Hacking Bluetooth enabled mobile phones and beyond Full Disclosure

Adam Laurie Marcel Holtmann Martin Herfurt

21C3: The Usual Suspects

21st Chaos Communication Congress December 27th to 29th, 2004 Berliner Congress Center, Berlin, Germany
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Who we are

Adam Laurie

CSO of The Bunker Secure Hosting Ltd. Co-Maintainer of Apache-SSL DEFCON Staff/Organiser Maintainer and core developer of the Linux Bluetooth Stack BlueZ Security Researcher Founder of trifinite.org
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Marcel Holtmann

Martin Herfurt

Outline (1)

Bluetooth Introduction History Technology Overview The BlueSnarf Attack The HeloMoto Attack The BlueBug Attack Bluetooone Long-Distance Attacking

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Outline (2)

Blooover Blueprinting DOS Attacks Sniffing Bluetooth with hcidump Conclusions Lessons tought Feedback / Discussion

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Introduction (1)

Wire replacement technology Low power Short range 10m - 100m 2.4 GHz 1 Mb/s data rate

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Introduction (2)

Bluetooth SIG

Trade Association Founded 1998 Owns & Licenses IP Individual membership free Promoter members: Agere, Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia and Toshiba Consumer http://www.bluetooth.com Technical http://www.bluetooth.org

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

History (1)

Bluejacking

Early adopters abuse 'Name' field to send message Now more commonly send 'Business Card' with message via OBEX 'Toothing' - Casual sexual liasons

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

History (2)

Bluesnarfing

First publicised by Marcel Holtmann, October 2003

Wireless Technologies Congress, Sindelfingen, Germany Bugtraq, Full Disclosure Houses of Parliament London Underground

Adam Laurie, A L Digital, November 2003

'Snarf' - networking slang for 'unauthorised copy'

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

History (3)

Bluesnarfing

Data Theft Calendar

Appointments Images Names, Addresses, Numbers PINs and other codes Images

Phone Book

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

History (4)

Bluebugging

First publicised by Martin Herfurt, March 2004

CeBIT Hanover

Create unauthorised connection to serial profile Full access to AT command set Read/Write access to SMS store Read/Write access to Phone Book

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

History (5)

Full Disclosure after 13 months

More time for manufacturers to fix

Embedded devices New process for telecom industry Firmware updates available 6310i tested OK

Nokia claims to have fixed all vulnerable devices

Motorola committed to fix known vulnerabilities Sony Ericsson publicly stated all problems fixed

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Technology

Data and voice transmission

ACL data connections SCO and eSCO voice channels

Symmetric and asymmetric connections Frequency hopping

ISM band at 2.4 GHz 79 channels 1600 hops per second Multi-Slot packets

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Piconet

Bluetooth devices create a piconet

One master per piconet Up to seven active slaves Over 200 passive members are possible Master sets the hopping sequence Transfer rates of 721 Kbit/sec

Bluetooth 1.2 and EDR (aka 2.0)

Adaptive Frequency Hopping Transfer rates up to 2.1 Mbit/sec

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Scatternet

Connected piconets create a scatternet

Master in one and slave in another piconet Slave in two different piconets Only master in one piconet Scatternet support is optional

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Architecture

Hardware layer

Radio, Baseband and Link Manager Access through Host Controller Interface

Hardware abstraction Standards for USB and UART

Host protocol stack

L2CAP, RFCOMM, BNEP, AVDTP etc.

Profile implementations

Serial Port, Dialup, PAN, HID etc.

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Stack
Application specific security mechanisms

Bluetooth host security mechanisms

Security mechanisms on the Bluetooth chip

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooth Security

Link manager security

All security routines are inside the Bluetooth chip Nothing is transmitted in plain text

Host stack security

Interface for link manager security routines Part of the HCI specification Easy interface No further encryption of pin codes or keys

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Security Modes

Security mode 1

No active security enforcement

Security mode 2

Service level security On device level no difference to mode 1

Security mode 3

Device level security Enforce security for every low-level connection

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Linux and Bluetooth

# hciconfig -a hci0: Type: USB BD Address: 00:02:5B:A1:88:52 ACL MTU: 384:8 SCO MTU: 64:8 UP RUNNING PSCAN ISCAN RX bytes:9765 acl:321 sco:0 events:425 errors:0 TX bytes:8518 acl:222 sco:0 commands:75 errors:0 Features: 0xff 0xff 0x8b 0xfe 0x9b 0xf9 0x00 0x80 Packet type: DM1 DM3 DM5 DH1 DH3 DH5 HV1 HV2 HV3 Link policy: RSWITCH HOLD SNIFF PARK Link mode: SLAVE ACCEPT Name: 'Casira BC3-MM' Class: 0x1e0100 Service Classes: Networking, Rendering, Capturing, Object Transfer Device Class: Computer, Uncategorized HCI Ver: 1.2 (0x2) HCI Rev: 0x529 LMP Ver: 1.2 (0x2) LMP Subver: 0x529 Manufacturer: Cambridge Silicon Radio (10) # hcitool scan Scanning ... 00:04:0E:21:06:FD 00:01:EC:3A:45:86 00:04:76:63:72:4D 00:A0:57:AD:22:0F 00:E0:03:04:6D:36 00:80:37:06:78:92 00:06:C6:C4:08:27

AVM BlueFRITZ! AP-DSL HBH-10 Aficio AP600N ELSA Vianect Blue ISDN Nokia 6210 Ericsson T39m Anycom LAN Access Point

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Sniffing with hcidump

Recording of HCI packets

Commands, events, ACL and SCO data packets

Only for local connections Decoding of higher layer protocols

HCI and L2CAP SDP, RFCOMM, BNEP, CMTP, HIDP, HCRP and AVDTP OBEX and CAPI

No sniffing of baseband or radio traffic

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Security Commands

HCI_Create_New_Unit_Key HCI_{Read|Write}_Pin_Type HCI_{Read|Write|Delete}_Stored_Link_Key HCI_{Read|Write}_Authentication_Enable HCI_{Read|Write}_Encryption_Mode HCI_Authentication_Requested HCI_Set_Connection_Encryption HCI_Change_Local_Link_Key HCI_Master_Link_Key

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Pairing Functions

Events

HCI_Link_Key_Notification HCI_Link_Key_Request HCI_Pin_Code_Request

Commands

HCI_Link_Key_Request_Reply HCI_Link_Key_Request_Negative_Reply HCI_Pin_Code_Request_Reply HCI_Pin_Code_Request_Negative_Reply

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

How Pairing Works

First connection
(1) HCI_Pin_Code_Request (2) HCI_Pin_Code_Request_Reply (3) HCI_Link_Key_Notification

Further connections
(1) HCI_Link_Key_Request (2) HCI_Link_Key_Request_Reply (3) HCI_Link_Key_Notification (optional)

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

BlueSnarf

Trivial OBEX PUSH channel attack

obexapp (FreeBSD) PULL known objects instead of PUSH No authentication IrMC (Specifications for Ir Mobile Communications)

Infrared Data Association

e.g. telecom/pb.vcf

Ericsson R520m, T39m, T68 Sony Ericsson T68i, T610, Z1010 Nokia 6310, 6310i, 8910, 8910i
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

HeloMoto

Requires entry in 'Device History' OBEX PUSH to create entry Connect RFCOMM to Handsfree or Headset

No Authentication required Full AT command set access

Motorola V80, V5xx, V6xx and E398

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

BlueBug History (1)

First presentation in February 2004

FH Salzburg 'Forum IKT 2004' Spicing up a presentation about Wardriving

Got inspired from Adam's BlueSnarf which has been written about on slashdot Tried to figure out how Adam did it (no purposebuilt tools available) Found BlueBug

Based on AT Commands -> not OBEX

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

BlueBug History (2)

Fieldtrial at CeBIT 2004

Booth close to the restrooms -> many people there Even Policemen ;)

Got on slashdot at the end of March 2004 Teamed up with Adam in April 2004 Various media citations Presentation at Blackhat and DEFCON in August 2004 Full Disclosure at 21C3 in December 2004 (now!)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

BlueBug Facts (1)

As mentioned earlier...

BlueBug is based on AT Commands (ASCII Terminal) Very common for the configuration and control of telecommunications devices High level of control...

Call control (turning phone into a bug) Sending/Reading/Deleting SMS Reading/Writing Phonebook Entries Setting Forwards -> causing costs on the vulnerable phones!

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

BlueBug Facts (2)

How come!?

Various Manufacturers poorly implemented the Bluetooth security mechanisms Unpublished services on RFCOMM channels

Not announced via SDP

Connecting to unpublished HS service without pairing!

Nokia has quite a lot of models (6310, 6310i, 8910, 8910i,...) Sony Ericsson T86i, T610, ... Motorola has similar problems (see HeloMoto)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Bluetooone

Enhancing the range of a Bluetooth dongle by connecting a directional antenna -> as done in the Long Distance Attack Original idea from Mike Outmesguine (Author of Book: Wi-Fi Toys) Step by Step instruction on trifinite.org

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Long-Distance Attacking (BlueSniper)

Beginning of August 2004 (right after DEFCON 12) Experiment in Santa Monica California Modified Class-1 Dongle Snarfing/Bugging Class-2 device (Nokia 6310i) from a distance of 1,78 km (1.01 miles)

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Blooover -What is it?

Blooover - Bluetooth Wireless Technology Hoover Proof-of-Concept Application Educational Purposes only Phone Auditing Tool Running on Java

J2ME MIDP 2.0 Implemented JSR-82 (Bluetooth API) Nokia 6600, Nokia 7610, Nokia 6670, ... Series 60 Siemens S65 SonyEricsson P900 ...

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Blooover- What does it do?

Blooover is performing the BlueBug attack

Reading phonebooks Writing phonebook entries Reading/decoding SMS stored on the device (buggy..) Setting Call forward (predef. Number) +49 1337 7001 Initiating phone call (predef. Number) 0800 2848283

Not working well on Nokia phones :( but on some T610

Please use this application responsibly!

For research purposes only! With permission of owner

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Blueprinting What is it?

Blueprinting is fingerprinting Bluetooth Wireless Technology interfaces of devices This work has been started by Collin R. Mulliner and Martin Herfurt Relevant to all kinds of applications

Security auditing Device Statistics Automated Application Distribution

Released paper and tool at 21C3 in December 2004 in Berlin (again, now!)
Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Blueprinting - How

Hashing Information from Profile Entries

RecordHandle RFCOMM channel number Adding it all up (RecHandle1*Channel1)+ (RecHandle2*Channel2)+...+(RecHandlen*Channeln) First three bytes refer to manufacturer (IEEE OUI)

Bluetooth Device Address

Example of Blueprint 00:60:57@2621543

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

BlueSmack

Using L2CAP echo feature

Signal channel request/response L2CAP signal MTU is unknown No open L2CAP channel needed

Buffer overflow Denial of service attack

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

BlueSmack
< HCI Command: Create Connection (0x01|0x0005) plen 13 0000: b6 1e 33 6d 0e 00 18 cc 02 00 00 00 01 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 0000: 00 01 05 04 > HCI Event: Connect Complete (0x03) plen 11 0000: 00 29 00 b6 1d 32 6d 0e 00 01 00 ..2m......... .... .)...2m....

< ACL data: handle 0x0029 flags 0x02 dlen 28 L2CAP(s): Echo req: dlen 20 0000: 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 51 52 53 54 EFGHIJKLMNOPQRST 0010: 55 56 57 58 UVWX > HCI Event: Number of Completed Packets (0x13) plen 5 0000: 01 29 00 01 00 .)... > ACL data: handle 0x0029 flags 0x02 dlen 28 L2CAP(s): Echo rsp: dlen 20 0000: 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 50 51 52 53 54 EFGHIJKLMNOPQRST 0010: 55 56 57 58 UVWX < HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3 0000: 29 00 13 > HCI Event: Command Status (0x0f) plen 4 0000: 00 01 06 04 > HCI Event: Disconn Complete (0x05) plen 4 0000: 00 29 00 16 ).. .... .)..

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Conclusions

Bluetooth is a secure standard (per se)

Problems at application level Pre-release testing at UPF (UnPlugFest)

Cooperation with Bluetooth SIG

Specifics under NDA Security Expert Group mailing list bluetooth.org more open areas

Better communication channels for external testers

Mandatory security at application level

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

trifinite.org

http://trifinite.org/ Loose association of BT security experts Features

trifinite.blog trifinite.stuff trifinite.album trifinite.group

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

trifinite.group

Adam Laurie (the Bunker Secure Hosting) Marcel Holtmann (BlueZ) Collin Mulliner (mulliner.org) Tim Hurman (Pentest) Mark Rowe (Pentest) Martin Herfurt (trifinite.org) Spot (Sony)

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3

Questions / Feedback / Answers

Contact us via [email protected] (group alias for Adam, Marcel and Martin)

Bluetooth Hacking Full Disclosure @ 21C3