UA-69458566-1

Thursday, June 30, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Frederick W. Kagan, and Grace Mappes

June 30, 7:25pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces retreated from the Snake Island on June 30 following a Ukrainian missile and artillery campaign. The Russian Defense Ministry spun the retreat as “a step of goodwill.”[1] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the Kremlin does not interfere with United Nations (UN) efforts to organize a humanitarian corridor for agricultural export from Ukraine but did not acknowledge the Ukrainian artillery and missile campaign that had actually caused the retreat. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command had announced elements of that campaign on June 21.[2] The Russian Defense Ministry has claimed that Russian forces defeated all Ukrainian drone and missile attacks leading up to their retreat despite considerable evidence to the contrary.[3] The Russian defeat on the Snake Island will alleviate some pressure off the Ukrainian coast by removing Russian air defense and anti-shipping missile systems from the island. The retreat itself will not end the sea blockade, however, as Russian forces have access to land-based anti-ship systems in Crimea and western Kherson Oblast that can still target Ukrainian cargo as well as the use of the remaining ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

Russian milbloggers overwhelmingly defended the Russian decision to withdraw troops and equipment from the island, claiming that Russian forces are prioritizing the “liberation of Donbas.”[4] Some said that Russian forces do not have enough capacity to destroy Ukrainian coastal troops and others claimed that Russian forces will be more successful striking Ukrainians when they attempt to deploy their own troops to the island. Milbloggers have previously criticized the Russian military command for failing to retreat to save equipment and manpower and are likely content with the Russian retreat from the Snake Island.[5] Milbloggers, following the Kremlin line, did not acknowledge the role Ukrainian strikes against the island played in compelling Russian forces to retreat.

Russian authorities continue to galvanize the support of proxy actors in order to support force generation efforts. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov announced on June 29 that another Akhmat special battalion, the Vostok (east)-Akhmat battalion, has been successfully formed and will shortly move to its point of permanent deployment and begin active service.[6] As ISW reported on June 28, Kadyrov stated he intends to form four new Akhmat special operations battalions and announced the formation of the Zapad (west)-Akhmat battalion early this week.[7]

Key Takeaways

  • Russian troops made limited gains within the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and around Lysychansk.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations to the south and east of Bakhmut and to the north of Slovyansk.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to regain control of settlements north of Kharkiv City.
  • Ukrainian counteroffensives continue to force Russian troops on the Southern Axis to prioritize defensive operations.
  • Russian occupation authorities took measures to ensure further economic and financial integration of occupied areas into the Russian system.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
  • Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces made limited gains within the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and continued offensive operations on and around Lysychansk on June 30.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had “partial success” on the territory of the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and control the northwestern and southeastern portions of the refinery.[9] Geolocated footage posted by Russian outlet RIA Novosti showed Russian and proxy forces of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) within the plant.[10] Russian troops are likely trying to drive through the northeastern corner of the refinery in order to advance into Lysychansk proper from the refinery.[11] Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov also claimed that Chechen Akhmat Special Forces and the 2nd Corps of the LNR advanced towards Lysychansk from the northwest and crossed the Siverskyi Donetsk river around Kreminna and Stara Krasnyanka, both within 10km northwest of Lysychansk.[12] Kadyrov claimed that Russian and proxy forces control half of Privillya, and will continue efforts to advance on Lysychansk through Novodruzhesk from these positions in the northwest.[13]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Bakhmut on June 30.[14] Deputy Chief of Main Operations Department of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksiy Gromov noted that Russian forces around Bakhmut have a distinct advantage in terms of force and means.[15] Gromov stated that Russian forces are conducting operations towards Soledar, which lies just northeast of Bakhmut along the T0513 Bakhmut-Siversk highway, and suggests that Russian forces additionally seek to interdict Ukrainian lines of communication along the T0513.[16] Russian troops also unsuccessfully fought for control of Klynove and Novoluhanske, both southeast of Bakhmut.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a series of Russian assaults on the Mykolaivka-Spirne, Volodymyrivka-Pokrovske lines northeast of Bakhmut and around Dolomytne and the Vuhledar Power Plant south of Bakhmut.[18] These limited gains around Bakhmut may indicate that Russian forces may soon seek to set conditions for an offensive operation towards Bakhmut itself, although they are likely more focused in the short term on interdicting and controlling lines of communication emanating from Bakhmut.

Russian forces continued attempts to advance southeast towards Slovyansk from the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on June 30.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance from Dovhenke to Mazanivka, which as ISW has previously assessed is a likely attempt to drive on Slovyansk from the west side of a series of reservoirs that run parallel to the E40 highway.[20] Russian forces additionally fought in Bohorodychne and Krasnopillya, both northwest of Slovyansk along the E40 highway.[21] Russian forces conducted an airstrike on Tetyanivka, 20km directly north of Slovyansk, and targeted civilian infrastructure in Slovyansk itself in order to set conditions for further offensive drives on Slovyansk.[22]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults to regain positions north of Kharkiv City on June 30.[23] Russian Telegram channels claimed that Russian forces took control of Dementiivka (20km north of Kharkiv City) between June 29 and June 30.[24] Ukrainian sources disputed this claim and stated that fighting is ongoing in Dementiivka, indicating that the current frontlines in northern Kharkiv Oblast continue to be highly contested.[25] Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly clashed near the international border and fought for control of Udy, Prudyanka, Pytomnyk, Tsupivka, and Velky Prokhody.[26] Russian forces additionally conducted air, artillery, and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions and civilian infrastructure throughout northern Kharkiv Oblast.[27]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces continued to prioritize defensive operations along the Southern Axis on June 30.[28] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian forces have reestablished control over Potemkyne (northwestern Kherson Oblast) and that Ukrainian troops are continuing to gradually advance and place pressure on Russian forces to maintain defensive lines.[29] The Russian grouping in Zaporizhia similarly focused on defensive operations and fired on Ukrainian positions along the frontline in Zaporizhia.[30] Russian forces conducted a series of missile, artillery, and airstrikes across Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa Oblasts.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the Russian grouping on Snake Island withdrew on June 30 as a gesture of ”goodwill” to the international community.[32] 

The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces are conducting a wide-scale “agitation” to recruit men willing to sign military contracts in Transnistria.[33] The GUR stated that Russian actors are disseminating information on signing military contracts through Transnistrian media, mail brochures, and advertising in public spaces, as well as in meetings held with employees of industrial and agricultural enterprises.[34] Russian authorities likely hope to leverage pro-Russian sentiment in Transnistria to support “covert mobilization” efforts.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian authorities continued measures to facilitate the economic and financial integration of occupied territories on June 29. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin met with the governors of Russian Oblasts that have established relationships with areas of the Donbas and discussed preparations for various infrastructure projects.[35] Khusnullin reported that Russian authorities are continuing to prepare to re-open the Port of Mariupol and that Russian authorities have already exported 7,000 tons of Ukrainian grain through the Port of Berdyansk.[36] Mayor of Enerhodar Dmytro Orlov additionally stated that Russian authorities in Enerhodar are spreading fake information that non-cash payment systems will no longer be making hryvnia payments in order to prompt residents to withdraw large quantities of hryvnias.[37]

 


[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/17283

[2] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=5644786742221692

[3] https://t.me/mod_russia/16966; https://t.me/mod_russia/16940; https://...

[4] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/37987; https://t.me/epoddubny/11377; https... https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/5762

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[6] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2462

[7] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[8] https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/06/30/najzapeklishi-boyi-tryvayut-na-lysy... https://t.me/rybar/34651; https://t.me/milinfolive/86111; https://twit...

[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[10] https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/50982; https://twitter.com/Cosmonaut19/stat...

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[12] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2467

[13] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/2467; https://t.me/rybar/34646

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/351687750477643

[15] https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/06/30/najzapeklishi-boyi-tryvayut-na-lysy...

[16] https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/06/30/najzapeklishi-boyi-tryvayut-na-lysy...

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/351687750477643; https:/...

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez... https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez... https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[22] https://t.me/spravdi/12059; https://t.me/stranaua/49828; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/p...

[23] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/37972; https://t.me/rybar/34646; https://w...

[24] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/37972; https://t.me/rybar/34646

[25] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[26] https://t.me/der_rada/1775; https://t.me/rybar/34646

[27] https://t.me/synegubov/3524; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/37972; https:... 

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[29] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1112389482961073; https://t.me/Bratch... https://fb.watch/dZqd0hMoPm/; https://t.me/stranaua/49815; https://twitter.com/neonhandrail/status/15... https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9NiJypdO7L0

[30] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02e2v4vxXSJ6byyCFHez...

[31] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1112389482961073; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/662 https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1232; https://t.me/rybar/34659; https:... https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=436044661458000&ref=sharing 

[32] https://t.me/mod_russia/17283; https://t.me/rian_ru/169294

[33] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/344742371170523

[34] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/344742371170523

[35] https://t.me/mkhusnullin/264

[36] https://t.me/mkhusnullin/264

[37] https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/626

Wednesday, June 29, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29

 


Karolina Hird, Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Grace Mappes

June 29, 6 pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 28 that the Kremlin is setting conditions to annex areas of Kherson and Zaporizhia into the Russian Federation under the template of the pre-1917 “Tavriia Gubernia.”[1] The Tavriia (or Tauride) Gubernia was a historical province of the Russian Empire.[2] Under the Tavriia Gubernia scenario, the left bank of Kherson Oblast and part of Zaporizhia Oblast would be directly annexed to the Russian Federation, likely as a single unit.[3] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian authorities are preparing for a pseudo-referendum to set conditions for the annexation of the Tavriia Gubernia (as opposed to proxy “people‘s republics“). The Russians are also requiring Ukrainian citizens in southern Ukraine to open bank accounts with Russian state-owned Promsvyazbank.[4] Head of Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast Administration Hennadiy Lahuta reported that Russian forces have locked down civilian traffic in northern Kherson Oblast and are not allowing anyone to enter or exit occupied territory, which may be an additional attempt to control the civilian population in preparation for annexation measures.[5]

Ukrainian sources warned on June 29 that Russian forces may be planning a false flag provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to accuse Ukrainian authorities of mishandling nuclear facilities.[6] Ukrainian nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom stated that Russian occupation authorities are planning to throw unsafe objects into the cooling system at the NPP in order to compromise the plant’s cooling mechanisms.[7] Mayor of Enerhodar Dmytro Orlov added that Russian troops have been kidnapping and torturing employees of the NPP to coerce confessions that employees dropped weapons into the cooling systems to sabotage the plant and blame Ukrainian authorities for paying inadequate attention to the management of the NPP.[8] Russian troops have previously demonstrated irresponsible and dangerous behavior in and around nuclear power plants, firing on nuclear facilities at the Zaporizhzhia NPP in early March and digging into radioactive soil in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone.[9]

Key Takeaways

  • Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities may be preparing to annex areas of southern Ukraine as the “Tavriia Gubernia” and that Russian authorities are setting conditions for annexation through preparing referenda in occupied areas.
  • Russian forces may be planning a false flag provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Lysychansk.
  • Russian forces made marginal gains east of Bakhmut along the E40 highway and may seek to prepare for a direct offensive on Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations to advance on Slovyansk from the northwest near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.
  • Russian forces are continuing to engage in offensive operations north of Kharkiv City, indicating that the Kremlin has territorial ambitions beyond the Donbas that will continue to attrit manpower and equipment, potentially at the cost of offensive power on more critical axes of advance.
  • Russian forces continued to reinforce their defensive presence along the Southern Axis.

 

Click here to enlarge the map.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
  • Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine 

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click here to enlarge the map.

 

Click here to enlarge the map.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Lysychansk on June 29. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are attempting to advance on Lysychansk from the Verkhnokamyanka-Vovchoyarivka line, about 5km southwest of Lysychansk.[10] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai noted that two Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) are engaged in offensive operations towards Lysychansk, although these BTGs are likely to be substantially under-strength and heavily degraded following protracted conflict around Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.[11] Russian forces are likely advancing within Lysychansk itself and are reportedly fighting in southwestern and southeastern suburbs of the city, as well as on the territory of the industrial zone in the gelatin and rubber plants.[12]

Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Russian forces have crossed the Siverskyi Donets River northwest of Lysychansk and established a bridgehead in Privillya, which indicates that Russian forces may be attempting to complete the seizure of the northwestern apex of the Lysychansk salient.[13] Ukrainian forces may have reduced or abandoned their efforts to hold the western banks of the Siverskyi Donets River north of Lysychansk because Russian forces are already advancing on Lysychansk from the south along the western bank.  The Russians likely have also learned to avoid the kinds of tactical errors that allowed Ukrainian artillery to decimate a BTG attempting to cross the river at Bilohorivka on May 15. Russian forces continued assaults on settlements along the T1302 highway near Lysychansk in the area of Spirne, Berestove and Verkhnokamyanka.  The Russians have already deprived Ukrainian forces of the ability to use this highway to support their troops in Lysychansk, as ISW previously reported on June 23, and are now likely continuing operations along the highway to complete the encirclement of Lysychansk from the south.[14]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Bakhmut and made marginal gains on June 29.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces had ”partial success” in Midna Ruda and Klynove- both within 15km southeast of Bakhmut along the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway.[16] Russian Telegram channel Rybar additionally claimed that a detachment led by the Wagner Group is advancing within Klynove and fighting in Pokrovske, just north of Klynove.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces have moved one BTG to the Bakhmut area, which indicates that Russian forces are likely prioritizing positional battles around Bakhmut and may attempt to capitalize on recent advances southeast of Bakhmut to drive directly on the city along the E40 highway.[18]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Slovyansk near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on June 29.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces are fighting around Bohorodychne and Krasnopillya, likely in order to drive southeast on Slovyansk along the E40 highway.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally noted that Russian forces shelled Mykilske—a settlement 15km northwest of Slovyansk that is separated from the E40 highway by a distinctive network of reservoirs that run parallel to the E40 between Dolyna and Slovyansk.[21] Russian forces may be shelling Mykilske to complement offensive operations to the south of Dovhenke (which also lies to the west of this water feature) in order to set conditions for offensive operations towards Slovyansk from the road network west of the reservoirs, in addition to the existing effort to drive down the E40. Russian forces additionally shelled Majaky and Tetyanivka to set conditions to advance on Slovyansk from the west of Lyman.[22]  

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)

Click here to enlarge the map.

Continued Russian offensive operations around Kharkiv are expending Russia’s limited offensive combat capability for extremely limited gains.  The diversion of Russian offensive combat power to secondary theaters in Ukraine may hasten the culmination of Russian offensive operations in the Donbas.  Russian forces continued offensive operations to regain control of settlements north of Kharkiv City on June 29, indicating that the Kremlin still holds territorial ambitions beyond the Donbas.  Russian forces conducted an assault on Dementiivka, about 15km directly north of Kharkiv City.[23] Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that the assault was successful, but Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleg Synegubov stated that Ukrainian forces repelled the attack.[24] While ISW cannot independently confirm the status of control of Dementiivka, control of individual settlements north of Kharkiv City along the frontline is likely highly contested. Russian forces additionally fought for control of Velyki Prokhody, Tsupivka, Pytomnik, and Ruska Lozova and shelled areas of Kharkiv City and surrounding settlements.[25] Continued battles for control of such settlements to the north of Kharkiv City suggests that while the Kremlin claims to be prioritizing the capture of the Donbas, it also seeks to regain control of Ukrainian territory outside Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.[26] 

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

 

Click here to enlarge the map.

Russian forces continued to focus on defensive operations and took measures to reinforce their grouping along the Southern Axis on June 29.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed one battalion tactical group (BTG) to the Kryvyi Rih direction, likely in order to support operations near the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in Vysokopillya and Potomkyne.[28] Russian forces conducted ground assaults near the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border near Vuhledar and reportedly took control of Shevchenko in western Donetsk Oblast.[29] Russian forces conducted artillery and missile strikes against Ukrainian positions and civilian infrastructure in northeastern Zaporizhia Oblast near the Huliapole-Orikhiv line.[30] Russian forces also conducted missile strikes against various areas of Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Mykolaiv Oblasts.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces moved an additional S-300VM anti-ballistic missile battery to Mykolaiv Oblast.[32]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities continued to set conditions to prepare for referenda on the annexation of occupied areas of Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Russian-appointed Kherson Occupation Administration Deputy-Head Kiril Stremousov stated on June 29 that his administration is preparing for a referendum on the accession of Kherson Oblast to Russia.[33] Several Ukrainian sources reported that in order to prepare for such referenda, Russian authorities are escalating efforts to collect personal data of Ukrainian citizens living in occupied areas.[34] Collection of personal information advances Russian occupational objectives beyond preparing for referenda and will allow Russian authorities to consolidate administrative control of occupied areas prior to making political moves to integrate these areas directly into the Russian Federation.

 


[1] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/06/28/rosiyany-shantazhem-vydayut-okupaczijni-pasporty-ta-nomerni-znaky-v-melitopoli/; https://t.me/spravdi/11896; https://spravdi.gov dot ua/v-uyavlenni-rosiyan-isnuye-tilky-odna-horosha-ukrayina-ekspert/

[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taurida_Governorate

[3] https://t.me/spravdi/11896; https://spravdi.gov dot ua/v-uyavlenni-rosiyan-isnuye-tilky-odna-horosha-ukrayina-ekspert/

[4] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/06/28/rosiyany-shantazhem-vydayut-okupaczijni-pasporty-ta-nomerni-znaky-v-melitopoli/

[5]https://www.facebook.com/100064555155257/posts/pfbid0nJZoNbJTcLayhBgsekY5MiCyg48DxqLkvK6WVYqH9gnzXq8GJZNGTgHSREd6ggrYl/?d=n

[6] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/7636; https://t.me/orlovdmytroEnergodar/239  

[7] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/7636

[8] https://t.me/orlovdmytroEnergodar/239  

[9] https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2022/04/07/russian-soldiers-dug-trenches-in-chernobyl-zones-radioactive-soil-ukrainian-official-a77255; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/unprotected-russian-soldiers-disturbed-radioactive-dust-chernobyls-red-forest-2022-03-28/; https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-troops-are-firing-europes-largest-nuclear-power-plant-ukrainia-rcna18668

[10]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3890  

[11] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3893  

[12] https://t.me/rybar/34621; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1542154616359485440https://t.me/miroshnik_r/7781

[13] https://t.me/rybar/34596; https://t.me/rybar/34621

[14] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3890; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUfl; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23

[15]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUflhttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l;

[16]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l; https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1542131855344140288

[17] https://t.me/rybar/34622

[18]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l

[19]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l

[20]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l

[21]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUfl

[22]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUfl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l

[23] https://t.me/rybar/34608; https://t.me/synegubov/3513

[24] https://t.me/rybar/34608https://t.me/synegubov/3513

[25] https://t.me/der_rada/1763; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUflhttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9lhttps://t.me/synegubov/3513; https://t.me/milinfolive/85993; https://t.me/rybar/34602?single; https://t.me/mod_russia/17252; https://t.me/spravdi/11924https://t.me/rybar/34602?single

[26] https://t.me/rybar/34596  

[27]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUflhttps://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9lhttps://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9741  

[28]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l

[29] https://t.me/readovkanews/37705; https://t.me/rybar/34596  

[30] https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9741; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/9780; https://t.me/rybar/34596  

[31] https://t.me/spravdi/11924; https://t.me/rybar/34596; https://t.me/rybar/34602?single; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1222 https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/658; https://t.me/rybar/34596; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/14638; https://fb.watch/dY9rXrGX1n/https://t.me/odesacityofficial/9040; https://t.me/milinfolive/85991https://t.me/rybar/34616https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1542056823066353671?s=20&t=tI_pxdvyrpcOIfxQUFFvmg; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1631 https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1632  https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1635; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/1633  ; https://t.me/rybar/34596; https://t.me/rybar/34602?single

[32]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02f6qW7QBT1Cf6NkdVLuS1h97pQ6uK9vcwpnM2J581eXHRvt6RQHq73mHe9LTbmzm9l

[33] https://t.me/readovkanews/37712

[34]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UpzEzsFFFWQ9vCG6HytTn51iZmNjL8UqLN7jTvJhea441dccaTZuUi9y3WXYYKUflhttps://t.me/spravdi/11934; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-zbyraiut-osobysti-dani-zhyteliv-mariupolia-ta-namahaiutsia-verbuvaty-evakuiovanykh-hromadian.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/786; https://t.me/mariupolnow/14615