Bilbao, Ann Gloria G. SocSci 2 Prof.

Molmisa INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT Liberalism, the principle of the Philipine democracy, is an ideology committed to the individual and a society in which individuals can pursue and realize their interests. To its right is conservatism while socialism is in its left. Conservatism is a political attitude with a strong desire to conserve and resist change. It is manifested in the Philippines by the traditional politics of guns, goons and gold or elite democracy1. And this oligarchic rule roots from Political Dynasties, which is defined as the concentration, consolidation or perpetuation of public office and political power by persons related to one another.2 Using other intellectual works of other scholars, the author will try to analyze the nature of the Philippine elite consolidated by families and clans. Wrapping up, this essay aims to add to the academic discourse of elite democracy prevailing in the Philippines. Entitled the Philippine clandestine clan drive, the study will be composed of four main sections discussing the (1) history of the issue, (2) effects of the issue, (3) efforts to address the issue and (4) recommendations and lessons from the issue. The statements contained in the paper will be highly informative and intend to suppose that the inefficient governance of elite can also be blamed from the electorate who selected their leaders. Marxs class antagonism will also be implied through the course of the paper: the political elite exploits the resources supposed to be for the masses. However, the deprived majority in the Philippines seem to have not learned in their past experiences, and continue on voting inept leaders.

Teehanke, Julio. Primer on liberalism. (Manila: National Institute for Policy Studies, 2005) PDF file. 2 Casio , Teddy A., et al. House Bill No.3314, The Anti-Political Dynasty Act of 2010. (Quezon City: House of Representatives, 2010).

HISTORY/ORIGIN OF THE ISSUE The Philippine elite originated from the quasi-feudal society of two classes: the small minority of landholding datus, and a large majority of landless tao. Here, the products of the land, but not the land itself, could be owned and sold.1 Farmers only pay tribute to their datu and render service to the upper classes. When the Spaniards came, the concept of land-ownership was introduced and would later be exploited by different forces. Such powers include the progenies of these datus; by collaborating with the colonizers, intermarriages and education, the ruling class of the pre-Spanish period became known as the Pricipalia or the principal citizens of the community. Their offspring could be identified into two mestizo kinds: the Spanish and the Chinese ones. These principalia, encountering the new land tenure concept, found it easy to claim as private property land earlier cultivated by their barangays, under the pretext that it was land granted to them by the Spanish monarchy.2 Through different means, legal or not, the principalia acquired lands and even built haciendas. Exploitative usurious loans given to the middle income landowning farmers in need, and with overpriced interests, they eventually gave up their lands to pay their debts. Religious orders also grabbed vast lands, and these scenarios aggravated the social inequality and debased the social order into a purely landlord-tenant relationship. However, these datu descendants were given less power in the government, and were only allowed to be cabeza de barangays or gobernadorcillos. The principalia now bereft of their previous control, nurtured resentments to the current leadership. With their wealth they were able to let their children attain tertiary and post-tertiary education locally and abroad, especially Europe. Endowed with the liberal thoughts of those times, political resistance, through their want of political power through reforms, grew upon this class. It will be manifested by the Propaganda Movement of the illustrados, their spokesmen. The ilustrados took advantage of the economic opportunity for them to study and to translate their knowledge into access to political power.3 Despite their fruitless efforts against the Spanish government, their ideas inspired the masses who were much more aware of the grave abuse in the society. Kataas-taasang kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan, or simply Katipunan, is a radical social movement founded by the masses upon the ilustrados writings, especially of those of Jose Rizal.4 The elites economic and intellectual resources soon enabled them to get to the leadership pinnacle of the Katipunan, and later on, the First Philippine Republic.

When the Philippine-American war was still raging, this class facilitated another betrayal and went over to the American side. They were able to convince the young Republican government to surrender, wasting the efforts of 14 generals, 28 colonels, 20 majors, 6 chief guerillas, 46 captains, 116 lieutenants and 2640 soldiers.5 With the use of their wealth, theyve also impeded the total selling of friar estates to the landless peasantry by the new colonial force, U.S.A and even obtained these lands. True agrarian reform was never enforced to lessen the widening social gap. On the epoch of American regime, U.S. was politically dependent on the Filipino elite on implementing their interests in the country. After building a representative system of government, the new colonial authorities supported the Pricipalia dominance in the country. It was later strengthened through an electoral system of property and literacy qualifications. Seeking the help of their American padrinos and their connections, the elites now garnered political power: In the Philippine Assembly, a politician gained power over the distribution of resources; at home, his network protected his local turf and served as trusted lieutenants Outside the Assembly, the socializing continued This formation of a national elite out of the gathered local power-holders was another step in the realization of the Philippines as it is today.6 Ever since then, the country was infused with so much politics. A unique political culture developed which later on brought forth pervasive corruption. And Timberman observed it mainly involves the (a) primary of kinship, the (b) influence of particularism and personalism, the (c) importance of reciprocity and patron-client relations, the emphasis on (d) smooth interpersonal relations, and the (e) effect of pervasive poverty on values and behavior.7 Elite families continue to dominate Philippine politics up until today. And such families dont only mean household or kinship, but a kinship network, of which a working coalition of a larger group, bound by different ties, actual or fictive8. Politics then became a battlefield of different factions of elite personalities vying for elected positions. Political clans, then, are assumed to be the main form political organization instead of political parties. These families constituted a political caste, and over the years members of each clan have been elected to at least one important position. To maintain the powers they are holding, they make the Congress resist laws that would have enabled non-family, nontraditional representatives to be elected.9 In this scenario, theres also a continuing trend of party switching or political turncoatism, with patronage and spoils, not

policies or programs, as their bind10. Simply put, competing to get positions in the government, for holding public offices mean holding licenses and resources for monopolies of the markets. Also, to ensure their success in the elections, many resort to political violence, alliances and marriages to other political families, the accumulation of wealth and influence and the diversification of economic interests.11 As analyzed by McCoy, this rent-seeking attitude of the political elites enriched themselves not only with power but also with more connections. In local levels, some of them would purchase instruments of coercion such as private armies. This is commonly done to protect their interests from rival families and other competing forces. Especially exercised during elections in provinces, these families have created their own de facto autonomy using political violence with their paramilitary units. This phenomenon, called warlordism merely helps these families gain a more secure tenure over local elected offices. And to sustain and ensure political survival, local warlords will compromise (such as guarantees of votes from their units) with the national elites to seek rents.12 Through the years, different avenues of influence, such as media, were employed to gain seats in government offices. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalisms sums these up into 7 Ms, namely: Money, Machine, Media and/or Movies, Marriage, Murder and Mayhem, Myth and Mergers. Money, in massive amounts, used in costly elections, can easily be compensated by the profits of government positions. Local networks of campaigners or political Machines are set up by the candidates to ensure victory. Also, popular Media and/or Movie personalities have been either hired to endorse or become politicians themselves. Murder and Mayhem marks political kingpins rise to governance. Lasting Myths of heroism, humble origins, honesty, potency, generosity or credibility, passed down to generations, are used to heighten electoral appeal. Politics as addition takes place via Mergers or manipulative Alliances of different clans with those who either in great power (such as the President), or could grant them with great power themselves (well-off sponsors in elections).13 Through these trends, many politicians transform electoral offices into lasting family assets or family dynasties. And this constituted the so-called elite democracy in the Philippines, wherein citizens have equal political rights (through voting), yet ruled only by the selected elite.

EFFECTS OF THE ISSUE Theoretically, given the nature of elites, Philippine politics should have been progressive. They could have access with the best quality of education, locally and abroad, and be filled with great ideas as to how the country be properly managed. Even Jean Jacques Rousseau showed preference for an elective aristocracy.14 But Philippine experience proved otherwise. The two worst Philippine presidents15, Marcos and Arroyo, were both educated in the top academic institution of the country, University of the Philippines, with the latter having a PhD degree in Economics.16 Local corruption monitors confirm that graft and bribery in the Philippines remain rampant. Corruption has penetrated every level of government, from the Bureau of Customs down to the traffic police officers who pull over motorists to demand bribes. Nearly $2 billion dollars, or roughly 13 percent of the Philippines' annual budget, is lost to corruption in the country each year, according to the United Nations Development Program.17 Moreover, political dynasties could have a causal effect on socio-economic outcomes through policy choices and implementation made by incumbents linking with their dynastic rule and how the implications of chosen policies on poverty and inequality reduction.18 Often, elite politicians serve the interests of themselves and their families. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform (CARP), legislated in the time of President Corazon Aquino, a member of the landowning Cojuangcos, epitomized this grave reality. Another study of PCIJ showed how congressmen who came from different big industries tend to legislate for themselves. Several members of the House of Representatives have filed out bills that could benefit their enterprises but many have avoided sanctions because of legal loopholes in the conflict-of-interest rule.19 According to some analysts, economic stagnation may be related to the focus on elite representation with its parliamentary mechanisms to further its class interests, instead of social reformation and progressive developmental programs.20 Furthermore, a paper made by the Asian Institute of Management found out that measures for poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity are consistently higher in districts with dynastic legislators compared to other areas. Specifically, jurisdictions with dynastic legislators tend to have poverty incidence of five percentage points, poverty gap that is one percentage point and poverty severity that is half a percentage point higher than other areas.21 This table22 from the same study represents their statistical findings of

legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th, 14th, or 15th Congress, or at least one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010:

2009 Per Capita Income, Poverty Incidence, Gap and Severity for Dynastic and NonDynastic Districts
Per Capita Income Php23,275.43 PhP26,872.38 -PhP3,596.95 -3.565 (0.0003***) Poverty Incidence 24.15 18.95 5.2 2.606 (0.0039***) Poverty Gap 6.18 4.93 1.25 2.107 (0.0174**) Poverty Severity 2.31 1.86 0.45 1.794 (0.0367**)

Dynastic Non-Dynastic Mean Difference Test Statistic

Besides the substandard governance that the oligarchic system elicits, political stability has also been sacrificed for years. The continuing domination of political clans was one of the most formidable obstacles that block genuine democratization from being implemented in the country.23 Political actors in grassroots level align themselves with political clans that could best dispense patronage and access to power, with programs that respond to their interests. With the current practice of factionalism in the government, policy gridlock arises, thereby aggravating the circumstances. Within this system, deal-making is inevitable and it produces political operators and not statesmen. Political parties only concern themselves with the spoils of office while individual politicians are the ones governing. The virtual absence of a party system also means our electorate gets no meaningful policy choices.24 In addition, members of the governing class have been traditionally exempted from the rule of law. Legal immunity emanates from the informal and cultural obligations of alliances within the party the party of power. As a result, corruption pervades all levels of government and has crippled the governments attempts to achieve fiscal stability.25 With the failure of delivering economic prosperity, reducing mass alienation and the increasing social inequality, Filipinos have exercised what John Lockes advocated in his time, the right to resist the government.26 Resistances came into different forms from various sectors of the society which will be discussed later on. These movements were not directed to the government per se, but to those in power, namely, the elites.

EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE the Philippines remains the classic example of a flawed attempt by a constitutional order to achieve substantive democracy. It has become the laboratory to test and confirm the variety of regimes associated with the weak post-colonial state. Studies cover all levels of Philippine politics, although the sphere most extensively covered is the local level. While typologies differ, these studies generally agree that the exercise of power by local strongmen/women, bosses, and families has been in pursuit of selfish ends.27 Bereft of their to right for public officers that are accountable to the people, serving with utmost responsibility, loyalty, and efficiency, acting with patriotism and justice, and leading modest lives28, Filipinos have resorted into different proposals to remove the self-serving elites. These oppositions have varied from the most radical to self-conscious ones. And a prevailing character radiates over them: none have been successful in eliminating the elites in either power or expedient actions. The most radical groups rise in the pre-martial law era: the Stalinist PKP (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas) who sought reform through legal means, and Marxist-Leninist- Maoist CPP-NPA (Communist Party of the Philippines New Peoples Army) who seek after their goals by armed revolution.29 Even Martial Law was seen at first to be a an address to fight oligarchy but later on reveal its true colors. Martial law, according to Paul Hutchcroft, created many new opportunities for reform, but at the same time facilitated the capture of the state by newand more centralizedregime interests. As Marcoss chief ideologue remarked, Marcos believed he could have a vision for society . . . and still loot it.30 After Martial Law, social movements persisted. Some declined yet others were strengthened and even propagated. These were due to the problems the State, still governed by the elites, were unable to address. Peace talks have failed and harassments, killings of worker-demonstrators (Mendiola Massacre) occurred. Several events and innovations made significant changes, such as: the military supremacy of AFP over NPA, the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, debate within the CPP which led to its split and the rise of NGOs, Because of these different factors, the armed struggle of CPP-NPA-NDF, which was a dilemma since pro-martial law administrations, was eventually weakened. Social movements also challenged the power of the State formally or informally. The concerns of such groups were not emphasized on class-based issues, but more of

people empowerment. Their advocacies include helping the marginalized sectors of the community, environmental protection, human rights protection, and calls for accountable and good governance. Further democratization was also pushed, as opposed to elite democracy, by strategies other than armed struggle, through legal or extralegal means. Electoral politics, via marginalized representation in Congress, become another avenue for the movements to further the interest of the masses. Also, emerging trends of information and communication technology were also taken advantage, such as the massive text messaging during the ouster of President Estrada.31 Freedom of expression were commonly exercised by rallies of different advocate assemblages such as BAYAN MUNA and League of Filipino Students (LFS) and other groups commonly found in Universities and Colleges. Though the Philippines already had three major postwar uprisings (EDSA, EDSA 2 and EDSA 3), they were only seen as insurrections used to achieve the political ends of competing elites.32 Seeing their efforts ineffective, many Filipinos developed lethargic outlook on demonstrations and rallies on the streets. This protest fatigue and waning popular interest in alternative politics made mass mobilization less effective. As a result, party-list organizations such as Akbayan (Citizens Action Party) and Sanlakas (One Strength) began to focus more on electing candidates and expanding networks, and less on protests and picket lines.33 With the efforts of these pro-poor party lists, a bill has been proposed to totally abolish the roots of the inefficient aristocrats, political dynasties. House Bill No.3314, named as the Anti-Political Dynasty Act of 2010, is set out to embody Section 26 of the Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, wherein The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities fro public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.34 The provisions of the bill prohibits the establishment of political dynasties in local government units and districts, with a blatant case of daughter-father tandem serves as mayor and vice mayor respectively.35 In spite of this grand attempt, the bill hast not been passed into law and dynasties still linger and intend to stay in the coming elections of 2013. RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS The most accepted model of democracy in the world is generally termed as liberal democracy. It is the equivalent of representative democracy where political equality is exercised and political office gained through regular elections36 and encapsulates the ideals of Jean Jacques

Rosseau, wherein sovereign power of the people is inalienable, indivisible and cannot be represented by itself.37 Supposed to be, this is the democracy Filipinos should live through. And if one analyzes the activist groups here in the Philippines, it is a surprising fact to know that they see democracy here in an elitist view, and not really in a Marxist way, as they prefer to believe. Most of their aims and calls are really for the pluralist and not really a classless society, even though they articulate repeatedly that their aim is communism and for communism. Unfortunately, the basic Lockean notion that Laws must apply equally to rich and poor38 does not happen in this country, and this leads to what McCoy used for a title in his book an anarchy of Families. Trapos, or traditional politicians have continued to rule the Philippines based on 3 different facts: (1) their avowed motives are fatally and unquestionably accepted (2) they arent made truly accountable and (3) force of people power is needed, more than the capability of only changing the leaders, but not their practice.39 St. Augustines concept that a bad government is a punishment for the people40 applies, this time the consequence is not directly from God, but from the bad choices Filipinos made. The political culture persisting in the Philippines needs not only lead actors but also participants, to which the masses have played well. Keeping an eye on the ruling elite is the job of the civil society and majority of the Filipinos are either too busy or apathetic to thoroughly check and redress their governments grievances. Additionally, politics here is so personalistic and people base their party affiliations and candidate-preference not mainly on platforms, but on impressions. In a pulse Asia survey on the last elections, 68% of the respondents agreed that media image is the major influence on their votes.41 The media has played a great role in informing the citizens the activities of the government, yet their coverage also has limits (and some biases). Local government anomalies, if not big enough to cause public stir, are kept secret within the walls of public offices. With the 79 provinces, 138 Cities, 1,496 Municipalities, 42,025 Barangays, and 17 Regions that we have41, checks will rather be a great responsibility. There would lots of actions that could be done to successfully address the prevailing elite democracy in the country. But before anything else, a changed mindset should jump start the changefor the better, that we need. For example, if the masses would only be informed how selling of their votes deprive them of proper social services entitled to them, then maybe they would think twice before accepting the money in exchange for their ballots. Information, a power

held by the academe, should be disseminated to the electorate to warn them of the perils decided by their votes. Paradoxically, the problem in the Philippines is that the knowledgeable people are so great that their greatness do not reach the underprivileged, which are often swayed by the populists appeals. Data about the synergistic correlation of our corrupt elite democracy has always been presented in ways the masses do not understand. Because they can not relate their lives with the statistics presented to them, they would rather not care and continue living with the rotten system. Given the faculties of discerning more, the academe can and should think of creative ways to reach the majority. If reforms be done, it should start with the brains then circulate the body politic.

NOTES 1. Abinales, Patricio N. and Donna J. Amoroso. State and Society in the Philippines. (Pasig City: Anvil, 2005), 27. 2. Ibid., 57. 3. Tadem, Teresa Encarnacion. Philippine Social movements before Martial Law. in Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democartization and Development ed. Noel M. Morada and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem. (Quezon City: Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, 2006), 5. 4. Ibid., 6. 5. Simbulan, Dante S. The Modern Pricipalia: the Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2005), 294. 6. Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society, 135-137. 7. Timberman, David. A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Manila: 1991), 15-70. 8. McCoy, Alfred W. An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines In An Anarchy of Families: The State and Family in the Philippines,edited by Alfred W. McCoy, 1-32. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994. 9. Coronel, Shiela S. Born to rule: Dynasty, in The Rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-born dominate the Congress, Shiela S. Coronel et al. (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004), 46-53. 10. Gutierrez, Eric U. et al. Clans as Primary political organizations and Analysis and prospects In All in the Family: A study of elites and power relations in the Philippines, edited by Noel T. Pangilinan, 1-15, 156-166. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1992. 11. Coronel, Born to rule. 12. McCoy, An anarchy of Families. 13. Coronel, Shiela S. Born to rule: The 7 Ms of Dynasty Building, in The Rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-born dominate the Congress, Shiela S. Coronel et al. (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004), 46-53. 14. Molmisa, Ronald. From Hobbes to Rousseau (synthesis of the ideas of political thinkers). (UP Diliman: prepared for Social Science II course, 2nd semester AY 2011-2012).

15. Both administrations were mired with the most massive corruption, extra-judicial killings and abuse of power in the history of the Philippines. 16. Presidential Museum and Library. Accessed March 25, 2012, http://malacanang.gov.ph/presidents/fifth-republic/gloria-macapagal-arroyo/ 17. Conde, carlos H. Philippines most corrupt, survey says, The New York Times, March 13, 2007, accessed March 25, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/business/ worldbusiness/13iht-peso.4891792.html?_r=1 18. Mendoza, Ronald U. et al. An Empirical Analysis of Political dynasties in the Congress. (Asian Institute of Management, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969605. html. Accessed March 7, 2012. 19. Gutierrez, Eric. A house for the elites in Betrayals of Public Trust: Investigative reports in Corruption, ed. Shiela S. Coronel. (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000), 103-114. 20. Bello, Walden. THE ANTI-DEVELOPMENT STATE: The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. (Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc. and Walden Bello, 2009),1-5. 21. Mendoza, et al., An Empirical analysis. 22. Ibid., 27. 23. Gutierrez et al. All in the family. 24. Almonte, Jose T. Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming our democracy of stalemate, in To put our house in order we must LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD, Jose T. Almonte. (Metro Manila: Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc., 2007), 190. 25. Rogers, Steven. Philippine Politics and the Rule of Law. Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 4 (October 2004):117.Accessed February 23, 2012.DOI:10.1353/jod.2004.0071 26. Molmisa, From Hobbes to Rousseau. 27. Abinales, Patricio N. Weak State, Resilient President, Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 2008(2008): 295. Accesed February 23, 2012. DOI:10.1353/saa.0.0007 28. De Leon, Hector S. Textbook on the Philippine Constitution 2008 edition. (Manila: Rex Bookstore, Inc., 2008), 472. 29. Tadem, Philippine Social movements. 30. Paul D. Hutchcroft qtd. in Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society, 213.

31. Tadem, Teresa S. and Jorge V. Tigno. Philippine Social Movements after Martial Law, in Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democartization and Development edited by Noel M. Morada and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem (Quezon City: Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, 2006), 43-58. 32. Bello, THE ANTI-DEVELOPMENT STATE, 325-332. 33. Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society, 267. 34. De Leon, Textbook, 110. 35. Pertain to the case of Davao City, wherein Sarah Duterte, current mayor is directly linked to the Vice Mayor Rodrigo Duterte, her father. Davao City Website, 2011. Accessed March 25, 2012. http://www.davaocity.gov.ph/davao/default.aspx 36. Heywood, Andrew. Democracy, in Politics, third edition. (London and New York: Palgrave, 2007), 72-88. 37. Molmisa, From Hobbes to Rousseau. 38. Ibid. 39. Valdehuesa Jr., Manuel E. A Nation of Zombies: powerless grassroots, clueless elites and the cycle of corruption in the Philippines. (Cagayan de Oro: Capitol University and Manuel Valdehuesa, 2009), 5-33. 40. Thompson Mark R. Reformism Vs. Populism in the Philippines. Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 4 (National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press, October 2010): 154-167. Accessed February 23, 2012. 41. 2010 figures in http://www.dilg.gov.ph/

REFERENCES Abinales, Patricio N. and Donna J. Amoroso. State and Society in the Philippines. Pasig City: Anvil, 2005. Almonte, Jose T. To put our house in order we must LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD Metro Manila: Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc., 2007. Bello, Walden. THE ANTI-DEVELOPMENT STATE: The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines. Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc. and Walden Bello, 2009. Coronel, Shiela S. et al. The Rulemakers: How the wealthy and well-born dominate the Congress. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004. Coronel, Shiela S. ed. Betrayals of Public Trust: Investigative reports in Corruption, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2000. Davao City Website, 2011. Accessed March 25, 2012. http://www.davaocity.gov.ph/ davao/default.aspx De Leon, Hector S. Textbook on the Philippine Constitution 2008 edition. (Manila: Rex Bookstore, Inc., 2008. Heywood, Andrew. Democracy, in Politics, third edition. London and New York: Palgrave, 2007. Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 4 (October 2004):117.Accessed February 23, 2012.DOI:10.1353/jod.2004.0071 Journal of Democracy, Volume 21, Number 4 (National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press, October 2010): 154-167. Accessed February 23, 2012. 41. 2010 figures in http://www.dilg.gov.ph/ McCoy, Alfred W. ed. An Anarchy of Families: The State and Family in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994. Mendoza, Ronald U. et al. An Empirical Analysis of Political dynasties in the Congress. (Asian Institute of Management, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1969605. html. Accessed March 7, 2012. Morada Noel M. and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem eds. Philippine Politics and Governance: Challenges to Democartization and DevelopmentI.Quezon City: Department of

Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, 2006. Pangilinan, Noel T. ed. All in the Family: A study of elites and power relations in the Philippines. Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 1992. Presidential Museum and Library. Accessed March 25, 2012, http://malacanang.gov.ph/presidents/fifth-republic/gloria-macapagal-arroyo/ Simbulan, Dante S. The Modern Pricipalia: the Historical Evolution of the Philippine Ruling Oligarchy. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2005. Timberman, David. A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Manila: 1991 Southeast Asian Affairs Vol. 2008(2008): 295. Accesed February 23, 2012. DOI:10.1353/saa.0.0007 The New York Times, March 13, 2007, accessed March 25, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/business/worldbusiness/13iht-peso.4891792.html?_r=1 Valdehuesa Jr., Manuel E. A Nation of Zombies: powerless grassroots, clueless elites and the cycle of corruption in the Philippines. (Cagayan de Oro: Capitol University and Manuel Valdehuesa, 2009