3 Innovation
3 Innovation
3 Innovation
Contents
1. Technology and Strategy (Part I - Intro) 2. Technology and Corporate Planning (Reading I-2) 3. Management Criteria for Effective Innovation (Reading I-4) 4. Core Competence (Reading I-3)
Process development to support high tolerances, greater quality control, more reliable scheduling, faster response time to orders, and other dimensions that improve the ability to perform
Process development to tune production and delivery system to segment needs in order to lower cost
Process development to tune the production and delivery system to segment need in order to improve performance
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Bet
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Cash in
Fold
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B A
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ss e ne v it artt A
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Elements in planning
Industry, competition, organizational resources... Technology can result from inside or outside Questions: How are technological issues recognized by management? How has technology been used to implement strategic objectives? How has technology been monitored? How are technology-related activities recognized and organized?
New Product Management
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Management Innovation
Criteria
for
Effective
Two sides
technological (new and good) and business (embodiment, operational consequences and market dynamics)
Technical potential
What fundamental technical constraints limiting prior art are lifted? What new technical constraints are inherent? How favourable is the trade-off?
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Management Innovation
Embodiment
Criteria
for
Effective
Is the end product enhanced by additional technology and components required to use innovation? Is the innovation enhand or diluted by embodiment? Does the embodiment offer potential for further inventive enhancement?
Operations
What operations are displaced or weakened? What new operations are needed? What is the tradeoff?
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Management Innovation
Market
Criteria
for
Effective
Does the product provide enhanced effectiveness serving the final user? Does the operation reduce cost of delivery? Does latent demand expansion or price elasticity expansion determine characteristics of new markets?
Example analyses
Transistors (Exhibit 1) Jet turbines (Exhibit 2)
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Core competence
Collective learning, coordinate production skills, bring together technologies, organization of work, delivery of value Sony: miniaturization, Philips: optical-media, 3M: sticky tape
New Product Management
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Strategic architecture
Establish objectives for competence building How long could we stay in this business if we lose it? How central to customer value? Future opportunities foreclosed? Architecture provides logic for product and market diversification (Does it add to overall goal? Does it exploit/add to core competencies?)
New Product Management
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Contents
1. Technology Strategy (Part II - Intro) 2. Technological Innovation and the S-Curve (Reading II-1, II-2 and II-3) 3. Disruptive and Sustaining Innovations (Reading II-4 and II-5) 4. Organizational Adaptation (Reading II-13) 5. Strategic Dynamics (Reading II-16) Case: Infosys Consulting (Case II-11) Case: NTT DoCoMo (HBS) Case: Kindle (HBS) Case: Amazon Web Services (HBS) Case: Geox (HBS)
New Product Management
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Technological capabilities
Technology strategy
Experience
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Strategic action
Generative Mechanisms
Integrative Mechanisms
Technology evolution
Industry context
External Environment
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Dominant culture
Reflects distinctive competence Science vs. engineering vs. manufacturing Reflects product architecture Can reflect founders
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Major innovations often based on emerging need or new way to meet demand
Entrepreneurial act, often based on superior performance
New Product Management
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Lessons
Difference component / architecture curves Architecture often closely coupled with market, new entrants often successful
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Organizational Adaptation
Evolutionary focus on strategy
How does it come about and evolve? From outside (environmental determinism) or inside (strategic choice)? Intraorganizational perspective: initiatives emerge and compete Variation selection - retention Internal and external selection
Organizational Adaptation
Selection: knowledge about strategy often located at top, as firm becomes larger, communication difficult, so participants might perceive different strategies as best for them and firm (reason for variation), top management needs to establish internal selection mechanisms to maintain coherence (administrative rules, control systems, rewards, cultural rituals, norms), should be in line with external (market) selection pressures Variation: induced process targeted at preserving coupling of initiatives at operational level with strategy, might lead to reduction of variation, depends on growth opportunities in current domain
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Organizational Adaptation
Autonomous strategic process
Variation: some people willl try to get firm to engage in activities outside current strategy, derive from new combinations of skills, capabilities, competences, more often from lower level, reasons: self-image that risk is not greater, career prospects, start-up Selection: clear up importance in context of current strategy, usually outside normal selection process through champions and top management, may lead to change in strategy, difficult processes, often some alternate funding reserved for demonstrating viability Retention: autonomous strategic process allows firm to become aware of environmental variations, autonomous initiatives can lead to new companies or stretch resources too thin, but open up strategic options
New Product Management
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Organizational Adaptation
Organizational adaptation
Relative inertia: adaptation necessary (reliability, legitimation), but reduces apatability to changes, consistent with induced strategic process, strategy evolution slow, internal selection needs to be open, free championship and challenging of ideas, role of founders and rule of knowledge and facts over position Adjustment: leave overall strategy in place and changes peripheral features, deliberate, non-random, generally increases life chance of firm, consistent with induced process Reorientation: major changes, upsets induced process, generally by environmental selection (would reduce chance for survival)
New Product Management
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Organizational Adaptation
Strategic renewal: major changes through autonomous process if internal selection (strategic context determination) works well Exhibit 2
Success factors
Top management builds quality of induced and autonomous process Maintain top-driven strategic intent and bottom-up internal experimentation and selection processes Successful reorientation preceded by internal experimentation and selection processes
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Strategic Dynamics
Decision making and game theory
Game theory is concerned with other parties that have own strategies and goals, decision making generally only with the environment Game defined by players, available strategies, payoffs and rules (repeated games, memory, information) Prisoners' dilemma probably most famous example...
Proposal
Corporate longevity depends on matching cycles of autonomous and induced strategy with strategic dynamics Strategic leadership means balancing those cycles
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Strategic Dynamics
Corporate longevity
Fortune 100: from 1965, 19 remain in 2005 Most of the time, companies operate in stable environment, and strategy making process is geared towards linear strategic dynamics Sometimes (quite often newcomers) nonlinear dynamics change rules of game (normative rules laws, customs etc., economic rules, technological rules, cognitive rules industry recipe), outcomes difficult to predict
Strategic dynamics
Actions of company and environment (other players, suppliers, technological change, government,...) considered, can be rule-abiding or -changing
New Product Management
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Strategic Dynamics
Rule-abiding means additive, linear, fairly predictable change Rule-changing materially change strategic context for others, nonlinear, difficult to predict Exhibit 1 Strategic recognition important, seeing rule-changing implications quickly, reaction time, constant alertness Player-independent change: problematic, e.g. rebates against new manufacturing
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Strategic Dynamics
Link to induced and autonomous strategy process
Example Intel: Independent industry change (DRAM came, Intel slow to withdraw, but autonomous strategy had provided microprocessor option), controlled change (Centrino based on autonomous strategy), runaway industry (RISC vs. CISC, internal civil war) Resource accumulation: firms engage in quite a lot autonomous processes (exploration mode), often funded by middle management faced by problems using resources from mature business not absorbed by induced process Scaling up: experimentation and selection of autonomous processes, middle management tries, role of cash reserves (Exhibit 2)
New Product Management
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Strategic Dynamics
Balance
Limited change: continue induced, but manage autonomous (slight rebalancing) Independent change: autonomous process key Controlled change: induced process key Runaway industry change: management decides based on whether bet available Exhibit 3
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Case: Kindle
eReading: Amazon's Kindle (HBS)
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Case: Geox
Geox: Breathing Innovation into Shoes (HBS)
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Contents
1. Developing Innovative Capabilities (Part III - Intro) 2. Corporate R&D (Reading III-2 & III-3) 3. Invention to Innovation and Research to Development (Reading II-4 & II-5) 4. Absorptive Capacity (Reading III-6) Case: NEC (Case III-1) 5. Corporate Venture Capital (Reading III-7) 6. Evaluating Innovation Investment (Reading III-10) 7. New Product Development 8. Communication in NPD (Reading IV-1) 9. Project Plans & Product Development Maps (Reading IV-5 & IV-6) Case: Apple (HBS)
New Product Management
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Opening windows on new science and technology Recruiting new kinds of skills Identifying acquisition candidates with needed technological expertise
Assessing threats and opportunities Recruiting talented people with high potential Recruiting for all divisions, from corporate research to operations
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Autonomous process
Corporate researchBusiness research interface: entrepreneurial task, needs market link, business researchers generally more ad-hoc, less structured, more external time pressure
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Administrative
Assessing opportunities
High uncertainty (usefulness unclear, depends on complementaries or total system, often new uses, ability to link to need) Questions (I): Are first-class researchers available? Is major investment going to return major result? How many years to useful results? How many failures/successes did others have in that area?
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Questions (II): Can be obtained from vendors or acquisitions? Cost for displacing an existing program to implement new one? Enough hope to transfer downstream? Necessary capital available?
Corporate R&D
Case study: Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)
Located in Silicon Valley near Stanford University Xerox spent hundreds of millions, but many ideas were turned into products by start-ups Still successful (copiers, CAD, laser printers) Especially computerized office systems (original reason) not cashed in on (business at Xerox makes loss) Problems: slow decision making due to size and being a one-product company, organizational flaws (weak ties to rest of company, generally no marketing channels for such products) Problems have also led to people leaving frustrated
New Product Management
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Corporate R&D
Founded in 1969 for Xerox to become architect of information in the office Top people attracted (blank check and 10 years no corporate interference) 50% computer science, 50% physical sciences Image of scientists / hackers basically from there (beards, T-shirts,...) PARC became leader in human-computer interaction Pioneered windows and mouse for interactions Hands-off management led to overstepping (developed Alto open - as PC product, other divison developed Star - closed) Text editor Bravo developed (outside charter), nobody saw market potential became MS Word
New Product Management
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Corporate R&D
Visitor Steve Jobs got some ideas for Apple from Smalltalk Ethernet developed at PARC Xerox strategy was complete office systems to increase lock on customers (open PC was not a good fit), and bigbank (build the best, not something better) Reorientation at PARC to increase transfer out and management attention / links PARC was transformed in 2002 into an independent, wholly owned subsidiary company dedicated to developing and maturing advances in science and business concepts with the support of commercial partners and client
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Corporate R&D
Cross-pollination
Idea of mixing things up to get creative results Cross- or interdisciplinary teams Value on average lower, but breakthroughs of unusually high value Depending on alignment of disciplines (e.g. economics and physics quite near, economics and psychology farther apart) Exhibit 1 Rules: pairings of well-established fields, deep expertise people
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Invention to Innovation
Innovation means welding marketplace opportunities with inventive technology and new technical knowledge
Complex decision making how to make a product out of break-through? Also involves consistency with firm corporate interest (fabric) Elements to be brought together: technical competency, market need and corporate interest How is this process of linking done? By whom?
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Invention to Innovation
Evolution and patterns
Corporate R&D established (scientists), market specialists seen as advisor to be brought in, then became a separate function in R&D: Should they take lead or work together? Technology push (scientists, based on technology), need pull (marketing, based on demand and markets) or cooperation
Technology push
Mostly based on scientists, aware of corporate interests Exhibit 1 Problems: tends to focus on easy applications, locked in to one technology, biased user selection, getting funding (bootleg research)
New Product Management
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Invention to Innovation
Need pull
Targeted research by specific market goals (not too broad and not too narrow - focusing) Exhibit 2 Problems: absence of true believer or champion, continues to change target (miss opportunity)
Both types of linking necessary: technical (problem with knowledge) and need (breakthrough to demand)
Also corporate interests needs to be accounted for Quite often group leaders as driving force (contact to technology, business and organizaitonal knowledge)
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Invention to Innovation
Successful conceptualization
Synthesizers, almost simultaneous linking of all three dimensions Steve Jobs and Smalltalk Exhibit 4 Better conceptualisations result from flexibility and modifications (do not get locked in)
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Invention to Innovation
Successful transfer: moved from research to development and resulted in product Unsuccessful transfer: left research but no product Nontransfer: intended for transfer but not accepted in development Primary success factors Technical understanding: main technical issues need to be understood before passing on Feasibility: demonstration necessary (agreement what that means), might imply user acceptance and therefore real users Advanced development overlap: research must deterime whether to maitain activity (support or defend), or to explore related and advanced technologies
New Product Management
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Invention to Innovation
Growth potential: too narrow aim without technical or market growth potential, new technology might become obsolete by old ones stretching in competition Existence of an advocate: someone in research selling it, looking after it Advanced technology activities at development lab: helpful and often necessary, sometimes provides hurdle (competitive, skeptical) but in the end beneficial as leads to thorough work and involvement External pressures: same technology at competitor lab or announcement Joint programs
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Invention to Innovation
Secondary success factors Timeliness Internal users: creates pressure and demand Government contracts High-level involvement: research sometimes turns to top management Individual corporate responsibility: corporate watchdog Proximity: no major factor generally, might be convenient and saves money, but transfer does not depend
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Absorptive Capacity
Outside sources often critical to innovation process
Ability to evaluate, recognize value, asssimilate and utilize outside knowledge important Factor of prior related knowledge (basic skills, shared language etc.), based on cognitive learning (associate learning by linking, learning is cumulative and based on richness of knowledge structure) Absorptive capacity Byproduct of doing research (sometimes manufacturing production experience) Can also be directly generated trainings etc.
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Absorptive Capacity
Organizational absorptive capacity
Based on members' absorptive capacities Not simply the sum, but also based on transfers on knowledge within Not only direct interface to outside, but also structure of communication within and distribution of expertise Interface can be diffused or centralized (people may act as gatekeepers or boundary spanners) depends on speed and uncertainty of change Internal communication based on languages, codes etc. - developing them can make this communication more efficient, but make outside-in more difficult (notinvented-here syndrom, tends to increase with group tenure)
New Product Management
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Absorptive Capacity
Knowledge structure: some overlap between individuals necessary for communication, diversity also important (tradeoff of specialization) Cross-function interfaces, job rotations etc.
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Absorptive Capacity
Path dependence
Set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past history matters Accumulating in one period will increase accumulation in the next Absorptive capacity allows to see trends, which will lead to build absorptive capacity (expectation formulation) Ceasing to invest in absorptive capacity can lead to lockout (NIH-syndrom too far away), confines firm to work in a particular domain based on early decisions Self-reinforcing cycle with high absorptive capacity: sees opportunities, aspires to them (proactive instead of reactive)
New Product Management
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Absorptive Capacity
Competence destroying technical change
Radical change can destroy competence, building new ones can be difficult due to accumulation effects, or may be blind to developments
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Case: NEC
What is your assessment of new technology strategy? What will it take to succeed? How can the new site best contribute? What is your assessment of performance to date? How should management ensure long-term survivial and growth of the center? What should Mr. Shinoda do next?
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Process Changes
New core process Unique radical Next generation process Tuning Single and dept. upgrade incremental
Product Changes
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Communication in NPD
Extensive communication between engineering and production critical
Informal communication: beer busts, technical symposia, offsite, multiday discussion meetings etc. Formal communication also essential Tasks: introducing new products to manufacturing, providing optimum level of documentation on products, facilitating orderly and effective changes to products in production
Communication in NPD
Prototyping: first in engineering for testing (lab & field) using different materials etc., then pilot production with normal design joint responsibility Design freeze: done before full-scale production (in agreement), later changes only through notices and formally, can be sequential for parts Skunk works: multidisciplinary teams with own facilities (high prestige, resources, fast, but might be disruptive) Following engineers: some design engineers move to production for some time (job rotation) Multiple products: more difficult balance of maintenance engineering and development, standardization of components becomes issue
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Communication in NPD
Engineering documentation
Product and process documentation (designs, lists,...) Level of detail: costly to produce but important, more documentation necessary with high-volumes, unskilled labour, much automation
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Product development
Often fails because of misunderstanding of markets (lack of distinctiveness) or own technology, mismatches between functions Planning and mapping necessary
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Case: Apple
Design Thinking and Innovation at Apple (HBS)
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Contents
1. Profiting from Technological Innovation (Reading I-1)
Case: Elio Engineering Inc. (Case I-1) Case: Matrix Semiconductor Inc. (Case I-4) Case: StubHub (Case I-5) Case: Lumni (HBS) Case: EA in 1995 / 2002 / 2005 (Case I-6 / I-7 / I-8) Case: Case: Case: Case: Pitney Bowes (Case III-5) Donnelley & Sons (Case III-7) Intel: Hood River (Case III-8 plus add-on) HP (HBS)
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Case analyses
EMI CAT scanner: needed assets like training, servicing, should have found a partner like Siemens IBM PC: needed cospecialized assets like software, chose open system approach, induced even without contracts, help of name to reduce risks for others Nutrasweet: tight appropriability, but patents will run out, created brand and manufacturing in-house, let supplier contracts expire
New Product Management
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Conceptualising business opportunity always needs linking between technical and need
Minimum winning game
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Case: StubHub
Describe the initial minimum winning game of StubHub and the strategic environment. Discuss the changes necessary to move to the next step.
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Case: Lumni
Felipe Vergara and Lumni: Launching an Innovation in a Developing Economy (HBS)
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Themes of success
Business focus: tight focus on one field (Xerox, Kodak, IBM,...), closely related products / product lines, focused R&D (high amount ddue to size or proportion 8-15% of sales), consistent priorities and behaviour, also helps in close interaction with customers
New Product Management
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Administrative/cultural frictions
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Operational relatedness
Efficiency considerations
Unrelated
Operational relatedness
Partly related
Strongly related
Very important
Strategic importance
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Implementation issues
Tool for clarification between entrepreneur and corporate management Corporate management needs to develop measurement and reward system for different alternatives New information could alter perceived strategic importance and operational relatedness renegotitation of organization design
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Major problems
Top management has limited insight and time (due to importance), mid-level R&D management not used to business environment, venture manager still unclear Exhibit 2
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Problems in impetus
ICV becomes venture (often with champion as manager) Continued growth depends on manager strategic forcing Needs to demonstrate sales volume and profit quickly Generalists replaced by specialist, efficiency considerations growth versus organization Mid-level at the same time strategy building to fit venture in it (and coach)
New Product Management
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Overlaying process
Objective often unclear, mid level management delineates boundaries of venture, strategic context often unclear (mid level management engages in organizational championship) Due to time lag and windows often small chance of establishing venture, as strategies and top management change Deducts time from mid-level, can not coach venture
New Product Management
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Case: HP
Innovation at HP: The Role of the Innovation Program Office (IPO) (HBS)
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