Syria Situation Report: December 22, 2016 - January 19, 2017

By ISW Syria Team and Syria Direct

Russia and Turkey implemented a nationwide ‘cessation of hostilities’ agreement on December 29 in preparation for negotiations between the regime and opposition scheduled to be held in Astana, Kazakhstan on January 23. The deal will exclude all groups designated as “terror organizations” by the UN Security Council including ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). Anonymous sources claimed that the deal also calls for splitting the country into “informal zones of regional power” between Turkey and Russia. Nonetheless, violence continued across the country. Pro-regime forces including Lebanese Hezbollah conducted sustained military operations to force the surrender of the opposition-held valley of Wadi Barada near Damascus. Meanwhile, ISIS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham conducted major spectacular attacks in Damascus, Tartus City, Jableh, and Azaz. 

At the same time, Russia and the U.S. intensified their competition to define anti-terrorism operations in the Syrian Civil War. The U.S. and Russia both began airstrikes against ISIS in Al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province in coordination with Turkey in Operation Euphrates Shield. The U.S. also continued its escalated campaign of airstrikes targeting members of Al-Qaeda in Idlib Province in Northern Syria with at least five separate sets of strikes reported in the first two weeks of January 2017. 

These graphics mark the latest installment of our Syria SITREP Map made possible through a partnership between the Institute for the Study of War and Syria Direct. The graphic depicts significant recent developments in the Syrian Civil War. The control of terrain represented on the graphic is accurate as of January 5, 2017.

ISIS Collapses Opposition Frontline in Northern Aleppo Province

By Christopher Kozak

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has mounted a major offensive against opposition groups in Northern Aleppo Province over the past week, threatening the total collapse of the last pocket of opposition-held terrain along the Syrian-Turkish Border. ISIS seized at least six villages in Northern Aleppo Province on May 27, besieging the critical opposition stronghold of Mare’a and entering the outskirts of the border town of Azaz. ISIS later entered the town of Mare’a on May 28 under the cover of up to nine Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improved Explosive Device (SVBIED) detonations before withdrawing in the face of heavy resistance from the opposition. Opposition groups successfully recaptured several villages near Azaz in a counterattack on May 28 - 30, but the situation remains tenuous. ISIS has launched near-continuous attacks against Mare’a over the past week, while the Syrian Kurdish YPG assumed control over the adjacent town of Sheikh Issa on May 30 in exchange for the safe passage of more than 6,000 civilians from the town. Meanwhile, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned that the fighting has displaced thousands of civilians in Northern Aleppo Province where over 160,000 civilians already live in temporary residences, informal settlements, or humanitarian camps.

These gains by ISIS mark the latest in a series of recent setbacks for the opposition in Northern Aleppo Province. On April 7, the Hawar Kilis Operations Room – a coalition of opposition groups backed by the U.S. and Turkey that includes fighters vetted by the U.S. Department of Defense - captured the ISIS-held town of Al-Rai in Northern Aleppo Province with the aid of cross-border artillery fire and coalition airstrikes. The operation was part of a wider offensive to clear ISIS from the Syrian-Turkish Border. The rapid advance along the border nonetheless left opposition forces vulnerable to an attack on their exposed southern flank. ISIS launched a two-pronged counteroffensive on April 10 - 11, seizing several villages near Azaz and recapturing the town of Al-Rai – a key route for illegal smuggling of foreign fighters and supplies. On April 14, ISIS mounted another attack that temporarily entrapped opposition groups against the Syrian-Turkish Border after entering four towns including Hawar Kilis – the namesake of the Hawar Kilis Operations Room. The opposition continued to suffer a steady erosion in terrain over subsequent weeks despite continued coalition support and several effective local counterattacks against ISIS.

The looming defeat of opposition groups in Northern Aleppo Province poses a significant risk to the long-term success of the anti-ISIS campaign. The U.S. and Turkey have provided varying levels of support to opposition factions along the so-called ‘Mare’a Line’ as part of a wider effort to isolate the ISIS stronghold of Ar-Raqqa City from the Syrian-Turkish Border. Turkey has repeatedly called for the U.S. to increase its support for Sunni Arab opposition groups in Northern Aleppo Province as an alternative to deepening cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – a U.S.-backed coalition led by the Syrian Kurdish YPG, considered by Turkey to be a terrorist organization due to its links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The U.S. airdropped ammunition and other supplies to vetted opposition groups in Mare’a on June 2 in a symbolic effort likely aimed at acknowledging these demands. The collapse of the Mare’a Line will nonetheless foreclose this alternative and instead drive the U.S. to deepen its current overreliance on the Syrian Kurdish YPG – setting the conditions for long-term ethnic conflict in the region and further limiting opportunities for partnership with Sunni Arabs in Northern Syria as part of the anti-ISIS campaign. In a reflection of this shift, the U.S. provided direct support to an SDF-led operation to seize the key cross-border transit hub of Manbij in Eastern Aleppo Province that began on June 1 despite long-standing reservations from Turkey regarding further Syrian Kurdish expansion along its border. The start of this operation despite these political tensions indicates that the U.S. may have already decided to abandon its support for Sunni Arabs in Northern Aleppo Province in favor of the Syrian Kurds – sacrificing long-term regional stability for short-term tactical gains against ISIS. 

Developments in Syria’s Armed Opposition

by Valerie Szybala

On September 24, 2013, a document entitled “Statement No. 1” was published on al-Tawhid’s website in which 11 fighting groups – including a number under the umbrella of the SMC and the al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-Nusra – announced a call to unity under an Islamic framework based on Sharia law, rejecting the transitional government of the Syrian National Council under the leadership of Ahmed Tohme (detailed in a previous post).  While this “Islamic alliance” itself does not appear to have materialized into a tangible coalition, the move did spark a flurry of behind-the-scenes maneuvering that may have very real implications for the rebel forces and for the future of Syria.

• In the days immediately following the announcement on September 24, there was a notable lack of public reaction from many key players, including Jabhat al-Nusra, General Salim Idris, and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). 
• On September 26, SMC head General Salim Idris announced he would end his visit to France early to head to Syria to “follow up with the field commanders and work toward unifying all the ranks,” referring to the eleven rebel leaders who signed the document.
• The next day, Jabhat al-Nusra renounced its participation in the Islamic alliance statement, noting that although an ISIS local commander signed the document, it was not approved by their central leadership, and that they rejected the attempt to create controversy between them and ISIS.
• On September 29, 2013 a new coalition was formed, called Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam). In a professionally-produced ceremony in the Damascus area, the leaders of 50 brigades pledged allegience to Sheikh Zahran Alloush, the leader of Liwa al-Islam, and a complete list of the 50 brigades consolidating under Jaysh al-Islam was published in both Arabic and English. Although many of these units were already operating under the leadership of Liwa al-Islam, this move reinforced their status as one of the strongest fighting groups in Syria. Jaysh al-Islam does not include the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, and rejects the leadership in exile of the SNC. Liwa al-Islam, and by extension Jaysh al-Islam, is backed by Saudi Arabia. 
• Shortly after Jaysh al-Islam was announced, Ahrar al-Sham (the leader of the non-FSA Syrian Islamic Front and also one of the strongest fighting groups in Syria, which is not part of the newly-formed Jaysh al-Islam) – published a statement that along with two other brigades it was withdrawing from a Damascus Operations Room that had been formed only a week earlier among six groups, under the leadership of Zahran Alloush of Liwa al-Islam. This operations room was made possible through funding provided by a group of Kuwaiti Sheikhs called the Council of Supporters of the Syrian Revolution in Kuwait. Ahrar al-Sham's announcement pointed to the existence of tension between Operations Room's six members over their leadership structure and decision-making process, indicating a struggle for dominance. 
• On September 30, Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani, spokesman for ISIS, released an audio speech entitled, "May Allah be with you, Oh Oppressed State." In the speech Adnani accused the media of conspiring against ISIS by launching false accusations, making ISIS look more ruthless than it is, and downplaying the group’s victories. It seems clear from this defensive and angry statement that ISIS is feeling the impacts of political criticism and more direct measures being taken against it on the ground.
• On October 2, a statement was released by six of Syria’s most powerful brigades regarding the fighting that has been going on in Azaz between ISIS and the FSA-linked Asifat al-Shamal. Notably, the signatories included rebel power players Liwa al-Tawhid, Ahrar al-Sham, and the newly consolidated Jaysh al-Islam. The statement called for a ceasefire, for ISIS to withdraw to their headquarters, and for the matter to be handled by a Shari’a court in Aleppo. Thus far there has been no indication that ISIS is complying with the statement, and it is not clear if the signatories intend to take action to enforce it. But the fact that these units have coordinated their messaging is notable, and the anti-ISIS sentiment seems to be emerging as a coherent thread throughout the continued shifting and reorganization of rebel groups within the armed opposition.
• Also on October 2, we saw another notable reorganization as four brigades in the eastern part of Syria in Deir Ez-Zor broke ties with the FSA to form Jaysh Ahl al-Sunna. With a logo that closely resembles that of the new Jaysh al-Islam, it seems likely that they are closely linked.

There are several key takeaways that we can glean from this past week of shifting dynamics within Syria’s armed opposition:

• The Western-backed political opposition leadership is in trouble. Though the Islamic alliance announced by al-Tawhid on September 24 may not have amounted to much, it seems to have ignited a chorus of rejection by fighting groups of the Syrian National Council leadership in exile. Of the recent groups to have rejected the SNC leadership, Jaysh al-Islam and its affiliate in Deir Ez-Zor are likely to have staying power as they are already active in major offensives on the ground.

• Syria’s rebels are following the money. This burst of reorganization seems to be propelled in part by influential sources of support coming from the Gulf. Saudi Arabia in particular has been active behind the scenes in the past week. Publicly, their frustration with the weak response by Western allies bubbled to the surface when they took the unprecedented step of canceling their speech at the UN General Assembly.

• Rebel alliances are forming which, while not yet explicitly opposed to the two al-Qaeda linked groups in Syria, have in practice demonstrated the will to address ISIS in Azaz with the statement released on October 2. Jabhat al-Nusra has a better track record of cooperation with other members of the armed opposition, so it is encouraging that they are not a party to the most recent alliances and were quick to back away from the September 24 Islamic alliance statement which gave the appearance of grouping them in with other fighting groups as opposed to ISIS.

The Islamic Alliance Emerges

by Valerie Szybala

(Note: post updated 9/26/13)

A new coalition has formed among eleven Syrian rebel organizations, according to a statement that Liwa al-Tawhid released late on September 24. Liwa al-Tawhid has hitherto fallen under the umbrella of the Syrian Military Council. The new Islamic alliance – which includes some of the most powerful factions from the FSA, the Syrian Islamic Front, and also Jabhat al-Nusra –aims to fight to establish an Islamic state under Shari’a law in Syria. It also rejects the Syrian National Coalition and the leadership of Ahmad Tohme – recently elected as the head of the Syrian opposition’s interim government – by name. The signatories to the document claim to represent the following organizations:

Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqor al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam, Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya, Harakat al-Noor al-Islamiya, Kataib Nour al-Din al-Zinki, Liwa al-Ansar, Tajamu Fastaqm Kamr Umrat & Al-Forqat al-Tisaa Ashr

Initial reports on this event (and some still circulating) indicated that there were 13 brigades who signed on to the document instead of 11. The reason for this discrepancy is that the original text version of the brigade list posted on Liwa al-Tawhid’s website listed two additional brigades, although these brigade names did not appear on the scanned signature page of the hard copy of the document or in the list that was enumerated in the video announcement, and was subsequently removed from the website text. The two other brigades were Liwa al-Haqq (SIF, Homs area), and Liwa al-Forqaan (Quneitra area). According to a Tawhid brigade spokesman, both brigades were present for the drafting process but were not at the signing ceremony. Although some of the remaining brigades have a presence throughout the country, the strength of the 11 alliance signatories is concentrated largely in Aleppo, and the two additional brigades would have served to bolster their southern credentials.

The fact that this announcement comes amidst a spike in incidents in which the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has clashed with the Free Syrian Army units and, atypically, Syria’s other al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, raises the possibility that this new coalition is also a move against ISIS by its Syrian nationalist rivals.

This move follows a chain of events on the battlefield through which ISIS took the town of Azaz in Northern Aleppo and the nearby Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, which serves as an important supply route for rebel forces and was previously held by a Free Syrian Army-linked brigade. The maneuver to take the border crossing began with an incident between local ISIS fighters and members of the FSA-linked Asifat al-Shamal brigade on September 18.





The timeline of events is as follows:

September 18, 2013
ISIS raided the al-Ahli hospital in Azaz to arrest a German doctor. When Asifat al-Shamal refused to hand the doctor over to ISIS, clashes broke out between the two groups and ISIS killed two Asifat al-Shamal fighters.
ISIS assassinated Amr Diab Hajulh, a media activist affiliated with Asifat al-Shamal. Asifat al-Shamal and activists in Azaz called for the Tawhid Brigade to intervene and join in the fight against ISIS.

September 19, 2013
Clashes broke out between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal in Azaz. ISIS also raided the Azaz Media Center, interrupting their news coverage. The Tawhid brigade arrived in Azaz.
Liwa al-Tawhid mediated a ceasefire agreement between ISIS and Asifat al-Shamal and published it. The agreement was signed by Abu Abdelrahman al-Kuweiti (ISIS) and Captain Abu Ghazala Al Rashid (Asifat al-Shamal brigade). The agreement called for the release of prisoners held by ISIS within 24 hours and for the implementation of standard checkpoints monitored by al-Tawhid.

September 22, 2013
The Asifat al-Shamal military administration issued a statement saying the agreement was nullified because ISIS failed to release its prisoners after 48 hours.
ISIS released a statement accusing Asifat al-Shamal of treason citing several examples. Asifat al-Sham then wrote a response defending itself against ISIS’s accusations.

By Monday, September 23, it was clear that ISIS was in full control of Azaz. The internet was abuzz with talk of the impending battle between FSA brigades and ISIS. The battle had even been given a name, نهروان, Nahrawan, after a famous battle of early Islam, in which Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, fought and defeated the army of a heretical group of Muslims known as Kharijites, who can be seen as ideological ancestors of al-Qaeda.

Many were expecting Liwa al-Tawhid to release its statement announcing the Battle of Nahrawan on September 24. The coalition formation statement that was published instead could be a preparatory step, a pragmatic consolidation that precedes any sort of direct confrontation with ISIS. The fact that JN has joined a coalition with non al-Qaeda affiliates and that ISIS is not currently a part of this coalition could signal a break between ISIS and JN. It is far too soon to confirm such a break.

The coalition could also represent another major inflection point in the organization of the rebels in Syria. Repudiation of the interim government is a major development and cause for concern, though perhaps unsurprising given its inefficacy. The greater consequence may lie in the implicit departure of this coalition from the leadership of the SMC, the unified military command of the opposition. Erosion of FSA-controlled ground lines of communication across the Turkish border combined with an abandonment by some of its most powerful brigades has the potential to leave the SMC in shambles.

Reactions from many of the relevant players both inside and outside of Syria have yet to surface. One quick response has come from Asifat al-Shamal, the embattled brigade from Azaz. Their quick show of support strengthens the case that this new coalition is a move not only against the ineffective interim leadership, but also against the encroaching forces of ISIS.

We will continue to monitor the situation and post important updates as it develops.