Liberty of Abode & Travel Section 6.

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. NOTE: THE APPLICABLE PROVISION OF THE HUMAN SECURITY ACT ON THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorismeven if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:

the dead of night, in two boats bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that they were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consent. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes.

Detained under house arrest; Restricted from traveling; and/or Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications with people outside their residence.

Upon application of the prosecutor, the suspects right to travel shall be limited to the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of the bail which shall then be forfeited as provided in the Rules of Court. Issue: These restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of the accused; or the dismissal of the case filed against him; or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion of the prosecutor. Art 13. (2) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provides that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Art. 12 (4) Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provides that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country (Marcos v Manglapus) Limitation on liberty of abode: lawful order of the court Limitation on right to travel: interest on national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949] Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expensefrom the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis. Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men Held: The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery. The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a government of laws and not of men." We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence. Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban et al must be severely punished. **the deportation of some 170 women of ill repute to Davao on orders of the Mayor of Manila was held unlawful. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [247 SCRA 127; G.R. NO. 115132-34; 9 AUG 1995] Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion. ** A maid has the right to transfer to another residence even if she had not yet paid the amount advanced for her transportation from the province by an employment agency which was then effectively detaining her because of the moral duress exerted on her. Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639 Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were signed as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date. Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for an haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's FirstDivision denying petitioner's motion for leave to travel abroad for medical treatment. The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the FirstDivision of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion for Leave toTravel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in thePhilippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio. Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here. The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied all of the motions.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 88211, September 15, 1989 and the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration dated October 27, 1989 Right to travel; liberty of abode and right to return En banc Cortes, J. This is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the Supreme Court to Order the respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of the Constitution: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law. The petitioners contend that the President has no power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only the Courts may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor may the President impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. Also, the petitioners claim that under international law, particularly the Universal Declaration of Humjan Rights guaranteed the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines. Thus: Art. 13 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, AND TO RETURN TO HIS COUNTRY. Likewise, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides: Art. 12 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. The respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, they argue that the right of the state to national security prevails over individual rights, citing Section 4, Art. II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted in the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. The sub-issues, which could help in the determination of the main issue, are: 1. Does the President have the power to bar the Marcoses to return to the Philippines? a. Is this a political question? 2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former Pres. Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, has the President made a finding that the return of the petitioners to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public welfare or public health. And if she has made that finding, have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding? Has there been prior notice to the petitioners? Held: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel connote. Essentially, the right to return to ones country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from, though related to the right to travel. Thus, even the Universal declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of the state, the right to leave a country and the right to enter ones country as separate and distinct rights. THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONES COUNTRY IS NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELL-CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE

Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous. Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing its source to the parties and used it in deciding a case against them. In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries. On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which summarily states that the required medical treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio. Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by joint panel of medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution. ** The Court upheld the denial by the Sandiganbayan of the request to travel abroad filed by Mrs. Marcos, as much as she had already been convicted. The persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the courts discretion. See also Yap vs CA Yap vs CA G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Yap was convicted of estafa. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court. After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending Appeal. The Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant." ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed bail of P5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail Whether or not the CA unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail HELD: SC finds the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the Court. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines are not absolute rights. It can be regulated by lawful order. The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by Sec 6. The condition imposed by the CA is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.

CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the Presidents RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general welfare of the people. The court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged by the insurgency, separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, etc. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically. Lastly, the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution, judicial power now includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. ** the SC sustained the refusal of the government to allow the petitioners return to the Philippines, on the ground that it would endanger national security. SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [195 SCRA 760 ; G.R. 94284; 8 APR 1991] Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.) **The Court further clarified the foregoing principles, saying: (1) The hold-departure order is but an exercise of the respondent courts inherent power to preserve and maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused; By posting bail, the accused holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, thus, she may be legally prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case; and Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts, which in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor, since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications thereof.

(2)

(3)

Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986] Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions andopportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities andExchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "nationalsecurity, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121). Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminalprosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or Judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or judicial officer (Rule 136, Sec 6, Rules of Court) DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. VASQUEZ Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is impaired.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. **The Court held that the trial court may validly refuse to grant accused permission to travel abroad, even if the accused is out on bail.