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A) Yes There Exists A Perfect Matching With No Strong Instability. This Is Proved by The

There exists a perfect matching with no strong instability according to the given algorithm. The algorithm initializes all people as free and has each man sequentially propose to their most preferred free woman or a random woman if they are tied, and the woman can reject or accept based on her preferences. This results in no strong instability since men are happy with any woman in their tied list. There also exists a perfect matching that results in weak instability, where two men and two women are indifferent between their options, so different matchings could also make them happy.

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Rahul Ram
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26 views2 pages

A) Yes There Exists A Perfect Matching With No Strong Instability. This Is Proved by The

There exists a perfect matching with no strong instability according to the given algorithm. The algorithm initializes all people as free and has each man sequentially propose to their most preferred free woman or a random woman if they are tied, and the woman can reject or accept based on her preferences. This results in no strong instability since men are happy with any woman in their tied list. There also exists a perfect matching that results in weak instability, where two men and two women are indifferent between their options, so different matchings could also make them happy.

Uploaded by

Rahul Ram
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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a) Yes there exists a perfect matching with no strong instability.

This is proved by the

mt denotes the list of men tied for men to propose. Initialize each person to be free. While (some man is free and hasn't proposed to every woman) { Choose such a man m w = a woman on ms first preference (or) a random woman on m's tied list to whom m has not yet proposed if (w is free) assign m and w to be engaged else if (w prefers mt1 to her fianc m' (or) w prefers mtm to her fianc m') assign any random mtm and w to be engaged, and m' to be free else w rejects m } following algorithm Men has list of tied women to propose. Men would be happy for any random woman in the tied list for which she accepts him. Hence there is no strong instability b) Yes, there exists a perfect matching which is indifferent with options making them weak instability. From the above algorithm Let m1, m2 be the list of men and w1 , w2 be the list of women. (m1, m2) indicates men whose preference is tied. (w1 , w2 ) indicates women whose preference is tied. (m1, m2)1 indicates subset of men whose preference is tied (w1 , w2 )1 indicates subset of women whose preference is tied. 1st (w1 , w2 ) (w1 , w2 ) 1st 2nd (w1 , w2 )1 (w1 , w2 )1 2nd

m1 m2

w1 w2

(m1 , m2 ) (m1 , m2 )

(m1 , m2 )1 (m1 , m2 )1

In this scenario If m1 proposes w1 and m2 proposes w2, they would accept. If m1 proposes w2 and m2 proposes w1, they would accept. So m 1 and m2 are happy with either of the women making them indifferent with the options they select. This indicates a weak instability

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