Iran’s Role in the Kirkuk Operation in Iraq

By Jennifer Cafarella with Omer Kassim

Key Takeaway: Iran provided decisive military support to compel Iraqi Kurds to surrender in Kirkuk, Iraq, on October 16, 2017. Military forces from three major Iranian proxies participated in the operation: Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al Haq, and the Badr Organization. Iran did not attempt to outshine Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in public. Iran instead allowed Abadi to take credit, while quietly positioning its proxies to influence Kirkuk in the future. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) conducted a rigorous study of social media activity and other reporting of troop movements in Iraq in order to assess the role of Iran’s proxies in Kirkuk and across Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries.

Iranian military proxies in Iraq supported Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi’s retaking of Kirkuk by compelling Iraq’s Kurds to withdraw from their positions on October 16. ISW assesses that forces from three major Iranian proxies helped compel the Kurdish surrender in Kirkuk: Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), Asa'ib Ahl al Haq (AAH), and the Badr Organization, as this report will detail. The Kurdish collapse in Kirkuk was a turning point in the conflict between Iraqi Kurdistan and the Iraqi Government. Iran and Abadi are now exploiting their success in Kirkuk and expanding their operations against Iraqi Kurdistan. Iran’s proxies continue to play a central role. 

Methodology

The evidence of Iran’s involvement in the initial confrontation in Kirkuk requires careful analysis of openly available sources. Official media channels of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) released little information about which units participated in the initial military operations in Kirkuk on October 16. ISW assesses that the PMF imposed a media blackout, since they went dark for an abnormal duration. One Facebook page affiliated with an Iranian proxy militia took down photos and videos about its involvement in Kirkuk that it posted from October 13-16. Social media outlets that normally report on PMF units were also unusually quiet. This media blackout may have extended to Iraqi press, which also did not report details on PMF units. Iraqi sources also rarely reported on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) unit numbers in Kirkuk, referring instead to general “Iraqi forces.” The media blackout and some retrospective removal of materials posted on unofficial social media links suggest that some authorities within the PMF, Iraq, or Iran wished to conceal evidence that the PMF participated.

Furthermore, some Kurdish press and social media sources published old, recycled imagery to argue that the Iranian-backed proxies were present, undermining the credibility of the official Iraqi Kurdish case. U.S. uniformed military spokesmen, senior general officers, and State Department officials have added to the confusion by dodging press questions about the involvement of PMF forces.

ISW conducted a rigorous study of the available evidence in social media and other reporting of troop movements in Kirkuk and across the disputed internal boundaries in order to assess which units comprised the PMF forces whose involvement Iraqi sources generally reported. Forces from three major Iranian proxies were present south of Kirkuk before the operation and advanced along with Iraqi forces: the 43rd and 42nd AAH Brigades and a Badr Organization unit also known as the PMF 24th Brigade. ISW has provided a list of indicators of the presence of these units below. ISW cannot assess the specific KH unit with confidence at the time of publication. KH, AAH, and the Badr Organization are lethal Iranian proxies that attacked U.S. forces in Iraq, particularly between 2006 and 2008.

Iranian Proxy Leadership in Kirkuk

• Badr Organization leader Hadi al Ameri met with Federal Police (FP) commander Raed Jawat and the deputy head of the PMF and leader of KH Abu Mehdi al Muhandis in Bashir. An official Badr Organization media site provided pictures of this meeting on Facebook on October 15.* 

Hadi al Ameri, Abu Mehdi al Muhandis, and Raed Jawat near Bashir on or around October 15, 2017.

• Hadi al Ameri and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis attended the flag raising in Kirkuk City along with Iraq’s Counterterrorism Services (CTS) commander General Yarallah. The Iraqi Army’s Twitter account posted a photo of the flag raising, showing all three in attendance. Facebook accounts affiliated with the Badr Organization also posted photos and videos showing the flag raising.* The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman said that he had not seen” the photos in response to a reporter’s inquiry during a press briefing on October 17.

Hadi al Ameri, Abu Mehdi al Muhandis, and General Yarallah in Kirkuk City on October 16, 2017.

• Hadi al Ameri toured the Bai Hasan oil field on October 16 after Peshmerga forces withdrew. A Facebook account linked to the Badr Organization posted a video of Hadi al Ameri touring the Bai Hasan oil field. Ameri, during an interview from the field, thanked the Peshmegra for not clashing with the ISF. An Emergency Response Division (ERD) officer was standing next to Ameri. When asked if there were oil fields under PMF control, Ameri stuttered, saying that “oil fields… I don’t think so except for Daybaka oil field which is important to control. Besides that, I don’t think we have a problem.” *

Hadi al Ameri tours the Bai Hasan oil field on October 16, 2017.

• Additional photos and videos that circulated on social media also show Hadi al Ameri and Abu Mehdi al Muhandis touring sites in Kirkuk Province.

Iranian Proxy Militia Deployments to Kirkuk

Asa'ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

• Photos and videos taken in the vicinity of Kirkuk City that circulated on social media included AAH flags. Western reporters also cited examples of AAH flags raised near Kirkuk. 
•  A Facebook page affiliated with the AAH 42nd PMF Brigade shared photos with a caption stating that the 42nd Brigade led by Haj Abu Bakr Jubouri was deploying to Daquq for further movement to Kirkuk, and included a photo of a fighter with an AAH flag.

Photo of Asa'ib Ahl al Haq fighter either on the way to or near Kirkuk City.

• A Facebook page affiliated with AAH’s 42nd PMF Brigade posted photos on October 16 of fighters holding an AAH flag with a caption stating the photo was taken at a Peshmerga position in central Kirkuk.*
• ISW assessed on October 19 that the AAH 43rd PMF Brigade was also present within proximity of Kirkuk as of at least October 15. The 43rd PMF Brigade was deployed in Salah al Din province before the Kirkuk operation.* A Facebook page affiliated with AAH’s 43rd PMF Brigade published information, including photos and videos, that supported ISW’s assessment that fighters from the Brigade deployed close to Kirkuk in early October.* Screenshots from the AAH 43rd Brigade’s Facebook page are included below.

Badr Organization

• The Badr Organization’s Turkmen brigade, also known as the 16th PMF Brigade, was already stationed near Bashir and may have received reinforcement from 16th PMF Brigade units in the vicinity of Hamrin and Qara Tapa.*
• An Iraqi news outlet shared a video from September 18 that shows a column of fighters from the 24th Badr Brigade arriving near southern Kikuk with Abu Mehdi al Muhandis.

Abu Mehdi al Muhandis arrives close to southern Kirkuk and sits in an apparent Badr Organization office on September 18, 2017.

• A Facebook account affiliated with Ansar Allah al-Awfiya posted a photo from IVO Bashir showing civilians offering food to the PMF and security forces.* The post included photos from al-Ghadeer channel (affiliated with the Badr Organization).
• The communications directorate of the PMF announced that its force,s along with ISF, control Bai Hasan oil fields in Kirkuk. The PMF in Bai Hasan most likely included a Badr Organization unit, given Hadi al Ameri’s visit.

Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH)

• Al Arabiya published a video on October 16 from a location near Kirkuk City showing two trucks laden with fighters carrying KH flags, in addition to fighters carrying KH flags stationed at a checkpoint. 

Al Arabiya video on October 16, 2017 shows Kata'ib Hezbollah fighters near Kirkuk.

These units joined the local Iranian-backed forces stationed south of Kirkuk, which included: Kita’ib Jund al Imam, Liwa Kirkuk al Thani, and Firqat Imam Ali al Qitaliya. Qiyadat Quwat Abu Fadl al Abbas and a Hawza-affiliated PMF unit named Firqat al Abbas al Qitaliya may also have been present.

Iran’s proxies joined an Iraqi force including the CTS and units from the 9th Iraqi Armored Division. It is unclear from publicly available information which specific CTS and 9th Iraqi Armored Division units participated. The deployment of elite Iraqi units supported by armored artillery indicates Abadi intended both to deter the Peshmerga from fighting and to prepare for that possibility. Abadi also deployed troops from the FP and ERD, which constituted the only government-controlled infantry force. The FP and ERD likely included units penetrated by Iran. These combined forces staged south of Kirkuk city in order to allow an avenue for retreat for Kurdish forces to the north. 

ISW mapped these forces on October 19 and updated that assessment on October 29. ISW will continue updating its assessment and map if and when new information becomes available.

Implications

Iran’s role in Kirkuk was decisive. The leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Qassem Suleimani traveled to Iraq on October 14 to convey Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s support for Abadi’s response to the referendum. He also issued an ultimatum to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and possibly to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al Ameri, also threatened “internal war” if the Peshmerga did not withdraw from Kirkuk. The deployment of Iran’s proxies to Kirkuk tipped the scales against Iraqi Kurdistan enough to compel it to withdraw from Kirkuk and large portions of Iraq’s disputed internal boundaries. 

Iran achieved a second goal through its support in Kirkuk: to further legitimize its proxies in Iraq while sidelining the United States. Iran seeks to subordinate the Iraqi government from within, and was careful to frame the Kirkuk operation as a sovereign Iraqi action. Iran quietly provided critical support that ensured Abadi’s success while positioning its proxies to have influence in Kirkuk moving forward. Iran also took action to keep the U.S. on the sidelines by deploying an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) against U.S. forces in early October. The Kirkuk operation thus bears signs of Iraq’s most likely future on current trajectory: Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi notionally in control, Iran’s proxies acting on Tehran’s orders but as legitimate arms of the Iraqi state, and the U.S. on the sidelines.

Iran’s proxies will capitalize politically and militarily on their role in Kirkuk and across Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBS). The battlefield circulations of major proxy leaders around Kirkuk bolstered their public image ahead of Iraq’s elections scheduled for early 2018. Their subordinates may compete in local Kirkuk politics. Their forces will likely control or contest Iraqi government control of Kirkuk’s military infrastructure and oil installations. Prime Minister Abadi placed an Iranian client, Ali Fadhil Imran, at the head of a new Kirkuk Operations command on October 28. Imran is the former head of the Iranian-influenced 5th Iraqi Army Division. Unconfirmed reports indicate Abadi also appointed an Iranian client, Abdul-Amir al-Zaydi, as the head of “redeployment operations” across Iraq’s DIBS and border crossings on November 5. Zaydi is the former head of the Iranian-influenced Dijla Operations Command. These appointments enable Iran’s proxies to consolidate militarily in Kirkuk and across the DIBS. 

The U.S. remains multiple steps behind Iran. President Donald Trump rolled out a new anti-Iran strategy days before the Kirkuk operation, without specifying prescriptions for containing and reversing the strength of Iran’s proxy networks. The Trump Administration’s initial apathy toward Iran’s role in the Kirkuk operation appeared to indicate the U.S. will not meaningfully push back against Iran in Iraq. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson provided a more forceful, but still sluggish, U.S. response to Iran’s role in Kirkuk in a subsequent trip to the Middle East from October 22-23. Tillerson said “Iranian militias that are in Iraq…need to go home” during a press conference with Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir on October 22. Secretary Tillerson’s statement recognizes the threat Iran’s proxies in Iraq pose, but rolling back their influence is not achievable through rhetoric alone. Abadi reportedly responded to Secretary Tillerson by stating the PMF “defended their country and made the sacrifices that contributed to the victory over ISIS. Abadi subsequently stated that he will disarm Iran’s proxies if they refuse to submit to his control, in an effort to reaffirm his intent to remain aligned with U.S. policy. He does not have the capability to do so without direct American military support, however. Only a serious change in U.S. policy in Iraq can save Abadi from de facto cooptation by Iran. 

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* Please contact ISW directly to request citations for these data. 

Iraq Situation Report: March 1-20, 2017

By Emily Anagnostos, Jennifer Cafarella, and Jessa Rose Dury-Agri

Regional actors are vying to dominate the post-ISIS security structure and political order in northern Iraq. Turkey and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) are threatening the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) and its affiliates in Sinjar, west of Mosul City. Sinjar is a historic flashpoint for ethnic tensions and at the center of Turkish, Iranian, and Kurdish interests. The KDP seeks to incorporate Sinjar into the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), expanding the KRG’s territorial control. Turkey supports the KDP’s desire to move against the PKK and has threatened to participate in a direct attack. The desire to move against Sinjar could bring Turkey and the KDP into conflict with Iran. Iranian-backed elements of the Popular Mobilization are stationed nearby at Tel Afar and have claimed that the PKK-backed Yazidi militia in Sinjar is part of the Popular Mobilization. Iranian-backed militias could intervene on the side of the PKK in Sinjar if Turkey or the KDP act further, escalating the conflict which could undermine post-ISIS stability in northern Iraq. Russia is also seeking to gain influence in northern Iraq through a financial relationship with the KDP, which could embolden the KDP by granting it greater independence from Baghdad. Russian-owned oil company Rosneft renegotiated a loan with the KRG to pre-finance crude oil exports to Russia on February 21. Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani later met with a senior Russian delegation in Arbil on March 1 to discuss strengthening bilateral relations between the KRG and Russia, marking the first high-level Russian delegation to visit Iraqi Kurdistan. Separately, tribal violence in southern Iraq, particularly in Maysan Province, signals rising intra-Shi’a competition ahead of provincial elections in September 2017.  

The Campaign for Mosul: November 8-15, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

As the fight between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and ISIS in and around Mosul compresses, the high stakes of the operation and close-contact warfare are increasingly placing Mosul’s civilian population in the crossfire.

The ISF is consolidating gains to the north and south of Mosul as it continues to contest neighborhoods in eastern Mosul. The Federal Police continued its advances along the western Tigris River bank, looking to breach the city limits through the airport. On the eastern bank, the Iraqi Army and tribal fighters recaptured several villages north of the Great Zab River from November 8 to 15, including the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud on November 13. ISIS destroyed much of the fabled ruins, which it deemed idolatrous, in the spring of 2015. Meanwhile, army units are positioning to enter Mosul from the north after retaking Bahwiza and its environs on November 8. Inside the city, units from the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army are engaged in over a dozen neighborhoods in eastern Mosul, announcing recapture of three neighborhoods in northeastern Mosul on November 12 and 13.

The Popular Mobilization is moving to take the military base southwest of Tel Afar as a strategic stepping stone towards the city of Tel Afar, west of Mosul. The base could also serve as a launch pad for intended militia operations into Syria. The capture of the Tel Afar base would give the primarily Iranian-backed paramilitary force a major foothold in northern Iraq, adding to the Popular Mobilization legitimacy as an Iraqi security institution. The establishment of a formal Shi’a militia base in northern Iraq will likely increase the risk of sectarian violence and create conflict with both local Sunni Arab and Kurdish populations and with Turkey, the latter of which threatened on October 30 undisclosed action if the Shi’a militias “terrorized” the region.

ISIS’s resistance has become increasingly brutal over November 8 to 15 in response to the ISF’s advance towards Mosul’s city center. Its defensive mechanisms include the use of the high number of civilians still living in the neighborhoods as human shields to slow and deter the ISF. ISIS has deployed snipers to rooftops of still-inhabited houses, denying the ISF the ability to call in airstrikes lest striking the families inside. ISIS has also been pulling civilians into the city from surrounding villages to be used as shields while executing hundreds of civilians accused of collaborating with the ISF. Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed on November 11 that ISIS used blistering agents against both civilians and security forces in Qayyarah in late August. The report,  following accounts of chlorine and mustard gas attacks in Bashiqa, northeast of Mosul, and the burning sulfur plant north of Qayyarah, underscores that ISIS will continue to use chemical weapons as part of its defense as well.

The ISF and Peshmerga have also been accused of human rights violations, which could undermine the mission to defeat and prevent the reconstitution of insurgent groups in Iraq. Amnesty International reported on November 10 that men in Federal Police uniforms had carried out extrajudicial killings of accused ISIS members in towns south of Mosul, while HRW accused in a November 15 report ISF members of mutilating ISIS corpses and executing surrendered militants, both of which constitute war crimes. HRW also issued a report on November 10 accusing both ISF and Peshmerga officials of unlawfully detaining or disappearing suspected ISIS militants at screening centers and camps around Mosul. Officials from the Iraqi and Kurdistan Regional Governments have denied the reports. Nevertheless, reports of human rights abuses underscore the high risk that the violations will increase as forces move into the dense urban terrain and the line between civilian and militant blurs. If the ISF fails to prove itself a better champion to Mosul’s population than ISIS was in 2014, it sets conditions for another insurgent group to exploit the seams between civilians and the government and resurge in ISIS’s wake.

Iraq Situation Report: October 26 - November 1, 2016

By Patrick Martin and the ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Iraqi security forces made significant gains in the Mosul campaign amid growing humanitarian concerns and fears of sectarian violence. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) broke through ISIS defenses around Mosul, recapturing the ISIS-held town of Shura south of the city on October 29. The Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) also recaptured a television station in eastern Mosul on October 31, marking the first time the ISF entered the city since ISIS captured it in June 2014. As security forces continue to advance into Mosul’s city limits, reports indicate that ISIS is corralling civilians near its positions to serve as human shields while intensifying its executions of non-compliant civilians and former ISF members. ISIS’s deliberate efforts to maximize civilian casualties indicate that operations to clear Mosul’s center will prove far more difficult than past operations in ISIS-held cities like Fallujah and Ramadi. Meanwhile, the Popular Mobilization launched operations to recapture Tal Afar, a majority Turkmen town west of Mosul, on October 29, as well as majority Sunni Arab villages in the Jazeera desert, southwest of Mosul. The advance consists of Shi’a Arab and Shi’a Turkmen militias spearheaded by Iranian proxy militias, whose participation in operations in majority-Sunni areas will increase the likelihood of sectarian violence. ISIS and Sunni insurgent groups will be able to exploit sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions to reestablish themselves in recaptured terrain and among disaffected Sunni populations. Tal Afar has a particularly bloody history of sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a Turkmen and historically served as hub of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); failure of the Iraqi forces to minimize sectarian and ethnic violence during clearing operations will increase the possibility that Sunni insurgent groups will once again resurge in the area, thus undermining the long-term stability of Ninewa Province and Iraq as a whole. 

Iraq Situation Report: October 18-25, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The operation to retake Mosul entered its second week with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Peshmerga advancing along the northern and eastern axes, nearing Mosul’s city limits. ISF units in the southern axis advanced but lagged behind the other axes, resulting in operational pauses on October 19 and October 25 in order for the southern units to regroup and catch up. Delays on the southern axis will challenge the operational objective to encircle Mosul if the axes cannot close in on the city in sync and there remains an opening for ISIS to escape to Syria or other strongholds in Iraq. The southern axis is critical to closing that aperture as there is no offensive moving in from the west. 

ISIS responded to gains made by the ISF and Peshmerga in Mosul by launching sophisticated counteroffensives in far-reaching areas in Iraq in an effort to draw security forces away from frontlines and to prove that ISIS remains strong despite territorial losses. ISIS launched attacks in Sinjar, in Iraq’s northwest corner, on October 19 and 24, in Kirkuk City on October 21, and Rutba, in far western Iraq, on October 23, resulting in a redeployment of security forces to secure the areas. The attacks undermine the argument that ISIS’s command and control lies only in its top leadership echelon and that knocking out that leadership damages its ability to attack. ISIS may further increase attacks in order to prove its continued strength, despite losses, including large-scale suicide attacks in Baghdad and southern Iraq.

The Campaign for Mosul: October 19, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Coalition-led operation to secure Mosul from ISIS advanced towards the city from two directions in the first 72 hours as of October 19, 2016. U.S. Forces are participating in the operation as advisers and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization units advanced from the south, while ISF and Peshmerga units advanced from the southeast. The ISF and Peshmerga recently opened a third offensive northeast of the city. The ISF have recaptured the city center of Hamdaniya, southeast of Mosul, but fighting is still underway.

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) advanced north of Qayyarah towards Shura, a previous al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) hub south of Mosul, in a pincer move from the southwest and the southeast. Iraqi Army (IA) units moved in from the southeast, recapturing al-Hawd and al-Lazakah, directly north of Qayyarah on October 17. Civilians in al-Hawd had reportedly already risen up and killed many of the ISIS militants before the ISF arrived. Units from the Federal Police and Emergency Response Division (ERD) moved in towards Shura from the southwest and also moved west to recapture towns and oil wells west of the highway. Popular Mobilization units, including Iranian proxy militias, reportedly advanced alongside Federal Police units that are penetrated by members of the Badr Organization, a major Iranian proxy militia. Advancing security forces have yet to enter Shura, and the ISF ordered a two-day operational pause on October 19 in order to regroup. The pause was likely intended to allow the 15^th Iraqi Army Division to catch up, as it has advanced north at a slower pace than other units.

The ISF is also advancing southeast of Mosul on the Khazar-Gwer axis towards Hamdaniya, a majority Christian town southeast of Mosul. The Gwer-Hamdaniya line currently forms the seam between the areas of operation of the ISF and Peshmerga as of October 19. Armored Iraqi Army brigades led by Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) units advanced to Hamdaniya on October 18. The ISF recaptured the government complex but do not yet have control over the entire city due to resistance from remaining ISIS personnel, including heavy sniper fire, and because of a large presence of civilians. There is no indication that the Peshmerga is participating in Hamdaniya alongside the ISF or if it will join in, though the Peshmerga made advances from Khazar towards Mosul in villages north of Hamdaniya. Meanwhile, the Peshmerga began an offensive from their position on Mt. Bashiqa northeast of Mosul into the ISIS-held town of Bashiqa at the base of the mountain on October 18, but have not made significant progress. The CTS reported on October 19 that they would assist in the Peshmerga operation beginning October 20. The CTS’s positioning in Kurdish terrain is one of the results of a U.S.-brokered agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government and Iraqi Government in August and will set the CTS up to breach Mosul’s city limits from the northeast.

ISIS demonstrated signs of resistance to the Coalition’s advances. ISIS launched suicide attacks against advancing forces in Hamdaniya and north of Qayyarah. ISIS has also attacked away from the frontlines, including in Sinjar on October 19, to distract from progress towards Mosul. In Mosul, the Pentagon stated that ISIS lighted tires and oil on fire in order to create black clouds to conceal their movements from Coalition aircraft. Reports also surfaced of ISIS using human shields in Mosul to avoid airstrikes.

The Pentagon confirmed that over 100 U.S. soldiers are on the ground with the Peshmerga and ISF in a report on October 18. The report stated that the forces, serving as advisors and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), are embedded with the ISF at the division level and with the Peshmerga in smaller units. The U.S. forces are expected to advance with the offensive.

Turkey remains a potential spoiler in northern operations. Prime Minister Binali Yildirim stated in a press conference on October 18 that Turkey’s air force was involved in Coalition airstrikes in Mosul, but later backtracked the statement, saying that Turkey participates “in principle.” The Pentagon likewise did not list Turkey as among the Coalition countries conducting airstrikes in Iraq. These statements come in the midst of a large-scale demonstration at the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad on the same day, directed by radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Turkey may escalate its rhetoric to military maneuvers in order to prove its importance in shaping the operation and post-ISIS conditions in Mosul.

Iraq Situation Report: October 12-17, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the launch of operations to retake Ninewa Province and Mosul from ISIS at dawn on October 17. PM Abadi named Deputy Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Abdul al-Amir Jarallah as commander of the operation. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Peshmerga began offensives on the Khazar-Gwer axis, southeast of Mosul, and moved north from the Qayyarah airbase, retaking several villages. ISIS offered minimal resistance to the joint forces’ advance and may elect to withdraw the bulk of its forces to Mosul to await the city offensive.

Security forces over the past several weeks have moved into position to begin a multi-axis offensive to encircle the city. Units from Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) and Iraqi Army moved to locations in Kurdish-held territory north and northeast of the city, where they have begun to work in parallel with Peshmerga forces around Khazar and Gwer. Units from the Peshmerga affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) also moved into primarily Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) terrain around Khazar. Coordination between the KDP and PUK Peshmerga is rare and was likely the result of a still undisclosed agreement. Shi’a militias, including Iranian-backed groups, have deployed into the vicinity, primarily around Qayyarah and Shirqat, where they will likely shadow militia-friendly ISF units northwards. Turkey also responded to the launch of the Mosul operation, moving military forces along the Iraqi border as Turkish President Recep Erdogan maintained Turkey’s right to intervene in Iraq. Coordination between forces in Iraq remains high, although complications may ensue as these forces near the city itself and prospects for Mosul’s post-ISIS administration become more immediate.

Iraq Launches the Campaign for Mosul

By Emily Anagnostos, Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Iraqi and regional actors are preparing to assist with or spoil the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) operation to retake Mosul and its environs from ISIS. Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the start of operations to retake the city on October 17. The ISF began shelling ISIS-held villages south of Mosul, Iraqi Army armored units and Federal Police advanced towards Mosul near Gwer, southeast of Mosul, and Peshmerga units began advancing towards Mosul from Khazar, east of Mosul. The ISF’s operation against ISIS will require security forces to isolate Mosul before it can begin a block-by-block clearing operation in the city itself. The ISF recaptured Shirqat, the last major ISIS-held city on the Mosul-Baghdad highway, on September 22, thereby setting the operational conditions to launch operations for Mosul. The ISF will need to continue its line of effort up the highway while also encircling the city from the north and northeast. ISIS will seek to conduct attrition warfare against the ISF before it arrives in Mosul, leveraging its remaining lines of communication in Anbar, Ninewa, and Syria to shift people and supplies. ISIS will also use the sparsely populated areas on both the eastern and western sides of the Tigris River to launch attacks against recaptured areas and the ISF.

The ISF does not have the force size to take both the city and its environs on its own. Consequently, although the ISF will lead the operations into the city proper, they will need to cooperate with the Kurdish Peshmerga, who hold the majority of terrain surrounding the city. However, the Peshmerga participating in anti-ISIS operations will likely exploit the opportunity to take control of areas by displacing Sunni Arabs from their homes, as they did following operations in Sinjar in November 2015.

The shortage of manpower also leaves a gap for Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, which will likely follow the ISF as they clear the cities and remain as a part of the holding force, as they have already done in Shirqat. The Popular Mobilization reported on October 10 that militias are moving to the Ninewa provincial border to participate. Unnamed commanders from Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), two Iranian proxies with a record of sectarian violence, reported on October 13 that more than 2,000 of their fighters withdrew from Syria, mostly from Aleppo, to redeploy to Mosul as well as Hawija. The deployments were followed by two high level meetings indicating heavy Iranian proxy participation in the operation. On October 15, PM Abadi received senior Iranian proxy militia commanders, including Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri, AAH leader Qais al-Khazali, Harakat al-Nujaba leader Akram al-Kaabi, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSAS) leader Abu Alaa to discuss Mosul and Hawija operations. A day later, images circulated of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qassem Suleimani visiting an undisclosed location with Amiri and senior Popular Mobilization commander and U.S.-designated terrorist Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Unsafe link – do not visit). Iranian proxy involvement in the operation opens up the possibility of sectarian violence against the 1.2 to 1.5 million civilians estimated to flee the Mosul area.

Actors outside of Iraq are positioning themselves for the operation as well. Turkey has insisted that it reserves the right to intervene in northern Iraq if Mosul operations fail to go its way. There are Turkish forces inside Iraq already, and Turkish President Recep Erdogan has increased Turkish forces along the Iraqi border ostensibly to defend against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Erdogan also announced that Turkey is actively participating in Mosul operations following PM Abadi’s announcement of operations, which could open up conflict with Iraqi Shi’a militias who vow to attack Turkish forces.

The operation to retake Mosul is resulting in a dangerous convergence of Shi’a, Turkish, and Kurdish actors as they jockey for influence in northern Iraq. Iranian proxy militias appear set to play a major role in the operation. A multi-party sectarian, ethnic, and international conflict will likely give opportunities to ISIS and other Sunni insurgent groups, such as the Baathist group Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia (JRTN), to reconstitute after areas have been cleared.

Iraq Situation Report: August 3-8, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Popular Mobilization, including major Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, sought to formalize their participation in operations in northern Iraq. IRGC-Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani reportedly visited unnamed locations in Ninewa Province to discuss operations in Mosul with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and militia leaders on August 4. Suleimani’s presence in theater before the start of major operations in the past has preceded intense militia involvement in the operation. Suleimani’s visits to Fallujah at the start of the operation in late-May and Baiji in mid-October 2015 heralded a significant increase of militia participation in the operations. The pattern will likely remain true, and his visit to Ninewa Province on August 4 indicates that Popular Mobilization, including proxy militias, could play a serious role in upcoming operations in Shirqat and even Mosul. Senior militia leaders, including Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri and Popular Mobilization Deputy Chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, also met with senior ISF officials under Salah al-Din Operations Command on August 6 to discuss participation in Shirqat. The Popular Mobilization, however, will face resistance against their deployment to northern Iraq from Coalition, Kurdish, and Ninewa officials out of fear of sectarian reprisals on Ninewa’s majority Sunni population. The Coalition will also reject militias imposing on long-cultivated Coalition turf. The Coalition will shape the Mosul operation by leveraging air support to eliminate militia participation and by increasing its presence on the ground. The Pentagon announced on August 5 the beginning of the deployment of the 560 soldiers announced on July 11 in order to provide logistical support to Qayyarah airbase, which was recaptured on July 9. The base will serve as a logistics hub for operations into Mosul. Coalition basing in both Qayyarah and Makhmur may limit the militias’ expansion towards Mosul, though they are likely to participate in Shirqat. 

Iraq Situation Report: July 26-August 2, 2016

By Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford arrived in Iraq on July 30 to discuss upcoming operations in Mosul with Coalition, Iraqi, and Kurdish officials. Dunford met with Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi and Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi on July 31 and Kurdistan Regional President Masoud Barzani on August 1. The visit comes as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to make headway around Shirqat and Qayyarah as part of condition setting for Mosul. The question of force composition for the Mosul operation continues to arise as the ISF makes progress towards Mosul. The Coalition can currently enforce which forces participate in operations in northern Iraq by leveraging Coalition airstrikes, as they did in Ramadi to ensure that Popular Mobilization did not participate. Both Barzani and Gen Dunford stressed that the Peshmerga participation was necessary for a successful operation in Mosul, however it is still unclear if the Peshmerga will operate within the city of Mosul itself, rather than its environs. If the Peshmerga fights in the city and remains there after the end of the operation, they may be unwilling to withdraw in an effort to claim Mosul as a Kurdish city rather than cede it back to the Iraqi Government. The Popular Mobilization are also angling for the right to participate in Mosul. They tried to justify this right by surfacing a four-month old decree from PM Abadi which calls for the restructuring of the Popular Mobilization under the ISF. The decree was signed on February 22 in the midst of PM Abadi’s attempts to reshuffle the Cabinet, but remained undisclosed until July 26 when several Popular Mobilization units circulated the document. The decree, however, would not alter the way the Popular Mobilization is organized or operates. It calls for the organization of the Popular Mobilization under the command of PM Abadi and in a brigade-centric structure similar to the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). Both of these structures already exist, however PM Abadi lacks leverage over the Iranian-backed proxy militias in the Popular Mobilization. The Popular Mobilization likely surfaced the decree now to legitimize their presence in northern Iraq as part of the ISF. However, Coalition, Kurdish, and Ninewa officials will continue to reject militia participation in northern operations.

Fallujah Control of Terrain Map: June 9, 2016

by Emily Anagnostos and the ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization completed the encirclement of Fallujah on June 5 after retaking Saqlawiyah on Fallujah’s western axis.  The joint forces had recaptured Albu Shajal, west of Fallujah, on June 1, and consolidated terrain south of Fallujah around the Tuffah Bridge, likely as condition setting to retake the Fallujah Dam. The ISF, without Popular Mobilization forces, began operations into Fallujah city on June 6, when they surrounded the southern neighborhoods of Jubeil and Hayy al-Shuhada. The ISF, spearheaded by efforts from the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS), secured the first zone of Hayy al-Shuhada on June 8 and stormed the second zone on June 9 where efforts are ongoing. ISIS likely no longer has control over al-Zawiyah, to the south of Fallujah, given the establishment of a humanitarian corridor through the area.

The Popular Mobilization, however, may no longer be satisfied with simply securing Fallujah’s environs and has begun to push for militia participation in Fallujah’s city limits. Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri announced on June 4 a ten-day deadline for residents to leave Fallujah, citing civilian presence as the biggest obstacle to retake the city. The U.N. nearly doubled the estimate of civilians in Fallujah from 50,000 to 90,000 on June 8. The deadline is set to expire on June 14, the two year anniversary of the Popular Mobilization’s founding.  Popular Mobilization deputy chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis amended Amiri’s statement on June 5 saying that militias would enter the city “if needed” and entrusted the city to the ISF’s command. Popular Mobilization spokesman Karim al-Nouri similarly stated that entering Fallujah was not the Popular Mobilization’s “duty” and that they would await Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s decision before participating. However, the Popular Mobilization will continue to lobby for permission to enter Fallujah, as Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leader Ammar al-Hakim stated on June 6 that the lack of participation of militias in Fallujah was “unrealistic and illogical.” Sunni officials continue to push back against the possibility of militia participation in Fallujah, and they have demanded that militias withdraw from Fallujah amidst ongoing reports of human rights violations against Fallujah residents fleeing the city. The Popular Mobilization has maintained that they do not engage in “systemic” abuse in the area, however claims of Shi’a militias “kidnapping, killing, and harassing” Sunni civilians, most recently in Saqlawiyah following its recapture, continue to surface. The Iraqi Government cannot guarantee its long-term stability as long as Sunni populations do not feel protected or represented by their government and are possibly more inclined to welcome extremist ideology.

Iraq Situation Report: January 12 - 19, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: Iraqi Shi’a militias significantly escalated their confrontation with the U.S. by kidnapping three American contractors and an interpreter in southern Baghdad on January 15, reportedly from the apartment of the interpreter. While no group has claimed responsibility, Iraqi Shi’a militias proliferate both the neighborhood of abduction, al-Dora, as well as Sadr City, the northeastern neighborhood to which the contractors were reportedly taken. Iranian proxy militias were responsible for kidnapping American servicemen before the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Iraqi Shi’a militias carried out similar kidnappings of Turkish citizens in Baghdad in September 2015 and Qatari citizens in Muthanna Province in December 2015. The kidnapping of the American citizens came just one day before the release of four American prisoners by Iran and two days before the imposition of additional sanctions on Iran in response to an Iranian ballistic missile test in October 2015. The timing of the kidnapping suggests that Iranian proxies did not kidnap the contractors in response to the additional sanctions, but did so in order to secure future leverage over the U.S. However, the possibility remains that an Iranian proxy militia may have conducted the kidnapping without a direct order from their supervisors in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds Force (IRGC-QF). Regardless of intent, the kidnapping underscores the impunity with which Iranian proxies operate as well as the persistent threat they pose to U.S. personnel and interests.

The impunity of Iraqi Shi’a militias also undermines the cohesion and sovereignty of Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi’s government. The Basra offices of major Iranian proxy militias, including Badr Organization, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSAS), Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, and Nujaba Movement, rejected the presence of an armored brigade on January 17 that PM Abadi ordered to Basra to clamp down on rising criminality and tribal violence. The rejection came after a confrontation in Shatt al-Arab district in southeastern Basra Province, when gunfire was exchanged between KSAS members and an Iraqi Army unit at a checkpoint. A combination of the need for ISF units on the front lines against ISIS along with protests from proxy militias likely led to the brigade’s withdrawal from Basra on January 19. Iraqi Shi’a militia abuses against Sunnis in Muqdadiyah on January 11 also infuriated the Sunni Etihad bloc, who decided to boycott the government for at least two parliamentary and cabinet sessions and demanded the disarmament and disbandment of unspecified militias in Diyala province. Sunni boycotts of the government have led to little more than stalled draft laws in the past, and this one is unlikely to result in the passage of either priority legislation or reduced impunity of the Popular Mobilization due to the relative strength of the Iranian proxy militias. Nor will it result in a collapse in the government, as this would not assist Sunnis in passing important legislation. Nevertheless, the threat of a boycott is a serious demonstration of Sunni dissatisfaction with PM Abadi’s government, the persistent marginalization of Sunnis within government, and the ability of Iraqi Shi’a militias to operate nearly unchecked in Sunni areas of the country. Moreover, Sunni politicians may escalate their demands if human rights violations by Iraqi Shi’a militias continue or if Shi’a parties continue to block legislation prioritized by Sunni parties in the Council of Representatives.

Iraq Situation Report: December 22, 2015 - January 6, 2016

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The ISF made significant gains in Ramadi in December, clearing much of the city center and recapturing the government complex on December 28. ISIS launched a major attack on Haditha district, west of Ramadi, less than one week later, inflicting heavy casualties among the ISF and tribal fighters and briefly capturing three villages. The attack demonstrates ISIS’s continued capability to conduct significant ground operations in Anbar, despite the group’s loss of most of Ramadi. The ISF victory was also overshadowed by Saudi Arabia’s execution of prominent Shi’a cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on January 2, sparking outrage from Iran as well as Iraq’s religious establishment. Anti-interventionist leader of the Sadrist Trend political movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, condemned the execution, and his supporters protested in large numbers across Baghdad and the southern provinces on January 5. Iranian proxy militias called for the expulsion of the Saudi ambassador and the closure of the Saudi embassy one week after its first reopening since 1990. Iranian proxy militia and Popular Mobilization members protested on January 6 for protests likely intended to pressure Prime Minister Abadi into cutting off ties with Saudi Arabia. The proxy militias seek to demonstrate the necessity of Iranian support and the Popular Mobilization in the fight against ISIS at the expense of the Coalition and Iran’s regional opponents, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey. They likely scheduled their demonstration to coincide with Iraq’s Army Day military parade in the Green Zone, occurring less than a kilometer away from the Baghdad protest site, to spoil the celebration of the ISF’s recent gains. The Prime Minister signaled an unwillingness to concede, and Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari suggested Iraq serve as a mediator between the two countries to mend relations while speaking in Tehran on January 6. However, Iranian proxy militias will continue pressuring PM Abadi to align more closely with Iran, and may be tempted to deploy targeted violence against Saudi assets or citizens, as they have done against Turkish and Qatari citizens in the past.

Iraq Situation Report: December 8 - 14, 2015

By Patrick Martin and ISW Iraq Team

Key Take-Away: The ISF accomplished major gains in Ramadi amid reports of an imminent increase of U.S. support, recapturing key areas north and south of the city and began advancing into the city’s southeastern neighborhoods. ISIS’s destruction of four bridges around Ramadi may slow the ISF’s advance, though ISF operations in southern Ramadi continued towards the city center on December 14. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter signaled willingness to provide additional assistance, including attack helicopters and additional advisers, but PM Abadi has yet to accept the assistance. PM Abadi is likely hesitating because of longstanding pressure from Iranian proxies, who threatened the possibility of a vote of no confidence on December 2 if PM Abadi accepted any more U.S. assistance. Pro-Iranian Shi’a politicians and proxy militias are using the controversy over Turkish troops near Mosul as an additional tactic to pressure PM Abadi to accept no additional foreign assistance other than from Iran and Russia.