Ml-.

S ROBI BROWN
U
rp^i kluwer
the language of science
' '
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Scientific rationality: The sociological turn.
(The University of Western Ontario Series in philosophy of science;
v. 25)
Consists of original and revised versions of papers presented at a
conference held at the University of Western Ontario, London, in 1981.
Includes bibliographies and index.
1. Science-Social aspects-Congresses. 2. Science-Philosophy-
Congresses. 3. Science-History-Congresses. I. Brown, James Robert.
II. Series.
Q175.4.S388 1984 500 84-15051
ISBN 90- 277- 1812- 1
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A very Interesting exchange took place between Larry Laudan
and David Bloor In Toronto In the fall of 1980. It stimulated a
conference in the spring of 1981 which I organized at the
University of Western Ontario, London, while I was visiting
there for the year. The initial papers in this volume are the
published versions of the original Laudan-Bloor exchange. They
are reprinted here with the permission of Philosophy of the
Social Sciences and the authors. Most of the other papers are
revised versions of what was presented at the conference In
London; some are independently contributed.
I am indebted to many people for help In either organizing
the conference which gave rise to this volume or In putting the
volume Itself together (or both). My greatest thanks go to
Maxine Abrams, Robert Butts, Kathleen Okruhllk, John Nicholas,
Glenn Pearce, the British Council, and, of course, the
participants themselves.
1
James Robert Brown
INTRODUCTION: THE SOCIOLOGICAL TURN
The problem we are concerned with here is just this: How
should we understand science? Are we to account for scientific
knowledge
1
by appeal to the various social factors which may
have been prevalent when the theory was being formulated?
Should we, that Is, appeal to the "Interests" which a group of
scientists may have had? Undoubtedly, social factors play some
role, but are social causes totally responsible for the production
of belief? Or should we take a different approach and account
for scientific knowledge in a fashion which largely mirrors the
very accounts that rational scientists themselves would have
given to Justify their theory choices? Perhaps we should be
citing the "evidence" for the belief in question; perhaps we
should be providing "good reasons" as part of the explanation for
holding the belief. Which approach to understanding science is
right?
The most effective modern champions of social causation are
the members of the "Edinburgh School", a very vigorous group
of sociologists and historians of science centred in the Science
Studies Unit of the University of Edinburgh. They are the ones
primarily responsible for the sociological turn. The principal
opposition to this way of viewing science comes chiefly from
philosophers as well as the more traditional sociologists and
intellectual historians. But the problem we are faced with Is as
old as i t is tricky, so, before elaborating on the modern debate,
a backward glance would not be out of place.
Natural vs Cultural Sciences?
If we are properly to set the stage for the debates which
take place in this volume, we could hardly do better than to
start with a brief look at Karl Mannheim's view, in Ideology
3
J. R. Brown fed.). Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, 3-40.
1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
4 James Robert Brown
and Utopia, the magnum opus of the father of the modern
sociology of knowledge, Mannheim characterizes the discipline
this way: "The principle thesis of the sociology of knowledge is
that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately
understood as long as their social origins are obscured."
2
In
itself, this seems quite innocuous; i t expresses a sentiment that
we all might agree to, for we all concur that some people
believe some of the things they do because of social factors.
Quarrels do not arise until i t is a question of which people and
which beliefs. Things usually become heated when i t is
suggested that our scientific beliefs have this (possibly
contaminating) social origin.
There has been a long tradition in the sociology of knowledge
which has sharply separated beliefs into two kinds. A boundary
has been drawn between mathematics and the natural sciences
on the one hand, and most everything else on the other.
Included in this latter collection are such "cul tural " things as
religious beliefs, morals, "practical wisdom", and, often enough,
the social sciences. The natural sciences are viewed as pristine,
uncorrupted by any considerations of interest, while everything
else is suspect, Ideological, tarnished wi th subjectivity, and
corrupted with naked or concealed self-interest.
Mannheim is part of this tradition (at least in some of his
writings; he tended to be ambivalent on the issue). In one
place he expresses the dichotomy this way:
It may be said for formal knowledge that i t is essentially
accessible to all and that its content Is unaffected by the
Individual subject and his historical-social affiliations.
But, on the other hand, It is certain that there Is a wide
range of subject-matter which Is accessible only either to
certain subjects, or in certain historical periods, and
which becomes apparent through the social purposes of
individuals.
3
By "formal knowledge", he means the natural sciences and
mathematics. In another passage, Mannheim again gives voice
to the duality between the natural and the social:
Are the existential factors in the social process merely of
peripheral significance, are they to be regarded merely as
The Sociological Turn 5
conditioning the origin or factual development of ideas
(i.e. are they of merely genetic relevance), or do they
penetrate into the "perspective" of concrete particular
assertions? This is the next question we shall try to
answer. The historical and social genesis of an idea
would only be irrelevant to Its ultimate validity if the
temporal and social conditions of Its emergence had no
effect on Its content and form. If this were the case,
any two periods in the history of human knowledge would
only be distinguished from one another by the fact that
in the earlier period certain things were still unknown and
certain errors still existed which, through later knowledge
were completely corrected. This simple relationship
between an earlier incomplete and a later complete
period of knowledge may to a large extent be appropriate
for the exact sciences (although indeed today the notion
of the stability of the categorical structure of the exact
sciences is, compared with the logic of classical physics,
considerably shaken). For the history of the cultural
sciences, however, the earlier stages are not quite so
simply superseded by the later stages, and i t is not so
easily demonstrable that early errors have subsequently
been corrected. Every epoch has Its fundamentally new
approach and its characteristic point of view, and
consequently sees the "same" object from a new
perspective.
4
Admittedly, Mannheim hedges on the "stability of the exact
sciences". Nevertheless a sharp distinction between such things
as physics, chemistry, and mathematics on the one hand and
what he calls the "cultural sciences" on the other hand Is
made.
In consequence of this dichotomy, we should have a similar
dichotomy in our approach to accounting for knowledge. If we
wish to explain why a certain scientist or community of
scientists believes (or did believe In the past) a particular
theory of physics (or some other natural science) we should look
to the evidential reasons which were available. However, If i t
is a belief in a theological, moral, or ecomomlc doctrine that is
to be accounted for, then "evidence" would have l i ttl e or
6 James Robert Brown
nothing to do with i t . Instead, we must look to the social
factors prevalent at the time the theory choice was made which
would have caused such a decision. We should point to the
evidence to account for the growth of natural science; and we
should point to social causes to account for every other kind of
belief.
It Is very important to notice, in the passage cited, why
Mannheim makes the distinction between the cultural and the
natural sciences. He thinks that the exact or natural sciences
exemplify a "simple relationship between an earlier Incomplete
and a later complete period of knowledge". This reflects a
view of the development of science known as the cumulative
account. Once a fact has been discovered, It Is never
abandoned, additional facts are simply added toward i t .
Mannheim is not alone in holding such a view of natural
science nor in thinking It is a good reason for taking a
hands-off attitude to i t. In a recent exigetical piece on the
sociology of knowledge Werner Stark voices the same sentiment
when he writes, "Because man must take the facts of nature as
he finds them, while the facts of culture are his own work, the
social determination of knowledge wi l l be different in the two
instances."
5
This Is, however, a view of the natural sciences to which
hardly anyone today, and In particular no one in this volume,
gives any credence. Quite the contrary. Whether they are
proponents of a "rational" or of a "sociological" approach to the
understanding of science, all contributors to this volume think
the natural sciences have been revolutionary, not cumulative,
that many past theories, and even many past "facts" have been
completely overthrown.
Indeed, attacks (especially that found in Kuhn's The Structure
of Scientific Revolutions) on the cumulative account of science
have done much to inspire the contemporary sociological turn.
One of the leading figures in the Edinburgh school, Barry
Barnes, puts i t this way:
It is well known that as scientific knowledge has
developed, numerous mechanisms and theories have been
postulated and successively set aside. This is, indeed,
why so many philosophers of science have struggled to
8 James Robert Brown
pursuing their cognitive ends. Of course, the practitioners of
one or the other of these disciplines may not be following the
method properly, but if they were to be completely rational
they would use the same procedures. Scientific rationality
simply means following the scientific method; and i t is the same
method for all.
As well as rejecting a demarcation between science and other
cognitive activities, Laudan would also reject the idea that the
practitioners of the natural sciences have made nothing but
rational choices. Indeed, no one seriously believes that every
scientist who ever held to some theory of physics, chemistry, or
mathematics did so because of the evidence which was
available. It is widely thought, even by the staunchest
champions of scientific rationality, that sometimes a scientist
will act Irrationally, either In believing something which is
totally crazy or In believing the right thing for the wrong
reasons. And those "bad reasons" might well stem from social
forces. It will simply not be true that every cognitive decision
in the history of the natural sciences can be accounted for by
appeal to the evidence available" to those who made the
decision.
In consequence, some sort of guideline is required, some sort
of rule which wi l l tel l the historian how to approach individual
cases in the history of science. A rule which has been proposed
is this: If a belief can be explained as being the rational result
of the examination of the evidence available then that should
be accepted as the correct explanation. If, and only if, no such
rational explanation Is available, should we account for the
belief by appeal to social (or other non-rational) causes. (In the
jargon of "internal/external", we should only seek an external
account if no internal one can be found.) Robert Merton, for
instance, holds such a view: "...thought has an existential [i.e.,
social] basis in so far as i t is not immanently [i.e., rationally]
determined...."
7
This methodological principle is explicitly adopted by Laudan
who calls It the "arationallty principle":
...basically, i t amounts to the claim that the sociology of
knowledge may step in to explain beliefs if and only if
those beliefs cannot be explained in terms of their
10 James Robert Brown
influential work, Knowledge and Social Imagery.
Bloor chastises many of his fellow (traditional) sociologists
for "a betrayal of their disciplinary standpoint".
10
The hands-off
attitude toward science of many traditional sociologists is
anathema to him. These sociologists are unnecessarily limiting
the scope of their own enterprise according to Bloor; they
should bring their considerable resources to bear on the very
content of scientific knowledge. Philosophers have traditionally
given sociologists only the non-natural sciences to account for,
or only the irrational residue to explain. When philosophers
distinguish between "discovery" and "justification", they give
sociologists only the former to cope with. But, asserts Bloor,
all of science Is the legitimate domain of the sociologist.
Bloor has proposed the following tenets as characteristic of
an adequate sociology of knowledge and a proper account of
science:
1. CAUSALITY. It would be causal, that is concerned with
the conditions which bring about belief or states of
knowledge. Naturally there wi l l be other types of causes
apart from social ones which wi l l cooperate In bringing
about belief.
2. IMPARTIALITY. It would be impartial with respect to
truth and falsity, rationality or Irrationality, success or
failure. Both sides of these dichotomies wi l l require
explanation.
3. SYMMETRY. It would be symmetrical in Its style of
explanation. The same types of cause would explain, say,
true and false beliefs.
4. REFLEXIVITY. It would be reflexive. In principle its
patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to
sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this
Is a response to the need to seek for general
explanations. It Is an obvious requirement of principle;
otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its
own theories.
11
Bloor has much to say In defence of each of these tenets of
the strong programme. The main point Is that the sociologist Is
a scientist too, and ought to act as scientists do; he or she
should try to characterize knowledge in a scientific fashion. "If
The Sociological Turn 11
sociology could not be applied in a thorough-going way to
scientific knowledge It would mean" concludes Bloor, "that
science could not scientifically know itself."
12
Thus, says Bloor
of the sociologist:
His ideas therefore will be in the same causal idiom as
any other scientist. His concern wi l l be to locate the
regularities and general principles or processes which
appear to be at work within the field of his data. His
aim will be to build theories to explain these
regularities. If these theories are to satisfy the
requirement of maximal generality they wi l l have to apply
to both true and false beliefs, and as far as possible the
same type of explanation will have to apply In both
cases. The aim of physiology is to explain the organism
In health and disease; the aim of mechanics is to
understand machines which work and machines which f ai l ;
bridges which stand as well as those which fal l . Similarly
the sociologist seeks theories which explain the beliefs
which are in fact found, regardless of how the
investigator evaluates them. 13
In other words, to be truly scientific, which Bloor certainly
takes to be a good thing, one has to look for the causes of
beliefs. Moreover, we do not have two theories of nature, one
for explaining why a bridge stands up (when It does) and a
second theory for explaining why another bridge has fallen
down. We have but one theory and we use i t Impartially and
symmetrically (with the appropriate choices of initial conditions)
to explain both standing and falling bridges.
Barry Barnes adopts a methodological requirement simillar to
the symmetry principle when he Insists that:
What matters is that we recognize the sociological
equivalence of different knowledge claims. We wi l l
doubtless continue to evaluate beliefs differently
ourselves, but such evaluations must be recognized as
having no relevance to the task of sociological
explanation; as a methodological principle we must not
allow our evaluation of beliefs to determine which form,
of sociological account we put forward to explain them.**
12 James Robert Brown
A common argument directed against such a full-blooded
sociology of scientific knowledge goes like this: If all belief is
caused by social factors then this must be true of the strong
programme as well. Therefore, the strong programme falls into
a self-refuting relativism; It undermines its own position. Bloor,
however, thinks this is not damaging in the least. The principle
of reflexivty is simply an admission of the premiss of this
argument. But the conciulslon does not follow, says Bloor,
unless social determination Implies falsehood. But causation
does not imply error; so the charge of "self-refutation", he
maintains, will not stick.
The requirement of being "scientific" Is not the only
motivation for the recent sociological turn. Another factor is
the perceived success of recent case studies. The last decade
has seen a great number of new sociological accounts of old
stories and I shall summarize three of these below for handy
reference.
A third factor which has played a big role In the sociological
turn stems from recent (largely philosophical
15
) work on
"underdetermlnation" and "incommensurability". The problem of
underdetermination, briefly, Is this: there are indefinitely many
logically possible theories which are compatible with the
empirical data. Thus, the experimental evidence cannot pick
out one from among these as being the uniquely correct or true
theory. So, i t is concluded, the decision which scientists do
make cannot be based on rational considerations and we must
look elsewhere for an explanation of the choice. As Bloor puts
i t, "The theoretical component of knowledge is a social
component".
16
The philosopher Mary Hesse Is sympathetic; she
comes to the same conclusion in her new work Revolutions and
Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science.
17
Sociological
explanations will have to be given since the evidence, she
claims, will not determine one theory as being better than Its
rivals.
The work on incommensurability by Kuhn, Feyerabend, and
Wittgenstein has had a great deal of influence on Barnes. In his
new book on Kuhn he remarks, "Nothing in the nature of things,
or the nature of language, or the nature of past usage,
determines how we employ, or correctly employ our terms."
18
The Sociological Tum 13
The determining factors in how we use our concepts, and
especially In how we extend them, Barnes claims, are social
factors.
Some Examples
I have been describing some of the programmatic features of
the Edinburgh school's view of science, but now, in order to
help make clearer just what the recent sociological turn is, a
few examples are in order. Brief descriptions of some
paradigmatic case studies will throw considerable light on the
new sociological enterprise. The ones which I have chosen to
recount are from the collection of examples that Edinburgh
school members have either produced themselves or have
repeatedly referred to in approving terms.
This volume contains only sketches of a few case studies
(with the notable exception of Robert Butts's long study of Kant
and ESP). Yet clearly, concrete examples are important to the
Issue. No single case study will make or break either side, but,
I think all contributors to this volume will readily agree that
historical considerations have some role or other to play In
deciding the lssure between sociologists and rationalists. Just
what that role is, is hard to say. It cannot be a case of simple
induction since the proponents of the arationality principle can
readily allow that there have been some instances of "bad"
science and that consequently there should be cases where the
rationalist and the sociologist concur on the cause (I.e.,
sociological) of the scientific belief In question. Whatever the
evidential role these examples play, legitimate or not, there can
be no doubt that they have been Influential in discussions of the
issue. Here, for handy reference, are brief synopses of three of
the most Influential among them. After each, I cite a reply
which is highly critical of the study In question. (My uncritical
expositions of these three case studies should not be taken as
endorsements.)
(1) Forman on Weimar Culture and Causality. The scientists of
the Weimar Republic, according to Paul Forman,
19
perceived
themselves to be under attack. And their perceptions were
correct for they were indeed living in a hostile intellectual
The Sociological Tum 15
about It. Forman concludes:
...[S]uddenly deprived by a change in public values of
the approbation and prestige which they had enjoyed
before and during World War I, the German physicists
were impelled to alter their ideology and even the
content of their science In order to recover a favorable
public Image. In particular, many resolved that one way
or another, they must rid themselves of the albatross of
causality.
In support of this general interpretation I illustrated
and emphasized the fact that the program of dispensing
with causality in physics was, on the one hand, advanced
quite suddenly after 1918 and, on the other hand, that i t
achieved a very substantial following among German
physicists before i t was "justified" by the advent of a
fundamentally acausal quantum mechanics. I contended,
moreover, that the scientific context and content, the
form and level of exposition, the social occasions and the
chosen vehicles for publication of manifestoes against
causality, all point inescapably to the conclusion that
substantive problems In atomic physics played only a
secondary role In the genesis of this acausal persuasion,
that the most Important factor was the social-Intellectual
pressure exerted upon the physicists as members of the
German academic community.
22
And, moreover, he adds,
Although a readiness to view atomic processes as
Involving a "failure of causality" proved to be, and
remains, a most frui tful approach, before the Introduction
of a rational acausal quantum mechanics the movement
to dispense with causality expressed less a research
program than a proposal to sacrifice physics, indeed the
scientific enterprise, to the Zeitgeist.
2
*
For a strong critique of Forman see John Hendry (1980),
"Weimar Culture and Quantum Causality".
24
(2) Shapin on the Edinburgh Phrenology Debates. A Viennese
The Sociological Tum 17
most prominent phrenologist In Edinburgh) and his circle
vigorously, and to some extent successfully, agitated for
penal reform, more enlightened treatment of the insane,
the provision of scientific education for the working
classes, the education of women, the modification of
capital punishment laws and the rethinking of British
Colonial Policy.
27
He certainly admits that there was a technical debate with all
the trappings of regular science, that is, argument, evidence,
and so on; nevertheless "...to say there was a technical debate
is not to say that i t can be or was separated from the social
conflict, nor that such a technical debate does not reflect social
and institutional divisions."
28
Shapln's account of the Edinburgh phrenology debates is part
of a debate he himself had with G. Cantor.
29
The Cantor-Shapin
confrontation especially repays close examination because i t Is a
head-on clash of two diametrically opposed ways of
understanding science. While Shapln accounts for the episode in
terms of social factors, Cantor, who Is much more of a
traditional intellectual historian, looks to the evidence, the
arguments, and the reasons which were adduced for each side.
Cantor criticizes Shapln's sociological account for a number
of reasons. On the one hand he disputes some of the details
such as Shapln's claim that there was an Increase of social
tension at the time; he also notes that the overlap of the
memberships of the "elite" Royal Society of Edinburgh and the
Phrenological Society was not negligible as Shapln claims. 8ut
Cantor's other charges are of a more general programmatic and
philosophical nature: What is the relation between the content
of the beliefs and social factors? Shapln has not spelled out
the connection. Why should one look, as Snap in demands, to
social conflict in order to explain intellectual conflict? The
main complaint coming from Cantor, however, is that Shapln has
failed to pay attention to the reasoning processes that went on
and to the evidence which was available. In other words, he
has failed to take the Intellectual content of the Edinburgh
phrenology debates seriously.
(3) Farley and Geison on the Politics of Spontanious Generation.
Louis Pasteur and Felix Pouchet had a famous debate over
18 James Robert Brown
spontaneous generation which lasted for about five years during
the middle of the nineteenth century. Contrary to traditional
accounts of this famous episode In the history of science, John
Farley and Gerald Gelson "believe that (their) reexamination of
the Pasteur-Pouchet debate reveals the direct influence of
extrinsic factors on the conceptual content of serious
science".
30
Spontaneous generation, In a nutshell, is the doctrine that
living organisms can arise independently, without parents, from
either Inorganic matter (ablogenesls) or from organic debris
(heterogenesis). Typical historical accounts claim that Pouchet
set out with preconceived ideas favouring spontaneous generation
while Pasteur, with his flawless experimental technique,
destroyed the doctrine by doing a series of conclusive tests. It
is quite a different picture that Farley and Gelson present.
In the middle of the nineteenth centruy, France was a
politically conservative, even reactionary, country. Louis
Napoleon had come to power In 1848 with the support of the
Catholic Church; and religious and political Issues were
Inseparable. Church and state faced perceived common
enemies: republicanism and atheism. Indeed, very often atheists,
positivlsts, and materialists truly were opposed to both church
and state. (One striking Instance Is Clmence Royer who
translated Darwin's Origin in 1864. In her preface she explicitly
attacked the Catholic Church calling It corrupt, ignorant, and
responsible for all societal Ills.) Generally, there were
considerable social tensions, and these were reflected in people's
attitudes toward science.
The Pasteur-Pouchet debate can be said to begin with the
appearance In 1859 of Pouchet's Heterogenic, ou traite de la
generation spontane. Aware of the political climate that he
was working in, Pouchet made explicit disclaimers of atheism
and offered a prolonged justification of his claim that his
account of the theory of spontaneous generation was perfectly
compatible with orthodox science and orthodox religion. His
version of the theory posited a "plastic force" which was
capable of organizing molecules In special ways and endowing
them with vitality. It was an egg, not an adult organism, which
was spontaneously generated in this way. In defending himself
against possible religious challenges, Pouchet claimed that
The Sociological Turn 19
scripture did not contradict his claim that God might be always
creating l i fe; there is no reason to think that he stopped after
the sixth day.
Pasteur's background to the debate is characterised by
curiously contradictory trends, according to Farley and Geison.
On the one hand, Pasteur had done a great deal of work on
fermentation. In his work he needed to face the Issue of the
origin of the organisms responsible for the process. Pasteur was
arguing against any chemical theory of fermentation, and so he
had to argue that the organisms pre-existed and did not arise
heterogenetically. His later attack on Pouchet would seem to
be of a piece with his views on fermentation.
However, Pasteur also did a great deal of work in
crystallography where he had become convinced that molecular
asymmetry (which manifested itself in optical phenomena) was
intimately connected to l i fe. Pasteur speculated that the force
which brought molecular asymmetry about, an asymmetric force,
was a kind of ordinary physical force. Al l of this, of course,
suggests that abiogenesis could occur under ordinary mechanistic
circumstances. Indeed, in his laboratory Pasteur tried to
"Imitate nature" and to "Introduce asymmetry Into chemical
phenomena".
31
Concerning all of this, Farley and Geison remark:
In fact, of course, Pasteur did not succeed In creating
asymmetry or l i fe and temporarily abandoned these
experiments. But he continued to believe that abiogenesis
should be possible under some such exprimentai
conditions. He thus came Into the debate over
spontaneous generation faced with a curious dilemma. On
the one hand, his work on fermentation led him to
discount the possibility of heterogenesls, while on the
other his theoretical views on asymmetry and life led him
not only to believe in the possibility of abiogenesis but
actually to attempt such a feat experimentally. If It
seems illogical simultaneously to believe that life can be
produced artificially from inorganic elements but not from
a rich organic soup, i t Is essential to recall that Pasteur
reached this paradoxical position as the result of two
quite separate research problems and to emphasize the
20 James Robert Brown
distinction in his mind between symmetric chemical
influences and asymmetric physical forces. Nevertheless,
and this Is the central point, Pasteur could deny the
possibility of spontaneous generation only by suppressing
part of his own scientific beliefs.
32
Pasteur's political views were in complete harmony with the
orthodoxies of the Second Empire, which is to say he was very
conservative. He was a strong supporter of Louis Napoleon,
dedicating a book to the Emperor and another to the Empress.
And in turn he benefited greatly from Imperial favour. He once
ran for the senate as a conservative and as a champion of the
established order. Pasteur, according to Farley and Geison, had
a "general preference for order and stability over free speech,
civil liberty or even democracy, whose potential for anarchy and
mediocrity he feared".
3
* It was this strong conservative political
stance which influenced Pasteur to take the scientific stance
that he adopted. In conclusion, Farley and Geison say:
Remarkably enough, we are led to a conclusion precisely
the opposite of that usually attached to the
Pasteur-Pouchet debate. For we are persuaded that
external factors influenced Pasteur's research and
scientific judgement more powerfully than they did the
defeated Pouchet. Having formulated his version of
spontaneous generation prior to the politically significant
Darwinian controversy in France, Pouchet maintained his
views with striking consistency In spite of their presumed
threat to orthodox religious and political beliefs which he
fully shared. By contrast, Pasteur's public posture on the
Issue seems to reveal a quite high degree of sensitivity to
reigning socio-political orthdoxies.
3
*
This cases study has been criticised by Nils Roll-Hanson
(1979) who claims external factors counted for l i ttl e in the
debate. 35
There are a number of other examples which I could have
just as easily given, for instance, the studies by T. Brown, D.
MacKenzie, H. Collins, M. Mulkay, or any of those appearing In
Barnes and Shapin (eds. 1979). (See the bibliography for
22 James Robert Brown
questions.
The opening salvos by Laudan and by Bloor provide the main
point of departure for most of the remaining contributions.
Gary Gutting provides a considerable amount of clarificatory
analysis in "The Strong Programme: A Dialogue". In particular,
he distinguishes between two types of explanation of belief and
thereby sheds some light on what is, and is not, really at issue
in the debate between philosophers and sociologists.
In his contribution, "Problems of Intelligibility and Paradigm
Instances", Barry Barnes worries about antagonists, such as Bloor
and Laudan, talking past one another. He is somewhat
optimistic, however, that a few paradigm case studies should go
a long way toward clarifying and then settling the debate.
Ernan McMullin calls for a middle course In "The Rational
and the Social in the History of Science". He sees Laudan and
Bloor as both being extremists. Presumptions of unrestricted
rationality or unrestricted social causation are both unwarranted,
he says.
In "A Plague on Both Your Houses", Ian Jarvle, like some
other contributors to this volume, wants to set out on an
entirely different course. Laudan and Bloor both accept the
internal/external distinction (with Laudan claiming that most
science falls under the first heading and Bloor claiming that It
all falls under the second). The problem, as Jarvle sees i t , Is
with the distinction itself. Give that up, he says, and we will
have quite a different view of science from that presented by
either Laudan or Bloor.
Andrew Lugg's "Two Historiographie Strategies" considers
various aspects of the sociological turn and counters several of
the standard arguments put forward for the Edinburgh school's
way of approaching history. He largely favours the methods and
techniques of the traditional historians of science.
In the only paper In this volume to provide a detailed case
study, Robert Butts sides mainly with Laudan and the
rationalists. As reason for doing so, he cites the interesting and
unusual case of Kant and ESP. In his analysis he is critical of
an earlier sociological attempt to account for Kant's actions.
Instead, using machinery developed in the Gutting article, he
concludes on the side of the rationalists.
Jerry Gaston finds himself in sympathy with small points that
24 James Robert Brown
serve as a sort of evidence. If this is so, then how do they
function as evidence? No Individual case study could serve as a
crucial experiment, for i t is conceded by the rationalist that
some episodes In the history of science were not rational.
Thus, some would require a sociological (or other external)
explanation. So how then does a case study support one side or
the other?
These are just a few of the many real problems which
remain open, problems which have a definite bearing on the
outcome of the debate over how best to understand science.
There has been a growing interest in these sorts of issues In
recent years, and this is a turn of events we can only
welcome. If a greater number of historians, philosophers, and
sociologists work on these problems, then so much greater will
be our eventual understanding of science.
Department of Philosophy
University of Toronto
Notes
1. Philosophers typically use "knowledge" to mean something
like true justified belief. Accordingly, the sociology of
knowledge might better be called "the sociology of
belief". However, I shall follow the sociologists' custom
of using "knowledge" six.' "bel i ef interchangably.
2. Mannheim, ideology and Utopia, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1936.
3. ibid.., p. 150.
4. Ibid., p. 243.
5. Stark, "The Sociology of Knowledge," Edwards (ed.) The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 7, Collier Macmillan,
1967, p. 477.
6. Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 197 7, p. 23. Kuhn has been very
influential in this regard sn much so that Barnes has just
written a new book, 7.5. Kuhn and Social Science, which
uses Kuhn to justify a souolcgical approach to science.
7. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Freepress,
The Sociological Turn 25
1968, p. 516.
8. Laudan, Progress and Its Problems, University of
California Press, 1977, p. 202.
9. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 238.
10. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1976, p. 1.
11. Ibid., p. 5
12. ibid, p. 40.
13. ibid., p. 3.
14. Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 25.
15. See, for example, Feyerabend, 1975; Kuhn, 1970; Quine,
1953, 1960.
16. Bloor, loc. cite., p. 13.
17. See especially chapter 2.
18. Barnes, T. 5. Kuhn and Social Science, p. 30. See also
Barnes 1980 for an elaboration of this theme.
19. Forman, "Weimar Culture and Causality" in Historical
Studies In the Physical Sciences, McCormmich (d.), 1971.
20. ibid., p. 55.
21. Ibid., p. 62.
22. ibid., p. 109f.
23. ibid., p. H2f.
24. J. Hendry, "Weimar Culture and Quantum Causality",
History of Science, xviii (1980).
25. S. Shapin, "Phrenological Knowledge and the Social
Structure of Early Nineteenth-Century Edinburgh," Annals
of Science, 32 (1975), pp. 219-243.
26. ibid., p. 224.
27. ibid., P. 232.
28. ibid., p. 234.
29. G. Cantor, "Phrenology in Early Nineteenth-Century
Edinburgh: An Historiographical Discussion," Annals of
Science, 32 (1975), pp. 195-218 and "A Critique of
Shapin's Social Interpretation of the Edinburgh Phrenology
Debate," Annals of Science, 33 (1975), pp. 245-256.
30. Farley and Geison, "Science, Politics and Spontaneous
Generation In Nineteenth-Century France: The
Pasteur-Pouchet Debate," Bulletin of the History of
26 James Robert Brown
Medicine, 48, 1974, pp. 161-198. Passage quoted from
p. 162.
31. Ibid., p. 178.
32. fold* p. 178f.
33. Ibid., p. 187.
34. Ibid., p. 197.
35. Nils Roll-Hansen (1979) "Experimental Method and
Spontanious Generation: The Controversy between Pasteur
and Pouchet, 1859-64. Journal of the History of Medicine,
34, pp. 273-292.
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Larry Laudan
"To ask questions of the sort which philosophers address
to themselves Is usually to paralyse the mind...." David Bloor
1
1. Introduction
2. The Attack on 'Philosophical' Views of Belief
3. The 'Scientific' Character of the Strong programme
4. The True, the Rational and the Successful
4.1 Eplstemlc Symmetry
4.2 Rational Symmetry
4.3 Pragmatic Symmetry
5. The Avowed Primacy of the 'Sociological Turn'
6. Conclusion
1. Introduction
After several decades of benign neglect, the content of
science has once again come under the scrutinous gaze of the
sociologist of knowledge. Aberrant Marxists, structuralists,
Habermaslans, 'archeologists of knowledge' and a host of others
have begun to argue (or, sometimes, to presume largely without
argument) that we can give a sociological account of why
scientists adopt virtually all of the specific beliefs about the
world which they do. More than this, It Is often claimed that
only via sociology (or Its cognates, anthropology and
archaeology) can we hope to acquire a 'scientific' understanding
of science itself. The older sociological tradition, which tended
to take a hands-off policy where 'sound* scientific belief was
concerned, has been variously indicted by the new wave as
lacking the courage of Its convictions, treating science as
41
/. R. Brown fed.), Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn, 41- 73.
1984 by Philosophy of the Social Science*.
The Pseudo-science of Science? 43
think was intended to be approached, as a set of regulative
principles about what sort of theories sociologists should aspire
to. Its four constituent 'theses' are designed as constraints on
the theories which are admissible into sociology. It is important
to understand this about the character of the strong programme,
since one evaluates regulative principles differently than one
evaluates specific theories about social structure and social
process, programmatic pronouncements, and here the strong
programme is no exception, are generally too amorphous to be
put directly to empirical test. They are judged rather by what
we may call their plausibility. We ask: Is It reasonable to adopt
such constraints? Are there any arguments for preferring the
proposed demands rather than other conflicting requirements?
Knowledge and Social Imagery Is simultaneously a sustained
tirade against philosophers of almost all persuasions and a
lengthy articulation of a 'new' and ambitious programme for the
sociology of knowledge. The two themes are not unconnected.
As Bloor sees It, philosophers (under the guises of 'eplstemology'
and 'philosophy of science') have attempted to monopolize the
cognitive study of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge,
leaving only the fringes and dregs the Irrational residuum
to psychologists and sociologists. * Hoping to beat philosophers at
their own territorial game, Bloor sets out to re-define the
disciplinary boundaries for the study of science, giving sociology
pride of place, leaving a limited scope for psychology, and
dealing philosophers, on the strength of their prior track record,
largely out of the new game altogether. Bloor's 'strong
programme in the sociology of knowledge' is ostensibly a set of
principles about how sociologists should approach the problem of
explaining scientific belief. Beyond that, It entails that (what
Bloor takes to be) the dominant philosophical approach to
knowledge is hopelessly unscientific, non-naturalistic and
unempirlcal; to make matters worse, philosophers have become
proponents of a 'mystical' view of knowledge, the chief function
of which is to preserve the 'sacred' character of science in the
face of sociologists who might profane i t.
Whenever philosophers and sociologists of knowledge discuss
such matters, there is scope for a great deal of smugness and
self-righteousness on both sides. Quite apart from the rival
disciplinary interests which are at stake, both parties can
The Pseudo-science of Science? 45
II). Bloor has not established that any elements of the
strong programme are more 'scientific' than their contraries;
i l l ). Quite apart from their scientific status, the theses of
the strong programme are of very different sorts. Some are so
unproblematic as to be almost gratuitous. Others (specifically
the 'thesis of symmetry') are not made plausible by any of
Bloor's arguments and, if construed literally, would
fundamentally undermine existing explanatory mechanisms in
both philosophy and the social sciences. Limitations of space
and competence preclude any lengthy discussion of Bloor's
fascinating examples from the history and sociology of
mathematics; but that is no serious loss, since i t Is not Bloor's
sociology I want to take exception to but rather his
meta-sociology which I find unconvincing.
2. The Attack on 'Philosophical' Views of Belief
Bloor's central concern is with the explanation of scientific
belief, especially of what one might call-'theoretical belief (i.e.,
a belief In the theories and theoretical entitles which populate
the conceptual universes of natural scientists.)
5
Why is i t that
scientists came to hold the theoretical beliefs that they do?
This is, of course, one of the classical questions of eplstemology
and philosophy of science. As Bloor sees i t , however, the
philosopher makes a wrong turn at the outset. Before he seeks
to explain a belief, the philosopher attempts to determine Its
truth status and its rationality status (i.e., whether the belief is
reasonable or rational). Depending upon the answer to those
evaluative inquiries, the philosopher wi l l adopt radically different
approaches to explaining the belief. If the philosopher Is a
teleologist' (and Bloor evidently thinks most are), he wi l l Insist
that no explanation whatever can be given for true or rational
beliefs. The 'teleologist' Insists that such beliefs just happen,
that they are literally uncaused. It is only false or irrational
beliefs for which an explanation can appropriately be sought.
As Bloor summarizes the 'teleological' position:
The general structure of these explanations stands out
clearly. They all divide behavior or belief into two
types: right and wrong, true or false, rational or
46 Larry Laudan
Irrational. They then invoke causes to explain the
negative side of the division. Causes explain error,
limitation and deviation. The positive side of the
evaluative divide Is quite different.... Here causes do not
need to be involved. 6
The so-called empiricist', by contrast, believes that
explanations can be given for both true and false beliefs, as
well as for rational and Irrational ones. But he insists that true
beliefs have different sorts of causes than false ones and that
rational beliefs are produced differently from irrational ones.
What both teleologists and empiricists share in common is a
conviction that an appraisal of the eplstemlc status and the
rationality status of a belief Is relevant to the mechanisms (if
any) which we subsequently invoke to explain that belief. As
we shall see, i t will be Bloor's claim that this manner of
proceeding Is Intrinsically
,
unsclentlfic'. Indeed, Bloor will go on
to object not only to these prior appraisals, but to any use of
the epistemic or rationality status of a belief in Its
explanation. Although Bloor has this crucial bone to pick with
both teleologists and empiricists, he is particularly scornful of
the teleologlst for the latter's Insistence that true and rational
beliefs are uncaused. This teleologlcal model violates another
of Bloor's 'scientific' theses: specifically, the claim that all
beliefs are caused.
If Bloor's caricatures were to be accepted, we should believe
that most philosophers (being 'teleologists') have malntaianed
that there is literally nothing that causes us to believe what is
true and that nothing is causally responsible for rational action
and rational belief. But Bloor's analysis of the philosophical
tradition will not stand up to scrutiny. For as long as we know
anything about the history of philosophy, eplstemologlsts have
been concerned to explain how to discover the true and the
rational. The suggestion that most philosophers have believed
that true beliefs just happen, that rational behavior Is uncaused,
that only 'aberrant* belief Is part of the world's causal nexus, Is
hard to take seriously.
It Is true that many philosophers have suggested that true or
rational beliefs are not to be attributed to sociological causes.
But unless we are to Imagine that sociology has a monopoly on