4910 Kidwell Chapter 3

69
The Role of Leaders

in Influencing Unethical
Behavior in the Workplace
Linda Klebe Trevio
Michael E. Brown
A
fter years of focusing on explaining and predicting positive employee
attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction, employee commitment) and behaviors
(e.g., employee citizenship, work performance), organizational behavior
researchers have increasingly turned their attention to understanding what drives
costly misconduct in organizations (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Giacalone &
Greenberg, 1997; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Robinson & OLeary-Kelly, 1998;
Trevio, 1986; Vardi & Wiener, 1996). Although researchers have used a variety of
terms to describe such employee behavior (e.g., deviance, antisocial behavior,
misbehavior, counterproductive behavior, unethical behavior), all of them share a
concern with counternormative behavior intended to harm the organization or its
stakeholders (OLeary-Kelly, Duffy, & Griffin, 2000).
Unethical behavior in organizations has been widely reported in the wake
of many recent high-profile corporate scandals. As researchers and practitioners
consider what may be driving such behavior, leaders are coming under increasing
scrutiny not only because many senior executives are accused of having committed
unethical acts but also because of the role that leaders at all levels are thought to
play in managing the ethical (and unethical) conduct of organization members. For
example, Bernie Ebbers, the former chief executive officer of WorldCom, was hailed
as a great leader for growing the company into a telecommunications superpower.
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Ebbers, however, was later discredited for his failure to provide moral leadership
as WorldCom became engulfed in financial scandals that resulted in the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history (for more on Ebbers, see Case 3). As Turner, Barling,
Epitropaki, Butcher, and Milner (2002) suggest, organizational researchers are
increasingly interested in the moral potential of leadership (p. 304). The assump-
tion is that a leader who exerts moral authority should be able to influence followers
ethical behavior.
Theory and research suggest that leaders should, and do, influence organiza-
tional ethics. The normative business ethics literature has focused on cases (e.g.,
Donaldson & Gini, 1996) or prescriptions regarding what leaders should do to pro-
vide ethical leadership (e.g., Ciulla, 1998; Freeman, Gilbert, & Hartman, 1988; Rost,
1995). The descriptive business ethics literature has reported that executive leaders
set the ethical tone at the top of organizations (Murphy & Enderle, 1995) and shape
their formal and informal ethical cultures (Trevio, 1990; Trevio & Nelson, 2004).
Executive leaders have been found to play an important role in communicating
ethical standards and using rewards and punishments to reinforce normatively
appropriate conduct (Trevio, Hartman, & Brown, 2000). In addition, senior man-
agements concern for ethics has been shown to influence an organizations values
or compliance-oriented approach to ethics management and its integration of
ethics into everyday activities such as performance appraisals (Weaver, Trevio, &
Cochran, 1999a, 1999b). Leaders have also been found to influence employees
ethical conduct. For example, employees perception that executives and supervisors
sincerely care about ethics has been associated with the amount of unethical con-
duct observed in the organization (Trevio, Weaver, Gibson, & Toffler, 1999).
However, despite this evidence suggesting that leaders matter when it comes to
organizational ethics, the specific role of leadership in influencing unethical behavior
in the workplace has yet to be fully explicated.
In this chapter, we explore theoretical reasons why leaders should play an
important role in influencing followers ethical and unethical behavior. Specifically,
we look at this relationship from cognitive moral development, social learning,
and social exchange perspectives. Next, we consider leadership styles and how
they have been linked to ethics in the leadership literature (e.g., transformational/
charismatic leadership). Next, we discuss our recent research on the development
of an ethical leadership construct. We conclude with recommendations for future
research.
Why Leaders Are Important: Insights
From Cognitive Moral Development Theory
To understand why leaders are important for understanding ethical and unethical
behavior in organizations, we first turn to moral psychology and particularly to
cognitive moral development theory (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlbergs theory, widely
cited as the leading theory in the field of moral development, focuses on how
individuals reason through ethical dilemmas and how they decide what is right.
70MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL DEVIANCE
Although Kohlberg studied the moral development of children and young adults,
his students (e.g., Rest, 1986) and others have studied adults in work settings.
According to Kohlberg (1969), people reason at six stages that can be understood
in terms of three broad levels: preconventional, conventional, and principled.
Preconventional individuals (the lowest level) are concerned with avoiding punish-
ment and a one hand washes the other kind of reciprocation. Principled individu-
als (the highest level) make decisions autonomously by looking inside themselves
and are guided by principles of justice and rights. But we know from decades of
research that the large majority of adults reason at the conventional level of cogni-
tive moral development (for summaries of research on moral development, see Rest,
1986; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999; for a summary of research on moral
development in the professions, see Rest & Narvaez, 1994). Such conventional-level
individuals look outside themselves to rules and laws and to the expectations of sig-
nificant others in their environments for guidance when determining the ethically
right thing to do. Because these conventional-level individuals represent the large
majority of workers, immediate supervisors should be among the most important
sources of moral guidance for these employees, and we can expect that they will look
to leaders for cues about what behavior is appropriate and inappropriate.
It is also important to note that moral reasoning has been associated with
ethical and unethical conduct in a number of studies. Individuals at the principled
level of moral development are less likely to engage in negative behaviors such as
cheating and stealing, whereas those at lower levels are more likely to engage in such
behaviors and are more susceptible to outside influences (e.g., Greenberg, 2002; for
a review, see Trevio, 1992). Although other outside influences, such as peers (Zey-
Ferrell & Ferrell, 1982; Zey-Ferrell, Weaver, & Ferrell, 1979), and formal organiza-
tional systems, such as ethics codes and training programs (Greenberg, 2002;
Trevio et al., 1999), affect ethical behavior, leaders should be a key source of
ethical guidance due to the authority role they play. In fact, leaders level of moral
reasoning has been shown to influence the moral reasoning used by group
members in their decision making (Dukerich, Nichols, Elm, & Vollrath, 1990), and
leadership style has been shown to influence conformity in ethical decision-making
frameworks in work groups (Schminke, Wells, Peyrefitte, & Sebora, 2002). The next
step, then, is to attempt to better understand some of the theoretical processes by
which leaders are likely to influence such behavior.
How Leaders Influence Employee
Ethical and Unethical Behavior
We discuss several theoretical explanations for how leaders influence ethical and
unethical behavior. We offer a social learning perspective to suggest that leaders
influence ethical and unethical conduct through modeling processes, and we offer
a social exchange perspective to suggest that subordinates are likely to reciprocate
with positive behavior when they and their leaders are involved in relationships
that are based on admiration and trust.
The Role of Leaders71
Social Learning
Social learning has been used to understand how leaders influence followers
more generally. House (1977), Bass (1985), and Kouzes and Posner (1987) all have
referred to role modeling as essential leader behavior. In particular, charismatic or
transformational leaders (discussed in detail later) are thought to influence follow-
ers, at least in part, through modeling and identification processes (Avolio, 1999;
Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1999; Kelman, 1958).
A social learning perspective (Bandura, 1977) suggests that leaders influence
their followers by way of modeling processes. Modeling is acknowledged to be
one of the most powerful means for transmitting values, attitudes, and behaviors.
Employees learn what to do, as well as what not to do, by observing their leaders
behavior and its consequences. Leaders are likely to be models by virtue of their
assigned role, their status and success in the organization, and their power to affect
the behavior and outcomes of followers.
Clearly, modeling by leaders can influence followers to be ethical or unethical.
Leaders who engage in unethical behaviors create a context supporting parallel
deviance (Kemper, 1966), meaning that employees observe and are likely to imitate
the inappropriate conduct. If leaders are observed cooking the books, enriching
themselves at the expense of others, or lying to customers or suppliers, followers
learn that such behavior is expected. If leaders are rewarded for unethical conduct,
the lesson for followers becomes particularly strong. Consider some chief executive
officers, such as WorldComs Bernie Ebbers and Enrons Ken Lay, who were
celebrated by financial analysts and the media as exceptional executive leaders
who defied conventional wisdom as they continually surpassed Wall Streets
short-term financial expectations. They were publicly hailed and financially
rewarded for achieving extraordinary financial outcomes, and no one seemed to
care what means they used to achieve those outcomes. We should not be surprised
to find that their subordinates followed their leads and became increasingly adept
at inventing new (and sometimes unethical) ways in which to contribute to these
outcomes.
Employees can also learn to be ethical by observing leaders who stand up for
doing what is right, especially if the leaders are successful in doing so. For example,
a chief executive who communicates with employees about a decision not to invest
in a highly corrupt foreign country because it would require employees to engage
in inappropriate behavior such as bribery is sending an important signal about
what is appropriate and expected of followers. Similarly, an executive who shuts
down machinery to ensure employee or product safety makes it clear that doing the
right thing is expected even if it means short-term losses.
Leaders power to influence may be particularly effective because leaders make
decisions about the rewards and punishments that are imposed on employees,
and followers learn vicariously by observing what happens to others. People in
organizations pay close attention to rewards and punishments (Arvey & Jones,
1985; Kanfer, 1990; Trevio, 1992), and these contribute to modeling effectiveness
because they are socially salient. Modeling theory argues that consequences
(rewards and punishments) facilitate learning in an anticipatory and vicarious
manner. Consequences inform observers about the benefits of modeled ethical
behavior as well as about the negative effects of modeled inappropriate behavior.
So, not only are leaders role models themselves, but they also make others
into models by rewarding appropriate conduct and disciplining inappropriate
conduct (Gini, 1998; Trevio, Brown, & Hartman, 2003). This seems especially
important to the management of unethical conduct. We would not want every
employee to have to personally experience punishment for inappropriate conduct
so as to learn that such behavior is unacceptable. By observing how other employ-
ees are rewarded and punished, many employees can learn these important lessons
vicariously.
Relying on justice and social learning theories, Trevio (1992) emphasized the
key social implications of punishment in organizations. Discipline sends powerful
signals about the value of organizational norms and leaders willingness to stand
behind them. Employees who are trying to do the right thing expect misconduct
to be punished harshly, and they are disappointed if it is not. For example, if an
employee who downloads pornography to his office computer is quickly termi-
nated, other employees will get the clear message that such behavior will not
be tolerated and that rules against it are being enforced in the organization.
Employees sense of retributive justice (Hogan & Emler, 1981) will be satisfied
(Trevio, 1992; Trevio & Ball, 1992), and they will be less likely to engage in such
behavior themselves. However, if such behavior is allowed to continue, employees
will question managements sincerity and whether the organizations rules mean
what they say.
Similarly, vicarious rewards can send powerful messages supporting ethical
or unethical conduct. If an employee who pulled the handle to stop a potentially
dangerous machine from harming a coworker is celebrated for his or her caring,
observers learn that such behavior is appropriate, expected, and appreciated in the
organization. Alternatively, if that same employee is punished because stopping the
machine means missing short-term production quotas, employees will learn that
short-term production quotas are more important than employee safety and that
they are expected to behave accordingly. Finally, if a salesperson who is known to
lie to customers is made Salesperson of the Year, given a fat bonus, and sent on a
Hawaiian vacation, employees will learn that lying to customers is rewarded,
making such behavior more likely. Thus, employees are susceptible to leaders
influence to engage in appropriate or inappropriate behavior by learning from the
leaders own modeling of such behavior and by learning vicariously from how other
employees behavior is rewarded and punished.
The social learning approach suggests a mostly instrumental understanding of
what drives unethical behavior in organizations. It argues that because of leaders
authority role and the power to reward and punish, employees will pay attention to
and mimic leaders behavior, and they will do what is rewarded and avoid doing
what is punished in the organization. The rewards and punishments need not be
direct but also can be learned vicariously by observing how others in the organiza-
tion are rewarded and disciplined.
Social Exchange
Instrumental exchange is not the only way in which leaders can influence
followers ethical and unethical behavior. The quality of the interpersonal treatment
that employees receive from leaders is also likely to be an important factor.
Typically, high-quality leaderemployee relationships are characterized as social
exchanges as opposed to transactional ones. According to Blau (1964), transactional
exchanges are characterized by quid pro quo logic and are governed by contract
so that all terms and obligations are specified in advance and are enforceable by
third parties. As a result, obligations governed by transactional exchange have a
contractual tone and do not depend on trust between the parties. In a transactional
exchange relationship, a supervisor relies on legitimate power to influence employ-
ees through the use of rewards or punishments, and employees can be expected to
perform their duties as directed but to do little more.
In contrast, social exchange relationships entail future obligations that are
unspecified and are enforced by norms of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Without
the protection of contractually specified obligations, the perceived trustworthiness
of the partners and the fairness of the exchange become important for developing
and maintaining lasting relationships. With social exchange, the obligation to reci-
procate is voluntary (i.e., not contractually specified), and the benefits obtained
may be nonmonetary. The rewards exchanged may be spontaneous (e.g., attraction,
gratitude, respect). In addition, individuals in social exchange relationships tend to
identify with the other parties in the exchange relationships. Parties engage in social
exchange willingly, and reputation plays an important role in ensuring that the
norms of fairness governing the exchange are not violated. Although the risks of
exploitation and one-sidedness are high, a social exchange relationship develops
over time with increased trust (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998) and
can be mutually beneficial for the parties involved as well as for the larger organi-
zation in which they work. Typically, leaders engage in both social and transactional
exchanges with subordinates (Bass, 1985). Studies have shown that these two
dimensions are strongly correlated (Avolio, 1999), although the dimensions can
lead to different outcomes.
Perceived Fairness
Perceived fairness is particularly important for the development of a social
exchange relationship (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994), especially in the context of a
leadersubordinate relationship (Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999). When
employees believe that they are treated fairly in a social exchange relationship
(Konovsky & Pugh, 1994), they are motivated to give more of themselves
affectively, cognitively, and/or behaviorallyin support of their supervisor and the
group or organization that he or she represents. Fair treatment engenders satisfac-
tion and loyalty among employees, making it less likely they will be motivated to
harm their supervisor, group, or organization.
Social exchange is closely linked to both procedural and interactional fairness
(Moorman, Blakely & Niehoff, 1998; Pillai et al., 1999). Interactional fairness refers
to employees perceptions of the degree to which they are treated with respect and
dignity by authority figures (Bies & Moag, 1986). Perceived interactional justice
should be particularly important to the development of a social exchange relation-
ship between supervisors and subordinates because supervisors interact with their
subordinates and make decisions that affect them every day. Although immediate
supervisors may have little impact on the development of organizational proce-
dures (procedural justice), they are likely the most important influence on employ-
ees perceptions of whether the employees are treated with dignity and respect in
the organization. When leaders treat employees well, they initiate social exchange
processes, creating a sense of obligation among subordinates and motivating them
to reciprocate. Subordinates may reciprocate by way of organizational citizenship
behaviors, particularly those aimed at their supervisor (Malatesta & Byrne, 1997;
Masterson, Lewis-McClear, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993;
Wayne, Shore, Bommer, & Tetrick, 2002), or by refraining from behaviors aimed at
harming their leader, work group, or organization.
Alternatively, perceived unfair treatment can provoke strong negative reactions
from employees. Greenberg (1990) found that employees reacted to perceived
unfair pay cuts and interpersonally insensitive explanations from management by
stealing from the organization, just one of many studies that have linked perceived
unfairness with counterproductive employee behaviors (Konovsky, 2000). In
response to perceived injustice, employees may engage in interpersonal and orga-
nizationally directed retaliation, including sabotage (Ambrose, Seabright, &
Schminke, 2002; Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Robinson & Bennett, 1997; Trevio &
Weaver, 2001) in an attempt to rebalance the scales of justice. One might expect an
employee to target the source of the injustice, but an employee will be unlikely to
retaliate against a leader overtly because such retaliation will most likely lead to for-
mal sanction or punishment. Instead, we expect that employee retaliation will be
covert and broader, including behaviors such as falsifying expense reports, abusing
sick time, lying to the supervisor, and misusing company time and other resources.
Research has found that unfair treatment by an individual, especially by a supervi-
sor, can result in retaliation against either the person or the organization as a whole
(Ambrose et al., 2002; Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002).
Trust in Supervisor
Social exchange relationships between leaders and followers are built on trust.
Trust in leaders is especially important for employees due to their weak and subor-
dinate positions relative to their supervisors (Kramer, 1999). Furthermore, leaders
influence important outcomes such as pay, promotion, and satisfying work condi-
tions. Employees face uncertainty about these outcomes and whether their leaders
will allocate them fairly (Kramer, 1996). Furthermore, employees are dependent
on their supervisors as representatives of higher organizational authority. When
employees trust their leaders, the employees are more willing to engage in volun-
tary behaviors that benefit the organization (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, &
Bachrach, 2000). A recent meta-analysis found that employees trust in their lead-
ers was associated with many positive outcomes (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002), including
citizenship behaviors (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994) such as altruism, civic virtue,
conscientiousness, courtesy, and sportsmanship as well as job satisfaction and
satisfaction with their leaders. We can think of citizenship behaviors (which help
the work group and organization) as representing the opposite of organizationally
and interpersonally harmful behaviors. Therefore, as citizenship behaviors increase,
unethical behaviors should decrease. Negative outcomes should be lower if employ-
ees trust their leaders because, as argued earlier, the leaders represent the organiza-
tion to direct reports. Furthermore, although trust has been found to be more
strongly related to work attitudes than to job performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002),
the relationship of trust with unethical employee behaviors is likely to be strong
because, theoretically, trust is more closely related to such behaviors than to more
general job performance.
Liking and Affection for Supervisor
The leadermember exchange literature has focused on the importance of high-
quality relationships between employees and their leader (Dansereau, Graen, &
Haga, 1975; Graen & Cashman, 1975). In this literature, high-quality relationships
are frequently characterized by employee liking and admiration of their leader
(Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999). When employees have a high-quality rela-
tionship with their manager, they have been found to be less likely to engage in
retaliation (Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997). Alternatively, when employees have a
poor exchange relationship with their supervisor, negative outcomes can result
(Fairhurst, 1993). Some have argued that if employees dislike or are frustrated with
a supervisor, they will retaliate in surreptitious ways by harming the organization
through sabotage or by being aggressive with coworkers (Fairhurst, 1993; Liden
et al., 1997; Zahn & Wolf, 1981). Again, we expect that employees will be less likely
to engage in overt retaliation against a supervisor who they dislike because doing so
would most likely lead to formal sanction or punishment. Rather, such frustration
and dislike for a supervisor is likely to lead to covert (i.e., behind-the-back) harm-
ful behaviors aimed at coworkers or the organization (Bennett & Robinson, 2000).
Leadership Styles and
Employee Ethical/Unethical Behavior
Now that we know something about the theoretical processes that are important
to leaders influence on followers ethical and unethical behavior, we turn to the
leadership literature to see what it can tell us about this relationship.
Transformational and Charismatic Leadership
The organizational leadership literature has addressed leaderships moral
dimension primarily through the transformational and charismatic leadership
dimensions (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996). In the broader leadership literature,
Burns (1978) distinguished transformational leadership from transactional
approaches. He argued that transformational leaders encourage followers to
embrace moral values and to act in the interest of the collective rather than self-
interest. He cited Kohlbergs (1969) theory of cognitive moral development,
Maslows (1954) hierarchy of human needs, and Rokeachs (1973) theory of values
to explain transformational leaders influence. Transformational leaders are
thought to raise followers level of moral development and to focus followers atten-
tion on higher level needs and values.
In contrast, transactional leaders rely on rewards and punishments to direct
followers behavior. Kanungo and Mendonca (1996) argued that transactional
approaches are inconsistent with moral leadership because transactional
approaches ignore followers needs and aspirations and that transactional leaders
focus on the status quo rather than on an inspiring vision of the future and may be
motivated by their own achievement and power rather than followers needs.
Bass (1985) translated Burnss (1978) work on transformational leadership for
the organizational behavior literature and, with Avolio (Bass & Avolio, 2000), devel-
oped a multidimensional transformational leadership construct with the following
dimensions: individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, idealized influ-
ence, and inspirational motivation. The idealized influence dimension is the most
clearly moral dimension, with its focus on setting a good example, communicat-
ing moral values, and sacrificing self-interest for the benefit of the group.
Transformational leadership has been associated with many positive outcomes
such as workers satisfaction with work and the leader, organizational commitment,
citizenship behaviors, and job performance (Fuller, Patterson, Hester, & Stringer,
1996; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; Yukl, 2002). However, researchers
have just begun to study the influential mechanisms that mediate between leader
behavior and these outcomes. Transformational leaders, by way of the idealized
influence component, are thought to influence followers to develop a collectivistic
orientation rather than a selfish one, to internalize moral values transmitted by the
leader, and to increase followers self-efficacy (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993).
The inspirational motivation component of transformational leadership
combines with idealized influence to represent the charismatic aspect of trans-
formational leadership. With inspirational motivation, leaders use symbols to
present an attractive and optimistic vision of the future. Conger and Kanungo
(1998) proposed that charismatic leaders would influence followers by arousing
their personal identification with the leaders (Pratt, 1998). The charismatic leader-
ship literature (House, 1977) argues that charismatic leaders link the organizations
mission with followers self-concept, including a sense of moral virtue (Gecas, 1982).
Similar to transformational leaders, charismatic leaders are thought to emphasize
the collective and the value of being part of something larger than themselves.
Thus far, the research to document these mediating mechanisms has produced
mixed results. For example, Kark, Shamir, and Chen (2003) found that transforma-
tional leadership was related to personal identification with the leader and to social
identification with the work unit, although personal identification with the leader
had the stronger effect. But Dvir, Eden, Avolio, and Shamir (2002) failed to support
their hypothesis that transformational leaders influence followers to develop a
collectivistic orientation or to internalize moral values. Similarly, Shamir, Zakay,
Breinin, and Popper (1998) found a negative relationship between leader charisma
and follower self-efficacy, and their research provided only weak support for the
proposition that charismatic leaders influence followers by inspiring them to work
for the collective interests of the group. Furthermore, although a recent study found
that transformational leaders are higher in moral reasoning (Turner et al., 2002),
we do not yet have evidence that transformational leaders transmit this higher
moral reasoning to their followers.
Clearly, more theoretical and empirical work will be needed to fully understand
the processes by which transformational and charismatic leaders influence follow-
ers and any relationship between these leadership styles and ethics-related
outcomes. One problem with understanding the relationship with ethics-related
outcomes may be that transformational and charismatic leadership approaches
presume charismatic appeal and/or transformative processes that may or may
not be necessary to influence followers ethical conduct (Trevio et al., 2003).
Another problem concerns the potential darker manifestations of transforma-
tional and charismatic leaders. Bass (1985) acknowledged that transformational
leaders can wear white hats or black hats. In addition, others have argued that
both transformational and charismatic leaders can be self-centered and manipula-
tive in the means they use to achieve their goals (Parry & Proctor-Thomson, 2002).
Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) distinguished between pseudo-transformational lead-
ers, who are self-interested and lack moral virtue, and authentic transformational
leaders, who are more clearly moral leaders.
Others have coined the term authentic leadership to refer to a broad leadership
construct that they propose to be the root concept underlying all positive approaches
to leadership and its development (May, Chan, Hodges, & Avolio, 2003, p. 2). May
and colleagues (2003) argued that authentic leaders have the ability to judge ethical
dilemmas from multiple stakeholder perspectives and see their leadership role as
including ethical responsibility. In addition, authentic leaders are self-aware and
transparent in their decision making as well as in their intentions to act ethically.
Authentic leaders can be, but are not necessarily, charismatic and/or transforma-
tional, but they are courageous enough to act on their ethical intentions and to
sustain ethical action despite countervailing pressures.
Ethical Leadership
Because we sought to establish empirical grounding for further research on an
ethical dimension of leadership, we have focused our attention on the development
of a construct we call ethical leadership. We conducted interviews with 20 senior
executives (mostly chief executives) and 20 ethics officers in large business organi-
zations. We asked them to describe the characteristics and behaviors of an ethical
leader with whom they had worked closely during their careers. The good news is
that all of them quickly thought of someone, suggesting that ethical leadership is
not a rare phenomenon in todays business organizations. Similarly, a majority of
respondents to the National Business Ethics Survey agreed that their supervisors
and executive leaders model ethical behavior (Joseph, 2000).
Systematic content analysis of our interview data suggested that ethical leaders are
both moral persons and moral managers (Trevio et al., 2000). We think of the
moral person as representing the ethical part of the term ethical leadership, and
we think of the moral manager as representing the leadership part of that term.
Ethical leaders are thought to be moral persons because they are honest and
trustworthy, take good care of their people, and do the right things in both their
personal and professional lives. They make decisions based on values and ethical
decision rules, and they are fair and concerned about stakeholders interests and
long-term outcomes.
As moral managers, ethical leaders are clear about their expectations of follow-
ers. They are visible role models of ethical behavior, communicate with their people
about their ethical and values-based expectations, and use the reward system to
hold followers accountable for ethical conduct.
Ethical leaders are also socially salient in their organizations. Ethical leaders
stand out from what can be described as an ethically neutral background in many
business organizations where the intent focus on the financial bottom line can easily
drown out other messages (Trevio et al., 2003).
It is important to note that the executives we interviewed rarely described ethical
leaders as either transformative or visionary, terms that are consistent with the
transformational and charismatic leadership literatures. In addition, ethical leaders
clearly use the reward system to support ethical conduct, suggesting that ethical
leadership includes a dimension more consistent with transactional leadership
approaches. Thus, although overlap certainly exists between ethical leadership
and the transformational and charismatic leadership constructs, some important
differences remain.
Understanding ethical leadership in this way makes sense if we consider the
proposed theoretical processes underlying the relationship between leadership and
employee ethical conduct: social learning and social exchange. In accordance with
a social learning perspective, ethical leaders are described as being visible ethical
role models who stand out from an ethically neutral landscape. They behave
ethically in their personal and professional lives, and they make decisions based on
ethical principles and the long-term interest of multiple stakeholders. Followers are
likely to personally identify with such a visible role model of ethical conduct and to
pattern their own behavior after that of the leader.
In addition, ethical leaders send clear messages to organizational members
about expected behavior and use the reward system to hold everyone accountable
to those expectations. By clearly rewarding ethical conduct and disciplining
unethical conduct, they allow for vicarious learning to take place. This aspect of
ethical leadership depends on social learning and can be viewed as more transac-
tional (than transformational) because followers behave ethically and refrain from
unethical conduct largely due to the observed consequences.
However, ethical leadership is also consistent with a social exchange perspective.
Ethical leaders were described as being trustworthy and as treating their people
with care, concern, and fairness. As such, they are likely to create social exchange
relationships with their subordinates, who can be expected to reciprocate this care
and fair treatment by engaging in citizenship behaviors and by refraining from
unethical conduct. In addition, using the reward system to support ethical conduct
is consistent with followers perceptions of organizational justice. By disciplining
unethical conduct, the leaders are upholding organizational norms and supporting
the values of those who obey the rules. Thus, ethical leaders are likely to influence
their followers to engage in ethical conduct and to refrain from unethical conduct
by way of multiple processes that rely on both transformational and transactional
approaches to leadership. This finding is contrary to the view that transactional
approaches are inconsistent with ethical leadership (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996).
Discussion
In this chapter, we have focused on the role of leadership in influencing employees
ethical and unethical conduct. We argued that because most employees are at the
conventional level of cognitive moral development, they are looking outside them-
selves for guidance in ethical dilemma situations. Leaders, especially first-line
supervisors, should be a key source of such guidance due to their proximity to their
followers and their power to influence subordinate outcomes. We then outlined a
number of theoretical processes, particularly social learning and social exchange,
that are proposed to underlie this relationship between leader and follower ethical
outcomes. We also reviewed the leadership literature for insight into relevant
leadership styles and found that although transformational/charismatic leaders are
proposed to be moral leaders, the empirical evidence for their influence on ethics-
related outcomes remains scanty. Finally, we reviewed our own work on an ethical
leadership construct that more tightly links leadership characteristics and practices
to ethics-related outcomes.
Potential Limitations on the Role of Leadership
We hope that we have convinced the reader that leadership is enormously
important and deserves more attention in our attempts to understand employee
ethical and unethical behavior. However, we should also put the role of leaders in a
broader context and understand its potential limitations, all of which are open to
empirical testing.
We expect that some employees will be less influenced by leaders than will others.
For example, employees who are at the principled level of cognitive moral develop-
ment are expected to behave in accordance with internally held principles of justice
and rights. Therefore, their ethical conduct should be less influenced by what spe-
cific leaders do or say. If faced with unethical leadership, principled individuals are
more likely than others to try to change the situation, blow the whistle, or leave.
Employees at the lowest levels of cognitive moral development (preconven-
tional) should be less influenced by leaders than by reward system contingencies.
When thinking about right and wrong, preconventional individuals think mostly
about obedience and punishment avoidance or instrumental exchange (i.e., a one
hand washes the other kind of relationship). Therefore, preconventional individ-
uals will likely pay more attention to what will happen to them if they engage in
a particular behavior than they will attend to leaders behavior or expectations.
Still, to the extent that leader expectations are tied to reinforcement contingencies,
preconventional individuals can be expected to do what is expected of them by
leaders.
Leader and follower demographics may also be significant. We suspect that
ethical leadership may be less influential in homogeneous settings where leaders
and their followers share values based on age and cultural similarity. Yet with the
development of an increasingly diverse workforce in the United States, ethical
leadership should become even more important.
Supervisory leaders may be more or less influential depending on characteristics
of their work group such as size and type of work. For example, the larger the
span of control, the more difficult it may be to communicate ethical standards
and to hold work group members accountable. Furthermore, if employees work
in the field and not under a leaders direct supervision (e.g., sales representatives),
a leaders ability to influence them may be diminished simply because the leader
is less visible or salient due to less frequent communication.
Individual leaders may also be less influential to the extent that the organization
has a strong ethical climate and culture that incorporates formal and informal
systems to support ethical conduct (Trevio, 1990; Trevio, Butterfield, & McCabe,
1998; Victor & Cullen, 1988). For example, since the implementation of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 (see www.ussc.gov), the majority of large business
organizations have developed formal systems such as codes of conduct, ethics and
legal compliance training programs, and telephone advice and reporting lines that
answer employees questions about appropriate conduct in ambiguous situations
and that allow employees to anonymously report misconduct they observe (Joseph,
2000). To the extent that these formal systems are supported by other formal orga-
nizational systems such as performance management systems and norms of daily
business practice, unethical conduct should be lower (Joseph, 2000; Trevio et al.,
1999). On the one hand, a strong ethical context can be thought of as providing a
kind of substitute for ethical leadership; thus, individual leaders may have less
influence on their direct reports in such settings. On the other hand, in a strong
ethical context, leaders are expected to provide ethical guidance. So, their efforts
simply become part of the larger ethical environment that supports and encourages
ethical conduct.
Alternatively, some organizations have a strong culture and climate that sup-
ports unethical conduct. In such an environment, it is unclear how much a single
supervisory-level leader can do to change the situation. Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that only a chief executive may have the power to change such an unethical
culture. Take the example of Douglas Durand. Durand had worked for 20 years at
Merck & Company, where he was a senior regional director in 1995. Merck had a
strong ethical culture where ethics and social responsibility were taken seriously.
Durand accepted a lucrative offer to become the vice president of sales at TAP
Pharmaceuticals. Once he arrived, he quickly discovered a culture where sales
representatives bribed doctors, did not account appropriately for free samples, and
engaged in Medicare fraud. Durand tried to change the culture first by appealing to
the sales representatives ethics and by using the reward system to reinforce ethical
conduct. However, his efforts were not supported by senior management, and he
began to feel increasingly marginalized. In desperation and fear that he too would be
implicated in the fraud, he finally determined that he had no choice but to blow the
whistle on the company and leave. After years of investigation, the company was con-
victed and paid a record $875 million fine, and Durand collected a large part of the
fine under the federal whistle-blower statute. Even at his fairly high executive level in
the organization, he was unable to change a culture that focused exclusively on the
bottom line and supported unethical and illegal conduct (Trevio & Nelson, 2004).
Levels of Leadership
Another question for future research relates to levels of leadership. Much lead-
ership research does not distinguish between the executive and supervisory levels,
although such a distinction is likely to be important for leaders influence on ethics-
related outcomes. Our published qualitative research focused on characteristics of
executive-level ethical leaders. We conducted follow-up interviews with M.B.A.
students that focused on supervisory ethical leadership, and we found that these
informants characterized supervisory ethical leaders in similar ways. But some dif-
ferences do stand out. Based on our executive ethical leadership data, we inferred
four types of executive leader: ethical leader (high on the moral person and moral
manager dimensions), unethical leader (low on both dimensions), hypocritical
leader (high on the communication of an ethics agenda but not perceived to be a
strong moral person), and ethically neutral leader (low on the moral manager
dimension and not clearly high or low on the moral person dimension) (Trevio
et al., 2000).
Executives are perceived from a distance. As a result, ethical leadership is largely
a reputational phenomenon whereby the social salience of their ethical leadership
is particularly important (Trevio et al., 2003). Executives must work to stand out
from a background filled with other messages. If they are not visible ethical role
models who communicate a strong ethics and values message and hold followers
accountable for ethical conduct, executives are likely to be perceived as ethically
neutral. Followers simply do not know where such executives stand. However,
supervisory leaders are seen quite differently. Most employees work closely with
their supervisors every day and have a clearer understanding of the ethical dimen-
sion of their leadership based on direct observation and experience. As a result,
supervisory ethical leaders are likely to be seen in more black-and-white terms as
either ethical or unethical leaders.
It is also unclear whether executive or supervisory leadership is more important
in influencing ethical and unethical conduct. We suspect that both are required, but
for different complementary reasons. For example, senior executives set the tone at
the top and create and maintain organizational culture, including an organizations
ethical culture and climate (Trevio, 1990; Victor & Cullen, 1988). Through their
impact on the performance management system and their support (or lack of
support) for ethics-related resources, organizational membersincluding
supervisorsreceive powerful messages about the importance of ethical conduct in
the organization. Supervisors translate those messages and make them real through
their daily treatment of followers and by setting daily expectations. When supervisory
leaders reinforce the messages from the top, the positive influence on ethical conduct
should be strongest. However, if supervisors contradict these messages, followers are
forced to make a difficult choice. We suspect that most followers will choose to do
what is expected by their supervisors unless the ethical culture is so strong that the
followers believe that reporting unethical supervisors will be supported.
Conclusion
Leaders receive much of the credit for success and also shoulder most of the blame
for ethical failures in organizations. Given their visible positions of authority,
responsibility for shaping formal organizational policies, ongoing interactions with
employees, and control over important rewards and punishments, leaders should
play an important role in influencing employees ethical and unethical conduct. In
this chapter, we have proposed that leaders influence such conduct primarily by
way of social learning and social exchange processes. Through modeling, leaders
influence followers by demonstrating high ethical standards in their own conduct
and by using the reward system to teach employees vicariously about the outcomes
of ethical and unethical behavior in the organization. Furthermore, admired lead-
ers who are seen as trustworthy, and who treat employees fairly and considerately,
will develop social exchange relationships that result in employees reciprocating in
positive ways. We hope that these insights will help to guide future research.
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89
Bernard Ebbers:
Innovative Leader or
Reckless Risk Taker
I
n 1998, Bernard Ebbers, then chief executive officer of WorldCom,
was named one of Network Worlds 25 most powerful people in the
telecommunications industry. Through the 1990s, Ebberss WorldCom had
acquired many companies and merged with others in a quest to build
a worldwide telecommunications giant from a headquarters based in
Mississippi.
As Ebbers became a major player in a rapidly growing industry, he
cultivated a maverick image as an industry outsider in cowboy boots leading
his troops to the top of the mountain. Although he was not seen as an Internet
prophet who foretold of the inevitable dominance of cyberspace, Ebbers
displayed a simple charm that led key staff members to describe him as a
charismatic leader who inspired extraordinary levels of personal loyalty and
high employee performance.
When he enters a room, he is like a rock star, one WorldCom employee
said. People wanted to touch him, shake his hand. He created tremendous
wealth, at least on paper. People revered him.
CASE 3
AUTHORS NOTE: This case was prepared by Roland Kidwell (Niagara University) as
the basis for classroom discussion. It was developed from accounts that are listed in
the bibliography at the end of the case. All names of individuals and the organization
are real.
Within a few years of achieving industry prominence, the WorldCom
bubble burst. A man who challenged the status quo in worldwide telecom-
munications through more than 70 mergers and acquisitions, including a
multibillion-dollar deal to take over the much larger MCI, Ebbers was uncer-
emoniously removed by his companys board of directors in 2002. That
summer, allegations of accounting fraud surfaced, WorldCom entered into
what was then the largest bankruptcy in the United States, and within a few
months the company name became MCI.
From Small Beginnings
to Industry Powerhouse
The story of Bernie Ebbers was once described by author George Gilder as
one of the most fascinating, improbable, and inspiring in North American
business. To Gilder, who examined networking and telecommunications in
his 2000 book Telecosm, Ebbers displayed the magic of entrepreneurial
vision and temerity. Ebbers quickly moved from motel chain owner to fiber-
optic network magnate, leading commentators to dub him the Ted Turner of
the Internet.
Ebbers was born in Edmonton, in western Canada, during the early 1940s.
After flunking out of two other colleges, the 6-foot-4-inch Ebbers was offered
a basketball scholarship at Mississippi College, where he eventually gradu-
ated with a physical education degree. At the small liberal arts school, Ebbers
learned a valuable lesson from his coach: With hard work, dedication, a
commitment to principles, and a commitment to Jesus Christ, life can be
worthwhile.
After graduation, Ebbers married a local woman and decided to stay in
Mississippi. He got his start in business by purchasing rural motels, financing
the purchases with large helpings of money borrowed from friends. In 1982,
the breakup of telecommunications giant AT&T offered an important oppor-
tunity to Ebbers and his business associates. Ebbers became an original
investor in LDDS, a company that purchased long-distance service wholesale
from AT&T and resold it to individual customers at retail prices.
The company was not immediately successful. It lost money and racked up
debt for the first 2 years. At that point, in 1985, Ebbers gained control of
LDDS by using equity from his motel chain. Shortly afterward, he was named
chief executive officer and began to seek new sources of capital and to cut
the costs of operations. Along the way, large amounts of debt financing
caused him little concern.
Murray Waldron, one of Ebberss original partners, described him as the
most focused leader Id ever seen.
Ebbers, who saw himself as a marketing expert, hired engineering and
accounting expertise to assist in his efforts to make LDDS profitable. Part of
that turnaround effort involved rapid expansion. According to Gilder, Ebbers
adopted economies of scale as a means to success; Ebbers purchased or
rented larger volumes of bandwidth, thereby reducing unit costs. This strategy
was accomplished through rapid expansionpurchasing regional long-
distance resellers and integrating them into the system. In 1989, LDDS
merged with Advantage, a publicly traded company that held a small long-
distance business. The newly acquired public status of LDDS allowed
the company to expand by trading its stock for assets. More acquisitions
followed.
Eventually, Ebberss growth strategy led to vertical integration. In 1994,
LDDS purchased its key network supplier, Wiltel, the nations fourth-largest
fiber-optic network. This purchase allowed Ebbers to obtain the name
WorldCom, which was the moniker of Wiltels European subsidiary. Wiltel
was purchased for LDDS stock and paid for by cuts in operating costs that
resulted from the merger.
Expansion did not end there. The new WorldCom made additional
network purchases that allowed the company to start building a fiber-optic
network across Europe and to boast of owning one of the largest Internet
service providers in the world. In 1998, the multibillion-dollar purchase
of MCI, which was three times the size of WorldCom, gave the company
additional industry clout and resources.
Its actually a very, very enjoyable exercise, Ebbers once said of his rash
of acquisitions. After you do enough of them, it kind of becomes part of your
culture.
In WorldComs heyday, Ebbers controlled the worlds most menacing
business challenge to the worlds telecom industry, according to Gilders
account. That industry included corporations such as AT&T, British Telecom,
Sprint, GTE Communications, and the Bell regional operating companies.
WorldComs stock surged in 1999, reaching $75 a share. After the MCI
acquisition, the company, led by Ebbers, continued its efforts to create a lean
and mean amalgamation, selling off two of MCIs five corporate jets, cutting
expense accounts of former MCI people, and (most significantly) axing 2,000
of the companys 75,000 jobs.
As his industry status increased, Ebbers was viewed by colleagues and
members of the local community in Mississippi as a responsible business
leader who was willing to give back to the community. He taught Sunday
school at his local Baptist church, served meals to the needy at a Jackson
restaurant, and lived modestly in a prefabricated home. He invested most of
his wealth in company stock.
He is absolutely one of the most incredible human beings I have come in
contact with, said Diana Day, who worked with Ebbers for nearly 20 years.
The Lord was his CEO, as (He) is all of ours.
Bernie Ebbers is my mentor, LeRoy Walker, Jr., a businessman and com-
munity leader, once told Jesse Jackson, according to an account in Time mag-
azine. Jackson had attacked Ebbers during a speech at historically black
Tougaloo College, accusing him of failing to provide money for Mississippis
black students while spending billions to buy MCI. Walker, a Tougaloo board
member, explained to the social activist that Ebbers had given the college
more than $1 million, new information technology, and computers to be used
by disadvantaged black youth in the local community.
Another View of Ebberss Leadership
Not everyone was thrilled about Ebberss capabilities and priorities. Although
Ebberss professed hatred of corporate bureaucracy led to significant reduc-
tions in staff as new companies were acquired, the company chief executive
purchased a 164,000-acre ranch and 20,000 head of cattle in British
Columbia.
As new companies were absorbed, critics argued, WorldCom did not
effectively realize the savings that had been suggested as the reason why the
takeovers made business sense in the first place. Acquisitions occurred so
quickly that there was no time to properly integrate new companies into
WorldCom. Employees at WorldCom meetings would often introduce
themselves by the company where they had originally worked, for example,
Happy to meet you. Im legacyMCI.
While WorldCom moved to make its largest proposed acquisition of all
that of SprintEbbers did not endear himself to international competitors
when he attacked the European telecommunications players that he claimed
were lagging behind North America: Most of the companies in Europe
would not be survivors in a transaction between U.S. and European
telecommunications companies, he said. Ebbers expressed impatience with,
and disdain for, those who questioned WorldComs direction.
Based on stories that were related to the media about Ebbers, his manage-
ment philosophy focused obsessively on keeping down costs. He questioned
why expensive bagels, rather than cheaper food, were served at company
meetings. He replaced the coffee supplier with vending machines when he
discovered that the company was spending $3 million a year on coffee. He
announced that he would videotape employees walks on an exercise track
at company headquarters to document whether they were taking too many
breaks. He banned color copies because he deemed them too expensive. He
personally turned off lights to shave energy bills and adjusted thermostats
in WorldComs offices, putting them 2 degrees higher during the summer and
2 degrees lower during the winter.
These cost-cutting tales conflicted with Ebberss alleged generosity in loan-
ing money for the purchase of company stock; he provided personal loans to
key senior executives for that purpose. One former senior manager told the
Financial Times that Ebbers offered $80,000 to $300,000 loans to as many as
50 top executives. These loans were not put in writing, but it was understood
that they would be repaid.
All those guys drank Bernies Kool-Aid, one anonymous WorldCom
source said in a Financial Times analysis of the company. The source likened
the situation to the infamous Jim Joness religious cult mass suicide of
the 1970s.
Company observers said that power became concentrated among a few
people in the upper echelon, including Scott Sullivan, chief financial officer;
Ron Beaumont, chief operating officer; and Diana Day, senior vice president
of customer service. Other executives who joined the company through its
acquisitions were shunted to the background. These outsiders viewed the
company as lacking the professional management and operating systems
that would be expected in an organization of its size. They claimed that the
mammoth company ran like an entrepreneurial start-up.
Regulatory Problems,
Deflated Stock, and Disgrace
Because of the use of company stock to finance most of WorldComs contin-
uing run of acquisitions, it was crucial for the company to keep the stock
price high. Thus, company officials found it extremely important to meet Wall
Streets expectations of what the company earnings should be. Ebbers and
Sullivan frequently attended industry analyst conferences, where they made
presentations touting the company and its rising stock price. When the stock
price declined during the general telecommunications stock downturn, it was
inevitable to some that the company would go bust.
Everybody always felt like there was no room for error, a former execu-
tive told the Financial Times. Once, we missed [earnings] by 1 cent, and the
stock nearly [collapsed]. That was an error that lived with the Bern for a long
time. He went on a rampage. He would be completely nasty, condescending,
and arrogant.
In 1999, WorldCom moved to take over Sprint, making a $115 billion bid
to acquire the rival carrier. The bid exceeded the $80 billion proposed merger
of the Exxon and Mobil oil companies. Ebberss long-term strategy in acquiring
Sprint, along with MCI in 1998, was to upgrade their Internet facilities and
engage larger competitors on a worldwide basis with a streamlined Internet
capability. However, in both cases, U.S. regulatory agencies stepped in, claim-
ing that WorldCom was attempting to monopolize the industry. Regulators
forced WorldCom to sell MCIs Internet facilities to Cable & Wireless of Britain
and barred acquisition of the Sprint network. Some observers, including
Gilder, said that the governments failure to allow WorldCom to pursue its
strategy led to the companys downfall.
At the least, such regulatory actions did not aid Ebbers in turning his orga-
nization into a strong company that would be able to cope with economic
fluctuations and a stock market downturn that would make additional acqui-
sitions unfeasible. By April 2002, calls for Ebberss dismissal increased as the
company stock slid from a market value of $180 billion in 1999 to $8 billion
3 years later, and a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation into
WorldComs accounting practices began. Ebbers was also questioned about
$400 million in low-interest loans that he had secured earlier from the
companys board of directors, ostensibly to buy more stock.
With Bernie, it was live by the sword, die by the sword, said Alex Peters,
manager of Franklin Global Communications Fund. He has certainly assem-
bled a valuable set of assets. The question is, will he be able to get a fair price
for them in the end?
When Ebbers was finally forced out by the boards outside directors, he
still refused to concede that the company had significant problems. At that
point, WorldCom stock was selling for approximately $2.50 a share.
Fraud, Bankruptcy, and Recriminations
Within 2 months of Ebberss departure, allegations of financial fraud surfaced
and led to the firing of Sullivan. An internal audit found that the company had
fabricated profitable numbers to ensure that its stock price stayed high. In
June 2002, John Sidgmore, who took over as chief executive officer for
Ebbers, announced that an irregularity had been found in the way in which
the company had been accounting for its capital expenses. An ensuing inves-
tigation by accountants for WorldCom found that $3.8 billion in operating
costs had been incorrectly classified as capital expenditures over a 15-month
period that began in 2001. The inaccuracy increased reported cash flow and
profits, leading the company to falsely report a $1.4 billion profit in 2001 and
a $130 million profit for the first 3 months of 2002.
As the investigation continued, more reporting problems were uncovered,
leading the company to admit that it had overstated its earnings by more than
$9 billion since 1999. Five company officials, including Sullivan, were
charged with criminal fraud, but for many months investigators efforts to link
Ebbers to illegal activity were unsuccessful. Despite WorldComs high-tech
nature, Ebbers did not use e-mail and usually responded to e-mails from his
staff with phone calls.
Within a month of disclosing its accounting misdeeds, WorldCom, faced
with $41 billion in debt, filed for reorganization in federal bankruptcy court.
The largest bankruptcy in U.S. history affected creditors, business clients,
20 million consumers, and 80,000 employees around the world. Lawsuits
related to the companys downfall continue, as do investigators attempts to
implicate Ebbers in the accounting fraud.
WorldComs board voted in September 2002 to ask the bankruptcy court
to rescind Ebberss severance agreement, which awarded him $1.5 million a
year for life. Lawyers for the board argued that the agreement was void
because Ebbers knew the company was insolvent at the time the agreement
was reached.
In June 2003, a report prepared by an independent law firm with the aid
of MCI (formerly WorldCom) board members cited tremendous pressure at
WorldCom to keep revenues up so as to meet Wall Streets expectations.
Although the company was legitimately growing at 5 to 10% each quarter,
one MCI board member said, that figure was boosted to 10 to 15% to meet
analysts expectations. The report asserted that only a few top executives at
WorldCom directed the fraudulent accounting, but it identified Ebbers as the
creator of a culture that gave birth to the fraud.
On March 2, 2004, federal authorities charged Ebbers with conspiracy,
securities fraud, and filing false financial statements. Sullivan agreed to plead
guilty to similar charges and to testify against Ebbers in exchange for receiv-
ing a less severe sentence. Two months later, Ebbers was accused of falsify-
ing six regulatory filings just before WorldComs collapse.
Discussion Questions
1. To what extent were the actions of Bernard Ebbers indicative of leadership, and
to what extent did Ebbers display destructive deviant behavior? Provide
examples of leadership and deviant behavior from the case.
2. How did Ebbers influence his managers and employees to engage in deviant
unethical behavior? How could he have used his influence and leadership style
to avoid deviant behavior among subordinates?
3. Identify some theoretical linkages between Ebberss leadership style as prac-
ticed and the behavior that occurred within WorldCom.
4. The law firm report identified Ebbers as the source of a culture that resulted in
the companys accounting fraud. How did Ebberss leadership style contribute
to the values and actions of key managers? How could key managers perform
their jobs effectively and ethically in the WorldCom culture?
5. Consider the characteristics of the ethical leader described in Chapter 3. How
does such a leader encourage ethical behavior among managers and employees
and, at the same time, obtain successful organizational results? Could Ebbers
have used these characteristics to accomplish his goals at WorldCom? Explain.
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The Role of Leaders

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