1.

Araneta vs Dinglasan

Facts: Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which
regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is
the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit
Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that
EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other
cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma.
Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the
Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to
prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds *from 49-50+ pursuant to EO
225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating
funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN
ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR
INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or
simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671
ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it
had likewise ceased.

Issue: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

Held: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress
met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos.
62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the
first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to
the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session,
the Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the
corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the
Legislature, unless sooner amended or repealed by the National
Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be
made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted
upon reconvening or upon early repeal.












2. People vs Vera

Facts: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed
for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded
the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he
was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to
the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However,
Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to
be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has
no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of
Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting
provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to
convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable
to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial
boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the
said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the
executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issue: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the
Probation Law provides that ony in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer may the probation system be applied.
Held: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In
fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue
delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by
Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of
power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall
be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that
only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may
have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say
that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not
avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as
unconstitutional.

3. U.S. vs Tang Ho

Facts: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special
session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the
Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under
extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such
products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued EO 53
which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which
rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,
voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at
the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6
th
of August 1919. On 08
August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He was found guilty
as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation
of power to the Governor General.

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

Held: Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed
the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto
charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law
or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order
fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the
judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of
the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms
and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and
nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its
details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.











4. Hirabayahsi vs U.S.

Facts: After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued EO
9066 which was later endorsed by the Congress thru HR. 1911 authorizing
the Secretary of War to adapt measures in protecting the state against
espionage and espionage.

General Dewitt then issued Public Proclamation No. 1 and 2 defining the
military zones. Public Proclamation No. 3 was released thereafter imposing
curfew hours on all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, and all alien Italians
including all persons of Japanese ancestry, and that they all be confined
within their respective residences between 8pm- 6am.

Hirabayashi failed twice to adhere to the curfew and was therefore
sentenced to one month and one day imprisonment.

Issue: WON EO 9066 is constitutional and that if it violates the Fifth
Amendment as to descriminating citizens as to their race or ancestry. WON
the congress unjustly delegated its powers to another in promulgating laws.

5. Ynot vs IAC

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not
only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as
the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6
carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-
A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to
curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 626-A is Constitutional or not.

Held: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process.
EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive.
The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and
is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.

6. De Llana vs Alba

Facts: In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la
Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the
judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he
said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides
the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can
remove judges NOT Congress.

Issue: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).
Held: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the
abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent
is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office
with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that
from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise.

7. Pelaez vs Auditor General

Facts: From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds
thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive
orders.

Issue: Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this
power has been vested in the legislative department.


Held: Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
concerned. Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. Section 68 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power
than what was vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or
any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

8. Jimenez vs Cabangbang

Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He
wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in several
newspapers of general circulation exposing the allegedly operational plans by
some ambitious AFP officers regarding a massive political build-up of then
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him to become a
candidate for President in 1961.

Issue: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged
communication.

Held: The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the
publication falls within the purview of the phrase speech or debate in
Congress as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices,
in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such,
at the time of the performance of the acts in question.


The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was
an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of the
Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication
is not absolutely privileged.

9. Adaza vs Panaca

Facts: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the
January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging
his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-
governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27,
1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP
elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana
lost. Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984
and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23,
1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25,
1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has
brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was
elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the
governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided
by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France,
Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position
to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.

Issue: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a
governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor
who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such
can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.

Held: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa]
shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet . . .


The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot
invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions
which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza
further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he
became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by
petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP.
697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984,
Section 13*2+ of which specifically provides that governors, mayors,
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a
certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from
office. Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision,
considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in
Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.

10. Puyat vs De Guzman

Facts: On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the
International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by
Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted
hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange
Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao
Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a
conference held by SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to
have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is
unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before
any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez
inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an
Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not
as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion
in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat then moved to
question the Commissioners action.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may
intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art.
VI) of the Constitution.






Held: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise
that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and
that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from
appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the
conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated
that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as
a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after
the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What
could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

11. Arroyo vs De Venecia

Facts: An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced
to the House of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and
sale of beer and cigarettes. This was later passed accordingly and brought to
the House of Senate. Upon the interpellation on the second reading, herein
petitioner moved for adjournment for lack of quorum which is constitutionally
needed to conduct business. Petitioners motion was defeated and was
railroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not the law passed on violation on the constitutional
mandate.

Held: There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be
determined by viva voce or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require
that the yeas and nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to
vote, except only on the following instances upon the last and the third
readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the Members present and in
passing a bill over the veto of the President. Second, there is obviousness on
the part of the petitioner to delay the business of the House, thus eliminating
the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused. Third, the enrolled bill
doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding
provided it is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld
principle of separation of powers, which herein, is applicable for the
legislative branch for it has exercised its power without grave abuse of
discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.












12. Philippine Judges Association vs Prado

Facts: Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the
Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court,
COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from
them. In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the
methods adopted prior it becoming a law.



Issue: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection before
the law.

Held: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying
that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act,
or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection
clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and
the grantees of the franking privilege. Therefore, RA 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

13. Astorga vs Villegas

Facts: House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application filed in the House of
Representatives, was passed on third reading without amendments. But
when the bill was discussed in the Senate, substantial amendments were
introduced by Senator Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto
by the Senate. There was also an amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas but this does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as
having been acted upon. The House of Representatives thereafter signified
its approval of H.B.9266 containing the amendments recommended by
Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The printed copies of the bill were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the
Senate President. Then the President affixed his signature thereto by way of
approval. The bill became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of H.B.
9266 signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill actually
passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced
by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence, the Senate
President invalidated his signature on the bill. Thereafter, the President
withdrew his signature on H.B. 9266.
Issue: Whether or not the enrolled bill doctrine should be adhered to.

Held: The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal
and independent departments, which requires the judicial department to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner.

Petitioners argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment, required, it is said, by
the respect due to a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized
by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his
signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the
Senate. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in the
journal should be consulted.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. The
Court declares that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law.

14. ABBAs vs Senate Electoral Tribunal

Fact: This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the
Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and
May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners' Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter
filed.

Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit
themselves in hearing SET Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested
parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral Tribunal senateless, and all
remaining members coming from the judiciary.

Issue: Whether or not the set can function without the Senator members.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit and affirmed the decision of the Tribunal to not let Senator-Members
to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from participating
in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests
or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.





15. Bondoc vs Pineda

Facts: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the
LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9
members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are
members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP
and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached
in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP
voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman
Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled
from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of
Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del
Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the
decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal
that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request
of the dominant political party therein, may change that partys
representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision
freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

Held: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and impartial
tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of
partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience
vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination
and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of
discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution
of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.


Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to
security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of
the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore,
membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause,
such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or
removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another.

16. Daza vs Singson

Facts: The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting
to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its
representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat
occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member.
Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA
which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by
Singson. Daza questioned such replacement.
Issue: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly
changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments.

Held: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the
House of Representatives elected by each house respectively on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily
connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the
requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also
subsequently thereto NOT the court.













17. Gonzales vs Hechenova

Facts: Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000
tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. Ramon A.
Gonzales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters asso.,
filed and averring that in making or attempting to make importation of
foreign rice are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because
RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by Rice and
Corn Administration or any government agency.

Issue: Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our
courts.

Held: The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in
consonace to section 2 art. VIII of the constitution. the alleged consummation
of the contracts with vietnam and burma does not render this case academic.
RA 2207, enjoins our government not from entering contracts for the
purchase of rice, but from entering rice, except under conditions prescribed
in said act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation wouldnot
compel our government to default in the performance of such obligations as
it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question because aside from
the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said
commodity into the phils., the proposed importation may still be legalized by
complying with the provisions of the aforementioned law.

18. Lidasan vs COMELEC

Facts: Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is
entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios
Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,
Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are
parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the
Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said
territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being
unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in
creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from
Cotabato.




Issue: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located
in another province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill?

Held: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to
the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and
added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark
as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily
weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

19. Philconsa vs Gimenez

Facts: Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the
validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to
the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement
gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision
constitutes selfish class legislation because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity
equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not
refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other
officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty
(20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24
months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest
rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt
of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or does not
constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article
VI of the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class
legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under
the said Act is merely in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due
each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their
salary.


Issue: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.

Held: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless
otherwise provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand
two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective
district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but
it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such
increase. In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding
the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no
increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the
members of the Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI,
includes in the term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point
on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided
for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term other emoluments.
Emolument as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of
an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument,
because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of
said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available
thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.



20. Tobias vs Abalos

Facts: Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the
City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong
whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only
14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7,
911 voted no.

Issue: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing
Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)
Held: Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the
contention of constitutionality pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was
enforced justifying the act of the legislature to increase the number of the
members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which
drafted the bill reapportioning the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

21. Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs Valencia

Facts: Bolinao Electronics is co-owner an co-petitioner of Chronicle
Broadcasting Network Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate
and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They
were summoned by Valencia, then Sec of Communications, for operating
even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs
continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused
damage to his department.

Issue: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.

Held: The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of
his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the
SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the
Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in
the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow
appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was
no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are
expenditures made by Valencias department they are in fact in violation of
the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown
that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is
illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an
appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. This ruling, that the
executives veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the
veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect
whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore,
remains.

22. Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon

Facts: Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged
acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is
a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Section 5.

The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the
decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a
temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon
committee of compelling them to appear before them.

Issue: Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend
that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative
purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of
hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond
the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the
inquiry violates their right to due process.

Held: The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation
wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of
the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary.
The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the
Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed.

Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation.








23. Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works

Facts: In 1953, RA 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for
the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig
feeder road terminals. Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the
law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private
use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Zulueta who was a
member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual
claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those
terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of
the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Sec
of Public Works be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on
the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the
City of Pasig.
Issue: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
Held: The donation of the property to the government to make the
property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was
passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In
accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land
on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and,
hence, was null and void.
24. Garcia vs Mata
Facts: The donation of the property to the government to make the
property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was
passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In
accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land
on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and,
hence, was null and void.
Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain rider in an appropriation
bill?
Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA
1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an
appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a
fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of
inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION
MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the
general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated
provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered
must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which
are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such
provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.
25. Demetrio vs Alba
Facts: Petitioners fi l ed as concerned ci ti zens of thi s country, as
members of the Nati onal Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their
millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the
people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected
by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for. The petitioners assai l the
consti tuti onal i ty of the fi rst paragraph of Sec. 44 of PD 1177 or the
Budget Reform Decree of 1977 with a petition for prohibition with prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. The contents of PD 1177 particularly that of the first paragraph of
section 44 extends the privilege of the president to discriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department of any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or offi ce i ncl uded
i n the General Appropri ati ons Act or approved after its enactment.

Issue: Whether or not the peti ti oners have l ocus standi and
ful fi l l the requi si tes for sui ng as taxpayers and concerned ci ti zens.

Hel d: The petitioners comply with the legal standing both as concerned citizens and taxpayers.
As concerned citizens, the petitioners bring the suit in quest of law and justice. The issue cri es out
to be sol ved as j usti ce demands not onl y for the vi ndi cati on of the
outraged
right but also for the guidance of the bench and bar, and as a restraint upon the future.
Furthermore, the petitioner has standing to sue as taxpayer. In the determination
of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a s t a t u t e , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e i s t h a t n o t o n l y
p e r s o n s i n d i v i d u a l l y a f f e c t e d , b u t a l s o taxpayers. They have
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys.
T h e S u p r e m e C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e i n s t a n t p e t i t i o n .
P a r a g r a p h 1 o f S e c t i o n 4 4 o f Presidential Decree No. 1177 was also
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.