A.C. No.

4017 September 29, 1999

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL,
INC., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents
Pool, Inc., filed before this Court a Petition for
disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The
precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent,
as counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that
respondent should be disbarred for the following acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the
same was already final and executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five
hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555)
from complainant, allegedly for "cash bond" in
the appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his
illegal act 1
In his Answer, 2 respondent denies that he persuaded
complainant to file an appeal. On the contrary, he
asserts that it was the complainant who insisted on
appealing the case in order to delay the execution of
the
POEA
Decision. 3 He
also
controverts
complainant's allegation that he asked for a cash bond
and that he issued the fake receipt. 4

complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a]

"Cash Bond" in UNITED STATES DOLLAR
amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to
the Supreme Court in order that the said
appealed case could be heard or acted upon
by the Supreme Court. The said amount was
given to the respondent.1wphi1.nt
. . . [S]ubsequently the complainant
corporation came to know that the fees to be
paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of
nominal filing and docket fees for such kind of
appeal but in order to cover up respondent's
misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented
complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged
Supreme Court receipt representing payment
of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme
Court made by the complainant corporation
revealed that the said receipt issued by the
treasurer's office of the Supreme Court . . .
[was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The
said verification revealed that what was only
paid by the respondent to the Supreme Court
was the amount of P622.00 as shown by the
enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court
Docket-Receiving Section showing the
handwritten name of the respondent for
purpose of showing that the said computation
was requested by and addressed to the
respondent. 5 (citations omitted)

In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court

referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Meanwhile, a criminal case 6 for estafa based on the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and same facts was filed against herein respondent before
recommendation.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
The pertinent portions of the Complaint were 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was
declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.
summarized by the IBP in this wise:
Under its petition, complainant alleges that
the respondent was given the task to defend
the interest of the complainant corporation in
POEA Case No. 8888-06-468, entitled
Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian Promotions
Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when the said
case was resolved in favor of the complainant
therein on October 5, 1992, the respondent
Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said
decision had already become final and
unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an]
apparent desire to collect or to "bleed" his
client of several thousand pesos of attorney's
fees, convinced the complainant to appeal the
case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on
December 14, 1992, the respondent filed with
the Supreme Court a Petition for Review
which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and
that two (2) days thereafter misrepresented to
the complainant corporation that the

Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a

Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 1996,
on the ground that he had already been acquitted in
the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the
Motion. 7
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP
Board of Governors' Resolution, which approved the
investigating
commissioner's
report 8 and
recommendation that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one (1) year. In his Report,
Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his
recommendation in this manner:
. . . [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of
the complainant that the signature [on the
receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his.
Hence, respondent anchors his position on a
mere denial that it is not his signature.
Likewise, the respondent denies the check
voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the

encircled signature of the respondent, which .

. . according to him is falsified and irregular.
No evidence, however, was presented by the
respondent that his signature therein was
falsified and irregular. [As to the altered
Supreme Court Official Receipt, the
respondent denied] that he ha[d] anything to
do with it because it was the complainant who
signed the Petition for Review and tried to
explain that his name appear[ed] to be the
payee because he [was] the counsel of
record of the petitioner. But while it is true that
the affiant in the said Petition for Review
[was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian, president of
the complainant company, the respondent
does not deny that he signed the said petition
as counsel of the petitioner corporation and
that he was actually the one who prepared
the same and the notary public before whom
the affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one
who "caused the preparation" of the said
petition.
The legal form (Exh. "G") of the legal fees for
the Petition for Review re G.R. 107984 was
denied by the respondent because according
to him he was never given a chance to crossexamine the person who issued the
[certification] . . . . However, respondent does
not deny that he is the person referred to by
the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza who paid
the legal fees of P622.00.

recommended penalty is not commensurate to the

gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that
respondent's Motion to Dismiss should be denied. In
that Motion, he maintains that he should be cleared of
administrative liability, because he has been acquitted
of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues
that the issue involved there was "the very same issue
litigated in this case,"13 and that his exoneration "was
a result of a full blown trial on the merits of this
case." 14
In a similar case, we have said:
. . . The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of]
the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards
of legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape
the penalties of . . . criminal law. Moreover,
this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting
in an entirely different capacity from that
which courts assume in trying criminal
cases. 15
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class
of their own. 16 They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In

a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; 17 in an administrative case for disbarment
or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all
that is required. 18 Thus, a criminal prosecution will not
In addition to the said respondent's Formal constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts
Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
Commission as his most important piece of proceedings. 19
evidence the Decision of acquittal in Criminal
Case No. 93-8748 entitled "People of the It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the
Philippines versus Primo R. Naldoza", the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
20
copy of which Decision is appended to his liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate
July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court's
present administrative case in view of his finding of civil liability against the respondent will not
being exonerated in the said criminal case inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
based
on
the
same
facts
and administrative action before this Court. Neither will a
favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
evidence. 9 (citations omitted)
administrative liability of the lawyer. 21 The basic
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
contention that his acquittal in the companion criminal different from administrative matters, such that the
case should result in the dismissal of this disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the
administrative
complaint.
The
commissioner third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well
emphasized that the criminal case for estafa 10 was to remember the Court's ruling in In re
completely different from the proceedings before him; Almacen, 22 which we quote:
acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
the latter. 11 He further noted that the RTC Decision
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
itself hinted at the administrative liability of
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein
action or a suit, but are rather investigations
complainant for $2,555. 12
by the Court into the conduct of one of its
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that
officers. Not being intended to inflict
respondent should be sanctioned. However, the

punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal

prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may
be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of
an attorney. . . . (emphasis ours)
We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges
against respondent.
First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed
the POEA Decision, despite knowing that it had
already become final and executory. The IBP
investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on
this point. Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during
the pendency of the appeal, his company had
received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led
him to the conclusion that "they [had] lost the case
before the Supreme Court." 23 This, however, does not
substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the
status of the appeal. Neither has there been any
showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground
that the POEA Decision had become final and
executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that
respondent knew that the case was unappealable.
Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the
Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioner's
failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible
duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge
has no leg to stand on.
Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that
respondent obtained from complainant the amount of
$2,555, on the false representation that it was needed
for the appeal before this Court. According to
Gatchalian,24 respondent explained that the amount
would "cover all the expenses to be incurred in the
Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which
amount also will answer for the payment as sort of
deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be
given or paid to the complainant in that case so that
our deposit with the bank would not be
garnished." 25Corroborating Gatchalian's testimony,
Edna Deles declared that respondent received the
amount on the representation that it "would be paid to

the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano

case." 26
The defense of denial proffered by respondent is not
convincing. Quite the contrary, when he paid P10,000
and issued a check to complainant as his "moral
obligation," he indirectly admitted the charge.
Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely
accused of appropriating the money of another. This is
an admission of misconduct. 27 In his Answer
submitted to this Court, he declared:
(8). That I have no knowledge, information or
belief as to truthfulness of the allegation of
the Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no.
9, the truth being that in all the cases and
assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I
was made to report to him personally and to
his Board of Directors the progress of the
cases both orally and in writing. I even [went]
to the extent of paying him P10,000.00 as my
moral obligation only to find after accounting
that he still owes me P180,000.00 as
attorney's fee [to] which I am entitled under
rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and
under sec. 37 of the above-cited rules, I have
the right to apply the funds received from
Gatchalian in satisfaction of my claim for
Professional Services, otherwise known as
Attorney's Lien, as shown in my Service
Billings
and
Statement
of
Accounts." 28 (emphasis ours)
Contrary to respondent's claim, the amount of $2,555
was not a part of his attorney's lien. He demanded the
money from his client on the pretext that it was
needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but
he actually converted it to his personal gain. This act
clearly constitutes malpractice. 29 The claim that
respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of
his client is just an afterthought, the accounting being
made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by
a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation
of professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. 30
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of
the money entrusted to him, respondent gave
complainant a photocopy of a receipt purportedly
showing that the Supreme Court had received the
sum of $2,555 from him. Again, the testimonies of
Gatchalian 31 and Deles 32 were equally clear on this
point. After respondent had presented the false
receipt, Gatchalian learned that no such payment was
made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash
Collection and Disbursement Division issued a
certification that respondent had paid the amount of
P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the said
case 33 contain no indication at all that the Court has
required the payment of the latter sum, or that it has
been paid at all.

Juxtaposed to the complainant's evidence, the bare

his client, the herein complainant, a clear
denials of respondent cannot overturn the IBP's
breach of the canons of professional
findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt
responsibility.
to conceal his misappropriation of his client's money.
In Obia v. Catimbang, 37 we meted out the same
We agree with the IBP that "it is unbelievable that the
penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the
complainant in the person of Rogelio Gatchalian,
money entrusted to him:
being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the
The acts committed by respondent definitely
procedure of filing a case before the Supreme Court,
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct
could spuriously weave such documents which are
in his office as attorney. These acts are noted
denied by the respondent." 34
with disapproval by the Court; they are in
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed
violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the
the standards of his noble profession. As we have
integrity and dignity of the legal profession
35
stated inResurrecion v. Sayson:
and to engage in no conduct that adversely
[L]awyers must at all times conduct
reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such
themselves, especially in their dealings with
misconduct discredits the legal profession.
their clients and the public at large, with
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he
reproach.
also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official
demanded money from his client for a bogus reason, receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly,
misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake he does not deserve to continue being a member of
receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya, 36 the the bar.
Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby
not remitting to his client the amount he had received
DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is
pursuant to an execution, viz.:
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
[E]ven as respondent consistently denied Attorneys and to inform all courts of this
liability to Dumadag, his former client, the Decision.1wphi1.nt
records abundantly point to his receipt of and
failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to