By Jonathan Mautner
Russia tempered its air
operations across Northern Syria following the
surrender
of the last remaining opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City on
December 13, but only after playing a decisive military role in enabling this major
battlefield victory for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Russia continued its
campaign of
airstrikes
against the pocket of opposition-held districts southwest of the city center
from December 7 – 12, intensifying its
bombardment in the two days before
Russia and Turkey brokered a surrender and local ceasefire
agreement
to evacuate remaining opposition fighters and civilians to
Western
Aleppo Province. Russia
resumed its
airstrikes in Aleppo City on December 14 after Iran spoiled the initial deal
with additional last-minute
demands
for parallel evacuations from the besieged majority-Shi’a towns of Fu’ah and Kefraya in Idlib
Province. Russia nonetheless slowed the tempo of its air operations in Aleppo
and Idlib Provinces from December 13 – 19 in a likely attempt to preserve the
evacuation deal and gain credibility as an impartial diplomatic broker. The
eventual completion of the evacuation, however, will likely signal the start of
a new phase in Russia’s air campaign in Northern Syria. Russia will likely resume
its aggressive targeting of opposition-held terrain in Idlib Province under the
guise of anti-terrorism operations against Jabhat Fatah al-Sham – the successor
of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. This narrative may gain further
traction as the remaining acceptable opposition forces evacuated from Aleppo
City deepen their cooperation with Salafi-jihadist groups in Northern Syria in order
to continue their insurgency against the Assad regime.
Russia also intensified its air
operations against ISIS in Eastern Syria beginning on December 7 in a failed
attempt to prevent the
recapture
of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province by ISIS on December 11. Russia conducted
heavy
waves of airstrikes against ISIS on the outskirts of Palmyra from December
7 – 10 amidst an
ongoing
offensive by the group against outlying oil and natural gas fields.
Although the air campaign forced ISIS to
temporarily
reverse its progress into Palmyra, poorly-trained pro-regime militiamen on
the ground proved unable to hold the city – particularly given the
withdrawal
of local garrisons by Russia and Iran on or around December 7. In the wake of
that defeat, Russia conducted punitive air operations against ISIS-held terrain
in
Eastern Syria on
December 12, including the group’s stronghold in
Ar-Raqqa City and a
swathe of several villages in Eastern Hama Province allegedly targeted with
chemical munitions. Russia
will likely invest more heavily in the defense of the nearby T4 (Tiyas) Airbase
in order to protect its main base of operations in Central Syria. Russia reportedly
deployed
special operations forces
to T4 Airbase on December 13 amidst ongoing clashes with ISIS, reflecting
the airfield’s critical importance as a launching point for helicopter gunships
operated by Russia in Palmyra. The recapture of Palmyra highlights the inability
of pro-regime forces to establish security across the entire country without sustained
support from Russia and Iran, notwithstanding their recent success in Aleppo
City. In the end, Russia and Syria prioritized the defeat of the opposition in Aleppo
City over the defense of Palmyra from ISIS, ultimately enhancing the threat
posed by Salafi-jihadist groups in both Northern and Eastern Syria.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
