___________________________________________________________

THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

DECEMBER 2009
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All personal property is the product of some man's labor, and whether the owner
has acquired it by his own labor, by inheritance or by exchange, his interest is a
vested right of the most unlimited character. He does not hold it by any favor of
the state, and in consequence of his possession of it he has assumed no peculiar
obligation to the state. He has the right, therefore, to acquire it in any manner
that he pleases, provided in so doing he does not interfere with or threaten the
rights of others. Footnote: The term "personal property," it must be observed, is used in this
connection in the sense of chattels personal, including movable property of all kinds, ...

Christopher Gustavus Tiedeman

The less than penurious authorities cited throughout this writing,

though seemingly redundant, are not attendant of an obstreperous
mentality; yet are instead meant to emphatically impress the all but
forgotten law and the expression of our Rights to the free and
unobstructed use of the highways. This information is not intended
to belay comity, scruples, respect, consideration or empathy for fellow
travelers or abate or avoid law or policy where and when applicable.
 CREDITS--------RESOURCES

American Juris Prudence (1st)

American Juris Prudence 2d
American Law Review
Attorney General Opinion 61-62 No. 46, Washington
Attorney General Opinion 96-57, Florida
Attorney General Opinion 96-045, Ohio
Author unknown-World Wide Web Internet source
Author unknown-World Wide Web Internet source
Ballentines Law Dictionary
Ballinger' code-Washington
Black's Law Dictionary
Blackstone's Commentary
Bouvier's Law Dictionary
Century Dictionary
Chamberlaynes Modern Law of Evidence
Code of Federal Regulation
Cooley on Taxation, 3d Ed.
Constitution of the State of Washington
Constitution of the United States of America
Corpus Juris Secundum
Driver Licensing Law Annotated, 1980
Epstein’s, Casenote-Legal Briefs/Torts
Federal Administrative Procedure Source Book, 4th Ed.
Freund, Police Power
Georgia State University College of Law
Hare, on Constitution
Hill' code-Washington
Huddy On Automobiles 6th Ed.
Huddy Automobile Law 9th Ed.
John MacArthur McGuire, Harvard Legal Essays
Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases,Vol 8
Judicial rulings and opinions (miscellaneous, contained herein)
Merriam Webster Ninth Collegiate Dictionary
Michigan Law Review
Pierce' code-Washington
Remington' code-Washington
Revised Code of Washington
State Control of Trade and Commerce-By National or State Authority, by Albert Stickney
State of Washington, Department of Licensing
Statutes in Courts-The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation; by William D. Popkin
The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles, Babbitt
The Legal Nature of a Driver's License, by John H. Reese
Transportation Law Journal
Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power in the United States; by Christopher G. Tiedeman
Uniform Commercial Code
Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic Ordinance
United States Code
U.S. Dept. of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Washington Administrative Code
Washington Court Rules-State
Washington State Legislature
Washington Uniform Court Docket
Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia International Illustrated Edition
Yale Law Journal
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Definitions. p. 5
A list of dictionary and statute definitions.

Right to Travel, Freedom of Movement, p. 9

Methods and Modes of Locomotion,
Use of Streets and Highways.
A break down explanation of common law authority
Supporting the Right to use the roadways.

Police Authority. p. 37
Just what and how much authority do the police
really have concerning common law travel.

Due Process, Void for Vagueness. p. 46

The requirements of Notice, and when notice fails.

Federal Preemption. p. 55
Which laws have superior authority,
and which ones take a back seat.

Municipal Regulation. p. 60
Which laws have superior authority,
and which ones take a back seat.

The Whole Act Rule, p. 66

and 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius'.
What the statutes don’t tell, could hurt.
What judges and attorneys won’t tell.

Statute History. p. 78
It didn’t all begin with the statute laws of the state.

Taxation. p. 93
What the annual vehicle tab costs really pay for.

Constitutional (charter) Authority, p. 99

Understanding the Contract.
Where the state gets authority to demand license plates
and a driver license.
Driving. p. 110
Are you really driving, and did you know?
Ignorance of the law is no excuse.

Licensing. p. 121
What license plates and drivers license really means.

Anatomy of a Traffic Infraction. p. 140

Why drivers never win in court.

Tort Liability. p. 145

If the state doesn’t have authority,
will the police force you against your consent?

Public Disclosure p. 157

Definitely maybe positively almost certainly kind of
an admission from the state.

Because she lived through the assaults and insults from many cops,
in the name of the law;
She has lost many days in jail and had many vehicles stolen from her,
in the name of the law;
She has lost jobs and been subject to stressful community humiliation,
in the name of the law;

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED TO MY DAUGHTER, ECHO;

NOW WE KNOW THE TRUTH

All thanks and appreciation to friends and family

who helped prepare and edit this writing.
 DEFINITIONS

Citation. JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES,

VOLUME 8; WEST PUBLISHING CO. , 1905
A citation is a writ of the court, addressed to an officer of the court, and commands him to do
certain things.

Commerce.
From L. commercium "trade, trafficking"; from com- "together" + merx (gen. mercis)
"merchandise" (see market). From commerce, "pertaining to trade"; meaning "done for the sake
of financial profit". Commodity, from commodité "benefit, profit," from L. commoditatem

Constitution.
The term CONSTITUTION when used here in this writing may also be represented by the term
CHARTER, and as such, the terms are interchangeable.

Constructive Contract.
"A constructive contract is where duty defines it instead of the contract defining the duty to be
performed. Constructive contracts are fictions of law adopted to enforce the legal duties by
actions of Contract where no proper contract exists, express or Implied."
Graham v. Cummings, 57 Atl. 943, 208 Pa. 616 (citing Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. [5 Casey] 465).

Convey. Merriam Webster Ninth Collegiate,

To transfer or deliver to another; to cause to pass from one place or person to another; transmit.

Conveyance. Merriam Webster Ninth Collegiate,

b. an instrument by which title to property is conveyed

Driver. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, (1914) p. 940.

One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle..."

Driver. Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed

One employed in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses,
mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car.
See Davis v. Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654, 21 So. 344, 36 L.R.A. 615; Isaacs v. Railroad Co., 7 Am.
Rep. 418, 47 N.Y. 122;

Driver. Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed, 1951

One employed...

License. The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §83, @141

In Webster’s Dictionary we find a “license” defined as: Authority or liberty given to do or forbear
any act; especially a formal permission from the proper authorities to perform certain acts or to
carry on a certain business, which without such permission would be illegal.
License. Bouvier's 3rd Ed., 1984
In Governmental Regulation. Authority to do some act or carry on some trade or business, in
it's nature lawful but prohibited by statute, except with the permission of the civil authority or
which would otherwise be unlawful.

Operating Motor Vehicle. Ballentines Law Dictionary, 1969

Exercising control over the vehicle, although not at the time in the drivers seat.

Private. Merriam Webster Ninth Collegiate

1.a. intended for or restricted to the use of a particular person group or class.
b. belonging to or concerning an individual person, company, or interest.

Private.
c.1380, from L. privatus "set apart, belonging to oneself" (not to the state), used in contrast to
publicus, communis; originally pp. stem of privare "to separate, deprive," from privus "one's
own, individual," from Old L. pri "before." Meaning "not open to the public".

Privilege.
from L. privilegium "law applying to one person"; from privus "individual" + lex "law."
A right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage or favor.

Public Road.
A road way existing for the free and unrestricted use of all common people, is a public road.
Heninger v. Peery 47 S.E. 1013, 102 Va. 896

Register.
From L. regesta, neuter pl. of regestus, pp. of regerere "to record", literally, "to carry back," from
re- "back" + gerere "carry, bear."

Register. Merriam Webster Ninth Collegiate,

Means “enrollment”.

Register. Blacks 7th ed.

To enter in a public registry

Service. Rev. Code of Washington 63.14.010

...services for which the price charged is required by law to be determined or approved by or to
be filed, subject to approval or disapproval, with the United States or any state, or any
department, division, agency, officer, or official of either as in the case of transportation services.

Traffic. Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia

International Illustrated Edition (1960)
1. Business or trade, commerce. 2. Transportation.
3. The movement of vehicles on street or highway...
Traffic. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856)
Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money and the like.

Traffic. Black's Law Dictionary 3rd

Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the like. The passing of
goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money.

Traffic. Black's Law Dictionary 6th

Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the like. The passing or
exchange of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods and
money. The subjects of transportation on a route, as persons or goods; the passing to and fro of
persons, animals, vegetables, or vessels, along a route of transportation, as along a street,
highway, etc.

Transportation. Webster's Unified Dictionary and Encyclopedia

International Illustrated Edition (1960)
1. The act or business of moving passengers and goods.

Transportation. Black's Law Dictionary 3rd

The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.
Under Interstate Commerce Act, (49 USCA sec. 1 et seq.), "transportation" includes the entire body of services
rendered by a carrier in connection with the receipt, handling, and delivery of property transported, and includes the
furnishing of cars.

Transportation.
The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.
Interstate Commerce Comm. v Brimson 154 US 447, 14 S.Ct.1125

Transportation. Black's 6th

The movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.

Transportation. 49 USC 5102 (12)

"transports" or "transportation" means the movement of property and loading, unloading, or
storage incidental to the movement.

Travel. Century Dictionary

To journey or to pass through or over; as a country district, road, etc. To go from one place to
another, whether on foot, or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile, carriage,
ship, or aircraft; Make a journey."

Traveler. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed.

One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or health."
Locket v State, 47 Ala. 45;
USC Title18 §31(6) Motor vehicle.
The term "motor vehicle" means every description of carriage or other contrivance
propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the
highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or
cargo.

USC Title49 §30301(4)

``motor vehicle'' means a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semi trailer propelled or
drawn by mechanical power and used on public streets, roads, or highways, but does not
include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.

RCW 46.04.320
"Motor vehicle" means every vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is
propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon
rails.

RCW 81.80.010(9)
"Vehicle" means every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in,
upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public
highway, except devices moved by human or animal power or used exclusively upon
stationary rail or tracks.

RCW 46.04.670
"Vehicle" includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, `
upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a
public highway, including bicycles.

RCW 81.04.010(4)
Common carrier" means any person who undertakes to transport property for the general
public by motor vehicle for compensation, whether over regular or irregular routes, or
regular or irregular schedules, including motor vehicle operations of other carriers by rail
or water and of express or forwarding companies.

RCW 81.04.010(14)
"Transportation of property" includes any service in connection with the receiving,
delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration, icing, storage, and
handling of the property transported, and the transmission of credit.

RCW 81.04.010(15)
"Transportation of persons" includes any service in connection with the receiving,
carriage, and delivery of persons transported and their baggage and all facilities used, or
necessary to be used in connection with the safety, comfort, and convenience of persons
transported.
 RIGHT TO TRAVEL, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT,
METHODS AND MODES OF LOCOMOTION
USE OF STREETS AND HIGHWAYS

The constitutional Right of individuals, in the exercise of their liberty interests, by

claiming their Right to travel, in this writing, is a one hundred year old concept, as it relates to
the introduction and evolution of the automobile industry, and an individuals necessarily
impetuous need to travel the common highways. As indicated herein, the highways were
established for the use of the general public.

Streets and highways are established and maintained primarily for purposes of
travel by the public and incidental uses.

Am Jur 2d Highways, Streets and Bridges §227, citing Birmingham Ry.

Light and Power Company v Smyer 181 Ala 121, 61 So 354

The term travel is a generic and broad term. The phrase “incidental uses” in the above
citation means the use of the highways as a means of personal gain, discussed later on. It is now,
and has been known, that traveling is of two basic categories: those who travel in a personal
capacity for pleasure and those who travel the public highways incident thereto for profit.

... the terms “travel” and” traveler” are usually construed in their broad and
general sense where used in this connection, rather than in a narrow and restricted
one, and the duty and consequent liability is extended so as to include all those
who rightfully use the highways viatically, and who have occasion to pass over
them for the purpose of business, convenience, or pleasure.

Van Cleef v. Chicago, 240 Ill 318, 88 NE 815,

23 LRA(NS) 636, 130 Am St Rep 275;

Traveling for pleasure connotes the movement from one place to another for ones own
enjoyment, as in the case of visiting friends and relatives. However, it is undisputed that the use
of common highways is also for general purposes. Those common purposes may include, but are
in no way limited to traveling to or from the following places: doctor, veterinarian, grocer,
hardware store, beach picnic, coffee stand, work, movie, funeral, convenience mart, bank, school,
families homes, dinner out, sporting events, etc.
 A distinction may also be made between private carriers who transport their own
property for compensation and those who transport their own property without
compensation. The use upon the public highways of motor vehicles engaged in
transportation for hire may be prohibited restricted or conditioned by the
controlling public authority. Highways are public avenues for use by the entire
public for their private and personal purposes and the use of a highway for profit
and gain may be restricted.

Stephenson v Binford 287 US 251, 53 S Ct 181

"...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary
control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power may
absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private
business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the
ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the
streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business for private
gain. The former is a common Right; the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the
former, the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter, it is
plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by
a common carrier in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a
mere license of privilege."

Hadfield v Lundin, 98 Wash 657, 168 P. 516

The use of the highways for the purpose of transporting persons or property for
hire by the ordinary means is incidental to and consistent with the primary
purpose of their establishment [highways] and is therefore a proper use in the
absence of any restricted regulation. Such use is not however one which may be
exercise as of right but is a special or permissive use.
A street is a road or public way in a city town or village. A way over land
set apart for public travel in a town or city is a street no matter by what name it
may be called. It is the purpose for which it is laid out and the use made of it that
determines its character. As the way is common and free to all people it is a
highway and it is proper to affirm that all streets are highways although not all
highways are streets.

Huddy On Automobiles §26

 Rem. Rev. Stat., §10512 [P. C. §5639], reads in part as follows:
" . . all state and county roads, streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, parkways, and
other public places actually open and in use, or to be opened and used, for travel
by the public,"
further...
"A highway is a way open to the public at large, for travel or transportation,
without distinction, discrimination, or restriction, except such as is incident to
regulations calculated to secure to the general public the largest practical benefit
there from and enjoyment thereof. Its prime essentials are the right of common
enjoyment on the one hand and the duty of public maintenance on the other. It is
the right of travel by all the world, and not the exercise of the right, which
constitutes a way a public highway, and the actual amount of travel upon it is not
material. If it is open to all who desire to use it, it is a public highway although it
may accommodate only a limited portion of the public or even a single family,
although it accommodates some individuals more than others."
[citing] 25 Am. Jur. 339, §2
"Highways are public ways as contra–distinguished from private ways. The
distinguishing mark of a highway is that it must be opened generally to public
use, as expressed in the English books, 'common to all the king's subjects,'
although it is the right to travel upon a highway by all the world and not the
exercise of the right which makes the way a highway. It's character is not
determined by the number of persons who actually use it for passage; if it is open,
it is immaterial that but few individuals are in a position to make use of it, or that
one person is most benefited by it; and its character as a highway is not affected
even by the fact that it furnishes access or egress to but a single property owner."
[citing] 29 CJS 366, §1

State of Washington, in re Oregon- Washington Railroad& Navigation

Company et al. v. Walla Walla County et al., 5 Wn.2d 95,

To further proliferate the fundamental liberty that is the Right to travel the common
highways is the language below. In the first sentence, in italics, the court uses the language
“existence, creates, permits, will”. These words are proof positive as declared by the courts, that
one has a constitutional liberty interest in the free uninhibited use of the public highways. To
exemplify these words, they become the epitome of divinity. Existence is existential, creates is
creation or creator, permits is permission, will is liberty or freedom. The pinnacle summation of
the forgoing, in strict text, reads: “existence from creation is existential permission by our
creator to the free use”. Remembering that phrase, we understand the dominate introversion of
private traveling versus the extroversion of traveling for hire and/or commercial travel.
 The existence of a public highway creates a public easement of travel which
permits the general traveling public to use the highway at will. All persons have
an equal right to use highways for purposes of travel by proper means, and with
due regard for the corresponding rights of others. Italic mine

Am Jur 2d Highways Streets and Bridges §228, citing

Town of Ridgefield v Eppoliti Realty Co, Inc. 71 Conn. App 321,
801 A 2d 902; State v Mayo 106 Me 62, 75 A 295; see also Williamson v
Garrigus 228 Ark 705, 310 SW 2d 8.

Hence a traveler as such may occupy and use any part of the highway he or she
desires when not needed by another whose rights thereto are superior to his own.

Am Jur 2d Automobiles §10.

The right of locomotion has also been held to be a part of the liberty guaranteed
by the due process clauses.

U.S. v Laub 385 US 475, 87 SCT 574.

The United States Supreme Court has held that "the right of locomotion, the right
to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of
personal liberty."

Williams v. Fears 179 U.S. 270, 21 S. Ct.128; see Papachristou v.

Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164, 92 S. Ct. 839; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S.
116, 126, 78 S. Ct. 1113; see also Johnson v. City of Cincinnati 310 F.3d
484, 6th Cir. 2002 (Constitution protects right to travel locally through
public spaces and roadways).

The right of the public to use a street for travel is greater than that of an
individual to occupy it for other purposes.

Am Jur 2d Highway Streets and Bridges §230.

The evolution of the highways dates back centuries, but this writing is confined to the 20th
century. The “road” is what our grandfathers' grandfathers traveled to survey and settle this
continent. It was traveled by horse, mule and wagon. Those people were not required to have a
driver license to travel the roads, albeit they were drivers, drivers of mule teams, etc. As noted
below, one may choose the method and or mode of transportation which is most prudent to, and
for his particular needs, not prohibited by law. Provided the use of said vehicle does not
transcend to commerce.

It is therefore the adaptation and use rather than the form or kind of contrivance
that concerns the courts. Italic mine

Huddy On Automobiles 6th Ed., Citing

Indiana Springs Company v Brown 165 Ind 465, 74 NE 615

The public easement includes every kind of travel and communication for the
movement or transportation of persons or property which is reasonable and
proper in the use of a public highway, or of a particular portion thereof, with all
means of conveyance which can be introduced with a reasonable regard for the
safety and convenience of the public, and without inflicting upon the owner of,
the fee, an injury differing in kind from that imposed by use and improvement for
ordinary public travel, and embraces all public travel, not prohibited by law, or
by dedicatory restriction, on foot, in carriages, omnibuses, stages, sleighs, or
other vehicles, including motor vehicles, as the wants and habits of the publics
demand. The public is not confined, to the use of vehicles in use at the time
when the streets or highways were established, but may use such other reasonable
means of conveyance as may be discovered in the future, provided they do not
exclude the proper use of the highway by other modes or kinds of vehicles, or
tend to destroy it as a means of passage and travel common to all.

The use of such new and improved means of locomotion must be deemed to have
been contemplated when the highways and streets were laid out or dedicated,
whenever it is found that the general benefit requires it, and such new means
of locomotion cannot be excluded there from or be deemed unlawful merely
because their use may tend to the inconvenience or even to the injury of those
who continue to use the highways and streets by former methods.
Emphasis mine Italic mine
25 Am Jur Highways §165.

A citizen has an absolute right to choose his mode of conveyance provided he

observes all of the laws of the road.

Swift v Topeka 43 Kan 671, 23 P 1075.

 One may transport his goods over the highway in wagons, automobiles, or other
vehicles, loaded thereon or therein as he may deem best, provided that in so
transporting them he uses the care that a prudent man would use; care
commensurate with the dangers created by his undertaking.

Ryder v. Hayward 98 Vt 106, 126 A 491, 36 ALR 453

"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways …. includes the
right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and
under the existing modes of travel…." Italic mine

Thompson v Smith 155 Va 367, 154 SE 579

It has also been recognized that as a village grows, the rights of the public in its
streets are correspondingly broadened. The easement of the public highway
is not limited to the particular use in vogue when the easement was acquired but
included all methods that are later developed...

Cloverdale Homes v Town of Cloverdale 182 Ala 419, 62 So 712.

Improved methods of locomotion are perfectly admissible... “pubic rights do not

depend upon the methods of travel recognized at the time the streets were opened
or such public uses as have been sanctioned by long continued custom and
acquiescence. The use of the streets must be extended to meet the new needs of
locomotion.” Italic mine

Huddy On Automobiles 6th Ed., citing

People v Field & Co. 266 Ill 609, 107 NE 864.

In all human activities the law keeps up with improvement and progress brought
about by discovery and invention and in respect to highways, if the introduction
of a new contrivance for transportation purposes is conducted with due care, the
contrivance is compatible with the general use and safety of the road.

Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §31

In the cases of Ryder and Swift supra, the court uses the term “provided”. There is no
proviso in the statutes discussing a uniform blanket general licensing scheme, applicable to
private travel. What is clear is that the primary intended use is for personal travel, consistent with
the proviso as to use by the general public, see Birmingham Ry. Light and Power Company v
Smyer supra, by the usual and customary mode of transportation not inconsistent with the current
status of mobility, which is a legally and lawfully acceptable use.

The states duties and obligations with respect to the safety of streets and other
public ways are limited to keeping them reasonably safe for the uses for which
they are intended, and for those who travel upon them in the ordinary and
accustomed modes.

25 Am Jur HIGHWAYS §426, citing

Leber v King County, 69 Wash 134, 124 P 397, 42 LRA (NS) 267;
Lorence v Ellensburgh 13 Wash 341, 43 P 20, 52 Am St Rep 42;
Sutton v Snohomish, 11 Wash 24, 39 P 273, 48 Am St Rep 847

One of the most informational discussions on traveling, static constitutional issues

thereto, and the distinctions of private automobile use, in the latter century, may be found in the
following case. [Lutz] The state, by any agency, has not disputed and can not dispute any point
of law herein, but will incessantly default to the statutory phrase “drive a motor vehicle” or
“operate a motor vehicle”. This default motive claim, without objection, to the personal and
private use of an automobile for personal and private purposes, is for all intents and purposes a
tacit admission of the distinctions of personal use, without governmental interference, and the
“incidental use” for commerce, which is secondary systemic; discussed further herein.

The rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to go where one pleases and to

use the public streets in a way that does not interfere with the personal liberty of
others are basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment [citations omitted]. One may
be on the streets even though he is there merely for exercise, recreation, walking,
standing, talking, socializing, or any other purpose that does not interfere with
other persons' rights.
further,
No right is more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the liberty assurance of
the due process clause than the right of every citizen to the possession and control
of his own person, free from restraint or interference by the state. The makers of
our Constitution conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone --
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man.
Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford 141 U.S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000;
Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564. Uninhibited movement
 is essential to freedom. Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658, 662 W.D. Ky. 1967;
see Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 1964, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 12 L. Ed.
2D 992, Id. at 1254-55 (brackets added). See Papachristou, supra.
further,
We recognize that defendant would distinguish pedestrians strolling and meeting
on the sidewalk from persons operating motor vehicles on the streets but we
reject this argument. Motor vehicles are a lawful means of locomotion and
plaintiff has the right to drive himself where he pleases - to go where he wants
to go for whatever reason - if he is otherwise obeying the law, including relevant
traffic statutes and ordinances. Plaintiff has therefore asserted a valid liberty
interest. ..."intrastate travel" as we understand that phrase, encompasses the right
to migrate freely within a state.

Lutz v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 692 F. Supp. 457

It should be noted here that the court does not use the phrase “drive a motor vehicle” or
“operate a motor vehicle”, both of which have very clear contextual meanings in commerce. The
terms motor vehicle and drive are broad terms, and these terms should not be confined to
a single definition unless strictly done so by a legislative body. see Huddy and DLLA infra

The term travel is a broad term having two legally distinguishable meanings. One being
the statutory definitions listed herein which specifically clarify, that commercial travel is
accomplished when a person undertakes to deliver, using a public highway, that which has been
purchased, and accepts a fee for such delivery. The other, being normal everyday use, as
discussed above, by way of traveling public roads to connect oneself with the community. As the
Eggert court points out, traveling the highways is not based on the commerce clause.

The right to travel is a right applicable to intrastate as well as interstate

commerce. In as much as the right to travel is not based on the commerce clause,
it does not depend on the interstate nature of travel. Rights such as the right to
travel which involve personal liberty are not dependent on state lines. Both travel
within and between states is protected.

Eggert et al v City of Seattle 81 Wn 2d 840, citing King v New Rochelle

Municipal Housing Authority, 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Karp v
Collins, 310 F. Supp. 627, (D.N.J. 1970); see also Moen v Erlandson
80 Wn 2d 755; Frazer v Shelton 320 Ill. 253
 The Washington State Supreme Court understands the private right to use the public
roads. It was not unlike that expressed by the United States Supreme Court. The Boyd Court in
1886 stated thus: "It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.", Boyd v United States 116 U.S. 616,
which the Court reiterated again in 1961 in the case of Mapp v Ohio 367 U.S. 643. Justice
Tolman of the Washington Supreme Court termed this language:

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that
we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an
act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely
monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look
to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or
less rapid encroachment."

Robertson v Department of Public Works 180 Wash 133, 39 P.2d 596

The public roads have been monopolized by a foreign military [state police]. The "most
sacred of liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke is personal liberty. The definition of personal
liberty is;

"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the
fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a
guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or
dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote
and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred
and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property ... and is regarded
as inalienable.”

16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §202

This concept is further amplified by the American Jurisprudence Encyclopedia, 1st ed.;

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where

and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may
make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the
Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property
thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere
privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common
 Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under
normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in
public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent
manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be
protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct."

11Am.Jur.(1st) Constitutional Law §329

And further...
"Personal liberty -- consists of the power of locomotion, of changing situations,
of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, without
imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law."

Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed.;

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.;
Blackstone's Commentary 134;
Hare, Constitution, Pg. 777

Justice Tolman was concerned about the state prohibiting the Citizen from the "most
sacred of his liberties," the Right of movement, the Right of moving one's self from place to
place without threat of imprisonment, the Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of
life. When the state allows the formation of a public corporation business, it may control its
creation by establishing guidelines (statutes and charters) for its operation. Companies that use
the roads in the course of business do not use the roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a
difference between a corporation and an individual. The United States Supreme Court has stated;

"...We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between
an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit
its books and papers for examination on the suit of the state. The individual may
stand upon his Constitutional Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his
private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no
duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors
to investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty
to the state, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his
life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such as the law of the land long
antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by
due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his Rights
are the refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his
 property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of law. He owes nothing to
the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights."
further...
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to
be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges
and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations
of its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it
obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to
investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that the state, having chartered a corporation to
make use of certain franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire
how those franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and
demand the production of corporate books and papers for that purpose."

Hale v Hinkel 201 US 43

Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the State's admiralty
jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected from their activities, as they are engaged in
business for profit. In order to reach a full understanding of the Right versus "privilege", it is
important to know that courts have ruled consistently without ambiguity, no sacrifice exists;

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule
making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602

"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted into a

crime."

Miller v U.S. 230 F. 486

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise
of constitutional Rights."

Sherar v Cullen 481 F. 946

 Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of travel and
transportation by the public. Such travel may be for business or pleasure.

"The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a
mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the
individual cannot be rightfully deprived.
further...
Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the
highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or
pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public
interest and convenience."

25 Am. Jur. (1st) Highways, §163

Chicago Motor Coach Co. v Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 NE 22;
Ligare v Chicago 139 Ill. 436, 28 NE 934;
Boone v Clark 214 SW 607 Tex. Civ. App.

"The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his
property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or by automobile, is not a mere
privilege which a city can prohibit or permit at will, but a common Right which
he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways …. includes the
right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and
under the existing modes of travel…."

Thompson v Smith 155 Va 367, 154 SE 579

It is certain that a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the public highways by
automobile and the Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived of his Liberty. The courts have held that
a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways, but that he does not have the right to
conduct business upon the highways. The ill-conceived notion that the Right to use of the
common roads is always and only a privilege comes from, firstly, the ever threatening presence
of the police, followed by ignorant fear gotten gossip. The courts have stated it as follows:
 "... For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the
highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter
purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a
privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its
discretion."

State v Johnson 75 Mont 240, 243 P. 1073;

Cummins v Jones 79 )re 276, 155 P. 171;
Packard v Banton 264 US 140, 44 S. Ct. 256;
Hadfield v Lundin 98 Wash 657, 168 P. 516

"Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a Citizen has
the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property
thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or
in part, as a place of business for private gain."

Willis v Buck 81 Mont 472, 263 P. 982;

Barney v Board of Railroad Comm. 93 Mont 115, 17 P.2d 82

"The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property
thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and
obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for
private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus."

State v City of Spokane 109 Wash 360, 186 P. 864

What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so "radically and obviously" from one
who uses the highway as a place of business? The Court in noting a "radical and obvious"
difference went on to explain what the difference is;

"The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a common right to all,
while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."
and...
"This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all
the authorities."

State v City of Spokane supra.

 This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has been proclaimed
by an array of cases ranging from the state courts to the federal courts.

"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property
thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously
from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for
private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual
and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all, while the latter is special,
unusual, and extraordinary."

Ex Parte Dickey 76 W. Va 576, 85 SE 781

"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his
property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right
which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess
property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to
use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes
of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or
to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and
business."

Teche Lines v Danforth 195 Miss.226, 12 S.2d 784

Thompson v Smith, supra; see also,
Skinner v Town of Weathersfield 63A 142, 78 VT. 410;
Dunn v Blumstein 405 U.S. 330, 31 Lawyers Ed. 2D 272;
16 Am Jur 2d 607; 1 Hawk P.C. 22; State v Stroud 52 S.W.
697; 1 Bl. Comm. 134, Joseph v Randolph 71 Ala. 499;
Kent v Dulles 357 U.S. 116; U.S. V Guest 383 U.S. 745;
Shapiro v Thompson 394 U.S. 618

"The right to travel is a well-established common right that does not owe its
existence to the federal government. It is recognized by the courts as a natural
right.

Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to move from one place to
another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right,
ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a right
secured by the 14th amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution."

Schactman v. Dulles 96 App DC 287, 225 F2d 938, at 941

 There is no dissent among various authorities as to this position. See Am. Jur. (1st)
Const. Law, 329 and corresponding Am. Jur. 2nd.

"Personal liberty -- or the right to enjoyment of life and liberty -- is one of the
fundamental or natural rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a
guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, nor dependent
on, the U.S. Constitution. ... It is one of the most sacred and valuable rights
[remember the words of Justice Tolman, supra.] as sacred as the right to private
property ... and is regarded as inalienable."

16 C.J.S. Const. Law, §202

There exists considerable authority on the subject of the deprivation of the liberty of an
individual "using the roads in the ordinary course of life and business." However, it should be
noted that extensive research has not turned up one case or authority acknowledging the state's
power to convert the individual's right to travel upon the public roads into a privilege, see
Miranda v Arizona supra.

Therefore, it is concluded that the Citizen does have a "Right" to travel and transport his
property upon the public highways and roads and the exercise of this Right is not a "privilege."
“Driving” is not “traveling”, absent express language to the contrary and proof of allegation.
Notwithstanding the static eccentricities, no conviction may be lawfully sustained or upheld.

Nullum simile est idem; Things that are similar are not identical.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius; The expression of one thing is the
exclusion of the other.

No person shall be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process of law.
The courts at many levels have firmly established an absolute Right to travel. The state, by
applying commercial statutes to all who would use the highways, has deprived the common
traveler of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due process of law.
 "The essential elements of due process of law are ...
notice and the opportunity to defend."

Simon v Craft 182 US 427

Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss of the Right to travel the roads
and highways, let alone before signing the driver license application or the application for vehicle
title. To defend against the potential loss of the Right to travel, by automobile, on the highways,
the traveler must be armed with the knowledge that there was an intentional concealment by the
Dept. of Licensing.

"There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty ..."

Barbour v Connolly 113 US 27; Yick Wo v Hopkins 118 US 356

"The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This Right was emerging
as early as the Magna Carte."

Kent v Dulles 357 US 116 (1958)

The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived
without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is to be
regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress. . .
Freedom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as
well, was a part of our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, . . .
may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or
wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values.

62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §148 et seq; citing Kent v Dulles, supra

Since the state alleges, and forcibly alludes, that one give up the Right of traveling in
order to exercise the privilege of driving, the statute regulation cannot stand under the police
power, or due process, but which must be exposed as oppressive by misapplication and
misrepresentation, to deprive the Citizen of Rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and the State Constitutions.
 "Any claim that this statute is a taxing statute would be immediately open to
severe Constitutional objections. If it could be said that the state had the power to
tax a Right, this would enable the state to destroy Rights guaranteed by the
constitution through the use of oppressive taxation. The question herein, is one of
the state taxing the Right to travel by the ordinary modes of the day, and whether
this is a legislative object of the state taxation. The views advanced herein are
neither novel nor unsupported by authority. The question of taxing power of the
states has been repeatedly considered by the Supreme Court. The Right of the
state to impede or embarrass the Constitutional operation of the U.S. Government
or the Rights which the Citizen holds under it, has been uniformly denied."

McCulloch v Maryland 17 US (4 Wheat) 316

The Right to travel may not be restricted, regulated or alienated; no state or court of any
jurisdiction, neither any legislative body, not one in this country, has authority to require an
individual to apply for a privilege. The state may have discretion to grant or withhold the
business privilege; however, it is the sole discretion and proprietary interest of the individual to
even reach the point of making application.

The distinction can be simply stated as: an individual has a right to do that only which
affects and benefits him, but no one has a right to do that which affects the community. The rule
of travel is the same as the rule of standing. The rule of standing, simply stated, saving further
elaboration, says a person may only sue on their own interest, and may not sue on the interest of
the people at large. The distinction between a "Right" versus a "privilege" to use the public roads
is drawn upon the line of "using the road as a place of business" and the various state courts have
ruled as much. The U.S. Courts equally held to this point.

"First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are public property,
and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes, and that their use for
purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the
legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit."

Stephenson v Binford 287 US 251; Packard v Banton 264 US 140, 44

S.Ct. 256; Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v Railroad Commission 271 US
583, 46 S. Ct. 605; Railroad Commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co. 57
SW 2d 290 Tex. Civ. App.; Parlett Co-operative Inc. v Tidewater Lines
Inc. 164 MD 405, 165 A. 313
 So what is a privilege to use the roads? The distinction has been drawn between traveling
upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads, which is our Right, and using the
public roads as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business, which is a privilege.

"[The roads] ... are constructed and maintained at public expense, and no person
therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested right to their use in
carrying on a commercial business."

Ex Parte Sterling 53 SW.2d 294;

Barney v Railroad Commissioners 17 P.2d 82;
Stephenson v Binford supra.

"When the public highways are made the place of business the state has a right to
regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience of the public as well as
the preservation of the highways."
further...
"[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature of the business
and the use of the highways in connection therewith."

Thompson v Smith, supra.

"We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial
purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest
of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate ... the use of the highways for
gain."

Robertson vs. Dept. of Public Works, supra.

Wholesale licensing is accomplished under the guise of regulation. The Dept. of

Licensing never asks what the name of the business is; they automatically assumed the person is
the business. This statement is indicative in and of the states perseverance to ignore the limits
placed upon governments by and through the several constitutions; further discussion of this is
found in public disclosure, herein.

The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to

deny or disparage others retained by the people.

U.S. Constitution Amendment IX

 "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule
making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436, 491

The legislature does not have the power to abrogate the Citizen's Right to travel
upon the public roads, by passing legislation intimidating the citizen to waive his Right and
convert that Right into a privilege. Furthermore, we have previously established that this
"privilege" has been defined as applying only to those who are "conducting business on the
streets" or "operating for-hire vehicles."

The legislature has conspired (by legislative obfuscation) to deprive the Citizen of his
Right to use the roads in the ordinary course of life and business, without affording the Citizen
the safeguard of due process of law. This has been accomplished under illusive powers of
regulatory authority.

"In addition to the requirement that regulations governing the use of the
highways must not be violative of constitutional guarantees, the prime essentials
of such regulation are reasonableness, impartiality, and definiteness or certainty."

25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, §260

"Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity

which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by government
sufferance of permission."

Davis v Massachusetts 167 US 43;

Packard v Banton supra.

"... the only limitations found restricting the right of the state to condition the use
of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation
are (1) that the state must not exact of those it permits to use the highways for
hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional
Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use ..."

Riley v Lawson 143 So. 619; Stephenson v Binford, supra.

 "We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another."

Simmons v United States 390 US 377

The promulgation of core terms, including, inter alia, the terms road, street, alley and
highway (whether it be denominated a freeway), is and are cohesive.

A "road" is defined generally as "an open way or public passage for vehicles,
persons, and animals: a track for travel or transportation to and for serving as a
means of communication between two places usually having distinguishing
names. . . ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary. In common parlance,
therefore, a "road" is a thoroughfare intended to facilitate travel, including
vehicular travel. Furthermore, "that the state may under the police power regulate
travel upon the public highways cannot be doubted."

Silver v. Silver, 108 Conn. 371, 143 A. 240,

aff'd, 280 U.S. 117, 50 S. Ct. 57, 74 L. Ed. 221

Above the court stated “to facilitate travel, including vehicular travel.” The court so
stating, confirms that vehicular traffic is a separate and distinct activity from mere travel. It is
further stated below, “...for the purposes of travel and commerce...”. This conclusively solidifies
that there are in fact two distinct and separate uses, one public business, the other personal
private travel.

“The right of the public in a common highway is paramount and controlling. This
right extends to the entire territory within its limits; and an obstruction placed
upon any part of it constitutes a public nuisance...”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §34, @104 citing,

Morton v. Moore 81Mass. 573; citing Commonwealth. v. King 13 Met. 115

The title of the public in the highway is that of an easement for “passage and re-
passage,” that is to say, it is a right to use for purposes of travel. The right of no
one is exclusive, but is to be exercised with regard to the equal right of every one
else. It is a right which each enjoys in common with all his fellow citizens. The
subject is clearly summarized in the Pennsylvania motor vehicle case of Radnor
Township v. Bell, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, (1904), where the court say:
 “The right in the public to use the highways is the right to use them for the
purposes of travel and commerce by any method not of itself calculated to
prevent a reasonably safe use of the highway by others. The rights of all
travelers on the highway are reciprocal. The law of the road requires that
every man restrain the speed of his vehicle within such bounds as will not
endanger others, considering the place and circumstances. The roads are
open and free to all on equal terms— that is to all complying with the
reasonable regulations of the duly constituted authorities. The fundamental
idea of a highway is not only that it is public, but that it is public for free
and unmolested passage thereon by all persons desiring to use it— all the
inhabitants of the said township, and of all other good citizens of the
Commonwealth going, returning, passing and re-passing, in, along, and
through the highway. The use of a highway is not a privilege, but a right,
limited by the rights of others and to be exercised in a reasonable manner.”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §35, @105

In keeping with the recognition that businesses can be dangerous to the public, and the
tendency or likelihood that drivers could be dangerous to the public, thusly must obtain special
training; it has been ruled that the usual and ordinary use of an automobile is not dangerous. A
former Washington Attorney General addressed this point later herein.

“We do not believe that the automobile can be placed in the same category as
locomotives, gun powder, dynamite and similarly dangerous machines and
agencies. It is true that the operation of these machines is attended with some
danger not common to the use of ordinary vehicles and we believe and have
already held that those who operate these machines must be held to that degree of
care which is commensurate with the dangers naturally incident to their use.”

Jones v Hoge 47 Wash 663, 92 Pac 433

“The customary or usual or ordinary use of a street is for travel from one point to
another both along and across it. The Use of a street by an automobile when
operated with due care and caution and not in violation of state or municipal
police regulations would be deemed a proper and lawful one.”

Huddy On Automobiles 6th Ed, citing

Jenkins v Goodall 183 Ill App 633
 As shown below, when using, by whatever phraseology, the terms, words or phrases
commonly used in the English language known as motor vehicle and automobile, they are used
by the layman in a generic sense. But when used in law they are defined and confined to have a
narrow and particular meaning, in order to conform to a specific intent.

The term motor vehicle is not necessarily synonymous with the term automobile.

Huddy Automobile Law 9th Ed., Definition and Distinctions §3.

A mule team, a golf ball, or a nail, may be driven; these are generic idioms of driving.
Legally speaking though, to drive is a more specific and intentional act as discussed in licensing
later on. The same is true for motor vehicle, which generically describes any of several genre of
motorized vehicle, which are self propelled by an internal combustion engine or an electric
motor, or as now, in the 21st century, hydrogen engines.

Motor Vehicle is a broad term that has no universally accepted meaning. It has
been considered to be much broader than the word automobile and to include
various vehicles which cannot be classified as automobiles.

Am Jur 2d Automobile §2

An automobile may be purchased from an automobile dealership or a private party when

such automobile is proffered for sale, and yet the purchase of the automobile itself does not
trigger a commercial kinship. The dealership did not proffer for sale a “motor vehicle” as defined
by statute. As stated by the Dunklee court, infra, it is not the possession of the vehicle that is
subject to regulation, rather, it is the intended use. Personal use of a personal property automobile
is not chimerically representative of a governmentally regulated activity merely because one may
use it on the common highways. The definition of motor vehicle found in both the Federal
regulations and those of the State of Washington are strictly construed and confined to the use of
an automobile in a commercial aspect, meaning the remuneration for services.
 The word automobile expresses its own meaning and generally it is to be taken
and understood in its ordinary and popular sense.

Am Jur 2d Automobile §1, see also

Huddy Automobile Law 9th Ed., Definitions and Distinctions §1

“Judges have the general cognizance of other people as to the terms relating to
the use of automobiles.”

Huddy Automobile Law 9th Ed., Definitions and Distinctions §7, citing
Chamberlaynes Modern Law of Evidence.

...A motor vehicle must have been designed for use...or be used to transport
persons and property over the public highways.

Am Jur 2d Automobiles §2

It is well known by the state and its agencies, that there is an absolute distinction between
private travel and commercial travel. When versing a Motor Vehicle Act, it is critical that the
definitions used therein are strictly adhered to. It is further inextricably technical that in order to
enforce the motor vehicle code, the state, by any branch, must adhere to, and comply with, the
whole act rule. ANY prosecution, civil or criminal, commenced pursuant to the motor vehicle
act, must be in fact commercial, and it is the sole obligation of the state to prove that the act in
question was in fact commercial.

In pleadings however, especially in criminal proceedings, particular care should be

exercised in using the proper and correct terms especially where the definitions
are to be found in a statute, which should be followed in the language of the act.

Huddy Automobile Law 9th Ed., Definition and Distinctions §7;

see also City of Chicago v Gall below
Let's rewind briefly. This is what the Hadfield court said of highway use;

The former is a common Right,... as to the former, [the ordinary Right of the
Citizen to use the streets in the usual way] the legislative power is confined to
regulation; the latter is an extraordinary use,...as to the latter, [the use of the streets
as a place of business...for private gain] it is plenary and extends even to absolute
prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution
of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege.
...because the state,
...may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution
of a private business for gain.

Caution should be taken when using the term private. When used by the public state, the
term private has a business connotation, because public business itself can be either common, or
private, as confidential between two parties. This writer recommends the term “personal private”
in order to distinguish and eliminate any confusion that may arise.

The Washington State Supreme Court has longstanding declared the difference of uses of
automobiles not inconsistent with the breadth of this document. When Taxi operators had their
licenses suspended, they appealed claiming loss of liberty. The word particular in this exemplar
ruling, identifies a factual distinction between personal conduct and commerce; and even
suggests, that one may use a company vehicle for personal use, when not commercially engaged.
The Court said this;

The defendants are being prohibited from using a particular mode of travel in a
particular way.

State v Scheffel 82 Wn 2d 872

The evident purpose of the ordinance...was to regulate and supervise the business
of public carriers of passengers upon the streets of the city for the convenience and
safety of the public. The license is required when one engages in that business and
not when he used a vehicle for his own accommodation. In other words, the
ordinance does not purport to regulate or supervise the mechanism of vehicles that
are allowed to use the streets...It is only the business of public conveyance of
vehicles of some kind that is subject to the supervision of the city.

State v Dunklee 76 NH 439, 84 Atl 40

 In proceedings to punish for a violation of the regulation, the burden is upon the
prosecution to show that the defendant is within the terms of the regulation and
has violated it.

City of Chicago v Gall 195 Ill. App. 41,

See also Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §145

On the trial of a charge of violating a provision ...without a license, it is necessary

to prove that the accused was “plying for hire.” As an example, the placement of
an automobile on public street where it is accessible to those who may wish to
hire it, and the solicitation of passengers for hire by the one operating it, by word,
act or exhibition of signs or devices.

Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §149

In the early 20th century, the State of Washington has ruled that personal and private use
of ones personal automobile is perfectly legal and lawful. It is only under the auspice of a
violation of commercial licensing statute policies that it could be said one has committed a
traffic crime. The state would have to act in bad faith to rule personal use of public highways
lawful and then with surreptitiously spurious intent, dare to bring a criminal violation of a policy
which offers no jurisdiction, no redress, and no authority over lawful conduct.

Crimes are not to be created by inference. They may not be constructed nunc pro
tunc. Ordinarily, citizens may not be punished for actions undertaken in good
faith reliance upon authoritative assurance that punishment will not attach. As
this Court said in Raley v. Ohio 360 U.S. 423, 438, we may not convict "a
citizen for exercising a privilege which the state clearly had told him was
available to him." As Raley emphasized, criminal sanctions are not supportable if
they are to be imposed under "vague and undefined" commands (citing Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)); or if they are "inexplicably
contradictory" (citing United States v. Cardiff,344 U.S. 174 (1952)); and
certainly not if the Government's conduct constitutes "active misleading" (citing
Johnson v. United States,318 U.S. 189, 197 (1943)).

16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §576

 Of special note here, is that the legislative policy, has the blessing of the judiciary. The
judicial blessings are supportive that the legislative policy is and only commercial in nature. This
leaves only the executive branch of government to be reined and bridled as to their enforcement
of interpretive presumption; noting of course, the executive does not have authority to interpret
statutes, neither can they presume the statute to mean any thing more or less than its intent.

The State of Washington wholly concurs with this writers rendering of statute policy and
law. The following is former attorney general John J. O'Connell's opinion as to the intent and
application of the operator and driver license. Mr. O'Connell, as a [former] representative of the
State of Washington, agrees that all statutes relating to operating and driving are static, as well as
confirming that all license's issued by the Dept. of Lic. are in fact issued to “for hire” status and,
by use of the latin legal maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, he acknowledges that no
license may issue for personal use of an automobile. Mr. O'Connell's opinion reads as follows:

AGO 61-62 No. 46

________________

EDITED FOR SPACE AND CONTENT

________________________

"The business of operating as a motor carrier of freight for compensation along the
highways of this state is a business affected with a public interest. The rapid increase
of motor carrier freight traffic and the fact that under the existing law many motor
trucks are not effectively regulated have increased the dangers and hazards on
public highways and make it imperative that more complete regulation should be
employed to the end that the highways may be rendered safer for the use of the
general public;..."

RCW 81.80.211 provides:

"The commission may adopt rules and regulations relating to the hours of
duty of motor carrier drivers and operators."

RCW 81.80.290 provides in part:

"The commission may, by general order or otherwise, prescribe rules and
regulations in conformity with this chapter to carry out the purposes
thereof, applicable to any and all 'motor carriers,' ..."
Outside the confines of chapter 81.80 RCW, but of prime importance and significance to our
consideration of this matter is RCW 81.04.460 providing:

"The commission shall enforce the provisions of this title and all other acts affecting
public service companies, the enforcement of which is not specifically vested in
some other officer or tribunal."

Thus, addressing ourselves solely to that portion of your question which relates to driver
qualifications, we conclude that the public service commission has the authority to both adopt
and enforce rules and regulations governing driver qualifications with respect to auto
transportation companies and motor freight carriers. By this, we do not mean to imply that such
authority includes the power to prescribe conditions precedent to the issuance of a motor vehicle
operator's license. The "general supervision and control of the issuance of vehicle operators'
licenses" is specifically vested in the director of licenses. RCW 46.20.010. However, the
commission may prescribe safety regulations over and above those prerequisite to the issuance of
a driver's license with respect to the drivers of auto transportation companies and motor freight
carriers.

In so far as your question relates to the authority of the commission to adopt and enforce
rules and regulations governing safety of equipment, a final conclusion at this juncture would be
premature without first considering certain provisions of Title 46 RCW.

Section 46.08.010, chapter 12, Laws of 1961, provides in material part:

"The provisions of this title relating to the certificate of ownership, certificate of

license registration, vehicle license, vehicle license plates and vehicle operator's
license shall be exclusive..."

In this respect, it is worthy of note that although several provisions of chapter 81.68 RCW
and chapter 81.80 RCW have been amended at various times since the original enactment and
amendment of RCW 46.37.005, the legislature has never seen fit to amend in any way the
particular provisions of RCW 81.68.030 and RCW 81.80.130 which grant the public service
commission the authority to regulate the safety of operations of auto transportation companies
and motor freight carriers respectively.
 Under these circumstances, we do not feel it can be said that there is a manifest intent
upon the part of the legislature to effect a repeal by implication.

Under the maxim"expressio unius est exclusio alterius," it is the uniform rule that
the express mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of all others.
State ex rel.Port of Seattle v. Dept. of Public Service,
1 Wn. (2d) 102, 95 P. (2d) 1007 (1939).

Provisions relating to the same subject matter embodied in different statutes should
be harmonized so as to maintain the integrity of both statutes whenever possible.
State ex rel. Shomaker v. Superior Court, 193 Wash. 465, 76 P. (2d) 306 (1938).
Furthermore, as previously noted, the authority to regulate granted by RCW 46.37
.005,supra, and the other provisions of chapter 46.37 RCW apply to motor vehicles
generally, ... It is well established that a general statute does not repeal a special
statute on the same subject, unless the intent to repeal is manifest and such an intent
cannot be implied unless the two acts cannot stand together and effect be given to
both. State v. Whitney, 66 Wash. 473, 120 Pac. 116 (1912), and cases cited therein.

In determining whether any particular rule or regulation of the public service commission is
in conflict with those of the state commission on equipment or those set forth in chapter 46.37 RCW,
the test is whether the former permits, or licenses, that which the latter forbids, or prohibits, and vice
versa. Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1 (1960) [[57 Wn.2d 106]].

There yet remains for consideration the question of the public service commission's
authority to enforce those rules and regulations which it properly adopts. Its authority in this respect
is sufficiently prescribed in that portion of RCW 81.04.460, supra, providing:

"The commission shall enforce the provisions of this title and all other acts affecting
public service companies, the enforcement of which is not specifically vested in
some other officer or tribunal.”

JOHN J. O'CONNELL DUANE S. STOOKEY

Attorney General Assistant Attorney General
 POLICE AUTHORITY

In order to understand police power, it should be understood what police are.

When a man hears or thinks of police, his mind sees a public employee with a uniform, usually
adorned with assorted weaponry. The word police is a conjugal derivative of policy. There are
three branches of government; legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative body writes
policy; the executive branch enforces that policy; and the judicial resolves conflicts of policy.
Government employees only fall into one of three categories, if the employee is not a member of
the judiciary or a member of the legislature then he is a member of the executive branch, no
matter municipal or state or his status.

The uniformed, armed, executive employees that prey upon our common highways are
the same executive branch policy enforcers likened to those that sit behind a desk and issue tax
warrants or demands for child support payments or issue building permits.

The truth of the matter is, that if one applies for and receive a driver license, that creates
an assumption that one is always engaged in driving. Driving is legally defined as, a person in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle, as an occupation or business; don't forget the
underlying criteria of being paid for services rendered.

...the police power is exercised for the promotion of the public welfare by means
of the regulation of dangerous or potentially dangerous business, occupations or
activities...

16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §318

The state, resting upon their original basis of sovereignty, exercise their police
powers and regulates its domestic commerce, contracts.

Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 How. 504 (1847)

 The state only has authority to license and regulate business. Business is commerce,
commerce is sale and purchase, bought and sold, with, of course, the static delivery/shipment.
The driver license issued after 1968 is, in fact, a proprietary operator license with a secondary
driver aspect; this can be identified at RCW 46.01.040 (13). That's why, and how, the policy
enforcement employee's are able to randomly interfere with the public at large; through lack of
notice, and policy that is so deliriously fragmented, that a man of average intelligence could not
understand it to be any thing other than what is facially posited.

RCW 46.01.040
Powers, duties, and functions relating to motor vehicle laws vested in department.
(13) Operators' licenses as provided in chapter 46.20 RCW;
(14)

Later in is discussed the state of Washington spurious introversion of operator and driver;
but do not mistake the illusion that a license is not in fact permission to operate a business.

The constitutional Right of every person to pursue a business, occupation or

profession as a paramount Right is subject to government regulation and
restriction and as such is subject to reasonable use of police power. If a business
itself is a proper subject of police regulation so are all its incidents and
accessories such as the manner of conducting the business.

16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §372

Since it is a universal rule that every business or occupation itself is subject to

proper police regulation for the public interest, it logically follows that the right
of every person to pursue a business, occupation, or profession is subject to the
paramount right of the government as a part of its police power to impose such
restrictions and regulations as the protection of the public may require.

Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696, 43 ALR1086

see also Anthony v Texas infra

As stated above at Am Jur §372, again are the words incident followed by manner.
In this context the actual commission of driving [a passenger] is incidental to the operation of
the business. Likewise, it is well established that the operation of a business and the driving of
an automobile are two absolutely distinct actions; until the automobile becomes the business.
 This is where the restrictive nature of a license comes to bear. The license which is
required restricts business use as well as types of business and the incidentals; load capacities,
night time driving, chemical containers, explosives and oversize vehicles to name a few. These
things may be prohibited.

These types of motor vehicles are categorized and the drivers thereof are classified (see
RCW 46.25.080). It is however, with no small measure of deference, that the definition of
“private carrier” is again fragmented and encrypted in yet another title of the statutes, as to what
exactly is intended by the phrase, “use of the highways for gain.”

RCW 81.80.010(6).
A "private carrier" is a person who transports by his or her own motor vehicle,
with or without compensation, property which is owned or is being bought or sold
by the person, or property where the person is the seller, purchaser, lessee, or
bailee and the transportation is incidental to and in furtherance of some other
primary business conducted by the person in good faith.

The highways of a state are public property, the primary and preferred use of
which is for private purposes; their use for purposes of gain may generally be
prohibited by the legislature.

Stephenson v Binford, supra

Under its inherent police powers the state has the right to regulate any and all
kinds of businesses in order to protect the public health morals and welfare of its
people subject to the restrictions of reasonable classification.

Allinder v City of Homewood 254 Ala 525, 49 So 2d 108

As shown above, where the intent of a statute or the execution of a statute must be
determined by referring to other parts of a statute or a separate statute altogether, one must
invoke the “whole act rule” as the separate chapters and separate statutes must be read in
para materia.
 The plain meaning of a statute may be “discerned from all that the legislature has
said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the
provision in question.” Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.
2d 1, 43 P.3d 4. We emphasize that “ [w]e read the plain language of the statute as
a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same
chapter and related chapters.”
Miller v. Weaver 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592

The state nonetheless is endowed with the authority to suspend or revoke a license for
careless or negligent operation. However, as clarified earlier and hereunder, the loss of a license
to operate a business does not disable a mans use, of the same, if appropriate, automobile for his
personal affairs. In the Scheffel case, the court reasons a particular use in a particular way,
which is prohibited. The Scheffel court, not inconsistent with the Stephenson court, have each
succinctly denominated the separate and distinct nature of operating and driving for hire, as
against the personal use of an automobile.

Revocation of a motor vehicle operator's permit is within the ambit of the state's
police power to protect the public from reckless or negligent operators. The
governmental interest involved is that of the protection of the individuals who
use the highways. The act [RCW 46.65] calls for the revocation of the privilege
of operating a vehicle where one has demonstrated his disregard for the traffic
safety of others... The defendants are being prohibited from using a particular
mode of travel in a particular way. italic mine

State v Scheffel 82 Wn 2d 872

The object and purpose of the statute is to promote the safety of those traveling
the public highways. The statute has, in effect, forebode the operations of
persons under the age of 18. It in substance declares that such persons do not
possess the requisite care and judgment to run motor vehicles on the public
highways.

Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §222

When speaking of motor vehicles and interstate commerce the state must follow Federal
standards, at a minimum, as outlined in the U.S. Code and those outlined in the Code of Federal
Regulation. These Federal standards explain the minimal basis for what is commerce, whether
intrastate or interstate. So while the Federal statutes control interstate commerce, they have no
authority to interfere and regulate intrastate commerce insofar as the intrastate commerce does
not cross state lines. See also generally 49 USC 30103, for comity of regulations.

A state may be preempted from establishing its own standards, it is not preempted
from enforcing the federal standards.

Sims v State of Florida, Dept. Hwy Sfty Mtr Veh. 862 F2d 1449

But very different considerations apply to the internal commerce or domestic

trade of the states.”

United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978),

citing 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1866)

Under its police power, the state may control generally, the operation of motor
vehicles upon a public highway.

Cohen v City of Hartford 244 Conn 206, 710 A 2d 746

The definition of motor vehicle is nearly succinct with the definition of vehicle at both
state and federal levels, see definitions. Although the state definitions may be fragmented and
diffuse, they operate with the same intent, to regulate commercial activity at the state level. By
their language, they are intended to regulate commerce and transportation, for compensation or
the transmission of credit upon the receipt and delivery of property (obtained as the result of a
transaction). Notice that the state definition is nearly exact to Federal, save the deletion of the
term commerce. Transportation is defined as;

The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier.

Interstate Commerce Comm. v Brimson 154 US 447, 14 S.Ct.1125

Here again, notice that this definition, incorporating the term carrier, refers to one
"conducting business." No mention is made of one who is traveling in his personal private
automobile. This definition is of one who is engaged in the passing of a commodity or goods in
exchange for money, i.e .., vehicles for hire. Furthermore, the words "traffic" and "travel" must
have different meanings which the courts recognize. The difference is recognized in Ex Parte
Dickey, supra, stating;

"...in addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses, taxicabs, and hacks,
when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the ordinary traffic and travel and
obstruct them."

Interstate Commerce Comm. v Brimson above

The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a distinction between the two.
But, what was the distinction? We have already defined both terms, but to clear up any doubt;

"The word `traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, and has reference
to the business of transportation rather than to its primary meaning of interchange
of commodities."

Allen v City of Bellingham 95 Wash 12, 163 P. 18

Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined the word "traffic", in
either its primary or secondary sense, in reference to business, and not to mere travel! So it is
clear that the term "traffic" is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege." The net result
being that "traffic" is brought under the police power of the legislature. The term has no
application to one who is not using the roads as a place of business.

"... Traffic thereon is to some extent destructive, therefore, the prevention of

unnecessary duplication of auto transportation service will lengthen the life of the
highways or reduce the cost of maintenance, the revenue derived by the state ...
will also tend toward the public welfare by producing at the expense of those
operating for private gain, some small part of the cost of repairing the wear ..."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v Schoenfeldt 123 Wash 579, 213 P. 26

In the above case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with the unnecessary Auto
Transportation Service, or in other words, "vehicles for hire."
 The ultimate test of the proprietary police power regulations must be found in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, since it operates to limit the field of the
police power, to the extent of preventing the enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the
Amendment protects. See generally Parks v State, 159 Ind 211, 64 NE 862 as to procurement of
a license for the public practice of medicine.

"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right

secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any
state police authority."

Connolly v Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 US 540;

Lafarier v Grand Trunk Railway of Canada 84 Me 286, 24 A. 848;
O'Neil v Providence Amusement Co., 42 RI 479, 108 A. 887

"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the

provisions of the U.S. Constitution."

Buchanan v Warley 245 US 60;

Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v State Highway Comm. 294 US 613

"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the
police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied
prohibitions in the Constitutions."

Tiche v Osborne 131 A. 60

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are
found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as
efficient as if expressed in the clearest language."

Mehlos v City of Milwaukee 156 Wis 591, 146 NW 882

The Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police
power, in accordance with the general principle that the power must be exercised so as not to
invade unreasonably the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. It is established
beyond question though, that every state power, including the police power, is instead limited by
the Fourteenth Amendment.

The case of Chicago v. Banker below is a cumulative ruling exercising the charter
restriction, emphasizing the difference of vehicle operator, from the personal private traveler,
and further employing the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The case of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94, 1904, turned upon the question
whether the city of Chicago had the power by ordinance, and in the absence of
statute, to require an automobile owner “to submit to an examination and to take
out a license” before he should be permitted to operate his vehicle for his private
and personal pleasure. The court, in declaring the ordinance void, held that
inasmuch as there was no statutory provision on the subject, the charter of the
corporation “is the measure of its powers, and the enumeration of those powers
implies the exclusion of all others,”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §32, @103

In the case of Shreveport below, the city brought an action against Stringfellow for the
payment of taxes on his automobile. The cities claim for taxes was denied by the court because
Stringfellow only had personal automobiles that were for his families use, not for access to or by
the public. Galvanizing that no taxes may be levied against, and consequentially, no policy
enforcement may be laid against a private traveler.

“In the case at bar, a license tax is sought to be collected from the defendant, not
on account of his calling or vocation, but because he is the owner of two motor
cars, used by him for the convenience of himself and family.”

City of Shreveport v Stringfellow 137 La. 552, 21 ALR 951

However, in maintaining consistency of authority, it is again reiterated, that businesses

fall under legislative purview, and subsequently, the police power of the executive branch.
It is so because those who drive for a living spend a good deal of time on the roadways and
therefore increase ratios of likely harm to other travelers.

Here in Washington we have several public “trails” that were created for the use and
enjoyment of all walkers runners and cyclists that would choose to use them; the most popular
being the Burke-Gilman Trail. These trails are used buy athletes and serious health enthusiasts.
This group of people would be likened to the businesses that use the highways, because it is this
group that would attend the trail with more frequency, as would a business' use of the highway.
However, there is the second group of people who would not use it so frequently, and for a less
convicted purpose. The people out for a sunny day walk, or a romantic stroll, or perhaps walking
a dog. There is no less of an expectant right to the common use of the trail differing from the
athletes, but there is the courteous and accepted reasonable regulation; i.e. calling out when
coming from behind or slowing down when approaching crowded areas or even the left side
versus right side flow of movement.

"‘When the calling or profession or business is attended with danger, or requires a

certain degree of scientific knowledge upon which others must rely, then
legislation properly steps in to impose conditions upon its exercise.’ It is certainly
true that the business of the man who operates and propels an automobile along
the public street is such a business as is above alluded to.”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §27, @101 citing,

State v. Swagerty 203 Mo. 517 (1907); citing Railroad v. Beckwith 129 U.
S. 29; See also Radnor Township v. Bell 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 6, 1904.

“Some employments in which integrity is of vital importance it may be proper to

treat as privileges merely, and to refuse the license to follow them to any who are
not reputable.”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §30, @102

See also Freund, Police Power, Sec. 651.

DUE PROCESS, VOID FOR VAGUENESS

 Herein this section, it is plead that the state statutes are vague as to their text. The statutes
do not expressly include personal use of an automobile in and of their regulatory scheme. The
statutes make no mention of any use other than commercial. As is indicative of the breadth of
dictum set forth herein, it is a fact the state has no authority to stop and harass personal private
travelers in their use of the common highways, by any pretext.

The state statutes do not specifically include private conduct; ipso facto they impliedly
exclude private and personal conduct. The state has the burden of defeating all arguments herein
by a mandatory showing that private and personal conduct can be, or is properly, within the scope
of the statutes hereby challenged.

If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,

the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on
a permissible construction of the statute.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837

...The right of reasonable regulation is a modification of the sweeping

generalization that every person has a right to pursue any lawful calling.
Restrictions and regulations may be imposed within proper limits without in any
way impairing the fundamental right to engage in occupations. Thus, the state
may demand skill requisite with the subject matter involved for public protection
in those callings in which incapacity would injuriously affect the public...unless
an act restricting the participation of a citizen in ordinary occupations can be
shown to fall within the police power, such act is void as violating the
constitutional right of the citizen to liberty and the pursuit of happiness...

11 Am Jur Constitutional Law §337, citing Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253,
150 N. E. 696, 43 ALR1086; see also Anthony v Texas infra

However, it has also been held that statutory authority to prescribe traffic rules is
strictly construed and that an ambiguity in a motor vehicle act should be read in
favor of the motor vehicle operator because personal interests are at stake.

Am Jur 2d Automobiles §16

Now the judicial branch is a co-conspirator in the initially legislative, subsequently
executive, licensing scam. Private travelers run the risk of being stopped and harassed for not
having license plates on their personal property automobile's or a driver license. But by what
authority? Clearly the state has no authority or jurisdiction concerning private affairs. This
writing goes back one hundred years to get resolution as to the licensing scheme. The fact that
the Police use commercial license statutes to interfere with personal affairs is clearly inconsistent
with the history of, and intent of the driver license. The statutes are void for vagueness as being
overly broad and void for want of substantive due process, by failing to provide notice of the
distinctions in traveling, whereby not clearly and succinctly delineating the differences and
establishing proper authoritative and jurisdictional guidelines.

A statute is constitutional or unconstitutional in accordance in the way in which it

operates and the effect that it has. The constitutionality of an act depends on its
real character and on the end designed to be accomplished, rather than on its title,
for the professions as to its purpose which may be contained in it...mere
declaration cannot give character to a law or turn illegal operation into legal.
“Courts should... consider the true operation and effect of the law which must be
dealt with on the basis of the practical results which follow its operation and not
alone by the legislative declarations contained therein.” “As we said in both of
these cases, the legislative body cannot change the real nature and purpose of an
act by giving it a different title or by declaring its nature and purpose to be
otherwise, anymore than a man can transform his character by changing his attire
or assuming a different name.”

State v Slavin, 75 Wn.2d 554, citing 16 Am. Jur. 2D Const. Law §150;
Bunting v Oregon 243 U.S. 426, 37 S. Ct. 435; Aberdeen Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v Chase 157 Wash. 351, 289 Pac 536; Jenson v Henneford 185 Wash.
209, 53 P. 2d 607; Clark v Sieber, 48 Wn 2d 783, 296 P. 2d 680

In the case of Atty. Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, the court determined that the state
must state with particularity the compelling state interest or intent of the policy. Notice the use
of the word compelling, not competing. A competing state interest may be found by comparing,
for instance, the right of privacy of a sex offender to live at an unpublished location, against the
states interest to protect the public and publicize his location for the safety of the public.
A states compelling interests are based in the necessities of national or community life such as
clear threats to public health, peace, and welfare.
States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions and as part of their
power to protect public health and safety and other valid interests, they have the
 broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the
practice of the profession.

Lenders Service Inc. v Dayton Bar Asso. 758 F. Supp. 429

see also Munns v Martin 131 Wn 2d 192

Note the correlations of public health and safety. The personal private use and enjoyment
of the highways is neither an existing threat, as in the former, neither an impending threat, as in
the latter. The states use of a private “for hire” classification in one statute, and a vaguely written
driver licensing statute, is an attempt to surreptitiously create or manifest some potential threat
generated by all who use the roads and highways; these may be construed as fraud, because the
courts, and the Attorney General, and other statutes have already confirmed that it is commerce
that creates the threat.

Further, the licensing statutes reach unconstitutional vagueness, because elemental in their
failure to provide notice, the statutes do not define with specificity a rational basis for including,
covertly, the personal and private use of the highways and how it reasonably relates to licensed
commercial activity, which would have to be done consistent with the threat discussed above.

"The traditional test for a denial of equal protection is: whether the challenged
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a valid
state objective."

Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346

For a classification to be constitutional there must be: 1) real or substantial

difference in kind of persons it defines, and 2) it must bear a rational relation to
the evil to be remedied.

Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124,
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837

The statute policies challenged are enforced in excess of their historical legislative intent,
by the Police at their individual discretion. The chapter by chapter cross reference search needed,
suffers only to establish there to be absolutely no link or suggestion that private and personal use
of a personal automobile is even remotely implied; and further fails in submission to the
narrowing rule, wherein if the suspect statute were stripped to its bare minimum intent, could
that intent include the private and personal use of a personal automobile, and thus requiring a
driver license? NO!

Why? Because if the statute had a compelling state interest, declaring a threat by the
private and personal use of a personal automobile, the statute policies could not possibly contain
language giving “discretionary” ability to Police. The statute policy is enforced in excess of its
historical legislative intent, and is per se banishment, when the Police exercise discretionary
functions, whereby penalizing private travel by arrest and imprisonment, for the enjoyment of the
common highways.

While "'all property is held subject to the right of government to regulate its use
in the exercise of the police power'"; Figarsky v. Historic District Commission,
171 Conn.198, 368 A.2d 163; "if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as
a taking." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886;
see also Cohen et al. v. City of Hartford 244 Conn. 206, 710 A.2d 746

The Lucas ruling above, declares that enforcement in excess of statute, constitutes a
taking. A taking requires compensation by Constitutional authority, or restriction as it may be, by
law of eminent domain.

Also included in due process is the vagueness doctrine. Anthony argues the
unwritten policy is inherently vague and the "vague statutory language permits
selective law enforcement." There is also a denial of due process where
inherently vague statutory language permits selective law enforcement. Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 576, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 39 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1974). In order to
satisfy constitutional due-process requirements, the statute or regulation must
provide adequate notice of the required or prohibited conduct. Freeman United
Coal Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 323 U.S. App.
D.C. 304, 108 F.3d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972); Papachristou, 405
U.S. at 162; State v. Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Although the regulation must give fair warning--in light of common
 understanding and practices--of the prohibited conduct, the regulation is not
required to be mathematically precise. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110; Ex parte
Anderson, 902 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, pet. ref'd). The
regulation, though, must be defined with "sufficient definiteness that ordinary
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Holcombe, 187 S.W.3d at 499.

The unwritten policy at issue here is not premised on a violation of specific park
rules. The policy delegates complete discretion to the police officer, and there
are no guidelines for the exercising of that discretion. A reasonable person would
not have fair warning of what conduct would violate that regulation. Not only are
the policy's prohibitions not clearly defined, the policy presents substantial risk of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. While there is no evidence Pool used
this policy in a discriminatory manner, the policy presents significant risk it could
be used in such a manner. The unwritten policy is unconstitutionally vague.
Due process is ordinarily absent if a party is deprived of his or her property or
liberty without evidence having been offered against him or her in accordance
with established rules. In re Application of Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107, 1112 (5th
Cir. 1981). see red section below

"However, a court may not assume the legislative prerogative and rewrite a
statute in order to save it if the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing
construction." Id. Without completely rewriting the policy, there is no reasonable
interpretation of the unwritten policy that would be constitutional. We are
to sever the unconstitutional portion of the unwritten policy, and the unable
unwritten policy is not susceptible to a narrowing construction.

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the relevant evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Lamar Anthony, Jr., v State of Texas 209 S.W.3d 296; 2006 Tex. App.

Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that; "no one shall be
personally bound [restricted] until he has had his day in court,” by which is meant, until he has
been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without
such citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial
usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld where it is fairly administered.
A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving
him an opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is
 not entitled to respect in any other tribunal. ...Until notice is given the court has
no jurisdiction in any case to proceed to judgment, whatever it's authority may
be, by the law of it's organization, over the subject-matter. ...that no one shall be
personally bound until he has had his day in court... Judgment without such
opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination. ..." The definition
here given is apt and suitable as applied to judicial proceedings, which cannot be
valid unless they 'proceed upon inquiry', and render judgment only after trial."

Hovey v. Elliot 167 U.S. 409; State v Strasburg 60 Wash 106,

110 P. 1020; Dennis v Moses 18 Wash 537, 52 P. 333;
see also 12 Am. Jur. [1st] Const. Law, §573.

When later we discuss tort liability, it is important to understand the 4th Amendment law
of search and seizure. The following court ruling is a cumulative summation, including some of
the most reverent search and seizure case studies this writer could delineate. So, without
compounding duplicitous rulings, the law of search and seizure is stated thus;

The application of the Texas statute to detain appellant and require him to identify
himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any
reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged in
criminal conduct. Detaining appellant to require him to identify himself
constituted a seizure of his person subject to the requirement of the Fourth
Amendment that the seizure be "reasonable." Cf. Terry v. Ohio,392 U.S. 1; United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,422 U.S. 873. The Fourth Amendment requires that such
a seizure be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate
interests require such action, or that the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.
Delaware v. Prouse 440 U.S. 648. Here, the State does not contend that appellant was
stopped pursuant to a practice embodying neutral criteria, and the officers' actions
were not justified on the ground that they had a reasonable suspicion, based
on objective facts, that he was involved in criminal activity. Absent any basis
for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest
in crime prevention and appellant's right to personal* * * security and privacy
tilts in favor of freedom from police interference.

Brown v. Texas 443 U.S. 47 (1979)

The Brown case above exalts the operational dictate that a policy enforcement employee
must have at least one of three potentially overlapping minimal criteria; reasonable suspicion,
reasonable cause or probable cause. When a policeman stops a traveler on the highway and upon
his approach to the automobile, the traveler should inquire of the Policeman his reasonable cause
to stop; and the answer he gives should be “reasonably” along the lines of operating a business
evidenced by the license attached to the automobile. Second, inquiry as to the “probability” that a
violation of some motor vehicle business related statute has occurred; civil or criminal, is
irrelevant.

When construing this Act, we are guided by the familiar rule of construction stated
by this court in United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955, 83 S.Ct. 507, 9 L.Ed.2d 502 (1963), when construing
provisions under the previous aviation act (the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938):

'It is axiomatic that any regulation should be construed to effectuate the intent of
the enacting body. Such intent may be ascertained by considering the language
used and the overall purpose of the regulation, and by reflecting on the practical
effect of the possible interpretations.'

U.S. v Christensen 419 F.2d 1401

The history of the invasion of the Citizen's Right to use the public highways was not
attempted in an outright action, but in a slow, meticulous, calculated encroachment upon the
Citizen's Right to travel.

"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot be tolerated, even

though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the
best interests of the public."

Slote vs. Examination, 112 ALR 660

"Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of Constitutional guarantee."

Riley v Carter 79 ALR 1018;

16 Am. Jur. 2nd Const. Law §81

"Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their

assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be
 made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to
afford them."

Watson v Memphis 375 US 526

The state cannot demand from the Sovereign People what it never had a right to. Then
there is the issue of public policy. Public policy a.k.a. statute, is just that, public policy, and does
not transcend the private. However, if this argument is used, it too must fail, as:

"No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive guarantees of
the U.S. Constitution."

16 Am. Jur. 2nd Const. Law §70

“Statutes that violate the plain and obvious principles of common right and
common reason are null and void.”

Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Baldwin 60

So even public policy cannot abrogate the Citizen's Right to travel and to use the common
highways in the ordinary course of life and business. Therefore, it must be concluded that;

"We have repeatedly held that the legislature may regulate the use of the
highways for carrying on business for private gain and that such regulation is a
valid exercise of the police power."

"The act in question is a valid regulation, and as such is binding upon all who use
the highway for the purpose of private gain."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v Schoenfeldt 123 Wash 579, 213 P. 26

It is possible to go on quoting court decision after court decision, but it is not necessary,
because the Constitution itself tells us a government cannot legally put restrictions on the rights
of the American people at any time, for any reason. Article Six of the U.S. Constitution reads;

“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof;...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
 every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the Contrary not one word withstanding."

In the same Article, it says just who within our government are bound by this Supreme Law:

“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the
several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution...”

The state cannot proceed upon presumption. The presumption that someone allegedly
violated some business regulation is based on a presumption that someone was driving as defined
by statute. The law against presumption is found in 5 ALR 3d 100 Inference on Inference et seq;

The rule that it is not permissible in making a case or proving an issue to

draw one presumption based upon another presumption may be found stated
in many cases.

United States v Ross (1876) 92 US 281, 23 L ed 707;

Manning v John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1880) 100 US
693, 25 L ed 761; Looney v Metropolitan R. Co. (1906) 200 US
480, 50 Led 564, 26 S Ct 303.

The presumption that officials have done their duty is limited by the rule
that a presumption cannot be based upon a mere presumption, and will not
supply proof of independent, substantive facts, such as that a deficiency
judgment was entered and docketed by the clerk of the court. Italic mine

Mahoney v Boise Title & T. Co. (1926) 116 Okla 202, 244 P 170

Where circumstantial evidence is proper, since the same consists in reasoning

from facts which are known or proved to establish such as are conjectured to
exist, the process is defective if the circumstances from which it is sought to
deduce the conclusion depend also upon conjecture and speculation.

St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v Mobley (1918) 70 Okla 297, 174 P 510

FEDERAL PREEMPTION
 Titles 46, 47, and 81, Revised Code of Washington, are intended to compliment the
federal motor vehicle act at 49 USC, 23 USC, 23 CFR and 49 CFR. The State codes apply to
intrastate commerce whereas the federal counterpart applies to interstate commerce. The state
would have absolutely NO control over interstate commerce common carriers if they [State] were
not certified to participate in the Federal Motor Carrier Act.

This declaration of intent demonstrates that the act was intended to cooperate with
the Federal act, and to be construed in connection therewith. Section 21, of
initiative 141, supra, expressly provides that, "if any portion, section or clause" of
the act shall be declared not in accordance with the provisions of the Federal
social security act, such adjudication shall not affect the remainder of the act. By
this provision, the intent that the act shall accord with the Federal statute is made
doubly clear.
further,
...The ... Federal ... is not subject to criticism as to its reasonableness or legality.

…It is manifestly the intention of the state act to place the state in a position to
avail itself to the full of the benefits of the Federal act, and the state statute
negatives the idea that it was the intention of the act that the state proceed upon its
relief program independently of the predominant partner, the Federal government,
in administering relief funds, or upon any plan or system different from that
established by the Federal act.

"The federal and state statutes represent a cooperative legislative effort by state
and national governments, for carrying out a public purpose common to both,
which neither could fully achieve without the cooperation of the other.
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495." Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640

James R. Morgan v. Department of Social Security 14 Wn.2d 156

In keeping with the spirit of the above citation we find similar language in the
statutes of the State of Washington; keeping in mind the rule “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius”, to specifically identify a person, class of persons or intent, impliedly excludes all
others. The following statute specifically declares compliment to federal statutes.
RCW 46.25.005 Purpose — Construction.
(1) The purpose of this chapter is to implement the federal Commercial Motor
 Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (CMVSA), Title XII, P.L. 99-570, and reduce or
prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and injuries by:
(a) Permitting commercial drivers to hold only one license;
(b) Disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain serious
traffic violations, or other specified offenses;
(c) Strengthening licensing and testing standards.

(2) This chapter is a remedial law and shall be liberally construed to promote the
public health, safety, and welfare. To the extent that this chapter conflicts with
general driver licensing provisions, this chapter prevails. Where this chapter is
silent, the general driver licensing provisions apply.

As shown above and amplified below, again it is declared by the legislature that state
statute is to be implicitly factored in relation to federal law. Below we see the use of the term
“other laws” which includes federal laws, and other state laws through the interstate driver
compact at RCW 46.21.010. The viscous use of the phrase 'other laws' or 'all laws' is an inclusive
mandate to read statutes in pari materia. This declaration is demonstrated as follows;

RCW 46.98.020 Provisions to be construed in pari materia.

The provisions of this title shall be construed in pari materia even though as a
matter of prior legislative history they were not originally enacted in the same
statute. The provisions of this title shall also be construed in pari materia with the
provisions of Title 47 RCW, and with other laws relating to highways, roads,
streets, bridges, ferries and vehicles. This section shall not operate retroactively.
Emphasis mine

The starting point for every case involving statutory construction is the language
of the statute itself. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, (1985); Miller
v. Dept of Trans. 86 M.S.P.R. 293, 7 (2000). Where the statutory language is clear,
it must control absent clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. Lewark v.
Department of Defense, 91 M.S.P.R. 252, 6 (2002); Todd v. Dept. of Defense, 63
M.S.P.R. 4, 7 (1994), aff’d, 55 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Statutory provisions
should not be read in isolation; rather, each section of a statute should be construed
in connection with other sections so as to produce a harmonious whole. Styslinger
v. Department of the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 223, 17 (2007).
further...

...further,
Under the general rules of statutory construction, Congress can be presumed to
 have known that its selection of the broader phrase “by law,” in the absence of any
limiting language, could expand the scope of the exemption to include all “law.”
See D’Elia v. Department of the Treasury, 60 M.S.P.R. 22677 M.S.P.R. 224
(1998), Thomas overruled in part on other grounds by Ganski v. Department of
the Interior, 86 M.S.P.R. 32 (2000).

MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security

Docket No. SF-0752-06-0611-I-2 (2009)
United States of America Merit Systems Protection Board

Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, "the Laws of the
United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . , any thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const.
Art. VI, cl. 2. A state law which conflicts with federal law is unenforceable. In re
Tax Appeal of Karsten, 22 Kan. App. 2d 882, 886, 924 P.2d 1272 (1996). Because
"'[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case,"
analysis of a federal statute "must begin with its text," including the "'structure and
purpose of the statute as a whole.'"

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700, 116 S. Ct. 2240
(1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 11 L. Ed. 2d
179, 84 S. Ct. 219 (1963), and Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Assn. 505 U.S. 88, 120 L. Ed. 2d 73, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992))

As discussed above, some of those other laws, including but not limited to the following,
are always construed in a commercial nature and intent as and by their predicate definitions
contained in statute. They also show the congressional edict asserting superior force and effect,
and any State law in conflict with that federal law as unenforceable.

Title 23--Highways
Chapter 3--General provisions
Sec. 308--Cooperation with Federal and State agencies and foreign countries
(a) The Secretary is authorized to perform by contract or otherwise, authorized
engineering or other services in connection with the survey, construction,
maintenance, or improvement of highways for other Government agencies,
cooperating foreign countries, and State cooperating agencies, and reimbursement
for such services, which may include depreciation on engineering and road
building equipment used, shall be credited to the appropriation concerned.

Title 23--Highways
Chapter 1--Federal-Aid Highways
 Sec. 154. Open container requirements
(b) Open Container Laws.--
(2) Motor vehicles designed to transport many passengers.--For
the purposes of this section, if a State has in effect a law that makes
unlawful the possession of any open alcoholic beverage container by the
driver (but not by a passenger)--
(A) in the passenger area of a motor vehicle designed, maintained,
or used primarily for the transportation of persons for
compensation; emphasis mine

RCW 46.61.519 Alcoholic beverages

Drinking or open container in vehicle on highway – Exceptions.

(3) It is a traffic infraction for the registered owner of a motor vehicle, or the
driver if the registered owner is not then present in the vehicle, to keep in a motor
vehicle when the vehicle is upon a highway, a bottle, can, or other receptacle
containing an alcoholic beverage which has been opened or a seal broken or the
contents partially removed, unless the container is kept in the trunk of the vehicle
or in some other area of the vehicle not normally occupied by the driver or
passengers if the vehicle does not have a trunk. A utility compartment or glove
compartment is deemed to be within the area occupied by the driver and
passengers.

(4) This section does not apply to a public conveyance that has been commercially
chartered for group use or to the living quarters of a motor home or camper or,
except as otherwise provided by RCW 66.44.250 or local law, to any passenger
for compensation in a for hire vehicle licensed under city, county, or state law, or
to a privately-owned vehicle operated by a person possessing a valid operator's
license endorsed for the appropriate classification under chapter 46.25 RCW in
the course of his usual employment transporting passengers at the employer's
direction: PROVIDED, That nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
authorize possession or consumption of an alcoholic beverage by the operator of
any vehicle while upon a highway. Emphasis mine

In the above statute, albeit long winded, diluted yet still opaque, the State of Washington
has committed itself to the rule of preemption by showing conformity to the federal mandate.
This simple agreement is in and of itself sufficient to show that the expression of “drinking and
driving” is specifically and only designated to for hire vehicle drivers and operators,
notwithstanding the FMCSA (federal motor carrier safety act).
On the rule of preemption; Epstein’s Casenote-Legal Briefs/Torts, defines the preemption
rule of law as: “CONCISE RULE OF LAW: Federal law implicitly preempts an area traditionally
regulated pursuant to the states’ police powers if the state and federal law are in actual conflict or
the state law frustrates Congress intent.” Epstein’s relies on this holding of the following case;

The Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution provides that any state law in
conflict with a federal law is preempted by the federal law and has no effect. …
preemption only applies where it is clear that Congress intended preemption to
apply. Preemption is accomplished in several ways: expressly, by pervasive
regulation in a particular field, or by implication where state and federal law
conflict so that it is impossible to comply with both.

Lewis v Brunswick Corp. 107 F.3d 1494 (1997)

It is irrepressibly shown, throughout this writing, and more predominately in the first two
chapters, that the U.S. Supreme Court has reverently and concisely stated that the people have the
Right to freedom of movement and the Right to the free use and enjoyment of their personal
property and of the uninhibited use of the roadways.

The Supreme Court has final authority to determine meaning and application of
those words of Constitution which require interpretation to resolve judicial issues.

Pennekamp v State of Fla. 66 S.Ct. 1029, 328 U.S. 331,

90 L.Ed. 1295. (1946)

The construction given by the United States Supreme Court to the constitution and
laws of the United States is to be accepted by all courts as the proper construction.

Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S.152, 10 Wheat. 152, 6 L.Ed. 289. (1825)

Decisions of United States Supreme Court in cases involving federal questions are
conclusive authorities in state courts.

Provident Institution v. State of Mass. 73 U.S. 611, 6 Wall. 611,

18 L.Ed. 907 (1867)

MUNICIPAL REGULATION
 The courts are duty bound to recognize and stop the stealthy encroachments which have
been made upon the Citizen's Right to travel and to his personal, private use of the roads.
Hadfield, supra. Further, the court must recognize that the Right to travel is part of the Liberty of
which a Citizen cannot be deprived without specific cause and without the due process of law
guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. Kent, supra.

In general, municipal corporations possess no power to encroach on individual

rights unless such authority is plainly conferred by the City charter or other law,
and municipal ordinances ordinarily should not contravene those principles of
common right which are embodied in the common law.

Ferran v. City of Palo Alto, 50 Cal. App. 2d 374, 122 P.2d 965 (1942);
McKelley v. City of Murfreesboro, 162 Tenn. 304

It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and not the mere form.

"The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be misled by mere
pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under a solemn duty -- to look at
the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the
legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute
purported to have been enacted to protect ... the public safety, has no real or
substantial relation to those objects or is a palpable invasion of Rights secured by
the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution."

Mugler v Kansas 123 US 623, 661

A municipality has no authority, subsequently no jurisdiction to prosecute claims of a

commercial nature against private Citizens not commercially engaged. More because the
highways passing through a city are extensions of highways preemptively regulated by state and
federal laws.

When the state chooses to regulate and act under its police power, its laws and
 operations predominate over the local laws and ordinances. Municipalities may
not adopt ordinances that are inconsistent with state law. A State statute which
preempts a field precludes local agency or government legislation on the subject...

56 Am Jur 2d Municipal Corporations §391;

see also Ollinger v Bennett 562 NW 2d 167 ;
Thomas v State 614 So 2d 468

A city may not attempt to regulate beyond its jurisdiction.

City of East Lansing v Yocca 142 Mich App 491, 369 NW 2d 918

The focal point of this question of police power and due process must balance upon the
point of making the public highways a safe place for the public to travel. A local municipality
may induce reasonable regulations; for instance when a person could block a portion of road for a
parade, or erect barriers to protect the public from a sinkhole or designate certain portions of road
for public parking.

A municipality may impose other regulations adapted to its own peculiar

conditions if they are not inconsistent with those of the general character
prescribed by the State.

Am Jur 2d Automobiles §20

Municipalities retain considerable authority to regulate how motor vehicles

engaged in interstate commerce shall be operated over their streets and may
require that such vehicles obey traffic and other general safety regulations.

Am Jur 2d Automobiles §29, citing City of Chicago v

Atchison, T. and S. F. Ry Co. 357 US 77, 78 S CT 1063

On the other hand, a municipal regulation is not necessarily rendered invalid by

 the mere fact that private rights are subjected to restraint or that loss will result to
individuals from its enforcement, this is more to parking enforcement for instance.

Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, 156 F.2d 672 (C.C.A. 8thCir. 1946);
Downey v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929); City of Butte
v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 75 P. 521 (1904); Solof v. City of Chattanooga,
180 Tenn. 296, 176 S.W.2d 816 (1944); Harper v. City of Wichita Falls,
105 S.W.2d 743, Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth (1937)

...as long as municipal bodies confine their enactments within the proper limits
of their police power, they do not unlawfully violate the private rights of the
individual.

Rehmann v. City of Des Moines, 200 Iowa 286, 204 N.W. 267, 40 A.L.R.
922 (1925); Wilhoit v. City of Springfield, 237 Mo. App. 775,171 S.W.2d,
95 (1943); Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 .W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
Fort Worth 1937), writ refused.

These next few pages tell of municipal regulation and municipal authority from a myriad
legal resource, which need no further narration on the part of this writer as they are substantially
clear on municipal abatement; as much as these judicial decisions and legal resources further
explicate the breadth of this writing, the length of the citations remain to show judicial and legal
consistency.

However, the municipal police power must be so exercised as not to infringe

arbitrarily or unreasonably on private rights,...

Merri11 v. City of Wheaton, 379 Ill. 504, 41 N.E.2d 508 (1942); Downey v.
Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929); City of New Orleans v.
Southern Auto Wreckers, 193 La. 895,192 So. 523 (1939); Farrell v. City
of Syracuse, 137 Misc. 472, N.Y.S. 316 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Harper v. City of
Wichita Falls, S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1937), writ refused.

...whether they are personal rights or property rights.

Jell-O Co. v. Brown, 3 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Wash. 1926); Miami Shores
Village v. Wm. N. Brockway Post No. 124 of American Legion, 156 Ha.
673, 24 So. 2D 33 (1945); City of New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers,
193 La. 895,192 So. 523 (1939).
The standard for evaluating ordinances claimed to be violative of due process or
 equal protection is whether a rational basis exists for the police power exercised or
classification established by the ordinance.

Autotronic Systems, Inc. v. City of CoeurD’Alene

527 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1975).

Local police power enactments must not interfere with private rights beyond
necessities of the situation.

Hausman v. Dayton, 73 Ohio St. 3d 671, 653 N.E.2d 1190 (1995),

reconsideration denied, 74 Ohio St. 3d 1423, 655 N.E.2d 742 (1995) and
(distinguished by, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward,
86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999)); Priddy v. City of Tulsa, 1994
OK CR 63, 881 P.2d 81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).

Any interference with the protected rights of the citizens of the municipality must
bear a reasonable relationship to the public need served.

Metropolitan Dade County Fair Housing and Employment Appeals Bd. v.

Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park, Inc., 511 So. 2D 962 (Fla. 1987);
Priddy v. City of Tulsa, 1994 OK CR 63, 882 P.2d 81 Okla. Crim. App.
(1994); Tidewater Ass’n of Homebuilders, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach,
241 Va. 114, 400 S.E.2d 523 (1991).

The police power does not justify an interference with the citizen’s constitutional
rights that is entirely out of proportion to any benefit redounding to the public.

City of Baton Rouge v Williams 661 So. 2d 445 (La. 1995).

Municipalities must not exercise their extensive regulatory powers in an arbitrary

or discriminatory manner.

Neece v City of Johnson City, 767 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. 1989).

It is not within the power of a municipal corporation to make a particular use of

 property which, in the absence of legislation, is lawful but which is of such a
character that it may be regulated or controlled by public authority, conditional
upon the assent or permission of private persons...When an ordinance thus
attempts to confer power on some property holders virtually to control and dispose
of the property rights of others, and creates no standard by which the power thus
given is to be exercised, so that the property holders who desire and have the
authority to establish the regulations may do so solely for their own interests, or
even capriciously, constitutional limits have been violated.

56 AM Jun 2d Municipal Corporations Etc. §400, cites omitted

A municipal ordinance which commits the exertion of the police power to the
option of individuals to determine whether the use of property for a purely lawful
purpose offends the health, safety, or welfare and violates the fundamental
principles of the police power.

Appeal of Perrin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 A. 305, 79 A.L.R. 912 (1931)

As a general rule, the owner of private property is entitled to the enjoyment

thereof free from municipal interference. However, a municipal corporation in the
exercise of its police power may make regulations with respect to property within
its borders provided the regulations are reasonable and bear a substantial relation
to the preservation of the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.

Teglund, below

In general, and except insofar as concerns the exercise by a municipality of its

police powers, the owner of private property, located within the municipal
boundaries, may use it for any lawful purpose or in any lawful manner that he may
see fit,

Teglund v. Dodge, 316 Mich. 185, 25 N.W.2d 161 (1946); Tillotson v. City
Council of City of Cranston, 61 R.I. 293, 200 A.767 (1938).

...a municipal corporation may not interfere with such right.

Benner v. Tribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 57 A.2d 346 (1948);

Town of Clinton v Ross 226 N.C. 682, 40 S.E.2d 59 (1946)

But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there is no cause for
 interference in the private affairs or actions of a Citizen.

56 Am Jur 2d Municipal Corporations Etc. §396 et seq;

Municipal police regulations must also operate in a manner that is not

arbitrary, oppressive, or fraudulent.

City of Russellville v. Vulcan Materials Co., 382 So. 2d 525 (Ala. 1980);
Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 138, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 190, 346
N.E.2d 666 (1976); Wright v. Woodridge Lake Sewer Dist.,
218 Conn. 144, 588 A.2d 176 (1991).

Municipalities may enact ordinances pursuant to their police power, subject to

constitutional limitation that they be not arbitrary or capricious.

515 Associates v. City of Newark, 132 N.J. 180, 623 A.2d 1366 (1993).

The police power exercised by localities is subordinate to the equal protection and
other guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.

Hicklin v. Orbeck, 565 P.2d 159 (Alaska1977), probable jurisdiction noted,

434 U.S. 919, 98 S. Ct. 391, 54 L. Ed. 2D 275 (1977); Town of Atlantic
Beach v. Young, 307 N.C.422, 298 S.E.2d 686 (1983), appeal dismissed,
462 U.S. 1101, 103 S. Ct. 2446, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1328 (1983).

As a short corollary, saving exciting discussion, see section on anatomy of a traffic

infraction. At 56 Am Jur 2d Municipal Corporations Etc. §396 above, the question of harm is
raised. The question or statement of harm raises, in a criminal context, the rule of corpus delicti.
The rule of corpus delicti demands that the crier show proof that some actual injury has been
sustained. So, the question begs, in a criminal traffic prosecution, against the unaware traveler
who thinks a license is mandatory, what exactly was the loss incurred by the crier [state]?
Immediately there are only two suspect yet undisclosed potential losses: 1) loss of revenue, 2)
failure to maintain the business in conformance with state policy mandate; more to the point,
corpus delicti, in a legislative context, means an injury malum prohibitum, which means,
violation of a legislated policy, i.e. loss of interest; it does not import actual physical loss.
The WHOLE ACT RULE
 and
'EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS'

This chapter is dedicated to the summation that all law supports all law. It does not matter
the type of law; commercial, civil, criminal, common, or tort. All law is somehow and
somewhere dependent on other forms of law. For instance criminal trespass lends itself to civil
tort. Maritime law lends itself to commercial trade. While this writing is prejudice to common
law travel, constructive rules of law still apply. The whole act rule is based in part on these two
latin maxims of law;

Optimus interpretandi modus est sic leges interpretare ut leges legibus accordant
The best mode of interpreting laws
is to make laws agree with laws.

Optima statuti interpretatrix est (omnibus particulis ejusdem inspectis) ipsum stutum
The best interpreter of a statute is
(when all the separate parts of it have been considered)
the statute itself.

The basic introduction to the whole act rule is stated thus;

Statutes in pari materia must be construed together. Statutes in pari materia

are those which relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of
persons or things; and in construing a statute, or statutes, all acts relating to
the same subject matter of having the same purpose, should be read in
connection therewith as together constituting one law. The object of the rule
is to ascertain and carry into effect the intent of the legislature, and it
proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes having to do with
related subject matters were governed by one spirit or policy, and were
intended to be consistent and harmonious in their several parts and provisions.
emphasis
mine
State v Houck 32 Wn 2d 681, (citing State ex rel. American Piano Co. v.
Superior Court, 105 Wash. 676, 178 Pac.827; Paltro v. Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co., 119 Wash. 101, 204 Pac. 1044.)

In referencing the basics of the “whole act rule”, a Washington State Court of appeals has
stated, that only one part or section, does not beget an allegation;
 “When Legislative intent is at issue, the whole act rule requires that the entire
statute, not merely designated parts, be reviewed.” Prante v Kent School District
27 Wn. App. 375, (citing Graham v State Bar Ass'n 86 Wn 2d 624, 548 P. 2d 310,
State v Rinkes 49 Wn 2d 664, 306 P. 2d 205, Degrief v Seattle 50 Wn. 2d 1, 297 P.
2d 940.) In State v. Rinkes,49 Wn. (2d) 664, 667, 306 P. (2d) 205 (1957),
further...
we set out the rules to which we are committed in construing penal statutes.
Those applicable here are: “...The legislative intent must be gleaned from a
consideration of the whole act, by giving effect to the entire statute and to every
part thereof.

Chapin v Rhay 59 Wn 2d 459.

The entireties of Titles 46, 47, and 81 RCW, are intended for and only the regulation of
commercial motor carriers. Whereas every chapter, sub chapter, section, subsection, paragraph
and subparagraph, part and subpart of title’s 46, 47 and 81 is and can only be enforced on
commercial enterprise.

In placing a judicial construction upon a legislative enactment, the entire sequence

of all statutes relating to the same subject matter should be considered.

Percy Connick et al., v. City of Chehalis et al.53 Wn.2d 288; citing,

State ex rel. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. Bellingham
183 Wash. 415, 48 P. 2d 609

“It is our duty to construe two statutes dealing with the same subject so that the
integrity of both will be maintained. Buell v. McGee,9 Wn 2d 84, 90, 113 P. (2d)
522 (1941). The same rule applies to the construction of parts of one act. Each
part must be construed in connection with every other part or section. 2
Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), 336, § 4703.” emphasis mine

Tacoma v. Cavanaugh 45 Wn 2d 500, 275 P. (2d) 933.

The language of a statute must be read in context with the entire statute and
construed consistently with its general purpose.

Wilson et al. v. Lund 74 Wn.2d 945

 The driver license issued by the Dept. of Licensing (DOL) under authority of RCW
46.25, as a species corollary to RCW 46.20, is for the conduct of business on the highways and
no others. Take for example, RCW 46.72 Transportation of passengers in for hire vehicles, RCW
46.72A Limousines, RCW 46.73 Private carrier drivers.

In the case of Seattle v. Clark, 28 Wash. 717, 69 Pac. 407, it was stated:
"Every statute must be considered according to what appears to have been the
intention of the legislature... It is decisive evidence of an intention to prescribe
the provisions contained in the later act, as the only ones on that subject which
shall be obligatory.”
further,
In ascertaining the purposes of the legislature, we realize it to be a fundamental
rule of statutory construction that the whole act must be considered together, that
each word, phrase, clause, and sentence must be considered with reference to the
other words, phrases, clauses, and sentences appearing in the statute.
"The practical inquiry is usually what a particular provision, clause or
word means. To answer it one must proceed as he would with any other composition
construe it with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument.
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one
general purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section should be construed
in connection with every other part or section and so as to produce a harmonious
whole. It is not proper to confine the attention to the one section to be construed.
`It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute or contract to divide it by a
process of etymological dissection, into separate words, and then apply to each,
thus separated from its context, some particular definition given by
lexicographers, and then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these
definitions.'" 2 Lewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed.), 706, § 368.
See, also, Seattle v. Clark, supra; Bradley Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56
Wash. 628, 106 Pac. 170, 134 Am. St.1127; Rothweiler v. Winton Motor Car Co.,
92 Wash. 215, 158 Pac. 737; Salo v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 95 Wash.109,
163 Pac. 384, L. R. A. 1917D, 613; State v. Hilstad, 148 Wash. 468, 269 Pac. 844

in re Port of Seattle, 1 Wn.2d 102, infra Emphasis mine

The businesses identified above, similarly situated, are the private class of persons
required to have a driver license to operate motor vehicles for hire. To remove this class of
operator, limits the license scheme to common carriers under Title 81 RCW. The whole act rule
demands respect on this issue.
 In determining legislative intent, with which we are here concerned, we are not
limited to the provisions of the act being construed, but may consider the general
provisions of the criminal statutes.

State v. Burgess, 111 Wash. 537, 191 Pac. 635, 59 Wn.2d 459;
In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
of Ben Omar Chapin v B. J. Rhay

In the usual case, if “the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms,” without reference to its legislative history.
United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quotation
omitted). This rule “results from deference to the supremacy of the Legislature, as
well as recognition that Congressmen typically vote on the language of a bill.”
Lamie v. United States Trustee 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004) (quotation omitted).
Where the plain meaning of a statute is clear, “we are not free to replace it
with an unenacted legislative intent.” INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). “If Congress enacted into law something
different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform it to
its intent.” Lamie, 540 U.S. at 542.
...further,
Like most principles of statutory construction, judicial deference to the plain
meaning of a statute is not an absolute. One exception consists of those “rare cases
”when a statute’s plain text produces a result “demonstrably at odds with the
intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling.” Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); see In re Kolich, 328 F.3d
406, 409-10 (8th Cir. 2003).

Owner-Operator Independent v. United Van Lines

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
#07-3829, (2009)

The case citation directly above tells us that, on the topic of driver licenses, when RCW
46.20. et seq is read to its noticed language, there is no mention of business or commerce, when
the statute says that no person may operate a motor vehicle without a license. But when one
consider the case above where the court stated; ...when a statute’s plain text produces a result
“demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, ...; It means that the application of the
statute effecting the right to private use of the highways “is demonstrably at odds with the intent
of the drafters”. To conclude otherwise, is to admit that the legislature, intended to engage in
converting a protected Right into a mere privilege.
 The implication of the whole act rule demands we attach RCW 46.20 et seq to all other
related statutes, which includes RCW 46.25 et seq. In the states defense, and only on this point,
the fact of having two separate statutes for application of a driver license, is clear and convincing
proof, that the legislature recognizes and intended to delineate between common carriers [RCW
46.25] and private carriers [RCW 46.20] only, there is no other statute for common law traveler’s.

"For purposes of the present case, the key phrase, obviously, is 'relating to.' The
ordinary meaning of these words is a broad one – 'to stand in some relation; to
have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or
connection with,' Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)
This passage supports the district court's conclusion that the phrase
"related to" in the express preemption clause at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) should be
broadly construed. The Supreme Court's statutory interpretation in Morales also
bolsters the proposition that the phrase "relating to" in the price preemption
exception of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(C) should be construed broadly. The Morales
court effectively equated the words "related to" and "relating to," even though
the phrases were found in different acts, i.e., the ADA and ERISA. See 504
U.S. at 383-86. Similarly, we should not differentiate these phrases in the
ICCTA, especially when they are found in the same statute.
It is true Morales construed "relating to" with regard to the breadth of
preemption, not the breadth of an exception to preemption which is at issue here,
but the principle is the same. Morales emphasized that "statutory intent" is based
on "'the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. [Citations
omitted.]'" 504 U.S. at 383. Nothing in the ordinary meaning of language suggests
that cognates of "relate" have a broad meaning for purposes of preemption but a
narrow meaning for purposes of an exception to preemption. Such a construction
could only be based on a consideration other than the statutory language itself.
In this regard, we note there is a general presumption against preemption of state
law. See Coma Corporation v. Kansas Dept. of Labor, 283 Kan. 625, 632, 154.3d
1080 (2007) (citing New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695, 115 S. Ct. 1671
[1995]). emphasis mine

In The Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas, No. 96,967, State of

Kansas ex rel. Phill Kline, Att.General v. Transmasters Towing and Kevin
Raasch; see also Independent Towers, WA v. Washington 350 F.3d 925
(9th Cir. 2003)
 The intent of the drafters, for the basis of a driver license, is found at PIERCE CODE,
Laws of 1919, §196, which code is printed herein. We then look to the latter half of the court
ruling in Owner-Operator Independent above which states; “...and those intentions must be
controlling.” This tells us that the original intent of the license statute requires the name of the
business and the intended use of the vehicle.

"Congressional intent has been traditionally determined by an examination of the

language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and a consideration of its
statutory purpose." R. B. J. Apartments, Inc. v. Gate City Savings & Loan
Association, 315 N.W.2d 284, 287 (N.D. 1982) "Statutes must be construed with
reference to the policy intended to be accomplished, so as to effectuate the
legislative purpose which prompted their enactment." Hughes v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975).

Northwest Airlines v. State, ex rel. Board of Equalization

358 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1984)

Title 46 RCW specifically includes for hire statutes and definitions. Therefore under the
statutory construction canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius there can be no other form of
license. Licenses are issued to and for businesses. RCW 46.72(010) Definitions (1), reads in
relevant part;

The term "for hire vehicle" includes all vehicles used

for the transportation of passengers for compensation.

"It is a general principle of interpretation that the mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of another thing; expressio unius est exclusio alterius." 25 R. C. L. 981,
§ 229. In North Point Consolidated Irr. Co. v. Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 14 Utah
155, 46 Pac. 824, the court made this statement:

"The maxim, `Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' is usually applied to

determine the intention of the lawmaker where it is not otherwise expressed, and
is applicable to constitutional or statutory provisions which grant originally a power
or right. When a statute defining an offense designates but one class of persons as
subject to its penalties, all other persons are deemed to be excluded.
further...
 ...further,
As a general rule, the expression of one thing in a constitution or statute excludes
all others. So specific provisions, relating to particular subjects, must govern in
relation to that subject, as against general provisions in other parts of the law
which might otherwise be broad enough to include it. Where a statute enumerates
the persons or things to be affected by its provisions, there is an implied exclusion
of others and the natural inference follows that it is not intended to be general."
emphasis
mine

the State of Washington, on the Relation of the Port of Seattle

v. the Department of Public Service et al. 1 Wn.2d 102,

What follows here, is a gathering of research on the whole act rule, which is reverently
succinct as to the commands and dictates of reading policies in pari materia; from legislative
conception to judicial rendering. This writer finds no need, as holding self indicting, to expound
on, neither narrate, these rules further.

"Legislative inclusion of certain items in a category implies that other items in

that category are intended to be excluded." Bour v. Johnson, 122 Wn 2d 829, 836,
864 P.2d 380 (1993). "Where a statute specifically designates the things or classes
of things upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that all things or
classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the legislature
under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius--specific inclusions
exclude implication." emphasis mine

Washington Natural Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1

77 Wn 2d 94, 459 P.2d 633 (1969).

Under the ''expressio unius est exclusio alterius'' canon of statutory construction,
the expression of one thing in a statute ''implies the exclusion of the other.''

State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 63 P.3d 792 (2003)

citing In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476, 55 P.3d 597 (2002)

In ascertaining the purposes of the legislature, we realize it to be a fundamental

rule of statutory construction that the whole act must be considered together, that
each word, phrase, clause, and sentence must be considered with reference to the
other words, phrases, clauses, and sentences appearing in the statute. “The
practical inquiry is usually what a particular provision, clause or word means.
 further...
...further,
To answer one must proceed as he would with any other composition – construe it
with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument.” A statute
is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section and so as to produce a harmonious
whole.

State ex Rel Port of Seattle v Dept. of Public Service 1 Wn 2d 102

In construing a statute and ascertaining the legislative intent, certain rules are
observed by the courts. The legislative intent must be gleaned from a
consideration of the whole act by giving effect to the entire statute and every part
thereof.

Houck supra (citing Lin v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 Pac. 13; State ex rel.
Baisden v. Preston, 151 Wash. 175, 275 Pac. 81; Pease v. Stephens, 173
Wash. 12, 21P. (2d) 294; Arden Fare Co. v. Seattle, 2 Wn. (2d) 640, 99P.
(2d) 415; State ex rel. Wilson v. King County, 7Wn. (2d)291.)

Language within a statute must be read in context with the entire statute and
construed in a manner consistent with the general purposes of the statute. A
learned writer has explained: The presumption is that the lawmaker has a definite
purpose in every enactment and has adapted and formulated the subsidiary
provisions in harmony with that purpose; that these are needful to accomplish it;
and that, if that is the intended effect, they will, at least, conduce to effectuate it.
That purpose is an implied limitation on the sense of general terms, and a
touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms. This intention affords the key to
the sense and scope of minor provisions. From this assumption proceeds the
general rule that the cardinal purpose or intent of the whole act shall control, and
that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious.

Wilson v Lund 74 Wn 2d 945.

Where the language of a statute is plain, free from ambiguity, and devoid of
uncertainty, there is no room for construction because the meaning will be
discovered from the wording of the statute itself.

Houck supra (citing Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates,

4 Wn. (2d) 498, 104 P. (2d) 478)
 Where an act has a doubtful or ambiguous meaning, it is the duty of the court to
adopt a construction that is reasonably liberal in furtherance of the obvious or
manifest purpose of the legislature.

Houck supra (citing Othus v. Kozer, 119 Ore. 101, 248 Pac. 146;
Gallagher v. Campodonico, 121 Cal. App. 765, 5 P. (2d) 486.)

Under this approach, it is appropriate for a court to give, and did the court
appeals, a nontechnical statutory term its dictionary meaning. We have, however,
recently indicated that the plain meaning of a statute may be “discerned from all
that the legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose
legislative intent about the provision in question.” Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell
& Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Under this approach, we
construe the act as a whole giving effect to all of the language used. We stated
that this “formulation of the plain meaning rule provides the better approach
because it is more likely to carry out legislative intent.”

Thurston County v Cooper Point Ass'n 148 Wn 2d 1.

We emphasize that “ [w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and
interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters.” Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ?17, 66 P.3d 592 (emphasis
added). In so doing, we adhere to “ ' “the cardinal rule that the general purpose,
intent, or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be
interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object.” ' ” Id. (Citations
omitted). Therefore, to avoid interpreting the statute in a “piecemeal fashion,”
we interpret the terms of the act as a “comprehensive whole.”

Business Aviation of S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc. 882 P.2d 662 (Utah 1994).

Generally, the first step a court takes when reviewing the meaning of a statute is
to look into the plain meaning of its terms.

State v. Fjermestad 114 Wn.2d 828, 791 P. 2d 897 (1990).

 “It is too well-established to need citation of authority that a court may not place
a narrow, literal, and technical construction upon a part only of a statute and
ignore other relevant parts. In the process of construction, the intention of the
lawmakers must be extracted from a consideration of all of the provisions of the
act.”

DeGrief v City of Seattle 50 Wn 2d 1

(citing In re Cress, 13 Wn.(2d) 7, 123 P. (2d) 767.) see also
Commercial waterway District no.1 of King County v
Permanente Cement Company 61 Wn 2d 509

“It is a familiar canon of construction, that when similar words are used in
different parts of a statute, the meaning is presumed to be the same throughout.”

DeGrief supra, (citing Booma v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 330

Mass. 79, 111 N.E. (2d) 742, and cases cited

"courts should interpret a statute with an eye to the surrounding statutory

landscape and an ear for harmonizing potentially discordant provisions * * * ."
United States v. Bass 404 U.S. 336, 344 (1971). Indeed, even in the context of
sentencing provisions in penal statutes, a single phrase should not be construed in
isolation from the statutory scheme as a whole when to do so would result in a
meaning that contradicts or distorts "the fair import of the whole remaining
language." United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948); see, e.g., United
States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298 (1971); United States v. Bass, supra,
404 U.S. At 350-351.
further;
the rule of lenity is merely "a guide to statutory construction" (Callanan v.
United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961)), which is not applicable unless there is
such a "grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act"
(Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)) that even "(a)fter (a court
has) 'seiz(ed) every thing from which aid can be derived * * * ' (it is still) left with
an ambiguous statute." United States v. Bass, supra, 404 U.S. 347, quoting United
States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805). As this Court observed in
United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 125 (1975), quoting United States v.
Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948):

The canon in favor of strict construction (of criminal statutes) is not an

inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory
purpose * * * . Nor does it demand that a statute be given the "narrowest
meaning"; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord
with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.
 See also, e.g., United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 778-779 (1979), United
States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379 (1978); Scarborough v. United States, 431
U.S. 563, 577 (1977); Iannelli v.United States, 420 U.S. 770, 789 (1975); id. at
795 (Douglas J., dissenting); id. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States
v.Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. Denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980).

Moreover, as this Court noted in United States v. Culbert, supra, 435 U.S. at 379,
the rule of lenity applies only when a statute is genuinely ambiguous, or
uncertainty exists as to Congress' intent.
...further,
The "rule of lenity," which should only be utilized when a court's " * * *
interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended." Bifulco v. United States, supra, 447 U.S. at 387. It should not be used
to directly contradict legislative intent or to reach what the Second Circuit
correctly characterized as an "anomalous result." United States v. Rossetti
Brothers, supra, 671 F.2d at 720.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RSR Corp.

In the Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1982, No. 82-491
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States of America.
Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

A court should presume that every word has some meaning, and avoid rendering
any word nugatory. Tiger Stadium Fan Club, Inc v Governor, 217 Mich App
439, 457; 553 NW2d. Legislative intent is to be found in the terms and
arrangement of the statute without straining or refinement, and the expressions
used are to be taken in their natural and ordinary sense. Gross v General Motors
Corp, 448 Mich 147, 160; 528 NW2d 707 (1995) The primary goal of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to its legislative purpose. Haworth,
Inc v Wickes Mfg Co, 210 Mich App 222, 227; 532 NW2d 903 (1995). The
language of the statute itself is the primary indicator of legislative intent.
Folands Jewelry Brokers, Inc v City of Warren, 210 Mich App 304, 307; 532
NW2d 920 (1995). If the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute is clear,
judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. Dept of
Transportation v Thrasher, 196 Mich App 320, 323; 493 NW2d 457 (1992), affd
446 Mich 61; 521 NW2d 214 (1994). “...the title or caption of an act may be
properly considered to aid in the construction of a statute and to show the intent
of the Legislature.” See: Lindsay v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C.
272, 188 S.E.2d 374 (1972). When interpreting the meaning of a statute, certain
basic principles must be observed. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is
to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Martin, 293 S.C. 46, 358
 S.E.2d 697 (1987).
Typically, legislative intent is determined by applying the words used by the
General Assembly in their usual and ordinary significance. Martin v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company, 256 S.C. 577, 183 S.E.2d 451(1971). Resort to subtle
or forced construction for the purpose of limiting or expanding the operation of a
statute should not be undertaken. Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E.2d 14
(1984). Courts must apply the clear and unambiguous terms of a statute according
to their literal meaning and statutes should be given a reasonable and practical
construction which is consistent with the policy and purpose expressed therein.
State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991); Jones v. South Carolina
State Highway Department, 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166 (1966). Rules of
construction are but guidelines by which to arrive at legislative intent and must be
applied with care and with due regard to common sense. A study not only of the
rule but the cases applying them and attention to the purpose of Congress,
prior tariff acts, background information, and legislative history are important in
this area. L.R. Markell et al. v. United States, 16 Ct. Cust. Appls. 518, T.D. 43239
(1929). It is a primary function of the courts to determine legislative intent. United
Metal Goods Mfg. Company v. United States, 46 CCPA 120, C.A.D. 712 (1959);
United States v. S. H. Kress & Co., 46 CCPA 135, C.A.D. 716 (1959). The first
source for the determination of that intent is the statutory language, which is
presumed to be used in its normal sense. United States v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
42 CCPA 144, 151, C.A.D. 587 (1955); United States v. British Cars & Parts,
Inc., et al., 47 CCPA 114, C.A.D. 741 (1960); John S. James a/c The Consolidated
Packaging Corp. v. United States, 48 CCPA 75, C.A.D. 768 (1961); United States
v. Gulf Oil Corporation et al., 47 CCPA 32 C.A.D. 725 (1959). It is the duty of the
court to adopt the rule of construction which will give effect to the intention of
Congress as ascertained. United States v. American Express Co., 2 Ct. Cust. Appls.
95, T.D. 31636 (1911).

In the presence of ambiguity in a statute, the fact that inconsistent or absurd

results may flow from one construction and not another will often lead the court to adopt
the latter as most likely expressing the legislative intent. Cohn & Rosenberger v.
United States, 4 Ct. Cust. Appls. 378, 383, T.D. 33536 (1913); Spencer-Importing
& Trading Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Cust. Appls. 444, T.D. 32201 (1912). A
possible ambiguity in the first part of an act may be resolved when the entire
statute is read and considered. Border Brokerage Company v. United States, 27
Cust. Ct. 223, 227-228, C.D. 1375 (1951), aff'd 40 CCPA 185, C.A.D. 515 (1953).
It is well-established that in the construction of a statute the intention of the
legislature is to be deduced from the whole statute and every material part of the
same. The entire context must be considered and every effort made to give full
force and effect to all the language contained therein. United States v. Invicta
Seeland Inc., 25 CCPA 300, 305, T.D. 49397 (1938); Dart Export Corp. et al. v.
United States, 43 CCPA 64, 74, C.A.D. 610 (1956); United States v. Gulf Oil
Corporation et al., 47 CCPA 32, 35, C.A.D. 725 (1959).
 STATUTE HISTORY

The statute policies herein challenged, determined to be commercially geared, do not

specifically employ the “for hire” language, see anywhere in RCW 46.20. While it may be, with
some coordination of interrelated statutes, reasonably established that a common carrier is any
person who transports persons or property for compensation, the subtle illusion comes from the
private automobile, which may be used in some instance for monetary gain on the highways.

It is contended that the absence of a drivers license was evidential of the

operators unfitness to drive a car. We think such evidence was irrelevant and that
the rejection was proper. Non observance of the statute, by the [driver], is not
evidence of his ability to drive a car. He may have possessed more skill than may
persons that held a license...

Ross v Penn. R. Company (N.J.L.) 148 A 741;

See generally Huddy on Automobiles 9th Ed. §249 footnote 63

It is this intentional want of language, missing from the statute policy, which creates
discretion. It is necessary to turn the clock back forty years and in some instances over one
hundred years to establish that the 'incidental use of the highways' language which is the
historical legislative authority, regulating commerce, does not transcend the private, until that
private is intended to be used commercially. This is exactly the question in considering “narrow”
policy construction, whereby inquiring and invoking the “strict scrutiny” rule.

An examination of the county's implementation and authoritative constructions of

the ordinance demonstrates the absence of the constitutionally required "narrowly
drawn, reasonable and definite standards,"

Niemotko v. Maryland 340 U.S. 268

A law subjecting the right of free expression in publicly owned places to the prior
restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards is
unconstitutional, and a person faced with such a law may ignore it and exercise
his First Amendment rights.
 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), 89 S. Ct. 935
Can RCW 46.20 be definitively narrowed to succinctly and specifically identify the
differing aspects of private, and the authority of the state, when a person “hires” out his
personal automobile. NO! The object rule of substantive “notice” is to be plainly posted for a
person of average intelligence to understand. The rule does not provide any latitude for the
state to fragment chapters, which clearly have a causal link to the primary intent and purpose of
the regulation, which would tend to force an affected person not to suspect that there are
volumes more relevant and pertinent information on the requirements of a “driver” license.

In considering the “offer and acceptance” practice that is the fundamental basis of
commerce, when the state proffers a claim a.k.a. charge, civil or criminal, it is the states burden
of proof, to show that in fact their was a commercial act to effect their claim.

If the state, in their enforcement proceedings, cannot show commercially, that personal
affairs falls within the reach of the questioned policy, the policy does not provide notice of
whether or not private conduct falls within the prescript of the legislative intent.

The state is equally bridled with, in consideration of the foregoing paragraph, the burden
of showing that there was an attempted solicitation to “hire” out.

As a general rule of construction, the plain language of the statute will prevail in
the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.[4] Only when the meaning
of the language is unclear will the court resort to the recitals in or title of a statute
to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.[5] However, it is a fundamental principle
that statutes should be construed to effectuate the Legislature's intent.

[4] See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Galbut, 626 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1993) (where statute is clear and
unambiguous, court will not look behind statute's plain language for legislative intent); Cohen v.
Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 654 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (where language
of statute is unambiguous, statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning).
[5] See generally, 82 C.J.S. Statutes ss. 349 and 350.

Attorney General Advisory Legal Opinion

AGO 96-57, July 19, 1996
Robert A. Butterworth
Florida Attorney General
 Should then the statute be narrowly construed? Yes! Why? Because the statute [RCW
46.20 et seq] as written, clearly uses the term motor vehicle but does not imply private travel. To
narrowly construe the statute, the term vehicle should be defined. We know what the legal
definition of vehicle is, but it is equally important that the natural language definition of vehicle
is understood for translation from natural language to legal language, the natural language
definition is “medium─means of conveyance”. When one speaks legally, the term 'convey' by
any extension, means to transfer property from one place or person to another place or person.

But when the statute impinged on the common law, that is, legislation was in
derogation of the common law, the courts could narrowly interpret the statute by
appealing to the canon of interpretation that such statutes should be narrowly
construed.

Statutes in Courts,
The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation.
[a book] authored/compiled by WILLIAM D. POPKIN

Further, we cannot " 'add words or clauses to an unambiguous statute when the
legislature has chosen not to include that language.' " Id . (quoting State v.
Delgado , 148 Wn 2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003)).
The plain language of RCW 10.31.040 is clear. Its unambiguous language does
not encompass the enforcement of civil arrest warrants. Because we cannot add words
or clauses to an unambiguous statute, we are prohibited from reading into the
statute "civil actions." Thus, we presume that the legislature intended to exclude
"civil actions" from RCW 10.31.040.

State v. Thompson 151 Wn.2d 793,(2004)

Due process is the linchpin of both over breadth and vagueness. One involves
substantive due process; the other, vagueness, implicates procedural due process.

Blondheim v. State 84 Wn 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975).

On the issue of over breadth, i.e., substantive due process, does the statute fail? Is
it so broadly drawn that it may prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well
as unprotected behavior?
 State v. Yancy 92 Wn 2d 153, 594 P.2d 1342 (1979).
The issue of vagueness raises the procedural due process requirements of fair
notice to citizens and clear standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement of laws.
State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn 2d 259, 676 P.2d 996 (1984).

Hontz v. State 105 Wn.2d 302, 714 P.2d 1176

In Hontz above, the last paragraph identifies arbitrary enforcement of laws. If an

individual has a driver license or a vehicle business license, enforcement is not arbitrary.
However, if one did not have either license and declared oneself to be a private traveler or
common law traveler, then any enforcement is arbitrary and may raise tort liability to the
individual policeman. It is, by reading the current driver license statute and even the current
vehicle license statute, exceedingly simple to fall into the business trap set by the legislature,
whereby the common law right to free travel “falls within the scope of regulation”. It was stated
thus;

“A regulatory statute does not violate substantive due process unless constitutionally
protected activity falls within its scope. The permissible scope of a legislative regulation
depends upon an evaluation of the governmental interest promoted versus the degree and
reasonableness of the intrusion on individual rights.” (cite omitted)

“A regulatory statute is not so vague as to violate procedural due process protections

unless it does not give fair notice to citizens of the conduct subject to regulation or does
not contain clear standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement.“ (cite omitted)

Referencing the above quote, and considering RCW 46.20, give attention to the use of the
phrases; governmental interest, fair notice, subject to regulation, clear standards to prevent
arbitrary enforcement. Ask these questions...;

 Does the current statute give fair notice of the intent of the statute?
 Does the current statute give fair notice of the subject regulation?
 Does the current statute give fair notice of preventative restrictions
that a policy enforcement employee would trespass against private
travels, and arbitrarily enforce public business standards?
  Does the current statute provide notice of the states competing or compelling interest?
Reflecting on the questions above, here is a portion of an intake orientation from a
prominent law school, also reflecting the breadth of this writing;

Substantive Canons - reflecting certain policy choices;

• Statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.
• The Rule of Lenity: criminal statutes should be narrowly construed.
• Special statutes trump general statutes.

Ejusdem Generis:when general words follow particular words, the general

words are to be limited to the class of things indicated by the particular words.

Georgia State University College of Law,

Orientation notes on statutory interpretation

To address further the above orientation sheet, refer to the following latin maxim of law,
but also keeping this in mind while reading on:

generalibus specialia derogant; things special restrict things general

The whole act rule requires traverse to all statutes which cover similarly the same subject
matter. As to criminal allegations relating to motor vehicles, traverse to the State of Washington
criminal code is prudent. There, we find a definition that irrevocably binds commercial carriers to
private carriers. This definition is a pinnacle summation, eradicating all confusion which might
arise considering the definition listed at RCW 46.04. RCW 9a.04.110 reads in relevant part;

(28) "Vehicle" means a "motor vehicle" as defined in the vehicle and traffic laws,
any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail;

Notice the above statute definition does confine itself to Washington codes and policies,
but by use of the term “laws” implies all laws including Federal. Federal law defines motor
vehicle in the transportation field. See also MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security below.

18 USC 31. Definitions. ''Motor vehicle'' means every description of carriage or

other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for
 commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers,
passengers and property, or property or cargo; emphasis mine
The curriculum of law schools is expressed throughout this writing; as indicated above,
the law school presents that special statutes trump general statutes, and that particular words
trump general words. The same theory of law was expressed in the policy intent by the
Washington State Legislature at RCW 46.25.005 as follows;

…To the extent that this chapter conflicts with general

driver licensing provisions, this chapter prevails….

The special commercial motor vehicle provisions of 46.25 trump and prevail over the
general license proviso of 46.20. That is proof positive that all licenses are in fact commercial!

The following case law is introduced to influence thought as to the entire application of
the motor vehicle act. The following case is a good example for a criminal traffic infraction; can
a person be charged with, for instance, driving under the influence, while traveling privately?
NO. WHY? Initially, because the rule of preemption dictates that federal statute prevails. That is
important here because federal statute only regulates commerce. Secondly, state statute has
already admitted to be predicated on the federal statute.

Thirdly, as and for commercial consideration, with respect to the rule of lenity, and the
following rule of severability, the DUI and DWI statutes were passed subsequent to the initial
licensing act; so, speaking to these rules means that, according to the rule of lenity, to strictly
construe a DUI statute is to make it only applicable to drivers of businesses, thusly, to the rule of
severability below, if were able to delete from the states police power and regulation the licensing
provisions, would then the state have the ability to charge a person with a DWI under motor
vehicle laws? No.

It also runs counter to the constitutional requirement that the prosecution must
prove every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 363, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); State v. Roberts,88 Wn 2d
337, 340, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977).
further...
 ...further,
"An act of the legislature is not unconstitutional in its entirety because one or
more of its provisions is unconstitutional unless the invalid provisions are unseverable
and it cannot reasonably be believed that the legislature would have passed the
one without the other, or unless the elimination of the invalid part would render the
remainder of the act incapable of accomplishing the legislative purposes."
(quoting State v. Anderson 81 Wn 2d 234, 236, 501 P.2d 184 (1972)).

State v. Crediford 130 Wn.2d 747, 927 P.2d 1129

The following case, while not factually adjunct to this discussion, in the first half, reasons
those who actually benefit from the business license granted by the state have no justification for
complaint. In contrast, it further reasons, in the latter half, that the state ought not bootstrap
private travel under public law.

The U.S. Supreme Court phrase “The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state
law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes” stated in the case below,
when placed juxtapose the Washington legislature’s own language; “It is intended that this 1965
amendatory act be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of improving the safety of our
highways through driver licensing procedures within the framework of the traditional freedoms
to which every motorist is entitled”[SB 334(1965)]; galvanizes the utilitarian aspect of highways,
as secondary to the primary private use classification.

Yet the fact that all those not benefited by the challenged exemption are treated
equally has no bearing on the legitimacy of that classification in the first place. A
state cannot deflect an equal protection challenge by observing that in light of the
statutory classification all those within the burdened class are similarly situated.
The classification must reflect pre-existing differences; it cannot create new ones
that are supported by only their own bootstraps. "The Equal Protection Clause
requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it
establishes." Rinaldi v. Yeager; 384 U.S. 305,308 (1966). Emphasis mine

Williams v. Vermont 472 U.S. 14 (1985)

 Washington statutes are no different in intent and content, than what is discussed of
Florida and Kansas herein. Why? Because of the Uniform Vehicle Code, which was implemented
nationwide after several years of discussion and evolution. This was as much admitted by the
Washington State Legislature, Senate Bill No. 334, (1965);

An Act relating to motor vehicle driver licensing;

Purpose--Construction--1965 ex.s. c121 §1. With the advent of greatly increased
interstate vehicular travel and the migration of motorists between the states, the
legislature recognizes the necessity of enacting driver licensing laws which are
reasonably uniform with the laws of other states and are at the same time based
upon sound, realistic principles, stated in clear explicit language. To achieve these
ends the legislature does hereby adopt this 1965 amendatory act relating to driver
licensing modeled after the Uniform Vehicle Code subject to such variances as are
deemed better suited to the people of this state. It is intended that this 1965
amendatory act be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of improving the
safety of our highways through driver licensing procedures within the framework
of the traditional freedoms to which every motorist is entitled.”
emphasis mine

Take note of the emphasis directly above. First, this act is amendatory not newly created.
Secondly, notice the phrase within the framework of the traditional freedoms to which every
motorist is entitled. In 1965 the Washington State legislature acknowledged we have the free use
of the public roads, and the legislature designed the commercial aspect to be within not to
replace that freedom!

What Washington statutes have done is to dilute the clarity of express language, appealing
to the supposed necessity of the “driver license", and has concealed the concept of the free and
unmolested use of the highways by the general public, and openly enforced, by statute, the
highways only as a place of business, bootstrapping the governments alleged compelling interest
to regulate travel.

That spurious maneuver has divided its intent amongst no less than four statute titles, two
administrative code sections, and the myriad related chapters, with dizzying plausible affects so
that the average individual could not possibly, without the aid of the whole act rule, the rule of
exclusion, the rule of lenity, bootstrapping, and the rule of statutory construction, “expressio
unius est exclusio alterius” and the equity rule “nullem simile est idem”, discern the purpose and
intent of not only the state's jurisdiction and authority to regulate and control the roads, but also
the federal governments original issue intent of and for the highway system (not to detract from
the legal definition of the term highway).

Anyone can pick up the Revised Code of Washington, currently, look to Title 46, and
find, what 99% of police and lawyers know to be the policy laws of conduct upon the highways;
this is not to suggest the Police are not aware of personal private travel. Beginning in 1915, the
statute codes of Hill, Ballinger, Remington, and Pierce as and with their amendments, were
slowly absorbed by amendment, or simply repealed, to be rewritten into what was enacted in
1919 to be an exclusive title for vehicle codes. Pierce Code at section196, Laws of 1919, states
that this act is now conclusive. Meaning, it is now a comprehensive conclusive statute of vehicle
codes, over what had been a mere few sporadic codes previous.

Not to discount any of the several amendments to Title 46, the focus of this writing is
with the origins of the state motor vehicle acts back to the turn of the century [1900], with select
curiosities. First, here, (for discussion only, discounting repeal) we find that a vehicle on the
public roads with an expired registration (tabs) or without a valid driver license is a nuisance.
Therefore the individual has damaged the state. What do nuisances create? Tort liability.

PIERCE CODE circ.1902, CHAPTER 73. OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

Amendatory—AN ACT relating to nuisances, amending section 118 of the Penal Code
(C8I §898) contained in Hill’s Annotated Statutes and Codes of Washington. Approved
March 2, 1895. Laws ‘95 p 21.

§1741. Doing Business Without License. §900.—137. Every person who

shall, by himself or agent, transact any business, or do any act, without
a license therefor, where such license is required by any law in this state,
shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in any sum not exceeding five
hundred dollars, and in all such cases where the principal is prosecuted, his
agent may be compelled to testify; and when the agent is prosecuted, the
principal may be compelled to testify. B. C. §7311; 2 H. P. C. §132.
emphasis mine
 In 1903, the legislature passed a law (in so accepting federal highway grants [funds]) that
the free use of the highways shall be maintained, and as such, not cause impediment to travelers.

SESSION LAWS, 1903, CHAPTER 103. [H.B. No. 424]

EMPOWERING BOARDS OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO
ACCEPT RIGHTS-OF-WAY FOR CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:
SECTION 1. The boards of county commissioners in their County Commissioners
respective counties in this state are hereby authorized and empowered to accept
the grant of rights of way for the construction of highways over public lands of the
United States, not reserved for public uses, contained in section 2477 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States, ... Provided, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed to invalidate the acceptance of such grant by general public use
and enjoyment, heretofore or hereafter had. Emphasis mine

Remember that pursuant to, and with accommodation of, the whole act rule, all statutes
“relating” to a particular scope are considered in the interpretation of the intent of the policy.
See Washington Constitution Art. XII §15 for similar language.

SESSION LAWS, 1911. [CH. 117.]

ARTICLE II. PROVISIONS RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS.
SEC. 9. Charges; Duties of Common Carriers. All charges made for any service
rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of persons or property, or in
connection therewith, by any common carrier, or by any two or more common
carriers, shall be just, fair, reasonable and sufficient.
Every common carrier shall construct, furnish, maintain and provide safe,
adequate and sufficient, service facilities, trackage, sidings, railroad connections,
industrial and commercial spurs arid equipment to enable it to promptly,
expeditiously, safely and properly receive, transport and deliver all persons or
property offered to or received by it for transportation, and to promote the safety,
health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public.
All rules and regulations issued by any common carrier affecting or pertaining to
the transportation of persons or property shall be just and reasonable.
Sec. 10. Duty of Carriers and Persons to Expedite Traffic. Every common carrier
shall under reasonable rules and regulations promptly and expeditiously receive,
transport and deliver all persons or property offered to or received by it for
transportation.
 So in consideration of all previous citations, court rulings, and implications of commerce
whether public or private, we have the first [as near] complete collection of statutes under a
single act for motor vehicles. Restated here, by and with the authors excision of dictum matters;

PIERCE CODE, Laws of 1919, §196. AUTOMOBILES.

AN ACT relating to the use of the public highways...

§196. Act conclusive.

§200. Application for License. Showing to Be Made. The application must show:
(1) The name of the owner, with the business or residence address thereof,
or both if there be such;
(2) The nature of the license required; whether a license has heretofore
been issued for such vehicle, and if so, the number of such license;
(3) The trade name of such vehicle, the factory number thereof and the
name and address of the manufacturer;
(4) The kind of vehicle, whether a motor cycle, automobile, auto stage,
auto truck or other motor vehicle;
(5) The rated carrying capacity of such vehicle;
(6) The purpose for which the same is to be used, and whether for public
or private use; if for public, the nature of the same and the city or community
to be served;
(7) The power to be used, whether electric, steam, gas or other power;
(8) The weight of all automobiles for private use which shall be
determined by the shipping weight thereof as given by the manufacturer:
Provided, however, that if the secretary of state is unable to obtain
such shipping weight on any particular make or model of automobile he
may by general rules and regulations adopted and published from time to
time prescribe the method of ascertaining such weight and the proof
thereof by certificate, affidavit or otherwise which shall accompany the
application for license when the same is forwarded to the secretary
of state and the owner of the vehicle shall pay ...
italic mine

§207. Number Plates. §12 ...The secretary of state may put such other mark or
character on such plates...to properly identify the kind of license issued.

§228. Arrests by Peace Officers. §32. Any peace officer may make arrests for any
violation of this act with or without warrant therefore upon showing his authority
as such officer, and for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this act the
secretary of state, or his appointed deputies shall be deemed peace officers and
shall have the same power and authority as any peace officer within the county,
 city or town in which such violation occurs. Emphasis mine

§230. Restrictions on Local Authorities. §34. The local authorities shall have no
power to pass or enforce any ordinance, rule or regulation governing the speed of
any motor vehicle in conflict with the provisions of this act or requiring of the
owner or operator of any motor vehicle, any license other than an occupation
license ... when such motor vehicle is engaged in inter-city service,... Provided,
however, that nothing herein shall be construed as limiting the power of the county
commissioners or local authorities to make, enforce, and maintain ordinances,
rules and regulations governing traffic in addition to the provisions of this act
affecting motor vehicles, but not in conflict therewith. Emphasis mine

§235. Permits for Automobiles as Passenger Carriers. §1. It shall be unlawful for
any person, firm or corporation, ...to engage in or carry on the business of carrying
or transporting passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle along any public
street, road, or highway, Provided,... engaging in the business of transporting
passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle ...shall come under the
provisions of this act... Emphasis mine

The following section is added to this reading to show that statute code is only prima
facia evidence of [law] policy. The following excerpt is the legislative enactment from 1919.
Notice how the legislative language differs from the preceding statute section 200, paragraph 8.

SESSION LAWS, 1919. Chapter 59. SEC.5.

...the owner of any such automobile when making application for license thereon
shall cause said vehicle to be duly weighed upon a public scale and attach the
certificate of weight to his application for license, which certificate must
accompany such...

We find an admitted acknowledgment from the state that the motor vehicle act is commercial.

PIERCE—WASHINGTON CODE circ.1921, AUTOMOBILES—Common Carriers;

§234-10. Application Intrastate. §8. Neither this act nor any provision thereof shall
apply or be construed to apply to commerce with foreign nations or commerce among the
several states of this Union except in so far as the same may be permitted under the
provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the Acts of Congress.
Emphasis mine
 Prior to 1921 the office of the secretary of state would receive applications for motor
vehicle business license. However, in consideration of the rapid growth and popularity of the
motor vehicle, replacing horses to transport their freight and passengers, this became a burden on
the secretary's office, thusly the Washington State Legislature created a separate dept. to handle
the massive influx of applications. Can the Dept. of Licensing issue any kind of license that isn't
a business?? NO!! As shown in and of the numerous, consistent, non-conflicting court rulings,
use of the public highways as a place of business and profit is separate and distinct from that of
the common traveler. As seen above in the legislative enactment, the following excerpt is proof
positive that a license is for business, and only for those who use the public roadways for purpose
of that business: “The word “license” wherever used in the succeeding sections shall be held and
construed to mean...authorizing the practice of a profession or calling, the carrying on of a
business or occupation,...”

SESSION LAWS, 1921. CHAPTER 7. [H. B. 11.] ; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:

SECTION 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as the administrative code.

SEC. 2. There shall be, and are hereby created, departments of the state government
which shall be known respectively as, ...(9) the department of licenses,

SEC. 98. The word “license” wherever used in the succeeding sections shall be held and
construed to mean and include license, certificate of registration, certificate of
qualification, certificate of competency, certificate of authority, and any other instrument,
by whatever name designated, authorizing the practice of a profession or calling, the
carrying on of a business or occupation, or the doing of any act required by law to be
authorized by the state.

Review above, PIERCE CODE, Laws of 1919, AUTOMOBILES. §200. Application for
License. Note the differences in legislation here now below in 1921. This language is implicated
again in 1937 and 1947. Below, there is no longer the term “business” in subsection (1) as was
previous, because the state has unilaterally “assumed” that the owner of the vehicle business is
the person making application, and therefore must both be at the same address. Secondly, the
request for the purpose of the license in sub section (4), to determine whether the vehicle is used
to transport persons, property, or freight. Sub section (5) shows the requirement to disclose the
“adult seating capacity” of the vehicle, for 'purposes' of transporting passengers. The remainder
of this title discussion on motor vehicle weights is primarily for “haulers”, who transport goods
and property at a scale weight. However, it is noteworthy, that all pick-up trucks and some SUV's
pay a “tonnage” excise tax when the yearly tabs are renewed, which classifies and qualifies them
as commercial freight haulers, irrespective of whether that commerce is public or private.

The application must show:

(1) Name and address of the owner of the vehicle. _____________
(2) Trade name of the vehicle, the model, year, type of body, factory number and motor
number thereof.
(3) The power to be used, whether electric, steam, gas or other power.
(4) The purpose for which said vehicle is to be used and the nature of the license required.
(5) The rated carrying capacity of such vehicle, which in cases of auto for hire, auto
stages or auto stage trailers shall be the adult seating capacity thereof and in cases of
motor trucks or trailers shall be the rated capacity load as given by the manufacturer ...

In 1923, the legislature, once again makes a published admission that there is a separate
and distinct difference between those who operate motor vehicles as a business on the public
highways and the common traveler. In one enactment the legislature has distinguished vehicle,
motor vehicle and other.

SESSION LAWS, 1923, CHAPTER 122, [S. B. 267.] MOTOR VEHICLES.

An Act relating to the operation of vehicles and the use of public highways,
providing for the licensing of persons operating motor vehicles, providing
for the enforcement thereof and all other highway and motor vehicle laws
and prescribing penalties for violations thereof; and amending Section 234-22
of Pierce’s Code, and adding a new section. emphasis
mine
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Washington:
SEC. 2. That a new section be added to Sec. 234-22 of Pierce’s Code, to be known
and designated as Sec. 234-22-a, to read as follows: Sec. 234-22-a. It shall be
unlawful for any person to drive a motor vehicle in a reckless manner over and
along the public highways of this state. For the purpose of this section, to drive in
a reckless manner shall be construed to mean the operation of a motor vehicle
upon the public highways of this state in such a manner as to endanger or
inconvenience unnecessarily other users of such highway. Any person found
 guilty of a violation, of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and the
court may in his discretion suspend the operator’s license for a period of time not
to exceed six months. emphasis mine
By 1937, motorized automobiles had been around for near thirty year. So, what is the
difference though between an automobile, a vehicle, and a motor vehicle? As it is defined by
federal law, a motor vehicle is, while not distinguishing types, a publicly available commercially
applied vehicle. A vehicle however is a private not for public use vehicle. Although a private
vehicle is still commercially engaged because it is employed in the private business sector. This
distinction was clarified by the Washington State legislature as follows;

SESSION LAWS, 1937 [CH. 188.] SEC. 29. ...The application must show:
(2) Trade name of the vehicle, model, year, type of body, the motor number
thereof if such vehicle be a motor vehicle, or the serial number thereof
if such vehicle be a trailer; emphasis mine
 TAXATION

The exertion of power used in the case of private travel cannot, however, be the power of
taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a Right would be open to Constitutional objection.
A state may not levy a tax or fee on the exercise of a protected Right; a Right that may be taxed is
not a Right but a mere privilege.

“Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions: 1. "Is there
threatened danger? 2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right? 3. Is this
regulation reasonable?"

People v Smith 108 Am. St. Rep. 715;

To the first, as discussed earlier herein, the term “threatened danger” requires the state to
show a compelling interest. That compelling interest has been considered by the courts and they
have determined that businesses whom spend, in all probability, the better part of a business day
on the highways are more of a threat than those who infrequently occasion the roads for quick
trips to a market.

"The automobile is not inherently dangerous."

Cohen & Others v Meador 119 Va 429, 89 SE 876;

Blair v Broadmore 93 SE 532

“We do not believe that the automobile can be placed in the same category as
locomotives, gun powder, dynamite and similarly dangerous machines and
agencies. It is true that the operation of these machines is attended with some
danger not common to the use of ordinary vehicles and we believe and have
already held that those who operate these machines must be held to that degree
of care which is commensurate with the dangers naturally incident to their use.”

Jones v Hoge 47 Wash 663, 92 Pac 433

 Next, does the regulation involve a Constitutional Right? The Right to travel freely is a
liberty interest. While personal private travel is a separate liberty interest from the driver license,
the driver license none the less remains a property interest of which a person may not be deprived
without due process of law, see Bell v Burson 402 US 535 (1971), also Goldberg v Kelly 397 US
254 (1970).

"If the Right of passing through a state by a Citizen of the United States is one
guaranteed by the Constitution, it must be sacred from state taxation."
...further,
"... It may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing through the state cannot
sensibly affect any function of government or deprive a Citizen of any valuable
Right. But if a state can tax ... a passenger of one dollar, it can tax him a thousand
dollars."
Crandall v Nevada 6 Wall 35

Indeed, the very purpose of constraining the state to comply with the limitations of the
Constitution was to protect the rights of the people from intrusion, particularly by the forces of
government. So, we can see that any attempt by the legislature to convert the act of using the
public highways as a matter of Right into a granted privilege crime, is void upon its face.

"The state cannot diminish Rights of the people."

Hurtado v California 110 US 516; see also

Miller, supra; Sherar, supra

We know that taxes are of two varieties, direct and indirect. A direct tax is notoriously
either a strict percentage or a flat rate, and applied to a specific (tangible) thing or group. An
indirect tax is applicable to a thing or class which tends to be passive in nature. The excise tax
paid to renew the tabs on a vehicle business is a quasi-direct tax on the vehicle itself but indirect
in nature, as to the business it purports to represent.
 “One invariable limitation upon the power of taxation is that it must always be
exercised for the benefit of the public. * * * Whether or not a particular purpose of
taxation is a ‘public’ purpose, is a question which must be determined, in the first
instance, by the legislature. But its determination is not conclusive. And if the
courts can see that the purpose of the tax is plainly and indubitably a private
purpose, they will not allow its collection.” Black, Const. Law, p. 336. Among the
purposes “unquestionably ‘public’ in every proper sense of the term” the author
last quoted (p.340), mentions “the construction, repair, and improvement of public
roads including highways, turn pikes, and paved streets in cities.” See also Cooley
on Taxation 3d Ed., p. .182. Lowell v. City of Boston, 11 Mass. 454, 462, was case
involving a question of taxation, Mr. Justice Wells, says:

“The power of the government, thus constituted to affect the individual in

his private rights of property, whether by exacting contributions to the
general means, or by sequestration of specific property, is confined, by
obvious implication as well as by express terms, to purposes and objects
alone which the government ‘was established to promote, to wit, public
uses and the public service. * * * So far as it concerns the question what
constitutes public use or service that will justify the exercise of these
sovereign powers over private rights of property, which is the main
question now to be solved, this identity renders it unnecessary to
distinguish between the two forms of exercise, as the same tests must
apply to and control in each.” emphasis mine

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §66, @131

The manner in which all forms of taxes other than a direct tax affect the present
consideration, is as a tax “on the privilege of carrying on the business,” that is to
say, of using and operating the vehicle.

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §90, @145 citing,

Cooley on Taxation, 3d Ed.

In these next three citations from Babbitt, we see that the state has authority to tax those
who supply a benefit to the public, thusly the rule of reciprocity dictates that business is to be of
mutual benefit, which public benefit is the subject of the tax. As seen in the second citation
below, Portland Bank v Apthorp, the question of income tax arises. If a person operates a vehicle
business, then certainly that person must have a tax liability. Yes? This is the essence of federal
taxing regulations of commodities.

“When employments are expressly permitted to be taxed as privileges, the burden

is usually restricted to those which in some particular are exceptional, either * * *
because they require special regulations * * * or because they supply a general
demand.”

“When the tax takes the form of a tax on the privilege of following an
employment, convenience in collection will commonly dictate the
requirement of a license, and the person taxed will be compelled to pay the
tax as a condition to the right to carry on the business at all. In such case
the business carried on without a license will be illegal.”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §74, @135 citing,

Cooley on Taxation, 3d Ed., pp. 1906, 1097.

“The term excise is of very general signification, meaning tribute, custom, tax,
tollage, or assessment. It is limited, in our Constitution, as to its operation, to
produce goods, wares, merchandise, and commodities. This last word will perhaps
embrace everything, which may be a subject of taxation, and has been applied by
our legislature from the earliest practice under the Constitution, to the privilege of
using particular branches of business or employment...

It must have been under this general term, commodity, which signifies
convenience, privilege, profit, and gains, as well as goods and wares, which are
only its vulgar signification, that the legislature assumed the right,... . It is a
commodity, convenience, or privilege, which the legislature has by
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, assumed a right to sell at a
reasonable price, and, by parity of reason, it may impose the same conditions upon
every other employment or handicraft.”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §81, @140 citing,

Portland Bank v Apthorp 12 Mass 252

“It is entirely customary, under our system, to impose exceptional taxation upon
certain pursuits and callings, upon the theory that, from their relation to the public
interest * * * they should be classed as special privileges or franchises * * *.
Where the legislature has power to tax an occupation, it has the further power to
make it a penal offense for any person to engage in that occupation without first
paying the tax imposed * * *. Such provisions cannot be said to deprive the
citizen of his rights or property without due process of law.”
 The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §96, @154.

As to the cite above, Babbitt §96, consider whether the state provided verbal or written
notice, that the application was actually for a business license, that they could impugn for
noncompliance; i.e. traffic infractions for, pick a violation, or even throw someone in jail for
violating some federally adjunct drunk driving statute and then turn a blind eye when the state
quarterly tax reports weren't filed, as required by statute; assuming of course, the vehicle
business were 100% legitimate. Certainly if the state can prosecute, either civilly or criminally,
the motor vehicle act against an individual, it must be then, that quarterly B&O and sales taxes
are due to the Dept. of Revenue.

“[taxation]assumes the legality of the business for any who may choose to pursue
it, but imposes a burden for the public benefit upon those engaged in it. ...A
license law, assumes the illegality of the business and denounces penalties upon
those who pursue it without previously protecting themselves by procuring a
license. ...Hence it follows that any law which requires certain acts other than the
mere payment of the tax, to be done by the party as a prerequisite to his right to
enter upon the pursuit * * * and makes it a penal offense to engage in the business
without such formalities, is in reality a license law, no matter whether it be called a
tax or by any other name.”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §97, @155 citing,

Cleary v Johnston 74 Atl. Rep. 538 (1909)

To command the perfection of license before entry upon the highways is deprivation of
property and liberty; for the state to place a road in the pathway of a traveler constitutes an
obstruction and nuisance, which one could demand removal of, (saving eminent domain), as it
inhibits/restricts the enjoyment of freedom of movement. If a traveler wanted to pass from point
A to point B along a specific route; would it be legal for the state to place a paved road along the
identical route and have the audacity to expect him to obtain a business license to undertake that
journey? NO!

"It cannot be contended that by the enactment of this chapter [ordinance]...that it

has taken away from it [the city] the power to keep it [highways] free from
nuisance, and open and free to the general public as an avenue of travel. ...It is
 true that it provides that municipalities may not exclude the owner of an
automobile from the free use of the public highway. ...In passing on the last
proposition [italicized] it is sufficient to say that this ordinance does not exact any
fee, license, or permit from the owner of any automobile for the privilege of using
the public streets. It [ordinance] does not exclude any automobile owner from the
free use of the public streets. ...We interpret this to mean the free use for the
purpose for which streets are primarily dedicated,—the free use of the streets
for public travel. Conceding, for the purpose of the argument, that the legislature
has given to the automobile driver the free use of the public streets, and that the
city has no power to exclude from the free use of the public streets, we must
construe this language to mean that free use which is involved in the right to come
and go and drive upon the streets without let or hindrance.
Emphasis mine
21 ALR 1209 citing,
Pugh v. Crawford (1916) 176 Iowa 593, 156 N. W. 892

So then to answer the third question from above; Is this regulation reasonable? What is a
highway? A highway is nothing more than a footpath; a footpath that has been widened and
covered to allow for heavier forms of conveyance. Can the state demand application for license
to use a footpath in the woods? No. Then is the driver license regulation reasonable? No.
 CONSTITUTIONAL (CHARTER) AUTHORITY,
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTRACT

Nearly every aspect of the scope of this writing was summarized here by Albert Stickney
one hundred and twelve years ago. Everything basic, needed to understand the right of travel, the
privilege of commerce, and authority of state control, is contained in these first three paragraphs.

And the reason why the use has always been held a public one is that such a road
is a highway, whether made by the government itself, or by the agency of
corporate bodies, or even by individuals, when they obtain their power to
construct it from legislative grant. ... Whether the use of a railroad is a public or a
private one, depends in no measure upon the question who constructed it or who
owns it. It has never been considered a matter of any importance that the road was
built by the agency of a private corporation. No matter who is the agent, the
function performed is that of the state. Though the ownership is private, the use is
public. . . . The owners may be private companies, but they are compellable to
permit the public to use their works in the manner in which such works can be
used. That all persons may not put their own cars upon the road, and use their own
motive power, has no bearing upon the question whether the road is a public
highway. It bears only upon the mode of use, of which the legislature is the
exclusive judge.’ "All public highways are subjects of general state jurisdiction,
because their uses are the common property of the public. This principle of the
common law is in this state of universal application. As to the class of public
highways known as railroads, the common law is fortified by the express
conditions of the statutes creating or regulating or controlling them.
further,
On other public highways every person may be his own carrier; or he may hire
whomsoever he will to do that service. Between him and such employee a special
and personal relation exists, independent of any public duty, and in which the state
has no interest.

STATE CONTROL OF TRADE AND COMMERCE

BY NATIONAL OR STATE AUTHORITY, c1897
[a book] BY ALBERT STICKNEY OF THE NEW YORK BAR
citing; People v New York Central, etc, R.R. Co. 28 Hun, 543
 "This brings us to inquire as to the principles upon which this power of regulation
rests, in order that we may determine what is within and what without its operative
effect. Looking, then, to the common, law, from whence came the right which the
Constitution protects, we find that when private property is ‘affected with a public
interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.’ This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale
more than two hundred years ago, in his treatise De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. L. Tr.,
78, and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of
property ever since. Property does become clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at
large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use;
but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control.
Thus, as to ferries, Lord Hale says, in his treatise De Jure Maris, 1 Harg. L. Tr. 6,
the King has “A right of franchise or privilege, that no man may set up a common
ferry for all passengers, without a prescription time out of mind, or a charter from
the King. He may make a ferry for his own use or the use of his family, but not for
the common use of all the King’s subjects passing that way; because it doth in
consequence tend to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest
and use, and every man for his passage pays a toll, which is a common charge, and
every ferry ought to be under a public regulation, viz.: that it give attendance at
due times, keep a boat in due order, and take but reasonable toll; for if he fail in
these he is finable.” So if one owns the soil and landing-places on both banks of a
stream, he cannot use them for the purposes of a public ferry, except upon such
terms and conditions as the body politic may from time to time impose; and this
because the common good requires that all public ways shall be under the control
of the pub1ic authorities. This privilege or prerogative of the King, who in this
connection only represents and gives another name to the body politic, is not
primarily for his profit, but for the protection of the people and the promotion of
the general welfare.

This statement of the law by Lord Hale was cited with approbation and acted
upon by Lord Kenyon at the beginning of the present century, [1800] in Bolt v
Stennett, 8 T.R., 606.

STATE CONTROL OF TRADE AND COMMERCE

BY NATIONAL OR STATE AUTHORITY, c1897
[a book] BY ALBERT STICKNEY OF THE NEW YORK BAR
citing; Munn v People of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
 One further consideration may be added. The United States Supreme Court has
laid down the following as one of the guiding principles in the interpretation of
statutes: "Even in construing the terms of a statute, courts must take notice of the
history of legislation, and out of different possible constructions, select and apply
the one that best comports with the genius of our institutions and is therefore most
likely to have been the construction intended by the law-making power.

“The history of legislation,” as set forth in the preceding pages, seems to make it
clear, that attempts to control the contractual freedom of persons engaged in trade
and commerce have been found unwise and pernicious. The “genius of our
institutions” is overwhelmingly in favor of emancipation from all restrictions on
complete contractual freedom—in private employments. In public employments—
wise jurists and wise legislators are well agreed, that the individual citizen must
have all needful protection at the hands of the State. But what are we to say of the
latest attempt at State control of trade and commerce, in private employments?

STATE CONTROL OF TRADE AND COMMERCE

BY NATIONAL OR STATE AUTHORITY, c1897
[a book] BY ALBERT STICKNEY OF THE NEW YORK BAR citing;
Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
162 U. S. 197, 218.

There are many judicial rulings both at the state and federal level, which will indicate that
a driver license is not a contract. The application for a driver license does not create a contract,
neither does the possession of the driver license; IT IS however, an application for permission to
engage in offering a public service as a driver, to a publicly oriented business, whether that be for
a business outright or a business colorable. It is now undoubtedly and without dispute that to be
driving is to be either an employee or a subcontractor or in some instances a sublet. The vehicle
operator is the employer/contractor, which creates the contract; while the driver is the
employee/subcontractor/sublet.

Let’s use tow trucks, taxi cabs, and moving company's for reference because they are, the
three most well known forms of vehicles that transport persons and property for compensation.
Each of the three operators usually has a fleet of vehicles a.k.a. motor vehicles, which are owned
by typically one company, the employer/contractor. Each of the three operators either lease the
vehicle/motor vehicle to subcontract drivers or are driven by employees. There are a variety of
factors which determine that relationship. ONE – the operator owns the vehicle and hires
[employee] drivers to execute the business transaction with the public. TWO – the operator owns
the vehicle but leases it to a subcontract driver assigning an element of risk and a de facto benefit
to the driver whereby the subcontract driver would have to insure the vehicle to protect the
operators interest.

The two examples above should not be considered exhaustive or limiting to establish the
relationship. With and for the purpose of this discussion, below is established plausibility for
both. Starting with the Constitution of the State of Washington. The state constitution is
tantamount to the magna carte, which is, simply stated, a charter.

Const. Art. I DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

§16 EMINENT DOMAIN.
...No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without
just compensation having been first made, ...Whenever an attempt is made to take
private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the
contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as
such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public: ... .

Const. Art. XII CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN MUNICIPAL

§1 CORPORATIONS HOW FORMED.
...all corporations doing business in this state may, as to such business, be
regulated, limited or restrained by law.

§10 EMINENT DOMAIN AFFECTING.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain shall never be so abridged or
construed as to prevent the legislature from taking the property and franchises
of incorporated companies, and subjecting them to public use the same as the
property of individuals.

§13 COMMON CARRIERS, REGULATION OF.

All railroad, canal and other transportation companies are declared to be common
carriers and subject to legislative control. (...)

§18 RATES FOR TRANSPORTATION.

The legislature may pass laws establishing reasonable rates of charges for the
transportation of passengers and freight, and to correct abuses and prevent
discrimination and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the
different railroads and other common carriers in the state, and shall enforce such
 laws by adequate penalties. A railroad and transportation commission may be
established and its powers and duties fully defined by law.

A service is said to be performed when one takes to perform a task or duty for which there
is no instruction, guidance or assistance from the party receiving the benefit of said service.
However, a service may still be performed if the parties agree that the beneficial party assumes
some portion of the risk for consideration.

In the case of the taxi and tow truck company, they provide a service and therefore
provide the driver. That driver may be either a subcontractor or an employee depending on their
agreement. In the case of the moving company, they hold out their business to the public, but
they are considered a private contract carrier because they provide a private service and do not
hold open their business for the general public at large as would a bus company or ferry service.
Moreover, the moving company may provide a driver, his employee, or it may sublet the vehicle
and allow the sublet to drive the vehicle or their hired driver. The moving company, like the car
rental service below, would agree to sub[let] contract to a person in consideration of a reduced
fee for the interest.

If a person rents a vehicle from a car rental service company, he will be required to sign a
contract agreement to provide a driver, or at a minimum have a driver license (which is the same
thing); likewise signing a contract to provide the lessor with his insurance company information
or purchase insurance from their insurance provider. If a person provides insurance and a driver
he is a sub[let] contractor. If, however, a person purchases the service fully at the lessors proviso
then he is merely contracting a service from a private carrier.

While the question of contract as to a driver license is settled law, it remains a clever
focus of clandestine artifice. The vehicle license actually created a contract, because it is the
business. The term contract means to come together and make as agreement; assimilate. To say
that one agrees to be bound by the motor vehicle code can be established merely by asking if
there are license plates on the vehicle. Here’s why; the individual consented to convey the
property (the automobile) to state (legislative) control. Start with the Constitution of the State of
Washington, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS;
 Const. Art. I §1-POLITICAL POWER.
All political power is inherent in the people, and governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed...
On the idea of consent, the legal maxim of law is stated thus;

Non potest rex subditum renitentem onerare impositionibus;

meaning-The king cannot load a subject with impositions against his consent.

When an individual voluntarily registers an automobile with the state, he has consented
and given a security interest to the state. This can be verified by looking to UCC Chapter 9. The
state now has a perfected security interest in the vehicle by issuance of a certificated title of
ownership. See, inter alia, UCC 9 et seq. Ownership by corporate standard means only a secured
interest. To say governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is in fact a
contract agreement. To further expound this statement, is to look to the following definition;

The phrase "valuable and adequate consideration," used in Act Cong. June 30,
1864, c. 173, §132, declaring that if any person shall by deed of gift or other
assurance of title made without valuable and adequate consideration, and
purporting to vest the estate, either immediately or in the future, convey any real
estate, such disposition shall be taken to confer upon the grantee the succession,
means either money paid or some present legal interest or estate parted with or
charged, or services rendered, to the value of the property received.
(Italic mine)
Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases
West Publishing Co., 1905 ; citing,
United States v. Banks (U.S.) 17 Fed. 322

When applying for title, whereby registering the [now] vehicle, a.k.a. starting a business,
the State obviously could not take the automobile from an individual, saving fair market
payment, without, at a minimum, giving or perhaps taking valuable consideration. As seen below,
defined in law, valuable consideration consists of any thing that has value; accordingly
everything is assigned value. That does not mean everything has a monetary value, only that
some value attaches; for example sentimental value.

Value in se is not indicative of a proprietary interest, albeit value may be intrinsic or

extrinsic. As seen below, the vehicle business has value because the state has considered the
mutual financial benefit. In derogation though, the loss of a driver license occurs in consideration
of the failure to keep the business within regulatory standards.
JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF WORDS AND PHRASES,
VOLUME 8; WEST PUBLISHING CO. , 1905
Valuable Consideration.
A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either of some right, interest, profit, or benefit
accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment. loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or
undertaken by the other. (cites omitted)

"A valuable consideration is one that is either a benefit to the party promising, or some trouble or prejudice
to the party to whom the promise is made. Any damage or suspension or forbearance of a right will be
sufficient to sustain the promise." That is, a benefit or advantage accruing to the party who makes the
promise, or some inconvenience or injury sustained by the party to whom the promise is made, is sufficient to
support a contract. Homan v. Steele, 26 N. W. 472, 474, 18 Neb. 652.

"A valuable consideration is such as money, marriage, or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent for
the grant, and is therefore founded in motives of Justice." (cites omitted)

A "valuable consideration," as denned in the books, means money or any other thing that bears a known
value. As much may be inferred from the word "consideration" as from the word "value." Jackson v.
Alexander (N. Y.) 3 Johns. 484, 489, 3 Am. Dec. 517.

A "valuable consideration" means, and necessarily requires, under every form and kind of purchase,
something of actual value, capable, in the estimation of the law, of pecuniary measurement; parting with
money or money's worth, or an actual change of the purchaser's legal position for the worse. (cites
omitted) emphasis mine

To constitute a valuable consideration, as against existing creditors, the consideration recited, if relied on,
must be such as will evidence an obligation on the part of the creditor that the grantee could have enforced
against him or his estate. (cites omitted)

A valuable consideration is a thing of value parted with, or a new obligation assumed, at the time of
obtaining a thing, which is a substantial compensation for that which is obtained thereby. It is also called
simply "value," (cites omitted)

In the dissection of constitutional provisions, remember, the people went to them and
applied, the state did not come to the people. The state did not per se take the private property.

Const. Art. I §16 EMINENT DOMAIN. No private property shall be taken

... for public ... use without just compensation having been first made, ...

“The legislature represents the public. So far as concerns the public, it may
authorize one use to-day and another and different use to-morrow. If the new use
affects private rights, proceedings for condemnation may have to be invoked; but
so far as it affects the public alone, its representative, in the absence of
constitutional restraint, may do as it pleases.”
 The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §40, @111 citing,
People v. Walsh 96 Ill. 232
Section 16 tells us that the state now owns (has a perfected security interest in what was)
the personal automobile which is now a public vehicle. We must read the charter colorably. Why?
Because the charter tells us the state only attempted; this is because they threatened statutory
sanction and we consented to “fear of the unknown”. The charter also tells us for a use “alleged”
to be public. See also the section on use of the highway earlier. The question of use is to be
judicially determined. However §16 read literally, says, if there is a dispute as to whether the use
was public or not, the judiciary shall resolve the dispute; PROVIDED THAT the question is
“determined [as such] to be public”, regardless of legislative intent. It is most certainly public
because consent was given conveying personal property to the public state, and not one judge
will adjudicate otherwise, ESPECIALLY when the vehicle has business license plates attached to
the front of it AND that business vehicle information appears on the policy enforcement traffic
infraction of business activity within the state.

§16 EMINENT DOMAIN. ...Whenever an attempt is made to take private

property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use
be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such, without
regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.

An application for a driver license is a request for permission to provide a service

[driving] for someone else who has agreed to remunerate the driver in some fashion, whether that
be for a business outright or a business colorable. If a person drives for an individual, using his
own vehicle he is both the business operator and the driver. If the vehicle being driven belongs to
another person, then the driver is driving for some other business. As it pertains to the motor
vehicle code, a driver submits to legislative control because of the business venture related use of
the roads and highways.

Const. Art. XII CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN MUNICIPAL

§1 CORPORATIONS HOW FORMED.
...all corporations doing business in this state may, as to such business, be
regulated, limited or restrained by law.
 As a short corollary, saving further comment, to this employee/employer status, review
Internal Revenue Service Code, section 3121(a) WAGES. The term wages includes the cash
value for benefits. Having a driver license and or an operators [business] license is a benefit
privilege granted by the state. As such, that benefit has a cash value. As a co-[registered] owner is
then presumed to be actually operating a business. Having either of the licenses, or presumptively
both of the licenses, entitles a person, pursuant to authority of Title 26 United States Code, to
take as a deduction, every single dime made in a year as a business expense.

The state is a colorable business having an ownership interest in the vehicle [business].
Notice above, that the constitution expressly states the taking of individual property. Art. XII §10
(Constitution of the State of Washington) is an expression that no business shall be exempt from
governance. The term taking used in §10 below, more to the point, declares that equal protection
of the law applies to big business which requires an extensive easement across private and/or
public land, as is the case of the railway, and shall not be given prejudicial deference over small
business, requiring a similar easement.

Const. Art. XII §10 EMINENT DOMAIN AFFECTING.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain shall never be so abridged or
construed as to prevent the legislature from taking the property and franchises
of incorporated companies, and subjecting them to public use the same as the
property of individuals.

For the same reason that doctors, dentists and daycares provide the street address of the
buildings where they have their business practice, is why the vehicle is registered, the license
plates perpetrate an address for the place of business. If the doctor, dentist or daycare attempted
to practice without a license the state would have authority to injunct the premises to prevent
further unlicensed practice. While the vehicle [business] has the good fortune of being mobile the
state would likely seize the vehicle to prevent unlicensed practice; unless, and with prejudicial
discretion on the part of the policy enforcement officer, a licensed driver were to take control of
the vehicle.

It is not such a reach to suggest that a person, however subtle, may be transporting state
persons and state property, for the state, in the interest of community proliferation, exercising and
thusly stimulating the economy, for which the state has mutually benefited from a persons
travels, having at a minimum collected sales taxes from a myriad purchases from other
merchants, now have the expectant obligation to report to the Internal Revenue Service the cash
value of those travels as income to the state.

Possession of a driver license and a vehicle business license is regulated by a legislative

grant of authority under the constitution. The charter gives the legislature authority to regulate
“all...other transportation companies”. Vehicles and motor vehicles are, by license, transporters of
persons and property, which makes them a common carrier.

§13 COMMON CARRIERS, REGULATION OF.

All ... other transportation companies are declared to be common carriers...

The Congress of the United States and the State Legislature proliferate the dichotomy of
interstate and intrastate commerce by qualifying and distinguishing purpose and capacity. For
instance there are three major divisions of carrier; common, contract and private. Common
carriers deal almost entirely with quantum mass public movement; trains─of any size or rail,
buses, trams and ferries. Contract carriers are transfuse, meaning they can either transport, by
contract, a large shipment for a common carrier or a smaller shipment for a private carrier; i.e.
moving companies and postal shipping companies. Contract carriers operate for the public
benefit by way of private contract. Both common and contract carriers are predominately
classified by axle weight, tonnage or prejudice of easement, as of railways or water borne
vessels.

The private [for hire] carrier is as diverse as it is transfuse. The private carrier is of two
calibers: those carrying greater than sixteen passengers and/or 26,001 .lbs, versus those carrying
less than those limits. Here the classification being lesser axle weight and/or lesser passenger
capacity, the automobile “bottom feeds” on the smaller contracts of the larger counterpart, but
still is able to bill itself as a publicly offered common carrier. These types of vehicles are pick-up
trucks and small panel trucks and anything from a subcompact two door sedan to a stretch
limousine.

Tow trucks, taxis, ambulances, postal trucks, ice cream trucks, milk trucks, police cars,
dial-a-ride taxis, and plumber trucks. All of these vehicles use the highways as a place of
business. It seems obtusely obvious to say that these vehicle businesses could not exist without
the highways, because they transport persons and or property upon a public road and they get
paid to do it.

When taking into consideration the definition of commerce, from com- "together" + merx
"merchandise"; look around while commuting on the roads and visualize the highway as a side
walk “marketplace” not unlike the Pike Place Market, with all the vehicle businesses lined up
booth to booth to booth, conducting a business hawking their wares.

More succinctly the roadways are governed because of the vascular “connectivity”. That
is to say that commerce itself, the act of exchange and trade, is done privately, on private
property, in private buildings, on private phones. It is “transportation”, after the fact, when the
“goods” or “commodities” need to be exchanged, that requires delivery to the purchaser. That
delivery, requiring space on the roadways, is incidental to the normal use.
 DRIVING

Now as shown infra, the legislature has clearly outlined the parameters of driving as that
which is commercial by common carrier, private carrier and private for hire. What is of
importance is the type of use. Personal use of the roads does not occasion the need for a license.

The legislative body acknowledged a right to beg that does not rise to the level of
"aggressive solicitation," or it would have proscribed begging altogether. By
expressly proscribing one type of solicitation, the ordinance implicitly allows
other types not otherwise proscribed. See State v. Delgado 148 Wn 2d 723, 729,
63 P.3d 792 (2003) ("'Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a canon of
statutory construction, to express one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of
the other.' " quoting In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wn 2d 476, 491, 55 P.3d 597 )

City of Spokane v. Marr 129 Wn. App. 890

See also Brown-Edwards v. Powell 144 Wn. App. 109

"It is obvious that those who operate motor vehicles for the transportation of
persons or property for hire enjoy a different and more extensive use of the public
highways. * * * Such extraordinary use constitutes a natural distinction and a full
justification for their separate classification and for relieving from the burden of
the license tax those who merely employ the public highways for the
transportation of their own property or employees."

Bacon Service Corporation v. Huss, 129 Cal. 21, 248 P. 235,

(State v. Karel, 180 So. 3 at 8.)

The term "travel" or "traveler", while typically neuter, refers to one who uses an
automobile or a vehicle to move from one place to another, and includes all those who use the
highways as a matter of Right. The term "driver" is a contradistinction to "traveler," as defined.
Therefore, one who uses the road in the ordinary course of life and business, for the purpose of
travel, is a traveler. The term “for hire” is a rhetorical term, and is defined as a person who holds
himself out for payment of a fee or fare in exchange for transfer of some others property or
passenger.
 Considering the eristic poignancy of this writing, let’s review the charge of DWI. Of the
many court room arguments that litigants get into, then relying on judicial discretion for resolve;
the argument of “I‘m not a driver” or “I wasn’t driving”, may come up so then the judge would
have to consider the definition of driver. Remember though, the judge will always (saving
grievous error) favor the state. So, according to the ruling below, in order to actually convict for
driving under the influence, it must be established that a person was actually driving. (if one has
a license, the presumption is in fact, that one was driving).

When analyzing the concept of misconduct, the trier of fact must consider
the legal definition in context with the factual circumstances surrounding the
conduct at issue.

Garman v State Employment Security Dept. 102 Nev. 563, 729

P 2d 1335 (1986); Jones v Rosner 102 Nev. 215, 719 P2d 805

In and of all the research founded, the great many courts across this country, including
Washington courts, do not visit the discussion of driving v traveling, very often exceeding
decades. At that though they usually will divert attention to some other question of fact or law.
As much as driving is an element of a statute crime, in arguing civil and criminal litigation, there
is almost always more than one issue raised on appeal, and the courts will not address the driving
v traveling issue when given another option.

Due process requires that the prosecution prove each element of a crime. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). Jury instructions
must define every element of the offense charged.

State v. Johnson 100 Wn 2d 623 emphasis mine

The omission of an element of the crime produces a "fatal error" by relieving

the State of its burden of proving every essential element beyond a reasonable
doubt. Additionally, failure to instruct the jury on every element of the crime was
reversible error because such an error relieves the State of its burden of proving
every element beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Eastmond,129 Wn 2d 497, 919 P.2d 577 (1996); State v. Daniels

 87 Wn App. 149; State v Byrd 125 Wn 2d 707, 887 P. 2d 396 (1995)
The construction of the constitution of the United States by the supreme court is
binding on a jury as well as the court.

U.S. v Shive 20 Fed. Dig. 439, Fed. Cas. No.16278, Bald. 510 (1832)

As is indicated in definitions at RCW 46.20.040, drive and operate shall mean the same
thing: to be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle; except that it is shown conclusively
herein that driving is not operating. The statutes of the State of Kansas read near word for word
identical to Washington statutes; so it was stated in State of Kansas v Kendall 274 Kan. 1003, 58
P.3d 660, that the action of physical control of a motor vehicle is therefore transportation, and
therefore the basis of commercial activity. Kansas statutes of 1999.

We know that transportation of persons or property is a commercial activity. While the

term property is restricted to tangible physical items, to which possession is claimed by title,
contract or receipt (bill of sale-bill of lading). The term person is a more broad term and in the
transportation of persons the term may be expressed as a rider, quest, or passenger. No matter
which phrase is used, or the calibre of vehicle, be it public or private, to transport a person means
there is the axiomatic payment for such carriage. A rider does not always pay a fare, in the case
of a driver trainee, or husband and wife long haulers, or taking a cameraman along to film an
activity, whereby one does the driving and the others presence is merely migratory. Contrastly a
rider may pay a fare as a second or third party in a taxi where the initial fare is borne at a
stipulated rate or mileage, and the second and/or third passengers pay a “surcharge” as it were,
for carriage, having created additional transcendental wear and tear on the vehicle.

The term guest is similar to that of rider having much of the same attributes, but
moreover is someone who was invited, and as such is a mere invitee. Guests are incidental to
businesses that hold their doors open to the public, but the presence of the guest could be non-
commercial. A fee charged for service is borne to the user and the guest is welcome at the
invitation of the user when the user has paid a bulk rate, as it were, for the service. The term
guest is appropriate, when the demand for fare is discretionary, and contingent on the intended
use. For instance, a hotel charges a rate for guests who would use a room for staying the night; a
hotel would not however charge a fee to a guest who was attending a conference in a hall. As it
relates to the highways, a person may hire the services of a limousine company (the operator) and
the limousine company would provide a driver, and for that fee, the limousine would take any
number of persons on an excursion. Only one person paid the fare and all other riders are guests.

The term passenger is quantitatively similar to each of the definitions above for each of
the stated reasons. The term passenger is derived from passage; a passenger in a vehicle is one
having right of passage upon payment of fare. It is argumentative to say that the actual passenger
paid the fare, more certainly because a passenger could have received the right of passage from a
third person who paid the fare but is not the passenger.

The term passenger ordinarily imports some contractual relation between the
parties.

Long v Archer et al 221 Ind.186, 46 NE 2d 818; citing; Gale v Wilber 163

Va. 211, 175 SE 739; Bushouse v Brom 297 Mich 616, 298 NW 303

There is involved here, not a common, but rather a gratuitous, carrier. The legal
definition of "passenger" is two fold. Many definitions may be found for this
relationship between the one conveyed and the conveyor. Facts always control in
an individual case. When speaking generally upon the subject of common carriers,
this court said, in Weber v Chicago, R.I.&P.R. Co. 175 Iowa 358, 151 NW 852.
It is not easy to state a general rule, nor to give a definition of the word 'passenger'
which would embrace all the essential elements. As said in 2 Hutchinson on
Carriers (3rd Ed.), Sec. 997: 'The one usually accepted by the courts, when a
definition has been attempted, is that a passenger is "one who travels in some
public conveyance by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with the carrier, as
the payment of fare, or that which is accepted as equivalent therefore." This
definition, however, like all others, is hardly comprehensive enough; for, as a
general rule, every person not an employee, being carried with the express or
implied consent of the carrier upon a public conveyance usually employed in the
carriage of passengers, is presumed to be lawfully upon it as a passenger: First, an
undertaking on the part of the person to travel in the conveyance provided by the
carrier; and second, an acceptance by the carrier of the person as a passenger.
Whether either or both of these elements exist is ordinarily a question for the jury.

Pucket v Pailthorpe 207 Iowa 613, 223 NW 254

 Persons who drive are drivers. So, what is it to drive or be a driver, or do the driving?
Firstly, we recall the definition of driver, as being one who is employed, in Bouviers and Blacks
Law dictionaries. To expound on that definition the following rulings make clear that drivers and
driving is strictly a commercial venture and does not apply to all who use the public roadways.
For instance, in the Transportation Law Journal, 27 Trans. LJ 113 (2000), there is lengthy
discussion about for hire conduct of taxi cab driver/owners. For purposes of this record, the
following excerpts were found to be expositive of the nature of a driver license;

"...the condition of vehicles used as taxi cabs; ...the chauffeurs operating taxi cabs; ...the
companies providing taxi cab service."

The journal article is replete with use of the term(s): taxicab chauffeurs, taxicab license
owners, owner/driver taxicab drivers, taxicab drivers, taxicab license holder. It should be stated
that while a license to operate a taxicab business is distinct from the license to physically drive
the vehicle, there is the axiomatic relationship of owner/driver. The journal article also
references, sub silencio, the Florida statute which calls for what is termed a "for hire license".
The distinctions between owner and driver are discussed further at Wallace v Woods infra.

The above journal review is an overtly expositive narrative of how cab drivers may or
may not own their own vehicles but would stand to make more money in the exercise of their
trade if they did in fact own their vehicles, and were therefore owner/operator, instead of merely
employees, then paying the business operator for the use of the vehicle. The journal also
discusses the intrinsic relationship of the government then having authority to regulate the
business of both the operator and the driver.

The most revealing statement of the journal narrative (27 Trans. LJ 113) is stated thus;

"Anyone who owned an automobile could provide taxicab service."

It is the forgoing quote from the journal that raises, the most litigious concern, the
"presumption". This presumption is the basis for the police to stop the unsuspecting motorist and
issue a traffic infraction and more significantly reproach the general traveling public with the
entirety of title 46 RCW here in Washington. It is important to recognize when there is
discussion of private carriers we see the term 'vehicle', when there is discussion of common
carriers and contract carriers we see the phrase 'motor vehicle'. This is congruent with the federal
definitions of motor vehicles and the context of common carriers.

Highlighting the discussion in 27 Trans. LJ 113 above, we look to the following cases;
Howards Yellow Cabs Inc. v UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 987 F. Supp. 469, 97-2 U.S. Tax
Cas.(CCH) P50, 694 (1997); and J&J Cab Service Inc. v UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 98-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P50, 360. Both cases involve cab company operators. In Howard's, the
following language is used by the court (see similarly, dictum at J&J Cab Service);

As found by the magistrate judge, the facts are as follows: ...that the drivers
collected money from the cash paying riders; that [plaintiff] gave the drivers
“credit” for any contract riders whom they transported; that the drivers “settled
up” with the dispatcher by giving him 50% of the money collected from the cash
paying riders when such amounts exceeded the amounts due the drivers for the
contract riders which they had transported;

The Howard court citing Manchester Music Co. v. US, 733 F. Supp. 473, stated at footnotes;

“a payment occurs with the transfer of possession, dominion, or control

over money or its equivalent from a person who up to that point had been
exercising such prerogatives over the same to another who is due the funds.”

The previous citations describe the use of a vehicle, driving the public “for hire”. Below
is the description of the use of a private vehicle not for hire yet with the employ of a driver none
the less.

In the case of Ford Motor Co. v Stella D. Madden et al, 987 F. Supp. 469, there is the
distinctive act of driving a vehicle at the direction of an employer because the employer had
control of the vehicle. The driver was an employee of Ford Motor Co. and thusly, subsequently,
remunerated by a private party to drive vehicles for the purpose of attesting as to the vehicle
marketability. In this case, the dealership operated the vehicle although someone else drove it.
 An operator is defined as one who has actual physical control over a vehicle or a motor
vehicle. Operating a vehicle is also defined as one who facilitates or augments the movements of
the vehicle. In the two preceding cases, the cab company 'operated' the vehicles because they had
the authority and/or the ability, to determine when and where the drivers would pick up and
deliver or transport passengers to and from.

A license to carry on a business or trade is an official permit to carry on the same

or perform other acts forbidden by law except to persons obtaining such permit.

Hoefling v. City of San Antonio, 85 Ten. 228, 20 S.W. 85, 16 L. R. A. 608.

In some cases it is held that where a license is for the protection of the public and
to prevent improper persons from engaging in a particular business, and the
license is for revenue merely, a contract made by an unlicensed person in violation
of an act is void;

Bowdre v. Carter, 64 Miss. 221, 1 South. 162; 4 C. B. N. S. 405;

Johnson v. Hulings, 103 Pa. 501, 49 Am. Rep. 131;
Hustis v. Pickands, 27 Ill. App. 270.

When the power is exercised by municipal corporations, a license is the

requirement, by the municipality, of the payment of a certain sum by a person for
the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling, whether harmful or innocent,
for the general purpose of producing a reliable source of revenue;

Tied. Lim. Pol. Pow. 271.

In the regulation of occupations harmful to the public, it is constitutional to

require those who apply for a license to pay a reasonable sum to defray the
expense of issuing the license and maintaining the Proper supervision. What is
a reasonable sum must be determined by the facts of each case; but where it is a
plain case of police regulation, the courts are not compelled to be too exact in
determining the
expense of regulation and supervision, so long as the sum demanded is not
altogether unreasonable;

Tied. Lim. Pol. Pow. 274;

City of Boston V. Schaffer, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 415;
Welch v. Hochkiss. 39 Conn.140, 12 Am.Rep. 383
 Think of the distinction between driver and operator more like open ocean racing, or
hydroplane racing, stock car racing, or Baja sand rail racing. There is a very distinctly separate
function between driving and operating not excepting that the operator could be the driver. It
may be easier to understand operator in the context of navigator. When racing cigarette boats and
sand rails, there is a driver and a navigator. One person drives, by depressing the accelerator and
the brake and turning the steering wheel, and the other person manipulates the vehicle by
coordinating and directing its destination. Or, in the case of the hydroplane and stock car, there
obviously, is a driver, but the pit crew is the operator because the pit mechanic controls the
changing of tires, foils and windshields and has the ultimate responsibility to determine the
serviceability of the vehicle and, therefore, determine if it is in an operable condition.

However, a driver can be the operator if the vehicle is maintained, navigated, and driven
by one individual, as in the case of a sole proprietor business.

Another example of driver/operator is N.A.S.A., National Aeronautics and Space Agency.

Yes, flying constitutes driving by federal definition of law. The flight crew drives the shuttle to
the moon, while the control center “operates” the shuttle by monitoring critical functions and
navigation.

The Howard's court above, also established the fact that: The “drivers...had personal use
of the cabs during the day.” An empowering correlation to Howard's above, are the cases of City
of Chicago v Gall 195 Ill. App. 41 and State v Scheffel 82 Wn 2d 872. In the Chicago case it was
recognized that simply because there existed a license to operate a vehicle does not mean that any
person is fully engaged 24 hours a day in the operation of that business. Equally, it was said in
the Scheffel case, that use of an automobile, during certain periods, as a vehicle does not preclude
its use as an automobile when not being formally used as a vehicle.

To further amplify the distinctive nature that is driving, we find at Transportation Law
Journal, 35 Trans. L.J. 1, which is excerpt for brevity, not to lesson the context, more certainly for
clarity, as follows;
 In the motor carrier industry, the “employment classification” determination is
frequently critical because of the high incidence of use of “owner-
operators.” (footnote; The term “owner-operator” reflects individuals who lease motor carrier
equipment to a motor carrier with driver services. Normally the lessor performs the driver service.)
...other carriers operate a fleet utilizing driver-employees as well as owner-
operators. Driver-employees were utilized and were paid hourly wages. The
drivers take upon themselves...to complete a freight movement. ...most drivers,
whether employee or an owner-operator, are paid on a “per mile” basis...
It is obvious that a driver and owner-operator could increase his “pay” by driving
more miles and handling more loads and “overtime” as “dessert” would increase
the temptation to do so despite the wear and tear on the equipment and more
important, to the health and safe performance of the driver. Significantly, the
federal legislators recognized this and felt that two different units of the
government and approaches to wage and hour issues should not interfere with
each other. “Safety” of the public and the operators won out and thus the Secretary
of Transportation, who was presumably more knowledgeable of trucking
operations, was given the power to dictate the hours of service which drivers could
drive based, in part, of the normal operations of carriers.

Historically, the view of the courts, is that the history of a statute is important when
attempting to understand evaluate and implement a current version. As shown below, the
historical purpose of the statute, as opined by the court, is conducive of the legislative statement
in 1965, see section on statutes.

This reading is prejudice to the phrase traditional freedoms to which every motorist is
entitled, to exemplify that not everyone placing and using their personal automobile on the
highways needs a “driver” license, further, by extension and implication, even a numbered
“business” license plate on their personal automobile.

“The primary rule of construction of statutes is to ascertain the lawmakers’ intent,

from the words used if possible; and to put upon the language of the Legislature,
honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning, and to promote its object,
and ‘the manifest purpose of the statute, considered historically,’ is properly
given consideration.... [2 Lewis Sutherland on Stat. Const. (2 Ed.), sec. 363;
Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec.329; and Maxwell on Statutes (5 Ed.)
425.]” emphasis mine

Wallace v Woods infra, citing,Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,

334 Mo. 672, 66 S. W. (2d) 920
 That is, "where a statute has been construed by the highest court of the state, the court's
construction is deemed to be what the statute has meant since its enactment. In other
words, there is no question of retro activity."
Emphasis mine
State v. Moen 129 Wn 2d 535, 919 P.2d 69 (1996).

Notice here, that the judiciary has stated that inquiry must be to the historical intent of the
statute to properly determine its present intent. The court further explained jurisprudence based
on the whole act rule, stated thus;

“with a view of determining the meaning of the word 'driver', all provisions of
said section must be considered.”

Wallace v Woods infra, citing,

Bowers v Missouri Mutual Assn. 62 S.W. 2D 1063

Statutory references to driving have always been about compensation. As seen below, the
phrases drive, driver, and driving are only for those who receive compensation for their skill.
Underlined for emphasis are the key words used by the judiciary, in their own description of
driving.
“Certainly a driver is only one who drives. A stage coach driver may have had
unusual authority on his trips (see Drolshagen v. Union Depot Railroad Co., 186
Mo. 258, 85 S.W. 344), but we know of no good reason why the word driver
would not be commonly and reasonably interpreted to be the person actually
doing the driving, whether he was one employed by the owner to drive or whether he
was the owner driving. If such terms expressed the purpose of subsequent
amendments, there was no reason to change them merely because the statute was
being made applicable to situations beyond its original scope. We cannot now
judicially know the situation as to how often owners drove their own stage
coaches or how many were driven by hired drivers. However, we do know, and
we are sure that the Legislature knew, when and after they later inserted the words
“motor car” and “automobile” in this statute that many owners of motor vehicles
used for public transportation of both freight and passengers did drive them in
such service. It seems reasonable to believe that, in all the amendments
broadening the scope of the act, there was some purpose in using and continuing
to use different terms with respect to railroads and other instrumentalities of public
transportation.” emphasis mine

Wallace v Woods 340 Mo.452, 102 S.W. 2D 91 (1937)

 As one may well establish by the length of this reading that driving is and must be of a
commercial nature. The term commercial means to engage in commerce. To produce, deliver, and
receive payment is commercial, as being in commerce; everything from trucking coast to coast;
to the variety of the local fast food joint, where they produce a cheeseburger, deliver it over the
counter, whereupon credit is transferred to the store.

The plumber may be the best example, here, of operating and driving and commerce and
private carrier (under 16,001 .lbs). The plumber epitomizes the very substance of these
definitions. Title 81 RCW is the best definition of plumber;

RCW 81.80.010(6).
A "private carrier" is a person who transports by his or her own motor vehicle,
with or without compensation, property which is owned or is being bought or sold
by the person, or property where the person is the seller, purchaser, lessee, or
bailee and the transportation is incidental to and in furtherance of some other
primary business conducted by the person in good faith.

...lets rewrite the statute definition for purpose of this writing;

A "plumber" is a person who transports by his company truck [van],

with or without compensation, your new shower stall which is owned or is being
bought or sold by the consumer [client], or property where the plumber is the
seller, purchaser, lessee, or bailee and the transportation is incidental (after being
picked up at the warehouse) to and in furtherance of working on your bathroom
conducted by the person in good faith. [that you will pay him for his services]

...now lets excerpt that definition;

A "plumber" is a person who transports by his company truck [van], your new
shower stall which is bought by the consumer [client], or the plumber is the
bailee (of your new shower stall) to and in furtherance of working on your bathroom ...

Remember, no driver license is needed to operate a business; conversely, no operator

license is required to drive. When the State of Washington defined driver and operator to be the
same thing, it in fact was intended to reify these two separate functions in order to bridge or
bootstrap common law traveling. Because then, most common people that have the
driver/operator license, fit quite neatly into this perverse extrapolation.
 LICENSING

A claim may be laid that RCW 46.20, is void for vagueness as being over broad, similarly
void for want of due process, similarly facially void and as applied void. This can be articulated
by demanding the state to provide the section of the Act that provides substantive notice of its
application to personal use of personal automobiles; same, by demanding the state to provide the
section of the Act that provides procedural protections, of its application to personal use of
personal automobiles. If the state cannot provide these sections, then the statute must be void, as
overly broad in its intent, and application, for want of clear, concise and express terms.

The power of the state to license, and further regulate, through a driver license, private
affairs, is non existent.

It has been laid down as a general rule that if the power of the state to control its
highways has not been delegated, and the state has prescribed no conditions
limiting or regulating the use of the highway, the people are at liberty to use it
for travel, transportation, and communication, by any lawful means, subject only
to the condition that such use neither interfere with other or similar lawful uses of
the way nor invade the rights of the owners of abutting lands.

25 Am Jur HIGHWAYS §169, citing

State ex rel. Bartlett v. Weber, 88 Kan 175, 127 P 536

The Washington State Supreme Court has already made it clear in the following case that
the “driver license” is intended to apply only to “for hire” vehicles. The International Motor
Transit Co. case below must be read in pari materia with the rules of municipal regulation.

“[Sec. 103] It shall be unlawful for any person to drive an automobile or other
motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire, within the city of Seattle, without
having a valid and subsisting license so to do, to be known as a ‘drivers
license’. “Driver’s license, ‘first class’ shall entitle the holder thereof to drive any
kind or class of motor vehicles for hire within the city of Seattle. “Drivers
license, second class’ shall be limited to stages, sight-seeing cars, or other motor
vehicles operating over a specified route and having a fixed terminal. “Drivers
license, ‘third class’ shall be limited to drivers of taxicabs, for hire cars, or other
automobiles not operating on fixed routes, and having a passenger capacity of
less than seven (7) persons, not including the driver. ...it is intended to apply to
 “for hire” vehicles as provided in section 6313, Rem. Comp. Stats., are defined to
mean all motor vehicles other than automobile stages used for the transportation
of persons for which remuneration of any kind is received, either directly or
indirectly.”

International Motor Transit Co. v Seattle 141 Wash 194, 251 P. 120

As noted previously and further in this section, the requirement of a driver license is for
the operation and conduct of a business. The research compiling this section procured no
evidence anywhere, not in any state or federal regulation or judicial opinion which extends the
State authority in Title 46 RCW to the common man, requiring a driver license to the use of a
personal automobile to conduct personal affairs.

A state is within its police power by requiring a license as a prerequisite to the

carrying on of certain activities commonly designated as businesses, occupations,
professions, trades or callings.

51 Am Jur 2d Licenses and Permits §14

States have broad powers to regulate and license the practice of the professions.

National Pharmacies Inc. v De Melecio 51 F. Supp. 2D 45

It is seemingly proper to reiterate the definition of the term "license," as the definition of
this word will be important in understanding the statutes as they are properly applied:

"The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without permission,

would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort."

People v Henderson 391 Mich 612, 218 NW.2d 2

"Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent."

Western Electric Co. v Pacent Reproducer Corp. 42 F.2d 116

 For this definition to apply to a common traveler, a state would have to take up the
position that the exercise of a protected Right to use the public roads, in the ordinary course of
life and business, is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which a state could then regulate or prevent. This
position would raise fundamental questions, as this position would be diametrically opposed to
Constitutional Law. As recognized in this writing, the proper definition of a "license" is;

"a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for

consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation or to
carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the police power."

Rosenblatt v California State Board of Pharmacy

69 Cal. App. 2D 199,158 P.2d 199

Curiosity alone should question the authority of a state to impugn one for not having a
public license for travel in the private. What reason could the legislature have, not to include
language, and in the history of amended legislation, purposefully delete such terms as 'business',
if it were not to confuse, and manifest a clandestine subterfuge of fraudulently created
businesses, which then a state could regulate.

What the state may not do directly it may not do indirectly.

Bailey v Alabama, 219 US 219, 31 S Ct 145, 55 L Ed 191

"A license fee is a charge made primarily for regulation, with the fee to cover
costs and expenses of supervision or regulation."

State v Jackman 60 Wisc.2d 700; 211 NW.2d 480, 487

Shown above are the fundaments of a driver license. One court called out the distinction,
in discussing the public health and welfare, as that being the use of the highway by travelers is
usually a short trip with a single departure point and a single termination point, limiting the
amount of time on the highway. Where in contrast, a driver for hire or other occupation or
profession, may spend several hours or days traveling public easements with several intermittent
stops whereby creating greater liability to other travelers.
 States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions and as part of their
power to protect public health and safety and other valid interests, they have the
broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the
practice of the profession.

Lenders Service Inc. v Dayton Bar Asso. 758 F. Supp. 429

Certainly the operation of business on public roads and streets by those individuals
who use the highways in excess, should be required to pay a highway or tonnage tax.

What was spuriously deleted from the Motor Vehicle Act reformation in the 1960's is the
term chauffeur, discussed infra. It is the chauffeur that is the subject of a basic driver license
notwithstanding other delivery type occupations. The Latin term nullum simile est idem, things
that are similar are not the same, is the suspect of a claim of void, as to RCW 46.20. See RCW
46.20.055 for similar definitions following;

It is necessary, in order to regulate automobiling, to pay the expenses of the

department issuing licenses and registering drivers and owners of automobiles.
These expenses naturally should be met by the class of persons regulated and
licensed.

Statutes which regulate the licensing of chauffeurs, contemplate that an applicant

for a license shall have received training in that work. Under a statute permitting
an unlicensed person over a designated age to operate a motor vehicle
“accompanied by a licensed operator”, such training may be possible.

Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §225

...”any trade, business, occupation, vocation or profession”...may impose license

tax “upon persons and corporations doing business”...

excerpt from John MacArthur McGuire, Harvard Legal Essays, citing

State v Gowdy 62 Montana 119, 203 Pac 1115, see also 4 Thorpe 2324

taxing power is exercised for the purpose of raising revenue and is subject to
certain designated constitutional limitations.

16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §318

 Here we start to see the courts express the original intent of the statutes, which the
legislature has conveniently exscripted, classifying types of drivers and the tax revenue generated
by the business they execute in their use of the highways. The question may be asked, does a
state have authority to classify personal conduct as a part of commerce like that of chauffeurs?
NO! Why? Because travelers don't collect a fee, or charge a fare, for traveling to visit the doctor,
the veterinarian, the grocer, the hardware store, the beach, the coffee stand, a job, the bank, the
school, other family, a restaurant, a sporting event, or to see a movie, or attend a funeral, etc.
Ipso facto, if no fee is collected for personal affairs, then the state cannot impose a tax, which is
defacto revenue, which is one of several intents of regulation for Title 46 RCW.

Earlier, we encountered, at Am Jur 2d Highways, Streets and Bridges §227 and Huddy
On Automobiles §26, the term 'incidental'. This term refers to the nature of commerce upon the
highways. The courts, in their determination of the phrase incidental, have acknowledged the
transpersonal hyperbolic legal reasoning behind licensing statutes. When we look at RCW 46.20,
the licensing statute for the STATE of WASHINGTON, we find no notice of the personal private
use versus the private for hire use that was formerly a part of the statute.

The fundamental risk associated with unbridled license schemes is the inability to
detect the extent of the licensing statute in the absence of a narrowly drawn
objective and definite standards to guide the licensing authority. Whatever the
motive which induced its legislative adoption, lack of strict legislative definition
promulgates an overly broad legislative scheme and is therefore void for
vagueness.

The void for vagueness doctrine, on the front end, necessarily implies that the
governmental intent of the statute must be made explicit in the text, not then
subject to judicial or administrative construction.

see generally 16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §527

However, in order to regulate...the government may impose a permit

requirement...so long as the scheme does not delegate an overly broad licensing
discretion to an governmental official...therefore any licensing scheme must be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest...

16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §527

 So, the question comes, is RCW 46.20.001 narrowly tailored? No it is not. This writer
found the statute to be overly vague, and substantial research was needed to qualify the text and
intent of the currently written statute. Ultimately what was determined is that the currently
written statute (including those prior, dating back to1968) classifies every single man and woman
desiring to use the public highways as a chauffeur a.k.a. driver for hire. RCW 46.20.001 reads in
relevant part;

(1) No person may drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without first
obtaining a valid driver's license issued to Washington residents under this chapter. ...
(2) A person licensed as a driver under this chapter: (a) May exercise the privilege upon
all highways in this state; (b) May not be required by a political subdivision to obtain
any other license to exercise the privilege; and (c) May not have more than one valid
driver's license at any time.

The interesting similarities between RCW 46.20.001 and the pre-reformation

statutes are these; 1) A person licensed as a driver, 2) May not have more than one valid driver's
license at any time. These sections as written are expositive of the spurious attempt of the
legislature to conceal the actual purpose of the licensing statutes. Licensing statutes must
provide notice as to purpose and intent, and the Washington State legislature has intentionally
done exactly the opposite. So comes the question, is the state attempting to regulate personal use
of personal property? Sure seems like it. Maybe the state would like to license and regulate the
type of shoes a man can wear on the public easements. Sure, why not, it is established that many
things qualify as vehicles, as in the Laub case of a U.S. Passport.

The legislature can in the exercise of its police power, regulate and require the
licensure of professionals as it sees fit, but any law in furtherance of the police
power must be reasonable and not arbitrary.

51 Am Jur 2d Licenses and Permits §14, citing

Auto Reality Service, Inc. v Brown 27 Ohio App. 2d §77, 272 NE 2d 642;
see also Ohio AGO 96-045

The means or mode of traveling may be subjected to reasonable regulations.

Benning v State 161 Vt. 472, 641 A2d 757
As noted by the Benning court, above, the state may regulate, for the safety of the public
health and welfare, to protect the public health and welfare. However, as discussed supra the
choice of vehicle is for individual determination and use, not then subject to state licensorship.
The shoes people wear are in fact vehicles, same as an automobile or skateboard and as such are
subject to state licensing. The state can no more require a license for the use of shoes than they
can require a license to ride a skateboard or use a personal automobile.

Commerce is simply defined as payment, delivery, receipt. Intercourse is the giving and
receiving of that which is mutually beneficial. What constitutes commerce upon the highways is
one of two usual scenarios. One: purchase point of origin-delivery/transport along the highway-
and payment/receipt at a terminal point, as is defined of shipping vessels in maritime/admiralty.
Two: purchase/hire of a third party vehicle on the highway-for delivery along the highway-
payment/receipt [compensation] for use of the third party vehicle on the highway.

Commerce consists of commercial intercourse. It must be conceded that

interstate travel for pleasure and recreation does not savor of anything
commercial. It is not business. It is pleasure and recreation and nothing more.
The greater amount of interstate automobile travel is for the pleasure and
recreation. Business and pecuniary gain have no connection with it. We will
consider briefly in the note the meaning of the term commerce and ascertain if
the travel must in some way be connected or related to business, trade or gain.
It is the opinion of many persons that Congress possesses no power to take
cognizance of the automobile which is engaged in interstate travel for pleasure
merely, by legislation directly regulating that kind of travel.

See generally Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §86;

Regulations which might be an unreasonable infringement of the common right

to use the highways in the one case would be proper when applying to one
seeking to use the highways as a carrier of passengers.

Le Blanc v New Orleans 138 LA 243, 70 So 212;

see also Chicago v Banker and Hutson v DesMoines infra

Moreover it has been held that, as a prerequisite to one operating his automobile
 for pleasure on the public ways, the city of Chicago has no power to require a
party who uses his automobile for his private pleasure only, to submit to an
examination and to take out a license.

Huddy on Automobile 6th Ed., citing

Chicago v Banker 112 Ill. App. 94.

Discussed here again is the personal use dictum versus the for hire dictum. Title 46 RCW
Chapter 20 is overly broad because it presumes to notice the public, conversely, the public
assumes by the vague language, that all are subject to the statutes licensing guise. What is
relevant in this statement is that Washington Courts have ruled on class distinctions several times.

“It is well settled that the equal protection of the 14th amendment to the federal
constitution does not take from the State the right or power to classify the subject
of legislation; it is only [an] arbitrary and unreasonable classification,
classifications to which there is no just difference or distinction between the class
affected and others that is thus prohibited.”

Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §137, citing State v Seattle Taxi Cab and
Transfer Co. 90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac 837; Allen v City of Bellingham 95
Wash. 12, 163 Pac18; McGlothern v City of Seattle 199 Pac 457

The legislature has ample power to compel the owners of...motor vehicles used
for the carriage of passengers for hire to procure licenses.

Hutson v Des Moines 176 Iowa 455, 156 NW 883

The fact that the operator of a vehicle has taken out a license to operate it for
hire does not raise any presumption that he is actually engaged in that business.

City of Chicago v Gall 195 Ill. App. 41;

See also Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §145

No license is required to use personal automobiles for personal affairs, and no state may
coerce or otherwise mandate a license to exercise personal liberties. It seems appropriate to
discuss when, and to whom a license is required. To follow this discussion, notice the language
below, persons driving motor vehicles. Now let’s digress to RCW 46.20.001 previous and the
language thereto. In the first sub chapter we see the language “person may drive a motor
vehicle”. Relevant here is the reference to the Stork court. Persons who drive for hire a.k.a. for
compensation, are the proper and only subject of legislation.

Chauffeur. The term in legal significance means any persons operating or driving
a motor vehicle as an employee or for hire. Italic mine, emphasis mine

Huddy on Automobiles 9th Ed. § 27, Definitions.

The occupation of a chauffeur for hire is one for which under the police power
inhering in legislative bodies may properly be a subject for regulation.

Huddy on Automobiles 9th Ed. §238, citing

Matter of Stork 167 Cal. 294, 139 P. 694

Under its power to regulate the use of the streets and pass and enforce all
necessary police regulations, a city may require the drivers of automobiles used
in transporting persons or property for hire to be examined and licensed...

Huddy on Automobiles 6th Ed. §221

In 1968, a major reformation was undertaken affecting the motor vehicle acts of many
states. Of special note here, as to the strict distinction of who must possess a driver license, in
the latter half of paragraph one below, it is made clear that those chauffeur drivers currently in
possession of a license will remain current until such time as they may come to renew subject to
the new codification. Every driver license issued after 1968 is issued to a chauffeur or driver
for hire, notwithstanding the substitution of the word driver in place of chauffeur.

The State of Washington Dept. of Licensing issues thousands of driver licenses every
year. Is it a realistic presumption that every man and woman who gets a driver license is a
driver for hire, or, is it fraud?? If it is a realistic presumption, there is absolutely no cause for
any man or woman to be unemployed
However, as this all applies to the State of Washington the following is published and known;
 Prior to 1968, chapter six provided for the issuance of operator's licenses and
chauffeur license. This distinction was discontinued in 1968. In favor of licensure
based on the type or general class of vehicles to be driven by the licensee.
It is also suggested that each state consider adopting a law providing that
all operators and chauffeurs licenses issued prior to the effective date of the
revised chapter 6 [1968] shall remain valid until their normal date of expiration or
the dates of expiration shown on such license cards...
further...
Attention is directed to the fact that this section referring to any person driving
“any motor vehicle” is sufficiently broad by reason of the definition of motor
vehicle in section 1-134...

UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE AND

MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE, Ch.6, 1968;

Throughout the years of its existence the Code has reflected provisions of state
driver licensing laws and in turn many state laws have reflected the visions of the
Code. Although there has been less conformity with the Code in driver licensing
laws than in rules of the road [Model Traffic Ordnance], nevertheless many state
driver licensing laws can be categorized on the basis of similarity to a provision
which is now or has been in the past a part of the Uniform Vehicle Code.
further...
Hence the development of the Code should be of general interest in that it
mirrors the evolution of driver licensing law in this country and may be helpful
in improving or at least explaining existing laws.

DRIVER LICENSING LAW ANNOTATED, 1980, (herein after DLLA)

U.S. Dept. of Transportation,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
[see Historical notes at preface]

The State of Washington was a major supporter of the UVC and MTO. The definition
contained in the federal Motor Vehicle Act is, not of irony, identical in the preceding reference to
the DLLA, which uses the object definition of motor vehicle contained in UNIFORM VEHICLE
CODE AND MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE, Definitions §1-134 Motor Vehicle, which reads;

Every vehicle which is self propelled and every vehicle which is

propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires
but not operated upon rails.
 What was done in the mid to late 60's, having several revisions to gain nationwide
acceptance by 1968, was to combine the operator's license with the chauffeur's license,(as a taxi
cab company operating vehicles for hire and the drivers paid to transport people) creating one
license. The term chauffeur, French in origin, was deleted and replaced with the English
common term, driver.

What did not happen, citing from the sources below, is the presumptive all encompassing
graft of every man and woman who may use their personal automobile, and subject them to a
driver license. Here, once again, deference to RCW 46.20.001 and the language thereto is
prudent. Subchapter (2)(c) reads: May not have more than one valid driver's license at
any time. Forty years later, this statute bears a striking resemblance to the 1968 Uniform
Vehicle Code. The Code was extensively amended in 1968 to form the current §6-101(c), by
eliminating the operator-chauffeur distinction and by clearly applying the one license concept to
all licenses issued under the Code. DLLA infra.

Valid driver's license. In 1968 the Code abandoned the distinction between
operators and chauffeurs licenses and combined these two categories into a single
driver's licenses with classifications based upon the type of vehicle the licensee is
qualified to drive. Thirty one jurisdictions follow this Code concept by issuing
just one basic driver's license and by not making the distinction between
operators and chauffeurs.

DLLA supra §6-101(a); [including the State of Washington]

The one license concept expresses that every person has but one privilege to drive
and that no matter how many different types or classes of vehicles a licensee has
been qualified to drive in his home state all types and classes will be noted on one
license card. The issuance of one license card to a person for a motorcycle,
another card for a passenger car, and another for a tractor semi trailer
combination is not recommended because of the inconvenience and enforcement
difficulties that would result.

DLLA supra. footnote 4 § 6-101(c)

 This annotation covers state laws which provide for license classification for
special licensing based upon factors of vehicle type...or factors of vehicle use
(...to transport persons or property for compensation...) or a combination of such
factors.

DLLA supra §6-104, statutory annotation subsection (a)

(Washington is listed in this annotation. )

In Washington the law provides that the director [of the Dept. of Lic.] shall adopt
rules and regulations and standards pertaining to a determination of what types of
vehicles require special skills for the operations thereof, taking into
consideration the extent to which a special knowledge of traffic laws pertaining
to the type of vehicle and a special ability to maneuver such vehicles is necessary
for the safe operation of the vehicle both alone and in relationship to other types
of vehicles on the road.

DLLA supra §6-104 subsection (b);

Every time an executive employee stops, detains, interferes and harasses a traveler on the
common highway, that employee invokes and uses commercial licensing policy to coerce the
traveler into believing that the personal use of the common highways by personal automobile is
illegal and he has authority to deter such further conduct until such time as the policy is complied
with.

The illusion of the necessity of a license to use a personal automobile is per se

banishment from the free use of the public highways. The state police stop people at random for
traveling and issue traffic infractions for no valid operator’s license, and arrest people, and
impound their personal property for allegedly driving on a suspended license.

For purpose of discussion, if an individual should have the unfortunate circumstance of

not paying a traffic infraction, and as a consequence, perhaps the driver license is suspended or
revoked, consider RCW 46.20.245, driving While License Suspended. This statute penalizes the
driver for traveling the common easements in a personal capacity, with a monetary fine and
incarceration. This is done via presumption that because one was traveling the common highways
one must have been driving, by definition.
 The right to travel includes the freedom to enter and reside in any state, and a
state law implicates that right when it actually deters such travel, when impeding
travel is its primary objective, or when, as here, it uses a classification that
penalizes the exercise of that right. When the latter is involved, heightened
scrutiny of the law is required to determine its constitutionality, and the State
must come forward with a compelling justification. Emphasis mine

Atty. Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986);

Eggert etal v City of Seattle supra, Turner v. Fouche infra.,
see also 39 Mich. Law Review 782

The decision in Dunn [Dunn v Blumstein 405 US 330] makes clear that the right
to travel is, as a fundamental right, violated, by classifications which penalize,
not actually deter the right to travel and the actual deterrence was not a factor to
be considered in deciding whether a penalty was imposed.

Eggert, supra, citing Vaughan v Bower 313 F. Supp. 37

see also Turner v Fouche infra

The people have a Right to travel, uninhibited, the common highways. That Right is
prejudicially barred when the state or local armed police stop and arrest based on a statute that is
factually designed for compensatory drivers. Theft of a personal automobile is loss of personal
property. While the personal automobile is in impound, an individual is forced to use alternate
methods and modes of transportation.

RCW 46.25 does not have a sub-chapter for the suspension of a commercial driver
license. A suspension of a commercial driver license is affected through RCW 46.20.245.
This represents proof positive that RCW 46.20 is in fact a commercial licensing statute.

Other illustrations could be included but it is readily apparent that when one is
deprived of the use of his automobile today, for all practical purposes his mobility
is seriously impaired. Admittedly he may be able to locate public transportation,
such as a taxi or a bus, but in many instances it will not be available [when
needed]. Furthermore, as we have seen, the constitutional right of mobility is an
individual, personal right which is not protected but [de facto] restricted if
he is forced to use public transportation.

[a book], THE LEGAL NATURE OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE; John H. Reese.

 As a general rule, any law subjecting the exercise of liberty, such as the freedom
of movement, to the prior restraint of a license, infringes that freedom.

16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §527.

Ones Right to travel is severely limited if he is forced to constantly wait for buses or
taxis, both of which would create a financial hardship. For then, the Right to travel freely, with
the usual and ordinary conveyance of the day, is then subject to a fee or fare. Which is a state
dictate, for an individual to pay, for limited and restricted exercise of a Right.

Strict scrutiny is the most rigorous form of judicial review. In applying the strict
scrutiny test the Supreme Court has determined the Right to travel, a fundamental Right worthy
of protection by strict scrutiny. Once a court determines that strict scrutiny must be applied, it is
presumed that the law or policy is unconstitutional. The government has the burden of proving
that its challenged policy is constitutional. To withstand strict scrutiny, the government must
show that its policy is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. If this is proved, the
state must then demonstrate that the legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve the intended
result.

Here again we have the term 'narrowly tailored'. So, does RCW 46.20 have a
narrow state objective as to the licensing of drivers for hire? The answer is NO! Can the statute
distinguish the Right to the use of a personal automobile in contrast to that of a driver for
hire? NO!

This right to travel is a fundamental right subject to the strict scrutiny test under
the United States Constitution.

16B Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §612,

see also Johnson v City of Opelousas 658 F. 2d 1065

To be unconstitutional the restrictions must prevent or limit a person's freedom of

movement.

15A Am Jur 2d, Commerce §97 and cases cited.

 Taking into consideration what has been discussed thus far, in order for the statute to
have a valid objective only two plausibility’s exist; 1) when the personal automobile was
purchased, The buyer was then obligated to hire a full time driver subject to the license statute,
for two reasons; a) certainly one cannot pay himself to drive, b) if the buyer is the operator
/driver, then he is required by law to obtain a business license and pay taxes to the Dept. of
Revenue; 2) Every automobile dealership is in fact a defacto “motor vehicle” distributor wherein
every vehicle purchased is actually a private 'for hire' vehicle and the purchaser is subject to the
licensing statute.

A partnership or corporation is not entitled to a motor vehicle license as such.

They may register the machine “in the corporate or partnership name, but
the license must be issued to the person who operates it.” italic mine

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §86, @143 citing,

Emerson etc.. Co. v. Pearson, 74 N. H. 22, 1906.

However, for either of these to be true, the statute would have had to provide substantive
notice of the license regulation at the time of purchase. Not likely however, because as we have
seen previously, the legislature has NOT specifically classified personal automobiles and the
personal use thereof.

RCW 46.20 is unconstitutionally vague as overly broad, facially void and as applied void
because it allows the state to indiscriminately interfere in private affairs by using what has now
been shown to be the driver for hire classification statute to inflict undue harassment, illegal
fines, unlawful imprisonment and illegal seizure, upon a common traveler, where NO otherwise
authority exists. To remain consistent, RCW 46.55.113 is also void as applied because this
statute is an accessory to the fact of illegal enforcement.

...or when it uses any classification which it serves to penalize exercise of that
right.

16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §576,

see also Attorney General of New York v Soto-Lopez 476 US 898,
106 S CT 2317; see also Johnson v City of Opelousas.
 It is only after careful study of numerous fragmented statutes, that it is determined, the
entirety of Title 46 RCW, is and only for, application to commerce upon the public highways and
that all provisional clauses thereto can only be enforced to persons who use the highways in and
for commercial trade for compensation.

“The activity licensed by state DMVs and in connection with which individuals
must submit personal information to the DMV - the operation of motor vehicles -
is itself integrally related to interstate commerce”.

Seth Waxman, Solicitor General

U.S. Department of Justice
BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
Reno v. Condon, No. 98-1464, decided January 12, 2000
Supreme Court of the United States

“RCW 46.25.080 License contents, classifications, endorsements, restrictions,

expiration—Exchange of information.
(1) The commercial driver’s license must be marked “commercial driver’s
license” or “CDL,”
...(a) Licenses may be classified as follows:
(i) Class A...
(ii) Class B...
(iii) Class C...

RCW 46.25.050(1) Commercial driver's license required

— Exceptions, restrictions, reciprocity.
Drivers of Commercial motor vehicles shall obtain a “commercial driver’s
license” as required under this chapter...
HOWEVER, this requirement does not apply to any person:
(C) Who is operating a recreational vehicle for non commercial purposes.

It is undisputed that all driver licenses are issued under RCW 46.20 (even those issued to
common carriers under RCW 46.25, and RCW 81 et seq) as and for the purpose of trade, traffic
and transportation upon the public highways. Below is the implied exclusion rule. Notably, it is
reasonably ascertainable that the statutes apply to drivers of businesses, thereto by implied
exclusion, if the statute does not expressly include private travel, then it impliedly excludes it.
 ...and it is possible to argue that it is limiting only under the rule of express
mention and implied exclusion. In State ex rel. Becker v. Wiley 16 Wn 2d 340,
133 P. (2d) 507, this court said, with respect to that rule, the following:
". . . This rule should be applied only if and when it aids in determining
legislative intent.

"In other words, the principle is to be used only as a means of ascertaining the
legislative intent where it is doubtful, and not as a means of defeating the
apparent intent of the legislature."

King County Employees Assn. et al. v. State Employees'

Retirement Board 54 Wn.2d 1

We cannot presume the legislature meant it to be applied to persons it specifically

excluded. City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wn 2d 663, 678, 694 P.2d 641 (1985); 16A
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 218, at 109 (1998) Emphasis mine

Mt. Hood Beverage Co. v. Constellation Brands, Inc.

149 Wn.2d 98 (2003)

There is no such thing as a personal driver license!! As shown previously, the legislature
has seen to discuss 'general' license schemes referencing RCW 46.20, as well as special
commercial license under RCW 46.25 issued pursuant to RCW 46.20, but what is not discussed,
neither is it written anywhere in the breadth of title 46, is the term 'personal’ driver license. That
term is likewise not discussed in the Washington Administrative Code, or any other associative
policy. However, it does further serve dogmatic, the whole act rule, which now undoubtedly has
determined the driver license a.k.a. operator license to be a business license for compensation.

Not to get lost in the vortex of commercial definitions, the State of Washington has
declared by Executive directive in the Administrative Code, that “driving” is in fact driving a
motor vehicle in commerce and that a person is deemed a commercial operator/driver.

WAC 308-100-005 (3) "Employee" means any operator of a commercial motor vehicle,
including full time, regularly employed drivers; casual, intermittent or occasional drivers;
leased drivers and independent, owner operator contractors, while in the course of operating a
commercial motor vehicle, who are either directly employed by or under lease to an employer.

WAC 308-100-005(10) "Street driving" means driving a commercial motor vehicle on a

 public road, where the traffic laws are enforced, consisting of city street, country road,
and freeway driving.

In fact the entirety of WAC 308-100 is a mandate to the State of Washington Dept. of
Licensing, directing the issuance of a commercial driver license and NO other kind. However
one may escape this tenebrous licensing scheme if an automobile qualifies as a recreational
vehicle primarily designed for travel use.

WAC 308-100-210 the term "recreational vehicle" shall include vehicles used
exclusively for noncommercial purposes which are: (1) Primarily designed for
... travel use;

This too is illusive, as discussed earlier, the term travel is a broad vague term with
contextually express statutory meanings, notwithstanding every vehicle run on the highways was
designed for travel in one context or another. Caution be had to recreational use as well, because
recreational use also has business ramifications. For clarification, the Washington Administrative
Code specifically defines the term “recreational vehicle” at WAC 308-100-210 which policy
reads:

WAC 308-100-210 Recreational vehicle—Definition.

For the purposes of RCW 46.25.050(1)(c), the term “recreational vehicle” shall
include vehicles used exclusively for noncommercial purposes which are: (1)
Primarily designed for recreational, camping, or travel use.

Note the use of the term vehicle. Vehicles have a commercial orientation when spoken in
the language of statute. To be sure, there are many businesses that rent out motor-homes and
motorcycles and mini-cars for tourists to fulfill their recreational muse.

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §91, @147 stating,

Still again, subdivision of the last mentioned class has occurred, vehicles on four
wheels perhaps, being placed in one group, and those on two wheels in another; or
perhaps, vehicles drawn by two horses have been made to pay one rate of license
fee, and vehicles drawn by one horse, another. Where, then, in principle, is there
any distinction when it comes grading or grouping automobiles into sub-classes
according to their horse-power, or the number of passengers they carry? It may be
 said of either class, that the large or heavy vehicle pays a license fee rated on some
arbitrary basis—a commercial vehicle pays on a standard established for the class
within which it falls, and the pleasure vehicle owner pays his license according to
the vehic1e which he operates. (Dillon on Mun. Corp., 4th Ed., Sec. 682.)
Anybody can join any one or several of the classes as he chooses.

A personal automobile may be used for personal reasons on the roads and ways
as long as that use is not and does not cumulate to trade, traffic and transportation; this was
expressed in the cases of State v Scheffel, Chicago v Gall, Chicago v Banker, and Howards
Yellow Cab as it is, by intent of the whole act.

Giving respect to the rule of exclusion, it was equally stated by the Marr court; while the
factual basis of Marr is not precisely adjunct to this discussion, the theoretical resonance is the
same; from the language of the [statute], one can legally [travel] as long as he or she does not
engage trade or traffic [for compensation]'. Ones personal automobile is his personal property the
same as the shoes on his feet, and as such, may be used to his personal indulgence not being in
service for hire.

From the language of the ordinance, one can legally beg as long as he or she does
not do so aggressively.
Spokane v. Marr 129 Wn. App. 890.

"... [T]he exemptions provided for in section 1 of the Motor Vehicle

Transportation License Act of 1925 (Stats. 1925, p. 833) in favor of those who
solely transport their own property or employees, or both, and of those who
transport no persons or property for hire or compensation, by motor vehicle, have
been determined in the Bacon Service Corporation case to be lawful exemptions.

In re Schmolke 199 Cal. 42 (1926)

ANATOMY OF A TRAFFIC INFRACTION

 One might be wondering where is the written authority for the police power to be
executed against a personal private traveler. Nowhere. The threshold of the police power, at least
as far as statute traffic regulations are concerned, is the public enterprising businesses. Initially, in
this section, remember that possession of a driver license and a vehicle registered to the state is a
public benefit of business grant from the state.

What is the point of challenging a traffic infraction? Perhaps even to challenge personum
jurisdiction, or subject matter jurisdiction? What of an effort to challenge the facts that gave rise
to the infraction? Perhaps a challenge that the infraction failed to give notice.

A citation by definition is a command, by way of writ, from an agency head or a policy

dictate, sometimes issued by a court, to compel an officer of the court to do a thing. An arrest
warrant is a per se citation. The traffic infraction issued by a policeman is a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. A court is only supposed to resolve disputes and settle claims
between litigants, based on the facts brought by either party.

As it pertains to a traffic infraction, the judiciary has stepped across boundaries and issued
a “citation” commanding the executive branch, to use the courts format for an infraction notice,
whereby providing to the executive branch a “pleading” document, intended to perfect judicial
appellate jurisdiction. The executive branch citation, a.k.a. traffic infraction, is an executive
branch citation; which, on the reverse, gives the option to appeal the infraction to a lower court.
The 'appeal' to a lower court is descendant of an executive administrative action.

As citations go, look to Infraction Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction 2.1(a) (IRLJ
2.1(a), which reads as follows;

Infraction Form Prescribed or approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Infraction cases shall be filed on a form entitled "Notice of Infraction" prescribed by the
Administrative Office of the Courts; ... Notice of Infraction forms prescribed or
approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts are presumed valid and shall not be
deemed insufficient by reason of defects or imperfections which do not prejudice
substantial rights of the defendant.
The preceding “citation” is found at the bottom of a traffic infraction. Notice at the
bottom of the infraction claim form, the words “WASHINGTON UNIFORM COURT
DOCKET”. This 'form' of infraction, or writ, is a command by the judiciary to the executive
department of government, the police, to provide the judiciary with all of the jurisdictional
information they need to perfect the states claim.

Everything that happens in a court room happens at the discretion of the judge. However,
be equally assured that the judge will use that discretion to the best benefit of the state; because
as the rule above indicates, an infraction is valid so long as it does not “prejudice substantial
rights of the defendant.” And a drivers substantive rights will not have been violated, because the
driver is presumed to have knowledge of the constructive contract. (see definitions)

Because several statutory alternatives for meeting that element were based on
conduct alone, the statutory scheme created a strict liability crime, requiring no
proof of the defendant's intent.

State of Washington v. Steven Mertens

(2003)

The policy enforcement employee is only enforcing a contract that was made to operate a
business, and the judge is fully cognizant of that contract. HERES WHY; the infraction contains
a certification by the police employee that everything is as true:

THE UNDERSIGNED CERTIFIES AND SAYS THAT IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

[your legal person information here]

DID OPERATE THE FOLLOWING VEHICLE/MOTOR VEHICLE ON A PUBLIC HIGHWAY

AND
[your business information here]

DID AND THEN THERE COMMITT EACH OF THE FOLLOWING OFFENSES

[statute violation(s) here]

I CERTIFY UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY..... /S/

 On the infraction, there are three 'jurisdictional balloons'. The first balloon contains a
persons employee driver license number which certifies the person to be a driver. It also contains
all identifying information about t legal person. It also contains a block for the identity of the
employer of the driver. It also contains several blocks which indicate that the statute violation
occurred within the venue jurisdiction of the State of Washington and/or the local jurisdiction.
The first balloon gives the court indisputable personum jurisdiction.

The second balloon contains all of the business identifiers (as far as the DOL, DMV, and
DOT are concerned, saving taxing regulations) necessary to convince a judge, that in fact, there
exists a business for the proprietary jurisdiction of the police and the latent jurisdiction of the
court. It contains the business name and address as well as the business vehicle identifiers,
primarily the license plate number. The license plate number itself is tantamount to a Master
Business License; and as such, is a physical address, as it were, of the business vehicle, much
like a street address if the business were located on real property. Occasionally a policeman will
write “same as above”, in the “owner” box. This is because the owner/operator of the business
occasionally is driving his own business. The second balloon gives the court the first element of
subject matter jurisdiction, being that the business is conducted within the State of Washington.

This third balloon gives the court, the second half of subject matter jurisdiction. This
balloon calls for the specific statute code section purportedly violated. The box labeled DV is an
acronym for domestic violence.

As for wanting to argue facts; when a person checks the box to request a mitigation
(appeal) hearing, he is not only acquiescing that he committed the violation, and subsequently
wants to negotiate the damages he caused the state (asking for equitable review), he also, in and
of his eristic delusion, has voluntarily given the last element of subject matter jurisdiction, which
are now the facts in evidence. All totaled, the court has complete and inescapable jurisdiction to
uphold the executive decision.
 Damages? Yes damages. When a traffic violation is alleged, it is a suspect determination,
that a driver has disrupted the flow of traffic or caused there to be a potential public risk
circumspectly harmful to some other fellow traveler or commercial enterprise. So, in the
estimation of the states regulatory police power, it is deemed suitable to issue a warning, as it
were, that the conduct is suspect, and that the driver surrender some consideration of penalty
(money), intended to be a form of behavioral modification.
 TORT LIABILITY

The journal discussion below, not intending polemic discourse from the significance of
the article, has been taken excerpt and edited for content. The journal article is a discussion of
the differences between those who are specifically invited, impliedly invited and those who
trespass for want of permission to enter a premises.

The article also discusses the liability of tort, or percent thereof, for injury while on those
premises, with respect to the type of permission granted, implied or expressed. The article lays
out differences between property owner’s vs lessors of property and their relation to the
permission given. As a matter of course, of and for expurgatory value, there also is intold of a
right of passage on property. It is the last which the discussion here exemplifies.

As we move through the actual article excerpt, be mindful of the following terms. There
is significance in these terms as we substitute them later.

owner..............occupier..........licensee...........defendant........invitee............ bare licensee..

visitor............. premises......... property.......... dangerous....... condition........

63 YALE LAW JOURNAL 605

Rule: Even where the occupier knows of a danger, he owes the licensee
no duty of precaution if the danger is perfectly obvious.

This rule has sometimes been put as a duty to warn the licensee of a known “trap” and
some of the older cases considered a condition a trap...if it was...dangerous and very much
concealed.

The licensee must show defendant’s knowledge of the dangerous pitfall, whether it be
natural condition or arrangement of premises. ...or that he made an inspection which would have
been likely to disclose the dangerous condition to him. If he shows that defendant created the
dangerous condition, which will suffice. While Plaintiff must show defendant’s actual knowledge
of the condition, defendant will be held to appreciate its danger if a reasonable man would do so.
 An interesting question is posed if defendant created a condition which was not dangerous
at the time but which would foreseeably become dangerous.

There are a good many dicta ─mostly in older cases —and some holdings to the effect
that the occupier of land owes the bare licensee no greater duty than to refrain from intentional,
or willful or wanton, misconduct towards him.

“Once a person’s presence becomes known, the significance of the classifications

largely disappears, and he is owed the duty of reasonable care (as to activities)
whatever his status on the land. ... This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff’s
status may have no bearing on what conduct defendant may reasonably expect of
him.” (cites omitted)

The occupier is commonly said to owe greater duties to his invitees than to licensees,
notably with respect to inspection and discovery of latent dangers on his land. ...The economic
benefit theory proceeds on the assumption that affirmative obligations are imposed on people
only in return for some consideration or benefit. Any obligation to discover latent dangerous
conditions of the premises is regarded as an affirmative one, and the consideration for imposing it
is sought in the economic advantage—actual or potential—of the plaintiff’s visit to the occupier’s
own interest.

“It is not the fact of ‘invitation, nor of the knowledge of the probability
of the customer’s presence which this implies which raises the
duty, but the purpose of the visit and the occupier’s interest therein.”
(cites omitted)

The invitation test does not deny that “invitation” may be based on economic benefit, but
it does not regard that as essential. Rather it bases “invitation” on the fact that the occupier by his
arrangement of the premises or other conduct has led the entrant to believe “that [the premises]
were intended to be used by visitors” for the purpose which the entrant was pursuing, “and that
such use was not only acquiesced in by the owner [or possessor], but that it was in accordance
with the intention and design with which the way or place was adapted and prepared.... Even an
express invitation might not raise such expectations, however. ...It has been applied particularly
when premises were prepared for the public or a segment of it.

“A business visitor is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on

land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected
with business dealings between them.” (cites omitted)

“[W]hen one expressly or by implication invites others to come upon his

premises, whether for business or for any other purpose, it is his duty to be
reasonably sure that he is not inviting them into danger, and to that end he must
exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the premises reasonably safe for the
visit.” ... “Mutuality of interest does not mean that there must be a
commercial business transaction between the parties, but merely that each party
is moved by a lawful purpose or interest in the object and subject-matter of the
invitation. The enterprise must be mutual to the extent that each party is lawfully
interested therein, or that there is a common interest or mutual advantage involved.”
(cites omitted)

In other cases, there has been no arrangement of the premises so as to induce entry, and
the significant factor is the economic benefit conferred on the occupier by the visit. ...This is true
of ... the person summoned to transact business with the occupier, whether the premises be
arranged for business....

...viewed as indirectly incidental to an economic benefit, it seems much more to the point that
“such people know that the occupier is required by law to receive them, and so have reason to
believe that their coming is anticipated, and that the premises are ready for their reception.”

...”There is no reasonable distinction between the rights of a person visiting the

premises for the purpose of escorting another to a departing train, and the rights of
one who goes there for the purpose of talking with a departing person on a
business matter. There is a wide difference between the use of the premises with
such motives [the latter] and those of idle curiosity and merely to kill time.” [the
former] (cites omitted)

These cases can be reasonably explained only by the invitation theory, as can the cases
involving an apparent extension of the highway. If a man arranges part of his land so that it looks
like an extension of the public sidewalk or roadway, a traveler who takes it for such is an invitee
though his entry onto the private land confers no benefit whatever on its possessor.

“It makes no difference that no pecuniary profit or other benefit was received or
expected by the society. The fact that the plaintiff comes by invitation is
enough....” (cites omitted)

If, on the other hand, defendant arranges part of his premises, leading a visitor reasonably
to think they are included in the area of invitation, he will be held as an invitor as to that part
even though he did not mean to invite the plaintiff to it.

The occupiers' duty to the invitee is one of due care under all circumstances. If plaintiff is
an invitee at the time and place of his injury, the occupier, of course, owes him all the duties he
owes to trespassers and licensees. Thus the occupier must use care not to injure plaintiff by
negligent activity.... In addition, the occupier owes the duty of care to inspect his premises and to
discover dangerous conditions. This is the most prominent difference between the rights of
invitees and those of licensees....
 ...the occupier need not invite visitors, and if he does, he may condition the invitation on
any terms he chooses, so long as there is full disclosure of them. If the invitee wishes to come on
those terms, he assumes the risk.

But here again, the basis of defendant’s truncated duty is not his superior knowledge, but
his ownership and control of the unreasonably dangerous condition. Under this rule the
occupier’s superior knowledge might properly be called a condition of liability, but it is not a
reason or justification either for the occupier’s duty or for the limitation put upon it.

Defendant claimed that its only duty was to warn, but the court answered that it
did “not recognize it to be a universal rule that an owner who invites the public
upon his premises for business or pleasure may, in the absence of reasonable
necessity, maintain thereon dangerous agencies, as wires charged with deadly
currents of electricity, in such places as to endanger life and limb, and escape
liability by maintaining danger signals or otherwise advising the public.”
(cites omitted)

In cases where the invitee’s recovery has been denied, contributory negligence has often
played an important role, and is sometimes hopelessly confused with the duty issue. If
contributory negligence would always bar an invitee who was injured by a condition of the
premises which he knew and appreciated, the confusion would do little practical harm....

Most of the decisions denying liability are rested equally on the ground of
contributory negligence. Curtis v. Traders Nat. Bank, 314 Ky. 765, 237 S.W.2d 76

These situations show that the invitee will not always be barred by his self exposure to
known dangers on the premises. This means that the Restatement rule will sometimes bar a
plaintiff, who has not been negligent, from recovery against a defendant who has acquainted the
plaintiff with the condition which would be negligent towards him if a full duty of care were
owed.

A right to enter also stands on a footing different from the privilege which the occupier is
free to withhold or to give by invitation or permission. This does not mean that visitors in their
own right should all be accorded the same treatment. They are not, and probably should not be.
Rather, it casts further doubt on the utility of the present system of fairly rigid classifications.

END
______________________________________
 In this latter interpretive discussion and for purposes of this section, the following terms
used in the journal are given accord; though still very much within the parameters of the scope
of the journal discussion, the terms are augmented, to give veracity to this discussion. The term
'plaintiff' will not be affected because the non-business traveler (now armed with absolute
knowledge) would be the injured plaintiff. When reading this version, take care to notice, the
journal terms, have been replaced with terms applicable to this topic, and yet remains in context:

Journal substitute
terms; terms;

owner..............public
occupier.......... state
licensee.......... licensee (business)
defendant........state
invitee............ traveler
bare licensee.. traveler
visitor............. traveler
premises......... highways/roads
property.......... highways/roads
dangerous....... business
condition........ license

Rule: Even where the State knows of a business, the State owes the
licensee (business) no duty of precaution if the business is perfectly obvious.

This rule has sometimes been put as a duty to warn the licensee(business) of a known
“trap” and some of the older cases considered a license a trap...if it was...business and very much
concealed.

The licensee(business) must show state's knowledge of the business pitfall, whether it be
naturally occurring or a specific arrangement of highways/roads. ...or that he made an inspection
which would have been likely to disclose the business license to him. If he shows that the state
created the business license, that will suffice. While Plaintiff must show state's actual knowledge
of the license, the state will be held to appreciate its business if a reasonable man would do so.
An interesting question is posed if the state created a license which was not business at the time
but which would foreseeably become business.

There are a good many dicta ─mostly in older cases —and some holdings to the effect
that the state owes the traveler no greater duty than to refrain from intentional, or willful or
wanton, misconduct towards him.
“Once a person’s presence becomes known, the significance of the classifications
largely disappears, and he is owed the duty of reasonable care (as to activities)
whatever his status on the land. ...This does not mean, however, that the plaintiff’s
status may have no bearing on what conduct the state may reasonably expect of
him.”

The state is commonly said to owe greater duties to its travelers than to its licensee
(business), notably with respect to inspection and discovery of latent business on his land. ...The
economic benefit theory proceeds on the assumption that affirmative obligations are imposed on
people only in return for some consideration or benefit. Any obligation to discover latent
business license of the highways/roads is regarded as an affirmative one, and the consideration
for imposing it is sought in the economic advantage—actual or potential—of the plaintiff’s visit
to the state's own interest.

“It is not the fact of invitation, nor of the knowledge of the probability
of the customer’s presence which this implies which raises the
duty, but the purpose of the visit and the States interest therein.”

The invitation test does not deny that “invitation” may be based on economic benefit, but
it does not regard that as essential. Rather, it bases “invitation” on the fact that the state by his
arrangement of the highways/roads or other conduct has led the entrant to believe “that [the
highways/roads] were intended to be used by visitors” for the purpose which this entrant was
pursuing, “and that such use was not only acquiesced in by the public [or possessor], but that it
was in accordance with the intention and design with which the way or place was adapted and
prepared.... Even an express invitation might not raise such expectations, however.... It has been
applied particularly when highways/roads were prepared for the public or a segment of it.

“A business visitor is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on

land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected
with business dealings between them.”

“[W]hen one expressly or by implication invites others to come upon his

highways/roads, whether for business or for any other purpose, it is his duty to be
reasonably sure that he is not inviting them into business, and to that end he must
exercise ordinary care and prudence to render the highways/roads reasonably safe
for the visit.” ...“Mutuality of interest does not mean that there must be a
commercial business transaction between the parties, but merely that each party is
moved by a lawful purpose or interest in the object and subject-matter of the
invitation. The enterprise must be mutual to the extent that each party is lawfully
interested therein, or that there is a common interest or mutual advantage
involved.”
 In other cases there has been no arrangement of the highways/roads so as to induce entry,
and the significant factor is the economic benefit conferred on the state by the visit. ...This is true
of ... the person summoned to transact business with the state, whether the highways/roads be
arranged for business....

...viewed as indirectly incidental to an economic benefit, it seems much more to the point
that “such people know that the state is required by law to receive them, and so have reason to
believe that their coming is anticipated, and that the highways/roads are ready for their
reception.”

...”There is no reasonable distinction between the rights of a person visiting the

premises for the purpose of escorting another to a departing train, and the rights of
one who goes there for the purpose of talking with a departing person on a
business matter. There is a wide difference between the use of the premises with
such motives [the latter] and those of idle curiosity and merely to kill time [the
former].”

These cases can be reasonably explained only by the invitation theory, as can the cases
involving an apparent extension of the highway. If a man arranges part of his land so that it looks
like an extension of the public sidewalk or roadway, a traveler who takes it for such is an invitee
though his entry onto the private land confers no benefit whatever on its possessor.

“It makes no difference that no pecuniary profit or other benefit was received or
expected by the society. The fact that the plaintiff comes by invitation is
enough....” (cites omitted)

If, on the other hand, state arranges part of the highways/roads, leading a traveler
reasonably to think they are included in the area of invitation, he will be held as an invitor as to
that part even though he did not mean to invite the plaintiff to it.

The states duty to the traveler is one of due care under all circumstances. If plaintiff is a
traveler at the time and place of his injury, the state, of course, owes him all the duties he owes to
trespassers and licensee (business). Thus, the state must use care not to injure the plaintiff by
negligent activity.... In addition, the state owes the duty of care to inspect the highways/roads and
to discover business licenses. This is the most prominent difference between the rights of
travelers and those of licensee (business)....

...the state need not invite travelers, and if he does, he may license the invitation on any
terms he chooses, so long as there is full disclosure of them. If the traveler wishes to come on
those terms, he assumes the risk.
 But here again the basis of state's truncated duty is not its superior knowledge, but its
ownership and control of the business license. Under this rule the state's superior knowledge
might properly be an assumption of liability, but it is not a reason or justification either for the
state's duty or for the limitation put upon it.

Defendant claimed that its only duty was to warn, but the court answered that it
did “not recognize it to be a universal rule that an owner who invites the public
upon his premises for business or pleasure may, in the absence of reasonable
necessity, maintain thereon dangerous agencies, as wires charged with deadly
currents of electricity, in such places as to endanger life and limb, and escape
liability by maintaining danger signals or otherwise advising the public.”

In cases where the traveler’s recovery has been denied, contributory negligence has often
played an important role, and is sometimes hopelessly confused with the duty issue. If
contributory negligence would always bar a traveler who was injured by a license of the
highways/roads which he knew and appreciated, the confusion would do little practical harm....

Most of the decisions denying liability are rested equally on the ground of
contributory negligence. Curtis v. Traders Nat. Bank, 314 Ky. 765, 237 S.W.2d 76

These situations show that the traveler will not always be barred by his self exposure to
known businesses on the premises. This means that the Restatement rule will sometimes bar a
plaintiff, who has not been negligent, from recovery against a state who has acquainted the
plaintiff with the license which would be negligent towards him if a full duty of care were owed.

A right to enter also stands on a footing different from the privilege which the state is free
to withhold or to give by invitation or permission. This does not mean that travelers in their own
right should all be accorded the same treatment. They are not, and probably should not be. Rather
it casts further doubt on the utility of the present system of fairly rigid classifications.

END
_____________________________
What does all this mean?

It means that the state should take caution to warn travelers that an application for a driver
license or an operator’s license moves the traveler from a “free use” category to a full time
regulated business category. Conversely, a traveler has an obligation, to make his non-business
presence known to the state. The state owes a duty of full disclosure as to the distinction,
purpose of, and use for, the application for driver/operator license. When that “free use” traveler
distinction is made, the several classifications of vehicles and motor vehicles become irrelevant.

The states regulatory authority stops predominately (not entirely) at the regulation of
businesses. The state has a duty to protect all travelers as members of the general public; all the
while it is surveying the roadways affecting its business regulatory police power. The state cannot
force an individual into a business license of any kind and must accept the private traveler on the
common highway.

Licenses are for the conduct of businesses in commerce and the private traveler cannot be
forced by attrition to relinquish or surrender his common law access to the highways for some
license to engage in a business pursuit. The state has an obligation to allow private use of the
highways. When a policeman stops a traveler, he is trespassing creating a private nuisance; if the
policeman issues a traffic infraction, he creates an aggravation of circumstance. Although, the
infraction is tantamount to a solicitation, and thusly, an invitation to engage in a secured
transaction (saving elaboration), see UCC 1et seq, offering an opportunity to the traveler, to
submit to state jurisdiction, and/or admit that someone was actually driving a business.

The nuisance theory is reciprocal. It is this nuisance, post trespass, which creates the tort
liability of John Doe policeman. The fact that John Doe policeman has impeded the ability to
travel, he is the very epitome of an obstruction.

Blacks law dictionary defines nuisance as;

nuisance.
1. A condition or situation that interferes with the use or enjoyment of property.
 “A ‘nuisance’ is a state of affairs. To conduct a nuisance is a tort.
“The right of the public in a common highway is paramount and controlling. This
right extends to the entire territory within its limits and an obstruction placed
upon any part of it constitutes a public nuisance.
Commonwealth v. King, 13 Met. 115.”

The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles, Babbitt c.1911;

citing Morton v. Moore, 81 Mass. 573

To further define nuisance, we'll look to Washington statutes, to discern, between a public
and a private nuisance. First, we find a poignant statement of nuisance, affecting state actors, at
RCW 7.48.120, which reads as follows:

Nuisance defined.
Nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a
duty, which act or omission either annoys, injures or endangers the
comfort, repose, health or safety of others, offends decency, or unlawfully
interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or render dangerous for
passage, any lake or navigable river, bay, stream, canal or basin, or any
public park, square, street or highway; or in any way renders other persons
insecure in life, or in the use of property.
Emphasis mine

Below is the distinction of public versus private. Carefully noting though, that a public
nuisance, is when an obstruction affects the whole of the public; as likened to a roadblock or
fallen tree, which prevents passage to all people. RCW 7.48.130 reads as follows:

Public nuisance defined.

A public nuisance is one which affects equally the rights of an entire
community or neighborhood, although the extent of the damage may be
unequal. Italic mine

Traveling privately is not unlawful; conversely, police license regulation directed to

private travel is not lawful. What concerns the personal private traveler is the following statute.
The private nuisance is one that affects an individual interest, and not the whole of the public.

RCW 7.48.150, reads as follows.

Private nuisance defined.
 Every nuisance not included in the definition of RCW 7.48.130 is private.
But the policeman is protected by the state, right? No, not in the instance of the personal
private traveler. It was found at RCW 7.48.120 above, that a nuisance is, “unlawfully doing an
act”. Does the policeman have lawful authority to interfere with private travel? Not according to
one hundred ten plus years, of legal authority contained in the breadth of this writing. The state is
not in disagreement with this statement. State policy is found at RCW 4.92.070, which says that
the state will defend an employee if he is within the scope of his official duties. RCW 4.92.070
reads:

If the attorney general shall find that said officer, employee, or volunteer's acts or
omissions were, or were purported to be in good faith, within the scope of that
person's official duties,

The police' official duties are restricted to regulating business's. It is not a public
employee defense that a traveler did not apply for an employee driver license and/or convey an
interest in the automobile to the state by registering it as a business or even pay quarterly
business taxes; it also is not a defense that so many other persons have licenses.

While the state has an obvious interest in the money machine that the Dept. of Licensing
has allowed to burgeon by way of failure to disclose the true intent of the licenses and yet accept
every single license application that crosses the counter; it does not, itself, obviate the individual
policeman from liability in tort, for trespass.

It is not a defense that the policeman does not know the breadth of the law which is stated
in this writing; then he is poorly trained in the law of the highways. A policy enforcement
employee who affronts the private traveler, should be trained in the breadth of this legal study.

The determination of who is “adversely affected or aggrieved within the meaning

of any relevant statute” has “been marked out largely by the gradual judicial
process of inclusion and exclusion aided at times by the courts judgment as to the
probable legislative intent derived from the spirit of the statutory scheme.”

Federal Administrative Procedure Source Book, 4th Ed. 2008

 “That the streets of the city are highways of the state, and therefore public roads
which every citizen has a right to use, is a valid argument against stopping or
unreasonably hindering travel over the streets, but it is no argument at all against
subjecting travel over those streets to rules and regulations.”
emphasis mine
The Law Applied To Motor Vehicles. Babbitt §43, @112 citing,
City of St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo. App. 468

However, should a person actually possess a driver or operator license, admittedly suffers
the contributory negligence “learning curve”. Notwithstanding that, an individual can use a
company vehicle without a driver license, according to the Scheffel court (State v Scheffel 82 Wn
2d 872); the fact that a business license is in effect on the vehicle, pugnaciously mandates that a
person take up the traffic infraction solicitation and go to court and mitigate the damages,
because the alleged driver presumptively falls under the prescript of the statute regulation.

People have a right to the use of the common highways, but equally have an obligation to
NOTICE the state of that intended use, for the simple reasons that one is simply exercising the
existential right to free use of the highways and is not an enemy combatant. Once notice is given
the state, by any one or more agencies, of the status as private traveler, the full weight of tort
liability, falls on the policeman who has actually engages and detains the personal private
traveler. If the police are going to enforce the law, they should know the law; the affect for and
the effect of said law.
 PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

This writer undertook to get information from the State of Washington Dept. of Licensing
(DOL) to quantify the policy law stated herein this writing. A series of public disclosure (p-d)
inquiries went out and were answered in a timely professional manner. The p-d's themselves and
the e-mails exchanged are part of permanent files retained by this writer; what was queried is
documented hereafter.

The first set of requests was for the establishment of the license plates on vehicles, those
questions were presented as follows;

 Is the vehicle license plate number * * * a business license?

 Is the license plate number * * * a vehicle business license?
 If * * * is not the business license number for the vehicle,
please provide the business license number for said vehicle?
 At the time of, and upon, the application, in * * *, for a vehicle license,
what was the name of the business printed on the application for license?
• At the time of, and upon, the application, in * * *, for a vehicle license,
what was the type of business the vehicle was registered under?
• Please provide a copy of the application for vehicle license,
congruent with the vehicle license stated above.

The response received from the DOL indicated that the license plate number was not
registered to a business but only to a person’s name, and further requested me to fill out a
notarized request using their form, which was done. The notarized request was required by the
DOL because the information requested may fall under the purview of the privacy act. The
notarized request was filled out and sent with these questions;

 Please provide to me a copy of the original application for vehicle license on a specific
vehicle.
 Please also provide a copy of the original application for driver license for a particular
person.
 Please also provide a copy of the original application for an operators license for a
specified person with a known (specified) license number.
 Attached as a separate p-d was a question as to the DOL's use of the term “personal driver
license”. Which is the term the DOL uses on their disclosure form in response to a state request
for a driver abstract, when they suspend the driver license of a driver. Included in this query was
the use of the term “private” driver license. The DOL does not know what a private driver license
is; “No responsive record found.” See responsive items 11-12 below. In response to the question
of a personal driver license, the DOL stated it thus;

Finally, in response to your question “is there a specific statute that uses the
language 'personal driver license,'” I can only reassert that the statute I provided,
RCW 46.20.001 provides the authority for driver licensing: “No person may drive
a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without first obtaining a valid
driver’s license.” (emphasis added).

As to the question for a copy of the driver license application, a notarized form swearing
that the information would not be disseminated was sent, intended, as requested, to protect
personal information. A response came back telling me that the information would not be
released because it contained personal information and also that the record of question was aged
and unavailable. The DOL was asked to provide a copy of a blank form application for vehicle
license and a blank form application for driver license.

While waiting for a response to the vehicle licensing questions, a p-d was sent asking if
the DOL has a form similar to the U.S. FMCSA (federal motor carrier safety act) DOT-150. The
DOL' response is that the state does not have a form similar to the DOT-150.

In response to the question of application for vehicle license, the response came back with
a blank specimen “Vehicle Certificate of Ownership (Title) Application”. Along with that was a
computer generated application for driver license. No hard copy form exists for inspection prior
to application, as noted in item 6, response below.
5. A blank copy of application for vehicle registration.
(Requested by e-mail of Sunday, October 11, 2009)
A copy of the “Vehicle Certificate of Ownership (Title) Application” form is
enclosed with the posted copy of this letter, and under the file name “Veh Reg
Application pdf’ accompanies the email carrying the electronic version of this
letter.

6. A blank application for a driver license.

(Requested by email of Sunday, October 11, 2009)
Interestingly, this form does not exist as a paper form, nor can it be printed as a
blank form. The application for a driver’s license is completed by the Licensing
Services Representative questioning the applicant. Only then is it printed, after
which it is signed by the applicant.

An example of both the Record of Application and Application for Commercial

Driver’s License from a record creating for system testing is enclosed with the
posted copy of this letter, and under the file name “DL Application.pdf”
accompanies the e-mail carrying the electronic version of this letter.

7. Application for vehicle operators license.

(Requested by letter dated October 15 and received at Master License Service on
October 26)
The responsive record is the same as that supplied in satisfaction of Item 6 above

8. Application for motor vehicle operators license.

(Requested by letter dated October 15 and received at Master License Service on
October 26)
The responsive record is the same as that supplied in satisfaction of Item 6 above.

9. Application for driver license.

(Requested by letter dated October 15 and received at Master License Service on
October 26)
The responsive record is the same as that supplied in satisfaction of Item 6 above.

10. Application for vehicle registration.

(Requested by letter dated October 15 and received at Master License Service on
October 26)
The responsive record is the same as that supplied in satisfaction of Item 5 above.

11. The statutory authority which uses the language “personal as it applies to driver
licenses. (Requested by letter dated October 15 and received at Master License Service
on October 26, but not the same letter referenced in Items 7-10 above)
Driver licenses are required by and issued pursuant to Chapter 46.20.001 of the
Revised Code of Washington (RCW).
 RCW 46.20.001 License required — Rights and restriction.

(1) No person may drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without
first obtaining a valid driver’s license issued to Washington residents under
this chapter The only exceptions to this requirement are those expressly
allowed by RCW 46.20.025.
(2) A person licensed as a driver under this chapter:
(a) May exercise the privilege upon all highways in this state;
(b) May not be required by a political subdivision to obtain any other
license to exercise the privilege;
and
(c) May not have more than one valid driver’s license at any time.
[1999 c6 §3.]

12. The statutory authority for the issue (sic) of “private” driver license.
(Requested by letter dated October 15 and received at Master License Service on October
26; the same letter referenced in Item 11 above)
No responsive record found.

So it is determined, that an application for license plates and an application for

registration are the same thing. An application for title, is an application for a business license;
which application doubles as the signing over of ownership interest in an automobile to the state;
giving the state an interest in personal property which authorizes the regulation of the business
that was created .

A public disclosure was sent to the DOL, asking them to clarify vehicle license plates.
The p-d asked the DOL if it could be correctly determined that that License plate configuration
000AAA was a passenger carrier, and the configuration A00000A as a common carrier. Three
responses were received initially, stating that the 000AAA plates are passenger and the A00000A
plates are for trucks.

To galvanize the certainty in this writing that license plates are business related, these
questions were asked of the DOL, but notice below that the DOL has declared the license plates
to be an unidentifiable record, and further, will not definitively say yes they are business license
plates, neither will they say definitively no they are not business license plates.
 QUERY

1. As it pertains to the license plate configuration, and the relation to the attached
disclosure request, could you please state with clarity whether these are in fact license
plates issued to "carrier" businesses, and in so stating;

2. I would ask that you answer the disclosure request and state with clarity if an
application for vehicle title and an application to register a vehicle is in fact registering a
business?

3. I am still not clear on the term "personal" driver license. Ben attempted to locate the
term Personal in statute but could not. I ask again could you please tell me what statute I
can find the term "personal" as it exists on the attached DOL research document.

4. If the term "personal" does not exist in statute authority, could you identify the term as
a misnomer or provide statutory authority to issue personal driver license'.

RESPONSE

We have provided all the public records you requested. Your remaining questions
below are not requests for identifiable public records. Since I am with the public
disclosure office, I can’t effectively respond to them with the exception of Item 2.

The titling and registration of a vehicle is not the same as obtaining a Washington
state business license. Our website gives a very nice guide to business licensing at
[website omitted]. Some business own vehicles and register the vehicles under the
business name.

Of course, you know from prior communications that state agency staff cannot
give legal advice, and will not indulge in speculative interpretations of the law.

As seen from the above p-d response, received from the single, sole, and only agency
responsible for issuing license plates in the State of Washington; when asked if the license plates
issued, are for “carrier” businesses, and in so doing, if applying for title to register a vehicle is in
fact registering a business, the DOL’s response, is that they are “not requests for identifiable
public records”, and that the DOL “can’t effectively respond to them” because to do so would be
to engage in “speculative interpretations of the law”.
 When we resort to the maxim of law, being, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
the other, and then look around on the highways, what is found is that two door and four door
sedans, station wagons and smaller sport utility vehicles all adorn the 000AAA license plate.
Now if a taxi cab business has this license plate, what does that make the rest of the vehicles? If
the answer is passenger carrier business, that's correct. Were the quarterly business taxes paid to
the Dept. of Revenue?

On the other hand though, notice that the larger sport utility vehicles and pick-up trucks
and vans all have the same A00000A license plate that is found on the semi tractor trailer big
rigs, and community transit buses. If it is the expression of one thing, that the license plate
nomenclature A00000A is a common carrier, does that make “John Doe’s” pick-up truck a
common carrier? Absolutely it does! So, to be, the exclusion of the other, or common traveler, no
registration, title or license as a business is required.

On the computer generated driver license application form that was received from the
DOL, after a few requisite questions, mostly questions establishing a legal person and its
residence, there is a signature line certification. First it must be sworn that the person applying
for the license is the person signing. The second half of that certification reads thus;

“I grant the Department of Licensing permission to consider this application

with the understanding this permission cannot be withdrawn.”

Addressing the above certification, notice the terms grant, permission and consider.
First, the signer makes a grant to the state; which is in retrospect, the exact consent which is
required, according to the State of Washington Constitution at Art.1§1; “by the consent of the
governed”, as seen by reference to the definitions below.

Websters Ninth Collegiate defines grant as:

1. v. a. to consent to carry out for a person.
b. to permit as a right, privilege or favor.
n. 3. a. a transfer of property by deed or writing.
Websters Ninth Collegiate defines convey as:
2. c. STEAL, to carry away secretly.
d. to transfer or deliver to another; specif: to transfer by a sealed writing.

Websters Ninth Collegiate defines permission as:

2. n. b. formal consent: AUTHORIZATION.

Websters Ninth Collegiate defines deed as:

4. n. a signed and usu. sealed instrument containing some legal transfer, bargain, or
contract.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines grant as:

1. n. An agreement that creates a right of any description
other than the one held by the grantor. Examples include ... licenses.
2. vb. To formally transfer * * * by deed or other writing...

Blacks Law Dictionary defines convey as:

vb. To transfer or deliver * * * to another, esp. by deed or writing.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines permission as:

2. A license or liberty to do something; authorization.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines deed as:

3. n. At common law, any written instrument that is signed, sealed,
and delivered and that coveys some interest in property.

A driver license is not, in and of itself, a per se state business, moreover because the
driver license is simply an identification of an employee's particular task. However, the spurious
fraudulent act that the State of Washington has committed is to combine, by statute definition and
purpose, RCW 46.20.040, the operators (business) license with the driver license, whereby the
grant to be considered is not simply a request for a driver license but that the state has created an
operator paradigm business without noticing the applicant of that action; that act, or deed, is the
consideration language of the application, where the right to travel was conveyed, and converted
to the operation of a business privilege granted by the state. Ipso facto the driver license is a sole
proprietor business.
 To further invoke the notion of constructive fraud, of special note here, is that the
application for driver/operator license only contains line space for identification of an individuals
name; if it was only the operator (business) license, and not the driver license, that one sought to
make application for, there is no separate line space to identify a business proper.

Also noteworthy, is a reference to the application for title. For succinct purposes here, we
only need address two lines on the application for title; one, is the line space asking for a name
and the other asking for an address. The address line reads thus:

Washington State primary residence street address (if an individual)

or
Washington State principal place of business street address (if a business)
bold mine

The name line only asks for a name, without distinguishing an individual from a business,
while the business can be at either of two addresses. Interestingly though, saving discussion on
the difference of The State of Washington versus Washington State. What is relevant here is the
play on words; for example, primary and principal are each synonyms of the other; and the
business is the res-ident (latin, meaning- identity of a thing; in this case, it is the business). There
is no separate line to identify an actual business. This coy illusion is unnecessary because all the
DOL needs, by statute authority, is an address for the res-ident. Each of the two preceding
paragraphs should be read consistent with the section on statute history, earlier herein.

When an individual assumes application for a driver/operator (business) license is

mandatory, the applicant then assumes he must register his automobile. An automobile purchased
from a private sale comes with a bill of sale; the bill of sale is a deed of Right of possession.
When the automobile is registered, the DOL asks for the bill of sale, two things happen; one- the
possessor conveys to the state a partial, priority interest of right of ownership; and second-grants
to the state a consideration for the business that was created.
 The bill of sale that was freely given over to the state will never be seen again, because
the right of possession has been conveyed, and title was claimed by the state. The applicant has
now consented and authorized the state police to stop him for any one or more of the statute
violations, enumerated in the miscellaneous motor vehicle codes.

Produced also from this research, were two applications for a license, more appropriately
two parts of one application. The first, is a “general” license, and the second a commercial driver
license. The first, general license (simple) application having the above described terms. The
second, a commercial application which has the intrinsic information contained in the simple
license but also has curious attributes.

The commercial application asks four qualification questions. Three are highlighted here;

1. Do you drive a vehicle in interstate commerce?

2. Do you meet all the requirements in the code of federal regulations part 392.11
and 383.51?
3. Do you have a driver license from more than one state or licensing jurisdiction?

According to question number one, if a person can drive a vehicle in interstate commerce,
(which is federally regulated) he is automatically under the states authoritative mandate to
possess only one license. If the state only allows one license, and this one is commercial, then by
what authority is there issued a non-commercial license? The answer, is none, every license is
commercial.

The second question is vague. It points to “code of federal regulation part [* * * ].”
What title of the code of federal regulation? To be ironically certain, Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulation--Transportation.

The third curious attribute to the commercial application is the class certifications list, and
the signature certification, which reads in relevant part here;

“...the vehicles I drive are representatives for the class marked above.”
 For purposes of this writing, it is the first class which concerns the bulk of the private
vehicles that are licensed. The diagram below is shown as it appears on the license application
(that was provided); the classes of vehicles, and drivers thereof, are as follows;

CLASS ‌ ENDORSEMENTS AND / OR RESTRICTION TEST NEEDED

‫‌׀‬ Passenger/Bus __Hazardous Materials
‫‌׀‬ __Double/Triple Trailer __School Bus
‫‌׀‬ __Tank Vehicle __Air Brakes Restriction

Note that a passenger vehicle is first on the list, of classes of vehicles and drivers thereof.
What is interesting about this is that, a) this class appears on the commercial application, not the
general application; b) the passenger classification does not have a demarcation line; c) the
applicant swears the vehicle is representative of the class marked above.

Of the types of vehicles shown, a passenger vehicle, by statute, RCW 46.25.080, is a class
“C” commercial vehicle. This means that JOHN DOE has sworn that, for example, a Honda
Civic, is representative of a class “C” vehicle. It is a standing rule of law that silence is
acquiescence. The passenger class, being absent the demarcation line, is a technical silence as to
the applicable choice. However, this absence does not prevent the DOL from making some type
of sign or mark indicating the passenger class, thereby “assuming” this to be the correct class,
for the type of vehicle registered. It is, for all intents and purposes, a free for all default selection.

So, this “void”, is itself representative of an unidentifiable public record which cannot be
effectively responded to, as it presumes speculative interpretation of law.

Remember there is only one license authorized by statute and it is issued by authority of
RCW 46.20; the special license at RCW 46.25, called “commercial”, only authorizes the
extension of specific performance or circumstance, concerning weights, capacities, and cargo's.
And every vehicle bearing license plates is a business, registered to some person.