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Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy

Growing share of Republicans say U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and focus on concerns at home

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How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to examine Americans' views of Russia, Ukraine and NATO. For this analysis, we surveyed 3,576 U.S. adults from March 20-26, 2023. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

Here are the [questions used](#) for this analysis, along with responses, and [its methodology](#).

Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy

Growing share of Republicans say U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and focus on concerns at home

In the midst of a major international conflict in Ukraine and an expansion of NATO in Europe, Americans have distinct opinions on the key players in the war. Majorities of U.S. adults have favorable views of Ukraine itself, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and have confidence in Ukraine's leader, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. At the same time, few have positive opinions of Russia or confidence in its ruler, President Vladimir Putin. And a 64% majority view Russia as an enemy to the United States, rather than as a competitor or partner.


Americans [express mixed confidence](#) in two of NATO's most important leaders: French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. In fact, 35% of Americans have never heard of Scholz, with 24% saying the same about Macron.

Over the past few years, there have also been shifts in how Americans view their place in the world. A majority (55%) says that the U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems at home, compared with 43% who say it's best for the future of the country to be active in world affairs. This

represents a shift in opinion since 2021, before Russia invaded Ukraine, when 50% of Americans wanted to focus on domestic troubles and 49% wanted to be active in world affairs.

Americans see NATO and Ukraine positively, but view Russia negatively and see it as an enemy of the U.S.

% who have a ___ opinion of ...



% who say Russia is a(n) ___ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.


Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q3e-f, h & Q49.

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Americans, and especially Republicans, increasingly say the U.S. should focus on issues at home, while Democrats say it's best for U.S. to be active in world affairs

% who say ...



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q8.

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Similarly, 39% of Americans say that the country should follow its own interests, even if allies disagree, while 59% say the U.S. should consider the interests of other countries, even if it means making compromises. In March 2020, 32% said the U.S. should go it alone, while 66% said the U.S. should work more with other countries. All of the current data was collected before the [leak of classified intelligence information](#) on Discord and its subsequent [diplomatic fallout](#).

As is typical of American public opinion, there are partisan divides on many of the international issues surveyed. Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party are on balance more favorable toward Ukraine, NATO and key European leaders.

Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party are more likely to want to pay attention to domestic issues, rather than be active in foreign affairs, and are more inclined to

say the U.S. should follow its own interests. There are also slight partisan differences on attitudes toward Putin, with Republicans marginally less negative than Democrats toward Russia's leader. And Republicans are almost equally divided in their views toward NATO, Ukraine and Zelenskyy.

These are among the findings of a Pew Research Center survey conducted on the Center's nationally representative American Trends Panel, among 3,576 adults from March 20 to 26, 2023.

Other key findings include:

- Democrats, those with more education and people who say the U.S. should consider the interests of other countries all give more support to the NATO alliance. About half (49%) of Republicans have a positive view of NATO, down from 55% in the weeks following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
- Support for Ukraine follows a similar pattern, with older Americans, Democrats (especially liberal Democrats) and those who think that it's best for the U.S. to be active in world affairs having more positive views of the country.
- Attitudes toward Russia remain very negative. Majorities of Americans have very unfavorable opinions of Russia (62%), say Russia is an enemy (64%) and have no confidence at all in Putin (71%).
- Zelenskyy gets higher praise from older Americans, those with more education and Democrats. And about nine-in-ten Americans have heard of the Ukrainian leader.
- Those that say the U.S. should be active in world affairs are more positively inclined toward Macron, Scholz and Zelenskyy.
- The share of Republicans saying the U.S. should focus on problems at home rather than paying attention to issues overseas has increased 6 percentage points since last year (71% now, 65% then). And the share saying this is now 17 points higher than it was in September 2019, during the Trump administration.
- Democrats are 8 percentage points more likely since 2020 to say the U.S. should follow its own interests in international affairs, even if allies disagree.

Americans positive on NATO; partisan differences endure

Most Americans have a favorable view of NATO: 62% express a positive opinion, while 35% have a negative opinion of the organization. NATO, which recently [welcomed Finland as a member](#), is consistently viewed in a favorable light by Americans. In 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 67% held a favorable view of NATO, the highest percentage measured since Pew Research Center transitioned to online surveys in the U.S. Since last year, positive opinions of NATO have faded slightly, with favorable views dropping 5 percentage points.


U.S. adults with a bachelor's or postgraduate degree are more likely than those with some college or less education to have positive views of NATO. For example, three-quarters of Americans with a postgraduate degree express a favorable view of NATO, compared with 56% of those with a high school education or less.

Willingness to work with other countries is also associated with assessments of the alliance. Those who say the U.S. should take other countries' interests into account are more likely to express favorability in NATO (73%) than those who believe the U.S. should follow its own interests (47%).

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are consistently more likely than Republicans and GOP leaners to hold a positive opinion of NATO. About three-quarters of Democrats (76%) have a favorable view of NATO, in contrast to 49% of Republicans. Among Republicans, moderates and liberals are more likely to have a favorable opinion of the alliance than conservatives. And liberal Democrats are more positive toward NATO than conservative and moderate supporters of the party.

Democrats and adults with more education more favorable toward NATO

% who say they have a(n) ___ opinion of NATO



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. For full question wording, see topline.


Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q3e. "Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy"

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The partisan divide on the issue of NATO is [well established](#) in [past research](#). In 2022, Republicans grew more favorable toward NATO in the wake of Russia's invasion. However, since then, Republicans have become less positive, with favorable ratings of the alliance declining 6 points. Democratic views of NATO have remained relatively steady since 2021.

Fewer Republicans now have positive views of NATO than immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

% who say they have a *favorable* opinion of NATO



2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q3e.

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About two-thirds in the U.S. have a positive view of Ukraine amid ongoing war

Most Americans have a favorable opinion of Ukraine. About two-thirds (64%) have a positive view of the country, while 34% have a negative view.


About seven-in-ten Americans ages 65 and older express a favorable view of Ukraine – more than any other age group.

Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are much more likely than their Republican counterparts to have a positive view of Ukraine, and ratings are especially positive among liberal Democrats.

Views of international engagement also correlate with attitudes of Ukraine. Those who believe it is best for the future of the U.S. to be active in world affairs are much more likely to have a positive view of Ukraine than those who say it is best for the U.S. to pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on issues at home.

Democrats more positive on Ukraine than Republicans

% who say they have a(n) ___ opinion of Ukraine



Note: Those who did not answer not shown. For full question wording, see topline.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q3h. "Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy"

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Americans continue to view Russia unfavorably

As [Russia's military invasion of Ukraine](#) enters its second year, Americans remain very negative toward Russia: 91% have an unfavorable view of the country, including 62% who say their views are *very* unfavorable. Just 7% in the U.S. have a favorable view of Russia. This is a similar level of negativity compared with [last year's survey](#), when 92% of Americans were negative toward Russia.

Prior to the 2020 transition to an online survey in the U.S., Pew Research Center measured views of Russia over the phone dating back to 2007. U.S. views of the country between 2007 and 2014 were mixed, but grew much more unfavorable after [Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea](#).


Older adults (those ages 65 and older) are more likely to have a very unfavorable view of Russia than any other age group and are 28 percentage points more likely to have a deeply negative opinion of Russia than adults ages 18 to 29.

Americans with more education, such as a postgraduate degree or a bachelor's degree, are more likely to have a very negative view of Russia than those with some college or a high school education or less.

In general, Republicans and Democrats are aligned on negative views of Russia. But Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents are 5 points more likely than Republicans and Republican leaners to say they are very unfavorable toward Russia, and this view is especially common among liberal Democrats.

Older Americans more unfavorable on Russia than younger Americans

% who say they have a ___ opinion of Russia



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.


Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q3f. "Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy"

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Both Democrats and Republicans have also grown somewhat less negative on Russia over the past year, even after negative views of Russia increased markedly between 2020 and 2022. Two-thirds of Republicans and 72% of Democrats [had very unfavorable views of Russia](#) in 2022. This year, deeply unfavorable sentiment declined 6 points among each partisan group – a statistically significant drop. Other [Pew Research Center surveys](#) have found that Republicans especially are less likely to see the war between Russia and Ukraine as a major threat to U.S. interests than they were in the early months of the conflict, and an increasing share says the U.S. provides too much support to Ukraine.

Small decline in negative sentiment toward Russia among partisans

% who have a **very unfavorable** opinion of Russia



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q3f. "Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy"

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Majority of Americans continue to view Russia as an enemy rather than competitor

Over six-in-ten Americans view Russia as an enemy of the U.S. (64%), as opposed to a competitor (30%) or a partner (3%). The number of Americans who view Russia as an enemy is down slightly from last year (70%), after increasing dramatically following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This drop contrasts with [views of China](#): The share of Americans who see China as an enemy has *increased* over the past year.


Majorities among both Republicans and Democrats view Russia as an enemy of the U.S., though these shares have also decreased slightly since last year. Liberal Democrats are the *most* likely to consider Russia an enemy, with nearly three-quarters (73%) expressing this view. Meanwhile, nearly four-in-ten moderate and liberal Republicans (38%) view Russia as a competitor.

Older Americans are more likely to view Russia as an enemy of the U.S., with 76% of those ages 65 and older saying this, compared with 54% of adults under age 30 who say the same. Americans with at least a bachelor's degree (72%) are also more likely to consider Russia an enemy than those without a college degree (61%).

Views also vary by beliefs regarding the United States' role in global affairs. Those who believe that the U.S. should be active in world affairs are significantly more likely to view Russia as an enemy

Nearly two-thirds of Americans see Russia as an enemy

% who say Russia is a(n) ___ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q49.

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
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than those who believe that the U.S. should concentrate on domestic issues (74% vs. 57%, respectively).

Americans show much greater support for Zelenskyy than Putin, are less familiar with Macron and Scholz

Roughly seven-in-ten Americans express no confidence in Putin, but a majority have confidence in Zelenskyy; mixed reviews of other European leaders

% who have ___ confidence in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q15c-f.

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A majority of Americans say they have [confidence in Zelenskyy](#) to do the right thing regarding world affairs. However, opinions vary across demographic groups: Those with a college degree or higher are more confident in Zelenskyy than those without a college degree, and older Americans tend hold more confidence than younger Americans.

Democrats are much more likely to have confidence in Zelenskyy than Republicans: 71% of Democrats have confidence in the Ukrainian president, compared with 44% of Republicans. Liberal Democrats are the most likely partisans to have at least some confidence in Zelenskyy. Even so, moderate and conservative Democrats are still more likely than both moderate and liberal Republicans and conservative Republicans to say the same. Conservative Republicans are also the most likely to explicitly say they have no confidence in Zelenskyy *at all*, with just under three-in-ten (27%) holding this view.

Americans who say it is better for the U.S. to be active in world affairs tend to express greater confidence in Zelenskyy, Macron and Scholz.


In stark contrast to views of the other three leaders, nine-in-ten Americans say they do not have confidence in Putin to do the right thing regarding world affairs, with 71% of those expressing no confidence *at all*. Americans' negative assessments of Putin are relatively consistent across genders, age groups and levels of education.

Despite the growing [partisan divide regarding U.S. support for Ukraine](#), Democrats and Republicans hold similarly low shares of confidence in Putin (92% vs. 89%). Within parties, Americans are also relatively united in these assessments: Across all ideological stripes of both Republicans and Democrats, nearly seven-in-ten or more express no confidence *at all* in Putin.

Around four-in-ten Americans (37%) have at least some confidence in Macron, while the same share says they do not. Just over half of Democrats express confidence in Macron, while about a quarter of Republicans say the same. Conservative Republicans are the least likely to express confidence.

Americans who prioritize global engagement are much more likely to express confidence in Zelenskyy

% who have ___ **confidence** in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to do the right thing regarding world affairs



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q15f.
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Americans are about as confident in Scholz as they are in Macron. Democrats are nearly 17 percentage points more likely to express at least some confidence in Scholz than Republicans (44% vs. 27%). Liberal Democrats are the most likely to have confidence in Scholz, while conservative Republicans are the least likely. Overall, those who are more likely to say the U.S. should be active in global affairs are more likely to hold a positive opinion of the two European leaders.

Macron is more recognized by the American public than Scholz. Yet, around a quarter or more say they have never heard of either leader, with 35% saying this about Scholz – the highest share unfamiliar across the four leaders in this analysis. A majority of Americans ages 18 to 29 say they have never heard of the German leader and around four-in-ten women and those without a college degree say the same. Women are also twice as likely to say they have never heard of Macron than men.

A majority of Americans say the U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and focus more on domestic concerns, but Republicans and Democrats differ

A majority (55%) of Americans believe that the U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and instead concentrate on problems at home – up 4 percentage points from May 2022. This increase reflects a rise in the share of those who believe the U.S. should take a more isolationist approach to dealing with major international issues over the past several years.


There has long been a wide partisan divide on this question, with Republicans being much more likely to express a domestically focused view. Roughly seven-in-ten Republicans now say that the U.S. should pay less attention to issues abroad and instead concentrate on problems at home, 32 points higher than the share of Democrats who say the same. Among Democrats, liberal Democrats are less likely than their conservative or moderate counterparts to take a more isolationist stance.

While the share of Democrats who say that the U.S. should concentrate on problems at home is unchanged since last year, the share of Republicans who say this has *increased* by 6 points. The share of Republicans who say the U.S. should concentrate on problems at home has increased by 17 points since September 2019, the last time the question was asked during the Trump administration.

Younger Americans are also more likely to say that the U.S. should focus domestically rather

Republicans overwhelmingly say the U.S. should focus on domestic issues, while Democrats think it is best for U.S. to be active in world affairs

% who say ...



*Estimates for Asian adults are representative of English speakers only.

Note: White, Black and Asian adults include only those who report being only one race and are not Hispanic. Hispanics are of any race. Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q8. "Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy"

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than globally, with about six-in-ten saying this, compared with roughly four-in-ten Americans ages 65 and older who agree. A similar share (63%) of those with a high school education or less also express that the U.S. should focus on issues at home rather than global affairs, a difference of 22 percentage points from the Americans with a postgraduate education who say the same.

Views also vary by race and ethnicity. While majorities among Black and Hispanic Americans (60% each) believe that the U.S. should focus its attention on domestic issues, only about half of White and English-speaking Asian Americans agree.

Americans who negatively rate the economic situation and indicate dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the U.S. are more likely to believe the country should concentrate on issues at home. Americans with lower incomes are also more likely than their middle- or upper-income counterparts to say that the U.S. should focus on domestic issues.

Most Americans think the U.S. should consider the interests of other countries when dealing with major international issues

A majority of Americans say the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries even if it means making compromises with them when dealing with major international issues, as opposed to following its own interests even when other countries disagree. The share saying the U.S. should account for other countries' interests has decreased 7 percentage points since March 2020, while those saying the U.S. should follow its own interests is up 7 points.


Americans under age 30 are more likely to say the U.S. should take into account the interests of other countries, with nearly seven-in-ten saying this, in comparison with the 53% of those ages 65 and older who hold this view.

Democrats (76%) are also more likely to hold this view than their Republican counterparts (43%). Liberal Democrats are especially likely to say that the U.S. should prioritize compromise with other countries, with over eight-in-ten saying this. In comparison, only 36% of conservative Republicans agree.

Among those who positively rate the economic situation and feel satisfied with the way democracy is working in the U.S., around seven-in-ten believe the U.S. should prioritize compromise with other countries when dealing with international issues. Among Americans who say the economy is not doing well and are dissatisfied with the state of democracy, only 55% say the U.S. should consider other nations' interests.

Democrats and younger Americans more likely to say the U.S. should prioritize compromise with other countries

% who say, when dealing with major international issues, the U.S. should ...



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 20-26, 2023. Q9. "Americans Hold Positive Feelings Toward NATO and Ukraine, See Russia as an Enemy"

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Methodology

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from ATP Wave 124, conducted from March 20 to March 26, 2023, and includes an [oversample](#) of Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults to provide more precise estimates of the opinions and experiences of these smaller demographic subgroups. These oversampled groups are weighted back to reflect their correct proportions in the population. A total of 3,576 panelists responded out of 4,058 who were sampled, for a response rate of 88%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 4%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,576 respondents is plus or minus 2.0 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,503
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	881
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	434
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	4,116
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,472
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021; May 29 to July 7, 2021;	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,541
Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	788
May 24 to Sept. 29, 2022	ABS	3,354	2,869	1,697
	Total	42,894	30,283	12,432

Note: RDD is random-digit dial; ABS is address-based sampling. Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. In 2020 and 2021 another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that did not respond to the online survey were sent a paper version of the questionnaire, \$5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults who returned the paper version of the survey were invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults received a follow-up mailing with a \$10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the five address-based recruitments, a total of 23,176 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 20,341 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, one adult was selected and asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 30,283 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 12,432 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.¹ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii. It featured a stratified random sample from the ATP in which Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults were selected with certainty. The remaining panelists were sampled at rates designed to ensure that the share of respondents in each stratum is proportional to its share of the U.S. adult population to the greatest extent possible. Respondent weights are adjusted to account for differential probabilities of selection as described in the Weighting section below.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Pew Research Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated

¹ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)"

test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 20 to March 26, 2023. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on March 20.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 20. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking sampled panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 21.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists who consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Invitation and reminder dates, ATP Wave 124

	Soft launch	Full launch
Initial invitation	March 20, 2023	March 21, 2023
First reminder	March 23, 2023	March 23, 2023
Final reminder	March 25, 2023	March 25, 2023

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Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center’s researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, eight ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. These weights are then rescaled and adjusted to account for changes in the design of ATP recruitment surveys from year to year. Finally, the weights are calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists are invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

American Trends Panel weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age (detailed)	2021 American Community Survey (ACS)
Age x Gender	
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2021 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2021 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2021 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation	2022 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Frequency of internet use	
Religious affiliation	
<i>Additional weighting dimensions applied within Black adults</i>	
Age	2021 American Community Survey (ACS)
Gender	
Education	
Hispanic ethnicity	
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation	2022 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Religious affiliation	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th

percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Sample sizes and margins of error, ATP Wave 124

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,576	2.0 percentage points
Half sample	At least 1,776	2.9 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,491	3.0 percentage points
Half sample	At least 690	4.4 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,930	2.9 percentage points
Half sample	At least 922	4.2 percentage points

Note: This survey includes oversamples of Hispanic men, non-Hispanic Black men and non-Hispanic Asian adults. Unweighted sample sizes do not account for the sample design or weighting and do not describe a group's contribution to weighted estimates. See the Sample design and Weighting sections above for details.

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Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions, ATP Wave 124

	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,576
Logged on to survey; broke off	2.12	53
Logged on to survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	16
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	405
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	0
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		8
Screened out		0
Total panelists in the survey		4,058
Completed interviews	I	3,576
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	482
Non-contact	NC	0
Other	O	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		4,058
AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)		88%

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Cumulative response rate as of ATP Wave 124

	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	71%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 124	49%
Response rate to Wave 124 survey	88%
Cumulative response rate	4%

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Topline questionnaire

Pew Research Center
Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey
May 10, 2023 Release

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see [Methodology](#) section.
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2023 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.