that the reason why these propositions cannot be confuted in experience is that they do not make any assertion about the empirical. world, but simply record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion. Propositions concerning empirical matters of fact, on the other hand, I hold to be hypotheses, which can be probable but never certain. And in giving an account of the method of their validation | claim also to have explained the nature of truth. To test whether a sentence expresses a genuine empiri- cal hypothesis, I adopt what may be called a modified verification principle. For I require of an empirical hypathe- sis, not indeed that it should be conclusively verifiable, but that some possible sense-experience should be rele- vant to the determination of its truth or falsehood. If a putative proposition fails to satisfy this principle, and is not a tautology. then I hold that it is metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally senseless. It will be found that much of what or dinarily passes for philosophy is metaphysical according 3to this criterion, and, in particular, that it can not be sige nificantly asserted that there is a non-empirical world of values, or that men haye immortal souls, or that there is a transcendent God. As for the propositions of philosophy themselves, they are held to be linguistically necessary, and so analytic, And with regard to the relationship of philosophy and em- pirical science, it is, shown that the philosopher is not in a position to furnish speculative truths, which would, as it ‘were, compete with the hypotheses of science, nor yet to pass @ priori judgements upon the validity of scientific theories, but that his function is to clarify the proposi- tions of science, by exhibiting their logical relationships, and by defining the symbols which occur in them. Con- sequently ] maintain that there is nothing in the nature of philosophy to warrant the existence of conflicting philo- sophical ‘schools’, And | attempt to substantiate this by providing a definitive solution of the problems which have been the chief sources of controversy between philoso- phers in the past. The view that philosophizing is an activity of analysis is associated in England with the work of G. E, Moore and his disciples. But while I have leamed a great deal from Professor Moore, I have reason to believe that he and his followers are not prepared to adopt such a thoroughgoing phenomenalism as [ do, and that they take a rather dif- ferent view of the nature of philosophical analysis. The philosophers with whom I am in the closest agreement are those who compose the ‘Viennese circle’, under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, and are commonly known as logical positivists, And of these I owe most to Rudolf Carnap. Further, I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Gilbert Ryle, my original tutor in philosophy, and to Isaiah Berlin, who have discussed with me every point in the argument of this treatise, and made many valuable sug: rogestions, although they both disagree with much of what T assert. And I must also express my thanks to J. R. M. Willis for his correction of the proofs. AL J AYER 1 Foubert’s Place, London July 1935 arCHAPTER ft THE ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS Tue traditional disputes of philosophers are, for the most part, as unwarranted as they are unfruitful. The surest way to end them is to establish beyond question what should be the purpose and method of a philosophical inquiry. And this is by no means so difficult a task as the history of philosophy would lead one to suppose. For if there are any questions which science leaves it to philosophy to answer, a straightforward process of elimination must lead to their discovery. We may begin by criticizing the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality trans- cending the world of science and common sense. Later on, when we come to define metaphysics and account for its existence, we shall find that it is possible to be a meta- physician without believing in a transcendent reality; for we shall see that many metaphysical utterances are due to the commission of logical errors, rather than to a con- scious desire on the part of their authors to go beyond the limits of experience. But it is convenient for us to take the case of those who believe that it is possible to have knowledge of a transcendent reality as a starting-point for our discussion. The arguments which we use to refute them will subsequently be found to apply to the whole of metaphysics. One way of attacking a metaphysician who claimed to have knowledge of a reality which transcended the pheno- menal world would be to inquire from what premises his propositions were deduced. Must he not begin, as other men do, with the evidence of his senses? And if so, what valid process of reasoning can possibly lead him to the 13conception of a transcendent reality? Surely from erpiri- cal premises nothing whatsoever concerning the proper- ties, or even the existence, of anything super-empirical can legitimately be inferred. But this objection would be met by a denial on the part of the metaphysician that his assertions were ultimately based on the evidence of his senses. He would say that he was endowed with a faculty of intellectual intuition which enabled him to know facts that could not be known through sense-experience, And even if it could be shown that he was relying on empiri- eal premises, and that his venture into a non-empirical world was therefore logically unjustified, it would not fol- Jow that the assertions which he made concerning this non-¢mpirical world could not be true. For the fact that a conclusion does not follow from its putative premise is not sufficient to show that it is false. Consequently one cannot overthrow a system of transcendent metaphysics merely by criticizing the way in which it comes into be- ing. What is required is rather a criticism of the nature of the actual statements which comprise it. And this is the line of argument which we shall, in fact,. pursue. For we shall maintain that no statement which refers to a ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all possible sense- experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must follow that the labours of those who have Striven td describe such a reality have all been devoted to the production of nonsense. It may be suggested that this is a proposition which has already been proved by Kant. But although Kant also con- demned transcendent metaphysics, he did so on different grounds. For he said that the human understanding was so constituted that it lost itself in contradictions when it ventured out beyond the limits of possible experience and attempted to deal with things in themselves. And thus he made the impossibility of a transcendent metaphysic not, 14