By Genevieve Casagrande and Ellen Stockert
The Russian military is reshaping
its air campaign in Syria in order to compel the U.S. into partnering with
Russia, which cannot destroy jihadists, roll back Iran, or set conditions for a
desirable settlement to the war. Russia prioritized airstrikes against ISIS in
Homs, eastern Hama, and Deir ez Zour Provinces in support of the Bashar al
Assad regime from June 8 – July 16. Russia also
conducted a series of high-profile strikes, including
long-range
strategic bombing runs from Russia and cruise missiles launched from the
Eastern
Mediterranean against ISIS between May and July 2017. Russia de-prioritized
its air campaign against the Syrian opposition in June and early July as part
of an effort to encourage the U.S. to accept Russia’s proposal for a
“de-escalation zone” in Southwest Syria. The U.S. later agreed to the
de-escalation
zone agreement on July 7 following a meeting between U.S. President Donald
Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia is disguising its strategic
intent by masquerading as a reliable counterterrorism partner for the U.S. in
Syria. President Trump’s reported
decision
to end support for some anti-Assad opposition fighters will likely only
encourage Putin to seize greater control over the conflict and continue rolling
back U.S. influence in the country.
The
‘de-escalation zone’ deal has further secured Russia’s freedom of action to
support Iran and Bashar al Assad’s campaign. Russia has
consistently
used ceasefires
in Syria to
temporarily shift and
reorient resources elsewhere in the theater. The U.S.-Russia-Jordan
ceasefire is no exception. The deal has freed up Russian resources to surge
airstrikes in support of pro-regime operations to disrupt the U.S. and its
partner forces in Eastern Syria under the guise of fighting ISIS. Pro-regime
forces with support from Russian airstrikes
launched
operations
against
U.S.-backed
groups in Northern Suwayda and Eastern Rif Dimashq Provinces from July 8 –
10 amidst the start of the ceasefire,
reportedly seizing over a
“dozen” small villages and positions from rebels in the area. Russia has
likewise surg
ed strikes in
support of pro-regime forces near Palmyra and Deir ez Zour. This shift
seeks to constrain U.S. operations and provide leverage for Russia in future
negotiations over a potential second ceasefire in Eastern Syria.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties. The graphic likely under-represents the extent of the locations targeted in Eastern Syria, owing to a relative lack of activist reporting from that region.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.
