Very Low Fertility in Asia:

Is There a Problem?
Can It Be Solved?
S I D N E Y B . WE S T L E Y, M I N J A K I M C H O E ,
A N D R O B E R T D . R E T H E R F O R D
Analysis from the East-West Center
No. 94
May 2010
S U M M A R Y Fifty years ago, women in Asia were having, on average, more
than ve children each, and there was widespread fear of a population explo-
sion in the region. Then birth rates began to fallin several countries more
steeply than anyone had anticipated. This unexpected trend has now raised
concerns about the social and economic impact of extremely low fertility.
Today, four of Asias most prosperous economiesJapan, Singapore, South
Korea, and Taiwanhave among the lowest birth rates in the world. With
women having, on average, only one child each, these societies have expanding
elderly populations and a shrinking workforce to pay for social services and
drive economic growth. And in Japan, overall population numbers are already
going down. Why are women choosing to have so few children? How are policy-
makers responding to these trends? Government leaders have initiated a variety
of policies and programs designed to encourage marriage and childbearing, but
to what effect? Given current social and economic trends, it is unlikely that
Asias steep fertility decline will be reversed, at least not in the foreseeable future.
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AsiaPacic
I S S U E S

Over the past 50 years, economic and social modern-
ization in Asia has been accompanied by a remarkable
drop in birth rates. Gains in education, employment,
and living standards, combined with dramatic break-
throughs in health and family-planning technology,
have led to lower fertility in every country of the region.
The pace of this decline has varied widely. At
todays fertility rates, women in Pakistan will typi-
cally have three or four children over their lifetimes.
By contrast, women in the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) will have, on average, only one child (United
Nations 2008).
Four societies in East and Southeast Asia have
experienced some of the steepest fertility declines in
human history. In Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan, young men and women are waiting longer
to marry, and many who do marry go on to have only
one child. Others do not marry or have children at all.
Extremely low birth rates are leading to increasingly
elderly populations, with relatively few people left in
the workforce to pay for social services or to drive
economic growth. And in Japan, overall population
numbers are already going down. These trends have
prompted government leaders to initiate a variety of
policies and programs designed to reverse fertility
decline.
The trend was rst observed in Japan, where fer-
tility dropped from an average of 4.54 children per
woman in 1947 to 2.04 in 1957 (Retherford and
Ogawa 2006). This is close to replacement-level
fertility, defined as an average of 2.1 children per
womantwo to replace the woman and her partner
plus a little extra fertility to make up for children who
do not live to reproductive age. If this fertility level is
maintained, population growth will slow and even-
tually population size will stabilize.
Fertility is expressed in this discussion as the total
fertility rate, or TFR, dened as the average number
of children that a woman can expect to bear over her
lifetime at current age-specic fertility rates, assum-
ing that she survives to the end of her reproductive
age span, which is dened as 50 years.
The decline to replacement-level fertility, which
rst began in Japan in the late 1940s, started about
20 years later in the three other Asian societies. In
1960, women in Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan
were still having an average of about six children each.
Fertility reached the replacement level of 2.1 children
per woman in 1975 in Singapore, in 1983 in South
Korea, and in 1984 in Taiwan.
Demographers agree that fertility tends to decline
with economic growth and improvements in living
conditions, and indeed, these East Asian economies
were developing rapidly during the period that fer-
tility was going down. The link between economic
growth and fertility decline has health and education
components. As improved standards of living bring
down infant and child mortality, couples can expect
that their children will live to adulthood. They rarely
have to replace children who die, and they rarely feel
the need to have extra children to make sure that
a certain number will survive.
Expanded educational opportunities contribute to
lower fertility in two ways. With the spread of primary
and then secondary and college education, children
do not join the labor force at an early age but rather
remain economically dependent on their parents for
many years. Large families become an economic burden,
rather than an asset, as couples increasingly focus on
the quality of their childrenmeasured in large part
in terms of educationrather than on numbers alone.
In addition, as girls stay in school longer and then
join the labor force, they tend to postpone marriage
and childbearing. Given expanded educational and
professional opportunities that compete with the tradi-
tional roles of housewife and mother, some women
choose to avoid marriage and childbearing altogether.
While demographers anticipated that couples would
tend to have fewer children as they became more af-
fluent, they did not foresee that fertility would even-
tually fall to well below replacement level. By 2006,
the TFR in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan (and in several European countries) had fall-
en to levels rarely seen in human history (table 1).
Is Low Fertility a Problem?
Fertility this far below replacement level, if sustained,
will lead to age imbalance in a population, with older
men and womenwho were born in the past when
Analysis from the East-West Center
2
Fertility tends
to decline with
economic growth
and improvements
in living conditions

fertility was highbecoming a much larger propor-
tion of the total. In Japan, South Korea, Singapore,
and Taiwan, the percentage of the total population
in the age group 65 and above is projected to rise
steeply, reaching one-third or more of the total by
2050 (table 2). The gures on page 4 illustrate this
trend in Japan.
The concern is that large numbers of elderly people
will pose a burden on working-age men and women,
both in terms of nancial support and personal care.
Government policymakers are also worried about how
to nance public pension and healthcare systems.
A number of policy options have been proposed
to improve support for Asias growing elderly popu-
lations. These range from raising the retirement age to
improving nancial systems that foster personal sav-
ings, shoring up social security and pension schemes,
providing long-term care facilities, and helping
working adults care for their elderly parents at home.
The governments of Japan, South Korea, Singapore,
and Taiwan are actively pursuing, or at least seri-
ously considering, all of these options. Some gov-
ernments are also considering a limited relaxation of
immigration laws to bolster the number of working-
age adults in their populations.
Looking further ahead, below-replacement fer-
tility, if sustained, will eventually lead to population
loss. If todays fertility levels persist, the populations
of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan will
eventually shrink by about one-third per generation,
roughly every 30 years.
This process has already started in Japan, where the
total population began to decline in 2006. Accord-
ing to United Nations projections (United Nations
2008), the population of South Korea will begin to
decline between 2025 and 2030, and the population
of Singapore will begin to decline about 10 years
later. Taiwans population is projected to start declin-
ing in 2027 (Council for Economic Planning and
Development 2009a). Although fewer people might
be good for the global environment, policymakers
worry about the social and economic implications of
population loss.
Expanding immigration is frequently mentioned as
a possible measure to help counter population decline,
but realistically, the impact of immigration can only
be modest. If a population shrinks by one-third in
each generation, and this loss is replaced entirely by
immigrants, then well over one-half of the entire pop-
ulation will be foreign-born or the descendants of
foreign-born within two generations, or about 60
years. Even if these four Asian societies had policies
that allowed massive in-migration (which they do
not), it might not be practical or politically feasible to
replace such a large proportion of their populations
with immigrants. Thus, current efforts to halt popu-
lation loss focus, in part, on measures to raise fertility.
Why Are Young People Having So Few
Children?
Up until the 1970s or 1980s, nearly everyone in Japan,
South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan married, and
Analysis from the East-West Center
3
The populations
of Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, and
Taiwan could
eventually shrink
by one-third per
generation
Table 1. Total fertility rates, 1970 and 2006
Year
1970 2006
Japan 2.13 1.32
Singapore 3.07 1.26
South Korea 4.53 1.12
Taiwan 3.93 1.12
Sources: For 1970, Choe (2008); for 2006, Jones, Straughan,
and Chan (2009b).
Table 2. Percent of national population
ages 65 and above in 2000 and in 2020 and
2050, projected
Year
2000 2020 2050
Japan 17.2 28.5 37.8
Singapore 7.2 17.9 32.6
South Korea 7.2 15.6 38.2
Taiwan 8.6 16.2 35.9
Sources: For Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, United
Nations (2008); for Taiwan in 2000, Council for Economic
Planning and Development (2008); for Taiwan in 2020 and 2050,
Council for Economic Planning and Development (2009b).
Note: Data for 2020 and 2050 are projections.

Analysis from the East-West Center
4
Age and sex structure of the national population of Japan in 1950 and 2000
and projected for 2050
This dramatic shift from a preponderance of children in the population to a preponderance of working-age adults and even-
tually to a preponderance of the elderly is also occurring, although somewhat later, in South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.
The age structure of Japans population in 1950 (gure
at right) is typical of a country just entering the demo-
graphic transition from high to low fertility. There is a
broad base at the bottom consisting of large numbers
of children and a narrow top made up of relatively small
numbers of elderly. The age group 04 is particularly
large, reecting a baby boom that occurred in Japan
just after World War II.
The population of Japan in 2000 (figure at left) has a
primary bulge at ages 5054, corresponding to persons
born in 194549 during Japans brief postWorld War II
baby boom. Japans fertility dropped by half during the
1950s, and this is reected in the narrowing of the pyra-
mid at ages 40 to 44. The secondary bulge at ages
2529 is a generational echothe children of the baby
boomers, born on average 2530 years later.
The population pyramid projected for Japan in 2050
(gure at right) shows population aging that is so
extreme that the pyramid is inverted, broadening
steeply through the retirement years. The largest age
group, at 7579, was 2529 years old in 2000.
Source: United Nations (2008).
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Age and sex structure of the national population of
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Age and sex structure of the national population
of Japan in 2000
Age and sex structure of the national population of
Japan in 2050, projected

Analysis from the East-West Center
5
What is keeping
these young people
from starting the
families they say
they want?
most had at least two children. Fertility fell during
this period because fewer couples went on to have
three or more children. In recent years, by contrast,
more young people are not marrying at all, and those
who do marry are marrying at later ages. These two
trends account for half or more of the decline from
replacement-level fertilityslightly more than two
children per womanto the very low levels observed
today.
Yet surveys in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore
show that most young men and women still hope to
marry and to have at least two children. What is keep-
ing these young people from starting the families they
say they want?
For one thing, women have vastly greater oppor-
tunities to continue their schooling and to build their
careers than their mothers had in the past. Womens
education levels and employment rates have risen
steeply throughout the region (table 3).
At the same time, marriage rates have dropped.
Most women still say that they want to marry and
have children, but they are postponing starting a
family until some time in the future. And for some,
that time in the future never arrives.
Many women also have the option to remain single
while having an active sex life. Although childbearing
outside marriage is still extremely rare, premarital sex
is becoming more common and socially acceptable.
In 2000, Japans National Survey on Family Planning
found that 57 percent of single women age 16 and
above were using contraceptionup from 39 percent
in 1990 (Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001).
Another explanation for low marriage rates is cost.
Traditionally in East Asian societies, couples who
married lived in multigenerational households with
the husbands orless commonlythe wifes family.
This arrangement tended to minimize living expenses
for the newlyweds.
Today, unmarried adults still often live with their
parents, but married couples increasingly want, or
are expected, to set up households of their own. In
South Korea, for example, the 2005 census found that
76 percent of single men ages 2529 were living with
their parents, while 86 percent of married men in the
same age group had set up their own households. In
East Asias expensive urban housing markets, setting
up and maintaining an independent household is
likely to represent a considerable nancial burden.
Cost becomes an even more important factor
when a couple considers having a childboth the
cost to the family of raising the child and the op-
portunity cost for the woman who interrupts her
career to give birth and care for a baby. In 2000, the
average cost of raising and educating a Japanese child
from birth through four years of university ranged
from 28,600,000 yen (about US$286,000 at 2000
Table 3. College completion, labor-force participation, and marriage among women ages
2529 in Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan in 1970 and 2004 or 2005 (percent)
Completed four years of college Employed Married
1970 2005 1970 2004 1970 2005
Japan 10
a
49
ab
46 74 80 38
Singapore n.a. n.a. 31 86 77 54
South Korea 4 62 32 64 88 40
Taiwan 4
c
30 39
d
76 83 36
Sources: For education and marriage in Japan, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2009). For
employment in Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, Jones, Straughan, and Chan (2009b). For education and marriage in South
Korea, Doo-Sub Kim (personal communication). For marriage in Singapore, Jones and Gubhaju (2008). For education and mar-
riage in Taiwan, Ministry of Interior (1976, 2006). For employment in Taiwan, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and
Statistics (1979, 2006).
a
Includes junior college, technical college, university, and graduate school.
b
2000.
c
1975.
d
Ages 2534.

exchange rates) to 63,020,000 yen (US$630,100)
(Ogawa, Retherford, and Matsukura 2009). In both
South Korea and Singapore, the average cost of rais-
ing and educating a child has been estimated con-
servatively at about US$253,000 (Jones, Straughan,
and Chan 2009b).
The income that is lost when a woman interrupts
her career to have children is even higher. One esti-
mate in Japan (Cabinet Ofce 2003) found that a
university-educated woman who starts work at age 22,
works for six years at a regular full-time job, quits
for six years to have children, and then comes back
to another regular full-time job at age 34 will lose
84,770,000 yen (US$847,700) in lifetime income. If
the same woman returns to a part-time, more junior
position after having childrenwhich is a very com-
mon patternshe will lose an estimated 237,930,000
yen (US$2,379,300) in income over her life.
Inexible employment practices and a work cul-
ture that tends to be incompatible with family life
both contribute to the high cost of motherhood in
these societies. The professional and administrative
jobs that educated women aspire to often require
long work hours, frequent overtime work, and after-
hours socializing with colleagues. Part-time positions,
when they are available at all, tend to be at much
lower levels of responsibility and much lower pay.
At the same time, maternity leave is too short to
allow women to care for infants until they are old
enough to enroll in daycare. This situation forces
women to drop out of the labor force altogether when
they have a child. And after dropping out, it is very
difcult for women to return to a job at their previous
level of employment. According to a national survey
conducted in 2003 in South Korea, only 37 percent
of married women who had worked in administra-
tive, professional, or technical occupations before they
married were still working in jobs with the same
occupational status after marriage (Kim et al. 2004).
An additional explanation for low fertility relates
to a sense of eroding job security. With increasing
emphasis on global competitiveness, companies in
East Asia are much less likely than in the past to offer
secure, lifetime jobs to their employees. Yet at the
same time, young people have high economic
aspirations, leading to an emphasis on educational
attainment and work experience. As McDonald
(2009) points out, Investment in ones human cap-
ital (education and labor-market experience) is seen
as the essential hedge againstrisks. As a result,
family formation is put on hold while human capital
is accumulated.
Describing the situation in South Korea, Kim
(2009) notes, The 1997 economic crisis marked an
important turning point in the process of the socio-
economic development and fertility transition of
Korean society. Labor-market deregulation and high
unemployment associated with a poor economy have
made many young people delay or avoid marriage and
child-bearing. Kim found that women with rela-
tively secure employmentsuch as teachers and civil
servantshave higher fertility than women who work
in other sectors.
Looking at 25 years of economic data from Singa-
pore, Yap (2009) concludes, Perhaps most signicant
among recent developments that could have affected
fertility trends in Singapore are the economic fluc-
tuations and rise in unemployment due to globaliza-
tion and economic restructuring. Stressing that the
perception of insecurity is as important as insecurity
itself, she notes that in recent years while the econ-
omy has improved, and unemployment was on the
way down, the TFR has, at best, leveled off.
In the face of eroding job security, it makes sense
for both husband and wife to stay in the workforce
in order to minimize risk. If one is out of work, the
other may still have a job, so they will not have to
sell their house or other assets or relocate in search
of employment.
Given todays financial climate, no employer or
government program can fully restore job security for
young workers or compensate couples for the costs
of having a child. Nevertheless, Japan, Singapore,
and South Korea all have policies and programs in
place to help young women pursue their education
and career goals, while at the same time marrying and
having children. Policymakers in Taiwan are discuss-
ing similar options.
Analysis from the East-West Center
6
Inexible
employment
practices and a
work culture
incompatible
with family life
contribute to
the high cost of
motherhood

Analysis from the East-West Center
7
Policymakers
are nding that
it is much more
difcult and costly
to raise fertility
than to lower it
Policies and Programs that Address Low
Fertility
Policymakers are nding that it is much more dif-
cult and costly to raise fertility than to lower it.
Programs aimed at lowering fertility can be highly
cost effective because family-planning technology is
relatively inexpensive and because economic and
social development tends to lower fertility even in
the absence of government programs. Japan is a good
example. There, fertility declined to well below
replacement level without any government family-
planning program at all.
But in societies with very low fertility, policies
and programs designed to increase childbearing run
counter to economic and social trends. Government
interventions tend to be costly, and the forces of eco-
nomic and social development that keep fertility low
are very strong.
Nevertheless, in response to surveys, nearly all
young women in these societies say that they want
to marry and have children. And governments are
trying to help them reach their educational, career,
and family-building goals. The question now facing
demographers and policymakers alike is whether gov-
ernment policies and programs that are attempting
to raise fertility can be effective.
Such policies fall into ve general categories: (1)
monetary support for families with children, either
in the form of cash payments or tax deductions;
(2) maternity leave and childcare leave from work,
either for mothers or for both parents, and either
paid or unpaid; (3) assistance with childcare through
daycare centers, after-school programs, and monetary
support for childcare at home; (4) other programs
that help young families, such as housing preferences
and medical insurance that covers expenses related to
pregnancy and childbirth; and (5) dating services and
other programs that encourage young people to marry.
Japan
In 1989, when the TFR in Japan dropped to a new low
of 1.57 births per woman, the media picked up the
story, and the 1.57 shock made headlines through-
out the country (Ogawa and Retherford 1993). Since
then, government initiatives have included: (1) larger
child allowances paid directly to parents, (2) steadily
expanding provisions for parental leave, (3) highly
subsidized childcare services, and (4) social programs
to encourage marriage and childbearing.
Since 1990, eligible couples in Japan receive an al-
lowance of 5,000 yen (US$50) per month for each of
their rst two children and 10,000 yen (US$100) per
month for each subsequent child. The allowances are
paid until the child completes the third year of pri-
mary school. For a four-person household to be eli-
gible, household income must be less than US$41,500
per year.
Beginning in 1991, the Japanese government has
steadily expanded childcare leave, designed to make
it easier for working women to have children and
for women who have children to continue working.
Today, the law provides up to one year of childcare
leave for either the mother or the father of a child
less than one year old. A mother (or in rare cases, a
father) taking childcare leave receives 40 percent of her
salary, paid out of the Employment Insurance Fund
(originally established to pay unemployment benets).
She also accumulates seniority while on leave, and the
government pays both her and her employers share
of social security contributions.
Childcare leave benets have been restricted until
recently, however, to regular, full-time employees in
rms with more than 30 workers. The exclusion of
part-time workers has seriously limited the number
of households that can benet from the legislation.
Only about one-half of married women in Japan
work at all, and among those who work, about one-
half fall into the category of part-time worker. In
2003, only about 20 percent of all women who gave
birth took childcare leave (Ogawa, Retherford, and
Matsukura 2009). In 2005, to help remedy this sit-
uation, the government extended limited childcare
benets to nonregular employees who have worked
continuously in the same rm for more than one year.
Since the early 1990s, the Japanese government has
steadily expanded public daycare facilities through-
out the country. The government also provides
sports and other after-school programs and maintains

family-support centers that offer various additional
services, such as picking up a child after school if
both parents are working. These services are highly
subsidized, especially in major urban areas. In Tokyo,
the monthly cost to the government of daycare for
one infant currently exceeds the average monthly
wage of a male worker.
Government-subsidized daycare and family-support
services are offered on a sliding scale, with higher-
income households paying higher fees. Specic eligi-
bility criteria vary by locality, but in Japans largest
cities, waiting lists for government daycare may be
long. As a result, private-sector daycare services have
also expanded.
Additional programs to help raise fertility have in-
cluded information campaigns exhorting husbands to
help with childrearing and housework. Another gov-
ernment initiative addresses the problem that many
women do not take the childcare leave they are enti-
tled to because of social disapproval from coworkers
and employers. To create an atmosphere within rms
that encourages parents to take childcare leave, the law
requires employers with more than 300 employees
to submit a plan to the government every year out-
lining their efforts to raise fertility among their staff.
Firms that qualify are entitled to display a logo (above)
identifying them as government-certified child-
friendly employers. The impact of this law, which
went into effect in 2005, has yet to be evaluated.
Employer plans generally include dating services.
In fact, all the big keiretsu (families of allied indus-
tries) have been providing dating services for their em-
ployees for some time. These services are contracted
out to the 3,000 or so private-sector dating services
in Japan. In 2005, the government formed an expert
committee to look into the possibility of government
subsidies for marriage-information services, includ-
ing not only dating services but also programs such
as training in interpersonal communication skills
between men and women.
Singapore
In 1984, the Singaporean government created the
Social Development Unit (SDU), a dating service
designed to encourage marriage and fertility among
college graduates (Murphy 2002), who were most
likely to be ethnic Chinese. Three years later, facing a
TFR well below replacement level, the government
introduced programs to raise fertility among all social
classes and ethnic groups. These included tax and
housing incentives, childcare subsidies, and childcare
leave for working parents (Yap 2009).
Despite these measures, fertility continued to plum-
met. In response, the Singaporean government en-
larged existing programs in 2004 and introduced several
new initiatives, designed to address a broader set of
concerns that appear to be preventing Singaporeans
from having larger families. The new package of mea-
sures is grouped under ve broad categories, each ad-
dressing a specic aspect of parenthood: (1) promoting
marriage, (2) making childbirth more affordable, (3)
providing nancial support for raising children, (4)
expanding childcare options, and (5) encouraging a
better balance between work and family life.
Today the SDU provides subsidized parties and
excursions for singles, speed-dating events, and
computer matchmaking services. It also runs college
classes and seminars on courtship and marriage, a
Romancing Singapore advertising campaign, and
online advice sites on love and marriage.
Apart from problems encountered in meeting and
wooing prospective mates, housing availability and
housing costs are important constraints on young
Analysis from the East-West Center
8
Despite
expanding
government
programs,
Singapores birth
rate continues
to plummet
A Japanese employer with an approved plan to raise fertility
can display this logo on its products and advertisements,
stating We support childrearing among our employees. At
the bottom, the logo gives the year followed by Government-
certied child-friendly employer.

people in Singapore who wish to marry and set up
independent households. To promote marriage, the
government has introduced a scheme to increase
public-housing grants for singles who marry. The
government also provides public housing as a prior-
ity to couples with three or more children.
To make childbirth more affordable, the govern-
ment has expanded the medical services provided
under the national medical insurance scheme to cover
both prenatal and delivery expenses for all births,
as well as assisted conception procedures such as in
vitro fertilization.
The government provides financial support for
raising children through tax rebates and cash incen-
tives (Yap 2009). Parents are eligible for tax rebates
for the birth of second, third, and fourth children
on a sliding scale up to S$20,000 (US$13,260) per
child. Working mothers are also eligible for monthly
child-relief payments for each dependent child. This
amounts to 5 percent of the mothers earned income
for a rst child, 15 percent of the mothers earned in-
come for a second child, 20 percent for a third child,
and 25 percent for a fourth child. Since 2001, the
government has also provided a cash Baby Bonus
of up to S$6,000 (US$4,000) at the birth of each
child, plus a savings account in which the govern-
ment matches dollar-for-dollar the savings that parents
set aside for their children.
To help with child care, working mothers are eli-
gible for eight weeks of fully paid maternity leave after
each birth. Working parents with a child less than
seven years old are eligible for two days of employer-
paid childcare leave a year (ve days for government
employees). Parents of children ages 2 months to 18
months receive a subsidy to support enrollment in
any government-licensed infant or childcare center.
Tax provisions also benet working parents whose
children are cared for by grandparents or by foreign
domestic workers. And since 2001, fathers employed
in the civil service are eligible for paternity and child-
care leave.
More recently, to encourage a better balance be-
tween work and family life, the Singaporean gov-
ernment has allocated S$10 million (nearly US$6.5
million) to a WoW! (Work-life Works!) Fund. This
fund provides financial support to companies that
develop and implement family-friendly work prac-
tices. The government has set an example by reduc-
ing the work week for civil servants to ve days.
South Korea
In 1996, the government of South Korea abolished
policies designed to lower fertility and adopted a new
population policy with an emphasis on the quality
and welfare of the South Korean population (Choe
2008). Among the objectives of the new policy were:
(1) to keep the rates of fertility and mortality at levels
required for sustainable socioeconomic development,
(2) to promote family health and welfare, and (3) to
promote womens labor-force participation and well-
being.
The activities of both government and nongovern-
mental organizations shifted to focus on these and
related objectives, but the new programs were not
enough to reverse more than 30 years of fertility de-
cline. In 2006, with a total fertility rate of 1.12, the
South Korean government announced a comprehen-
sive plan to support childbearing by helping women
balance work and family responsibilities. The demo-
graphic goal is to increase the countrys TFR to 1.6,
the average level of fertility among economically ad-
vanced countries during 20002005. This target is
considered more realistic than aiming for replacement-
level fertility of 2.1.
Several programs are now in place. The govern-
ment has extended health insurance and strengthened
the mother-and-child health program to help defray
costs related to pregnancy and childbirth. Benets
include expansion of health insurance coverage to
include surgery to reverse vasectomy and sterilization
procedures, special care for infants born prematurely,
and prenatal tests to identify possible birth defects.
The government allows tax deductions for de-
pendent children and for educational expenses and
provides a tax-free allowance to help cover the cost of
childbirth and childcare. Maternity leave has been
extended to 90 days, with maternity benefits fully
covered by government-sponsored employment
insurance.
Analysis from the East-West Center
9
Government and
NGO efforts in
South Korea have
not been enough
to reverse more
than 30 years of
fertility decline

In addition, the government provides a childcare-
leave allowance to women (or men) who stay at home
to care for young children. Mothers (or fathers) re-
ceive 400,000 won (about US$345) per month, and
their employers receive up to 150,000 won (about
US$129) per month as a subsidy to help cover the
cost of temporarily replacing a staff member.
Other programs include baby bonuses, expanded
high-quality childcare facilities, tax incentives for
childcare and elderly care, paternity leave, flexible
work hours for parents of young children, and sup-
port for employees rights to return to work after
parental leave. Because many working parents are not
taking advantage of childcare leave, the government
has introduced two innovative measures in the civil
service: a bank of temporary employees who can
ll in for workers on childcare leave and an option to
work part time, dened as 15 to 32 hours per week.
Beginning in 2006, women have also been offered
paid leave after a stillbirth or spontaneous abortion.
Finally, the National Assembly is discussing a plan to
offer public pension credits to women who have two
or three children.
Looking Ahead
Today, in spite of government policies and programs,
Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have among the
lowest fertility rates in the world. As Jones, Straughan,
and Chan (2009a) point out, The general consensus
about pronatalist policies in East Asian countries seems
to be that they have failed, because there is no evidence
that fertility has risen as a result of their introduction.
As very low fertility rates continue over time and
young adults have fewer opportunities to interact
with children, there is a risk that even the desire for
children will diminish. As only children grow up,
they tend to have very little contact with infants or
younger children. In China, where fertility is also low
(around 1.4 children per woman), the government
now permits a couple to have a second child if both
the husband and wife were only children. But a
study in Beijing (Hou Yafei 2007, quoted in Jones,
Straughan, and Chan 2009a) showed that only 1824
percent of such couples want a second child.
As marriage is postponed, even young people who
grew up with siblings settle into a lifestyle that does
not include children. It is one thing for a govern-
ment program to help young people who want to
have children achieve their goals, but quite another to
persuade young people to have children if they do
not particularly want them. A large-scale survey con-
ducted in Singapore in 2005 (Straughan, Chan, and
Jones 2009) found that 68 percent of married peo-
ple of reproductive age felt that the governments
policies and programs would result in higher fertility
in general, but only 24 percent felt that these policies
and programs might encourage them to have more
children themselves.
Of course it is possible that fertility would be even
lower without the actions that governments have
taken to encourage marriage and childbearing. In
addition, many of these government policies and
programs are limited in scope and have been intro-
duced quite recently. So perhaps it is too soon to tell
whether they will achieve their objectives.
As household incomes have increased across the
region, the modest incentives currently offered may
not be very meaningful to a young couple looking
at the cost of interrupting a career and educating a
child. Yet with the current economic crisis putting
pressure on tax revenues, governments must measure
the cost of programs that support childbearing and
childrearing against other public priorities. And in
todays economic climate, it is important that mea-
sures to increase fertility do not erode the efciency
of the commercial and industrial sectors by placing
too much of a burden on companies. Legal require-
ments that increase the cost of hiring women might
also end up hampering female employment.
Further research can help elucidate whether todays
very low fertility levels are what women actually pre-
fer or whether they are the result of choices that
women are forced to make, given the personal and
institutional constraints they face. If women want to
have children, programs are needed that support
their efforts to achieve all their goalsin terms of
education, career, and family.
Perhaps more important than cash incentives,
governments and employers need to improve job
Analysis from the East-West Center
10
There is now
a risk that even
the desire for
children will
diminish

Analysis from the East-West Center
11
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flexibility by removing the institutional barriers
that make it difficult for women to combine work
and family responsibilities. They also need to re-
duce barrierssuch as the mandatory retirement
agethat put a burden on young families indirectly
by making it difficult for older family members to
support themselves.
On balance, it seems likely that the programs
already in place will continue, but further expansion
will probably be modest. Governments may simply
not be able to afford the cash and other incentives
necessary to provide meaningful support to couples
who have children. It therefore seems likely that
fertility in these East Asian societies will remain
lowat least for the foreseeable futureas women
make difcult choices between careers and mother-
hood.
Fertility in these
societies will likely
remain low as
women make
difcult choices
between careers
and motherhood

Analysis from the East-West Center
12
About this Publication
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About the Authors
Sidney B.Westley is a communications
specialist with the Research Program at the
East-West Center.
She can be reached at:
Email: [email protected]
Minja Kim Choe is a senior fellow in
Population and Health Studies at the East-
West Center.
She can be reached at:
Email: [email protected]
Robert D. Retherford is the coordinator of
Population and Health Studies at the East-
West Center.
He can be reached at:
Email: [email protected]
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sion. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and
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servations. In Gavin Jones, Paulin Tay Straughan, and Angelique
Chan, eds. Ultra-low fertility in Pacic Asia: Trends, causes, and
policy issues. Oxford, UK: Routledge.