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PLC - Pres

This document provides information about programmable logic controllers (PLCs). It discusses the main objectives of PLCs, including implementing process and safety logics. It also covers why PLCs are preferred over hardwired relay logic or DCS for certain applications due to advantages like reliability, flexibility, and minimum expenditure. The document lists specific PLC models used in different units of a refinery and describes basic PLC architecture, functioning, programming, and failures. It emphasizes the importance of redundancy and safety standards for PLCs.

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Sandeep Yadav
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241 views30 pages

PLC - Pres

This document provides information about programmable logic controllers (PLCs). It discusses the main objectives of PLCs, including implementing process and safety logics. It also covers why PLCs are preferred over hardwired relay logic or DCS for certain applications due to advantages like reliability, flexibility, and minimum expenditure. The document lists specific PLC models used in different units of a refinery and describes basic PLC architecture, functioning, programming, and failures. It emphasizes the importance of redundancy and safety standards for PLCs.

Uploaded by

Sandeep Yadav
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

PRESENTATION
ON

PLC

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER MAIN OBJECTIVE OF PLC


IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROCESS & TRIP LOGICS & INTERLOCK. INTERLOCK IS THE CAUSE AND EFFECT MATRIX/ LOGIC FOR PROCESS SAFETY. THE PLC ACQUIRES THE INPUT DATA, EXECUTES CAUSE & EFFECT LOGIC AND PRODUCES OUTPUTS AS REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE PROCESS

WHY NOT DCS ?


FAST ACTION/ TRIPPING ON OCCURANCE OF UNSAFE CONDITIONS. Typically 250 msec DEDICATED SYSTEM FOR INTERLOCK ONLY. VERY HIGH LEVEL OF RELIABILITY. SOE RECORDING 1 MSEC RESOULTION

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER ADVANTAGE OF PLC OVER HARDWIRED RELAY LOGIC


RELIABILITY. FASTER TROUOBLESHOOTING & REPAIR FLEXIBILITY IN MODIFICATION OF LOGIC. MINIMUM EXPENDITURE FOR FUTURE EXPANSION. INTEGRATION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS OF PLANT. EVENTS/ALARM RECORDING

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER PLCs IN PANIPAT REFINERY


MSG-3000 SAFEGURD-400 OF M/S ABB : PLC of CDU/ VDU/ CRU/ FCCU/ VBU/ MEROX/ OHCU/ HGU/ OFFSITES/PRU/SSRU/SRU AUGUST PLC SC300E OF M/S ABB : DHDS MP280 OF M/S ABB : UTILITY

5/40 OF M/S ALLEN BRADLEY : DMPLANT/ OHCU (RGC)/ CRU (RGC)/ FCCU (MAB&WGC).
984 OF M/S MODICON : HGU (PSA) S5-95U & S5115U OF M/S SIEMENS : FCCU (PALL FILTER & GAMBO LOADER) LM IPC620 OF M/S TATA HONEYWELL : TPS/ WWTP FSC OF M/S TATA HONEYWELL : GT/ HRSG

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER PLCs IN PREP


TRICONEX PLC : CR-11 & CR-12 UNITS 5/40 OF M/S ALLEN BRADLEY : DMPLANT M/S MODICON : HGU 1&2 (PSA) S5 OF M/S SIEMENS : DCU COKE HANDLING SYSTEM M/S ADVANT 416 PLC: DCU COKE CUTTING SYSTEM LM IPC620 OF M/S TATA HONEYWELL : TPS/ WWTP TRICONEX PLC : HRSG

NEW COCEPTS DONE IN PREP PLC


24DC IS SOLENOID VALVES SOFTWARE SWITCHES IN PLACE OF HARDWIRE SWITCHES OPERATOR CRT SCREEN FOR PLC TO SHOW THE STATUS OF CASUE AND EFFECT MATRIX,ALRAM,EVENTS OF PLC

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

BASIC ARCHITECTURE
PROGRAMMING TERMINAL

POWER SUPPLY MODULE

PROCESSOR MODULE

MEMORY MODULE

PLC BACK PLANE BUS


WATCH DOG TIMER/ DIAGNOSTICS COMMUNICATION MODULE I/O LINK MODULE

DCS etc

I/O CARDS

FIELD

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

BASIC FUNCTIONING OF PLC


INPUT
FROM FIELD LOGIC TABLE TABLE EXECU-TION

OUTPUT
TO FIELD

UPDA-TION

UPDA-TION

SCAN TIME

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

PROGRAMMING MODES
LADDER LOGIC A e.g.

LOGIC BLOCKS

A AND B
LOGIC STATEMENTS
IF A AND B THEN C

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

INPUT/ OUTPUT DATA ACQUISITION


SWITCH IN FIELD
One SLOT of an INPUT Card

Interrogation
Voltage

SOV IN FIELD/ CMD TO MCC etc

Output Command

One SLOT of an OUTPUT Card

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER


FLOW PATH FOR STARTING A PUMP FROM DCS & GETTING FEEDBACK
PUMP START COMMAND FROM DCS COMMAND COMMUNICATED TO PLC AS INPUT CHECKING OF LOGIC BY PLC

STATUS OF PUMP RUN/ STOP FROM PLC TO DCS

FEEDBACK OF PUMP RUN/ STOP FROM MCC TO PLC AS REAL INPUT

IF OK THEN START COMMAND FROM PLC TO ELECTRICAL MCC

STATUS AVAILABLE IN DCS GRAPHICS

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER BASIC FAILURES IN PLC


TWO BASIC TYPES : SYSTEMATIC HARDWARE & SOFTWARE FAILURES : THESE ARE ERRORS DUE TO
DESIGN SPECIFICATION PROGRAMMING OR CONSTRUCTION

THE SYSTEM FAILS INVARIABLY EVERY TIME THE SAME PARTICULAR SET OF CONDITIONS OCCUR.MOST PLC TAKEN PTR, THESE PROBLEMS ARE FACED IN COMMISSIONING STAGES. RANDOM HARDWARE FAILURES HARDWARE FAILURES GENERALLY OCCUR RANDOMLY. REDUNDANCY IS VERY EFFECTIVE IN SUPPRESSING RANDOM FAILURES . POWER SUPPLY IS ONE MAJOR EXAMPLE.

110 V AC from UPS feeder

SFU

M C B

M C B

24 V DC Power Supply
Fuse MCB BPS#1

MCB

Fuse

BPS#2

MSG PLC CABINET

24 V DC DISTRIBUTION

BPS#1

BPS#2

HRC FUSE

HRC FUSE

FTB1(#2)

FTB2(#2)

DSSX-N203

CPU & I/O RACKS

CPU & I/O RACKS

SOME IMPORTANT NON -PROCESS ALARMS

UPS1BO - BATTERY OPERATIONS, BATTERY IS ON LOAD UPS1CF- COMMON FAULT UPS1EBC - EXTERNAL BYPASS CONTACTOR CSS6BPS#1 - CSS BPS FAIL MD23CVAR04BPS#2 - AMR BPS FAIL FCCUCSS6CCFA1 - FAN FAILURE ALARM

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

24 VDC PS FAILURE IN PLC


BLOWING OF FUSE OF PS GOING TO PROCESSOR. BLOWING OF FUSE OF PS FOR MASTER VOTE BLOWING OF INCOMMING FUSE OF 24 VDC PS UNIT. TRIPPING OF MCB DUE TO OVER LOADING OF PS UNIT WHEN OTHER PS UNIT GOES OUT OF ORDER.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

REMEDIAL ACTION FOR AVOIDING RECURRENT PROBLEM OF PS FAILURE


GLASS FUSE REPLACED BY HRC FUSE IN ALL PLCS SHORTING OF INCOMING PS FUSE REPLACING 6 A FUSE BY 10 A AS PER COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

OUTPUT RELAY CONTACTS GETS OVERHEATING DUE HIGH CURRENT COIL USED IN BREAKER. OLD OUTPUT RELAY REPLACED WITH RE-400 RELAY HAVING HIGHER CURRENT CARRYING CAPACITY FOR STARING STOPING OF HT MOTORS.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER


ALARM EVENT RECORDING NEW ALARM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, A CUSTOMISED SOFTWARE. THE SOFTWARE PICKSUP THE REALTIME DATA FROM ALL THE PLCs IN MCR THROUGH PRINTER COMMN AND STORED. FROM SERVER IT CAN BE SEEN ON ANY NO. PC THROUGH REFINERY LAN. FOR AB PLC - KLG SYSTEL FOR MSG PLC - IMAC-SUPRA ADVATAGE- PAPERLESS EVENTS RECORDOING /DATA FOR YEAR IS STORED/FREQUNECY ANALYSIS/WEB ENABLING

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER REDUNDANCY


REDUNDANCY IS NECESSARY IN SAFETY SYSTEMS BECAUSE OF THE RANDOM & UNSAFE FAILURES OF COMPONENTS i.e. TO ENHANCE THE SYSTEM RELIABILITY. REDUNDANCY MAY BE REALISED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING WAY DEPENDING ON THE APPLICATION :

ONLY THE I/O CARDS OR ONLY THE PROCESSOR RACK CARDS ARE REDUNDANT. ALL THE CARDS i.e. I/O & ALL PROCESSOR RACK CARDS ARE DUAL MODULAR REDUNDANT. ALL THE CARDS i.e. I/O & ALL PROCESSOR RACK CARDS ARE TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANT. ALL THE CARDS i.e. I/O & ALL PROCESSOR RACK CARDS ARE QUADRUPLAR MODULAR REDUNDANT.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER DUAL MODULAR REDUNDANT (MSG 3000) (1oo2D)

I/P BOARD A

PROCESSOR A

O/P BOARD A

VOTER SYSTEM A

I/P

OUTPUT DRIVE
VOTER SYSTEM B

O/P

I/P BOARD B

PROCESSOR B

O/P BOARD B

MASTER VOTER CARD

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER DUAL MODULAR REDUNDANT (MSG 3000) (1oo2D)


THE ABB MASTER SAFEGAURD 3000(MSG3000) CONSISTS OF TWO MASTER PIECE 200/1 PROCESS CONTROL STATIONS WITH SEPARATE I/O SYSTEMS ACTING IN PARALLEL, AND A MODULAR OUTPUT VOTING SUBSYSTEM. THE FUNCTION OF THE MP 200/1 IS TO PRODUCE THE O/P FROM THE LOGIC BASED ON THE THE FIELD INPUTS. BOTH THE STATIONS PRESENT THE OUTPUT/ SHUTDOWN STATUS AND DIAGONISTIC INFORMATION TO THE VOTING SUBSYSTEM.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER DUAL MODULAR REDUNDANT (MSG 3000) (1oo2D)


THE VOTING SYSTEM DETERMINES THE CORRECT OUTPUT SIGNAL TO BE PRESENTED TO FINAL ACTUATOR DEVICE. IT IS POSSIBLE TO ISOLATE ONE OF THESE REDUNDANT STATIONS IN CASE THERE IS SOME FAULT. THE OTHER STATION EXECUTES THE SAFETY LOGICS AND PRESENTS CORRECT O/P SIGNAL TO THE FINAL ACTUATING DEVICE.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

Why Redundancy
For SAFETY- Example Furnace had to trip but PLC is not available For AVAILABLITY- Example All condition are healthy, but furnace
tripped due to PLC card Malfunction

The objective of any redundant system is to improve the amount of safe uptime of a machine or process by ensuring consistent availability of that machine to perform the safety shutdown on process demand , thereby reducing costs associated with equipment failure/shutdown. By using this backup system, one can design the system to take care of safe Availability of Equipments

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER The backup option is used where one must transfer the control of the process to a secondary system, without interrupting machine or process operationBumpless transfer Back up system also provide -Equipment with exceptional reliability. -Automatic fault isolation -No disturbance of the process when switching from primary to secondary system - Online Maintenance with Minimum/No disturbance to Plant.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER


AUGUST PLC (SC 300E) TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANT (2oo3)
HOT REPAIR MODULE I/P MODULE I/P PATH A PROCESSOR A R/O INPUT I/P PATH B PROCESSOR B R/O I/P PATH C PROCESSOR C O/P PATH C O/P PATH B O/P MODULE

O/P PATH A

2/3

OUTPUT

VO TI NG

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER


AUGUST PLC /TRICONEX TRIPLE MODULAR REDUNDANT (2oo3)

SOME FEATURES
SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTED FAULT TOLERANCE. OPERATING MODE IS 3-2-0. SCAN RATES 30 MSEC TUV CERTIFICATION CLASS AK6 HIGHER AVAILABILITY BETTER EVENT HANDLING. SEEMLESS INTERFACE WITH DCS. 95% NEW PLC ARE TMR ONLY.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER SOME SIGNIFICANT FEATURES


ISOLATION FROM FIELD

SIGNALS FROM PLC ARE NORMALLY ISOLATED FROM THE FIELD THROUGH INTERPOSING RELAYS.
INPUT TO PLC
(NO/ NC CONTACTS)

CMD TO FIELD
(NO/ NC CONTACTS)

INPUT RELAY
COIL

OUTPUT RELAY
COIL

STATUS FROM FIELD

COMMAND FROM PLC

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

SAFETY STANDARDS
SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVELS (SIL)
SIL LEVEL INDICATES AVAILABILITY OF THE SAFETY SYSTEM.

SIL LEVEL 4 3 2 1

AVAILABILITY > 99.99% 99.90% 99.00 to 99.90% 90.00 to 99.00%

MTBF 100,000 to 10,000 10,000 to 1,000 1,000 to 100 100 to 10

90% AVAILABILITY MEANS FOR EVERY 10 TIMES A TRIP SITUATION OCCURS, THERE WILL BE ONE PREDICTED FAILURE TO TRIP.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER SAFETY STANDARDS


SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVELS (SIL) - CONTD. SIL 4 - CATASTROPHIC COMMUNITY IMPACT. SIL 3 - EMPLOYEE & COMMUNITY PROTECTION. SIL 2 - MAJOR PROPERTY & PRODUCTION PROTECTION. POSSIBLE INJURY TO EMPLOYEE. SIL 1 - MINOR PROPERTY AND PRODUCTION PROTECTION. ASSINGMENT OF SIL LEVEL IS A CORPORATE OR COMPANY DECISION BASED ON APPLICATION & RISK TOLERANCE.

PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER

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