Upthrust Problems On Multistage Vertical Turbine Pumps: by Donald R. Smith and Stephen Price
Upthrust Problems On Multistage Vertical Turbine Pumps: by Donald R. Smith and Stephen Price
Upthrust Problems On Multistage Vertical Turbine Pumps: by Donald R. Smith and Stephen Price
1
2
2
Downthrust
Upthrust
value. Note that care should be taken when adding the balance
holes to the impellers. As with the centrifugal pumps, the balance
holes decrease the efficiency by 1 to 5 percent by providing addi-
tional paths for internal recirculation. In addition, the balance holes
can become clogged due to operating with unclean fluids, fluids
with solids, and intermittent service.
Figure 3. Hydraulically Balanced Impeller.
These thrust calculations are usually made by the pump manu-
facturer considering the full range of operating conditions. As
illustrated in the case histories, it is very important to consider
changes in the specific gravity of the fluid and in the operating con-
ditions when computing the downthrust and upthrust forces acting
on vertical turbine pumps.
Symptoms of Upthrust Problems
As stated above, vertical pumps normally operate with the pump
shaft in downthrust (tension). Operating the pumps in upthrust with
the pump shaft in compression can cause many problems (Dufour
and Nelson, 1993).
Driver (motor) thrust bearings often fail if they are not designed
for upthrust loads.
The upward forces can cause the motor rotor to rub against the
stator, resulting in electrical and mechanical damage.
Causes of Excessive Upthrust
The pump manufacturers design the pumps for a certain set of
operating conditions. Case History No. 1 illustrates upthrust
problems that can occur when the fluid properties (specific gravity,
suction, and discharge pressures) are significantly different from
the original design.
Excessive upthrust forces can also occur when a pump is
operated at very high flow rates beyond the BEP. These high flow
rates can occur when a pump is started with low discharge
pressure. To avoid these problems, pump manufacturers
recommend that vertical turbine pumps and vertical can-type
pumps should be started with a partially closed discharge valve that
is fully opened after the discharge pressure is fully developed. Case
History No. 2 discusses pump problems due to upthrust that
occurred when pumps were improperly started at low discharge
pressures with fully-open discharge valves.
CASE 1UPTHRUST PROBLEMS ON
31-STAGE VERTICAL TURBINE PUMPS
Three vertical turbine pumps were installed at a pipeline pump
station (Figure 4). The pumps were referred to as pumps A, B, and
C. The pumps were originally designed for gasoline service
(specific gravity of 0.688) at a suction pressure of 100 psig and a
discharge pressure of approximately 2130 psig. The pump config-
uration is shown in Table 1.
Figure 4. Installation at Pipeline Pump Station.
Table 1. Case 1Pump Configuration.
Prior to being shipped to the plant, the pumps were tested at the
manufacturers shop. This was a hydrostatic test with the pumps
operating on water at a reduced speed of 1795 rpm. During these
UPTHRUST PROBLEMS ON MULTISTAGE VERTICAL TURBINE PUMPS 48
Upthrust
Downthrust
Balance Holes
Item Description
Pump Type Vertical Turbine
Number of Stages 31
Impeller Thrust Balance Configuration 15 Standard, 16 Thrust-Balanced
Driver Induction Motor
Horsepower 600
Running Speed 3570 rpm
shop tests, the pumps operated satisfactorily with shaft vibration
levels of 1.5 mils peak-to-peak, which were considered to be accept-
able and were below the levels specified by the API Standards.
API Standard 610 (1995) provides allowable vibration levels for
vertically suspended pumps operating within the pumps preferred
operating region. For vibration measurements on the pump thrust
bearing housing, the allowable vibration levels are 0.2 in/sec root-
mean-square (rms) (0.3 in/sec zero-to-peak). The pump shaft
allowable vibration can be computed using Equation (3).
(3)
where:
A
u
= Unfiltered displacement determined by fast Fourier
transform (FFT), mils peak-to-peak (not to exceed 4.0 mils
peak-to-peak)
N = Rotational speed, rpm
Using this equation, the allowable shaft vibration levels would be
approximately 2.4 mils peak-to-peak at 1795 rpm and 1.7 mils
peak-to-peak at 3570 rpm.
Operating with Ethane
After the pumps were installed in the field, the plant desired to
operate the pumps in ethane service, in addition to the gasoline.
The specific gravity of ethane is 0.355 and the suction pressure
would be increased to approximately 800 psig. Although the
operating conditions with ethane were significantly different from
the conditions with gasoline, the pump manufacturer reviewed the
pump performance curve and indicated that the pumps could also
operate in ethane service.
When pumps A and B were run with ethane, the vibration levels
at the top of the motor and at the top of the pump thrust stand
(bottom of the motor) were approximately 1 in/sec zero-to-peak,
which exceeded the API 610 (1995) vibration limit. Pump B was
tested with the motor running solo and the vibration levels were
also considered to be high, even in the solo condition. Impact tests
indicated a minor structural natural frequency slightly above the
pump running speed of 60 Hz. The pump manufacturer felt that the
structural natural frequency contributed to the vibration levels.
Next, the connection between the motor and the thrust stand on
pump B was modified in an effort to lower the natural frequency
below the running speed. Impact tests indicated that the natural
frequency was lowered closer to the running speed, which actually
increased the vibration levels. The tests indicated that the vibration
levels were greater in the North-South (N-S) direction, which was
in the direction parallel with the suction and discharge piping. The
vibration levels in the East-West (E-W) direction (perpendicular to
the cutout sections on the thrust stand) were much lower.
Operating Deflection Shape
An operating deflection shape (ODS) was measured on pump A,
which had not been structurally modified. An ODS is the actual
forced vibration response shape of the motor/pump structure at a
particular operating condition. In addition to identifying the forced
vibration operating shape, the animation is useful in identifying
loose joints, weak structural members, and other problem areas.
The animation is created by obtaining response data at multiple
locations in the three orthogonal directions. The data are processed
to produce the animated display.
The ODS model is shown in Figure 5. A selected single frame of
the vibration animation at 1 running speed is shown in Figure 6.
Note that the vibrations are exaggerated in the plot to allow the
ODS to be easily visualized. As shown in the ODS, the maximum
vibration levels were measured near the top of the motor in the N-
S direction. The maximum vibration levels were approximately 6.3
mils peak-to-peak (1.2 in/sec zero-to-peak).
Figure 5. Pump/Motor ODS Model.
Figure 6. Operating Deflection Mode Shape at 1 Running Speed.
The ODS indicated that the motor was rolling or wobbling
on top of the thrust stand. In addition, slipping was observed
between the flanges connecting the discharge head to the barrel.
Subsequent to the ODS testing, several of the flange bolts were
determined to be loose and were tightened; however, tightening the
bolts did not reduce the vibration to acceptable levels.
Pump Shaft Vibration
During the process of obtaining the ODS vibration data on the
motor and thrust stand of pump A, excessive vibrations were
visually observed on the pump coupling. The vibration levels on
the pump coupling hub and the upper pump shaft were estimated
to be in the range of 100 mils peak-to-peak (Figure 7). These
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL PUMP USERS SYMPOSIUM 2005 49
A
N
u
=
10 000 ,
Motor
Thrust Stand
Discharge Head
Barrel
Foundation
Z
Y
X
East-West
North-South
Vertical
Slipping Between
Flanges
Thrust Stand
6.3 mils PP Vibration
Amplitude
Motor Wobbling on
vibration levels were clearly excessive and were considered to be
in the danger level. The observed vibration levels on the motor
coupling hub were significantly lower compared to the pump
coupling hub, which indicated that the coupling was effective in
isolating the vibration between the pump shaft and the motor shaft.
Figure 7. Excessive Vibration on Pump Coupling and Pump Shaft.
Although the observed vibration levels were clearly excessive, it
was decided to obtain a minimum amount of shaft vibration data
using proximity probes. Proximity probes were installed to
measure the pump shaft radial vibration near the mechanical seal
(the probes were installed similarly to those shown in Figure 16 in
Case History No. 2). The probes could not be installed near the
coupling because the estimated vibration levels of 100 mils peak-
to-peak exceeded the range of the proximity probes, which was
approximately 50 mils peak-to-peak.
After the proximity probes were installed, the pump was started,
operated at full speed for only a few seconds, and then shut down.
Figure 8 is a plot of the 1 running speed shaft vibration and phase
(Bode plot) during the coastdown. At operating speed, the pump
shaft vibration near the seal was approximately 36 mils peak-to-
peak. Slow roll data indicated that the shaft runout was
approximately 16 mils peak-to-peak (note that this pump had been
in service for approximately 500 hours at the time of the test).
Figure 8. Bode Plot of Pump Shaft Vibration During Coastdown.
This runout greatly exceeded the allowable runout at the seal.
API 610 (1995) states that the total indicated runout shall not
exceed 0.0005 inch per ft (4 m per 100 mm) of length, or 0.003
in (80 m) over the total shaft length.
The shaft vibration and runout data were reviewed with the
pump manufacturer. Everyone agreed that the vibration levels were
considered to be dangerous and could result in a failure of the
coupling, shaft seal, and/or thrust bearing. The excessive runout
indicated that the shaft was probably bent.
A visual observation of the coupling vibration on pump B, which
was running, indicated that the vibration levels were similar to those
on pump A. Therefore, it was suspected that the shaft on pump B was
also bent. The pump manufacturer recommended that both pumps
should be removed and returned to the factory for further analysis.
Pump C had not been run; therefore, it was decided to measure
the pump shaft runout prior to starting the pump. The shaft was
rotated by hand and the shaft runout at the seal was measured to be
approximately 1 mil peak-to-peak, which was considered to be
acceptable. The pump was subsequently put into operation and the
shaft vibration reached approximately 10 mils peak-to-peak at 1
running speed. Figure 9 is a time-domain plot of the shaft vibration
and pump speed just prior to shutdown and during the coastdown.
As shown, the runout increased to approximately 7.5 mils peak-to-
peak after operation, which indicated that the shaft was bowed or
cocked during this short run.
Figure 9. Time-Domain Plot of Pump Shaft Vibration and Pump
Speed During Coastdown.
The pump manufacturer recommended that the pump shaft be
raised approximately 3/16 inch, which also required adjusting the
seal position. When the pump was restarted, the vibration levels
immediately increased to approximately 18 mils peak-to-peak.
After operating for a few seconds, the mechanical seal began to
smoke and the pump was shut down.
It was determined that the mechanical seal was destroyed and the
pump could not be operated. It was unknown whether the high shaft
vibration contributed to the seal failure (especially since the other
pumps could operate with shaft vibration levels of approximately
31 mils peak-to-peak without immediately destroying the seal). The
plant personnel thought that the seal failure was due to improper
adjustments of the seal set screws after the pump was raised.
Excessive Upthrust Due to Changing
Fluid and Operating Pressures
The problems experienced by the pumps (excessive motor
vibration, excessive shaft vibration, bent shafts, and seal problems)
UPTHRUST PROBLEMS ON MULTISTAGE VERTICAL TURBINE PUMPS 50
Approx. 100 mils p-p
High Vibration Observed
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000
Speed (RPM)
180
0
-180
D
e
g
r
e
e
s
A
m
p
lit
u
d
e
(
m
ils
P
P
)
10
20
30
40
0
Runout = 16 mils PP
1X Order Track During Coastdown
Pump Shaft Probe Just Above Seal
X Direction
1 DIV
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time (secs)
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
R
P
M
X Probe
Y Probe
U
n
i
t
T
r
i
p
p
e
d
Approx. 10 mils p--p during operation
Runout = 7.5 mils
5 mil / Div
5 mil / Div
were all classical symptoms of excessive upthrust. The pump man-
ufacturer agreed and indicated that the pump thrust had not been
recalculated for operation with ethane. All three pumps were then
returned to the manufacturer for restaging (Figure 10).
Figure 10. Pump Assembly Being Removed.
The 31-stage pump was originally supplied with 15 standard
impellers and 16 hydraulically balanced impellers for operation
with gasoline. For operation with ethane, the pump was reconfig-
ured with 28 standard impellers and only three hydraulically
balanced impellers.
When the pumps were run with ethane with the new impeller
configuration, the vibration levels were significantly reduced. The
maximum vibration levels on the top of motor were less than 1 mil
peak-to-peak. Although no shaft vibration data were obtained,
visual observations indicated that the shaft vibration levels were
also significantly reduced.
It was recommended that proximity probes should be perma-
nently installed on each pump to measure the pump shaft vibration
at the seal. The probes should be monitored on a regular basis to
ensure that the vibration levels are acceptable. Although the motor
vibration levels were reduced with the new impeller configuration,
the field tests indicated that the motor housing vibration was not a
reliable indication of the pump shaft vibration.
The pump manufacturer indicated that the same impeller con-
figuration could not be used for pumping gasoline and ethane. The
original impeller configuration was designed for gasoline and the
new configuration was required for pumping ethane. It was
suggested that one of the pumps could be set up for pumping
gasoline and the other two pumps could be set up for ethane.
A long-term modification would be to consider a more robust
pump design that could operate with a larger range of fluids and
operating conditions. The modifications could include: a larger
diameter shaft, different impellers, and a larger thrust bearing that
could handle higher upthrust and downthrust.
This example illustrates that each pump should be designed to
match the product (specific gravity) and operating conditions
(suction and discharge pressures). The vertical turbine pump
should be set up so that the pump shaft is in tension (downthrust).
For this installation, a different impeller configuration was
required for each product due to the large difference in specific
gravity and operating pressures.
CASE 2UPTHRUST PROBLEM ON
NINE-STAGE VERTICAL CAN-TYPE PUMPS
Three nine-stage vertical pumps were installed at an electric
power station to pump liquid petroleum gas (LPG) with a specific
gravity of 0.53 (Figure 11). The pumps are referred to as pump A,
pump B, and pump C. The pumps draw suction from the bottom of
a 90,000 gallon tank adjacent to the pumps and deliver high
pressure LPG, which is later vaporized downstream to feed two gas
turbines. The design capacity of each pump is approximately 420
gpm at a discharge head of 1600 ft. The pump configuration is
described in Table 2.
Figure 11. Typical Vertical Can-Type Pump.
Table 2. Case 2Pump Configuration.
During normal operation, two pumps operate in parallel with a
third pump in standby. The pump station was configured with a
common recirculation line that is shared by all three pumps. The
pump manufacturer recommended a minimum flow of 111 gpm for
each pump to prevent pump recirculation and to provide sufficient
lubrication to the carbon bushings.
In the design stage, the pump manufacturer performed a
hydraulic analysis of the pump to compute the thrust for a wide
range of operating conditions. Computed thrust values and total
developed head for flow rates from zero to 504 gpm at the
minimum suction pressures are plotted in Figure 12. The down-
thrust values ranged from a maximum of 3585 lb (closed
discharge, zero gpm) to a minimum of 864 lb (maximum suction
pressure and 504 gpm).
The thrust values were extrapolated for high flow rates beyond
the BEP (Figure 12). As shown, at the higher flow rates the thrust
changed from downthrust to upthrust. The pump manufacturer
did not compute the thrust forces for the conditions with zero
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL PUMP USERS SYMPOSIUM 2005 51
Item Description
Pump Type Vertical Can Type
Number of Stages 9
Impeller Thrust Balance Configuration 9 Standard
Driver Induction Motor
Horsepower 150
Running Speed 3550 rpm
Figure 12. Computed Thrust Values and Total Developed Head
Versus Flow Rate.
differential pressure, or for discharge pressure less than the suction
pressure, because these conditions were not normal operating con-
ditions.
Pump Failure History
Pump B
During the initial commissioning, pump B failed after operating
for approximately seven to eight hours. The pump was rebuilt in
the manufacturers shop and returned to service.
A few weeks later, pump B failed for the second time. The pump
mechanical seal was leaking and the pump was taken out of
service. When the pump failed, it had been running together with
pump A. The total running time on each pump was unknown. The
pump was shipped back to the shop for disassembly.
Pump A
Pump A failed approximately one hour after the failure of pump
B. The pump shaft could not be rotated. Pump A was also removed
and taken to the shop for disassembly.
Pump C
Pump C also experienced a failure of the mechanical seal after
operating for a short period. A new mechanical seal was installed
and the shaft runout at the upper seal (below the motor coupling)
was measured with a dial indicator to be approximately 7 mils
peak-to-peak (total indicated reading (TIR) = 7 mils), which was
considered to be excessive. The normal diametrical clearance at the
upper bushing was approximately 8 to 10 mils.
In addition, the shaft was in a slight bind when the shaft was
rotated by hand. This also suggested that the shaft was possibly
bent.
Since the shaft runout (bent shaft) was considered to be
excessive, it was recommended that the pump should not be
started. It was felt that the vibration levels could be excessive and
the pump could experience another catastrophic failure. In
addition, it was felt that it was important to observe the damage on
the internal parts before excessive wear occurred. Therefore, the
pump was removed and also transported to the shop for disassem-
bly.
Mechanical Damage Assessment
Pump A
The pump rotor was seized and the intermediate shaft was bent
several inches (Figure 13). The shaft had to be cut into several
pieces to remove the impellers (Figure 14). The shaft showed
excessive wear at all of the bearing locations (carbon bushings). All
of the carbon bushings were destroyed. The carbon bushings were
broken into several small pieces, which were lodged in the
impellers (Figure 15). In addition, there were also large quantities
of carbon powder in the impellers. All of the wear rings were badly
worn and there was evidence of galling between the wear rings on
the impellers and the wear rings on the stationary parts.
Figure 13. Pump Shaft from Pump A. (Shaft was bent after the shaft
seized. The motor tripped on high amps.)
Figure 14. Damaged Pump Shaft Cut into Pieces to Remove
Impellers.
Pump B
The pump was in similar condition to pump A. Although the
pump shaft did not seize, the shaft was bent and galled. It was
difficult to remove the impellers from the shaft and they had to be
hammered off. The shaft showed similar signs of excessive wear
and heat at all of the carbon bushings. All of the carbon bushings
were similarly destroyed. Again, there were large pieces of the
carbon bushings in the impellers and large quantities of carbon
powder in the impellers.
Pump C
The upper shaft was bowed approximately 3 mils, which was
equal to the API limit. The intermediate shaft was straight with a
maximum bow of approximately 1 to 2 mils. During the disassembly
UPTHRUST PROBLEMS ON MULTISTAGE VERTICAL TURBINE PUMPS 52
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
Capacity (GPM)
H
e
a
d
(
f
t
)
-2000
-1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
T
h
r
u
s
t
F
o
r
c
e
(
L
b
)
Total Developed Head Thrust Force
Upthrust
Downthrust
BEP
Dashed Lines are
Extrapolated Values
Thrust
Head
Net Thrust Calculation
Figure 15. Impeller from Pump A During Disassembly after Pump
Failure. (Note carbon particles and dust from destroyed carbon
bushings.)
of the impellers from the pump shaft, the shaft was still in a bind
and a rub could be detected when the shaft was rotated by hand.
The lower pump shaft was bowed approximately 5 to 6 mils, which
exceeded the API limit. The lower shaft showed wear where the
shaft was in contact with the carbon bushings. The wear pattern
was not completely around the circumference of the shaft, which
indicated that the shaft was bent and was not in even contact with
the bushings.
The carbon bushings showed a light scoring around the circum-
ference. The bushings near the lower impellers (first and second
stages at the bottom end of the shaft) showed almost no wear, while
the bushings at the upper stages showed more wear. The lower
pump shaft was worn where the shaft was in contact with the
bushings.
The bearing damage was thought to be similar to damage to the
gland rings discussed in the manufacturers service manual, which
stated that carbon dust accumulation on an outside gland ring
could be due to: (1) inadequate amount of liquid at the sealing
faces, or (2) liquid film flashing and evaporating between seal
faces and leaving residue that is grinding away the carbon.
The visual inspection indicated that the C pump was apparently
experiencing problems similar to those that led to the severe
damage on pumps A and B. It was felt that the damage on pump C
was limited, because the pump had been in service for only a few
hours.
Task Force Recommendations
A task force was assembled to investigate the pump failures, to
recommend tests to identify the causes for the failures, and to
recommend possible modifications to eliminate the failures. The
inspection had revealed that pumps A and B were almost com-
pletely destroyed and the only items that could be reused were a
few of the flanged column sections. The damage to pump C was
not severe and it was decided to reassemble the pump and use it for
test purposes to obtain data with a pump in service.
The pump failures and the pump operating conditions were
reviewed with the pump manufacturer. At that time, the exact
cause(s) for the failures were not known. Visual inspection of
pumps A and B at the shop suggested that the failures were
possibly due to a lack of liquid flow through the impellers. The
lack of flow would result in a lack of lubrication of the carbon
bushings, which in turn would create excessive heat and the
failures of the carbon bushings. After the carbon bushings failed,
the wear rings on the impellers contacted the stationary parts,
which resulted in galling between the stainless steel parts.
Pump A tripped on excessive motor current after the pump shaft
seized. Pumps B and C tripped on high seal pressure after the
mechanical seals were damaged due to excessive shaft vibration.
Possible Vapor Locking
Although the exact cause(s) for the lack of flow through the
impellers was not known, it was felt that the problem could be due
to vapor locking of the pump impellers. Vapor locking occurs
when an impeller (usually the first stage impeller) ingests a large
quantity of vapor. Usually, small vapor bubbles pass through the
impellers. However, a larger quantity of vapor can cause the
impeller to stop pumping fluid. After the first stage impeller
becomes vapor locked, the second stage impeller can become
vapor locked due to the lack of flow into the impeller. The vapor
locking continues on subsequent impellers until the entire pump is
vapor locked.
The pump service manual stated that it is important to properly
vent the pump barrel and auxiliary seal components, particularly
when pumping fluids like LPG, which are near the vapor pressure.
The manual also stated that the barrel must be continuously vented
back to the vapor side of the suction vessel with liberal size piping.
The pump/piping system was inspected and it was determined
that the pump barrel was not properly vented. Several piping mod-
ifications were recommended to correct potential problems in the
vent and drain systems.
In addition to the piping modifications, several other modifica-
tions were installed in an effort to reduce the possibility of vapor
locking the pumps. These modifications were primarily designed
to prevent cavitation that could produce vapor in the pump.
The pump stainless steel wear rings were replaced with nickel
bronze wear rings to reduce the possibility of galling.
Field Tests
In addition to the possible vapor locking problems, it was felt
that the pump failures could be due to excessive upthrust forces
during certain operating conditions, especially during the startups.
Therefore, field tests were conducted on all three pumps to
determine the minimum flow rates, the effects of parallel pump
operation, and the effects of starting the pumps with the discharge
valve fully and partially opened.
The field tests were designed to obtain additional data to
determine the basic cause(s) of the previous failures. The tests
were designed to measure the pump shaft vibration and deflec-
tions, the suction static pressure and pulsation, the discharge static
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL PUMP USERS SYMPOSIUM 2005 53
pressure and pulsation, the pump flows (total and recirculation),
the temperature of LPG in the pump sump, and the motor amps at
the pump over as wide an operating range as possible.
Instrumentation
During the tests, data were obtained from permanently mounted
transducers (DCS data) and from transducers that were temporar-
ily installed. The following is a list of data that were obtained on
the pumps.
bushings.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND INTERNATIONAL PUMP USERS SYMPOSIUM 2005 55
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Time (secs)
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
(
P
S
I
G
)
F
l
o
w
(
G
P
M
)
0
1
0
0
0
5
0
0
S
p
e
e
d
(
R
P
M
)
4
0
0
0
0
Suction
Discharge
Total Flow
Recycle Flow
1 DIV
1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 2.75 3 3.25 3.5 3.75 4
Time (secs)
0
5
0
0
P
r
e
s
s
u
r
e
(
P
S
I
G
)
Suction Pressure
Pump C Discharge Pressure
Axial Position Shifted Out of Range of Probe
Note: Downthrust Occurred in Approx 0.5 sec
After Startup
Vibration Was Higher Than A or B Pumps
Speed Profile
0 RPM
4000 RPM
Note: "Noisy" Tach Signal
Because Pump C Has a Bent Shaft
Upper Shaft X
Upper Shaft Y
10 mil / Div
10 mil / Div
10 mil / Div
Shaft Axial
1 DIV
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Time (secs)
Shaft Radial Vibration - 20 mils / Div
Shaft Axial Position - 20 mils / Div
Pump Discharge Head Vibration - 5 mils / Div
Total Flow - 1000 GPM / Div
Recycle Flow - 1000 GPM / Div
Motor Current - 500 Amp / Div
Prior to startup, the shaft was rotated by hand and the runout on
the pump shaft at the mechanical seal was measured to be approx-
imately 4 mils with no suction pressure. The runout was increased
to approximately 12 mils when the shaft was in upthrust with 180
psi suction pressure. This increase in runout was due to the shaft
being in compression in the upthrust condition.
Pump A was started with pump C in service. Since another pump
was in service, the pump was started with the discharge valve fully-
open. As shown in Figure 21, the pump shaft shifted to the
downthrust position in approximately 0.5 seconds after the startup.
The discharge pressure began to increase immediately as the pump
running speed ramped to full speed. After the pump shifted to the
downthrust position, the vibration levels were immediately
reduced from approximately 9 mils peak-to-peak to the original
runout value of 4 mils peak-to-peak.
Figure 21. Time-Domain Plot of Shaft Radial Vibration, Shaft Axial
Position, Pressure, and Running Speed During Startup of Pump A
with Pump C Operating.
Pump C was tripped approximately nine seconds after pump A
was started. After pump C tripped, the pump C shaft axial position
switched to the upthrust position when the discharge pressure was
reduced to the suction pressure (Figure 22).
Figure 22. Time-Domain Plot of Flow, Shaft Axial Position,
Pressure, and Motor Amps of Pumps A and C During Startup of
Pump A with Pump C Operating and Shutdown of Pump C.
When pump A was shut down, the vibration levels again
increased to approximately 11 mils peak-to-peak during the
coastdown when the pump returned to the upthrust condition. This
shaft vibration was almost identical to the runout measured before
the startup when the shaft was in the upthrust condition, which
indicated that the shaft was not bent during the startup or during
operation.
Test Results
The following conclusions are based upon the measured data,
inspections of the failed pumps, and various technical references.
The proximity probes showed that the pump shaft was deflected
radially at certain operating conditions, which caused the pump
shaft to be forced against the bushings. It is thought that the force
against the bushings would be increased with a bent shaft. The
increased force with a bent shaft would result in higher tempera-
tures at the bushings. This increased temperature could then cause
the LPG to vaporize. Since the pumps did not originally have a
continuous vent system, the vapor levels could increase in the
pump and could eventually result in a vapor lock condition in the
impellers. This vapor lock condition could then result in the lack of
cooling and the eventual failure of the pumps.
During the field tests, the vent systems were installed and there
was no indication of a large increase in temperature in the pump
can, which suggested that vapor was not collecting in the pump can.
The field tests indicated that the vibration levels on the motor
and the pump discharge housing were low, even when the shaft
vibration levels were excessive; therefore, the motor and pump
housing vibration should not be used to evaluate vertical pumps.
However, the pump shaft vibrations measured with proximity
probes were indicative of possible problems and could be used to
evaluate the condition of the pumps.
SUMMARY
As discussed, upthrust forces can result in excessive vibration,
bent pump shafts, and damage to the seals and bearings. In some
instances, high-level upthrust forces can cause catastrophic failures
of the pump.
The following is a list of recommendations to prevent and avoid
excessive upthrust forces.