UA-69458566-1

Tuesday, May 31, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 31

 Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Frederick W. Kagan
May 31, 5:45pm ET

Moscow’s concentration on seizing Severodonetsk and Donbas generally continues to create vulnerabilities for Russia in Ukraine’s vital Kherson Oblast, where Ukrainian counter-offensives continue. Kherson is critical terrain because it is the only area of Ukraine in which Russian forces hold ground on the west bank of the Dnipro River. If Russia is able to retain a strong lodgment in Kherson when fighting stops it will be in a very strong position from which to launch a future invasion. If Ukraine regains Kherson, on the other hand, Ukraine will be in a much stronger position to defend itself against future Russian attack. This strategic calculus should in principle lead Russia to allocate sufficient combat power to hold Kherson. But Russian President Vladimir Putin has chosen instead to concentrate all the forces and resources that can be scraped together in a desperate and bloody push to seize areas of eastern Ukraine that will give him largely symbolic gains. Continuing successful Ukrainian counter-offensives in Kherson indicate that Ukraine’s commanders recognize these realities and are taking advantage of the vulnerabilities that Putin’s decisions have created.

The Ukrainian leadership has apparently wisely avoided matching Putin’s mistaken prioritization. Kyiv could have committed more reserves and resources to the defense of Severodonetsk, and its failure to do so has drawn criticism.[1]  Ukrainian forces are now apparently withdrawing from Severodonetsk rather than fighting to the end—a factor that has allowed the Russians to move into the city relatively rapidly after beginning their full-scale assault.[2]  Both the decision to avoid committing more resources to saving Severodonetsk and the decision to withdraw from it were strategically sound, however painful. Ukraine must husband its more limited resources and focus on regaining critical terrain rather than on defending ground whose control will not determine the outcome of the war or the conditions for the renewal of war.

Sound Ukrainian prioritization of counter-offensive and defensive operations pushed the Russians almost out of artillery range of Kharkiv City and have stopped the Russian advances from Izyum—both of which are more important accomplishments than the defense of Severodonetsk. Ukraine’s leadership has had to make incredibly difficult choices in this war and has generally made the right ones, at least at the level of strategic prioritization and in the pace, scale, and ambitiousness of its counter-offensives. That is why Ukraine still has a good chance to stop and then reverse the gains Russia is currently making.

Russian forces are likely attempting to exploit Belarusian equipment reserves to compensate for heavy material losses in Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 31 that Belarusian forces are moving tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from storage facilities in Belarus to Russia to replenish combat losses.[3] This report corroborates previous reporting that Russian forces have largely exhausted their own reserves and indicates that the Kremlin is still leveraging its influence over Belarus in order to use Belarusian equipment.

Some pro-Russian milbloggers began to capture the frustrating realities of limited warfare, which may further intensify societal tensions in Russia. Pro-Russian political figure and self-proclaimed “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev said that the limited mobilization of Russians for war has divided Russian society into two groups: a small proportion that is involved in the war and the “peacetime Russians” who distance themselves from the war effort and are inconvenienced by foreign sanctions.[4] Gubarev blamed the “peacetime Russians” for failing to start collecting donations for Russian equipment, while criticizing the Kremlin for increasing propaganda about Russian successes during the “special military operation” in Ukraine. Gubarev also blamed the “peacetime Russians” for slowing down rotation rates due to fear of conscription. Guberev noted that mass mobilization could resolve the divide in society but opined that Russian commanders will not order such a mobilization to avoid mass casualties of unprepared conscripts as occurred, he notes, in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).
Gubarev is accurately capturing a phenomenon that is normal in a limited war that nevertheless generates high casualties. Resentment by those fighting such a war and their families against those who are untouched by the horrors of combat can grow even in an all-volunteer professional military, as Western countries experienced during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It is likely to be even more pronounced in Russia, whose military relies so heavily on conscripts and involuntarily-recalled reservists. This resentment can erode morale and will to fight as well as the propensity to volunteer for military service.
Russian citizens continued to conduct a series of attacks on Russian military recruitment centers in late May, likely in protest of covert mobilization. Russian Telegram channel Baza reported that the Russian Federal Security Service arrested a former Moscow artist and opposition figure, Ilya Farber, for Molotov Cocktail attacks on military recruitment centers in Udmurtia in the Urals on May 21.[5] A Russian court had previously sentenced Farber to an eight-year prison sentence for a bribery case. The case gained Farber significant support from Russian opposition leaders.[6] Farber admitted to committing arson in court on May 30. Baza also reported two more attacks on recruitment centers in Simferopol and Tula Oblast on May 28 and May 31, respectively.[7]

Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces are increasingly focused on advancing on Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and west of Lyman.
  • Russian forces are making gains within and around Severodonetsk.
  • Russian forces are likely hoping to advance on Lysychansk from Toshkivka in order to avoid having to fight across the Severskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk.
  • The Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast is likely feeling the pressure of the limited Ukrainian counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast, especially as much of the Russian operational focus is currently on the capture of Severodonetsk.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:
  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to regroup and prepare for renewed offensives southeast of Izyum and made minor, unsuccessful attacks towards Slovyansk on May 31.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attempted to attack Dovhenke, 20 kilometers south of Izyum, but were unsuccessful.[9] Russian forces additionally shelled Ukrainian positions to the southwest and southeast of Izyum and struck Dovhenke, Virnopillya, Husarivka, and Velyka Komyshuvakha in order to prepare for resumed offensives.[10] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian forces are fighting in Bohorodychne, Svyatohirsk, and Schurove, settlements between the southeast of Izyum and northwest of Slovyansk.[11]

Russian forces are additionally pushing westward towards Slovyansk from the Lyman area.[12] A Russian Telegram channel indicated that Russian forces now control the road through Raihorodok and are advancing westward from Raihorodok and eastward from Izyum to drive on Slovyansk.[13] Recent renewed offensives towards Slovyansk likely indicate that Russian forces intend to attempt to take full control of Donetsk Oblast by seizing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, although their ability to do so is far from clear.  

Russian forces continued ground assaults in and around Severodonetsk on May 31.[14] Russian forces, including Chechen units, now control up to 70% of the city and continue to make gains within the city center.[15] Ukrainian troops are reportedly withdrawing from the center of the city. [16] Head of Luhansk Regional State Administration Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces will begin clearing the villages around Severodonetsk in the coming days, likely in order to support the encirclement of the area.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally reported that fighting is on-going in Toshkivka, to the south of Severodonetsk.[18] Russian advances north of Toshkivka are likely intended to support the capture of Lysychansk and would allow Russian forces to advance on Lysychansk from the south as opposed to fighting westward across the Siverskyi Donets River from Severodonetsk. Russian forces failed to advance across the Siverskyi Donets River from Bilohorivka and are likely eager to avoid another costly river crossing.

Russian forces continued ground assaults to the east of Bakhmut on May 31.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops are fighting in Zolote, Komyshuvakha, Nyrkove, Berestove, Pokrovske, and Dolomitne, all settlements along the eastern arc of Bakhmut.[20] Russian forces likely intend to keep pushing to gain access to the Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the northeast of Bakhmut to support their seizure of the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area. Russian forces reportedly made incremental gains near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and took control of Blahodatne and Neskuchne.[21] Russian troops additionally claimed to have made marginal gains north of Donetsk City in the direction of Niu York and reportedly took control of Novoselivka Druha on May 31.[22]



Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces continued to fire on Kharkiv City and its environs and did not make any confirmed advances on May 31.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Russian grouping in this area is comprised of elements of the Western Military District, which are focusing on preventing further Ukrainian advances towards the international border.[24] Head of Kharkiv Regional State Administration Oleg Synegubov stated that Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against the Osnovyanskyi and Kyivskyi districts of Kharkiv City, Korotych, Udy, Zolochiv, and Chkalovske.[25]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Ukrainian forces continued a counteroffensive in northwestern Kherson Oblast on May 31 and are pushing Russian forces east of the Inhulets River. Ukrainian forces launched several localized counterattacks west of the Inhulets River in the past few days.[26] Ukraine’s Office of Strategic Communications published images of destroyed Russian artillery equipment in Davydiv Brid, an operationally significant settlement that sits astride the Russian-controlled T2207 highway.[27] The T2207 highway loops around the northeastern Kherson Oblast boundary until it connects with the parallel T0403 highway to Krvyyi Rih and Zaporizhia City in the east. Russian forces have struggled to consolidate control over the eastern segment of the T2207 due to Ukrainian counteroffensives in the area. The Ukrainian counteroffensive on Davydiv Brid could hinder Russia’s ability to support units north of the settlement where they face Ukrainian counteroffensives from further north. The Ukrainian General Staff did not confirm that Ukrainian forces liberated Davydiv Brid, but numerous social media videos and reports suggest that Russian forces may have withdrawn from the settlement on May 31.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that Ukrainian forces liberated another settlement on the eastern segment of the T2207 highway.[29] Russian Telegram channels expressed concern for the possible increase of Ukrainian troops in the area, likely seeing the risk of increasing Ukrainian counteroffensives in the Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih directions.[30] The Russian prioritization of the Battle of Severodonetsk and the Donbas offensive operation continues to create vulnerabilities in the critical terrain of Kherson Oblast.       

 
Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation authorities continued to loot and set conditions for permanent societal control in occupied Ukrainian settlements. Mariupol Mayor’s Adviser Petro Andryushenko reported that Russian forces began to “nationalize” the Port of Mariupol, which included seizing the remaining 34 Ukrainian ships there.[31] Russian forces in Mariupol and Melitopol began accepting documents for Russian citizenship and have aimed a simplified passport procedure specifically at orphans.[32] Russian forces are also continuing mass burials, with geolocated video footage suggesting that they have already buried 22,000 to 45,000 Mariupol residents.[33]

Russian forces continued to face significant challenges in their attempts to consolidate occupation authority on May 31. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the Russian-appointed mayor of Melitopol Halyna Danylenko resigned due to partisan activity in the city.[34] The Ukrainian Resistance Center added that Ukrainian entrepreneurs stopped the operation of the Kupyansk Dairy Cannery in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and are refusing to use Russian banks and currency.[35]
 
[1] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/26/ukraine-frontline-russia-military-severodonetsk/; https://nv dot ua/lifestyle/kogda-zakonchitsya-voyna-otvet-arestovicha-prevratilsya-v-mem-foto-video-novosti-ukrainy-50246648.html
[2] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531013767928111104
[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329511842695234
[4] https://army dot ru/ryadovoj-gubarev-kakaya-nam-nuzhna-mobilizacziya/
[5] https://t.me/bazabazon/11798https://t.me/bazabazon/11799
[6] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/anti-jewish-undertones-grab-spotlight-at-russian-trial/
[7] https://t.me/bazabazon/11800https://t.me/bazabazon/11815
[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329511842695234
[9] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030
[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030
[11] https://t.me/swodki/107021; https://t.me/swodki/106888
[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030; https://t.me/swodki/107021
[13] https://t.me/swodki/107021
[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329511842695234; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030
[15] https://twitter.com/serhey_hayday/status/1531718472517967874; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3060https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3054; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531618630047244290; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531391242747224065; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531389979905114113https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1531367057052385283; https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1531360614743953408; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531013767928111104
[16] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531013767928111104
[17] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3054
[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030
[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030
[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329130549400030
[21] https://t.me/swodki/107020
[22] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/36904; https://t.me/swodki/107044; https://t.me/swodki/107037; https://t.me/swodki/107036https://t.me/swodki/107022; https://t.me/swodki/107001
[23] https://t.me/synegubov/3341
[24] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329511842695234
[25] https://t.me/synegubov/3341
[26] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29
[27] https://nv dot ua/ukraine/events/hersonskaya-oblast-zsu-unichtozhili-voennyh-rf-v-sele-davydov-brod-50246612.html
[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/329511842695234; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1531367261340057601; https://twitter.com/herooftheday10/status/1531567314230968320https://t.me/swodki/107102
[29] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2052372911617536
[30] https://t.me/swodki/107102
[31] https://t.me/andriyshTime/1151; https://t.me/mariupolnow/12180; https://t.me/pushilindenis/2283
[32] https://t.me/readovkanews/35454https://t.me/andriyshTime/1174; https://t.me/andriyshTime/1149
[33] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531570937602138112
[34] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/05/31/gaulyajter-melitopolya-nalyakana-j-hoche-jty-u-vidstavku/
[35] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/05/31/na-harkivshhyni-pidpryyemstva-sabotuyut-spivpraczyu-z-okupantamy/

Monday, May 30, 2022

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 30

 


Karolina Hird, Mason Clark, and George Barros

May 30, 3:30pm ET

Mounting casualties among Russian junior officers will likely further degrade Russian capabilities and lead to further morale breakdowns. The UK Ministry of Defense stated on May 30 that Russian forces have suffered devastating losses amongst mid and junior ranking officers. The UK MoD reported that battalion and brigade level officers continue to deploy forwards and into harm's way—rather than commanding from rear areas and delegating to lower-ranking officers—due to senior Russian officers holding them to an “uncompromising level of responsibility” for their units.[1] The British Defense Ministry further reported that junior officers are in charge of low-level tactical operations due to a lack of professionalism and modernization within the Russian Armed Forces and that the continued losses of these junior officers will complicate command and control efforts, particularly in Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) cobbled together from the survivors of multiple other units.[2] ISW previously assessed that continued demoralization and poor command and control among Russian forces could present Ukrainian forces opportunities to conduct prudent counteroffensives, particularly as the Russian military continues to pour resources into the battle of Severodonetsk at the cost of other lines of effort.

Domestic dissent within Russian military circles, claiming that the Kremlin is not doing enough to win the war, continues to grow. Former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officer Igor Girkin (also known as Strelkov) condemned Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statements about the priority of the “special operation” in Ukraine being the liberation of the Donbas.[3] Girkin claimed that the Kremlin has forgone the ideological underpinnings of the conflict by focusing the conflict on the Donbas, rather than the entirety of Ukraine. Girkin complained that Kremlin officials are no longer questioning the legitimacy of the existence of Ukraine and that the concepts of “denazification” and “demilitarization” have been forgotten. Girkin accused the Kremlin of appeasement policies and stated that the threat of defeat continues to grow.

Girkin’s dissent is emblematic of continued shifts within circles of Russian military enthusiasts and ex-servicemen. As ISW has previously reported, the Kremlin has repeatedly revised its objectives for the war in Ukraine downwards due to battlefield failures. The Kremlin is increasingly facing discontent not from Russians opposed to the war as a whole, but military and nationalist figures angry at Russian losses and frustrated with shifting Kremlin framing of the war. Russian officials are increasingly unable to employ the same ideological justifications for the invasion in the face of clear setbacks, and a lack of concrete military gains within Ukraine will continue to foment domestic dissatisfaction with the war.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces continued to incrementally capture areas of Severodonetsk but have not yet fully encircled the city.
  • Russian forces focused on regrouping near Izyum to renew offensives towards Slovyansk and Barvinkove and conducted only minor, unsuccessful, attacks. Russian forces are making incremental advances towards Slovyansk and seek to assault the city itself in the coming weeks, but are unlikely to achieve decisive gains.
  • Russian forces in Kharkiv continue to focus efforts on preventing a Ukrainian counteroffensive from reaching the international border between Kharkiv and Belgorod, and Ukrainian forces have not conducted any significant operations in the area in recent days.
  • The limited Ukrainian counterattack in northern Kherson Oblast did not take any further ground in the last 48 hours but has disrupted Russian operations. Russian forces launched several unsuccessful attacks against the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east bank of the Inhulets River.
  • Mounting casualties among Russian junior officers will further degrade Russian morale and command and control capabilities.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of Mariupol as a separate effort since the city’s fall. We had added a new section on activities in Russian-occupied areas:

  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces focused on regrouping near Izyum to renew offensives towards Slovyansk and Barvinkove on May 30 and conducted only minor, unsuccessful, attacks.[4] Russian troops reportedly conducted an unsuccessful assault on Kurulka, about 30 kilometers south of Izyum.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces deployed a squadron of Ka-52 helicopters to the area to provide air defense, and reported Russian troops have moved over 250 units of (unspecified) weaponry and equipment to the area to replenish their force grouping around Izyum.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces have rebuilt a railway bridge near Kupyansk to facilitate the movement of troops and equipment in the area.[7]

The ongoing replenishment of troops in the Izyum area and persistent attempts to advance to the southeast indicates Russian forces are likely reprioritizing attempts to advance towards Slovyansk, though they are increasingly attempting to simultaneously advance from two directions - southeast from Izyum and west from Lyman. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) troops claimed to capture Staryi Karavan and Dibrova, both between Lyman and Slovyansk, on May 30.[8] Russian Telegram channels additionally reported fighting in Raihorodok, 6 kilometers northeast of Slovyansk.[9] Russian forces are making incremental advances towards Slovyansk and seek to assault the city itself in the coming weeks. However, Russian advances remain limited and are unlikely to increase in pace in the near term, particularly as Russian forces continue to prioritize assaults on Severodonetsk at the cost of other lines of effort.

Russian forces continued ground assaults in and around Severodonetsk on May 30.[10] Russian forces reportedly control the northeast and southeast outskirts of the city and are continuing to gain ground within the city.[11] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported ongoing fighting to the south of Severodonetsk in Toshkivka, Ustynivka, Voronove, Borivske, and Metolkine, as Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of Severodonetsk from the south.[12] Russian forces are reportedly transferring large quantities of personnel and equipment to the area to strengthen operations against Severodonetsk.[13] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian forces control the entire southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River, except for the part of the river than runs through Severodonetsk.[14] ISW cannot independently confirm this claim, though it is consistent with previous reporting on persistent, incremental Russian advances in and around the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.

Russian forces continued assault operations to the east of Bakhmut with the intention of severing Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) northeast of Bakhmut.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are fighting in Komyshuvakha, Novoluhanske, and Berestov, all settlements ranging from the northeast to southeast of Bakhmut.[16] Russian forces will likely continue to focus on pushing towards GLOCS northeast of Bakhmut and are unlikely to attempt to capture the city itself.

 

 

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)

Russian forces fired on Ukrainian positions north of Kharkiv City and did not make any confirmed advances on May 30.[17] Russian forces conducted MLRS and artillery strikes against Odnorobivka, Udy, Ruski Tyshky, Cherkasy Tyshky, Ruska Lozova, Pitomnyk, Borshchova, Peremoha, Tsyrkuny, Shestakove, and the Kyivskyi District of Kharkiv City.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the goal of these artillery attacks is to deter further Ukrainian advances towards the international border.[19]


Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporozhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)

Russian forces focused on recapturing positions taken by previous Ukrainian counterattacks and shelling forward targets to prevent further Ukrainian counteroffensive actions on May 30.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff and Southern Operational Command both reported that Russian troops are replenishing equipment and regrouping forces in Kherson Oblast to strengthen their existing defensive lines against Ukrainian gains made during limited Ukrainian counteroffensives on May 28.[21] Russian Telegram channels provided further confirmation of limited and localized Ukrainian gains in Kherson and stated that Russian forces are fighting to dislodge a Ukrainian bridgehead on the left bank (east side) of the Inhulets River, as ISW assessed on May 29.[22] Ukrainian forces have not made any confirmed advances since May 28, and the Ukrainian counteroffensive in northern Kherson Oblast is likely a localized operation to disrupt Russian frontline positions, rather than a wider counteroffensive to recapture large areas of terrain.

Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts and a missile strike against a previously-destroyed bridge in Odesa.[23] These sporadic strikes are unlikely to significantly disrupt Ukrainian logistics. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that an unidentified partisan detonated an IED in Melitopol near the residence of the Russian-appointed Mayor of Zaporizhia Eugene Balitsky.[24] Partisan activity in occupied territories likely continues to disrupt Russian administrative activities in these areas.

 

Activity in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian occupation forces continued efforts to exert bureaucratic control in occupied areas but did not make any significant changes on May 30.

 


[1] https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1531143716840284161/photo/1

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1615106835555672; https://gur.gov dot ua/content/ia-v-pikhoti-sluzhu-my-prosto-vytratnyi-material-okupant-rozpovidaie-druzhyni-pro-svoie-bazhannia-povernutysia-dodomu-zhyvym-perekhoplennia.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_jTJbimwY8&ab_channel=%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%83%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8F%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%9C%D0%9E%D0%A3%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D0%B8

[3] https://t.me/strelkovii/2625

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141

[6] h https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214

[8] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/14770193; https://t.me/epoddubny/10975; https://t.me/sashakots/33196

[9] https://t.me/swodki/106354; https://t.me/swodki/106344; https://t.me/swodki/106335

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531015304368869379https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1531014444012212229https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3029

[12] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141; https://readovka dot news/news/98825

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/3022

[14] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/36851

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214; https://www.facebook.com/www.dshv.mil.gov.ua/posts/pfbid06XAAwgxK7Vo1SCDK4maDtyHH37KdgdMKtxe1UEafUfXpT7JwpP6cT7SozTUHddx7l; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214; https://t.me/synegubov/3327; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328769439436141https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1064505330809297; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28

[22] https://t.me/swodki/106185; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29

[23] https://www.facebook.com/100064555155257/posts/pfbid02W5bRh1fBbuKfFbyQoc6BaQbw1SnEWF91pDNvndLevppaTACXVQ95uKVPiA7TPk7yl/?d=n; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/8414; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/1046; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/520https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/12989; https://t.me/milinfolive/84249https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/328355376144214; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1064505330809297; https://t.me/mod_russia/16294; https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/50264https://t.me/swodki/106461

[24] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/05/30/u-melitopoli-prolunav-vybuh-u-rajoni-prozhyvannya-misczevogo-gaulyajtera/; https://t.me/Bratchuk_Sergey/12999https://t.me/rian_ru/165264https://t.me/rian_ru/165270https://t.me/milinfolive/84254https://t.me/milinfolive/84253https://t.me/milinfolive/84252; https://t.me/milchronicles/599