Iran and its Militias Back New Iraq Prime Minister

By: ISW Iraq Team, Jessica D. Lewis, and Kimberly Kagan

Maliki lost the support of Iran and Iranian-backed Shi’a militia groups. This drastically erodes his opportunity to leverage the use of force to secure political gains. It may also generate intra-Shi’a violence where forces loyal to Maliki, especially in Baghdad, come into contact with forces that respond to Iraqi state or Iranian direction. The reaction of the Baghdad security forces that are loyal to Maliki will determine if there is a peaceful transition of power and whether the defense of Baghdad against ISIS will prevail during government transition.

The Iranian-backed Iraqi Shi’a militia, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) decided to abandon support for Maliki. AAH released an official statement to express its support for the decision made by the National Alliance to appoint Haider al-Abadi for the Premiership over Nouri al-Maliki. There are also reports that Hadi al-Amiri, the head of the Badr organization, will give a statement in support of Abadi today. A CoR member from the Badr bloc, Razaq Mhibis also stated his support for Abadi. Statements by these two organizations strongly indicate the Iranian attitude toward Maliki and Iraq’s government formation. AAH and the Badr organization are not likely to make such statements without top cover from Qassem Suleimani and the Iranian regime against Maliki. This Iranian stance was also expressed through official channels when the Iranian foreign minister emphasized in a phone call with his Italian counterpart the need to form an inclusive Iraqi government after Abadi was tasked with the premiership. Also, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, which reports to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Ali Shamkhani stated that Iran supports the ongoing “legal” process in selecting the new PM. This is a strong indication that Iran desires to preserve the Iraqi state rather than Maliki's rule, now that the Shi'a political parties have united on a premier candidate.

Maliki cannot remain in the premiership in defiance of every other Shi’a party, militia, and Iran. He therefore cannot rely on the ISF where they are fully integrated with militias in Samarra, Diyala Garma, and elsewhere. Iranian-directed militia activities will likely neutralize other elements of the ISF that are loyal to Maliki. Maliki mobilized these forces on August 10 in Baghdad, raising concerns about a possible coup. Reports on August 12 indicated that the ISF units that were deployed by Maliki around the Green Zone redeployed inside, reducing their mobilization posture. Some ISF commander already expressed to Abadi their support for the “peaceful” transition of power and the political process and that their allegiance is “for the county rather than individuals” in a reference to Maliki. On August 12, pro-Maliki volunteers clashed with anti-Maliki volunteers in the area of Abasiay, north of Samarra, a potential realization of this intra-Shi’a conflict spreading outside of Baghdad. However, Maliki can still put up a fight in Baghdad with his most loyal inner circle and trusted praetorian guard. This raises the question about how Maliki will respond to the overt withdrawal of Iranian support.

Qassem Suleimani may first recommend a position for Maliki in the new government, and then exercise an exit strategy for Maliki in the midst of this contest that may reduce the potential for a Maliki-directed mobilization in Baghdad. These actions do not remove the threat of violent clashes among Shi’a groups and ISF elements in Baghdad that have taken opposing sides. Haider al-Abadi will face a challenge to gain control over Maliki’s Baghdad security forces. ISIS will likely take advantage of this contest, as indicated by such attacks in Baghdad as the VBIED and several other explosions reported in Baghdad on August 11.

Iraq Situation Report: June 26, 2014

by Heather L. Pickerell, Ahmed Ali, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: June 25, 2014

by Heather L. Pickerell, Ahmed Ali, and ISW Iraq Team

Iraq Situation Report: June 20, 2014

Heather L. Pickerell, Jenna Lefler, Ryan Youkilis, Lina Mesa, and ISW Iraq Team

The Iraqi Shi'a Mobilization to Counter the ISIS Offensive

Ahmed Ali with Kimberly Kagan

Iraq’s Shi’a are mobilizing against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In addition to fears of ISIS advances towards Baghdad, the Iraqi Shi’a threat perception is magnified by their desire to prevent an ISIS attack on the al-Askari shrine in Samarra. The February 2006 attack on the shrine triggered Iraq’s civil war during which Iraqi Shi’a militias targeted and killed thousands of Iraqis-primarily Iraqi Sunnis-in retaliatory attacks. The protection of the al-Askari shrine is an existential priority for the Iraqi Shi’a and Iran. Protecting the Sayyida Zainab Shrine in Damascus has likewise been a focal point of Iraqi militia mobilization. The concept of shrine protection by the Iraqi Shi’a further solidifies the merger of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi Shi’a had shown restraint in response to ISIS attacks prior to the Iraqi elections in April 2014. However, the ISIS threat to the shrine will unravel that restraint and trigger retaliatory attacks against the Iraqi Sunnis. Destruction of any of these shrines would bring on full scale ethno-sectarian civil war with violence meeting or surpassing 2006 levels.

The current Shi’a mobilization, however, differs from that of 2006.  It is faster.  It took six weeks in 2006 for the Mahdi Army to mobilize, but the Shi’a groups have rallied within a week of the fall of Mosul. There are a number of reasons why militia and defense force mobilization is proceeding so quickly.

1. Shi’a militia groups such as Badr, the Sadrist Promised Day Brigade, and Asai’b Ahl al-Haq had already mobilized for the 2014 Iraq elections. 
2. Prime Minister Maliki has been incorporating Shi’a militias into the Iraqi Security Forces since August 2013.
3. Maliki has been recruiting tribal members into protection forces since 2013 and has an administrative mechanism and recruiting centers to do so. 
4. Shi’a militia groups had a mobilization effort underway for deployments to Syria. Commanders of those militias are now returningto Iraq.
5. Iraq has demonstrated its capability to move units around the battlefield since January, even though these redeployments have been a sign of the ISF’s weakness.
6. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s preeminent Shi’a religious figure called on Iraqis to “volunteer” in part to protect such shrines. 
7. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps  (IRGC) – Quds Force has freedom of movement in Iraq in 2014 without American troops there.  The Quds Force also has developed capacity to integrate units from the “Axis of Resistance,” as it calls its alliance with Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and the various elements fighting for the Syrian Regime, and regular Iranian formations functioning as embedded advisory teams. Reports surfacedon June 14 that IRGC member, Ali Ridha Mashjari, was killedin ‘defense of Karbala.’ This reference is to Karbala in Iraq where there are two major shrines and therefore suggests that Mashjari was killed in Iraq.

These Shi’a groups together are orchestrating a counter-offensive with a rapidity and in numbers that have likely surprised the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, which has hitherto not generated the degree of Shi’a mobilization it has sought from its spectacular attacks on Shi’a civilian targets. This report will describe the initial outlines of the counteroffensive and its leaders.

Prime Minister Maliki visits Samarra

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visitedSamarra and thereby signaled to the Iraqi Shi’a that protecting Samarrais a priority for the Iraqi government forces. He met with local security officials to study “the plans to retake the city of Tikrit.” Tikrit fell to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandia (JRTN) on June 11. Maliki’s visit was confirmedby Salah ad-Din governor, Ahmed Abdullah al-Juburi.  Reports also indicate that security forces composedof army and police headed to Samarra. This ISF element reinforces an additional 1000 volunteers, likely a security contingent from Wasit knownas the “Wasit Volcano” battalion, who arrived on June 12. According to Wasit police sources, the battalion already engaged ISIS in a firefight killing 13 ISIS elements.  ISIS has responded by attacking the convoy of the supervisorof the Samarra shrine.

Maliki’s visit is an indicator of his strategy. This is his first visit outside of Baghdad since the fall of Mosul and more Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) members, volunteers, Iraqi Shi’a militia members will be sent to shrine.

Badr Oversight of Security in Diyala

Minister of Transportation and head of the Iranian-backed Badr organization, Hadi al-Ameri, is now in charge of the security portfolio in the province, according to statements by the head of Diyala’s provincial council security committee Sadeq al-Husseini.  Badr has a long history in Diyala, along with other Iraqi Shi’a militias who will also play a major role in providing security in Diyala. Badr has deployed its members in Syria and has likely been involved in anti-ISIS Iraqi government measures in the southern belt of Baghdad. Diyala is a critical province where ISIS has achieveda foothold.  Initial tactical engagements between ISIS and pro-Maliki elements have occurred in the northern portions of Diyala, including in the vicinity of Udhaim, areas east of Muqdadiya, 

Ameri will have the responsibility of coordinating with the ISF and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga who are deployed in the areas of Jalawla and Saadia. According to unnamed Iraqi government officials, 500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) members had recently deployedto Diyala. That statement, however, was denied by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Visual evidence has yet to surface to prove the presence of IRGC members in Diyala. Nonetheless, it is likely that Ameri will coordinate with the Iranian government and its security services because of Diyala’s shared border with Iran and Ameri’s close ties with the Iranian government.               

Sistani Endorses Volunteers

In a significant development, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s preeminent Shi’a religious figure calledon Iraqis to volunteer as the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham increases its operations and expresses its intent to attack the al-Askari Shrine in Samarra and Baghdad. Sistani did not make the statement himself, but the stance was conveyed by his representative in Karbala, Abdu al-Mahdi al-Karbalai. Traditionally, Sistani makes his official positions known through these channels.

During his June 13 Friday sermon, Karbalai stated that “the threats posed obligate the volunteering of those who are capable of carrying arms to defend the homeland and it is a duty on [them].” Karbalai also expressed support to the Iraqi Security Forces and given Sistani’s normal nationalistic stance, Karbalai ensured that the statement did not only focus on the Iraqi Shi’a, but that it is rather a “responsibility” for all Iraqis. Ayatollah Bashir al-Najafi, another member of Iraq’s clerical establishment, also issueda statement calling on Iraqis to join the ISF. 

The calls from Sistani and Najafi are an expression of grave concern by the Shi’a religious authorities with regards to ISIS and its increased threat. However, these are also calls for Iraqi Shi’a unity. The Iraqi Shi’a see ISIS as an existential threat. The calls will result in increased rates of recruitment.   

Sistani’s calls for Shi’a unity will also have ramifications in the political sphere.  Opportunities to split other Shi’a groups from withdrawing their support from Maliki and forcing him to step down have diminished in the short term, as Amar al-Hakim, Hadi al-Ameri, and Moqtada Sadr have rallied to the cause. These groups may gain leverage over Maliki as a result of their participation, but it is likely that a united Shi’a front loyal to Iran emerges from these conditions if the government survives.

Iraqi Shi’a Volunteers

In response to the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din, the Iraqi government started recruitment drives in Baghdad and Iraq’s predominately Iraqi Shi’a provinces.  Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki announcedhis plans to liberateSalah ad-Din and Nineveh provinces and areas near Samarra city in a military operation using an army of civilians. The number of volunteers in the civilian security forces increased since the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, called for civilians to volunteer.

The provincial recruitment is underway in most Shi’a provinces and Baghdad.

• In Baghdad, recruitmentis underway at the Muthana airport with thousands reportedly lined up to register.
• Karbala’s police directorate announcedthat it will open the doors to civilian recruitments on June 14 indicating that it will only accept 700 volunteers. Notably, a Karbala police official stated that volunteers have to own their own weapon in order to be recruited, likely because of a shortage of weapons for the ISF.
• A new recruitment center is planned to accept volunteers.
• Recruitment also began in predominantly Shi’a Qadesiyah province, with hundreds of people visiting recruitment centers, according to local security officials. Given the low morale and retreat manifested by the ISF during the fall of Mosul, the local security official stated that those volunteering should have “courage, steadfastness, and desire to defend the homeland, and not [volunteer] for money.”
• Governor of the predominantly Shi’a province of Dhi Qar, Mohammed al-Nasri, called for volunteers to form a 700-strong local police battalion. Nasri noted that volunteer registration will last for a week. This timeline suggests that these individuals will be part of a police force while the 10^th Iraqi Army (IA) division redeploys for operations in northern and western Iraq.
• In Basra, local security authorities announced that a new 13,000-strong local force will be in charge of providing local security after the deployment of the Basra-based 14^th Iraqi Army Division and a border guards battalion to the “hot areas.” This is a reference to northern and western Iraq. The number 13,000 is likely exaggerated since it would be hard to assemble that amount in Basra but nevertheless follows the pattern of the other predominantly Shi’a provinces in its active recruitment.
• The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) also formed its volunteer force and its leader Ammar al-Hakim visited a training location wearing a military uniform.  For his part, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki directed national security authorities to grant volunteers permanent status within the Iraqi Security Forces.       

   

ISCI leader Ammar al-Hakim in military dress following Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s call to fight against ISIS. ISCI official website

On June 14, Moqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend, ordered his supporters in all provinces to organize military parades. This mobilization by Sadr will very likely include members of the Promised Day Brigade, formerly known as the Mahdi Army. Since the fall of Mosul, Sadr has intensified the mobilization of his movement in order to bolster the solidarity of the Iraqi Shi’a community and also to outpace the mobilization of rival Shi’a militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq. On June 11, Sadr had called for the formationof the “Peace Brigades” to defend the shrines.  

Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Iranian-backed Shi’a militia that trained under Hezbollah to fight Americans in Iraq, has been resurgent in Baghdad since May 2013.  It has also participated in the conflict in Syria.  Its organized troopshave been fighting in southern Salah ah-Din province around the Samarra area since the fall of Mosul, and clashed with ISIS along the Hamrin Ridge in Diyala. Iraqi Shi’a militias deployed to Syriahave also returned with their commanders to join the fight in Iraq, formed into a brigade. 

Conclusion

The Iraqi Shi’a are not waiting for the ISIS threat to develop further nor are they waiting for the national government to organize a coherent defense against the ISIS threat. They are actively seeking to provide protection for themselves, their shrines, and predominantly Iraqi Shi’a areas. Violence perpetrated by Iraqi Shi’a militias will increase if shrines are attacked.  Reports of possible Iranian soldiers on Iraqi territory are very concerning, particularly as the Iraqi Shi’a begin to see the ISIS threat as existential.   When viewed through this lens, help from fellow Shi’a – in both material and manpower forms – could be easily justified as not only permissible, but necessary in the eyes of Iraqi Shi’a.

Therefore, there is currently a coordinated ISF, Iraqi Shi’a militia, and Iranian effort.  The Badr organization and Iranian main effort is concentrated in Diyala.  The counter-offensive will likely focus on the areas of Tikrit and Samarra, with additional Shi’a militias concentrating on Baghdad and holy shrines.

Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s declaration to fight against ISIS has numerous ramifications for Iraqi politics by cementing the unity of the Iraqi Shi’a political and militia leaders at a time when their support might have fractured.  It is likelier now than immediately after the fall of Mosul that a Shi’a unity government more dependent on Iran will emerge in Baghdad if the ISIS crisis is averted.

Ahmed Ali is Senior Analyst and Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War. Kimberly Kagan is the president of the Institute for the Study of War. 

Iraq’s Political Showdown over Elections Law: Iraq Update #37

By Ahmed Ali

The date for Iraq’s national parliamentary elections has been set for April 30, 2014. However, the law governing the conduct of these elections has not yet been passed. Debate over this law provides a venue for major political groups to establish conditions that will favor them in the upcoming elections. The debate also has the potential to cause tensions between the Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Kurds. If these tensions become too heated, they risk providing an opening for Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

On October 7, the Iraqi parliament, known as the Council of Representatives (CoR), votedto set April 30, 2014 as the latest date to hold the 2014 national parliamentary elections, which will determine who is the next prime minister. This vote came after several rounds of delays in voting on a law that will govern the conduct of the elections. In its statement, the CoR indicated that if an elections law is not passed by October 30, 2013 it will initiate “legislative measures” to amend a previous elections law.

The passage of an elections law in Iraq is an opportune moment for Iraq’s various political groups to establish conditions that will favor them in the upcoming contest. The process normally takes extensive negotiations and attempts to build consensus among the various factions. The negotiations over the 2014 elections law will follow a similar process. However, they are shaped by theaftermath of the 2013 provincial elections and are currently characterized by renewed political tensions between the Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Kurds.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Alliance (SLA) underperformed in the provincial elections and has since been reachingout to the Iraqi Kurds. Thus, the debate over the elections law is a test for the rapprochement between Baghdad and Irbil. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Sunni electorate was fragmentedin ways that benefited the Iraqi Kurds, especially in Ninewa province.  At the moment, Iraqi Sunnis view the elections law debate as an opportunity to regain unity on important issues such as elections in Kirkuk.

The aftermath of provincial elections in the elections law debate has manifested itself in the behavior of the major political groups as well. They are seeking to marginalize the smaller political groups by changing the seat-allocation system which was used in the last elections. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Kurds are testing Maliki, who was likely motivated to rebuild relations with them after the SLA’s disappointing performance in the provincial elections.

As the political groups posture for the next round of negotiations, setting an elections date is an important milestone. The overwhelming vote to do so indicates political fears that the poor security environment could lead to postponing the elections. The prospect of postponing elections will be damaging, as it will cause further citizen distrust in the political system and undermine the legitimacy of the government.

Background

Drafts of the elections law in its different, proposed versions have not been officially released. Nonetheless, the issues under contention are widely reported. The CoR’s debate is centered on amending the elections law of 2005.  First, there was a discussion about whether to use an open-list system or closed-list system in the elections. The open-list system, which was used starting in the 2009 provincial elections, allows the voter the opportunity to elect candidates they recognize since the vote can be given to a specific candidate. In the closed-list system, on the other hand, the votes go to the candidates according to their ordering on the electoral list, which is determined by list leaders. This dynamic gives political leaders greater leverage since they will be able to choose who gets to be higher on the list and thus receive more votes. The open-list system takes away that power. It is in the interest of the political groups’ leaders to legislate a closed-list system.   

According to a leakeddraft of the law, the open-list system will again be used in the 2014 elections. This is likely accurate given the success of the open-list system in elections since 2009. Voters would likely not accept a closed –list system and any political group pushing for it may be electorally punished.

There is also debate over how votes should be counted. Iraqi Kurds are advocatingfor  the country to be treated as a single electoral district whereby the votes for any political group nation-wide will be counted towards the total number of seats. Practically, a single-district system will be beneficial for the Iraqi Kurds since it will allow them to gain seats through the votes of the Iraqi Kurds who live in provinces other than Iraqi Kurdistan.   The alternative is a multi-district system which counts every province in Iraq as a separate constituency and the votes in that province will be limited to the province. On October 6, Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani calledfor establishing a single-district system and added that the Iraqi Kurds were subject to “injustice in the 2010 elections” when the multi-district system was adopted. Barzani threatened a boycott by Iraqi Kurds if a single-district system is not adopted. Member of Maliki’s SLA, Ammar al-Shebli, statedthat the boycott threat by Barzani is a maneuver in order to gain leverage on other issues pertaining to the elections.

Other important issues for the Iraqi Kurds are elections in Kirkuk and the issue of compensatory seats.

For the Iraqi Kurds, elections in Kirkuk are important especially in light of the recent Supreme Court decision that cancelled the governance power-sharing provisions in Article 23 of the 2009 provincial elections law.  Article 23 was voted on in 2008 despite objectionsfrom the Iraqi Kurds and was meant to address Arab and Turkmen grievances with regards to local governance. The article statedthat local elections in Kirkuk should be held after senior provincial posts are equally divided among the province’s ethnic groups.

As the debate on the elections law continues, there are attempts by Iraqi Arab and Iraqi Turkmen parties to reintroduce power-sharing mechanisms pertaining to Kirkuk in the national elections law. The Iraqi Kurds have voicedobjections to those attempts and viewthem as a vehicle to extract concessions from the Iraqi Kurds. The attempts to raise the issue of Article 23 concern the results of the provincial Kirkuk elections, but efforts by Iraqi Arab and Iraqi Turkmen parties indicates the linkage between national elections and issues arising from the provincial elections.      

It is important to note that the partial cancelation of Article 23 was likely the result of a political deal between the Iraqi Kurds and Maliki, who had been weakened after the provincial elections. As a quid pro quo, the Iraqi Kurdish ministers returned to the cabinet after an earlier boycott, and the Kurdistan Regional Government has even offered to assist Maliki by deployingthe Peshmerga alongside the Iraqi Security Forces.

In addition to the provincial parliamentary seats, political groups can secure seats based on their votes from what are known as national compensatory seats. These seats provide a pool for all parties to draw upon after the elections. Iraqi Kurds are demanding that 75 compensatory seats be provided, while the all-Iraqi Shi‘a National Alliance is consideringthe allocation of 32 seats total. Iraqi Kurds – who have 57 seats in the incumbent parliament – are seeking to maximize their electoral fortunes as the negotiations over the law continue.

Finally, major political groups including the SLA, the Iraqi Kurds, and Iraqiyya appear to be attempting to change the seat-allocation system. The system used during the provincial electionsallowed smaller political groups to benefit and secure seats at the expense of the major groups. Therefore, major groups are pushing for a new system that will change that dynamic, making it easier to exclude minor political groups. Accordingto the leaked draft of the law, a new system favoring the major groups is likely to be adopted.   

The Politics of the Negotiations  

Accordingto Prime Minister Maliki, the elections should be held at their scheduled time with a law that adopts an open-list and multi-district systems. This stance is the likely result of pressure from the religious authorities in Najaf (Marji‘a) which has reportedly been pushingfor elections to be held on time. However, Maliki may be trying to appear as an Arab nationalist, supporting a unified Iraqi Arab call for a multi-district system in opposition to the Iraqi Kurds. Evidence of this can be seen in a reportedclosed meeting that excluded the Iraqi Kurds between the predominantly Iraqi Sunni Iraqiyya and the National Alliance, which includes Maliki’s SLA, to discuss the elections law.

The Iraqi Kurds reacted to this possible development by warningthat an attempt to pass the elections law without the Iraqi Kurds would have repercussions on Baghdad-Irbil relations as did the vote on the 2013 budget debate, during which Iraqiyya and Iraqi Shi‘a parties voted on the budget without the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds reacted to the budget vote by withdrawing their ministers from the federal cabinet. SLA member Abbas al-Bayati stated that this possibility is unlikely this time because the SLA would seek to have a consensus vote including the Iraqi Kurds.

Conclusions

The discussions over the law will continue and it will be important to watch whether it would lead to delaying the elections despite the newly-set date. Additionally, it will be critical to watch if heated rhetoric between the Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Kurds over Kirkuk leads to changes on the ground – including a military confrontation between the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga. 

The current tenor of the elections law debate is a political showdown between the Iraqi Arabs and the Iraqi Kurds. This discussion will help mobilize the electoral bases for both groups. However, it has the potential to escalate due to the stakes involved in the elections. By resurfacing the discussion of Kirkuk, the Iraqi Arabs and Iraqi Turkmen are using the debate to strike back against the Maliki-Iraqi Kurdish rapprochement which has so far been beneficial for the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Sunnis are, for now, seeking to regroup, and emphasizing the Kirkuk issue may provide them with a boost. On October 7, CoR members of Iraqiyya criticizedthe Iraqi Kurds for their electoral stance and emphasized the significance of Kirkuk for the Iraqi Arabs. This eliciteda rebuke from Kirkuk’s Iraqi Kurdish CoR Member, Khalid Shwani.

An Iraqi Arab-Iraqi Kurdish escalation will be advantageous for al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI is resurgent and has in the past capitalizedon the Baghdad-Irbil tensions to gather strength. It will, therefore, be imperative for the Iraqi political groups to tone down the rhetoric with regards to Kirkuk and agree upon a law taking into account the concerns of the various groups involved. Not doing so could lead to further deterioration in security. 

Ahmed Aliis senior Iraq research analyst and the Iraq Team Lead at the Institute for the Study of War