Legal Ethics 3B

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(1) PANES VS. DINOPOL
FACTS:
1. Gomba submitted a complaint to the Respondent
Judge. The case arose when Gomba refused to
acknowledge the new Board of Directors in Kornadal
Water District (KWD)prompting the Local water
Utilities Administration to replace her by Vargas as
the general manager of the KWD.
2. Respondent Judge issued the assailed twin orders
in favour of GombaThe first one directing the city
mayor to desist and refrain from taking over the
operation and management of the KWD Arellano
office; otherwise his arrest would be effected. The
second Order meanwhile directed the LWUA
personnel to return properties to the KWD Arellano
office, also under pain of arrest.
3. Petitioners argued that the Orders were violent, and
caused undue disturbance. were patently illegal and
void and were issued with abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of law, jurisprudence and the Rules
of Court, for the following reasons:
1. These Orders were issued past working hours, on
a Saturday, a nonworking day, and without the
benefit of a hearing or a notice to concerned parties.
2. Resistance to a lawful court order, while a ground
for indirect contempt, still requires the filing of a
charge and the opportunity to be heard.
3. Complainants were not parties to the cases filed
before respondent judge on the legitimacy of either
faction.
4. The proceedings in Civil Case No. 1799-24 are
null and void because the lawyers representing
KWD, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, were not authorized by the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the
Commission on Audit (COA

4. Respondent argued that it was a necessary order for
a speedy disposition of the case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the issuance by respondent Judge Dinopol
of the 24 March 2007 twin Orders constitutes gross
ignorance of the law?
2. Whether respondent judge should have inhibited
himself from a case to which one of the parties was
his wifes nephew is party thereto?
HELD:
1. YES, the orders assailed constitute gross ignorance
that would warrant his dismissal from service.
2. Yes.
RATIONALE:
1. At the outset, respondent failed to provide any
legitimate reason for the issuance of the Orders on a
Saturday evening when the courts were already
closed. As pointed out by the CA, if indeed there
was robbery or looting happening in the premises,
arrests could be effected by the police officers who
were already in the vicinity of the KWD office.
2. We agree with the findings of the OCA that
respondents defenses neither justify his failure to
comply with due process requirements nor do they
demonstrate good faith on his part that would
exculpate him from administrative liability.
Respondent violated the most basic requirements
for the proper observance of due process, resulting
in the unwarranted arrest and incarceration of
powerless individuals
3. We find that the issuance of these Orders was in
total disregard of the Rules of Court and with grave
abuse of authority. Undoubtedly, respondent is guilty
of gross ignorance of the law.
4. To be held administratively liable for gross ignorance
of the law, the acts complained of must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must
have also been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption.
26
Gross ignorance of the
law is considered as a serious offense under Rule
140, Section 8,
5. Cabel, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1839-
24, is the nephew of the wife of respondent. Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, provides for the
following instances of mandatory inhibition:
Section 1.Disqualification of judges.
No judge or judicial officers shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree
Legal Ethics 3B

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of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
2 VICTORIANO G. MANLAPAZ vs. JUDGE
MANUEL T. SABILLO,
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1771; February 13, 2013; Brion, J.:
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-2160-MTJ)

FACTS:
Complainant Victoriano Manlapaz charged
respondent Manuel Sabillo, then a practicing lawyer,
with serious and gross misconduct for failure to
return an amount arising from a transaction before
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City
.


The RTC and the CA, on appeal, ruled in
favor of Manlapaz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not willful failure to pay a just
debt is a ground for disciplinary action against
judges.
HELD:
Yes. The Court has repeatedly stressed that it is not
a collection agency for the unpaid debts of its
officials and employees,but has nevertheless
provided for Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court that holds its officials and employees
administratively liable in unpaid debt situations. This
Section provides that willful failure to pay a just debt
is a ground for disciplinary action against judges and
justices.

Just debts, as defined in Section 23, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. No. 292, refer to (1) claims adjudicated by a
court of law; or (2) claims, the existence and
justness of which are admitted by the debtor.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies
willful failure to pay a just debt as a serious charge.
While reference to a debt necessarily
implies a transaction that is private and outside of
official transactions, the rules do not thereby intrude
into public officials private lives; they simply look at
their actions from the prism of public service and
consider these acts unbecoming of a public
official. These rules take into account that these are
actions of officials who are entrusted with public
duties and who, even in their private capacities,
should continually act to reflect their status as public
servants. Employees of the judiciary should be living
examples of uprightness not only in the performance
of official duties but also in their personal and private
dealings with other people so as preserve at all
times the good name and standing of the courts in
the community.

Here, the complainants claim is a just debt.
The willfulness of Judge Sabillo in not paying is
shown by his continuous failure to settle despite
demand letters sent to him. Thus, the court imposed
the penalty of fine.

(3) ANONYMOUS, complainant vs.JUDGE RIO
ACHAS, respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801
27 February 2013

FACTS:

1. A letter-complaint was filed before the court
alleging the immorality and conduct unbecoming
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of a judge against Judge Rio Achas (Judge
Achas) which alleges the following:

a. it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge
Achas is living scandalously with a woman who
is not his wife;
b. he lives beyond his means;
c. he is involved with illegal activities through his
connection with bad elements, the kuratongs;
d. he comes to court very untidy and dirty;
e. he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for
material and monetary consideration;
f. he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.

2. In his comment, Judge Achas denied all
allegations and claimed that these were hatched
to harass him. RTC through Judge Dungog found
that it is not commendable, proper or moral per
Canons of Judicial Ethics to be perceived as
going out with a woman not his wife, and for him
to be involved in rearing game cocks.

3. OCA recommended that Judge Achas be
reprimanded as to the charge of immorality. It was
further recommended that he be ordered to refrain
from going to cockpits or avoid such places
altogether, with a warning that the same or similar
complaint in the future shall be dealt with more
severely. The other charges were recommended to
be dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not anonymous complaints may
be filed against judges.
2. Whether or not the alleged acts committed by
Judge Achas constitute immorality thus
violating New Code of Judicial Ethics
specifically Canon 2 and Canon 4.

RULING:

1. Yes anonymous complaints may be filed
against judges under Section 1 of Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, but they must be supported
by public records of indubitable integrity. Thus,
for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof
in administrative proceedings must be
buttressed by indubitable public records and by
what is sufficiently proven during the
investigation. If the burden of proof is not
overcome, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his defense. In the present
case, no evidence was attached to the letter-
complaint. The complainant never appeared,
and no public records were brought forth during
the investigation. The charges that he (1) lives
beyond his means, (2) is involved with illegal
activities through his connection with the
kuratongs, (3) comes to court very untidy and
dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly in
exchange for material and monetary
consideration were, therefore, properly
recommended dismissed by the OCA for lack of
evidence.

2. The charges that (1) it is of public knowledge
that he is living scandalously with a woman not
his wife and that (2) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling are, however, violative of
the New Code of Judicial Ethics. Judge Achas
clearly violated Canon 2 and Canon 4 by going
out in public with a woman who is not his wife.
There is no evidence to prove that Judge Achas
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is engaged in gambling, but he admitted that he
is rearing cocks for leisure. Although it is not
illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with
a crowd of cockfighting enthusiast and bettors
as it is undoubtedly impair the respect due him.
The court further stated that as a judge, he
must impose upon himself personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. Lastly, the court said that no position
demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its occupant than does the
judicial office. Judges in particular must be
individuals of competence, honesty and probity,
charged as they are with safeguarding the
integrity of the court and its proceedings. He
should behave at all times so as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
His personal behaviour outside the court, and
not only while in the performance of his official
duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and
justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge
degrades the institution he represents.

(4) RE: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco
Against Associate Justices Francisco H.
Villaruz,Alex Quiroz and Samuel Martirez of the
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J January 15, 2013
FACTS:
Mayor Pacifico C. Velasco (Pacifico) was
convicted by the Sandiganbayan guilty for the
violation of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices
Act). Pacifico sought several reconsiderations before
the Supreme Court but the latter denied all of it.
These motions and pleadings delayed the execution
of his sentence despite the finality of his conviction.
In a hearing for the execution of Pacificos sentence
before the Sandiganbayan his counsel made several
manifestations stating that Pacifico was confined in
a hospital and was due for surgery. Nonetheless, the
Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest but
allowed Pacifico to stay in the hospital. The
accuseds counsel filed several motions to recall the
warrants issued on the ground of humanitarian
considerations.
Complainant Leonardo Velasco (Leonardo)
filed an administrative case against the Justices
claiming that upon the finality of the decision it was
the ministerial duty of the latter to execute such
decision. In not doing so and in granting the wishes
of Pacifico, they have shown evident partiality.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent
Sandiganbayan Justices may be held
administratively liable for their actions which unduly
delayed the execution of the final sentence of
conviction of Pacifico? (NO)
HELD:
Respondents did not commit grave
misconduct or any violation of a specific provision of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Such Justices merely
afforded Pacifico and his camp the legal remedies
given to them by law.
However, by extending too much modesty,
the Justices deserve admonition. They should have
executed the decision immediately unless TRO or
preliminary injunction has been issued.



Legal Ethics 3B

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(5) HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. J UDGE
ANTHONY E. SANTOS, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 19. Cagayan De Oro City, respondent
(A.M. No. RTJ -01-1657; En Banc; J . Callejo Sr.;
February 23, 2004)
FACTS:
1. The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-
Complaint Heinz Heck prayed for the disbarment
of Judge Anthony Santos alleging that prior to the
respondents appointment as RTC judge he
violated the notarial law by subscribing and
forwarding on a non-regular basis notarized
documents to the Clerk of Court despite his non-
commission as notary public.
2. In his Answer, the respondent judge categorically
denied the charges against him contending that
there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de
Oro as well as the submitted notarized
documents/ notarial register.
3. Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court
Administrator recommending a full-blown
investigation, the case was referred to Associate
Justice Edgardo Cruz of the Court of Appeals.
4. In a Sealed Report, Judge Cruz recommended
that respondent (who retired May 22, 2002) be
found guilty of the violation of Notarial Law by
notarizing documents without commission,
tardiness in submission of notarial reports and
non-forwarding of notarial register to Clerk of
Court upon expiration of his commission and that
for these infractions he be suspended from
practice of law and barred from being
commissioned as notary public for one year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a retired judge charged with
notarizing documents without the requisite notary
commission more than twenty years ago be
disciplined therefore

HELD:
The fact that a judge has retired or has
otherwise been separated from the service does
not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction
to determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority
over members of the bench. Jurisdiction was not
lost by the mere fact that respondent, had ceased
in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent innocent of the charges or declare
him guilty thereof. A contrary rue would be
fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications. If innocent, it taints
his name and integrity as he leaves the institution
which he has served well; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and penalty.
It must be remembered that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the
contrary it is invested with substantive public
interest such that only those qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a
public one, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of
authenticity and due execution. In the case, the
respondent did not object to the complainants
formal offer of evidence, prompting the
Investigating Justice to decide the case on the
basis of the pleadings filed. Furthermore, he did
not present any evidence of his commission as
well as proof of submission of notarial reports
and notarial register. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
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not, he committed falsehood in violation of the
Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Finally, an administrative Complaint against
a member of the Bar does not prescribe. The
qualification of good moral character is a
requirement which is not dispensed with upon
admission to membership of the Bar. It is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential
to maintain ones good standing in the profession.

(6) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460
March 31, 2006

Facts:
Judge Florentino V. Floro of Branch 73,
Malabon City faced a total of 13 charges calling for
his disbarment and removal from his office as a
judge. Some of the charges against him were the act
of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications in violation of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct; for
rendering resolutions without written orders in
violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of
Procedures; his alleged partiality in criminal cases
where he declares that he is pro-accused which is
contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial
Conduct; for appearing in personal cases without
prior authority from the Supreme Court and without
filing the corresponding applications for leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing; for
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial
Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of
Court and the Philippine justice system; for the use
of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings; for violation of Circular No.
13
5
dated 1 July 1987.

Judge Floro also claimed that he has certain
psychic powers such as the power to see the future,
the power of bilocation, the power to type letters
while he is in a trance and the power to see and
consult with his little friends or the duwendes.

Issue/s:Whether or not Judge Floro is unfit to serve
as a judge

Held:
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position
as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind that
renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his
office
Ratio:
With the foregoing, we find the act of Judge
Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-
laudatory statements constitutive of simple
misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Floro also violated
the Code of Judicial Ethics when he declared that he
was pro-accused.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
"A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is
to apply the law and dispense justice "should not
only be impartial, independent and honest but
should be believed and perceived to be impartial,
independent and honest" as well.
He is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a
pleading wherein he indicated that he is the
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presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City
and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath
with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical
explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge
Floro was obviously trying to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he
himself is a judge and is thus in the right. Verily,
Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative
agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say
the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward
position.
A judge should avoid being queer in his
behavior, appearance and movements. He must
always keep in mind that he is the visible
representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims
that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can
inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the
angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends"
are manifestations of his psychological instability
and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry
out the functions and responsibilities of a judge.
The findings of mental and psychological
incapacity are thus substantially supported by
evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests
and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the
undersigned has no other recourse but to
recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be declared
unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective
immediately.





(7) ALEN ROSS RODRIGUEZ and REGIDOR
TULALI vs. The Hon. BIENVENIDO
BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Acting
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan, Branch 52, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190171
March 14, 2011

FACTS:
Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was
Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson
case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan
Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During
the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a
controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by
Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to
Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of
the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto
Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of
the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of
the arson case on the other hand before the day of
the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the
arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation
withdrawing his appearance in the said case to
prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and
collusion, then Judge Blancaflor rendered his
decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson.
Purportedly on the basis of the administrative
complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez,
Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses
including Tulali and heard their testimonies, then he
issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear
before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on
matters pertaining to his possible involvement in
Tulalis filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the
administrative complaint against Awayan, among
others. During the pendency of the case Rodriguez
filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of
Judge Blancaflors continued inquiries considering
that the decision in the arson case had already been
promulgated however in an order, Judge Blancaflor
informed the petitioners that he was proceeding
against them for direct contempt and violation of
their oath of office on the basis of Tulalis Ex-
Parte Manifestation.
ISSUE:Whether or not Judge Blancaflors disregard
of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion
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which was further aggravated by the unlawful
manner of simultaneously conducting suspension
and contempt proceedings against them.
HELD:
The power to punish a person in contempt of court is
inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration
of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise
the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost
restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the
same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It
bears stressing that the power to declare a person in
contempt of court must be exercised on the
preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the
corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of
punishment. Such power, being drastic and
extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to
unless necessary in the interest of justice.
In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge
Blancaflors order penalizing petitioners for direct
contempt on the basis of Tulalis Ex-
Parte Manifestation.
Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect
toward the court, offensive personalities toward
others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition
when lawfully required to do so.
Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in
filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be
construed as contumacious within the purview of
direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject
manifestation bore Tulalis voluntary withdrawal from
the arson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion
between him and the accused. Its filing on the day
before the promulgation of the decision in the
pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the
proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should
not be held accountable for his act which was done
in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct
contempt as he had no knowledge of, or
participation in, the preparation and filing of the
subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by
Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in
the arson case. The attached complaint against
Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan
Governor, and not with the RTC.
Apparently, Judge Blancaflors conclusion, that the
subject manifestation containing derogatory matters
was purposely filed to discredit the administration of
justice in court, is unfounded and without basis.
There being no factual or legal basis for the charge
of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor
gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners
guilty as charged.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to
observe the elementary procedure which requires
written charge and due hearing. There was no order
issued to petitioners. Neither was there any written
or formal charge filed against them. In fact,
Rodriguez only learned of the contempt proceedings
upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring
him to appear before the Court in order to clarify
certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on
the other hand, only learned of the proceedings
when he was ordered to submit his compliance to
explain how he came in possession of the
administrative complaint against Awayan.
The fact that petitioners were afforded the
opportunity to file their appropriate pleadings is not
sufficient as the proceedings ex-parte to hear the
witnesses testimonies had already been completed.
Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the
standard of honesty and impartiality required of
judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
As a public servant, a judge should perform his
duties in accordance with the dictates of his
conscience and the light that God has given him. A
judge should never allow himself to be moved by
pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the
performance of his duties. He should always bear in
mind that the power of the court to punish for
contempt should be exercised for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a
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safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the
functions that they exercise.
Contempt and suspension proceedings are
supposed to be separate and distinct. They have
different objects and purposes for which different
procedures have been established. Judge Blancaflor
should have conducted separate proceedings
Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt
and suspension proceedings is permitted, the
suspension of petitioners must still fail.
In the case at bench, there was no prior and
separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the
facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them,
within a specified period from receipt thereof, to
show cause why they should not be suspended from
the practice of their profession. Neither were they
given full opportunity to defend themselves, to
produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by
themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the
suspension proceedings against petitioners are null
and void, having violated their right to due process.
(8) INSTANCE SHOWING SIMPLE MISCONDUCT
OF A JUDGE (Judicial Ethics)
Aida R. Campos, Alistair R. Campos, and Charmaine R.
Campos v. Judge Eliseo M. Campos
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint for serious misconduct,
immorality and dishonesty filed by complainants
against respondent, former Presiding Judge of the
MTC of Bayugan,Agusan del Sur.
Complainant Aida and respondent were married in
1981 and had two children, complainants Alistair
and Charmaine.
In 2008, respondent filed a petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage, alleging that he and Aida were
both psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations; for his part,
respondent is a homosexual who could not be
intimate with his wife unless he imagined he was
with another man, while his wife had affairs with
other men as a result of his homosexuality.
To her defense, Aida denied the allegations and filed
for legal separation. According to her, respondent
wanted their marriage annulled so that he could
marry another woman with whom he was having a
relationship. In the meantime, a separate case was
pending against the respondent, to which a
certain parcel of registered land might be taken from
their property in the event of loss. Facts show that
the title to such land was kept by respondent in his
drawer. When respondent could not find the title in
his usual place for safekeeping, he sought the
advice of the Register of Deeds who told him to
execute the affidavit of loss, to which he did.
Respondent then registered the title but in the name
of Alistair, a minor at that time.
ISSUE: Is respondent guilty of immorality,
dishonesty, and serious misconduct?
HELD: NO, respondent is not guilty of immorality,
dishonesty and serious misconduct but only simple
misconduct. First, the complainants failed to present
any proof of respondents alleged relationship with
another woman, so as to justify a charge for
immorality. There was no evidence presented that
respondent engaged in scandalous conduct that
would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action
against him. However, the Court reminded
respondent of the judge's duty to conduct himself in
a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office. As such, he must comport himself at all times
in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of
the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. Second, respondent was not
guilty of dishonesty as regards the declaration of
loss of title.

(9) ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA and ATTY. CLARITO
SERVILLAS vs. JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY
(February 22, 2012)

FACTS:
Relative to cases filed before Judge Canoy, an
administrative complaint was filed against him for
gross ignorance of law and procedure, undue
interference and gross inefficiency. In Civil Case No.
7077, the complainants alleged that the Judge acts
of issuing TRO and preliminary injunction are
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improper remedies for to transfer possession of one
property to another whose title has not been clearly
established, and also for failure to decide Motion for
Recommendation within the 30 days as required by
rules and jurisprudence. In In Spec. Proc. No. 7101,
for allegedly interfering with administrative functions
of the Bureau on Immigration by ordering the
release of the expired passport to a party, preparing
the said Order outside of the courts premises, and
violating Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
due to his friendly greeting to a party and for acting
as counsel for the latter by raising questions on the
respondents during their testimonies. Finally, in In
Civil Case No. 7065, for allegedly acting with undue
delay in resolving a simple Motion to Dismiss, and in
his alleged tardiness in trying cases before his
bench.
ISSUE: WON Judge Canoy is guilty of gross
ignorance of law and procedure, undue interference
and gross inefficiency in violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.
HELD: In Civil Case No. 707, Supreme Court held
that an injunction cannot be issued to transfer
possession or control of a property to another when
the legal title is in dispute between the parties and
the legal title has not been clearly established. X X X
When the law involved is simple and elementary,
lack of conversance with it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
In Spec. Proc. No. 7101, On the charge of violation
of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, we find
the same bereft of merit. A judge may properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite
and prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify
obscure and incomplete details in the course of the
testimony of the witness. X X X On the charge of
gross ignorance of procedure and undue
interference in the administrative functions of the
Bureau of Immigration, complainants failed to prove
the charge with substantial evidence.

In the
absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption that the respondent judge has regularly
performed his duties. On the charge of tardiness,
the same likewise without merit, without evidence as
to their truthfulness or veracity.
In Civil Case No. 7065, Respondent judge resolved
the said Motion after more than a year and only after
the filing of the instant complaint. Failure to decide
cases and other matters within
the reglementaryperiod of ninety (90) days
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction against the
erring magistrate. This is not only a blatant
transgression of the Constitution but also of the
Code of Judicial Conduct (CANON 6 SECTION 5),
judges shall perform all judicial duties including the
delivery of reserved decisions efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness.

(10) A.M. No. 12-2-6-SC March 6, 2012
RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY OF
JUDGE IRMA ZITA V. MASAMAYOR,
FACTS: Judge Irma Zita Masamayor, Executive and
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court at
Talibon, Bohol applied for a lateral transfer to the
Regional Trial Courts of Tagbilaran City. However,
she received a letter from the Judicial and Bar
Council dated January 24, 2012 informing her that
she was not included in the list of nominees for
RTCs in Tagbilaran City. She attributes her
disqualification to her previous administrative record
of gross inefficiency in 1999 and 2000 for belatedly
filing her motions for extension of time to resolve the
cases then pending before her sala. Thus, she was
Legal Ethics 3B

11

ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00 in A.M. No. 99-1-
16-RTC; P10,000.00 in A.M. No. 98-12-381-RTC;
and P12,000.00 in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC. She was
likewise earlier fined P5,000.00 for a similar violation
of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in A.M. No. 98-10-338-RTC. To reverse she
disqualification, she filed a petition for judicial
clemency in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Masamayor is
qualified for judicial clemency.
RULING: Petition GRANTED.
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides:
Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from
being nominated for appointment to any judicial post
or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular
administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in
foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any
criminal case; or in an administrative case,
where the penalty imposed is at least a fine
of more than P10,000, unless he has been
granted judicial clemency."
Considering Judge Masamayors previous record,
she is indeed disqualified from being further
nominated for appointment to any judicial post,
unless she be accorded judicial clemency.
In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge
Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, appealing for Clemency),
7
the Court
laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, thus:
1
st
.There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
(These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar
misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of
non-reformation.)
2
nd
. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
3
rd
. The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeem himself.
4
th
. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative
and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5
th
. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency."
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the
Court finds merit in petitioner's request.
Under the 1
st
guideline, notwithstanding her
disqualification, the IBP Bohol Chapter has shown
its high regard for her per the letter of support signed
by a number of its members addressed to the IBP
during the pendency of her administrative cases and
the IBP Resolution No. 11, Series of 2009 endorsing
her application for lateral transfer to the RTC of
Tagbilaran City.
In addition, in the Memorandum of the Office of the
Court Administrator, it was stated that her prompt
compliance with the judicial audit requirements of
pending cases was acknowledged and she was
even commended for her good performance in the
Legal Ethics 3B

12

effective management of her court and in the
handling of court records.
Under the 2
nd
guideline, a review of the records
reveals that petitioner has exhibited remorse for her
past misdeeds, which occurred more than ten (10)
years ago.
Under the 3
rd
guideline, while she was found to have
belatedly filed her motions for additional time to
resolve the aforecited cases, the Court noted that
she had disposed of the same within the extended
period sought, except in A.M. No. 99-2-79-RTC
where she submitted her compliance beyond the
approved 45-day extended period. Nevertheless,
petitioner has subsequently shown diligence in the
performance of her duties and has not committed
any similar act or omission.


Under the 5
th
guideline, petitioner's dedicated
service of 23 years to the judiciary, having been first
appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge in
1989, merits compassion from the Court. It bears to
note that petitioner does not seek for promotion to a
higher position but only a lateral transfer to a place
of work near her residence.
Note : 2 cases
(11) RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY
OF THEN JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336
Perlas-Bernabe,J.
FACTS:
For resolution is the Petition for Judicial
Clemency filed by Hermin Arceo, former Presiding
Judge of RTC San Fernando Pampanga, seeking to
lift the ban against his employment in any branch of
the government. According to him, he had
immensely suffered from and endured the stigma
caused by his dismissal from the service and claims
to have been humbled by his experience and has
become remorseful of his previous acts causing him
to reform his ways and treat each person with dignity
and respect.
ISSUE: WON the petition for Judicial Clemency
should be granted.
RULING:
YES. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus Diaz,
MTC of Quezon City, Appealing for Clemency,
the Court laid down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of officers or
chapters of the IBP, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will give
rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a
chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to the legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative
or other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify clemency.

Legal Ethics 3B

13

Applying the foregoing standards to this
case, the Court finds merit in respondents prayer for
the lifting of the ban against his re-employment in
the government service.
Records show that after his dismissal from
the service, respondent engaged in private practice
and most of his cases involve poor litigants,
neighbors and close friends. He also submitted a
Certificate of Good Moral Character from the Acting
Executive Judge of RTC Malolos and Certificate of
Favorable Endorsement from the President of the
IBP attesting to his reformation and recognizing his
valuable contributions to the bar and the bench. The
court also notes the many years that had elapsed
from the time of the dismissal and recognizes the
respondents dedication, citations and contributions
to the legal profession and to the judiciary prior to
his dismissal from the service.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his
remorse and reformation after his dismissal from the
service meriting the Courts liberality. While it may
be conceded that respondent at 71 years old had
already reached retirement age and can no longer
be eligible for regular employment in the public
service, yet, considering his achievements and
mental aptitude, it cannot be doubted that he could
still be of service to the government in some other
capacity.
(12) JOCELYN TALENS-DABON vs. JUDGE
HERMIN ARCEO
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, July 25, 1996
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Atty. Jocelyn
Talens-Dabon, Clerk of Court of RTC Pampanga,
charging Judge Hermin Arceo, Executive Judge of
said court, with gross misconduct and immorality.
The complaint stemmed from the acts of Judge
Arceo towards his personnel wherein said Judge
constantly made bodily contact with the complainant
and other female personnel whenever he had the
chance and that he even kissed one of them on
several occasions. According to the complainant, the
Judge wrote poems manifesting his sexual
intentions towards her and the latter likewise kissed
her violently against her will.

ISSUE: WON the Judge is guilty of Gross
Misconduct and Immorality.
RULING:
YES. The integrity of the Judiciary rests not
only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice
but also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system have
done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we
apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not
necessarily create confidence among the people
that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in order to
create such confidence, the people who run the
judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not
only be proficient in both the substantive and
procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly,
they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their
public and private lives. Only then can the people be
reassured that the wheels of justice in this country
run with fairness and equity, thus creating
confidence in the judicial system.
With the avowed objective of promoting
confidence in the Judiciary, we have the following
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Legal Ethics 3B

14

Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartially of the judiciary.
Respondent has failed to measure up these
exacting standards. He has behaved in a manner
unbecoming of a judge and as model of moral
uprightness. He has betrayed the people's high
expectations and diminished the esteem in which
they hold the judiciary in general.
The audacity under which the lewd and
lustful acts were committed and the seeming
impunity with which they were perpetrated shock our
sense of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion
that respondent judge has failed to behave in a
manner that will promote confidence in the judiciary.
His actuations, if condoned, would damage the
integrity of the judiciary, fomenting distrust in the
system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the
severest form of disciplinary sanction of dismissal
from the service.
The actuations of respondent are
aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and
supervision, he being the executive judge. He took
advantage of his position and power in order to carry
out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he
being in loco parentis over his subordinate
employees, respondent was the one who preyed on
them, taking advantage of his superior position.
Judge Hermin Arceo was dismissed from the
service.


(12) Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum
FACTS:
Atty. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano- Endriano
were indefinitely suspended from the practice of law
when they were found guilty of professional
misconduct when they misquoted or misused
constitutional provisions in their pleadings to impute
unjust acts to the members of the Court. However,
Atty. Endraino was reinstated because of lesser
culpability on her part.
ISSUE: WON the misuse of constitutional provisions
is a breach of standards of being a member in good
standing
HELD: Yes. However, the indefinite suspension was
lifted because for a period of 2 years, Atty. Lozano
did not do any act that would indicate that he acted
in any unscrupulous practices unsuitable for him to
be a member of the bar.

(13) Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Cader P. Indar
A.M. No. RTJ-10-223, April 10 2012
Per Curiam
Facts:
Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City
reported to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) that they have received an alarming numbers
of decisions, resolutions and orders on annulment of
marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.
Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous
annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in
the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that
(1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases;
(2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were
notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4)
Legal Ethics 3B

15

hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were
submitted for decision. In other words, Judge Indar,
who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued
decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage
cases, without any showing that such cases
underwent trial and complied with the statutory and
jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Indar is guilty of gross
misconduct and dishonest.

Held: Yes. Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct
and dishonesty . Judge Indar violated the following
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION.
In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing
decisions making it appear that the annulment cases
underwent trial and complied with the Rules of
Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates
the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court.
It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did
not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put
his moral character in serious doubt and rendered
him unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its
ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also accord continuing fidelity
to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.

Judge Indar is DISBARRED for violation of Canons
1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.

(14) ROMANCITO AND JULIANA LUARCA v.
JUDGE IRENEO MOLATO
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1711 and A.M. No. MTJ-08-
1716, 23 APRIL 2012,THIRD DIVISION (Abad, J .)
Facts: Spouses Ramoncito and Juliana Luarca (the
Luarcas) and Jenny Agbay charged Judge Ireneo B.
Molato of the Municipal Trial Court of Bongabong,
Oriental Mindoro, with conduct unbecoming a
member of the judiciary, alleging that Judge Molato
and his wife, Nilalina, enticed them to invest money
in Lucky Socorro Investor and Credit Corporation of
which Nilalina was president. The Luarcas and
Agbay invested in that company to earn interest of
2.5% per month. The Luarcas and Agbay claim that
they got the monthly interest promised them but only
up to 2003 when Lucky Corporation started missing
on its obligations Luarcas asked Lucky Corporation
to return their investments with the corresponding
interests. But Judge Molato and his wife failed to
comply.


Legal Ethics 3B

16

Issues:
1. Is Judge Molato , apart from being the
husband of Lucky Corporations president,
involve in its affairs; and
2. In the affirmative, what shall the nature of
his administrative liability be?
Held: Section 4 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees lays
down the norms of conduct which every public
official and employee shall observe in the discharge
and execution of their official duties, specifically
providing that they shall at all times respect the
rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary
to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, and public interest. Thus, any conduct
contrary to these standards would qualify as conduct
unbecoming of a government employee.
Absent any showing that Judge Molato defrauded
complainants of their money or committed acts that
detract from the dignity of his position, the mere fact
that the corporation of which his wife was the
president had difficulties meeting its obligations does
not per se make him lacking in moral integrity and of
questionable character as would make him liable for
conduct unbecoming a judge. Of course, there is
evidence that the corporations Board of Directors
issued Resolution 1-2000 that authorized Judge
Molato and three other persons to serve as the
companys alternate bank signatories, with their
signatures appearing on the document. But
complainants presented no evidence that Judge
Molato in fact performed such function for Lucky
Corporation. The complainants presented no
company withdrawal slips or checks where his
signature appears. No evidence has been adduced
that he was a stockholder of that corporation, proof
that he engaged in private business without the
Supreme Courts consent, or served as one of its
corporate or line officers.
Still, Judge Molato is to be reprimanded for agreeing
to serve as one of Lucky Corporations alternate
bank signatories even if he may not have performed
such service for the corporation. He has no business
agreeing to the performance of such service. His
offense constitutes a violation of Administrative
Circular 5 which in essence prohibits public officials
from performing or agreeing to perform functions or
services outside of their official functions for the
reason that the entire time of the officials and
employees of the judiciary shall be devoted to their
official work to ensure the efficient and speedy
administration of justice.

(15) RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008
STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NETWORTH
[SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET
ORCURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF
THE
SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY
A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC
June 13, 2012.

FACTS:
Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ,
sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of the
Supreme Court for the year 2008. She also
requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet of
the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating
their database of information on government
officials.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the justices are obliged to disclose
their SALNs and be accessed via the right to
information without violation against any
Constitutional rights?
Legal Ethics 3B

17


RULING: Yes. Canon 2, Sec. 1 of The New Code Of
Judicial Conduct For The Philippine Judiciary
provides that:
"Judges shall ensure that not only is their
conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of a reasonable person"
The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. In essence, it is the
consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned
courts and the various judges associations that while
the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to
have access to matters of concern, the Constitution
also holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary.
Thus, although no direct opposition to the disclosure
of SALN and other personal documents is being
expressed, it is the uniform position of the said
magistrates and the various judges associations
that the disclosure must be made in accord with the
guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the
independence of the Judiciary.

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right
to information, with its companion right of access to
official records, is not absolute. While providing
guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides
that the peoples right to know is limited to matters
of public concern and is further subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis--vis
the various requests made, the Court finds no
cogent reason to deny the public access to the
SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and
other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course,
to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A.
No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations,
and in the guidelines set forth in the decrial portion.

The Court notes the valid concerns of the other
magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of
some individuals in their requests for access to such
personal information and their publication. However,
custodians of public documents must not concern
themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of
the persons seeking access to the records. The
moral or material injury which their misuse might
inflict on others is the requestors responsibility and
lookout. Any publication is made subject to the
consequences of the law. While public officers in the
custody or control of public records have the
discretion to regulate the manner in which records
may be inspected, examined or copied by interested
persons, such discretion does not carry with it the
authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination,
or copying of the records. After all, public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees must, at
all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.

(16) JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, ET AL. vs. JUDGE
ANTONIO C. LUBAO
A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTJ | June 20, 2012 |
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The complainants were the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 7819 that was appealed from MTC
General Santos City to RTC, Branch 22, which was
the post of the respondent Judge. Judge Lubao then
issued an Order on 12 September 2008 directing the
parties to file their memoranda within 30 days from
Legal Ethics 3B

18

receipt. Complainants averred that defendants
should have received the Order by 07 October 2008,
giving them until 06 November 2008 to file the
memoranda, but they failed to do so. That
notwithstanding, Judge Lubao still didnt decide the
case 4 months from November 6. On 20 May 2009,
he even gave the defendants a last chance to file
their memoranda but the same was received by
defendants only on 17 June 2009. Thus, the
complainants filed the instant complaint with the
OCA against the Judge for gross ignorance of the
law, rules or procedures, gross incompetency,
violation of RA 3019, violation of Arts. 171 and 172
of the RPC and pertinent provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Judge Lubao, in his Comment, informed the
Court that one of the complainants, Remberto C.
Karaan, Sr., is engaging in the practice of law even
though he is not a lawyer. Karaan replied by saying
that Judge Lubao was only evading the topic at hand
and thus violating again basic rules of procedure
and the law. The OCA dismissed the complaint
saying that there was no evidence of fraud, bad faith
or dishonesty of Judge Lubao in giving the said
Orders. OCA said that the remedy of complainants is
a judicial remedy and not an administrative case.
The Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated 24
November 2010, dismissed the complainant against
Judge Lubao and ordered Karaan to show cause
why he should not be cited in contempt. Thus,
Karaan moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Lubao is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, rules or procedures, gross
incompetency, violation of RA 3019, violation of Arts.
171 and 172 of the RPC and pertinent provisions of
the Code of Judicial Conduct

HOLD:
No. The SC held that not all administrative
complainants against judges should merit sanctions
to judges especially if no bad faith, dishonesty or
corruption is present. Judge Lubao could not be
faulted for acting carefully before proceeding with
the civil case and in giving all the parties an
opportunity to be heard.

Further, the SC held that Karaan was indeed
engaged in unauthorized practice of law and he was
held in indirect contempt by the SC. His act of
requiring the parties to execute a Special Power of
Attorney in his favor to allow him to be a party
litigant constituted such illegal practice. He was
imposed a penalty of 10,000.00 for his actions.
(17) . Eladio D. Perfecto v. J udge Alma Consuelo
Desales-Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ -11-2258
J une 20, 2012, Brion, J .

Facts: Eladio D. Perfecto filed an administrative
complaint against Presiding Judge Alma Consuelo
Desales-Esidera for violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and ignorance of the law when firstly, he
filed a Petition to Cite for Contempt against one
Dalmacio Grafil and a Ven S. Labro which was
raffled to the court presided over by the respondent,
lamenting that the case has since been gathering
dust in the court of the respondent and maintains
that the respondent should be made administratively
liable for her failure to act on the case within a
reasonable period of time. And secondly, the
complainant claims that he is the publisher and
Editor-in-Chief of the Catarman Weekly Tribune
Legal Ethics 3B

19

(CWT), the only accredited newspaper inNorthern
Samar, that in Special Proceedings Nos. C-346 (for
adoption and change of name

and C-352 (for
adoption), the respondent directed the petitioners to
have her orders published in a newspaper of
national circulation and through these directives, the
complainant posits that the respondent betrayed her
ignorance of the law, considering that all judicial
notices and orders emanating from the courts of
Catarman, Northern Samar should be published only
in the CWT, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1079.

The respondent, with respect to her alleged
inaction on the petition for contempt maintains that
the summons were served on the respondents and
that eventually, the respondents filed their Answer
with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, but no
other pleadings followed. Relative to the issue on
the publication of court orders/notices, the
respondent submits that the CWT is not generally
circulated in the province and that according to her,
[t]he [CWT] caters only to those who buy
commercial space from the publisher for
announcements and legal notices.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of
ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority
under the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Held: Anent the allegations of ignorance of the law
and usurpation of authority against respondent
Judge Esidera, for issuing a directive to the
petitioner in a special proceedings case to cause the
publication of her order in a newspaper of general
publication, this Office finds the same devoid of
merit.That Catarman Weekly Tribune is the only
accredited newspaper of general publication in
Catarman does not bar the publication of judicial
orders and notices in a newspaper of national
circulation.A judicial notice/order may be published
in a newspaper of national circulation and said
newspaper does not even have to be accredited.

However, the Court found the respondent
judge guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law. With her
inaction on the petition for contempt, she betrayed
her unbecoming lack of familiarity with basic
procedural rules such as what was involved in the
contempt proceedings before her
court. Respondent Judge fell short of these
standards when he failed in his duties to follow
elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing
jurisprudence.

(18)STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T.
COMILANG and MA. VICTORIA SUNEGA-
LAGMAN, Complainants, versus JUDGE MEDEL
ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216
June 6, 2012

FACTS: State Prosecutor Comilang filed a
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Belen with
manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith,
inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance
of the law in issuing show cause orders, subpoenas
and contempt citations, in grave defiance to the
injunctive writ issued by the Court of Appeals. State
Prosecutor Comilang further alleged that Judge
Belen's acts were intended to harass, oppress,
persecute, intimidate, annoy, vex and coerce him,
and to place him in a disadvantageous and
compromising position, as he was prosecuting the
libel case instituted by herein complainant State
Legal Ethics 3B

20

Prosecutor Lagman against Judge Belen when he
was still a practicing lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Belen's
actuations showed manifest partiality and bias,
evident bad faith, grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law warranting his dismissal from
service as RTC Judge of Branch 36, Calamba City.

HELD: Yes. Judges are expected to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and
apply them properly in good faith as judicial
competence requires no less.

Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ
issued by the CA. In complete disobedience, Judge
Belen proceeded to issue (1) the Order requiring
State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to
file the supersedeas bond and to require his
presence in court, as well as to explain why he
should not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the
Order seeking State Prosecutor Comilang's
explanation for his defiance of the subpoena
requiring his presence at the hearing of even date,
and directing, once again, his attendance at the next
hearing and to explain once more why he should not
be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the Order
finding State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect
contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of
P30,000.00 and to suffer two days' imprisonment.

Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be
considered as mere errors of judgment that can be
easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic
and established rule of law or procedure amounts to
inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance
of the law. Likewise, citing State Prosecutor
Comilang for indirect contempt notwithstanding the
effectivity of the CA-issued writ of injunction
demonstrated his vexatious attitude and bad faith
towards the former, for which he must be held
accountable and subjected to disciplinary action.

(19) PROSEC. J ORGE D. BACULI v. J UDGE
MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, A.M. No. RTJ -09-
2179, THIRD DIVISION, September 24, 2012,
VELASCO, J.
FACTS:
The principal cause of action is the unlawful,
unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, malicious,
capricious and immoral orders issued by Judge
Belen. The adverted issuances refer to the
December 18, 2006 Decision, in which Baculi was
found guilty of direct contempt, and the June 7, 2007
Decision, wherein Judge Belen declared Baculi
guilty of indirect contempt of court, for the
contemptuous nature of pleadings that Baculi filed in
his sala.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Belens actions showed
manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, grave
abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law
warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge.
HELD:
Respondent is guilty of grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law
In the case of Pesayco v. Layague,
[21]
the
Court succinctly explained:

No less than the Code of Judicial conduct
mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws
and maintain professional competence. Indeed,
competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge
Legal Ethics 3B

21

must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts
as well as with procedural rules. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the publics confidence in the competence of
our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One
who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in
the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a
sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure
must be at the palm of a judges hands.
Thus, this Court has consistently held that a
judge is presumed to know the law and when the
law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure
to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law
and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the
law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a
judge.
[22]


This is because judges are expected to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws
and apply them properly in good faith as judicial
competence requires no less.



Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be
considered as mere errors of judgment that can be
easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic
and established rule of law or procedure amounts to
inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance
of the law.

Accordingly, in imposing the proper penalty, the
Court takes note of Judge Belens previous
administrative cases where he was penalized in the
following manner:

Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of
men who have a mastery of the principles of law,
who discharge their duties in accordance with
law. Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and
Judge Belens previous infractions, which are all of
serious nature and for which he had been severely
warned, the Court therefore adopts the
recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate
penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.
The Court can no longer afford to be lenient in this
case, lest it give the public the impression that
incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated
in the judiciary.

(20). PROSEC. J ORGE D. BACULI v. J UDGE
MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, A.M. No. RTJ -09-
2179, THIRD DIVISION, September 24, 2012,
VELASCO, J .

FACTS:
The principal cause of action is the unlawful,
unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, malicious,
capricious and immoral orders issued by Judge
Belen. The adverted issuances refer to the
December 18, 2006 Decision, in which Baculi was
found guilty of direct contempt, and the June 7, 2007
Decision, wherein Judge Belen declared Baculi
guilty of indirect contempt of court, for the
contemptuous nature of pleadings that Baculi filed in
his sala.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Belens actions showed
manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, grave
abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law
warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge.

Legal Ethics 3B

22

HELD:
Respondent is guilty of grave abuse of authority and
gross ignorance of the law
In the case of Pesayco v. Layague,
[21]
the
Court succinctly explained:

No less than the Code of Judicial conduct
mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws
and maintain professional competence. Indeed,
competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge
must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts
as well as with procedural rules. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the publics confidence in the competence of
our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. One
who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes
the public and the court the duty to be proficient in
the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a
sign of incompetence. Basic rules of procedure
must be at the palm of a judges hands.

Thus, this Court has consistently held that a
judge is presumed to know the law and when the
law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure
to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law
and the Rules constitutes gross ignorance of the
law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a
judge.
[22]


This is because judges are expected to exhibit more
than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws
and apply them properly in good faith as judicial
competence requires no less.



Judge Belen's actuations, therefore, cannot be
considered as mere errors of judgment that can be
easily brushed aside. Obstinate disregard of basic
and established rule of law or procedure amounts to
inexcusable abuse of authority and gross ignorance
of the law.

Accordingly, in imposing the proper penalty, the
Court takes note of Judge Belens previous
administrative cases where he was penalized in the
following manner:

Legal Ethics 3B

23



Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of
men who have a mastery of the principles of law,
who discharge their duties in accordance with
law. Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and
Judge Belens previous infractions, which are all of
serious nature and for which he had been severely
warned, the Court therefore adopts the
recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate
penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.
The Court can no longer afford to be lenient in this
case, lest it give the public the impression that
incompetence and repeated offenders are tolerated
in the judiciary.

(21) ATTY. RAUL L. CORREA vs JUDGE MEDEL
ARNALDO B. BELEN

Facts:

A complaint has been filed by Atty. Raul L. Correa
charging respondent Judge MedelArnaldo B. Belen
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba
City, Laguna of Misconduct

Complainant claimed that, in the course of the
proceedings, he was asked by respondent Judge
Belen to stand up while the latter dictated his order
on their Administrators Report.

Respondent Judge Belen even rebuked him for
some mistakes in managing the affairs of the estate,
adding that it is regrettable "because Atty. Raul
Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate and a Bar
Topnotcher at that.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Belen is guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge.

Held: Yes.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the
Docket
No.
Case
Title
Charge Penalty
A.M.
No.
RTJ-08-
2119
Mane v.
Judge
Belen
[26]

Conduct
Unbecoming
of a Judge
Reprimand,
with warning
that a
repetition of
the same or
similar acts
shall merit a
more serious
penalty

A.M.
No.
RTJ-09-
2176

Baculi
v.
Judge
Belen
[27]

Gross
Ignorance of
the Law
Suspended
for 6 months
without salary
and other
benefits, with
stern warning
that a
repetition of
the same or
similar acts
shall merit a
more serious
penalty
A.M.
No.
RTJ-10-
2242
Correa
v.
Judge
Belen
[28]

Conduct
Unbecoming
of a Judge
Fined for
PhP10,000.00
with stern
warning that a
repetition of
the same or
similar acts
shall merit a
more serious
penalty
A.M.No.
RTJ-08-
2139
Belen v.
Judge
Belen
[29]

Violation of
Section 4 of
Canon 1
and Section
1 of Canon
4 of the New
Code of
Judicial
Conduct
Fined for
PhP11,000
with stern
warning that a
repetition of
the same or
similar acts
shall merit a
more serious
penalty
Legal Ethics 3B

24

judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be
models of propriety at all times. Canon 4 mandates



CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
x xx

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they
shall always conduct themselves in such a manner
as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and
the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

A judge must consistently be temperate in words
and in actions. Respondent Judge Belens insulting
statements, tending to project complainants
ignorance of the laws and procedure, coming from
his inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the
cause of his client is obviously and clearly
insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such
abuse of power and authority could only invite
disrespect from counsels and from the public.
Patience is one virtue that members of the bench
should practice at all times, and courtesy to
everyone is always called for.







(22) ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III
ROHERMIAJ. JAMSANI-
RODRIGUEZ,VS.JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG,
JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA, SANDIGANBAYAN.

A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010

FACTS:
The complainant initiated this administrative
matter by filing an affidavit-complaint dated October
23, 2008 to charge Sandiganbayan Justices Gregory
S. Ong (Justice Ong); Jose R. Hernandez (Justice
Hernandez); and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada (Justice
Ponferrada), who composed the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), with Justice
Ong as Chairman, at the time material to the
complaint, with Improprieties During Hearings
Amounting to Gross Abuse of Judicial Authority and
Grave Misconduct.
Allegedly, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez
made the following intemperate and discriminatory
utterances during hearings. Firstly, the complainant
alleged that Justice Ong uttered towards the
complainant during the hearing held in Cebu City in
September 2006 the following:
We are playing Gods here, we will do what
we want to do, your contempt is already out, we
fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if you will
appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the
Supreme Court.
Secondly, Justice Ong often asked lawyers
from which law schools they had graduated, and
frequently inquired whether the law school in which
Justice Hernandez had studied and from which he
had graduated was better than his (Justice Ongs)
Legal Ethics 3B

25

own alma mater. The complainant opined that the
query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the
San Beda College of Law, the alma mater of Justice
Ong, and the UP College of Law, that of Justice
Hernandez, were the best law schools.
Thirdly, on another occasion in that hearing
in Cebu City in September 2006, Justice Hernandez
discourteously shouted at Prosecutor
HazelinaTujan-Militante, who was then observing
trial from the gallery: You are better than Director
Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are
you here to supervise Somido? Your office is
wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing
nothing.
Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty.
Pangalangan, the father of former UP Law Dean
Raul Pangalangan, thus:Just because your son is
always nominated by the JBC to Malacaang, you
are acting like that! Do not forget that the brain of
the child follows that of their (sic) mother.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent justices are
liable for Improprieties During Hearings Amounting
to Gross Abuse of Judicial Authority and Grave
Misconduct?

RULING OF THE COURT:Unbecoming Conduct of
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez.
The Court approves the Court
Administrators finding and recommendation that no
evidence supported the complainants charge that
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez had uttered the
improper and intemperate statements attributed to
them.A review of the transcripts of the stenographic
notes for the hearings in which the offensive
statements were supposedly uttered by them has
failed to substantiate the complainants charge. In
the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, the
Court must accept such transcripts as the faithful
and true record of the proceedings, because they
bear the certification of correctness executed by the
stenographers who had prepared them.
Even so, Justice Ong and Justice
Hernandez admitted randomly asking the counsels
appearing before them from which law schools they
had graduated, and their engaging during the
hearings in casual conversation about their
respective law schools. They thereby publicized their
professional qualifications and manifested a lack of
the requisite humility demanded of public
magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-
conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack
of judicial temperament and decorum, which no
judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid
especially during their performance of judicial
functions. They should not exchange banter or
engage in playful teasing of each other during trial
proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if
meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe).
Judicial decorum demands that they behave with
dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear
before their court.
Indeed, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine
J udiciary clearly enjoins that:
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum
in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require
similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff
and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.
Legal Ethics 3B

26

We point out that publicizing professional
qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how
prestigious, might have even revealed, on the part of
Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, their bias for or
against some lawyers. Their conduct was
impermissible, consequently, for Section 3, Canon
4 of the New Code of J udicial Conduct for the
Philippine J udiciary, demands that judges avoid
situations that may reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality in
their personal relations with individual members of
the legal profession who practice regularly in their
courts.
Judges should be dignified in demeanor,
and refined in speech. In performing their judicial
duties, they should not manifest bias or prejudice by
word or conduct towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they
should live up to the high standards their noble
position on the Bench demands. Their language
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of
intentions be misconstrued.
In this regard, Section 3, Canon 5 of the
New Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine
J udiciary, mandates judges to carry out judicial
duties with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff,
and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any
irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties.
In view of the foregoing, Justice Ong and
Justice Hernandez were guilty of unbecoming
conduct, which is defined as improper performance.
Unbecoming conduct applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior
but of ethical practice or logical procedure or
prescribed method.



(23) Velasco vs. Judge Angeles
September 06, 2010

Facts: Respondent, Presiding Judge of the
Caloocan Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121
(until her retirement on May 23, 2010), was charged
by then petitioner with violation of Supreme Court
Circulars, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the
Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically for
unauthorized practice of law, unauthorized absences
and falsification of certificate of service. By
petitioners allegation, respondent actively
participated in the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
04-230908, for libel, which was, on her complaint,
filed against him before the Manila RTC, she
appearing at Branch 26 thereof (to which the case
was raffled) without her filing leaves of absence on
the following dates February 2, 2005, May 3 and
19, 2005, June 14, 15, 22 and 30, 2005, July 12-13,
2005 and August 3 and 11, 2005. Petitioner thus
concluded that when respondent indicated in her
Certificates of Service that she had rendered service
during the questioned dates, she is guilty of
falsification and of violation of Canons 3 and 5 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons 3, 7, 22 and
31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After concluding
his investigation, the Investigating Justice
considering only the remaining issues of falsification
and incurring unauthorized absences, reported that
respondent is guilty of unauthorized absences on
May 3 and August 3, 2005. With respect to the rest
of the questioned dates, he held that respondents
absence thereon was legally justified as she
Legal Ethics 3B

27

merely complied with the subpoenas issued by the
trial court. Respondent filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration which was denied by Resolution of
February 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals. Hence,
the present second Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent incurred
unauthorized absences during her attendance at the
hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
on 3 May 2005, where her attendance thereat as a
private complainant was without subpoena which
resulted in her unjustified absence from her own
court and on 3 August 2005 where respondent failed
to file a leave of absence rationalizing that she was
out only for a few minutes which she compensated
by staying in the office and working beyond office
hours and the forfeiture of her leave credits in the
name of public service.
Held: No, the respondent the respondent did not
incur unauthorized absences during her attendance
at the hearing in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila on 3 May 2005 and on 3 August 2005.

In denying respondents first motion for partial
reconsideration, the Court in its February 22, 2010
Resolution, applied the ruling in Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Delia H. Panganiban where it
was held that a Judges unblemished record will not
justify her lapses. However, as correctly pointed out
by respondent in her second motion for partial
reconsideration, said case should not have been
applied, as it presupposes that respondent indeed
committed lapses which her long service and
unblemished reputation would not justify while she
has always maintained that she had not committed
the act complained of, that is, the non-filing of the
leaves of absence for May 3 and August 3, 2005
because she did not have to. Indeed, if respondent
committed no lapse or violation, then the Courts
denial of her first motion for partial reconsideration
on the basis of the Panganiban decision deserves to
be reviewed. Respecting respondents presence at
the trial court on May 3, 2005, while admittedly no
subpoena was served on her to appear on said date
that was a re-scheduled date of hearing, the earlier-
scheduled hearing having been postponed. There
was thus no absolute need for her to be
subpoenaed for the purpose.

As to the Investigating Judges observation that
assuming that respondents attendance in the May
3, 2005 hearing was covered by subpoena, she still
needed to secure a Certificate of Service because
she was the private complainant: The Court notes
that this is merely a matter of practice for
government employees who need such certification
to show to their superiors that they indeed attended
the hearing. In any case, the minutes of a hearing
show the parties who are present, hence, such
certification becomes a mere surplusage.
Respecting respondents going to the trial court
on August 3, 2005; the same did not require the
filing of a leave of absence. The Investigating
Justice himself noted that her absence involved only
a fraction of her official time.

(24) SUSAN O. REYES v. JUDGE MANUEL N.
DUQUE
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136, 21 September 2010, EN
BANC (Carpio, J .)

FACTS:
Legal Ethics 3B

28

Complainant Susan O. Reyes charged
respondent Judge Manuel N. Duque with
Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct.
Reyes alleged that she was a party-in-intervention in
a land registration case. Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr.,
the lawyer of Reyes, introduced her to Judge Duque.
When Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the
bank with regard to the pending case, she allegedly
received a phone call from Judge Duque, instructing
her to go to his house and bring some money in
order that he can deny the pending motion to break
open. Judge Duque demanded P100,000 but
Reyes was unable to give the full amount. When
Reyes went again to his house, he allegedly scolded
her, locked the main door of his house and asked
Reyes to step into his office. Judge Duque touched
her private parts and attempted to have sexual
intercourse with her.

On the other hand, Judge Duque averred
that since the complaint of Reyes was filed after he
retired, he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He denied
the charges hurled against him and claimed the
allegations were fabricated, false and malicious.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Duque should be held
liable for impropriety and gross misconduct for
soliciting sexual favors from a party litigant

HELD:
Yes. First, on the question of jurisdiction as
Judge Duque is no longer a member of the judiciary
having retired from the service on 21 February 2008,
the records show that Reyes filed four similar
complaints against Judge Duque. It is clear from the
records that Reyes filed her intended complaint
before Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the
Court no doubt has jurisdiction over this
administrative case.

On the charge of graft and corruption, the
Investigating Justice and the OCA found insufficient
evidence to sustain Reyes allegation that Judge
Duque demanded and received money from her in
consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge
should be dismissed for being unsubstantiated.

On the charge of impropriety and gross
misconduct, and after a thorough investigation
conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was
established, and Judge Duque admitted, that Reyes
went to his house. Substantial evidence also pointed
to Judge Duques liability for impropriety and gross
misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes. The
Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge
Duque merely attempted to destroy the credibility of
Reyes when he insinuated that she could be a
woman of ill repute or a high class prostitute or one
whose moral value is at its lowest level. However,
no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from a
party litigant even from a woman of loose morals.
In Tan v. Pacuribot, this Court further stressed:

We have repeatedly reminded members of
the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free
from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of
their official duties but also in their everyday lives.
For no position exacts a greater demand on the
moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are
Legal Ethics 3B

29

mandated to maintain good moral character and
are at all times expected to observe
irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage
public decency. We have adhered to and set
forth the exacting standards of morality and
decency, which every member of the judiciary
must observe. A magistrate is judged not only by
his official acts but also by his private morals, to
the extent that such private morals are
externalized. He should not only possess
proficiency in law but should likewise possess
moral integrity for the people look up to him as a
virtuous and upright man.

The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the
exacting standards for members of the judiciary. He
failed to behave in a manner that would promote
confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a judge
is a visible representation of the law and of justice,
he is naturally expected to be the epitome of
integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge
Duques conduct indubitably bore the marks of
impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the
high moral standards of the judiciary and even
transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of
society. Had Judge Duque not retired, his
misconduct would have merited his dismissal from
the service.

(25) Re: Anonymous Letter- dated August 12,
2010, complaining against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City,
Pampanga.

FACTS:

1. A letter-complaint was filed before the Office of
the Court Administrator against Judge Ofelia
Pinto where she was charged with dishonesty,
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Gross Misconduct in violation of the Judicial
Conduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment in connection with the reopening of a
criminal case whose decision was already final
and executor and subject of an entry of judgment
in the Court of Appeals.
2. OCA required Judge Pinto to comment on the
anonymous letter-complaint and Judge Pinot
alleged that the outright denial of the motion to
re-open the case was improper, without violating
the accuseds opportunity to be heard. She also
alleged that even granting that her acts were
indeed erroneous, they were done in the exercise
of her adjudicative functions which cannot be
made subject of a disciplinary, civil, or criminal
action absent fraud, dishonest, and corruption on
her part.
3. OCA recommended that Judge Pinto be held
guilty of Gross Ignorance of Law and Procedure
and be suspended from service without salary
and other benefits for a period of six month with a
stern warning. The Court agreed with the
resolution of OCA but changed the penalty to
dismissal from service.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Pinto should be
dismissed from service on the ground of Gross
Ignorance of Law and Procedures.

RULING:

The court said that in order to render
substantial justice and maintain public confidence in
the legal system, judges should be embodiments of
competence, integrity and independence. They are
likewise expected to demonstrate mastery of the
principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing
jurisprudence and discharge duties in accordance
therewith. Judge Pintos actions clearly deviate from
the exacting standards.

Judge Pinto had no jurisdiction to entertain
the motion filed by the accused-movant to reopen
Criminal Case No. 91-937 because the CAs
decision, which affirmed the accused-movants
conviction, had become final and executory. Judge
Pintos conduct was contrary to the clear language
Legal Ethics 3B

30

of Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. In other words, a motion to
reopen a criminal case is not the proper procedural
recourse when there is already a final judgment of
conviction. This rule is consistent with the doctrine
of finality of judgment which Judge Pinto failed to
apply. The doctrine of finality of judgment, which is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice, dictates that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgments of the courts must
become final and executory at some definite date
set by law. In this case, the final decision of the CA
should have been given effect.

Even granting that Judge Pinto had been
motivated by good intentions leading her to
disregard the laws and rules of procedure, these
personal motivations cannot relieve her from the
administrative consequences of her actions as they
affect her competency and conduct as a judge in the
discharge of her official functions.
We have previously held that when a law or
a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply
apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of
the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when
an error committed by the judge was gross or
patent, deliberate or malicious. It may also be
committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails
to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross
ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be
excused by a claim of good faith.
In this case, Judge Pintos utter disregard to
apply settled laws and rules of procedure constitutes
gross ignorance of the law which merits
administrative sanction. Section 8(9), Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court classifies gross ignorance as a
serious charge with the following imposable
penalties:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or
part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.13
We note that this not the first time that we
found Judge Pinto administratively liable. We
found her liable in two other administrative
cases.

26. Rolando Marcos vs.Judge Ofelia Pinto
A.M. OCA No. RTJ-09-2180July 26, 2010
FACTS:
Judge Pinto is the presiding judge in a
criminal case for violation of R.A. 7610 where
Marcos is a witness. While the case is being tried,
the DOJ Secretary issued a resolution granting the
motion for reconsideration filed by the defense
questioning the filing of the information against the
accused. By virtue of this resolution, Judge Pinto
issued an order terminating the proceedings and
required the prosecution to file a comment thereon.
The prosecution failed to file such comment within
the given period and as a result, the proceeding was
terminated.
Marcos filed an administrative case against
Judge Pinto for gross ignorance of the law by not
reviewing such resolution of DOJ, for manifest bias
and partiality on the basis that Judge Pinto acted as
the solemnizing officer in the accused sons wedding
during the same year the case was terminated. In
her defense, Judge Pinto claimed that she duly
exercised judicial discretion at every stage of the
proceeding and that she is allowed by law to
solemnize marriage under the Family Code.
Upon investigation of the presiding Justice
of Court of Appeals found no basis for the alleged
violation of Canon 2.

Legal Ethics 3B

31

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Pinto the Code of
Judicial Conduct? (Yes but under Section 1 of
Canon 4)
HELD:
Upon assumption of office a Judge becomes
the visible representation of the law and of justice.
Faithful observance of the Canons is the price one
has to pay for being a magistrate. He must conduct
himself in a manner that will withstand the most
searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles
and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial
system. The Supreme Court does not require of
judges that they measure up to the standards of
conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect
them to be like Caesars wife in all their activities.
In acting as the solemnizing officer is
improper and highly unethical for a judge
considering that the accused is a party in a case
pending before her sala.
*Canon 4, Section 1Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

(27). DR. J ANOS B. VIZCAYNO, complainant vs.
J UDGE J ASPER J ESSE G. DACANAY, in his
official capacity as the Presiding judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-
Compostela, Cebu, respondent
(A.M. No. MTJ -10-1772; Second Divison ; J .
Carpio; December 5, 2012)
FACTS:
1. Dr. Vizcayno filed an administrative complaint
against Judge Dacanay for gross Ignorance of
the Law, Abuse of Authority, Manifest
Partiality and Delay relative to a Civil Case.
2. The complaint originated from the alleged ex-
parte ocular inspection conducted by
respondent Judge without notice given to the
complainant.
3. In the Judges Comment he raised as defense
that he went to the subject property with his
utility personnel only to conduct his own
investigation and no one from the plaintiffs or
the defendant ever entertained him. He
argues that he made the inspection in good
faith and with noble intentions.
4. The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent be declared
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service in violation of Sec. 1, Canon 4
of The New Code of Judicial Conduct.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Judge Dacanay should be
held administratively liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service
for conducting an ocular inspection without
informing the parties
2. Whether Judge Dacanay should be held
administratively liable for the delay in the
resolution of the Motion for Inhibition
HELD:
1. Judge Dacanay is guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service. Section 1,
Canon 4 of The New Judicial Conduct states
that judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their
activities. The court previously ruled in similar
cases that an ocular inspection without notice
to nor presence of the parties is highly
improper. Good and noble intentions
notwithstanding, Judge Dacanays actuations
gave an appearance of impropriety. His
Legal Ethics 3B

32

behavior diminished public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. All
those involved in the dispensation of justice,
from the presiding justice to the lowliest clerk,
must always be beyond reproach. Their
conduct must, at all times, be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility free
from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.
2. The Respondent Judge expunged from the
records the said motion because the counsel
of complainant failed to indicate the date of
issue and number of MCLE Compliance as
required by Bar Matter No. 1922. Said Order
may therefore be considered as a denial of
the Motion for Inhibition, which was issued
within the 90-day period to resolve a motion.

(28). AMBASSADOR HARRY C. ANGPING and
ATTY. SIXTO BRILLANTES vs.JUDGE
REYNALDO G. ROS
A.M. No. 12-8-160-RTC
December 10, 2012
Facts:
The petitioners charged respondent Judge
Ros for violating Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The said letter-complaint
emanated from the actions and rulings of Judge Ros
relative to Criminal Case Nos. 10-274696 to 10-
274704. Petitioners alleged that on March 23, 2010,
the above cases were raffled to Branch 33, RTC-
Manila. However, on the very same day the said
case was raffled to the respondent judge, the latter
issued an order dismissing the criminal cases for
lack of probable cause.

The aforesaid incidents started to create
reservations in the mind of the petitioners on the
respondent Judges impartiality. They doubted
Judge Ros fairness in handling the aforementioned
criminal cases because of the speed at which he
disposed them when they had just been raffled to
him. The petitioners could not believe that he could
resolve the cases within the same day considering
that the records thereof are voluminous and that the
criminal cases were raffled to him on the day he
issued the order of dismissal. Nevertheless, the
petitioners continued to respect the respondents
order and sought other legal remedies such as the
filing of a motion for reconsideration. However, when
Judge Ros issued the order resolving the motion for
reconsideration after two (2) days from the filing of
the comment and without awaiting for PSCs reply,
petitioners were convinced that respondent Judge
Ros acted with partiality and malice, thus the petition
filed against him.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent Judge Ros is
liable for violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
charge against Judge Reynaldo G. Ros for violation
of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
hereby DISMISSED. However, for failing to live up to
the degree of propriety required of him under Canon
2 of the same Code, he is
hereby ADMONISHED and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts would be dealt with more severely.

Ratio:
Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that
litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold
Legal Ethics 3B

33

neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements
of due process, like notice and hearing, would
become meaningless if the ultimate decision is
rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must
not only render just, correct and impartial decisions,
but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as
to their fairness, impartiality and integrity. In the
instant administrative complaint, while no evidence
directly shows partiality and malice on the
respondents action, this Court cannot ignore the
fact that the dispatch by which the respondent Judge
dismissed the criminal cases provokes in the minds
of the petitioners doubt in the partiality of the
respondent.

29.
PROSECUTOR HILARIO RONSON H. TILAN vs.
JUDGE ESTER PISCOSO-FLOR, RTC, BRANCH
34, BANAUE, IFUGAO
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2188 (Formerly A.M. OCA-IPI No.
08-2995-RTJ)
January 10, 2011

FACTS:
In People v. Baguilat, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an
order dated October 20, 20072 directing the parties
to submit their respective memoranda within thirty
(30) days from receipt of the order. The complainant
alleged that the judge failed to render a decision
within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period;
instead, she issued an order, dated April 8, 2008,
reiterating her earlier directive for the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.

In People v. Talanay, Judge Piscoso-Flor issued an
order dated September 25, 20074 giving the
accused fifteen (15) days to file his formal offer of
evidence, and five (5) days for the prosecution to file
its comment/objections. Allegedly, Judge Piscoso-
Flor again failed to resolve the case within the 90-
day reglementary period; instead, she issued
another order dated May 21, 20085 giving the
parties fifteen (15) days within which to file their
memoranda.

Prosecutor Tilan claimed that in both cases, Judge
Piscoso-Flor resorted to the issuance of an order
requiring the submission of the parties memoranda
to circumvent the statutory period for the resolution
of cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to render
speedy disposition of cases.
Whether or not Judge Piscoso-Flor failure to decide
cases and resolve motions within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and gross
negligence.
HELD:
The OCA evaluation tells us that Judge Piscoso-Flor
is guilty of failing to decide cases within the required
periods, citing Criminal Case No. 127 (People v.
Juanito Baguilat) as the principal basis of its
conclusion. In this case, the OCA faulted Judge
Piscoso-Flor for using as justification for her inaction
the parties failure to submit their respective
memoranda. The OCA opined that this is not a valid
reason for not deciding the case; if she believed she
would not be able to decide the case on time, she
could have asked the Court for an extension of the
required period. The OCA acknowledged though
that Judge Piscoso-Flor requested for an extension
to decide the case in her monthly report of cases
and certificate of service.
We find the OCA evaluation in order. Although
Judge Piscoso-Flor claimed that she had requested
for an extension of time to decide Criminal Case No.
127, there was no showing that the request was
ever granted. Over and above this consideration,
she allowed the parties to control the period of
disposition of the case through their lukewarm
response to her call for the submission of
memoranda, which she had to do twice. She could
have acted more firmly, considering, as she said,
that she only inherited the case, which implies that it
had been on the docket for quite some time. In any
event, Judge Piscoso-Flor should have known that
Legal Ethics 3B

34

"[t]he Court may grant extension of time to file
memoranda, but the ninety (90) day period for
deciding the case shall not be interrupted thereby."
On the whole, we find Judge Piscoso-Flor guilty of
undue delay in the disposition of cases. Except for
People v. Dimpatan, Judge Piscoso-Flor failed to
resolve the other cases within the required period, in
violation of the law and the rules. No less than the
Constitution sets the limits on this all-important
aspect in the administration of justice. It mandates
that lower courts have three (3) months or ninety
(90) days within which to decide cases or matters
submitted to them for resolution. Also, the Code of
Judicial Conduct requires judges to dispose of the
Courts business promptly and decide cases within
the prescribed period.
It cannot be over emphasized that judges need to
decide cases promptly and expeditiously. Delay in
the disposition of cases, it must again be stated, is a
major cause in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the justice system. For this
fundamental and compelling reason, judges are
required to decide cases and resolve motions with
dispatch within the reglementary period. Failure to
comply constitutes gross inefficiency, a lapse that
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions
against the erring magistrate.
(30) RE: SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMMITED BY
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, RTC, BR. 27,
GINGOOG CITY
AM No. RTJ-06-1983 (December 14, 2007)

This case deals with violence against women
through the commission of rape and sexual
harassment, by no less than a member of the
Bench. Aside from using his position and
ascendancy in having his way with the women, he
also attempted to discredit their testimonies by
perpetuating gender stereotypes on how women
victims of rape should have behaved and why the
other was simply motivated by ill-will and revenge in
accusing him. The Court sifted through and beyond
the arguments raised by the Respondent Judge,
demonstrating commendable sensitivity to the plight
of the women.
Facts: On December 4, 2005, A, Clerk-
Stenographer of RTC, Branch 27, Gingoog City, filed
an affidavit-complaint against Judge Rexel Pacuribot
(Judge Pacuribot) charging him with rape. On 20
December 2005, another affidavit-complaint was
filed against Judge Pacuribot by B charging him with
sexual harassment.

* Ms. As Story
A was working under Judge Tan. On 20 October
2004, she filed a half-day leave of absence to attend
a wedding in Cagayan de Oro City. At around 8
oclock in the evening, while Ms. A was enjoying the
wedding reception, she received a call from Judge
Pacuribot. Judge Pacuribot asked her when she was
going back to Gingoog City. She answered that she
would go back after the wedding reception. Judge
Pacuribot offered Ms.A a ride to the Agora Bus
Station. She declined the offer. Judge Pacuribot,
then, ordered her to come out of the reception area,
saying he was already waiting outside. Aware of his
tendency to humiliate anyone in public when angry,
she decided to abruptly leave the wedding reception
and comply. When she went out, she saw Judge
Pacuribot alone in his car. When A went inside the
car, she saw, in between their seats, Judge
Pacuribots clutch bag containing a gun. He brought
her to a motel instead, and the Judge succeeded in
raping A. After, A told Judge Pacuribot that she
would just take the taxi to the bus station. However,
instead of driving her to the bus station, Judge
Pacuribot took her to another place. When A
protested, the Judge told her that it would be safer if
she slept there as it was already nearing midnight.
Still frightened, she failed to ask for help or call her
husband. When the judge left the place, A tried to
leave but the bellboy told her that she should settle
the account first, which she could not do because
she had no money. In the meantime, the Judge kept
calling her and threatening her. A was also afraid of
what the Judge would do to her family, and what
reaction her husband would have if she were to tell
him. The next day, Judge Pacuribot went back. The
judge again succeeded in raping A. After, the Judge
drove her to Cogon, Cagayan de Oro City. Judge
Pacuribot left her there. The next day, A did not
report for work.
A did not tell anyone of what happened to her and
Judge Pacuribot. From then on, the Judges
advances to her went unabated. Whenever she
would go inside Judge Pacuribots chambers, he
would grab her blouse, mash her breast, and kiss
her neck. The Judge also told A to send him text
messages of endearment. He warned her that her
failure to do so would prejudice her performance
Legal Ethics 3B

35

rating. The situation got worse when the Judge
rented a room, such that whenever As husband was
not around, the Judge would knock at her door,
ordering A to go to his room. A tolerated the judge
because of his threats to her performance rating.
Her performance rating eventually went down, from
very satisfactory to satisfactory.
* Ms. Bs Story
B first met Judge Pacuribot sometime in November
2004 at the lobby near the Probation Office where
she was working. Her childhood friend was the driver
of the Judge. One day, B received a cellphone call
from Judge Pacuribot followed by text messages
telling her how pretty and sexy she was, how her
mini-skirt suited her, etc Thereafter, Judge Pacuribot
started inviting her to dinner, which invitations she
always refused, being herself married and knowing
that the Judge was, too. In the last week of February
2005, she again received a call from Judge
Pacuribot. The Judge was fuming mad because she
refused his dinner invitations. Scared, she finally
relented.
The dinner was set on 22 February 2005. She
picked a restaurant owned by her relative, feeling
that she would be safe there. The Judge picked her
up. While they were talking inside the car, Judge
Pacuribot took out his gun, cocked it, and put it in
between them. When B noticed that the Judge was
going the wrong way, she called his attention. Judge
Pacuribot responded that he knew a good place in
Butuan City. After an hour of driving, they entered a
compound. It was then that B realized that Judge
Pacuribot brought her to a motel. Inside the room,
the judge succeeded in forcing himself on B. The
Judge, using his mobile phone, even took a picture
of her while she was naked. Judge Pacuribot told
her nobody in his right mind would refuse his
demands because he could easily cause damage to
anybodys honor if he wanted to.
The next day, B reported back to work. When she
arrived, she was told that Judge Pacuribot had
already called her twice. When the judge called
again, Judge Pacuribot belittled her, yelling
Prostitute, Animal, Devil. She was consumed
with fear. Days passed, Judge Pacuribot threatened
her with a publication of her naked picture. She tried
to pacify him sensing that he could make real his
threats. She was scared to figure in a scandal, being
married to an overseas worker with two kids. B was
also ordered by the judge to send him text
messages of endearment, love letters, etc.
The Judge always threatened B that he would
publish her naked picture, that he was going to tell
her mother-in-law (who was the Mayor of Gingoog
City at that time), and that he was going to destroy
her. The Judge went so far as to order B to petition
to annul her marriage from her husband. When she
failed to do so, she was summoned to the judges
chambers and when she was inside, he slapped her.
* Judge Pacuribots Defenses
Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of A and B. He
belied As charge, saying that her behavior was not
reflective of a rape victim, as she did not
immediately report the incident to the authorities. He
contended that a 43-year old lady was no longer
nave and having assisted as stenographer in a
number of rape cases, she knew how important it
was to report the incident immediately. He also
contended that even a month after the supposed
incident, A even invited Judge Pacuribot to her
birthday party.
Judge Pacuribot also belied the charge of B. He
contended that B was just a woman scorned and
that she was out to seek revenge. He alleged that B
was the one who called him repeatedly, sending him
alluring and seductive text messagesand that he
rejected all of these advances. He also alleged that
B was angry with him because, in one of his cases,
he mentioned her incompetence, inexperience, and
unprofessional attitude toward her work.
Held: Judge Pacuribot was found guilty of the
charges of rape (of A) and the sexual harassment
(of B).
The Court disbelieved Judge Pacuribots theory of
Bs fatal attraction towards him. The Judge was
known in the community as a terror: that he was
fond of humiliating people in public, using
excruciating language on his victims, and that
female employees avoided him and veered away
from him (every time they would run into him in the
Hall of Justice). In stark contrast to his nature, the
Court found it hardly likely that a 29-year old, very
pretty married woman would fall for such character.
The Court also found the Judges contentionthat B
was very much capable of protecting herself, having
relatives in positions of powerto be not valid. The
Court held that, on the contrary, it was the fact that B
had relatives in public positions that compelled her
to protect them at all costs from any scandal.
Legal Ethics 3B

36

The Court rejected the argument of Judge Pacuribot
that rape could not have happened as A did not
report the incident immediately. The Court held that
A cannot be put in the same footing as other rape
victims where the offender holds no control on the
victims survival and has no moral ascendancy over
her. In the case at bar, A valued her job, in fact, she
conscientiously kept track of her performance
ratings. An underling who believes that her superior
wields control over her continued employment will
cower in fear to the point of tolerating the indignities
committed on her. Hence, her delay in reporting the
incident was understandable.
The Court also rejected Judge Pacuribots
contention that As behavior was not typical of a
rape victim. The Judge contended that a rape victim
normally behaves with animosity and grievance
toward the offender. The Court held that A could not
display her animosity and grievance toward Judge
Pacuribot as this would have cost her to lose her
job. The Court also found that the delay of A in filing
the case was of no moment, as she was afraid of
Judge Pacuribots power and influence.
The Court, further, reiterated that it is against human
nature for a married woman to fabricate a story that
would not just put herself in a lifetime of dishonor,
but would destroy her family as well. The fact that
the victim resolved to face the ordeal and relate it in
public evinces that she did so to obtain justice.
The Court dismissed Judge Pacuribot from service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, with
prejudice to re-employment in any government
branch or service.

31 Re: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT
AGAINST HON. MARILOU RUNES- TAMANG,
PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC PATEROS, METRO
MANILA AND PRESIDING JUDGE, MeTC SAN
JUAN, METRO MANILA (April 7, 2010)

FACTS:
Chief Justice Hilario Davide received an anonymous
letter from Concerned Filipino Citizen which
contains a request for an investigation of an alleged
connivance of Judge Tamang, her husband who is a
sheriff of RTC, arresting officer and court employees
in arbitrarily approving fake bonds for a fee of
P1,000.00 per count ng kaso. Through a discreet
investigation conducted by the office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), it was revealed that the judge
had approved bail bonds issued by a blacklisted
assurance company (COVENANT). Although some
were secured through legitimate assurance
companies, it was found that judge approved bail
bonds in San Juan despite availability of judges in
RTC of Mandaluyong to which court the cases are
pending. In answer, Judge Tamang admitted that
she approved the bail bonds but she insisted that
she merely relied on the representation of her duly
authorized personnel that the bail bonds were in
order.

ISSUE: WON Judge Tamang competently act in
approving the bail bonds.

HELD:

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary requires that a magistrate be the
embodiment of judicial competence.

According to
Webster, competence means the quality or state of
being functionally adequate or having sufficient
knowledge, judgment, skill, or strength.
Judge Tamangs excuse of simply relying on the
representation of the court personnel who
unfortunately took advantage of her leniency and
kindness betrayed a deficiency in that requisite
degree of circumspection demanded of all those
who don the judicial robe. She cannot now thereby
exculpate herself, or take refuge behind that excuse,
for, in fact, such reliance was actually her admission
of being neglectful and of lacking the diligent care in
Legal Ethics 3B

37

paying attention to the judicial matters brought to her
for signature.

Although her approval of the bail bonds and her
issuance of the orders of release manifested a
degree of incompetence on her part, we should not
find Judge Tamang guilty of simple misconduct, a
less serious charge under Section 9, Rule
140, Rules of Court. Instead, we find her guilty of
simple neglect of duty, a light charge under Section
10, Rule 140, Rules of Court, for we are all too
aware of the pitfalls that a judge like her frequently
stumbles into when detailed in another station. She
became an unwitting victim of the continuing illegal
activities of Medrano, who took advantage of her
being too busy with her judicial and administrative
duties and tasks to have noticed and prevented his
illegal activities. Her liability was mitigated Medrano
(Clerk of Court) admitted his liability and totally
exonerated Judge Tamang of any participation in or
knowledge of the anomalous scheme of submitting
blacklisted bonds for approval; Second: It is
undisputed that upon learning about the anomaly in
August 2003 Judge Tamang immediately took steps
to frontally deal with it by conducting an
investigation, and directing Sorio at first and
Medrano later to explain their participations in the
uncovered anomaly.
[
Third: The offense is Judge
Tamangs first administrative charge as a judge.

(32) A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190 April 23, 2010
HADJA SOHURAH DIPATUAN vs JUDGE
MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA

FACTS: On September 2001, a criminal case for
murder for the killing of Elias Ali Taher was filed
against Ishak Abdul and Paisal Dipatuan
(complainants husband), before
the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City then
presided by Judge Pangadapun but the said judge
died during the pendency of the case which resulted
to its transfer to different judges designated by the
Supreme Court. Later on, by virtue of Administrative
Order No. 201-2007, the Supreme Court designated
Judge Mamindiara Mangotara, Presiding Judge of
the RTC of Iligan City, Lanao Del Norte, as Acting
Presiding Judge. Judge Mangotara suffered a mild
stroke; hence, the Supreme Court, by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 220-2007 issued on
December 26, 2007, revoked the earlier designation
of Judge Mangotara and designated Judge Busran
as the new Acting Presiding Judge. On December
28, 2007, Mangotara issued the disputed
Decision and found both accused Abdul and
Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and sentenced them to
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and likewise,
increased the accuseds bail bond from P75,000.00
to P200,000.00. As a result, Hadja Sohurah
Dipatuan (spouse of the Dipatuan) filed in the
Supreme Court a complaint against Judge
Mangotara for Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Grave Abuse of Authority alleging that the judge
displayed bias and prejudice considering that he is a
relative by affinity and consanguinity of the victim
Elias Ali Taher, he reside in the same locality where
Taher also used to reside, and despite the
designation of Judge Busran as Acting Presiding
Judge, he acting with grave abuse of authority,
illegally and maliciously rendered
the disputed Decision as well as the two Orders
dated February 2008.

Legal Ethics 3B

38

ISSUE: Whether or not there is bias or partiality on
the part of Judge Mangotara resulting to
grave abuse of authority.
Whether or not there is gross ignorance of
the law on part of Judge Mangotara in
deciding the case.

RULING: Petition GRANTED. WHEREFORE, the
Court finds JUDGE MANGOTARA, GUILTY of
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which he
is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000,00), to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

On the 1
st
issue, the Court rule in the negative.

As correctly observed by the Investigating Justice,
complainant indeed failed to specify the degree of
relationship of respondent Judge to a party in the
subject case. She failed to present any clear and
convincing proof that respondent Judge was
disqualified being related within the prohibited
degree with the victim under Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

This being the case, the inhibition was indeed
discretionary or voluntary as the same was primarily
a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the respondent Judge. When Mangotara
chose not to inhibit and proceed with the
promulgation of the disputed decision, he cannot be
faulted by doing so. Significantly, complainant while
asserting that Mangotara should have inhibited in
the said case, she nonetheless failed to institute any
motion for inhibition.
Complainant failed to cite any specific act that would
indicate bias, prejudice or vengeance warranting
respondents voluntary inhibition from the
case. Complainant merely pointed on the alleged
adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent Judge
to their prejudice. By themselves, however, they do
not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice.

To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be
shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case. Opinions formed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous,
as long as they are based on the evidence
presented and conduct observed by the judge, do
not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of
the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings
against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and
vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a
basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of
bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose,
in addition to the palpable error which may be
inferred from the decision or order itself. Although
the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise
doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent
extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be
insufficient to establish a case against the judge.
Moreover, we likewise found no basis to hold
respondent Judge administratively liable anent his
issuance of the Decision dated December 2007. As
aptly observed by the Investigating Justice,
Mangotara acted in good faith when he issued the
subject decision, since he received notice of his
replacement by Judge Busran, dated December 26,
2007, only on January 26, 2008. It must be stressed
that not every error or mistake that a judge commits
in the performance of his duties renders him liable,
Legal Ethics 3B

39

unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in which a
judge can find refuge. In this case, complainant
adduced no evidence that Mangotara was moved by
bad faith when he issued the disputed order.

On the 2
nd
issue, the Court ruled on the
affirmative.

Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides: Bail, when
discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary.xxx
The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail
is discretionary on the part of the respondent Judge.
It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic
legal principles and possessed sufficient proficiency
in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death, the accused has no right to bail
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, as the
accused in Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had been
sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should
have been cancelled, instead of increasing it as
respondent Judge did.

Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in
increasing the bail bond of the accused instead of
cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment on the part of respondent
Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules.
When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law.


(33) FRANCISCO P. OCAMPO vs. JUDGE
EVELYN S. ARCAYA-CHUA
April 23, 2010
FACTS:
Sylvia Santos filed a Complaint against
Judge Arcaya-Chua for serious misconduct and
dishonesty. Santos, an aunt of respondent Judges
husband, alleged that she asked for the Judges
help regarding the cases of her friend pending
before the Supreme Court. Judge Arcaya-Chua, a
former employee of the Supreme Court, said that
she could help as she had connections with some of
the Justices therein; she just needed P100,000.00
which she would give to an employee of the Court
for the speedy resolution of the said cases. Santos
gave the Judge the P100,000.00 in the privacy of
the latters chamber. But when Santos followed up
the cases, Judge Arcaya-Chua told her that there
was a problem, as the other party was offering P10
million to the Justices. Complainant asked
respondent to return the P100,000.00; however,
respondent could no longer be contacted.
ISSUE: WON the conduct of the judge is violative of
Canons 1, 2 and 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

RULING:
YES. The conduct of Judge Arcaya-Chua is
violative of the provisions of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, thus:
Canon 1, Sec. 4. A judge shall not allow family,
social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office
shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
Legal Ethics 3B

40

convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.

Canon 2, Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only
is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
Canon 2, Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of
judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be
done but must also be seen to be done.
Canon 4, Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
All those who don the judicial robe must
always instill in their minds the exhortation that the
administration of justice is a mission. Judges, from
the lowest to the highest levels, are the gems in the
vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked
upon as the embodiments of all what is right, just
and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice
and oppression. Those who cannot meet the
exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity
have no place in the judiciary.
Judge Arcaya-Chua was suspended from
office for six months.

(34) Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty, October
19, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. Harry Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel Bagares
alleged that Justice Mariano Del Castillo committed
an intellectual offense when the latter plagiarized its
discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga
omnes in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary case. By
reason of such allegation, members of UP College
of Law call for the resignation of Justice del Castillo.
However, the statement they made was aggravated
by additional imputations against the court and
criticizing it beyond reproach.
ISSUE: WON the criticisms made by the members of
UP College of law is proper
HELD:
No. while most agree that the right to criticize the
judiciary is critical to maintaining free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that the
healthy criticism only goes so far. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten
the independence of the judiciary. The court must
insist on being permitted to proceed to the
diposition of its business in an orderly manner, free
from outside interference obstructive of its functions
and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice.

(35) RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY:
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGEOF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THESUPREME COURT
A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC, 8 MARCH 2011,
(G.R.No. 162230). Counsels Attys. H. Harry L.
Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado
Bagares (Atty.Bagares) for Vinuya, et al . (the
Malaya Lolas), filed a supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration, on theground that, inter alia,
charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of theVinuya decision and a twisting
of the true intents of the plagiarized sources by
the ponenciawas made to suit the arguments of the
assailed Judgment for denying the Petition. Works
Legal Ethics 3B

41

allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents
article A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens; (2)
Christian J Tams book Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law; and (3) Mark
Ell is article Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime. Such supplemental motion for
reconsideration appeared on internet sites.
Thereafter, a statement entitled Restoring Integrity:
A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court was submitted by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leone
to the Court through Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona. The statement basically conveys that the
plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v
Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and
in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of
the Supreme Court. (See attachment for complete
text of the statement). The SC Ethics Committee
referred this matter to the Court en banc.
The high court said the UP law professors
statement was evidently intended to discredit its
April 28 decision on the Vinuya et al. v the Executive
Secretary et al. case. It claimed that the law faculty
wanted to undermine the courts honesty, integrity
and competence in addressing the motion for
reconsideration of 70 comfort women.
Accordingly,the Court directed the 37 UP law
faculty-signatories to show cause, within ten
(10)days from receipt why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of
Canons 1, 11 and13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents shoul d be
disci pl i ned as Members of the Bar under the
Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers, whether they are judges, court
employees, professors or privatepractitioners, are
officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an
oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission
to the Bar, to conduct themsel ves wi th good
fidelity towards the courts.
The administrative matter is decided by reminding
the Thirty-five UP professors of their duty as officers
of the court while Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen was
admonished to be more mindful of his duty, as a
member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a
Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor
and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely. While a lawyer is
entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such
(36) In The Matter of Charges of Plagiarism
Against Justice Mariano del Castillo
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8 , 2011
Per Curiam:
Facts: Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all
members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek
reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated
October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of
plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross
neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in
connection with the decision he wrote for the Court
in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v. Romulo.
Petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision
legalized or approved of the commission of
plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd.
The Court, like everyone else, condemns plagiarism
as the world in general understands and uses the
term
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is plagiarism in the
case at bar.
2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo is guilty
of misconduct and gross negligence

Held:
(1) No. It has been a long standing practice in this
jurisdiction not to cite or acknowledge the originators
of passages and views found in the Supreme
Legal Ethics 3B

42

Courts decisions. These omissions are true for
many of the decisions that have been penned and
are being penned daily by magistrates from the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide
and with them, the municipal trial courts and other
first level courts. Never in the judiciarys more than
100 years of history has the lack of attribution been
regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.

As put by one author Joyce C. George from her
Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial
or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from
a law review article, novel thoughts published in
a legal periodical or language from a partys brief
are used without giving attribution. Thus judges
are free to use whatever sources they deem
appropriate to resolve the matter before them,
without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies
to judicial writings intended to decide cases for
two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary
work and, more importantly, the purpose of the
writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result,
judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a
claim of legal plagiarism.

(2) No. Justice Del Castillo is not guilty of
misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There
was no malice, fraud or corruption. Though the
ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted
the attribution to them, there remained in the final
draft of the decision attributions of the same
passages to the earlier writings from which those
authors borrowed their ideas in the first place.
In short, with the remaining attributions after the
erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally
appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their
face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice
Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off
as his own.

The Court DENIES petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

(37) OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.
JUDGE MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2087 , 7 JUNE 2011, EN BANC
(Leonardo-De Castro,J .)

Facts: While Judge Aguilar was still the Legal
Officer of Olongapo City, a complaint for Falsification
of Public Document, Perjury and Estafa was filed
against her before the Office of Regional Prosecutor
and Ombudsman and the same was dismissed in
the former. Following her retirement, then Atty.
Aguilar applied for the position of judge, supported
with her accomplished Personal Data Sheet (PDS),
Question No. 23 of the PDS asked: "Is there any
pending civil, criminal or administrative (including
disbarment) case or complaint filed against you
pending before any court, prosecution office, any
other office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines?" In answer to said question, Atty.
Aguilar wrote "None" so Atty. Aguilar was appointed
as RTC Judge of Burgos, Pangasinan. After her
appointment, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
found no liability on Atty. Aguilars part for
dishonesty but only for misconduct and imposed the
penalty of one month suspension. Atty. Aguilar
Legal Ethics 3B

43

assumed her judicial position on February 8, 2006
and accomplished another PDS for submission to
the Supreme Court and were asked:37. a. Have you
ever been formally charged? b. Have you ever been
guilty of any administrative offense?38. Have you
ever been convicted of any crime or violation of any
law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court or
tribunal? Judge Aguilar answered "No" to all the
questions.

Issue: Is Judge Aguilar guilty of dishonesty in filling
out her PDS ?
Held: Yes. Judge Aguilar admitted that in two of her
PDS one accomplished in September 2004,
attached to her application for judgeship position,
and the other accomplished on March 6, 2006, upon
her assumption as RTC Judge of Burgos,
Pangasinan Judge Aguilar answered that she had
no pending administrative case against her; and that
she had not been formally charged nor found guilty
of any administrative charge. All the while, Arnel
Sisons administrative complaint against Judge
Aguilar, OMB-L-A-03-0718-G, was pending before
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, in a Decision dated
November 29, 2005 in OMB-L-A-03-0718-G, found
Judge Aguilar guilty of misconduct and imposed
upon her the penalty of one month suspension; and
in an Order dated January 31, 2006, denied Judge
Aguilars motion for reconsideration, but modified the
penalty imposed by converting it to a fine equivalent
to one month salary.
The accomplishment of the PDS is a requirement
under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations for
employment in the government. Since truthful
completion of PDS is a requirement for employment
in the Judiciary, the importance of answering the
same with candor need not be gainsaid. With
respect to Judge Aguilars supposed omission in her
PDS submitted with her judgeship application, we
are guided by the ruling in Plopinio v. Zabala-Cario
wherein we clarified that a person shall be
considered formally charged in administrative cases
only upon a finding of the existence of a prima facie
case by the disciplining authority, in case of a
complaint filed by a private person. However, Judge
Aguilars failure to disclose OMB-L-A-03-0718-G in
her PDS filed upon her assumption of office when
she already had notice of the adverse decision
therein constitutes dishonesty, considered a grave
offense under the Administrative Code of 1987, as
well as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (Civil Service Rules), with the
corresponding penalty of dismissal from service
even for the first offense.
(38) RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION
COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
AM No. 10-11-5-SC
June 14, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on
live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre. They
principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in
Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of
President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case and the
2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of
the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases
Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada
which were rulings that violated the doctrine that
proposed restrictions on constitutional rights that are
to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition
cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial case has attracted
intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of
the crime, prominence of the accused, and the
number of media personnel killed. They inform that
Legal Ethics 3B

44

reporters are being frisked and searched for
cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry,
and that under strict orders of the trial court against
live broadcast coverage, the number of media
practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been
limited to one reporter for each media institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose
Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter to Judge
Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss
concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of
the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-
Reyes replied, however, that matters concerning
media coverage should be brought to the Courts
attention through appropriate motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be live broadcast by
television and radio of the trial court proceedings
without violation of Canon 1 Section 1 of The New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary?

RULING:

Yes. The Court partially granted pro hac vice (for this
occasion) petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of
the trial court proceedings. The New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary Canon
1, Section 1 provides:
Judges shall exercise the judicial function
independently on the basis of their assessment of
the facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding og the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter of for
any reason.
According to the ruling penned by Conchita Carpio-
Morales, the indication of serious risks posed by
live media coverage to the accuseds right to due
process, left unexplained and unexplored in the era
obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to
the exercise of press freedom and the right to public
information. In this day and age, it is about time to
craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise
rights in the criminal administration of justice,
sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and
interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of
judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations,
not curtailment of a right, provides a workable
solution to the concerns raised in these
administrative matters, while, at the same time,
maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in
the two aforementioned cases.



(39) ATTY. CONRADO B. GANDEZA vs. JUDGE
MARIA TABIN
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736 | July 25, 2011 | Peralta, J.

FACTS:

On 20 November 2007, a car collision
between that of complainants car, driven by his
driver Guimba Digermo, and the car of the nephew
of respondent Judge Tabin. When Atty. Gandeza
arrived at the scene, respondent Judge was
conferring with the police investigator and when he
approached complainant, he spoke in a harsh tone
accusing the driver to have been driving under the
influence of liquor. This allegation was repeatedly
said to the investigator by Judge Tabin. When they
were all in the hospital, Judge Tabin continued her
allegations and when the breath examination for
alcohol came out negative, she even demanded a
re-examination.

Complainant also suspected Judge Tabin to
be conspiring with the prosecutor since the
complaint was already filed barely a week after the
collision. Additionally, complainants wife, also a
lawyer, even saw an employee of Judge Tabin
carrying the folder of the criminal case, which the
employee said that she was to bring it to the sala of
the judge. Further, when complainants wife was to
move for the postponement of the mediation of the
case before the Philippine Mediation Center, she
was informed by the clerk that Judge Tabin likewise
inquired about the same. Thus, the administrative
complaint was filed by Atty. Gandeza against Judge
Tabin before the OCA, who referred the case to the
Executive Judge of RTC Baguio.

Investigation Judge Clavarall recommended
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence
but OCA held that Judge Tabin was guilty of
violation of Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

ISSUE:

WON Judge Tabin is guilty of Canon 4,
Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on
Propriety

HOLD:

Yes, Judge Tabin is guilty of violating said
provision. Even though there was no evidence of
malice amounting to gross misconduct and conduct
Legal Ethics 3B

45

unbecoming of a judge, the acts of Judge Tabin
such as directing a second test for alcohol be taken
and interfering in the investigation of the incident.
Even though there was no disclosure made by
Judge Tabin of her personality, both the police and
the complainant knew her to be a judicial officer, and
that should have been enough cause for her to
refrain from her actions.

To stress how the law frowns upon even
any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates
activities, it has often been held that a judge must be
like Ceasars wife above suspicion and beyond
reproach. SC held Judge Tabin guilty of
impropriety, was reprimanded and given a stern
warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt
with more severely.
(40) Atty. J ose Vicente D. Fernandez v. J udge
Angeles S. Vasquez, A.M. No. RTJ -11-2261
J uly 26, 2011, Perez, J .
Facts: Atty. Jose Vicente D. Fernandez is the
counsel of several cases instituted for the recovery
of the properties against spouses Ranolas which
were all raffled to the court presided over by
respondent Judge Vasquez. Respondent judge
asked complainant to file a motion for his inhibition
on the ground that respondent judge was the
counsel, prior to his appointment as public
prosecutor, of the Raola family. No action was
taken by respondent judge on the Motion. It was
only after a year, after complainant filed a
Supplemental Motion for Inhibition, on the ground of
manifest bias, partiality and inexcusable delay in the
proceedings, that respondent judge ruled and
denied the two motions which according to
complainant, the Supplemental Motion for Inhibition
was triggered by the apparent bias of respondent
judge for the Spouses Raola.
Another matter that complainant
emphasized in his complaint was the dishonesty
allegedly committed by respondent when he
accomplished his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) for the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) when he placed an
"x" in the box indicating a "No" answer to the
question: "Have you been charged with or convicted
of or otherwise imposed a sanction of any law,
decree, ordinance or regulation by any court,
tribunal, or any other government office, agency or
instrumentality in the Philippines or any foreign
country, or found guilty of an administrative offense
or imposed any administrative sanction? (Question
No. 24), and Have you ever been retired, dismissed
or forced to resign from employment? (Question No.
25)." Respondent was alleged to had been criminally
charged for indirect bribery in the early 1970s and
tendered his resignation from his position as clerk of
court to evade the administrative case that may
arise from the indirect bribery incident, thus, in
brazenly giving untruthful statements in his PDS,
respondent committed dishonesty and falsification of
public documents.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of
gross dishonesty and falsification of an official
document in violation of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Held: We agree with the findings of the OCA on
respondents gross inefficiency and dishonesty
although we differ with respect to the penalty
imposed.
The Court, in the exercise of its
administrative supervision over the lower courts, has
the authority to look into the time spent by
respondent judge in resolving the incident. As
observed by the OCA, respondent judge failed to
resolve the motion for his inhibition within the 90-day
reglementary period. In the orderly administration of
Legal Ethics 3B

46

justice, judges are required to act with dispatch in
resolving motions filed in their court. The parties
have the right to be properly informed of the
outcome of the motions they have filed and the
Constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their
case. Taking into account the circumstances in this
case, we find no reason for respondent judges
delayed action. Delay in resolving motions and
incidents pending before a judges sala within the
reglementary period fixed by the Constitution and
the law is not excusable and cannot be condoned.
That respondent is guilty of dishonesty in
accomplishing his PDS is impossible to refute. It was
not mere inadvertence on his part when he
answered "No" to that very simple question posed in
the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called
for and what it meant, and that he was committing
an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway.
Clearly, there was an obvious lack of integrity, the
most fundamental qualification of a member of the
judiciary.

(41) ATTY. TOMAS ONG CABILI, Complainant,
versus JUDGE RASAD G. BALINDONG, Acting
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City,
Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225
September 6, 2011

FACTS: Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC
rendered a decision holding the Mindanao State
University (MSU) liable for damages amounting to
P2, 726, 189.90. When MSU failed to comply with
the writ of execution, Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje
served a Notice of Garnishment on MSUs
depository bank, Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), Marawi City Branch. Consequently, MSU filed
a petition for prohibition and mandamus with an
application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or preliminary
injunction against the LBP and Sheriff Gaje, which
was raffled to Branch 8 Marawi City RTC presided
by Judge Balindong. Respondent Judge issued the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), hence, an
administrative complaint was filed charging him with
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave
Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial
Service for interfering with the order of a co-equal
court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Balindong
violated the principle of judicial stability.

HELD: YES. Respondent Judge clearly ignored the
principle of judicial stability by issuing a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) to restrain Sheriff Gaje
from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a co-
equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and
from pursuing the garnishment from MSUs account
with LBP, Marawi City Branch.

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference in the regular orders or judgments of a
co-equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to
grant the relief sought by the injunction. The
rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the
case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction
over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over all
its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting
in connection with this judgment.

His lack of familiarity with the rules in
interfering with the acts of a co-equal court
undermines the public confidence in the judiciary
through his demonstrated incompetence. When the
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office
to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would
be constitutive of gross ignorance of law.

(42) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V.
J UDGE UYAG USMAN, A.M. No. SCC-08-12,
Third Division, October 19, 2011, Mendoza, J .
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that respondent acquired a
brand new SUV, specifically a Kia Sorento EX,
Automatic Transmission and 2.57 CRDI Diesel for
1,526,000.00; that he paid in cash the total down
payment of 344,200.00; and that the remaining
balance was payable in 48 months with a monthly
amortization of 34,844.00 to the Philippine Savings
Bank (PS Bank), Ozamis City Branch. Complainant
further averred that respondent had just been
recently appointed as a judge and since he assumed
his post, he seldom reported for work and could not
be located within the courts premises during office
Legal Ethics 3B

47

hours. Respondents financial capability to acquire
said vehicle has been questioned because he is the
sole bread winner in his family and he has seven (7)
children, two (2) of whom were college students at
the Medina College School of Nursing, a private
school. Respondent bared that, at present, he is
receiving a monthly take home pay of more than
40,000.00 including his salary and allowances plus
honorarium from the local government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is is guilty of violating
Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 8 of R.A.
No. 6713.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the finding of the OCA that
the charges against respondent were not fully
substantiated. The evidence adduced in the case,
consisting of documents submitted by respondent
are sufficient to prove that it was, indeed, his mother
who paid the down payment and the monthly
amortizations for the subject vehicle.

The Court also agrees with the OCA that respondent
is guilty of violating Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
and of Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019, known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

It is imperative that every public official or
government employee must make and submit a
complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net
worth in order to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth. This serves as the basis of
the government and the people in monitoring the
income and lifestyle of public officials and
employees in compliance with the constitutional
policy to eradicate corruption, to promote
transparency in government, and to ensure that all
government employees and officials lead just and
modest lives, with the end in view of curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service.

In the present case, respondent clearly violated the
above-quoted laws when he failed to file his SALN
for the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation
either why he failed to file his SALN for five (5)
consecutive years. While every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position
exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness
and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to
abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and
with existing administrative policies in order to
maintain the faith of our people in the administration
of justice.

(43) ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS
vs. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T. OCAMPO,
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663, March 26, 2010
ABAD, J .

FACTS:

1. Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans, a
Belgian, filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman complaint for theft and graft
and corruption against respondent Municipal
Trial Court Judge Ocampo wherein
Spelmans wife orchestrated a scheme of
removing properties in their home by filing a
complaint a complaint of theft.
2. In the course of the investigation of the
complaint, Judge Ocampo, together with the
parties, held an ocular inspection of that
rented house and another one
where Spelmans kept some of the personal
belongings of his late mother and that during
the inspection Judge Ocampo allegedly took
some of the personal properties in the
house.
3. Judge Ocampo Ocampo denied the charge,
pointing out that Spelmans wife, Villan gave
him certain household items for safekeeping
before she filed the case of theft and
according to him when he received a copy
of Spelmans complaint for grave
misconduct did he learn of the couples
separation and his unwitting part in their
legal battles.
4. OCA found Judge Ocampo guilty of
committing acts of impropriety and
maintaining close affinity with a litigant in
violation of Canons 1 and 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ocampos taking and
keeping of the personal items belonging
to Spelmans but supposedly given to him by the
latters wife for safekeeping constitutes a violation of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.



Legal Ethics 3B

48

HELD:

Yes, Judge Ocampo is guilty of misconduct.

Judge Ocampo did not explain why, of all
people in Polomolok, Spelmans wife would entrust
to him, a municipal judge, certain personal items for
safekeeping. He also does not deny that he
conducted an ocular inspection of the houses
that Spelmans used in Polomolok but
Judge Ocampo did not explain what justified it. The
charge was not robbery where he might have an
interest in personally looking at where and how the
break-in took place. It was a case of theft where it
would be sufficient for the complainant to simply
state in her complaint-affidavit where the alleged
theft took place. If Judge Ocampo received the
pieces of antique from Villan for safekeeping, this
meant that a relation of trust existed between
them. Consequently, Judge Ocampo had every
reason to inhibit himself from the case from the
beginning. He of course claims that he dismissed
the case against Rencio eventually but this is no
excuse since his ruling could have gone the other
way. Besides, Spelmans claims that the complaint
was just a scheme to enable Villan to steal his
personal properties from the two houses.

Further, Judge Ocampo only did return the
items after four years. Hence, Respondent judge
should be made accountable for gross misconduct

constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, Section
1 of Canon 2, and Section 1 of Canon 4. From the
circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice.
He was not a warehouseman for personal properties
of litigants in his court. He certainly would have
kept Spelmans properties had the latter not filed a
complaint against him. He was guilty of
covetousness. It affected the performance of his
duties as an officer of the court and tainted the
judiciarys integrity. He should be punished
accordingly.


(44). 3-D INDUSTRIES, INC. and SMARTNET
PHILIPPINES, INC. vsJUSTICES VICENTE Q.
ROXAS and JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR.,

Facts:

Herein complainant Smartnets representative
Gilbert is the son of the spouses Francisco and
Simny Guy. The spouses organized Northern
Islands Co., Inc. (NICI) which is engaged in the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of various home
appliances bearing the 3-D trademark. The
spouses also organized Lincoln Continental
Development Corporation, Inc. (Lincoln Continental)
as a holding company of 50% of the 20,160 shares
of stock of NICI in trust for their three daughters
Geraldine, Gladys and Grace-sisters of Gilbert.

Finding that their son Gilbert had been dissipating
the assets of Lincoln Continental, the spouses Guy
caused the registration of 50% of the 20,160 shares
of stock of NICI in the names of their three
daughters, thus enabling the latter to assume an
active role in the management of NICI.

Herein Smartnet, one of the occupants of the NICI
premises, filed on December 16, 2004 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City a
complaint for forcible entry against NICI and the Guy
family.

In the meantime, the CA-Eighth Division directed the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
by NICI and the Guy family in their new petition, CA-
G.R. SP No. 87104, and a writ was accordingly
issued on December 22, 2004.


Issue: Whether or not Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019
has been violated?

Held: No.The assailed Resolutions issued by
respondents favored NICI and the Guy family does
not necessarily render respondents guilty of violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, absent proven
particular acts of manifest, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, good faith and regularity
being generally presumed in the performance of
official duties by public officers.

While respondents may have based the assailed
Resolutions on mere allegations, thus disregarding
what has been established in jurisprudence that
mere allegation that a corporation is the alter ego of
the individual stockholders is insufficient, this does
not render them administratively liable because not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless
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49

he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice, which is not the
case here.
(45) OCA vs.LERMA October 12, 2010
FACTS:
Five (5) administrative cases were filed with
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against
Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 256, Muntinlupa
City, for violating Supreme Court rules, directives,
and circulars, for making untruthful statements in his
certificates of service, for gross ignorance of the law
and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an
order, for abusing judicial authority and discretion,
and for serious irregularity.
OCA charged respondent judge with
exceeding his authority under the Supreme Court
resolution dated June 30, 1998 in A.M. No. 98-6-
179-RTC. According to the OCA, the authority given
to respondent judge under the resolution was clearly
limited to the arraignment of the accused and the
taking of his testimony; it did not authorize
respondent judge to decide the merits of the
case. The OCA contended that the act of
respondent judge constituted violation of a Supreme
Court directive.
According to the OCA, its records in the
Office of the Administrative Services show that
respondent judge has incurred absences without
filing a leave for such absence, wherein respondent
judge was found playing golf on the dates of his
absences.
Also, respondent judge issued divergent
orders raising serious questions of impropriety that
taint respondent judges credibility, probity, and
integrity. Coupled with the clandestine issuance of a
second order where one party in a case and even
the judges own staff were left completely in the dark
the action of respondent judge gives rise to an
inference of bad faith. Indeed, it is reasonable to
believe that the second order was really intended to
give counsel of the opposing party the ammunition
to oppose the Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment , which was to
be heard by the RTC of Makati City.
On August 23, 2007, a complaint was filed
with the Supreme Court, contending that respondent
judge did not have the judicial authority to hear and
decide the issues involved in Civil Case No. 2003-
433 for want of jurisdiction. According to
complainant, this was brought to the attention of
respondent judge, but the latter, being grossly
ignorant of existing laws and rules, if not completely
insolent of the same, and with grave abuse of
discretion, took cognizance of the case.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent judge is liable for
violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and
circulars, for making untruthful statements in his
certificates of service, for gross ignorance of the law
and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an
order, for abusing judicial authority and discretion,
and for serious irregularity?

RULING: LIABLE
These unjustified absences indubitably
established that respondent judge violated Supreme
Court Memorandum Order dated November 19,
1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999, and Administrative Circular No. 5
dated October 4, 1988, which provides for the
observance by judges, among other officials and
employees in the judiciary, of a five-day forty-hour
week schedule which shall be from 8:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m. and from 12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. from
Mondays to Fridays.
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the
Investigating Justice, the Court finds that the actions
of respondent judge constitute gross negligence
and/or gross ignorance of the law.
We have repeatedly held that to warrant a
finding of gross ignorance of the law, it must be
shown that the error is so gross and patent as to
produce an inference of bad faith.Gross negligence
refers to negligence characterized by want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that
care which even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to take on their own property. In cases
involving public officials, there is gross negligence
when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
The totality of all these findings underscore
the fact that respondent judges actions served to
erode the peoples faith and confidence in
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50

the judiciary. He has been remiss in the fulfillment of
the duty imposed on all members of the bench in
order to avoid any impression of impropriety to
protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.
To reiterate, officers of the court have the
duty to see to it that justice is dispensed evenly and
fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial,
but they must also appear to be honest and impartial
in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make
sure that their acts are circumspect and do not
arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When
they fail to do so, such acts cast doubt upon
their integrity and ultimately on the judiciary in
general.
[37]
Courts will only succeed in their task
and mission if the judges presiding over them are
truly honorable men, competent and independent,
honest and dedicated.
Respondent judge failed to live up to the
judiciarys exacting standards, and this Court will not
withhold penalty when called for to uphold the
peoples faith in the Judiciary.

(46) Villanueva vs. Judge Buaya
November 22, 2010

Facts: Complainant assisted by her father
Pantaleon Villanueva, charged respondent Acting
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, with Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority.
Villanueva accused then Vice-Mayor Constantino S.
Tupa of Palompon, Leyte, of the crime of Qualified
Seduction and filed another complaint against the
same accused for violation of Section 5, paragraph
(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 otherwise
known as the Special Protection of Children against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Palompon, Leyte.
Judge Eric F. Menchavez, then Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Branch 17, of Palompon, Leyte, issued a
warrant for the arrest of Tupa, however, the warrant
was not served because Tupa went into hiding and
could not be located. Meanwhile, Judge Menchavez
was reassigned to the RTC in Cebu City which led to
the designation of the respondent-judge as Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17. Without
hearing and without notice to the prosecution,
respondent-judge granted the ex-parte motion and
ordered the release of Tupa on bail after the said
accused allegedly surrendered voluntarily in the
Ormoc City Police Station and filed with the RTC,
Branch 17 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Grant Bail.
Complainant moved to reconsider the order granting
the ex-parte motion but without acting on the merits
of the said motion, respondent-judge issued an
order allowing the accused to submit his comment or
opposition within ten days; thereafter, the matter
would be submitted for resolution. Respondent-
judges differing treatment of the ex-parte motion
and her motion for reconsideration apparently irked
complainant, prompting her to file the present
administrative complaint against the RTC judge.
Complainant contended that respondent-judges
assailed order on the ex-parte motion was contrary
to the Rules of Court requirement that a motion to
grant bail must be set for hearing to afford the State
and the prosecutor their day in court. She further
accused respondent-judge of being manifestly
partial as evidenced by the two temporary
restraining orders (TROs) he issued in favor of the
accused in another case for quo warranto, then
pending before the RTC, Branch 17.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty with
Gross Ignorance of the Law and Abuse of Authority
because of the granting of an ex-parte motion to
grant bail which must be set for hearing to afford the
State and the prosecutor their day in court.
Held: Yes, respondent is guilty with Gross Ignorance
of the Law and Abuse of Authority because of the
granting of an ex-parte motion to grant bail which
must be set for hearing to afford the State and the
prosecutor their day in court.
The Court has always stressed the indispensable
nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail. Where
bail is a matter of discretion, the grant or the denial
of bail hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong and
the determination of whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains
with the judge. In order for the judge to properly
exercise this discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. This discretion lies not in the determination
of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in
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51

the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the
prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused.
In any event, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required
in order for the court to consider the guidelines set
forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in
fixing the amount of bail.

This Court has repeatedly
held in past cases that even if the prosecution fails
to adduce evidence in opposition to an application
for bail of an accused, the court may still require the
prosecution to answer questions in order to
ascertain, not only the strength of the State's
evidence, but also the adequacy of the amount of
bail.
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge
owes the public and the Court the duty to maintain
professional competence at all time. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A
judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast
of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of
the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.
(47) ATTY. JONNA M. ESCABARTE, et.al. v.
LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE
A.M. No. P-09-2602, 1 December 2010, THIRD
DIVISION

FACTS:

Judge Bonifacio Maceda issued an order
suspending respondent Loida Marcelina Genabe for
30 days for neglect of duty and for being unruly and
highly combative during the staff meeting in his
chambers, shouting disrespectfully to him and
disrupting the meeting. Atty. Jonna M. Escabarte, et.
al. alleged that Genabe continued to render service
despite her 30-day suspension. Genabe denied the
allegations against her and claimed that Judge
Maceda treated her oppressively to drive her out of
her employment in the judiciary and to get even with
her on account of her intolerance of the anomalous
practices prevailing in the court. Further, Genabe
accused Judge Maceda of malversation when the
judge allegedly diverted to other purposes the
courts training budget for 2006, obtained from the
Las Pias City government.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended the following: (1) Genabe be found
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and conduct unbecoming of a court
employee and be fined in an amount equivalent to
one months salary; (2) Judge Maceda be reminded
to strictly comply with A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, with a
warning against a similar violation in the future; and
(3) the charge against Escabarte, Agbayani,
Chavez, Gerero, Ortiz, Ramos and Villar be
dismissed for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Genabe should
be disciplined, making the order of suspension
imposed by Judge Maceda proper

HELD:

Genabe ought to be disciplined. Without
doubt, Genabes negative attitude and penchant for
using offensive language can only prejudice the best
interest of the service, not to mention that they
constitute conduct unbecoming a court employee. It
is well to remind Genabe that "the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with x x x the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to
the x x x lowliest clerk x x x must be characterized
with propriety and decorum, as Genabes attitude
goes against the principles of public service. Also,
every "official and employee of an agency involved
in the administration of justice, like the Court of
Appeals, from the Presiding Justice to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility.

We agree with the OCA observations that
while the act of Judge Maceda in disciplining
Genabe with a 30-day suspension is "not
oppressive, capricious or despotic, that is, without
color of law or reason, or without supporting facts,"
he still had no authority to directly discipline her
under the terms of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, which
provided that the Executive Judge shall have the
authority to act upon and investigate administrative
complaints involving light offenses as defined under
the Civil Service Law and Rules (Administrative
Code of 1987), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(Republic Act No. 6713), where the penalty is
reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30)
days, or a fine not exceeding thirty (30) days salary,
and as classified in pertinent Civil Service
resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge against
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52

a court employee, except lawyers, who both work in
the same station within the Executive Judges area
of supervision; or (b) a court employee against
another court employee, except lawyers, who both
work in the same station within the Executive
Judges area of supervision. In the preceding
instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the
necessary inquiry and submit to the Office of the
Court Administrator the results thereof with a
recommendation as to the action to be taken
thereon, including the penalty to be imposed, if any,
within thirty (30) days from termination of said
inquiry. At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge
may delegate the investigation of complaints
involving light offenses to any of the Presiding
Judges or court officials within his/her area of
administrative supervision.

Under these terms, Judge Macedas order of
December 21, 2006 was clearly out of line. But while
the Judge overstepped the limits of his authority, we
see no reason not to ratify his action in light of its
obvious merits. Thus, the 30-day suspension he
imposed should stand but he should be warned
against a repetition of the direct action he took.

On the matter of the Judges handling of the Subic
seminar fund in September 2006, provided by the
Las Pias City, we agree with the OCA that the
judge cannot not be held liable. Nevertheless, in
view of the nature of the fund (which required no
liquidation and is not an accountable judicial fund),
we believe that the Judge should have taken steps
such as the informing the court staff or filing of a
report with the OCA on how the fund was handled.
This precautionary move would have placed the
Judge above any suspicion of impropriety. We stress
that "Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their actions.

(48) JOVITO S. OLAZO v. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010

FACTS
J. Olazo filed a sales application covering a parcel of
land in Taguig. The land was previously part of Fort
Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared
open for disposition. J. Olaza filed various charges
against Justice Tinga as follows:
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
J. Olazo claimed that the Justice Tinga abused his
position as Congressman and as a member of the
Committee on Awards when he exerted undue
pressure and influence over the complainants
father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest J.
Olazos sales application and claim the subject land
for himself and that Justice Tinga brokered the
transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel
Olazo and Joseph Rodriguez, nephew of Justice
Tingas deceased wife. As a result of Justice
Tingas abuse of his official functions, the sales
application was denied. The conveyance of rights to
Joseph Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the DENR.
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
J. Olazo alleged that Justice Tinga persuaded
Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights
over a different piece of land to Joseph Rodriguez.
In addition, J. Olazo alleged that Justice Tinga meet
with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the
conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph
Rodriguez.. J. Olazo claimed that Justice Tinga
wanted the rights over the land transferred to one
Rolando Olazo, a Taguig Barangay Chairman.
Justice Tinga in this regard executed an "Assurance"
where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon
Lee and Joseph Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
J. Olazo alleged that Justice Tinga engaged in
unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that
Joseph Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary. J.
Olazo averred that Joseph Rodriguez is not a bona
fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not
qualify for an award.
ISSUES :
1. WON Justice Tinga constitute a breach of the
standard ethical conduct while he was still an
elective public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards; and
Legal Ethics 3B

53

2. WON Justice Tinga constitute a breach of the
standard ethical conduct when he was no longer
a public official, but a private lawyer who
represented a client before the office he was
previously connected with.
RULING
NO. SC ruled that there is an absence of any
concrete proof that the Justice Tinga abused
hisposition as a Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards in the manner defined
under Rule 6.02 ofthe Code of Professional
Responsibility. First, the records do not clearly show
if the complainants sales application wasever
brought before the Committee on Awards. The
circumstances do not show that Justice Tinga did in
any way promote, advance or use his private
interests in the discharge of his official duties.
NO. Under the circumstances, it should be
correlated with R.A.No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which impose
certain restrictions on government lawyers to
engage in private practice after their separation from
the service. As a rule, government lawyers are not
allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. By way of
exception, a government lawyer can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following
conditions: 1) private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and 2) the practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions. As the records show, no evidence exists
showing that the respondent previously interfered
with the sales application covering Manuels land
when the former was still a member of the
Committee on Awards.
SC resolved case dismissed the administrative case
against Justice Tinga for the J. Olazos failure to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
former committed unethical infractions warranting
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.
(49)JOSEPHINE JAZMINES TAN vs. JUDGE
SIBANAH USMAN
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2666; February 15, 2011; Carpio
Morales, J .
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3320-RTJ
FACTS:
ComplainantJosephine Jazmines Tan filed a
Motion for Inhibition against respondent
JudgeSibanahUsman. Tan alleged that during the
hearing of the Motion for Inhibition, Judge Usman
became very emotional, coerced her to testify
without the assistance of counsel and demanded a
public apology from her; and that while she
requested to refer the motion to the Executive
Judge, Judge Usman interrogated her relentlessly
following which he issued an Order finding her guilty
of Direct Contempt andordered her detention for a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days. Tan was
actually detained for 19 days.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Usman is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
HELD: Yes.
Failure to follow basic legal commands as
prescribed by law and the rules is tantamount to
gross ignorance of the law. By accepting the exalted
position of a judge, respondent ought to have been
familiar with the legal norms and precepts as well as
the procedural rules.

Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. The penalty for direct contempt if imprisonment
is imposed should not, as Section 1 of Rule 71
provides, exceed 10 days. In this case,
Complainant was detained for 19 days or 9 days
more than the limit imposed by the Rules.
Moreover, Respondent judge did not fix the bond, in
violation of the same Section 2 of Rule 71, which
complainant could have posted had she desired to
challenge the order. And on the same day the Order
was issued, respondent ordered the confinement of
complainant to the provincial jail.
Thus, the court imposed the penalty of fine.

Legal Ethics 3B

54

(50) TERESITA D. SANTECO, complainant, vs.
ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, respondent.
FACTS:
Teresita Santeco filed an administrative case
against Atty. Luna Avance for mishandling an action
to declare a deed of absolute sale null and void and
for reconveyance and damages; where Atty. Avance
was found guilty. She was ordered suspended from
the practice of law for five years and was directed to
return to the complainant the amount of P3,900
which the complainant paid her for filing a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals which she never
filed.
During Atty. Avances five-year suspension from the
practice of law, Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, sent a
letter-report to the Court Administrator, informing him
that Atty. Avance appeared and actively participated
in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself
as Atty. LiezlTanglao. Acting on the report, the court
required Atty. Avance to comment within ten days
from notice. However, despite reiteration of the
directive, Atty. Vance still failed to file the required
comment, hence, the court found the respondent
guilty of indirect contempt ordering her to pay a fine
of P30,000 and stern warning.
Atty. Avance failed to pay the imposed fine despite
due notice hence, the court finds the respondent
unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Vance should be disbarred.
RULING:
Respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance is disbarred for gr
oss misconduct and wilful disobedience of lawful
orders of a superior court. Her name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The
highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown
by a lawyers obedience to court orders and
processes.We have held that failure to comply with
Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,insubo
rdination or disrespect which merits a lawyers
suspension or even disbarment. Respondents
cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring orders of the
Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the
judicial institution.
Respondents conduct indicates a high degree or irr
esponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the
Courts orders not only betrays recalcitrant flaw in
her character; it also underscores her disrespect of
the Courts lawful orders which is only too
deserving of reproof. Under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney
for gross misconduct and/or for a wilful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders,
respondent proved herself unworthy of membership
in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent
to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to
discharge the duties of an officer of the court and
deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.



Legal Ethics 3B

55

(51) Judge Napoleon Inoturan vs. Judge Manuel
Limsiaco
A.M. OCA No. MTJ-01-1362February 22, 2011
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case filed against
Judge Limsiaco. The first case is for failure to
comply with the directives of the Court and the
second for failure to decide a case within the 90-day
reglamentary period.
First Case:
Judge Limsiaco ordered the release of an
accused in a criminal case. The judge was found
guilty of ignorance of the law and of violating Code
of Judicial Conduct. He was directed to explain
within 10 days from notice why he should not be
administratively charged but failed to do so. The
Court then granted several motions for extension to
file his motion for reconsideration on account of his
alleged physical ailment. Despite the grant of such
motions, Judge Limsiaco still failed to respond to
such directive nor offered any explanation.
Second Case:
The plaintiff in an ejectment case claimed
that Judge Limsiaco failed to seasonably decide
such even though the case has already been
submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005.
Judge Limsiaco admitted he only decided the case 2
years after February 4, 2008.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Limsiaco violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct? (Yes under Sections 7 &
8 of Canon 1 and Section 5 of Canon 6)
HELD:
The counduct of Judge Limsiaco constitutes
clear acts of defiance of the Courts authority. It is a
deliberate disrespect and indifference to the
authority of the Court which further shows his
inability to accept instructions of his superior. His
conduct failed to provide a good example for other
court personnel, and the public as well, in placing
significance to the Courts directives and the
importance of complying with them. The delay in
deciding a case is a failure to perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with promptness.
The Court likewise found that Judge
Limsiaco has already been held liable in several
administrative cases undue delay in rendering
decision, gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the
law and procedure, delay in submission of monthly
report of cases, and gross misconduct. Being a
repeat offender exhibits his unworthiness to don the
judicial robes and merits a heavier sanction of
dismissal from service, but having been retired, his
retirement benefits shall be forfeited instead.
*Canon 1
Section 7 Judge shall encourage and
uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties
in order to maintain and enhance the institutional
and operational independence of the Judiciary.
Section 8 Judges shall exhibit and
promote high standards of judicial conduct in order
to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary, which
is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial
independence.
*Canon 6, Section 5Judges shall perform all judicial
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
(52) ASSISTANT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR III
ROHERMIA J. JAMSANI-RODRIGUEZ vs.
JUSTICES GREGORY S. ONG, JOSE R.
HERNANDEZ, and RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA,
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Respondents Sandiganbayan Associate Justices
sought reconsideration of SC Decision finding them
guilty for simple misconduct. The charge was based
on the complaint of Assistant Prosecutor Rodriguez
who alleged that the respondents failed to hear
cases as collegial during scheduled sessions by
hearing the cases either alone or only two of the
three of them, and for falsification of public
documents grounded on their issuance of orders
Legal Ethics 3B

56

signed by the three of them making it appear that
they acted as a collegial body. It was also alleged
that they have conducted themselves in gross abuse
of judicial authority and grave misconduct for
intemperate and discriminatory utterances during
hearings. Justice Ong and Hernandez admitted
randomly asking the counsels appearing before
them from which law schools they had graduated,
and their engaging during the hearings in casual
conversation about their respective law schools.
ISSUE: WON there is sufficient cause to establish
the Justices complete exoneration.
HELD:The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Section 2, Rule VII of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan expressly requires that rulings
on oral motions made or objections raised in the
course of the trial proceedings or hearings are be
made by the Chairman of the Division. Obviously,
the rule cannot be complied with because Justice
Ong, the Chairman, did not sit in the hearing of the
cases heard by the other respondents. Neither could
the other respondents properly and promptly
contribute to the rulings of Justice Ong in the
hearings before him X X X This necessitates the
equal and full participation of each member in the
trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not
enough, therefore, that the three members of the
Fourth Division were within hearing and
communicating distance of one another at the
hearings in question, as they explained in hindsight,
because even in those circumstances not all of them
sat together in session.
As applied to Justice Ong and Hernandez, SC
maintained their initial ruling on discriminatory
utterancces. They thereby publicized their
professional qualifications and manifested a lack of
the requisite humility demanded of public
magistrates. Their doing so reflected a vice of self-
conceit. We view their acts as bespeaking their lack
of judicial temperament and decorum, which no
judge worthy of the judicial robes should avoid
especially during their performance of judicial
functions. They should not exchange banter or
engage in playful teasing of each other during trial
proceedings (no matter how good-natured or even if
meant to ease tension, as they want us to believe).
Judicial decorum demands that they behave with
dignity and act with courtesy towards all who appear
before their court. This is in violation of Section 6,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
states that Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity.
(53) A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197 April 13, 2011

ANTONINO MONTICALBO vs JUDGE
CRESCENTE MARAYA
FACTS: Fatima Credit Cooperative filed a civil case
for collection of sum of money against Antonino
Moncalbo and his wife before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte. The case
was dismissed by the said court in its February 2008
Order on the ground that the representative of
Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to
prosecute the case but it did not rule on the
counterclaim of Monticalbo for attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. Aggrieved, after his motion for
reconsideration is denied, complainant elevated the
case to the Regional Trial Court, Calubian but Judge
Crescente Maraya dismissed the appeal for having
been filed out of time because under the rules on
Summary Procedure which was applied to govern
the proceedings of this case, a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and it will
not suspend the period of appeal. As a result,
Monticalbo filed an administrative case in the
Supreme Court against Judge Maraya for gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave
abuse of authority thru false representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is grave misconduct on
the part of Judge Maraya resulting to grave
abuse of authority.
Whether or not there is gross ignorance of
the law on part of Judge Maraya in deciding
the case.
RULING: Petition DENIED.

On the 1
st
issue, the Court rule in the negative.
In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be
established that respondents actions were
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were
attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
15
In the
Legal Ethics 3B

57

absence of such proof, the decision or order in
question is presumed to have been issued in good
faith by respondent judge.
In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or
grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be
presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be
inferred just because the judgment or order
rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant.
Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately
rendering an unjust judgment or order, one must be
able to show that such judgment or order is unjust
and that it was issued with malicious intent to cause
injustice to the aggrieved party. Well-established is
the rule in administrative proceedings that the
burden of proof rests on the complainant, who must
be able to support and prove by substantial
evidence his accusations against
respondent. Substantial evidence, the quantum of
proof required in administrative cases, is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Failure of the complainant to
substantiate his claims will lead to the dismissal of
the administrative complaint for lack of merit
because, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
the presumption that a judge has regularly
performed his duties will prevail.
In this case, complainant has nothing but mere
assertions and conjectures to buttress his
allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the
part of respondent who, if complainant is to be
believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in
drinking sprees with court employees during office
hours. Contrary to complainants statement, the
Investigating Justice found that respondent was
attending to his cases during the dates when he
allegedly had those drinking sessions.

On the 2
nd
issue, the Court rule in the negative.
A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure clearly shows that
complainants claim is covered by the said rule
which reads: Scope. This rule shall govern the
summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases
x x x
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings,
where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of
interest and costs.
Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old
books. The rule now, as amended by A.M. No. 02-
11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed
the ceiling at P100,000.00. As such, the complainant
has no basis in charging that respondents
"knowledge of law fell so short" and that he was
remiss in his obligation to be familiar with the law
which "even law students these days know such x x
x."
The complainant should have elevated his grievance
to the higher courts. The filing of an administrative
case against the judge is not an alternative to the
other judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it
complementary or supplementary to such actions.

(54) FLORENDA TOBIAS vs. JUDGE MANUEL
LIMSIACO, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Florenda Tobias requested her sister, Lorna
Vollmer, to inquire from the Fourth MCTC of
Valladolid-San Enrique-Palupandan, Negros
Occidental about the requirements needed in filing
an ejectment case. The Judge advised Volmer that
since there was no lawyer in Valladolid, Negros
Occidental, she had to choose the nearest town
lawyer as it would lessen expenses in transportation
and appearance fee, and mentioned the name of
Atty. Robert Juanillo. After the ejectment case was
filed, Volmer went to Judge Limsiacos court and told
him that she was withdrawing the services of Atty.
Juanillo. Because of such, the Judge prepared the
motion for the withdrawal of appearance of the said
lawyer.

ISSUE: WON the Judge violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

RULING:
Legal Ethics 3B

58

YES. The respondent judge committed acts
of unbecoming of a judge, in particular, talking to a
prospective litigant in his court, recommending a
lawyer to the litigant, and preparing the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Juanillo, which
pleading was filed in his court and was acted upon
by him. The conduct of the judge should be beyond
reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office.
The acts of the respondent judge violated
Section 1 of Canon 2, Section 2 of Canon 3, and
Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, thus:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
-
Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper
discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only
to the decision itself but also to the process by
which decision is made.
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her
conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
judge of the judiciary.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the
activities of the judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
Sec. 2. As a subject of constant public
scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in
a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

The aforementioned acts of the respondent
Judge constitute gross misconduct. Misconduct
means a transgression of some established and
definite rull of action, wilful in character, improper
and wrong behaviour. Gross has been defined as
out of all measure, beyond allowance; flagrant;
shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused.
Respondents act of preparing the Motion to
Withdraw the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as
counsel of complainant is inexcusable. In so doing,
respondent exhibited improper conduct that
tarnished the integrity and impartiality of his court,
considering that the said motion was filed in his own
sala and was acted upon by him.

Judge Limsiaco was found guilty of Gross
Misconduct for which he was fined in the amount of
P25,000.

(55) SY VS. DINOPOL
FACTS:
This case arose to a land which was mortgage to the
mortgagee, Metrobank. The latter foreclosed the
mortgaged land and won as the highest bidder.
Petitioner then filed an Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of the real estate mortgage.
The respondent judge inhibited himself to the case
before him on the ground that he received a call
both from the parties, and claimed that he wanted to
avoid being charged with partiality. However,
notwithstanding his inhibition on the said case, he
nonetheless grants the petition of Metrobank for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the disputed
land. Petitioner charged the respondent judge of
gross ignorance of law and conduct of unbecoming
a member of the judiciary. The latter charged has
been founded on the ground that respondent judge
received commodity loans in the form of construction
materials to be used in the construction of judges
house. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of law and conduct of unbecoming a
member of the judiciary
Legal Ethics 3B

59

HELD:On the ground of gross ignorance of law,
judge Dinopol cannot be held responsiibile for he
acted within the ambit of law and his jurisdiction.
However, with respect to the conduct of unbecoming
a judge, he is found guilty by the OCA of such
charge.
Judge Dinopol violated Sections 2 and 3 of Canon 3,
Section 1 of Canon 1, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2,
and section 1 of Canon 4 of New code of Judicial
Conduct.

(56) IMELDA R. MARCOS v. JUDGE FERNANDO VIL
PAMINTUAN
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062, January 18, 2011
Facts:
Imelda Marcos filed an administrative case against
Judge Pamintuan of Branch 3, RTC, Baguio City
with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu
propio the final and executory order of then Judge
Reyes dated May 30, 1996 (and modified in the
September 2, 1996 order), The order of Judge
Reyes in the said case did not rule on the
authenticity of the Golden Buddha because it was
not made as an issue while the questioned order of
Judge Pamintuan,10 years after, has ruled that said
Buddha, which is under the custody the court, was
fake and a mere replica.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Pamintuan was liable
for gross ignorance of the law.
Held: Yes. It is axiomatic that when a judgment is
final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect either by the court which rendered it or even
by this Court. The doctrine of immutability and
inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold
purpose, to wit: (1) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and
(2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk
of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts
exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
Judge Pamintuan failed to conform to the high
standards of competence required of judges under
the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that:
Rule 1.01 - A judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence
Rule 3.01 - A judge shall x x x maintain
professional competence.
Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a
judge exhibits an utter lack of know-how with the
rules or with settled jurisprudence, he erodes the
publics confidence in the competence of our courts.
It is highly crucial that judges be acquainted with the
law and basic legal principles. Ignorance of the law,
which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one
not even judges
In this case, the Court finds Judge Pamintuan
accountable for gross ignorance of the law. This is
not Judge Pamintuans first and sole administrative
case. Having been previously warned and punished
for various infractions.

Judge Fernando Pamintuan of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from
the service.
(57) OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATOR v.
JUDGE BENJAMIN P. ESTRADA AND JUDGE
JOSEFINA GENTILES-BACALA.M. No. RTJ-09-
2173, 18 JANUARY 2011, EN BANC (Brion, J .)
Facts: Atty. Nicandro A. Cruz, officer-in-charge,
Court Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), addressed to then Deputy
Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. De la Cruz,
regarding anomalies in the disposition of cases in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Legal Ethics 3B

60

Malaybalay City, Bukidno
n
and reported that
several orders, attached to the report, that were
issued by Executive Judge Josefina Gentiles-Bacal,
RTC, Malaybalay City, and Judge Benjamin P.
Estrada, RTC, Branch 9, same station, dismissing
the cases then pending in the MTCC. Atty. Cruz
pointed out that the MTCC, Malaybalay City had no
regular presiding judge at the time the orders were
issued, as Judge Estrada, the former presiding
judge, had been appointed to preside over the RTC,
Branch 9, Malaybalay City, on June 1, 2008. Atty.
Cruz commented that Judge Estrada could no
longer take cognizance of cases pending in his
former sala after he took his oath on July 17, 2008;
neither could Judge Bacal do the same even if she
had then been the executive judge of the RTC,
Malaybalay City.
Issue: Are Judge Estrada and Judge Bacal guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of
cases pending before another court?

Held: Yes. There is no question about the guilt of
the two judges. Their shared intention to uphold the
right of the accused to liberty cannot justify their
action in excess of their authority, in violation of
existing regulations. The vacuum in a first level
court, such as the MTCC in Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, created by the absence of a presiding
judge, is not remedied by a take over of the duties of
the still-to-be appointed or designated judge for the
court, which exactly was what Judge Estrada and
Judge Bacal did. The remedy lies in Chapter V of
the Guidelines in the Selection and Appointment of
Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties,which provides:
"Section 1. Designation of Judges of the First Level
Courts to Try Cases. (a) The Executive Judge of the
RTC shall have authority to designate a municipal
judge within his/her area of administrative
supervision to try cases of other courts of the first
level within said area of administrative supervision in
case of official leave of absence, inhibition,
disqualification, or preventive suspension of the
municipal judge concerned, or of permanent or
temporary vacancy in the position. Such designation
shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the
Supreme Court.
The Executive Judge shall furnish the Office of the
Court Administrator with copies of the orders of
designation effected under this Section within five
(5) days from the date of such designation."
Instead of allowing Judge Estrada and herself to act
on cases pending before the MTCC, Judge Bacal,
as executive judge of the RTC, Malaybalay City,
should have designated a municipal judge within her
area of supervision, to act on the pending cases.
She took time (two months as she claimed) in
making the designation, which delayed action, by
itself, is a negative reflection on her performance as
an executive judge. Judge Estrada, who was the
former presiding judge of the MTCC, Malaybalay
City, acted only on one case, but like Judge Bacal,
he had no authority to take over the case as he had
already taken his oath as RTC judge on July 17,
2008, almost a month before he issued the order in
Criminal Case No. 878-08, People v. Bellman E.
Durango, et al., for Attempted Homicide. Either
Judge Estrada and Judge Bacal forgot the
guidelines or chose to ignore them, but whatever it
was, they should suffer the consequences of their
actions in violation of the guidelines.
Legal Ethics 3B

61

What Judge Estrada and Judge Bacal did was
worse than overriding the action or decision of a
lower court.They entirely took over the judicial
function of the lower court. While they might have
been motivated by noble intentions in taking
cognizance of the pending cases with the MTCC
because they wanted to uphold the accuseds right
to liberty, they still cannot escape liability. However
well-intentioned they might have been, they still did
not have the authority to act on the cases as these
were not pending before their respective salas. Their
lack of authority was so patent and so self-evident;
to disregard it would itself be ignorance of the law. In
Mupas, the Court recognized that "not every judicial
error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, but only in cases xxx of
tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the
procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to
be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law."
Clearly, Judge Estrada and Judge Bacal are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
(58) VIVIAN T. DABU vs. EDUARDO RODEN E.
KAPUNAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 51 and
Acting Judge, Branch 52, MA. THERESA
CORTEZ, LEILA O. GALO, Both Court
Stenographers, SUZETTE O. TIONGCO, Legal
Researcher, All of Regional Trial Court, Branch
51, Guagua, Pampanga
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600
February 1, 2011

FACTS:
On August 24, 2000, Complainant Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu executed an
Affidavit citing several incidents wherein the court
records of cases for annulment of marriage, lost
titles and declaration of presumptive death were
being falsified. The Affidavit was treated as a
Complaint for falsification of court records against
Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan and court
stenographers Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O.
Galo. Respondent Suzette Tiongco was not included
in the charge of falsification of court records as
complainant ha[d] no evidence linking her thereto
but the Office of the Court Administrator included her
with the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

ISSUE:Whether or not Judge Kapunan is guilty of
falsification and for violation against Canon 2,
Section 1 of Judicial Conduct For The Philippine
Judiciary
HELD:Yes. A judge's conduct should be above
reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties
he should be conscientious, studious, thorough,
courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless
of public clamor, and regardless of private influence
should administer justice according to law and
should deal with the patronage of the position as a
public trust; and he should not allow outside matters
or his private interests to interfere with the prompt
and proper performance of his office.

Taking all these into consideration, it is undeniable
that Judge Kapunan, Galo and Cortez acted
together in issuing questionable orders and
decisions through falsification of public documents.

With regard to Tiongco, however, there is no
evidence against her. The inclusion of Tiongco in
this case was only upon the initiative of the Office of
the Court Administrator. As the record is bereft of
any evidence to hold her liable, her exoneration is in
order.

Legal Ethics 3B

62

Court employees, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office
dispensing justice, should always act with a high
degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their
conduct must not only be characterized by propriety
and decorum, but must also be in accordance with
the law and court regulations. No position demands
greater moral righteousness and uprightness from
its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court
employees should be models of uprightness,
fairness and honesty to maintain the people's
respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid
any act or conduct that would diminish public trust
and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those
connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy
burden of responsibility.

Falsification of an official document such as court
records is considered a grave offense. It also
amounts to dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par.
a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave
offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from
service upon commission of the first offense.

Furthermore, falsification of an official document is
punishable as a criminal offense under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code and dishonesty is an
impious act that has no place in the judiciary.

The penalty of dismissal, however, can no longer be
imposed and carried out with respect to the late
Judge Kapunan. The administrative complaints
against him have become moot and academic and
the case should be deemed closed and terminated
following our ruling in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube and Apiag
v. Cantero



(59) GAUDENCIO B. PANTILLO III vs. JUDGE
VICTOR A. CANOY
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262 | February 9, 2011 | Velasco,
Jr., J.

FACTS:

A criminal case was pending before the sala
of respondent Judge Canoy, wherein the victim was
complainants sibling. On 03 September 2008 at
around 5:00pm, complainant along with a few police
officers escorted the accused Leonardo Melgazo to
the City Prosecutors Office, wherein after a few
hours, Melgazo was released from detention and
this was relayed to Pantillo. Complainant was able to
verify this from the precinct and he was also
informed the release was pursuant to a 30,000php
bail posted by Melgazo.

Pantillo was even more puzzled when he
found out that no Information was filed against
Melgazo yet, but there was already approval of the
bail. He learned that there was only a verbal order
made by the Judge for the approval of a bail. The
following day, 05 September 2008, Melgazo filed a
Motion for the release of his vehicle that was object
evidence to the case. He prayed that said motion be
heard on September 5 or on the same day of the
filing, which was in clear violation of the rules. Judge
Canoy issued an Order directing the prosecutor to
file a Comment within 3 days upon receipt, and this
was complied with, but still the motion was granted.
Pantillo filed a motion for inhibition of judge Canoy
but the same was denied. Thus, the instant
complaint was filed with the OCA.

In his Comment, Judge Canoy said that he
considered the constitutional right to bail coupled
with the insistence of Melgazos counsel led him to
allow such actions to proceed. He presents as a
defense Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
which does not require a formal charge in court
before a person may post bail. He concluded that a
constructive bail was proper, lacking only the
formal papers to finalize the same. OCA
recommended that the complaint be re-docketed as
a regular administrative matter and that Judge
Canoy be fined 40,000php with a stern warning.

ISSUE:

WON Judge Canoy, in allowing the release
of Melgazo via a constructive bail is liable for
violation of Supreme Court rules, circulars and
decisions

HOLD:

Yes, Judge Canoy is liable for such. Though
the right to bail is definitely allowed in the instant
case, it is the matter of procedure that was violated
herein. Rule 114 requires an application or petition
for the release on bail of an accused. There was no
such written application made to the court, yet Judge
Canoy allowed the bail to be accepted. Also, another
requirement is that the bail should be deposited with
the nearest collector of internal revenue or any
municipal, city or provincial treasurer. Instead, it was
the clerk of court who received and acknowledged
the bond.

Legal Ethics 3B

63

Further, SC held that there was no such
specie of a constructive bond under the Rules, and
thus no validity should be given to the bail posted by
the accused. Judge Canoy was fined 11,000php and
was given a stern warning.
(60) Daniel G. Sevilla v. J udge Francisco S.
Lindo, M. No. MTJ -08-1714 , February 9, 2011 ,
Bersamin, J .
Facts: Daniel G. Sevilla charged Hon. Francisco S.
Lindo with delay in the disposition of a criminal case.
Sevilla asserted that Judge Lindo thereby violated
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which requires that a judge should administer justice
impartially and without delay; that Judge Lindo also
violated Section 1, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court,
which mandates that justice be impartially
administered without unnecessary delay; that Judge
Lindos unreasonable resetting of the hearings 12
times rendered inconsequential his right to the
speedy disposition of his case; and that such
resettings were made upon the instance of Judge
Lindo, not upon motion of the parties.
In his comment dated July 26, 2007, Judge
Lindo refuted the charge, claiming that the
postponements were upon valid grounds.
Issue: Whether or not retired Judge Lindo was
administratively liable for the numerous
postponements in violation of the Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Held: We agree with and adopt the report and
recommendation of the OCA that Judge Lindo be
held liable for delay in the disposition of his cases
that was tantamount to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of his official
duties. Although the postponement of a hearing in a
civil or criminal case may at times be unavoidable,
the Court disallows undue or unnecessary
postponements of court hearings, simply because
they cause unreasonable delays in the
administration of justice and, thus, undermine the
peoples faith in the Judiciary, aside from
aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of
the litigants. For this reason, the Court has enjoined
that postponements and resettings should be
allowed only upon meritorious grounds, and has
consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm
policy against improvident postponements.