Practice Case: Syria: HKS211x: Central Challenges of American National Security, Strategy, and The Press
Practice Case: Syria: HKS211x: Central Challenges of American National Security, Strategy, and The Press
participants. Neither the Assad regime nor the Western-backed Syrian National Coalition indicates a serious willingness to reach a settlement at the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the Syrian regimebacked by Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah fightershas achieved a series of military victories in recent months, including important battles at Qusayr and Homs. A once-steady flow of military defections has slowed to a trickle, and the core of Assads Baath Party loyalists remains largely intact. After many left Assad for dead a year ago, a growing number of analysts now worry that the authoritarian regime may last for years to come. The opposition to Assad consists of over 1,200 disparate groups that are ill-equipped and deeply fragmented. The Western-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) claims to include more than 80,000 loosely-affiliated fighters, but disparate FSA militias are often confined to patrolling their own neighborhoods. Moreover, the oppositions most cohesive and effective combat fighting groups are Salafist jihadists whose agendas are antithetical to U.S. interests. One important group is Jabhat al-Nusra, an Al Qaeda affiliate blacklisted by Washington as a foreign terrorist organization. Yet a steady flow of weapons and other equipment reaches these groups, mostly through Qatar, which has bankrolled the Syrian opposition with around $3 billion to date. Saudi Arabia, Qatars neighbor and competitor, has funneled even more to the more moderate forces fighting Assad. Finally, Syrias chemical and biological weapons add a further dimension of complexity. In August 2012, President Obama said, A red line for us is if we see a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around, or being utilized. That would change my calculus. Yet, reluctant to act, the administration took its time in considering the evidence in roughly a dozen small-scale attacks that appeared to involve chemical weapons. In June 2013, the Obama administration reported with high confidence that Assads regime had in fact killed 100-150 Syrians with sarin gas in a series of attacks. Around the same time, President Obama authorized a covert, CIA-led operation to arm and train select groups of rebel fighters. On August 21, a large-scale use of sarin gas killed more than a thousand people in eastern Damascus, including hundreds of children. In response, President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry vowed to hold Assads regime accountable for this attack. After they publically presented the case for limited, surgical cruise missile attacks on Syrian military targetsand the Pentagon completed plans to execute that orderPresident Obama called time out at the final hour. In a move that surprised the core leadership of his national security team as much as outsiders, Obama delayed military action by referring the issue to Congress. The Obama administrations proposed resolution would authorize all necessary and appropriate military measures to prevent or deter the use or proliferation of chemical or biological weapons and protect the United States and its allies against the threat posed by such weapons. The issue continues to twist in the wind. On September 9, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov seized upon an apparently offhand remark by Secretary Kerry in a London press conference and called on the Assad regime to not only agree on putting chemical weapons storages under international control, but also for its further destruction and then joining the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Before the day was out, President
Obama had called the Russian proposal a potential breakthrough, though he reiterated the need to trust, but verify. Yesterday, in a televised address to the nation, President Obama asked Congress to postpone a vote on military action so that his administration could pursue this potential diplomatic opening. As this hypothetical case is presented, it remains uncertain whether Congress will continue to consider military action, and, if so, how the American peoples representatives will vote. Assignment You are a new, trusted assistant to Susan Rice, the recently appointed National Security Advisor. As President Obamas former ambassador to the United Nations and a member of the National Security Council, Rice has been involved with Syria policy since the conflicts inception. But she is deeply uneasy about the course of events. As a passionate advocate of human rights who served in the Clinton administration when it stood on the sidelines during the Rwandan genocide, among her deepest core convictions is: never again. Reflecting on that experience, Rice said in 2001: I swore to myself that if I ever faced such a crisis again, I would come down on the side of dramatic action, going down in flames if that was required. As a relative newcomer to the Syria challenge, you have been chosen as a pair of fresh eyes to produce new, creative ideas about how the United States can act more aggressively and effectively to meet this challenge. Rice has told you that in her gut, she is certain that we could and should be doing a lot more to stop the killing, prevent the metastasis of a cancer that is spreading to the region, and secure U.S. interestsbut the question is what. President Obama remains focused narrowly and specifically on deterring future use of chemical weapons in Syria. Neither the military options he has been considering, nor the diplomatic initiative to disarm Syrias chemical arsenal, aim to significantly alter the balance of military forces on the ground or compel Assads government to negotiate. Despite this swirl of events, the issue Susan Rice has asked you to address is the much larger question of what else, beyond deterring future use of chemical weapons, should the United States do to stop the killing, prevent the metastasis of a cancer that is spreading to the region, and secure and advance U.S. interests. Her assignment to you: an eyes only strategic options outline that she can share with the President on where we stand now, what is likely to happen if U.S. strategy remains the same, realistic strategic alternatives that could better protect and advance American interests, and your best recommendations for moving forward. Strategic option 1 should characterize current U.S. strategy. Option 2 should summarize what you judge to be the most promising military action the U.S. could undertake. Option 3 should develop a third strategic initiative that is non-military but harnesses other instruments of American power. For example, you are free to propose a strategy for driving the Assad government and rebel groups to a negotiated settlement, for forcing regime change, for compelling Assad to turn over his chemical weapons stockpile, or for triggering the breakup of the countryor any other outcome that you see as desirable. But both option 2 and option 3 must be designed to, at a minimum, fulfill Rices objectives.
Logistics Please enter your strategic options outline in the text box provided on the application form, adhering to the SOPs and formatting guidelines provided. Note that outlines may not exceed 600 words.