Damion Kareem Scott Birkbeck College, University of London Thesis submitted as preparation for the completion of the degree

Master of Arts in Philosophy

Metaphorical and Scientific Perspectives on Nietzsche's bermensch:

Abstract: My claim is that Nietzsches bermensch may be approached as more than merely a rhetorical relic of 19th Century German Romanticism. His controversial, elusive idea is highly metaphorical and emotionally charged, yet if reconstructed responsibly, it may also be thought in a literal, indeed scientific, manner. I argue that this, ironically, adheres to the spirit of Nietzsches text.

It follows from this origin that the word good was definitely not linked from the first and by necessity to unegoistic actions, as the superstition of these genealogists of morality would have it. Rather it was only when aristocratic value judgments declined that the whole antithesis egoistic unegoistic obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience-it is, to speak in my own language, the herd instinct that through this antithesis at last gets its word (and its words) in. And even then it was a long time before that instinct attained such dominion that moral evaluation was actually stuck and halted at this antithesis (as, for example, is the case in contemporary Europe: the prejudice that takes moral, unegoistic, dsintress, as concepts of equivalent value already rules today with the force of a fixed idea and brain-sickness.) (On the Genealogy of Morals, First Essay 2) The lovely beast, man, seems to lose its good spirits every time it thinks well: it becomes serious. And where laughter and gaiety are found, the quality of thought is poor- that is the prejudice of this serious beast against all gay science.- Well, then, let us prove that it is a prejudice. (The Gay Science, 327 Taking seriously)

Perspectives on Nietzsches bermensch 1) Introduction 1.1) Objectives 1.2) Methodology 2) Analysis of the 'death of god' 3) Politics of the Soul 3.1) Why Politics? 3.2) Heroic or Radical Individualism versus Democratic Individualism 3.3) Superhuman as substitute for religious faith? 3.4) 'Three metamorphoses of the spirit': the necessity of creation born of struggle 3.5) Perpetual Overcoming 4) Superhuman as synthesis of master and slave personality types' 4.1) Drives/Power, ontology 4.2) The Master's simplicity, strength of purpose and activity 4.3) The Slave's diversity, weakness of will, and inability to affect change (reactivity) 4.4) Superhuman/Synthesis 5) A Psychodialectical approach to the Exploding Hero 5.1) Restructuring the Superhuman 6) Conclusion 6.1) Neurophysiology and Psychopathology 6.2) Reconstruction: Naturalism, pots-structuralism, Quietism and the bermensch

Introduction Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was deeply concerned and moved by questions relating to life, value, and culture: What is the nature of 'the good life? What is the highest that man could possibly attain or achieve or hope for? If human freedom is real, then how should it affect the world? How should one treat other human beings? What processes or things govern these types of decisions? Questions such as these have been historically in the field of philosophical anthropology, moral philosophy and ethics. Nietzsche's relations to these domains are striking and controversial. The tradition of moral philosophy in the West begins with Socrates. Socrates, unlike his student, friend and interpretive biographer Plato, did not make a sharp distinction between metaphysics (the theory of reality or being; questions concerning deity, time and space, possibility, necessity, and causality) and ethics. The Socrates presented to us by Plato, at least, did not. This 'textual' Socrates possessed a philosophy full of 'sense and value'. Did Socratic thought lack or degrade due the any perceived or ingrained lack of conceptual specificity? Or is this lack a histiographical pre-condition for the possibility for the factually primary? Aristotle, and other Western philosophers after Socrates and Plato, made sharper doctrinal distinctions between metaphysics and ethics Many subsequent philosophers have observed these distinction to various degrees. Nietzsche marks a break with Socrates and a movement outside this tradition; but a contiguous 'outside'. Nietzsche remained within a discipline of enquiry aimed at attaining a type of wisdom. His thought and writings echoed a sort of Socratic playful rhetoric, heavily laden with notions of tragic irony and natural power. Nevertheless his writings were relatively antisystematic and didactic. These characteristics are very much anti-Socratic. -Is Socrates irony an expression of revolt? Of the ressentiment of the rabble? Does he, as one of the oppressed, enjoy his own form of ferocity in the knife-thrust of the syllogism? Does he revenge himself on the aristocrats he fascinates? As a dialectician one is in possession of a pitiless instrument; with its aid one can play the tyrant; one compromises by conquering. The dialectician leaves it to his opponent to demonstrate he is not an idiot: he engages, he at the same time makes helpless. The dialectician devitalizes his opponents intellect. What? Is dialectics only a form of revenge in the case of Socrates? (Twilight of the Idols The Problem of Socrates

7)

Thus, it is contentious to assert that Nietzsche produces orthodox moral philosophy, ethics, metaphysics or philosophical anthropology, in the sense of canonical, systematic theory construction. Yet, what is certain is that Nietzsche engages moral philosophy and philosophical anthropology with such novelty, aggression, and vigor, that his work amounts to an undeniable historical contribution to these fields, whichever spin, positive or negative, it is given. Strange notions are strewn all over Nietzsche's texts. Of particular existential relevance to moral philosophical questions are a set of quasi-metaphorical notions which serve a multitude of textual functions, performative, figural, literal and conceptual: 'master and slave morality', 'the herd', 'beasts of prey', 'the wanderer and his shadow', 'higher and lower men', 'the lion, the camel, and the child', 'artists, saints, priests and philosophers', 'Englishmen and cows', the list rolls on; eventually snowballing into other quasi-metaphors which possess even wider orbits of meaning encroaching on fields relevant to metaphysics and epistemology: 'the death of god', 'the rise of nihilism', 'the eternal recurrence of the same', 'women/truth'. Often these notions are used, incorporated, played off against each other, deconstructed, reconstructed, and the like, all serving Nietzsche's multifarious writing style, although, occasionally getting out of hand and running amuck, taking on a life of their own. Often, study of one important notion in Nietzsche's work will jump into study of another notion, skipping from aphorism to aphorism, while staying on the same narrative thread. For instance, his discussions of higher men diffuses into discussion of master morality, in turn shifting (from one paragraph to the next, or even one text to the next) to the origins of morality in general, to specific individuals, like Jesus of Nazareth or Richard Wagner or Julius Augustus Caesar, to types, i.e. priests or artists or scientists. Here and now, I will focus on one of Nietzsche's most celebrated, but often misunderstood notions: the bermensch or the Overman or Superman or Superhuman, in Standard English. I will mention as lexical tokens these three words interchangeably in this essay

whilst hammering away at the concept and tracing relative movements of the notion. (1) The notion, both infamous and misunderstood, due to the fact that the actual word bermensch, only occurs in two of his published works, he first is Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a philosophical epic poem, published in parts, marking a turning point in the directions of Nietzsche's thoughts and writings. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a difficult text to comprehend critique or interpret. The second book in which the word appears is The Will to Power. This is a collection of material taken from Nietzsches notebooks and unpublished writing. There is strong scholarly consensus that the text The Will to Power was compiled and edited rather crudely and inaccurately by Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche. Decades after the publication The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann edited what is usually agreed to be a much fairer, more accurate edition of the text. The use and value of The Will to Power is often debated. Yet it, in itself, is a book of remarkable scope, and helps to illuminate much of Nietzsche's prior work even if one holds that it should be considered as a supplementary text. Since the word bermensch appears in only two of Nietzsche's texts, how does it persist in being a compelling notion to examine? The main reason is that it is often found to be fascinating, as the notion is presented quite dramatically: early in the prologue of Zarathustra, the main character, a strange hermit- prophet, comes out of a decade of solitude to address a nearby village. After announcing the 'death of god', Zarathustra heralds the coming Superhuman: I teach you the Superhuman. Man is something that should be overcome. ... The Superhuman is the meaning of the Earth. Let your will say: The Superhuman shall be the meaning of the Earth. .... All gods are dead: now we want the Superhuman to live - let this be our last will one day at the great noontide! (Zarathustra prologue)

Also, a close look at the notion of the Superhuman shows sufficient 'family resemblance' with certain other Nietzschean notions, such as the 'philosopher-artist', 'the hero', 'the ideal' (2) and the 'higher man'. Keeping in mind Nietzsche's penchant for wandering thoughts, his love of brevity and textual economy, and his use of latent imagery, there is warrant to suggest that the bermensch signals the locus of a cluster of views, some of which are crucial for understanding Nietzsche on his own terms.

Many questions may be posed concerning this notion: is the bermensch a pass idea? Is it a product of the inconsistent thought of a great writer, but incoherent theorist? Does it represent the last g(r)asp of a Eurocentric Western secularized philosophy to lay claim to divinity? Or rather, does the teaching of the superhuman herald an important philosophical formulation, which should speak to hearts and minds in the present day? Three writers, working across different academic disciplines, Leslie Paul Thiele (political theory), John Richardson (philosophy), and Henry Staten (comparative literature) present powerful interpretations of the notion of the Superhuman displaying overlapping elements, but also with some divergences. Yet certain ideas anchor all of these explorations, as some conditions are seemingly stipulative in Nietzsche's text and therefore necessary for any sustained attempt at responsible interpretation of his notion. These ideas include, thinking through and living in accordance with the principle of the 'eternal recurrence of the same', identifying and/or unifying an innate multiplicity of psychological and organic drives into a unified active character and the ability to transvaluate weak, stagnant and out-of-date values into progressive and active evaluations (all treated below). Other conditions are only hinted at, or expressed vaguely, such as whether the Superhuman is to be thought of as a sociological or cultural phenomenon, as a psychological or biographical type, a historical figure or a subjective feeling, whether the Superhuman is an ideal which must be constantly striven for or whether the goal can be instantiated and reinstantiated, and who if anyone has shown to fit this type, category, or particular so far in human history. My project here is not to paint a romantic or positivistic mere actuality (3), although these issues are intertwined with others that I treat more explicitly. The aim rather, will be to attempt a reconstruction of the notion of the Superhuman. Paradoxes are extremely problematic points of contention, which stem from seemingly plausible but inconsistent sets of ideas or premises. The paradoxical tension inherent in Nietzsches text will be illuminated by examination via readings of Nietzsche as conducted by Thiele, Richardson, and Staten. This reconstruction will be radically naturalistic (4). Many believe, with sufficient

warrant, that an appreciation for a dynamic version of metaphorical naturalism is important to maintain when approaching any Nietzschean notion. The hallmarks of the intended, interpretative notion of the Superhuman will be that it remains within the literary spirit of its original heralding in/of Zarathustra, thus insuring textual authenticity. In addition, the reconstruction will render the notion open for analysis and placement within an appropriate contemporary research paradigm, insuring scientific relevance, existential relevance, and empirical adequacy. To exemplify the reconstructive element of this approach is to indicate resonance with the actuality of the stylistic mode of presentation of the various texts examined. Yet this attunement to the stylistic modes of presentation is understood also within a somewhat orthodox post-structuralist outlook, in which claims of textual and semantic stability are not taken for granted but must instead be achieved by empathetic re-assessable and revisable interpretation. To clarify, this reconstructive post-structuralist and metaphorical scientific method interlaces actual elements of Nietzsche's text, with elements of the texts of three chosen primary interpreters, with the end product being hopefully an emergent insight with relative clarity into the aspect of Nietzschean philosophy centered on the notion of the Superhuman.

An analysis and the 'Death of god' (5) Discussions of the superhuman must be conducted with a basic understanding of Nietzsche's impetus for its creation. A familiarity with his work shows that the formulation of the idea of the Superhuman is a natural progression from concerns clustered around the notions of will-to-power and the death of god. The routine interpretation of the death of god is such that it facilitates a simple equation with nihilism. This now common linking of the notion of the death of god with nihilism is tautological, if left at that. It is unhelpful without a non-circular account of nihilism and an understanding of why Nietzsche expresses the notion in an atheistic, historical slogan as well as in moral and metaphysical thematizations. As for the will to power, the various authors discussed cover the topic sufficiently that a good general sense of it should emerge from the various reconstructions, especially those of Richardson and Staten. Like other quasi-metaphorical statements the connotations of god is dead are manifold,

and therefore somewhat ambiguous. On one interpretation, there are at least two important implications of the principle, one is a metaphysical implication, and the other is a moral or practical implication. I will try to make clear Nietzsche's controversial idea, which may operate in both of these distinct areas of discourse. First the metaphysical import of god is dead. If taken as a metaphysical claim, it may serve as an ontological hypothesis: god is dead is offered as part of a possible answer to the short but difficult question of what there is, in totality, or in general. Despite a rising tide of agnosticism and atheism in the socio-cultural tradition in which Nietzsche was immersed, both amongst the intelligentsia and the wider public, the most utilized solutions to ontological questions, the most powerful concept of nineteenth century Europe's general worldview, was "God", a distinctly omnipotent, personal, and benevolent being who served as the necessary and sufficient grounds for reality or the world. Whither is God? I will tell you. We have killed him - you and I. ( The Gay Science 125) Taken at face value, we can derive the notion from the phrase: "God" is used as a definite description quantifying over the supreme being. In line with the historical JudaeoChristian conceptions of "God" we may justifiably say that the supreme being is predicated of the properties of unity or trinity, absoluteness, omnipotence, supernaturalness, and omniscience. "God" is also said to be the infinite and uncaused first creator and, importantly, a source of and justification of laws and standards of judgment. Using the term "dead" is to refer to an end or annihilation of some biological being. It means that something is no longer living or animate. "Death" refers not only to a thing's passing into non-existence, but also to a completion of the process of total deprivation of self-functioning. Therefore one way to correctly thematize the ontologically relevant assertion involving god's death is to say simply that there is no longer a supernatural, or ethereal being with the functional capacity to produce effective change in the world. Also, that nature is neither conscious nor friendly, nor fixed and determined. Truth and satisfaction are to be found in the mundane. Notice that this assertion is anti-platonic. Nietzsche is saying there is nothing volitional

outside the realm of the temporal, the sensory or possibly sensuous, and that first-hand knowledge and personal conviction constitute the useful, the desirable and the valuable. This metaphysical implication of god is dead has evolved into contemporary discourse as theory and debate about the existence of mental or moral processes or mental objects and issues about the apparent relations between psychology and neurobiology, or other empirical sciences. It has also come to play a role in questions concerning the ontological status of insubstantials or abstracta, the definition of causality, issues concerning the nature and appropriate categorization of such entities as fundamental particles and space-time points or regions postulated by contemporary analytical metaphysics and contemporary theoretical physics. There really are many puzzles and problems yet, for a unified, comprehensive natural science. "Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things. There are no eternally enduring substances; matter is as much of an error as the God of the Eleatics. But when shall we ever be done with our caution and care? When will we complete our de-deification of nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature? (The Gay Science 109) Now shifting to the moral and ethical implications of god is dead, one aspect of Nietzsche's overall project is a vigorous attempt to outline a way of overcoming one of the more influential and pervasive ideas of his day: the philosophical and cultural justification of an altruistic lifestyle stemming from adherence to the teachings of traditional Judaeo-Christian doctrine. Altruism as a lifestyle is closely connected with utilitarianism, a moral system. Moral systems are the applications of sets of principled reasons to social action. Utilitarianisms main idea is that the rightness or wrongness of an action is best determined by the ability or inability of the action to produce happiness. The value of an act is thus fixed by the act's consequences; by the amount of happiness or pleasure derived from these consequences. The guiding principle of utilitarianism is the desire for the greatest happiness for the greatest amount of people ( qua moral agents). Nietzsches attacks against utilitarianism and utilitarians are infamous. He saw utilitarianism at times as quasi-religious, artificial, and essentially nihilistic. He felt that a person or a culture which employed utilitarian moral thinking and practice would create harm and foster

ill health. However, Nietzsches attempt at deconstructing utilitarian ethics was, in part, motivated by an unfortunate non-sequitur. Bentham, Mill and other early utilitarians expressed ideas motivated by humanistic and secular concerns. Utilitarianism, when viewed from a dialectichistorical standpoint, was more a movement in response to perceived historic and conceptual limitations of Kantian moral theory coupled with a growing appreciation of the power of rationality and science, and less a historical branch of theistic virtue ethics. Yet there were implicit and perhaps inadvertent remnants of the shadows of the old god in the writings of the Utilitarians that Nietzsche was familiar with. These remnants partly justify his polemical attacks. Thus Nietzsche found it necessary to formulate a principle by which he would be able to defeat what he took to be the worldview of late nineteenth century Christian morality and Utilitarianism. The tremendous event is still on it's way, still traveling - it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves. ( The Gay Science 125) That principle is that god is dead. It is used as an argument for the impossibility of non-agent relative evaluations, as an argument against ethics of absolute generalizations and prescriptions of right action, judgment, or conduct; as they will not hold (they devalue..decay) in this, the only, world. The argument leads to the conclusion that beliefs in situationless moral codes are misleading and wrong. Nietzsche uses god's death' in both a positive and a negative manner: the positive application of the conception of god's death is to urge the adoption of a particular lifestyle. It is a calling to arms. It is a singling out and an exalting of a certain character or personality type: experimental, skeptical, heroic, strong-willed independent and adventurous. The conception of god's death is used in a negative manner as a counter argument to absolutist, theistic ethics. It is used to smash the belief in perspective independent, external rules of conduct. The application of god is dead to contemporary concerns would be an engagement of

defenders of Utilitarianism, which today is more obviously connected with analytic moral psychology and decision theory than traditional theology or virtue ethics. Nietzsche would say that a utilitarian ethic allows for erosion of individual integrity and leads to probable alienation of an agent from his personal actions. Since under a utilitarian system, one's personal actions are deemed right or wrong based upon the particular actions effect upon the sum total of the public happiness, rendering ethical judgments impersonal and objective, the individual is required to subvert his own personal actions or projects if the utilitarian calculation deems that his actions might prevent the maximization of the public good. This, on the surface, does not necessarily constitute a problem for utilitarianism, as the utilitarian can point to the individual's happiness and thus the fulfillment of his own projects as a component in the calculation of the maximum public good. The response is that even with the individual's happiness reckoned in the calculation of the greatest public good, there may still come a time where one is asked to abandon a project, if the calculation of the maximum summum bonum deems his or her project as contrary to or opposed to the public good. If this project is something that the individual feels is an integral part of his or her life, a determining factor in selfidentification perhaps, then the abandonment does seem to be an affront to the very core elements of an individuals primary impetus to any action in the first place, namely a recognition of the capacity for unfettered and decisive action, and the accompanying choice of action, and does indeed constitute an alienation of the individual from his own personally valued actions. This feeling or sense of alienation may be viewed by the utilitarian as the individuals recognition of the selfishness and/or evilness of his action, which should be reconciled with the summum bonum in order to avoid this sense of alienation. Yet if one takes into consideration that the utilitarian calculating device, the "nexus" of the "utility framework", for determining the utility of a particular action consists of nothing more than the aggregate of individual judgments about that action, which are influenced by single individuals personal aspirations, moods, and reasons, then it seems that a utilitarian ethic advocates a kind of minority subservience to majority consensus. This consensus does not guarantee the rightness of an action; it only guarantees the mass democratic appeal of the action irrespective of the action's subjective and objective rationality.

This appeal to consensus upon which the utilitarian ethic is based, leads to a type of rightness or correctness arrived at by majority declaration. Subsequently the rejection of moralistic public pressure by the nonconformist is a contributing factor to any sense of personal integrity. Nietzsche's idea, if right, would reveal utilitarianism as an attempt to set up a type of artificial evaluative and motivational system, where the impetus for action is removed from the individual will and placed in the realm of public approval and consensus. Since it is not always possible to reach complete public consensus on the amount of happiness that the consequence of an action is likely to yield, the individual is required to suppress his own freedom of action and maximisation of his power, in order to benefit the projected public good. This, to Nietzsche, is just plain wrong. The well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value: to consider the former a priori of higher value may be left to the navet of English biologists. All the sciences have from now on to prepare the way for the future task of the philosophers: this task understood as the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values. (On the Genealogy of Morals First Essay 17) This is a cursory presentation of just one strand of argument concerning one utilitarian moral principle. Ironically, very much in line with the textual sneak attacks that Nietzsche often subjects his opponents to and often with strong vigor and a funny wit. There are responses to god is dead as an ethical principle. From a theoretical point of view, some positions related to Nietzschean Anti-utilitarianism, include redefining utilitarianism as a more pluralistic Consequenstealism, or using the notion to justify Moral Non-cognitivism (a position which Nietzsche seems to flirt with at times) or Moral Relativism (another object of his flirtations at other times). More interesting though, I think, are various practical responses: they include, rejection or denial, which leads to the stereotypically self-righteous type of person. Another reaction is ambivalence or ignorance, which tends to produce stereotypical hypocrisy. A third response is affirmation or acceptance, which tends to produce exactly the lifestyle that Nietzsche endorses for a small segment of society. It is probably impossible to live exclusively in accordance to any one response to the notion god is dead due to the changing circumstances of life but people may

certainly fashion a lifestyle in which one of these three outlooks becomes prevalent. As Nietzsche anticipated correctly, a lifestyle which rejects external, non-egotistical, utilitarian standards of evaluation would be deemed by many of his contemporaries and also by many in future generations as undesirable, immoral. He was correct in predicting resistance to this notion. How much must collapse now that this faith has been undermined because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it; for example, the whole of our European morality. ( The Gay Science 343). Very rarely does Nietzsche use such literal, conceptual language when discussing his own notions. Again, this type of analysis of the death of god is meant to clarify his motivational thinking about the idea of the Superhuman. We are now in a position to consider Thiele. His text is far more metaphorical, in a vein much closer to Nietzsche.

The Politics of the Soul Why 'Politics'? Orthodox western political philosophy has treated issues such as the nature and definition of justice, the ideal form of government and what is the best or most efficient way to relate the human individual to the state (polis). A political approach to Nietzsche seems peculiar and inappropriate as he seems, on the surface, so stridently apolitical. What Leslie Paul Thiele asserts in Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism, is that traditional political rhetoric matches Nietzsches thoughts well, as notions of power struggles, overcoming, domination, liberation, etc. are well represented in political philosophy. Thiele readily acknowledges that Nietzsche usually calls for a type of political apathy, and demonstrates how this follows from his heroic individualism, but he wants to keep the usage of political language to apply it to his own concerns. Thiele states that nowhere in Nietzsche's corpus does one ever come across the phrase 'heroic individualism'. This phrase is probably something that Nietzsche would find self-evident. Thiele uses it to token a distinction between modern liberal political philosophy's notion of 'democratic individualism'. This view aims at something very remote from the type of ideal that Nietzsche creates. 'Democratic individualism' is the view that either naturally, or through political coercion, the state should or

will countenance a basic equality amongst its citizens. He makes this distinction in order to facilitate a richer understanding of Nietzschean ideals. In Chapter 9 of Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism, Thiele begins by emphasizing what he perceives to be Nietzsches piety, as well as his extreme form of skepticism. Nietzsches piety is manifested as a steadfast dedication and inspired devotion to a task, which he feels is of utmost importance. The perceived importance of his chosen project, or at least a crucial aspect of it, is the instruction of how to live life to the fullest in the uncertain times, and times to come, of the waxing agnosticism and atheism in Europe, and other Western-influenced areas of the world. Nietzsches scepticism is manifested as his relentless attack on the onto-theological justification of reality or the world or nature. Onto-theological describes the use of monistic transcendental ideals to answer ontological questions, or explain the unity of objects or events that are countenanced as discretely sensuous, or apt for perceptive appropriation to mind and language. (6) We have seen what Nietzsche means by the death of god, and the ways in which the dedeification of nature, including the enigmatic complex that is human nature, may commence. Thus engendering the type of philosophical questions, which indicate the paths by which Nietzsche would like to lead us. (Zarathustra 109-10). At the end of the tunnel that is the exposition and description of the death of god, there still lie the remnants of immanent, as opposed to transcendental, ideals. Nietzsche posits relativistic, positive, immanent ideals. In nature, his ideals are named wills-to-power and in human nature, the Superhuman. This ideal, according to Thiele, is a momentary-transient ideal, yet nonetheless attainable in this world. How may one discern this ideal- in the absence of any objective standards of adjudicative evaluations in a world of ever shifting constellations of forces and drives which Nietzsche's (anti)-metaphysics posits? The answer, suggested by Thiele's interpretations, is to take seriously Nietzsche's active nihilism. The difference between active and passive nihilism is this: To be pounded into the sad state of extreme cynicism, pessimism, extended depression, and/or lethargy by the death of god

and the subsequent erosion of universal objective standards of evaluative justification for modes of human life and behavior is passive nihilism. To create a heroic lifestyle in the context of deterministic nature would be active nihilism. Thiele claims that this active nihilism is Nietzsche's substitute for religion. "To create greatness is Nietzsche's higher form of (active) nihilism, his substitute for religion. Not a postmortem union with God, but the apotheosis of living man is proposed." ( Politics of the Soul pg. 184) I find this somewhat controversial. The trouble with Thiele at this point may be little more than a quibble arising from Nietzsche's frequent use of hyperbole and rhetorical flourishes. Perhaps, but I think that the trouble stems more from reflection on the nature of religion. It seems that the demarcation between existentialist, Marxist, liberal humanistic or post-modern mysticism and religious faith is adherence to an organised doctrine of theology, metaphysics and ethics, which possesses a high degree of systematicity. This analytical requirement of systematicity seems to discredit the statement that Nietzsche's active nihilism is a 'substitute' for religion. Nietzsche never explains the notion of the Superhuman in anywhere near the systematic detail found in religious texts. One is left with something very different. A substitute would be a notion that although of a different nature, operating under different logical conditions, serves an identical existential-cognitive function. The heralding of the Superhuman serves a function other than that provided by dogmatic religious faith. There is a complete lack of orderly and methodical supernatural revelation. Thiele's seeming argument is that the concept of Ideal is equivalent to Holiness or possessing the property of religiosity. The ideal of the Superhuman is not a substantial ideal, but nonetheless an ideal. Therefore the Superhuman is an insubstantial substitute, but substitute nonetheless, for religious faith. The key assumption is that Nietzsche inadvertently slips into onto-theological and /or positivistic-political thinking and this problematic plays on the paradoxical tensions between secularity and divinity, immanence and transcendence, and substantiality and ethereality. This paradoxical tension opens the path to a reasonable poststructural reading of Thieles attitude to the superhuman/overman/existential and/or postmodern

superhero.

At a critical juncture in Thieles text, we arrive at a surprisingly early payoff: "What is the overman? He is the apotheosis of the hero as incarnated in the philosopher, artist, and saint." and "Who is the overman? This question has no answer, except perhaps that given by Odysseus to the Cyclops. The overman remains ever elusive. Mankind, Nietzsche stated, is only the means of pursuing a goal. This goal is the overman; but the goal is never reached, only striven for." (Politics of the Soul pg.184) These two statements provide the important material for the remainder of Thiele's account. I will try to unpack this 'what' and this 'who'. The apotheosis of the hero seems to be a specific form of an anti-romantic (7), individual, knee deep in never-ceasing struggle and toil, to create (and sometimes destroy in order to create anew) works and actions and a matrix of evaluations for these works. By means of pruning and strengthening of the various power-drives (see Richardsons account of power-drives below) which one has inherited by nature or genetic and material inheritance and shaped by fate or historical forces. This anti-romantic individual, freed of the excess sentimentality of romanticism, by spiritual (psychological) sublimation of the individual's will-to-power, aims at a particular relation to history and the life-world, which is, to reiterate, superlatively creative, enhancive and sacrificial. Yet, what if a human where to attain such a mode of existence? Would this be an end state? Wouldn't this be a back door to what Nietzsche labelled as the danger of the 'last man? Could there be a threat of an Superhuman, as an Overphilistine, despite his meeting the challenge of the call to create, enhance, and sacrifice? A man living always and henceforth in 'noontime'. (Twilight of the Idols 41) No, according to Nietzsche, as the animal nature, cannot be done away with. The living human is a being of flesh and bone, no matter how high the spirit soars. The cyclical nature of emotional life and biological evolution is, for Nietzsche, an inescapable function of reality.

Thus another of Nietzsches quasi-metaphors the eternal recurrence of the same. (see The Gay Science 273-74 The greatest weight) Apparently, according to Nietzsche, one is forced to add, strand by strand, to the psychosomatic web which is ones earthly existence, operating within this limited sphere of volition, creating without regretting. Not even the slightest of regrets, despite even the most intense infliction of pain, the most apparently shameful of moments, or the worst of the worst. This is the spiritual, agonal activity which produces the fleeting moments which Nietzsche gives the name of the bermensch. How? Part of the answer lies with laughter. (The Will to Power pg135) This may sound a strange but lets look closer. Nietzsches texts are often cast in a very serious tone. Yet sometimes the tone becomes light, ironic, or even comedic. To joke, to be cheerful, to look at ones toil or misfortunes with mirth, to transform misfortunes into fortunes, in other words, is the way to break the cycle of excessive toil, which, in the absence of the ability to laugh at will, leads to what Nietzsche has identified as asceticism. Asceticism is a particular mode of being in which great self-control and expenditure of will operate as a revengeful type of life. This type of life is geared towards a maximal removal of the individual from the sphere of self-regarding action and shifting the individuals will to a subordinate role to that of the utilitarian calculus. This state depends, psychologically, on the role of bad conscience in decision making, physiologically on simple weakness, and socio-culturally on the inability to create different than what is sanctioned by the majority. After the strength of purpose marshaled to affect change, after the creation of high standards of work, after the creation of a newer, more noble, value matrix, one must be willing to strive to surpass even these. The Superhuman must let go, must forget, again, must destroy in order to create, and do so with laughter. (see Beyond Good and Evil 199 and Zarathustra 306) This attainment of post-nihilistic joyfulness, of Nietzschean optimism, is something that happens in stages. Nietzsche draws a portrait of these respective stages using the metaphors: the camel, the lion, and the child. (Zarathustra 54-55) The camel a metaphor/sign for the phase in

which the person is able to take up within himself the 'truths' (Gemes 1992) of perspectivism and epistemic anti-foundationalism and the need for the creation of value-matrices. The camel, a lonely and solitary desert dweller, is necessarily so, as it needs a quiet expanse of space in order to maintain the focus on the job of bearing the heavy burden of many angst-inducing revelations. Then, by way of joint exercise of will, and allowance by chance of allotment, the camel metaphormorphisizes into a lion, a metaphor-sign of excessive strength and power of will. The Lion, the king of the jungle, is metaphorically pressed into service as king of ones personal will. The burdens of the camel become light, still burdensome, but lighter and no longer annoying, as the wild, powerful lion is rarely frightened and seldom annoyed at anything in its natural untrammelled habitat. The camel then becomes a lion, a wilful creature of strength. The thou shalt becomes I will. (Politics of the Soul pg. 189)

The last stage in this tri-cyclical process is the transformation of lion, into child. The child- a metaphor/sign for the most playful, innocent, and forgetful element within us. The child wills its own will (Ibid. pg. 189). The playtime of the child reflects the Superhuman's throwing off the temporary burden of existence, revelling in all of the world's fullness and nullities, embracing the truth in/of becoming, while avoiding the adult world of care and concern. The childs ability to toy with his world is a far greater achievement of strength within his own sphere of appropriation than the camel and even the lion relative to their respective spheres of appropriation. The camel and the lion represent the heros archetypes. They are burden bearing and courageous beasts of war. They are serious and passionately devoted to struggle. And they too must be overcome. Struggle must become play. The two must be childlike. ( Ibid. pg. 189) And then the cycle repeats. Thiele also identifies, at this juncture; an aspect of Nietzsche's thought which diverges from another of his main philosophical influences, Arthur Schopenhauer. This is Nietzsches

rejection of Schopenhauers philosophical pessimism. For Schopenhauer the camel would be a terminal metaphor. The phase in which the realisation that an accurate view of human existence is indeed an overwhelming burden leads to Schopenhauerian pessimism. This sort of philosophical pessimism precludes an existential justification for lightness of spirit, mirth, play, and bouts of joyful laughter. A philosophical pessimism which, in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, should be best incorporated into a Lebensanschauung by means of detached aesthetic contemplation, which allows the human being to temporarily escape the pushes and pulls of the multifarious libidinal drives, appetites, desires, and wills (all manifestations of The World-Will according to Schopenhauer). This denial of the basic will to life is a form of extreme asceticism and is attacked by Nietzsche in his boo k The Genealogy of Morals. There the Schopenhauerian ideal mode of existence is contrasted with 'heroic individualism' in the form of positive evaluation of certain, special kinds of active 'ascetic ideals' such as the 'philosopher' and 'the artist' and the 'solitary' whom creates. Yet how does playfulness, mirth and laughter square with Nietzsche's often puzzling, critical remarks on happiness? (see The Will to Power 12, 20,704, and especially 1022, but there are literally dozens of references to happiness in general, the vast majority scathing). Nietzsche insists that happiness by itself is not and should not be posited as the sole goal of living, joking that this Lebensanschauung is best suited for women, cows, Christians and Englishmen, an example of herd morality. Yet happiness may indeed be championed, when coupled with his brand of anti-romantic, heroic individualism. Happiness will then come to be considered a side-effect of this feed-back loop which is the affirmation of the nullities inherent in the cyclical nature of the world as will-to-power and earthly becoming, and of the eternal recurrence/reassurance of the same/sane. Where does this place the role of suffering and pain? Nietzsche is known for valuing healthy adversity, even, as usual for him, in an extreme form. Certainly it seems in some sense to be nihilistic, to seek out pain and suffering, while claiming that happiness is a by-product of such activity. This smacks of pathological masochism. Nietzsches distinction between active and passive forms of nihilism is the adjudicating

factor at play here. Passive nihilism is akin to Schopenhauerian pessimism, utilitarianism, and Judaeo-Christian morality. Active nihilism is that post-decadent mode of human existence in which the pain of struggle transforms into the exhaustion of one who has, after revelling for a long period, noticed the fatigue and pain that may have accompanied his ecstatic overactivity. However, this dual thematic of perpetual active overcoming and play is problematic, both from logical and existential points of view. Being logically problematic, for Nietzsche, seems to be a sign of good philosophy. As for existential problematics, well they may not be a sign of good philosophy; yet Nietzsche's texts certainly bred existential problematics prolifically. The problem that Thiele's account reveals at this juncture, I think accurately, is found in Become who you are! First it is necessary to emancipate oneself from ones chains and finally one must still emancipate oneself from this emancipation (from Nietzsche's Nachlass or notebooks, unpublished in English, Politics of the Soul pg. 190) The paradoxical tension lies in the fact that actual, self-reflexive emancipation can only point back to a return to bondage and be passive or reactive. The emancipation from 'emancipation' necessarily implies subjugation by another force and a passive moment which ends in bondage or a reactive resistance or fight with the same force that ends in freedom, but which is a reductio ad absurdum of itself . Real freedom in no way can be construed as emancipation from 'emancipation', which in actuality, would be just trickery in the face of a return to slavery or an incoherent nothing. In order to make this more understandable, I'll turn now to the text of Richardson.

Nietzsches Overman as synthesis of Master and Slave personality types John Richardson's Nietzsche's System, is a clear, analytical approach to interpreting and understanding Nietzsche. Although many regard Nietzsche's writings as anti-systematic, the gist is that, pace Arthur Danto and Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche was indeed a philosopher, along with his other titles and descriptions such as psychologist, cultural critic, prose stylist, literary critic, poet, polemicist, etc. There are certain conditions that determine the form, content, and style of philosophical thought and texts. For instance, if we are to take his philosophical views seriously,

then we are compelled to assume a certain degree of cogency, and since cogency implies a degree or modicum of systematicity, it is not incorrect to say that Nietzsche's writings express a system of discernible 'truths'. Discernible 'truths' those although extremely radical, yet remain something more than strictly figurative linguistic acts. Richardson's writing specific to the Superhuman is this: He first explicates a basic characterization of the core of Nietzsche's thoughts on the nature of the world: that the world is a collection of power-drives. These power-drives are a reflection of a global 'will-to-power'. This 'will-to-power' functions more like a metaphorical, empirical hypothesis about the way in which a perspectival, naturalistic ontology might proceed. Individual power-drives are teleological in the sense that they aim at keeping themselves distinct from other power-drives but also, and crucially, to overcome themselves and other obstacles that might serve as impediments to the growth or expansion of the power-drive. Depending on what kind of drive or aggregates of drives are interacting, will noetically determine, relative to a particular perspectival frame of reference, kinds of objects, processes, or the 'truths' of speech acts. Nietzsche takes the points of view of people, and especially the highest sorts of people, to be the best kinds of interpretative frames of reference. In fact he often writes that this anthropomorphic epistemology is the only legitimate epistemology, as all alternatives represent a lapse back into onto-theological thinking. Although, at other times he bemoans excessive anthropomorphizing of nature: "Life no Argument. We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we are able to live- with the postulations of bodies, lines, surfaces, causes and effects, motions and rest, form and content: without these articles of faith nobody could now endure to live! But that does not yet mean they are something proved and demonstrated. Life is no argument; among the conditions of life could be error." (The Gay Science 121) and "Ultimate Scepticism. What then in the last resort are the truths of mankind? - They are the irrefutable errors of mankind. (The Gay Science 265) The crucial distinction between types of power-drives is that of activity versus reactivity. Active drives are expanding and growing, appropriating and dominating. Reactive drives are in a state of atrophy, becoming weaker, sicker, subordinate, and subjugated. Homo Sapien, as being intimately continuous with nature, is both composed of drives and embodied evaluative

viewpoints which are co-terminous with nature. These power-drives constitute the quasimetaphorical cellular structure of humans. Human personality types are then given a distinctive account in terms of activity and reactivity by Nietzsche. They are named Herr master in English, Sklave slave and bermensch superhuman. Richardson reconstructs this tertiary distinction. Richardson begins with Nietzsches account of the master type. He asserts that the masters primary qualities are activity, independence and strength. The master type has the willpower and the resources to get what he wants from life. The master views the slave type as a tool, simply as one amongst many other tools which serve a purpose, and which can be used, and dominated, if need be. The master relates to the slave as a predatory animal, like the metaphorical blond beasts or lions, relates to prey or herd animals. This metaphorical relation is also reflected in a historical relation between powerful men such as the nobility and the warrior class and the commoners or Judaeo-Christian influenced masses. The master must show sufficient recognition of the slaves so as not to exploit them to the point of extinction or damage them and thus render them useless. He relates to other masters with a sense of indifference or grudging respect if in opposition. Like other powerful natural phenomena such as the weather or a dangerous species of wild animal, for instance, other masters types are just simply there. He is not able to wield power over them, so he simply coexists with them. Yet importantly, he does not resent them, as he has no need to. The master types moral code therefore is one where the guiding principle is avoidance of embarrassment or shame amongst his equals and alternating episodes of lashing out or disgust amongst his inferiors. The masters psychology, as mirrored by this morality, is one of relative inter-personal distance and control and efficiency of action. (The Nietzschean pathos of distance, Genealogy of Morals First Essay 2). The master is able to get what he wants out of life so easily, for the very specific reason that he doesnt really want much out of life. The master type is a bore. Since his basic drives are so limited, so narrow and focused, the master can never hope to reach the level of complexity nor possess the same multiplicity of drives as the slave or Superhuman types, as Richardson will go on to argue. Richardson's analysis shows how the Nietzschean Master personality type is, for all

his strength and command, overly-conservative, superficial and astoundingly uninteresting. There is one sense in which the master type may even be said to be a servant: He is a servant to the status quo, as he wants states of affairs to remain relatively the same with regards to his inclinations. Now to the slave type, whom is a servant in so many ways. "What is Noble-Every elevation of the type 'man', has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society and so it will always be -a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or other....Men with a still natural nature, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey, still in possession of unbroken strength of will and desire for power, threw themselves upon weaker, more moral, more peaceful races (perhaps trading or cattle-rearing communities), or upon old mellow civilisations in which the final vital force was flickering out in brilliant fireworks of wit and depravity. At the commencement, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste: their superiority did not consist first of all in their physical, but in their psychical power-they were more complete men (which at every point also implies the same as more complete beasts) (Beyond Good and Evil 257 The ordinary notion of a slave contains the ideas of forced submission and domination. This forced submission and domination often takes place within a socio-historical framework in which there is a caste or class-based system of inequality. This environment of inequality is the breeding ground for the evolution and growth of the Nietzschean Slave personality type. Yet the type which develops from this forced oppression is, naturally, a more complex and interesting personality type. The circumstances and the reasons for the slave's submission and domination, at times are presented as natural inferiority stemming from genetic, physiological weakness or ineptitude in the ways of warfare and militarism. Other times, more in the spirit of Richardson's conceptual analysis and more relevant to my textual reconstruction, is Nietzsche's alternative presentation of the slave as the sufferer of dysfunctional and masochistic psychological (spiritual) disorder. This disorder is literally an inability to prioritise one's appetites, desires, (general libidinal drives) into a healthy, synthetic whole, which operates efficiently or optimally.

To see this, it is necessary to look closer at some of the components of slavery, such as submission and subjection. Submission is a state, a relation, between two or more in which one of the agents is able to control or coerce an amount of reactive energy or labour out of the other. This could only lead to resentment if done without consent and could only be a sign of sickness or decadence if done with consent. Either way, what occurs from the standpoint of the slave type, is bottled-up resentment, aiming to discharge itself, or a dysfunctional peculiarity which is a sign of symptomatic disorder. Subjection is basically the same process but viewed from the standpoint of the actuality of what power-drives are forced or coerced into directions of particular behavioural patterns. Nietzsche presents a collage of the slave's psychology as one of reactivity, impulsivity, resentment, eccentricity, depression, weakness of will and crucially (a trait to which he actually gives much credit in the production of culture), one of diversity. The slave personality type is also given the distinction of being the most stridently religious of all types, as a drive for systematic, universal and external laws of conduct, evaluation, and interpretation is crucial for a life in which creative powers and enforcable standards of personal evaluation are wanting or deficient. (The Genealogy of Morals First Essay 10) The Slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. The Superhuman, presented by Nietzsche and analyzed by Richardson, is fundamentally a 'synthesis' (combinations of the right amount of active drives which are responsible for control over a vast amount of reactive drives) of master and slave personality types, lucky enough to be alive at the right moment in history: "A person synthesized in the right way, in this specific cultural context, will be (Nietzsche thinks) sufficiently unlike both master and slave that he will amount to a new basic type: an 'Superhuman'. Or rather, he will be a clearer and higher instance of a type we can then retroactively discern, already present as rare individual exceptions back in that 'slavish' history" (Nietzsche's System pg. 66) This is sufficient to understand Richardson's account, and as his work will be used extensively in

my own reconstruction, I will move on, no paradoxes necessary.

Staten: Psychodialetical approach at the cusp of the 'Exploding hero' Henry Staten's book Nietzsche's Voice is, at once in the traditions of depth psychology and post-structuralism. His emphasis however is more on dismantling and problematizing than reconstructing. It is also written from a psychoanalytical viewpoint. This means that Staten concerns himself with what he calls the textual 'economy' of Nietzsche's text, 'mapping' and reflecting paradoxes which he traces back to libidinal conflict in Nietzsche, the author, with the aid of biographical material. It is an exercise in deconstruction akin in spirit to philosophers like Jacques Derrida and David Wood. What is very useful, and a prime virtue of the book, is that the deconstructive reading roots out paradoxes inherent in Nietzsches text quickly and efficiently. A good example and the entryway into a section which is important for us: "Is it un-Nietzschean to say that the powerful individual 'fulfils the essence' of humanity? But then how are we accurately to characterise whatever it is that Nietzsche thinks as the consummation embodied in the superior individual?" (Nietzsche's Voice pg. 123) Again, as in all deconstructionist readings, troublesome, displaced ideals or sets of plausible but inconsistent propositions are never far away. The first problematized idea (l) in Staten's treatment of the Nietzschean 'exploding hero' or 'superior individual' is the Aristotelian to hou heneka or the 'for-the-sake-of- which'. This philosophically charged clause is put to good use by both Nietzsche and Staten's pyschodialectical reading of him. Nietzsche is never too far away from asking a 'what for': the what for of 'truth', the what for of 'belief in a priori synthetic judgments', the what for of 'history' in relation to life and modernity, amongst other similar questions. Although Nietzsche often attacks the notion of teleology and the consequences of the results of belief in goal-directed functions, there exists a tacit use of the idea operative in much of Nietzsche's key thoughts. (8) "There is a teleology of the isolated superior individual in Nietzsche's thought, early and late. (Nietzsche's Voice pg. 123)

Throughout much of Nietzsche's work, there is a discernible narrative thread that devalues the role of biological self-preservation and species-preservation. Biological selfpreservation and species-preservation, and ontological self-preservation or enduring identity through change, are often attacked under the rubric of critiques of Darwinism or Platonism, respectively. The element that Nietzsche devalues in preservation, is the will to existence, which posits an end goal of stasis. Stasis, for Nietzsche, would be a sign of weakness and stagnation, of reactivity; weakness of affect and stagnation of flow and output. Instead of self or species-preservation or the will to existence, Nietzsche posits the will to power, or self-overcoming. The will to power is the wellspring of all expansion, growth, and enhancement. Statens account at this juncture is very similar to Richardson's analyses of powerdrives, above. Staten makes the move of asking a further question which points at a problematic: given the forceful Nietzschean critique of the notions of a substantial self, the existence of the transcendental subject, and of the metaphysics of presence against the genealogy of dynamism, what sense are we to derive from the notion of will to power if we ask the simple question: Who or what wills power? Or more technically: What is the principle of individuation for distinctive power drives? In The Will to Power 693 there is a rather feeble attempt at diffusing this paradox: "If the innermost essence of being is will to power, if pleasure is every increase of power, displeasure every feeling of not being able to resist or dominate; may we not then posit pleasure and displeasure as cardinal facts? Is will possible without these two oscillations of Yes and No? - But who feels pleasure? - But who wants power? - Absurd question, if the essence itself is power-will and consequently feelings of pleasure and displeasure! Nonetheless: opposites, obstacles are needed; therefore, relatively, encroaching unitsNeither Staten, nor myself are left satisfied. ( Nietzsche's Voice pg. 124): "The fact that 'encroaching units' are only relative does not at all dispel their character as units, thus as identities with a boundary of identity, thus as something that can in some way remain itself across change. But then how far are we, really, from the 'subject' that Nietzsche supposedly 'deconstructs'?"

Scientific Re-construction and Quiet(ist) Conclusion The perspectives of Thiele, Richardson, and Staten on Nietzsche's notion of the Superhuman provide rich soil from which further related notions may grow. I have discussed and reconstructed the views of the respective authors with an eye towards an original attempt at a new reconstruction. As we have seen, Nietzsches exultation of the Superhuman comes out as an aspect of his project of a typology of persons or personality types, in order to indicate a certain type, which may be strived for by certain people naturally predisposed. Thiele has shown how, in the quasimetaphors of the 'three metamorphoses' found in Zarathustra, how the naturally inclined might attempt this project. Richardson's account of the Macht psychology of the Nietzschean personality types in terms of activity versus reactivity is found in germ form, more metaphorically, in Beyond Good and Evil and, more conceptually, in The Genealogy of Morals, especially in essay one. Initially, Nietzsche presents us with two basic personality types: Master and Slave. Nietzsche sketches, through an account of their differing systems of morality along with a proto-phenomenological analysis of their respective ways of being-in-the-world, a picture of what each type essentially is, culturally, psychologically, and physiologically. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche then presents his ultimate notion/conception, a synthesis of the first two personality types: the extra-moral, hyperbolic, overwhelmingly creative, and nearly impossible type: bermensch. I will now turn to two contemporary research paradigms to try to see if we can better understand the notion of the bermensch, keeping in mind the various problems as revealed by our paradoxes. As Nietzsche wrote, scientific psychology and natural philosophy had not yet formally split. Things are different now. In addition to philosophical anthropology and moral psychology, we are in a position to be able to use various kinds of scientific psychology, social, cognitive, biological and, more controversially, psychoanalytical, to understand personality types. The theoretical landscape has become much more detailed. From Nietzsches first formulation of the three personality types Master, Slave, and Superhuman, we now have various research

paradigms, which, in virtue of their increased conceptual specificity, may allow us to broaden our understanding of these types, in particular, that of the Superhuman type. In line with my goals here, the trick is to map Nietzsches typology of persons onto a present day physiology and psychology of personality that will do justice to Nietzsches original notions. The possibility of this project is certainly questionable. A relatively unaware theorist may be in agreement or display textual affinities or be seemingly connected to future theories, but unless a theory displays certain formal properties such as shared universe of discourse, similarity of methodology, and deductive or inductive implications or entailments, plus informal characteristics such as similarity of style or presentation, acknowledged citation of a shared set of previous works and statements of direction of intended future research, then the connection between historical theory and contemporary theory may be illusory. Tracing the evolutionary pathways of thought, and conversely, using current theories to illuminate historical ideas involve several operations. These operations include analysis and criticism of logical, structural, and stylistic similarities and difference. A crucial component of post-structural theory is the idea that historical as well as structural interconnections between texts, theories, and systems of thought are contingent, accidental, and unintentional as well as purposive, necessary, and logically unavoidable. Whatever the merits of post-structuralism itself as a theoretic paradigm may be, I find this component defensible. A comprehensive survey of post-structuralism is outside the scope of this thesis. It would also be unnecessary. At best, my reconstruction is an accurate genealogical linking of Nietzsches Superhuman with that of a contemporary cluster of views. At worst, it is a present day gloss on a Nietzschean notion which is informed and motivated by but not formally connected to Nietzsches writing on the Superhuman. (From Mixed Opinions and Maxims 1879 201 in the Genealogy, Kaufmann) Philosophers error.- The philosopher supposes that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the structure; but posterity finds its value in the stone which he used for building, and which is used many more times after that for building-better. Thus it finds the value in the fact that the structure can be destroyed and nevertheless retains value as building material.

I choose to use psychopathology and neurophysiology to determine a Nietzschean naturalistic typology. I have selected these two paradigms to stay on Nietzsches original naturalistic path, also having examined Nietzsches little-detailed philosophy of mind, it seems that these methods correspond well with his thinking on the subject. Nietzsche was definitely not a Cartesian substance dualist, as he makes explicit in many passages (see below, Of the Despisers of the Body). Substance dualism is the view that the mind is wholly separate, logically and ontologically from the body. Nietzsche saw this as a supernatural, life-denying view, which remained onto-theological and therefore decadent in his eyes, despite latter attempts to secularize the theory. On the other hand, Nietzsche was also not an eliminative materialist, someone whom holds that that mentality is ontologically identical with the nervous system. This view is that mental function is nothing other than neurophysiology, not even something emergent. Eliminative materialist believe that mentalistic language and a psychology based on real beliefs and desires as explanations for behaviour constitute an old fashioned unscientific outlook which needs to be discarded or eliminated. Nietzsches use of the language of the spirit(9), despite his anti-religious and anti-Cartesian views was a reflection of his core belief that personal, egopsychology could not be reduced to a subpersonal science of causes and effects, without the loss of an important conception, or perhaps a necessary illusion, of humanity. As stated, he was suspicious of any theory that posited a pre-given, substantial self, but did think that from our organic background, our physiology, a willful personal mentality could emerge under the right circumstances. This can be traced to deeper notions more central to his thinking such as his dynamic philosophical psychology and ontology of becoming: Der Wille zur Macht or the will to power. This would be contrastive to a behavioristic psychology and an ontology of being. Nietzsches rough theory of mentality seems to be at once physicalist, functionalistic and emergent, as illustrated by passages such as, The intellect, as a means for the preservation of the individual, unfolds its chief powers in simulation; for this is the means by which the weaker, less robust individuals preserve themselves .... (The Will to Power 243)

Contemporary psychopathology and neuroscience are supported by these kinds of theories. Specifying the exact philosophical foundations of particular scientific practice is challenging. Often scientific research goes on independently of primary research concerning conceptual foundations and logical consistency of theoretical postulations and principles. At other times philosophical and theoretical research dramatically alters the course of experimental research. Ideally, responsible scientific research is underwritten by a sound theoretical framework, relatively reasonable verification and falsification conditions, and careful and methodical observation. Yet logically regimented scientific theory is inevitably located within a historical context. During certain periods of historical change pre-scientific speculation is structured into plausible, systematic theory and at other times, very rarely, the opposite is true and reliably calculable and predictable phenomena come to display anomalous properties. Certain metaphysical theories both justify and often generate theoretical scientific theories. Particular experimental practices and case studies in psychiatric practice connect to theories of that connect to a vast network of others. This, again, is a function of conceptual and ideological affinities and formal likeness. Nietzsches typology of persons maps well onto current trends in psychopathology and neurophysiology because his personality types represent extreme ideals and he insists, as with Schopenhauer, on the organic, bodily rootedness (but not complete reduction) of the self, and thus the personality. (Zarathustra, Of the Despisers of the Body) "I wish to speak to the despisers of the body. Let them not learn differently nor teach differently, but only bid farewell to their own bodies - and so become dumb. 'I am body and soul' -so speaks the child. And why should one not speak like children? But the awakened, the enlightened man says: I am body entirely, and nothing beside; and soul is only a word for something in the body. The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman. Your little intelligence, my brother, which you call 'spirit', is also an instrument of your body, a little instrument and a toy of your great intelligence. Psychopathology is the science of extreme, abnormal, personality types and mental

characteristics. Nietzsches Master, Slave, and Superhuman are hyperbolic, abnormal, sketches of ideals. Neurophysiology deals with the actual underlying physiological realizations of mentality. As long as we remain aware that we should not hold the neurophysiological or neurochemical explanations to be the entire picture, but only an important part of the picture, then they may also serve as pieces of the organic and bodily puzzle that is Nietzsches typology of persons. Lastly, concerning the choice of paradigms, Nietzsches text makes it very explicit, unusually explicit for the standards of his writings, that he considers psychology and physiology to be the keys to understanding the most vital and pressing questions of humanity, free from (de)moralizing sentiment. Further, I would like to bleed the notions of their accumulated excess romanticism, which has infected interpretations of Nietzsche over time. This romanticization, as stated, goes against the spirit of Nietzsches texts. It is, indeed, textual support and even a textual imperative, that serve as the final arbitrator sfor choosing psychopathology and neurophysiology as these represent salient extensions of psychology and physiology: On the other hand, it is equally necessary to engage the interest of physiologists and doctors in these problems (of the value of existing evaluations) ; it may be left to academic philosophers to act as advocates and mediators in this matter too, after they have on the whole succeeded in the past in transforming the originally so reserved and mistrustful relations between philosophy, physiology, and medicine into the most amicable and fruitful exchange. ( On the Genealogy of Morals First Essay, 17) Now I am at a position to carry out the reconstruction with the stipulations of existential relevance and theoretical solidarity as guides. As seen from the perspectives of psychopathology and neurophysiology what, with regards to the master personality type, may we reasonably assert? I think that two categories of diagnoses become obvious from Nietzsches text. The first is that the psychological extremes of the master type fit very closely with a similarity of the symptomatology of various Attention and Social anxiety Disorders and Mood Disorders categorical manifestations. . This type of mental disorder corresponds with Nietzsches Master type, as there must be the observation of a marked lack of attention and general focus with regards situations and tasks, which differ from, whatever the person primarily desires to attend towards. This disorder tends to manifest itself early in adolescence, but not necessarily so, and

usually persists throughout a persons life if untreated. A withdrawn, dreamy appearance may often be observed, as well as a certain mild detachment from others and from the persons immediate cultural milieu. This classification corresponds to the master type better only at the Nietzsches emphasis on this personality type's efficiency of action would preclude any disorder showing marked uncontrollable hyperactivity. The second is the diagnostic category of Dissocial Personality Disorder. The actual corresponding diagnoses here accounts for the remaining essential behavioural traits of the master type: marked inability to empathize (again, Nietzsches pathos of distance), and as a consequence higher than statistically normal incidents of cases such as lying, cheating, and violent behaviour. There is also a remarkable ability for gaining influence and control over others. This is characterized generally by callous unconcern for the feelings of others; gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility and disregard for social norms, rules, and obligations; incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though having no difficulty in establishing them; very low tolerance with frustration and a low threshold for discharge of aggression, including violence; incapacity to experience guilt or to profit from experience, particularly punishment; marked proneness to blame others, or to offer plausible rationalizations, for the behaviour that has brought the person into conflict with society. There may also be persistent irritability as an associated feature (perhaps displaying the master type's ease at showing aggression in the face of situations he feels to be below him). As far as a neurophysiological analysis goes, there is not much empirical support for the aetiology of either Attention and Social anxiety Disorders disorders without hyperactivity or dissocial personality disorder being manifest purely at the neurostructural level. Although neuro-functional analysis does reveal something pertinent to our analysis: at the level of neuronal organization, Attention and Social anxiety Disorders deficit disorder shares certain pathological traits with other disorders such as Depression, and the Bipolar Mood Disorders, and therefore is oddly similar to these affective disorders. There is ample evidence that these types are to be reliably correlated with abnormal uptake of the phenolic amine neurotransmitter serotonin in both cerebral hemispheres. In the light of this data, we are now in a position to say of Nietzsches Master Type, as

being a subject with evidenced degrees of Attention and Social anxiety Disorders coupled with evidenced Dissocial Personality Disorder. This is determined neurophysiologically by abnormal regulation of the neurotransmitter serotonin and social psychologically by the independent artsist/philosopher/musician/scientist/poet being afforded the time, energy, and moment of clarity or madness and material necessities to create yet deals with the antagonistic, turbulent, conspiracy theory laden, violent, life world. The slave type's relation to psychopathology and neurophysiology is even fuzzier. I think one, rarely diagnosed, but quite well known category may be of service: Schizophrenia. The actual diagnostic elements in this personality type are as follows (notice how certain traits discussed above correspond). Schizophrenic disorders are characterized by fundamental distortions of thinking and perception and/or by blunted affect. This may help us in modelling the slave type's denial of 'reality' in the face of impotence to change states of affairs and weakness of will-to-create. Certainly, many psychoanalytic or intrapyschic accounts of schizophrenia posit a large amount of repressed cathetic energy stemming from exposure to enormous psychological trauma. This disturbance involves distortions in certain basic cognitive and perceptual processes and functions such as self-individuation (modelling the slave's overempathetic penchant for pity and unqualified love, unhindered altruism) ego-development (modelling the herd-instinct of this personality type) and self-direction (again the stagnation of the power drives and the impotency to create in the culture in which one exits in.) Hallucinations and other perceptual distortions, as well as delusional beliefs are often common, depending on the type of Schizophrenia present (a 'life-denying' involvement in the religious/superstitious 'spirit' world of demented delusion and daydreams.) One may assume in advance the probability that from time to time and in certain parts of the earth a feeling of physiological inhabition is almost bound to seize on large masses of people, though, owing to their lack of physiological knowledge, they do not diagnose it as such: its cause and remedy are sought and tested only in the psychological-moral domain (this is my most general formula for what is usually called a religion). ( On the Genealogy of Morals Third Essay, 17) Neurophysiologically, schizophrenia is not easy to pin down. Although post-mortem investigation, social psychiatric research, and advances in neural magnetic resonance imaging

technology has provided structural and functional data indicating that pathologies of the limbic and paralimbic areas of the brain, pre-natal viral infection affecting the early structural development of the neo-cortex, and abnormalities with synthesising and regulating various neurotransmissional chemical agents such as dopamine, glutamate and, again, serotonin, are all at play in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is the holy grail of psychiatric research since it is one of the more dramatic, complex, and detrimental of all internationally recognized mental disorders. Definitive conclusions in the aetiology and epidemiology of the disorder are far away at present. These are amongst the most agreed on findings in the body of research. (10) Perhaps this is outlandish. It is possible that this list of personality traits could be ascribed to the Nietzschean typology of persons without appeal to the vocabularies of psychopathology and neuroscience. The characteristics of these pathological personality types are also shared by normally functional, healthy people. Does my reconstruction really help to explain Nietzsches personality types in general and his notion of the Superhuman in particular? I have already forecasted this type of an objection earlier during my treatment of the structural and non-structural associations between theories. I would though, like to add, that to claim that certain vocabularies are inappropriate to express or explain particular theories, concepts, or notions is to open the possibility of a slippery slope leading to the unreasonable restriction of the scope of possible future interpretation, analysis, and theory. That is a general rebuttal. A more thesis-specific point, is that I am warranted in employing these explanatory paradigms, precisely due to the fact that the dysfunctionality of extremity is the province of pathological research. My contention is that Nietzsches Superhuman or the other personality types that he posits, would not process nor act out these characteristic behavioral patterns in the same way that an average socially functioning person would. It is the statistical deviation from normative functionality along with degree of seriousness of phenomenological accounts of maladjusted affective and cognitive functions that determine the appropriateness of diagnostic psychological and neurological evaluation. (The Genealogy, First Essay 2) (as, for example, is the case in contemporary Europe:

the prejudice that takes moral, unegoistic, dsintress, as concepts of equivalent value already rules today with the force of a fixed idea and brain-sickness.) Left at this, we have the radically naturalistic reconstruction of the superhuman type in accordance with the joint stipulations of scientific relevance and existential authenticity: One who has experienced these specified extremes of psychological strain, disorder, and unusualness, but who has lived through these extreme experiences, and come out the other side, healthy, strong, and, Thieles stress, laughing. Nietzsches intentions on this topic are indeed vague, but enough is written to suggest that the notion would remain incomplete if left at merely romantic or objective description of extreme immoral behavior, such as the glorious vanquishing in battle of thousands of enemy soldiers, or spectacular feats of creativity, as in the creation of a time honoured masterpiece. There is, I urge, a strong emphasis on personal, psychological upheaval and realized functional disruption. An emphasis on (perhaps to a degree, undesirable) uniqueness of point of view, and as a result or function of this rarified perspective on things, incredible feats of productive creativity ensues. Nietzsche reflects and exalts the history-altering creation. The crucial creation that may bring an age out of cynical phases and into rejuvenated periods. This is the grand sanction that such a person would have. Perhaps, she would do it all so stealthily during her lifetime, that in future times it would have seemed almost magical. My reconstruction should not be construed as an appeal to reductive scientism (11) Scientism as sharply summarized by Thomas Nagel is both idealistic and unduly restrictive. A truly reductive scientific account would utilize proxy functions to classify sets of concepts of one theory on to a set of concepts of another covering or epistemtically more powerful theory. There are of course a myriad of detailed, sophisticated types of intertheoretical reduction. Three important distinctions are apparent here. The first one is between symmetrical versus asymmetrical reduction. The second one is the difference between hierarchical reductions and

instrumental reductions. Lastly the distinction between the desire for theoretical reduction and the devaluation of the reductive act which renders discursive space as off-limits without mastery of domain specific meta-theories. Out of these current questions spring the possibility of future dialectic within this present neuronal net of meaning as firing and transferring. Not only have I written on the horizon of advocacy of scientific reductionism, I think that this type of hypernaturalism is very much influenced by Quinean scientific quietism but also a Deluezean reckoning of difference as immanence without end and or finitude that desires incessantly. This view of Nietzsche and his relation to science, or specifically the idea of formal empirical science as grounded in art and life is articulated in the work of Babete Babich. She thematizes empirical science and analytical philosophy of science in such a way as to expose the value and meaning of the rhetoric of science as always and already the inference to the best explanation as conceived by those in charge of nominating the best explainers. It does not mean that they are not worthy of the nomination. For Babich, as for Nietzsche, the conceptual censorship that is a pragmatic necessity for the role of the natural scientist as serious naturalist, is a function of the cultural ascendancy of science and the scientific domination of pop culture, common sense, and the cultural or societal given. I want to emphasize that this is only one path on the way to stimulating thinking about Nietzsche's bermensch. If it evokes fruitful thought on the subject, then I will take solace in that. There are, undoubtedly, many ways to think responsibly about how to articulate this type of approach to life. Writing on Nietzsche, psychopathology, and post-structuralism introduces a sardonic possibility: the realization of being unintentionally tangled up in the net of systematic theory which although mine, will inevitably extend beyond my own sphere of evaluation and creation. In fact, the science, although accurate as far as current research is concerned, is rather stitched together. I am happy to say that is intentionally so. The reality is that despite my hopes of a privileged insight into Nietzsches bermensch, by way of a radically naturalistic reconstruction,

the notion/metaphor remains, as it should: shadowy, ironic, and remote. Fine. As anyone who has made an intimate connection with Nietzschean thought/writing, and established a grasp of post-structuralist philosophy will feel, this is as it should be.

Notes 1) The German word bermensch is usually translated as Overman, Superman or Superhuman. I use Superhuman for the simple reason that Superman sounds less serious due to connotations related to the pop-cultural fictional character. I have changed a few translations accordingly. 2) An ideal for Nietzsche is not with the sense of being transcendent or otherworldly, but bearing in mind his naturalistic ontology of becoming, an ideal in the sense of a transitory state which is impossible to instantiate synchronically and difficult but possible to embody diachronically, in a pure manner. 3) Nietzsche's text makes certain things pretty clear, like his denouncement of possible interpretations which proposes a life of military might used to oppress and destroy, blindly and stupidly ..."bloodlust" ... as he calls it derisively. His eventual ambivalent attitude towards Napoleon Bonaparte and Julius Augustus Caesar, after initially seeming to present them as exemplars of the Superhuman type is evidence of this. (The Genealogy First Essay, 16) Like a last signpost to the other path, Napoleon appeared, the most isolated and late-born man there has ever been, and in him the problem of the noble ideal as such made flesh- one might well ponder what kind of problem it is: Napoleon, this synthesis of the inhuman and superhuman. Nietzsche, in The Genealogy, presents the anonymous 'spiritual types' of the Artist and the Philosopher, as being really praiseworthy, 'truly human types'. They are presented as the only 'vocations' (taken in an existential sense) capable of embodying the Superhuman, it seems to me, as Johann Wolfgang Goethe, William Shakespeare and Heraclitus are the only three figures which he always and consistently positively valued, hinting at something important here, such as potential realization. Also Nietzsches denouncement of financial wealth, for example his urging in The Dawn, not to transform "values of the spirit...into financial values or his insults directed towards those learned men who seek celebrity and acclaim, but "represent nothing" rule out vulgar, pop-culture interpretations of the Superhuman as the Rich, Famous, or Politically Influential: the types of the ultimately too "timely". 4) There is no doubt that Nietzsche was a highly experimental thinker. It is also clear that he held the natural sciences in high esteem, although he certainly understood the danger of rampant scientism and its subsequent temptation to asceticism and passive nihilism (thus his critique of the will to truth). Yet when viewed instrumentally, as a form of 'joyful wisdom', Nietzsche had no qualms with using the findings of the natural sciences to debunk bad myths, religions, and dusty superstitions. I take this to involve a type of methodological naturalism and not so much ontological naturalism. So when I say radically naturalistic, I mean a paradigm which lends itself to experimentation, but is also instrumental and pluralistic. See Leiter (1998) for an extensive discussion. 5) Introduced, metaphorically in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 2 6) Platonism or more specifically, Plato's time-honored theory of the eternal forms inaugurates this tradition

7) Nietzsches relation to Romanticism is complicated, despite his frequent, direct arguments against its legitimacy and affects. By anti-romantic, what is meant here is absence of the spirit of excess emotion, or being overly sentimental. 8) Something that Richardson discusses in Chapter 1 of Nietzsche's System, see also The Will to Power 666, 679) 9) There is a pressing issue of translation involved in the notion of Geist. In English, Geist, has connotations of spirit, ghost, and frequently, mind. What is important, for my concerns, is that in the original German, I can understand Nietzsche as using this word often to emphasize that mentality or spirituality is functional and dynamic, not inert and substantial, and that he speaks of Geist as an instrument or tool that is used by the body, but not reduced to the body. This is with reference to mind. Nietzsches remarks on Bewusstsein, consciousness, are a different story. 10) I am very grateful to Professors Robin Murray and Julian Leff at The Institute of Psychiatry, Kings College and Maudsley Hospitals, London. The opportunity to discuss social psychiatric and pharmacological issues while working on their respective teams as a research assistant was invaluable to me in developing a basic understanding of psychopathology and neurology. 11) The epistemic view, a kind of idealism, that claims that all true knowledge is or will be proven to be scientific.

Bibliography Friedrich Nietzsche Kritische Studien-ausgabe, editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari B Crawford Berlin: W. de Gruyter Press 1980 Nietzsche's works in English in order of original publication -1860's to1910's On the Origins of Language: The Beginnings of Nietzsche's Early Theory of Language Translated by Claudia Crawford Berlin: W. de Gruyter Press 1988 On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense and Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s Edited and Trans. David Breazeale. New Jersey: Humanities Press 1979 Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks Marianne Cowan, Trans. Chicago: Henry Regnery 1962 The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music and The Case of Wagner Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books 1967 Untimely Meditations Trans. R.J. Hollingdale Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983 Human, all too Human Trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehman Trans. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1984 The Dawn Trans. R.J. Hollingdale Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982 The Gay Science Trans. Walter Kaufmann New York: Vintage 1974 Thus Spoke Zarathustra Trans. Walter Kaufmann New York: Penguin Books 1981 Beyond Good and Evil Trans. Walter Kaufmann New York: Vintage Books 1967 On the Genealogy of Morals Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books 1967 Twilight of the Idols and The Antichrist Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin 1968 Ecce Homo Walter Kaufmann, Trans New York: Vintage Books 1967 The Will to Power Trans. and Ed. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage, 1967

Main Secondary Texts Richardson, John 1996 Nietzsche's System Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press Staten, Henry 1990 Nietzsches Voice Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press Thiele, L.P. 1990 Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism Princeton: Princeton University Press Secondary Texts Babich, Babette E. 1994 Nietzsches Philosophy of Science, Reflecting Science on the ground of Art and Life Albany: State University of New York Press Bolton, Derek and Hill, Jonathan Hill 1996 Mind, Meaning and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry Oxford, New York, Tokyo: Oxford University Press Danto, Arthur 1965 Nietzsche as Philosopher New York: Macmillan Publishers Deleuze, Gilles 1983 Nietzsche and Philosophy Translated by H. Tomlinson London: Athlone Press de Man, Paul 1979 Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust New Haven: Yale University Press Derrida, Jacques 1976 Of Grammatology Translated by G. Spivak Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1979 Spurs: Nietzsches Styles Translated by B. Harlow Chicago: University of Chicago Press Foucault, Michel 1961 Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason Translated by Richard Howard London: Tavistock Publishing Freud, Sigmund 1913 Totem and Taboo Standard Edition 13 (1953) London: Hogarth Press Gadamer, H.G. 1991 Truth and Method Second Edition Translated by J. Weinsheimer and D. Marshal New York: Crossroad Publishing Gemes- 1992 'Nietzsche's Critique of Truth' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 47- 65 2001 'Postmodernisms Use and Abuse of Nietzsche' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2) Gillet, E. 1998 Relativism & the Social Constructivist Paradigm in Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Janaway, Christopher, ed. 1998 Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator

Oxford: Clarendon Press Heidegger, Martin 1979-87 Nietzsche: Volumes I-IV Translated by D. Krell, J. Stambaugh, and F. Capuzzi San Francisco: Harper & Row Kaufmann, Walter 1950, 1974 Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist Fourth Edition Princeton: Princeton University Press Kim, Jaegwon and Sosa, Ernest, eds. 1995 A Companion to Metaphysics Cambridge, Mass., Oxford: Basil Blackwell Kofman, S. 1993 Nietzsche and Metaphor Translated by D. Large Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press Kuhn, Thomas 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago: University of Chicago Press Leiter, Brian The Paradox of Self-Creation in Nietzsche in Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator, Christopher Janaway, ed. Megill, A. 1985 Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida Berkeley, CA: University of California Press Mill, John Stuart 1863 Utilitarianism London

Murray, R.M., Lewis S.W. 1987 Is schizophrenia a neurodevelopmental disorder? Editorial, British Medical Journal 295: 681-682. Nagel, Thomas 1986 The View from Nowhere New York: Oxford University Press ORourke D.H., Gottesman I.I., Saurez B.K., Rice J., Reich T. 1982 Refutation of the single locus model in the aetiology of schizophrenia American Journal of Human Genetics 33: 630-649 Powchik P., Davidson M., Haroutunian V., Gabriel S.M., Purohit D.P., Perl D.P., Harvey P.D., Davis K.L. 1998 Post-mortem studies in schizophrenia Schizophrenia Bulletin; 24 (3): 325-341. Rosenthal, David, ed. 1991 The Nature of Mind New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press Schopenhauer, Arthur 1836 On the Will in Nature Translated by Karl Hillebrand 1915 London: G. Bell and Sons, LTD. 1819 The World as Will and Representation Volume I Translated by E.F.J. Payne 1958 New York: Dover Books Wood, David 1990 Philosophy at the Limit London: Unwin Hyman World Health Organization The International Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders, World Health Organization Library 1992 PAGE 24