This document summarizes a Supreme Court case from 1988 regarding two US Navy officers, Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, who were sued for libel by two former Navy employees, Rossi and Wyer. Sanders was the director of special services and Moreau was the commanding officer at the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. Rossi and Wyer alleged that letters written by Sanders and Moreau regarding changing their employment status and a grievance hearing contained defamatory statements. However, the Court ruled that Sanders and Moreau were performing their official duties as Navy officers in writing the letters, so they had state immunity from the lawsuit. The Court determined that any damages would have to be paid by the US government
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This document summarizes a Supreme Court case from 1988 regarding two US Navy officers, Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, who were sued for libel by two former Navy employees, Rossi and Wyer. Sanders was the director of special services and Moreau was the commanding officer at the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. Rossi and Wyer alleged that letters written by Sanders and Moreau regarding changing their employment status and a grievance hearing contained defamatory statements. However, the Court ruled that Sanders and Moreau were performing their official duties as Navy officers in writing the letters, so they had state immunity from the lawsuit. The Court determined that any damages would have to be paid by the US government
This document summarizes a Supreme Court case from 1988 regarding two US Navy officers, Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, who were sued for libel by two former Navy employees, Rossi and Wyer. Sanders was the director of special services and Moreau was the commanding officer at the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. Rossi and Wyer alleged that letters written by Sanders and Moreau regarding changing their employment status and a grievance hearing contained defamatory statements. However, the Court ruled that Sanders and Moreau were performing their official duties as Navy officers in writing the letters, so they had state immunity from the lawsuit. The Court determined that any damages would have to be paid by the US government
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
This document summarizes a Supreme Court case from 1988 regarding two US Navy officers, Dale Sanders and A.S. Moreau, who were sued for libel by two former Navy employees, Rossi and Wyer. Sanders was the director of special services and Moreau was the commanding officer at the Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. Rossi and Wyer alleged that letters written by Sanders and Moreau regarding changing their employment status and a grievance hearing contained defamatory statements. However, the Court ruled that Sanders and Moreau were performing their official duties as Navy officers in writing the letters, so they had state immunity from the lawsuit. The Court determined that any damages would have to be paid by the US government
Copyright:
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Myla Ruth N.
Sara
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR vs. HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II
FACTS: Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in
the Philippines. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the special services
department of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent
full-time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S.
Department of Defense. The hearing officer recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.
However, in a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's report. The letter
contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and
Wyers have proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even
though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places
where others not involved in the case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages alleging
that the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of
their personal and proprietary rights.
However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties
and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motion
was denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING: Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its
personnel, including the private respondents. Given the official character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued as
officers of the United States government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope of
their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is responsible for their acts.
It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity
will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and
liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled
principles are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to
the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such
award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as
their principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the
appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.
Myla Ruth N. Sara The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal
right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is
derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet 17 imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept is
formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. WHEREFORE, the
