

1 **Chapter 7: Risk management and Decision Making in Relation**
2 **to Sustainable Development**

3

4 **Coordinating Lead Authors:** Margot Hurlbert (Canada), Jagdish Krishnaswamy (India)

5 **Lead Authors:** Edouard Davin (France), Francis Johnson (Sweden), Carlos Fernando Mena
6 (Ecuador), John Morton (United Kingdom), Soojeong Myeong (Republic of Korea), David Viner
7 (United Kingdom), Koko Warner (United States of America), Anita Wreford (New Zealand), Sumaya
8 Zakieldean (Sudan), Zinta Zommers (Latvia)

9 **Contributing Authors:** Rocio Diaz-Chavez (Mexico), Minal Pathak (India), Darshini Mahadevia
10 (India), Charlotte Strick (Germany)

11 **Review Editors:** Regina Rodrigues (Brazil), B.L. Turner II (United States of America)

12 **Chapter Scientist:** Thobekile Zikhali (Zimbabwe)

13 **Date of Draft:** 08/06/2018

14

15

1	Table of Contents	
2	Chapter 7: Risk management and Decision Making in Relation to Sustainable Development.....	7-1
3	7.1 Executive summary.....	7-4
4	7.2 Introduction and Relation to Other Chapters	7-7
5	7.2.1 Findings of Previous IPCC Assessments and Reports and Gaps.....	7-7
6	7.2.2 Emergent, Emerging, and Key Risks	7-8
7	7.3 Characterising Risk.....	7-9
8	7.3.1 Describing Risk and Drivers	7-9
9	7.3.2 Exploring Risk	7-11
10	7.3.3 Emergent Risks and Substantive Risks	7-13
11	7.3.4 Economic Costs – What is at stake?	7-21
12	7.3.5 Conceptualising key, substantive and emergent risks.....	7-23
13	7.4 Policy Response to Risk.....	7-24
14	7.4.1 Multi-level response to risk.....	7-24
15	7.4.2 Policy instruments responding to risk.....	7-25
16	7.4.3 Policy mix and suites of policy instruments	7-52
17	7.4.4 Effectiveness of instruments	7-52
18	Cross-chapter Box: Gender in integrative approaches for land, climate change and sustainable	
19	development.....	7-55
20	7.4.5 Adaptation limits and barriers.....	7-57
21	7.5 Decision-making for climate change adaptation and mitigation to meet sustainable	
22	development.....	7-60
23	7.5.1 Formal and Informal decision-making.....	7-60
24	7.5.2 Decision making tools.....	7-62
25	7.5.3 Best practices of decision making toward sustainable land management.....	7-64
26	7.5.4 Adaptive management.....	7-65
27	7.5.5 Participation	7-66
28	7.5.6 Social learning.....	7-71
29	7.5.7 Performance indicators	7-72
30	7.5.8 Coherence and maladaptation	7-72
31	7.5.9 Trade-offs and synergies.....	7-74
32	7.5.10 Barriers of implementation	7-77
33	7.6 Governance: Governing the land-climate interface	7-78
34	7.6.1 Adaptive Management and governance	7-78
35	7.6.2 Resilient Institutions	7-79
36	7.6.3 Multi-level and polycentric governance.....	7-80
37	7.6.4 Institutional dimensions of adaptive governance.....	7-81

1	7.6.5	Inclusive governance.....	7-82
2	7.7	Key uncertainties and knowledge gaps.....	7-82
3		References.....	7-84
4			

1 **7.1 Executive summary**

2 Land-climate change interactions affect the central issues in sustainable development: how and where
3 people live and work, their access to essential resources like water, energy, and minerals, and their
4 ability to feed themselves. Decisions about land management combined with anthropogenic climate
5 change already contribute to soil degradation, desertification, flooding, extreme rain and heat wave
6 events in cities, pests and disease in agriculture, browning of forests, and the loss of ecosystem
7 services that support human well-being. Land-climate change interactions combine with population
8 and political dynamics to generate risks of conflict, migration, displacement, and poverty. Evidence
9 reveals policies that exacerbate these land-climate change challenges, as well as policies that dampen
10 negative consequences and amplify co-benefits of mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable
11 development.

12 **Changes in land-climate interactions will result in the crossing of thresholds or tipping points**
13 **for ecosystems and human welfare (*high agreement, limited evidence*).** Risk is the potential for
14 negative consequences where something of value is at stake and the outcome of events is uncertain,
15 recognising that there is a diversity of values. Risks are dynamic and may change over time.
16 Uncertainty exists in scientific findings due to definitional, observational, and modelling choices, and
17 intrinsic complexity of human and natural systems. Disagreement in decision and policy making
18 exists due to differing uptake of knowledge, diverse determinations of the problem and its
19 consequences, leading to unpredictable decision making of actors at different levels. Risks arise from
20 a combination of threats of desertification, land degradation and food insecurity in combination with
21 climate and major non-climate stressors. Risks may arise in one domain and cascade through
22 different domains such as human health, ecosystem services, livelihoods, or infrastructure with
23 potential for adverse consequences at regional, national or global scales including multi food basket
24 failures. (7.3)

25 **Adaptive and flexible decision-making that can be revised as new information and data becomes**
26 **available best responds to uncertainty.** Scenarios can provide valuable information at all planning
27 stages in relation to land, climate and food, but uncertainty in scenario planning requires that adaptive
28 and flexible solution planning and pathway choices be made and reassessed in order to respond to
29 new information and data as it becomes available. (7.5.4; 7.6.3)

30 **Purposefully-designed packages of policy instruments to manage the risks of land-climate**
31 **change interactions like drought, flood, fire, and food insecurity deliver co-benefits.** It is not one
32 single policy instrument that responds to risks of climate change-land impacts but a combination that
33 prepares for, responds to and recovers from these events. A suite of policy instruments to improve
34 resilience for floods, for example, will include flood zone mapping, building restrictions in flood
35 zones, financial incentives to move out of flood prone areas, and appropriately calibrated insurance
36 and disaster payments. Properly designed carbon tax can reduce GHG emissions but considerations of
37 renewable energy and land use incentives and policies targeting specific climate mitigation measures
38 and/or technologies also need to be considered. Policy instruments that can advance synergies of
39 land, climate and food security include social protection, sustainability certification, technology
40 transfer, land use standards and land tenure schemes integrated with early action and preparedness.
41 (7.4.2; 7.4.3)

42 **Land tenure** is a key dimension in any discussion of land-climate interactions, and will influence the
43 prospects for both rural adaptation and land-based mitigation. Both climate change and climate action
44 will have possible impacts on land tenure and thus land security, especially of poor people (*limited*
45 *evidence, high agreement*).

1 **Local factors such as land tenure and the access food producers have to the food they grow,**
2 **affect the degree to which policy instruments create opportunities to decrease poverty, food and**
3 **livelihood insecurity.** Evidence suggests that policies which pay attention to interactions of land and
4 climate and system linkages are more likely to create co-benefits between mitigation, adaptation, and
5 development. Local context, including land tenure and land rights, is an important consideration in
6 relation to the selection and application of policy instruments. Sustainable Development Goals can be
7 mutually reinforcing and there is *high agreement and medium evidence* that they need to be pursued
8 in a manner that recognises their inherent linkages, synergies and trade-offs and co-benefits which are
9 context specific depending on a variety of political, national and socio-economic factors. The gaps
10 and omissions in Sustainable Development Goals (e.g. fresh water ecosystems and their ecosystem
11 services) requires other frameworks to be considered as well. An adaptive management approach is
12 increasingly being adopted to explore synergies and trade-offs between goals and targets, albeit
13 depending on natural resource base, governance arrangements, available technologies and political
14 ideas in a given location and context. A nexus approach to policies could also be adopted to develop
15 comprehensive approaches to risk management. (7.4.3; 7.4.4)

16 **Informal decision-making processes and institutions including traditional knowledge are**
17 **important considerations in formal decision-making analysis** (*high agreement, medium*
18 *evidence*). If informal institutional interaction and decision-making are not considered, decisions and
19 selection of policy instruments may be inappropriate. Traditional ecological knowledge is important
20 for adaptation among farmers, pastoralists, and hunter-gatherers and can be congruent with climate
21 mitigation measures. (7.5.1; 7.5.5; 7.5.6)

22 **Including stakeholders and local populations in decision-making and policy formation related to**
23 **land improves all levels of governance and may enhance social learning** (*high agreement,*
24 *medium evidence*). New ways of involving citizens in environmental decision-making, including
25 combining citizen science, participatory modelling, and easily available technical tools to collect and
26 disseminate information, have flourished in recent years and influenced decisions on land use and
27 risk. (7.5.5; 7.5.6)

28 Social learning contributes to long term climate adaptation whereby individuals engage in multi-step
29 social processes in managing different framings of issues surrounding climate risks and opportunities.
30 Such processes facilitate social feedback and exploration of new policy options and institutionalise
31 new rights and responsibilities. There is *high agreement and limited evidence* that such learning
32 processes are important in engaging with uncertainty. Inclusive decision-making and good
33 governance will build resilience to risk and enhance service delivery and food security by
34 incorporating citizen obligations and responsibilities. (7.5.6)

35 Women play a dominant role in agriculture and face multiple barriers to adaptation. Land is an
36 important determinant of women's livelihoods; alienation of title, competing uses of land (such as
37 biofuel) or impacts of climate change may increase vulnerability. Integrative approaches focused on
38 gender and building on the collective action and agency of women increase resilience (Gender cross
39 chapter box)

40 **Measuring performance is important in decision-making and governance in order to create**
41 **common understanding and advance policy effectiveness** (*high agreement, limited evidence*).
42 Measurable indicators are useful for climate policy development and decision-making and include the
43 Sustainable Development Goals, targets established in the Paris Agreement, carbon stock
44 measurement, measurement and monitoring for REDD and metrics for measuring biodiversity and
45 ecosystem services. Institutional dimensions of adaptive governance include indicators of
46 performance in institutional systems at multiple levels that enhance adaptive capacity of a system.
47 (7.5.7)

1 **The complex spatial and temporal dynamics of risk and uncertainty in relation to land and**
2 **climate interactions and food security, may require an adaptive, iterative approach to assessing**
3 **and revising risks and the accompanying decisions and policy instruments.** Dynamic adaptation
4 pathways are emerging as a mechanism to make decisions recognising that equilibrium should not be
5 privileged and allowing socially disruptive threats and opportunities associated with the risks of
6 tipping points and regime shifts to be identified and prioritised. Windows of opportunity, including
7 during and after crises and extreme events, are important learning moments when ecosystem
8 feedbacks in a degraded system are recognised and significant changes may be made. There is *high*
9 *agreement and medium evidence* that acting early will generate returns on investments. (7.3; 7.5.9;
10 7.3.4)

1 **7.2 Introduction and Relation to Other Chapters**

2 This chapter focuses on policy responses and decision-making surrounding risks that arise due to the
 3 relationship between climate change, land and humans. The literature surrounding governance,
 4 institutions and decision making in respect of risks related to land-climate interactions is assessed.
 5 Land is integral to providing for human habitation, livelihoods, food, and resources and also serves as
 6 a source of identity and cultural meaning. However, the combined impacts of climate change,
 7 desertification, land degradation and food insecurity pose obstacles to climate resilient development
 8 and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. This chapter shows that consideration of
 9 these inter-linkages, utilising a deep understanding of risk, improves decision-making, builds resilient
 10 institutions and adaptive governance, ultimately lessening the socio-economic impacts of climate
 11 change and advancing sustainable land management.

12 This chapter will complement and build on the identification of policies, decision making and
 13 governance issues in respect of land-climate interactions covered in chapters 3 to 6. It will specifically
 14 address trade-offs and synergies between policies identified in these chapters.

15 **7.2.1 Findings of Previous IPCC Assessments and Reports and Gaps**

Box 7.1 Relevant Findings of Recent IPCC Reports

Climate change and sustainable development pathways

Climate change poses a moderate threat to current sustainable development and a severe threat to future sustainable development (Fleurbaey et al. 2014; Denton et al. 2015).

Significant transformations may be required for climate-resilient pathways (Denton et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2014).

There is a wide diversity and flexibility in the choice of adaptation and mitigation pathways and approaches with many synergies and trade-offs in reducing impacts of climate change, ensuring effective risk management, and sustainable development (O' Brien et al. 2012; Denton et al. 2015; Smith et al. 2014a).

Prospects for climate-resilient pathways are related fundamentally to what the world accomplishes with climate change mitigation, but adaptation is also essential at all scales (Denton et al. 2015).

The design of climate policy is influenced by: (1) differing ways that individuals and organisations perceive risks and uncertainties; (2) the consideration of a diverse array of risks and uncertainties as well as human and social responses which may be difficult to measure, are of low probability but which would have a significant impact if they occurred (Kunreuther et al. 2014; Fleurbaey et al. 2014; Kolstad et al. 2014).

Building climate resilient pathways requires iterative, continually evolving and complementary processes at all levels of government (Kunreuther et al. 2014; Kolstad et al. 2014; Somanthan et al. 2014; Lavell et al. 2012; Denton et al. 2015).

Important aspects of climate resilient policies include local level institutions, decentralisation, participatory governance, iterative learning, integration of local knowledge, and reduction of inequality (Dasgupta et al. 2014; Lavell et al. 2012; Cutter et al. 2012; O' Brien et al. 2012; Roy, J., Tschakert, P., Waisman).

Land and rural livelihoods

Policies and institutions relating to land, including land tenure, can contribute to the vulnerability of rural people, and constrain adaptation. Climate policies, such as encouraging cultivation of biofuels, or payments REDD+, will have significant secondary impacts, both positive and negative, in some rural areas (Dasgupta et al. 2014).

Sustainable land management is an effective disaster risk reduction tool (Cutter et al. 2012).

Risk and risk management

Risk results from the interaction of vulnerability, exposure and hazard (Oppenheimer et al. 2015).

A variety of emergent risks not previously assessed or recognised, can be identified by taking into account: a) the interactions of climate change impacts on one sector with changes in exposure and vulnerability, as well as adaptation and mitigation actions, and; b) indirect, trans-boundary, and long-distance impacts of climate change including price spikes, migration, conflict and the unforeseen impacts of mitigation measures (Oppenheimer et al. 2015).

Under any plausible scenario for mitigation and adaptation, some degree of risk from residual damages is unavoidable (Oppenheimer et al. 2015)

Decision-making

Risk management provides a useful framework for most climate change decision-making. Iterative risk management is most suitable in situations characterised by large uncertainties, long time frames, the potential for learning over time, and the influence of both climate as well as other socioeconomic and biophysical changes (Jones et al. 2014).

Decision support is situated at the intersection of data provision, expert knowledge, and human decision making at a range of scales from the individual to the organisation and institution (Jones et al. 2014).

Scenarios are a key tool for addressing uncertainty, either through problem exploration or solution exploration (Jones et al. 2014).

Adaptation

Adaptation is a complex social process. There is no single approach to adaptation planning and both top-down and bottom-up approaches are widely recognised. Institutional dimensions in adaptation governance play a key role in promoting the transition from planning to implementation of adaptation (Mimura et al. 2014).

1

2 **7.2.2 Emergent, Emerging, and Key Risks**

3 Oppenheimer et al. (2015) define *risk* as “the potential for consequences where something of value is
4 at stake and where the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values” and cite the formula
5 “Risk = (Probability of Events or Trends) x Consequences”. Here we regard risk as having important
6 dynamic, spatial and temporal characteristics, constituted partly by uncertainty and determined by
7 factors including vulnerability, sensitivity, exposure, and adaptive capacity with tolerance and
8 thresholds determined by anthropogenic and natural conditions (see 7.3.2). (Oppenheimer et al. 2015)
9 define *key risks* as “those relevant to the definition and elaboration of dangerous anthropogenic
10 interference with the climate system” in the terminology of UNFCCC (United Nations Framework
11 Convention on Climate Change) Article 2, but more generally as “potentially severe adverse
12 consequences for humans and socio-ecological systems resulting from the interaction of climate-
13 related hazards with vulnerabilities of societies and systems exposed”. Severity in this context can be
14 associated with high hazard or high vulnerability, or both.

15 An *emergent risk* is “a risk that arises from the interaction of phenomena in a complex system” with
16 the example of “feedback processes between climatic change, human interventions involving
17 mitigation and adaptation, and processes in natural systems” (Oppenheimer et al. 2015: 1052).

1 The risks discussed in this chapter are all risks associated with land-climate change interactions.
2 Within that category, given that several key risks are discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we have
3 limited our discussion of risks here to:

- 4 • Risks arising from a combination of two or more of the processes or threats of desertification,
5 land degradation and food insecurity, in combination with climate change, or;
- 6 • Risks arising from one or more of those processes or threats, in combination with climate change
7 and major non-climate stressors (for example macro-economic, governance-related or
8 demographic), or;
- 9 • Risks arising from one or more of those processes or threats, in combination with climate change,
10 that cascade through different domains, such as human health, livelihoods and infrastructure, or;
- 11 • The potential for adverse consequences at regional, national or global scales where one or more
12 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and biodiversity and ecosystem services are at stake due
13 to uncertain land-climate-society interactions under diversity of values and level of agreement on
14 priorities (Griggs et al. 2013a; Nilsson et al. 2016c).

15 In this chapter we also define and consider both risk and opportunity arising from land-climate-
16 society interactions in terms of trade-offs between SDGs, ecosystem services and biodiversity.

17

Box 7.2 Tipping points to illustrate complex problems, deep uncertainties, unknown unknowns

The complex interactions of land, climate change and society bring new challenges for risk management, particularly where the decisions made today for mitigation and adaptation can have long-term implications. A major challenge is that projections of future land-climate-society interactions are **deeply uncertain** because of long time-scales, non-linearities and feedback mechanisms. Furthermore, along with deep uncertainty, **tipping points** – where coupled biophysical and social systems or socio-ecological systems shift radically and potentially irreversibly into a different state or regime under climate and global change, offering both challenges and opportunities for mitigation and adaptation. These deep uncertainties and potential tipping points pose severe challenges for decision making frameworks which are already complicated due to diversity of norms, priorities and stakeholders. We will explore the role of scenarios, projections and early warning systems in planning for adaptation and mitigation under deep uncertainty and potential tipping points.

(Brook et al. 2013; Scheffer 2010; Kandlikar et al. 2005)

18

19 **7.3 Characterising Risk**

20 This section describes and characterises risk. It discusses the uncertainties that exist in the scientific
21 understanding of risk within the context of this report (7.3.1), explores dimensions of risk across time
22 and space (7.3.2), and describes emergent and substantive risks (7.3.3).

23 **7.3.1 Describing Risk and Drivers**

24 The specific dimensions of risk considered in this chapter relate to consequences of GHG fluxes,
25 climate change, and impacts of climate change (drought, flood, fire etc.), which may lead to soil
26 degradation, desertification, food insecurity and unsustainable land management. These impacts and
27 consequences of climate change may be worsened by the existence of drivers or human or natural
28 induced circumstances that cause change in ecosystems, either directly or indirectly; drivers may be
29 due to biological, physical, demographic, economic, socio-political, cultural, religious, or technical
30 factors (Nelson et al. 2006). The combination of the impacts of climate change with drivers creates a

1 severe problem: a social system problem where the exact nature of the issue is ill formulated;
2 information is confusing; many people have conflicting values that impact decision making
3 differently; every problem has sub-problems and is linked to other problems, and; confusing
4 ramifications to the whole system exists (Waddock 2013; Grundmann 2016). Because of this,
5 uncertainty and risk is not linear or simplistic, but complex requiring complex conceptual frameworks
6 (Kunreuther et al. 2014). As an example, the risk assessment of a hydroelectric dam that provides
7 renewable energy as well as irrigation water for food has not only climate change risk surrounding
8 variations in stream flow that differ across and within regions (Hamududu and Killingtveit 2012), but
9 also uncertainty in relation to the complex interplay of drivers including demographic shifts, human
10 development needs, energy and food security, investment and trade patterns (Grumbine et al. 2012).

11 *7.3.1.1 Uncertainty of Science*

12 IPCC AR5 relied on two metrics for communicating the degree of certainty in key findings:
13 Qualitative expressions of confidence in the validity of a finding based on the amount and level of
14 agreement in the evidence available; and Quantitative expressions of likelihood or probability of
15 specific events or outcomes. Uncertainty in climate science and its subsequent use has been assessed
16 and reviewed many times (IPCC Reports) along with the well described cascade of uncertainty (see
17 (Viner 2002)). However, the way in which scientific findings are used is less certain, in terms of
18 planning for and assessing risk in land management and climate and land interactions. For instance, in
19 the planning context, uncertainty in science exists when the exact nature of current and future
20 environmental trends and negative ecological impacts are not known, or the consequences of possible
21 interventions, their impact, what will occur if the interventions are not implemented or deferred
22 (Janicke and Jorgens 2000). As outlined in Chapter 1, uncertainties exist in scientific observations
23 surrounding land use and cover (Klein Goldewijk and Verburg 2013) and their associated agricultural
24 or forest management practices (Erb et al. 2017). Furthermore, there are large uncertainties in future
25 land projections due to differences in modelling approaches in current land use models which are at
26 least as great as the differences attributed to climate scenario variations (Alexander et al. 2017; Popp
27 et al. 2017). Finally, how land use and land management choices affect various ecosystem services
28 (7.3.3) and translate into biogeochemical and biogeophysical impacts on climate (Chapter 2) is also
29 uncertain. The uncertainty level is particularly acute for new technological solutions such as
30 bioenergy plantations and BECCS which are put forward to counteract climate change, but have not
31 been tested at large scales so far (Boysen et al. 2017a,b; Robledo-Abad et al. 2017; Vaughan and
32 Gough 2016).

33 Previous IPCC assessments have examined and used scenarios in a wide range of different ways and
34 from a very wide variety of sources, but questions still exist on how best to develop and use scenarios
35 (Lempert 2013). Scenarios have less confidence than do predictions, projections, and forecasts, but
36 they can provide valuable information at all planning stages depending on the competence of the
37 stakeholders. Using a broad range of scenarios can provide a comprehensive assessment but increase
38 complexity and cost (Lawrence et al. 2013). Uncertainty exists in relation to pathways to achieve the
39 ambition of keeping global-temperature change below 1.5°C; current Nationally Determined
40 Contributions (NDCs) maintain this uncertainty as they are far off the most realistic scenarios to meet
41 this target (Rogelj et al. 2016) as well as in relation to early warning systems, model structures,
42 parameterisations and inputs, and unknown futures as indicated in Chapter 1. A further challenge
43 exists surrounding uncertainty of anthropogenic climate change attribution as distinguished from
44 natural climate variability (Trenberth et al. 2015). Information on attribution plays an important role
45 in informing policy response (Garcia-Menendez et al. 2017). In order to address, understand and
46 ultimately cope with uncertainties in scenarios there is a requirement for policy makers to understand
47 that there is not one optimal and most likely future. Solutions and actions therefore need to be

1 adaptive and flexible to respond to new information and data that becomes available (Hallegatte and
2 Rentschler 2015).

3 **7.3.1.2 Uncertainty (Disagreement) of Norms, Values, Priorities**

4 The proactive actions of people adapting and mitigating climate change is based on how they
5 construct the risk of climate change and its impacts or judge its magnitude, and this is both an
6 individual and a political act (Fischhoff et al. 1984). While making a scientific realist assessment of
7 risk and objectively quantifying outcomes, the likelihood of a certain event is determined (likely to
8 rare) and the magnitude of its consequences (insignificant, minor, moderate, major, or catastrophic)
9 (Wisner et al. 2003). While engaged in this activity, people are fallible learners acting with often
10 incomplete information, based on perceptions of benefits, costs and reciprocity of relationships
11 (Ostrom 1998, 2010). Opposing the realist risk perspective is the perspective that risk is constructed
12 as experiences, emotions, attitudes, and knowledge, calibrating a ‘risk’ using a set of socially ascribed
13 decisions and calculative practices (Renn 2011; Zinn 2008; Kasperson et al. 1988).

14 These differing perspectives produce and underwrite uncertainty that can be: (1) substantive – where
15 there are gaps and conflicting understanding in the knowledge base such that there is no agreed and
16 clear understanding of the problem; (2) strategic – where many actors are involved having different
17 preferences such that their interaction and ultimate decision is unpredictable, and; (3) institutional –
18 where the processes of reaching decisions is messy and uncoordinated as the relevant actors are
19 attached to a variety of organisational locations, networks, and regulatory regimes (Koppenjan and
20 Klijn 2004). How risk is determined or constructed informs actors’ decisions and policy choices
21 (Hoppe 2011; Hisschemoller and Gupta 1999).

22 A problem may be structured, where there is agreement on norms, values and priorities and the
23 science is clear, or unstructured where there is little agreement on the norms, values and priorities and
24 the science is not clear. It is here with the unknown unknowns, chaotic (where cause and effect is not
25 discernible) and complex (where cause and effect may be determined after the event), that problems
26 reside (French 2015). Because of the uncertainty inherent in these problems, they are not often
27 holistically and consistently addressed by policy on the national, regional and local scales (Hurlbert
28 and Gupta 2016).

29 **7.3.2 Exploring Risk**

30 **7.3.2.1 Across Spatial Scales**

31 The characteristics of risk, including vulnerability, exposure and hazards, vary along spatial scales in
32 relation to both human and natural systems. For instance, global temperature increases are predicted
33 to impact specific species composition in a given location according to the impact on species
34 interactions at the local scale and dispersal between habitat patches at the regional scale (Grainger and
35 Gilbert 2017). Each of these local interactions may react to changes in climate in different ways and
36 positive local effects on one species’ intersections may have limited effect on habitat patches
37 elsewhere, due to a higher risk to a species of traversing a corridor to reach a neighboring patch
38 (Grainger and Gilbert 2017). As a result, single-scale analyses might misestimate the impacts of
39 anthropogenic modifications on species or the environment (Cohen et al. 2016). In relation to human
40 systems resilience at the household level, variations are not only by household (idiosyncratic shocks
41 such as illness of the breadwinner or loss of a job) (Holzmann and Jørgensen 2000), but also in
42 relation to agro-ecological setting (such as lowland, midland, and highland experiencing different
43 levels of vulnerability) (Tesfamariam and Hurlbert 2017).

44 **7.3.2.2 Time Frames of Risk – Current and Future**

45 Risk is a dynamic phenomenon that varies across time and includes short-term, or acute shocks (e.g.
46 extreme events of storm, fire or flood), and slow onset, or chronic events that occur over a long period

1 of time including drought. These events have differing levels of predictability at differing timescales.
2 For instance, current weather (0-14 days) at specific locations and specific times has a degree of
3 predictability, but as the timescale increases to monthly, seasonal, multi-annual or decadal, etc.
4 predictability changes in relation to the source of predictability (large scale weather patterns, sea-
5 surface temperatures, sub-surface oceanic conditions) and the scale of predictability (specific
6 locations, geographical scales (sub-continental, tropics etc.) (Jones and Morse 2012).

7 People and fauna are impacted by these natural events, but also experience vulnerability over time, or
8 at specific points in their life cycle. In a plant lifecycle, regeneration and recruitment are key phases
9 related to adaptation, distribution and survival of species (for example of trees in Nepal germinating at
10 higher temperatures but failing to establish, and insects altering behaviours at key points see (Marzluff
11 and Neatherlin 2006)). There is *medium agreement but limited evidence* of the interactions of rapid
12 and slow onset events and their impact on physiological and behaviour plasticity, genetic
13 differentiation, and phenotypic plasticity of species. The inherent dynamics of socio-economic
14 changes in vulnerability and resilience over time and space must also be considered such as
15 urbanisation or infrastructure construction; a gap in the literature exists as often only biophysical
16 dynamics of change are taken into account (Jurgilevich et al. 2017). Climate change risk across a
17 range of time scales from current weather induced risks to longer term changes is complex due to
18 multiple causal pathways of transmission through interconnected systems such as agriculture, trade
19 and food security; for example, climate change may give the UK a comparative advantage causing
20 domestic food production to become unsustainable (Challinor et al. 2017).

21 **7.3.2.3 Pace of Risk: Dynamics of risk**

22 The dynamics of risk (vulnerability, hazard and exposure) change over time both as a result of human
23 and natural process. Biological processes, genomic regions, and specific genes, for example, can
24 influence the vulnerability of individuals, populations and species. Adaptive phenotypic plasticity
25 (such as altered breeding times) and genetic evolution (such as increased metabolism) can mediate the
26 effects of environmental or climate shifts (Chevin and Lande 2010). An initially maladapted
27 population may become less vulnerable over time as plasticity benefits accrue over time. However,
28 species or individuals that lack such responses, or are unable to respond at the same rate, may have
29 heightened vulnerability. Genomic regions and specific genes are involved in climate change
30 adaptation in yellow warblers (Fitzpatrick and Edelsparre 2018). Longer lived species must evolve
31 faster per generation to adapt to a given rate of environmental change (Chevin et al. 2010). A recent
32 study shows that sea bird populations have been unable to adjust their breeding seasons over time in
33 response to changes in sea surface temperature; their vulnerability will increase if they are unable to
34 adapt to their prey (which is being changed by sea surface temperature change) (Keogan et al. 2018).

35 **7.3.2.4 Augmentation and Reduction of Risk**

36 Risks may become augmented through stresses with long fuses or triggering events because of linked
37 nature of climates across different regions of the world (e.g. ENSO climatic impacts that result in
38 large-scale droughts with multiple impacts in different countries and regions) (See Box 7.3), through
39 socio-economic factors such as real or perceived resource limitation (e.g. when food systems fail to
40 deliver food security or food price volatility as an aggregate perceived risk) (Challinor et al. 2017),
41 and maladaptation (see 7.5.8). Collective responses can further augment risks, especially if sudden
42 onset, affecting a large number of people and having significant short-term impacts (Homer-Dixon et
43 al. 2015). Risks may be reduced through adaptation, mitigation and policy measures (see 7.4, 7.5).

44 PLACE HOLDER - figure illustrating risk and uncertainty in relation to GHG fluxes, land
45 (degradation, desertification), climate, and food security

46

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Box 7.3: El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO)

The El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) which occurs quasi-periodically influences climate, ecosystems and societies across the world and is one of the most important sources of variability in the global carbon cycle, especially for tropical forests. ENSO’s relationship with regional climate such as the Monsoon has been non-linear and non-stationary. The El Nino of 2015/2016 was one of the strongest tropical climate events in the last hundred years, 20 years after the very strong 1997-98 event, and draws our attention to the future of this phenomena under climate change and the role it is likely to play in influencing the success or failure of mitigation and adaptation at diverse temporal and spatial scales. This box will illustrate the scenarios of emerging and cascading risks and possible policy responses at global scales, locally and regionally across diverse socio-ecological systems from changes in the intensity of ENSO (El Nino/La Nina) under future climate and land scenarios.

(Betts et al. 2016; Cai et al. 2015; Cane 2005; Paz and Semenza 2016; Wolter and Timlin 1998)

7.3.3 Emergent Risks and Substantive Risks

An analysis of risk as a factor of probability and impact does not work well for non-linear or ‘tipping point’ occurrences (such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet). There is *high agreement and limited evidence* that highly uncertain, low probability but high impact events that include crossing thresholds or tipping points are increasingly important for policy makers to address (Trisos et al. 2018) document that rapid Solar Radiation Management (SRM) termination would result in rapid climate change significantly increasing the threats to global biodiversity and ecosystems, especially in the tropics. SRM geoengineering is cited as a feasible and affordable technology to cool specific areas of the earth and reduce some climate risks for biodiversity, but there may be agricultural impacts and further research is needed (Caldeira et al. 2013; Kosugi 2013).

1
2
3
4
5

Table 7.1 Characterising land-climate risk and indicative policy responses

Table 7.1 shows hazards from land-climate-society interactions identified in other chapters or in IPCC reports; the regions that are exposed or will be exposed to these hazards; components of the land-climate systems and societies that are vulnerable to the hazard; the risk associated with these impacts and the available policy responses. The last column shows representative supporting literature.

Land-Climate-Society interaction Hazard	Exposure	Vulnerability	Risk	Policy Response (Indicative)	References
Forest dieback	Widespread across biomes and regions	Marginalised Population with insecure land tenure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of forest-based livelihoods • Loss of identity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land rights based • Community conservation political • Enhanced enfranchisement 	(Allen et al. 2010; Sunderlin et al. 2005; Belcher et al. 2005; Soizic Le Saout and Michael Hoffmann, Yichuan Shi, Adrian Hughes, Cyril Bernard, Thomas M. Brooks, Bastian Bertzky, Stuart H.M. Butchart, Simon N. Stuart, Tim Badman 2013) (Bailis et al. 2015; Cameron et al. 2016)
Fluvial flooding in urban areas	Widespread across regions	Across socio-economic strata but socially differentiated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extinction • Loss of ecosystem services • Cultural loss 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective enforcement of protected areas and curbs on illegal trade • Ecosystem Restoration • Protection of indigenous people • Regulation of urban land use • Pervious green spaces • LID (Low Impact Development) • Improved drainage • Upstream measure, i.e. upland restoration (peat uplands) • Sacrificial agricultural areas • Floodplain restoration 	(Ashley et al. 2005; Wilby 2007; Pelling 2012; Douglas et al. 2008; Tyler and Moench 2012)
Extreme events in	Global	• Food importing countries	• Conflict	• Insurance	(Fraser et al. 2005;

Land-Climate-Society interaction Hazard	Exposure	Vulnerability	Risk	Policy Response (Indicative)	References
multiple (biophysical and management) agricultural regimes Multi-bread basket failure		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low income indebtedness • Net food buyer 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migration • Food inflation • Loss of life • Disease, malnutrition • Farmer suicides 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social Protection encouraging diversity of sources • Climate smart agriculture 	Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007; Lipper et al. 2014a)
Changes in river systems	1.5 billion people, Regional (e.g. South Asia, Australia) Aral sea and others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Water intensive agriculture • Fresh-water, estuarine and near coastal ecosystems • Fishers • Endangered species and ecosystems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of livelihoods and identity • Migration • Indebtedness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assess performance of climate model in simulating historical regional climate • Build alternative scenarios • Experiment with Alternative crop and water management strategies • Redefine SDGs to include fresh-water ecosystems 	(Craig 2010; Di Baldassarre et al. 2013; Verma et al. 2009; Ghosh et al. 2016; Higgins et al. 2018)
Exhaustion of ground-water	Wide-spread across biomes and regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farmers, drinking water supply • Irrigation • See forest note above • Agricultural production • Urban sustainability (Phoenix, US) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food insecurity • Migration • Disease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adaptation strategies that reduce dependence on deep ground water 	(Wada et al. 2010; Rodell et al. 2009; Taylor et al. 2013)
Climate change impacts on land and water including impacts of mitigation measures	Across various biomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farmers and pastoralists • Endangered species and ecosystems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional food insecurity • Downstream impacts on biodiversity, ecosystem services and marginalised communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avoidance • Mitigation of impacts 	(Zomer et al. 2008; Nyong et al. 2007a; Pielke et al. 2002; Schmidhuber and Tubiello 2007; Jumani et al. 2017a; Eldridge et al. 2011)
Ecosystem shifts: e.g. Bush and woody encroachment in grasslands and pasture lands	Wide-spread across grass/semi-arid biomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farmers and pastoralists • Biodiversity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Downstream impacts on food security, biodiversity, ecosystem services and marginalised communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adaptive management of fire, livestock and wild herbivores 	(Eldridge et al. 2011; Asner et al. 2004; Moleele et al. 2002)
Competition for land e.g. Plastic substitution	Peri-urban and rural areas in developing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural landscapes; farmers; charcoal suppliers; small 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Land degradation; loss of ecosystem services; GHG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustainability certification; producer permits; subsidies 	(Woollen et al. 2016; Kiruki

Land-Climate-Society interaction Hazard	Exposure	Vulnerability	Risk	Policy Response (Indicative)	References
by cellulose, Charcoal production	countries	businesses	emissions; lower adaptive capacity	for efficient kilns	et al. 2017)
Overharvesting of biomass and/or dependence on traditional cookstoves	Mainly poor rural areas in developing countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rural landscapes; poor households; women and children 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GHG emissions, indoor air pollution, short-lived climate forcers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subsidies for cleaner fuels and stoves; promotion of managed woodlots 	(Woollen et al. 2016; Bailis et al. 2015)
Land degradation and desertification	Arid, Semi-arid and sub-humid regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Farmers • Pastoralists • Biodiversity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food insecurity • Migration • Loss of agro and wild biodiversity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restoration of ecosystems • Climate smart agriculture and livestock management • Managing economic impacts of global and local drivers 	(Fleskens, Luuk, Stringer 2014; Lambin et al. 2001)
Loss of snow and glaciers	Boreal, Mountain and downstream river basins	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Riparian Ecosystems • Mountain villages and towns 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summer flows of rivers • Loss of biodiversity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Climate change mitigation • Prioritize remaining high elevation and latitude biodiversity hotspots to reduce non-climatic stressors • Maintain ecological flows 	(Barnett et al. 2005a)
Coastal inundation	Islands, coasts and deltas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cities, towns, delta farmers, fishing communities, • Estuaries, mangroves, Beach and dune ecosystems 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of infrastructure, livelihoods and migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adaptation to transforming ecosystems • Planned migration 	(Tribbia and Moser 2008a)
Loss of carbon sinks	Wide-spread across biomes and regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tropical forests • Boreal soils 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feed-back to global and regional climate change 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conservation prioritisation of tropical forests • Afforestation 	(Barnett et al. 2005b; Tribbia and Moser 2008b)
Permafrost destabilisation	Arctic and Sub-Arctic regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Soils • Indigenous communities • Biodiversity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced GHG emissions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced carbon uptake from novel ecosystem after thaw • Adapt to emerging wetlands 	(Schoor et al. 2015)

1 **7.3.3.1 Extreme Events**

2 The length or number of warm spells or heat waves has increased in many areas of the world and
3 many are experiencing more intense, frequent, and longer droughts. At the same time, and often in
4 the same place that drought is being experienced, torrential rains and flooding is occurring (Modarres
5 et al. 2016; Mann et al. 2017). Other extreme events resulting from climate change and documented in
6 chapter 6 are anticipated to have impacts on human systems and livelihoods, socio-economic factors,
7 and food security as detailed in Table 7.1.

8 **7.3.3.2 Loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services**

9 Climate change is a great risk to maintaining biodiversity and ecosystem services. According to the
10 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005), climate change is
11 likely to become one of the most significant drivers of biodiversity loss by the end of the century.
12 Climate change is already having an impact on biodiversity, and is projected to become a
13 progressively more significant threat in the coming decades; loss of Arctic sea ice threatens
14 biodiversity across an entire biome and beyond; the related pressure of ocean acidification, resulting
15 from higher concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, is also already being observed
16 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2009). (Parry et al. 2007) suggest that
17 approximately 10% of species assessed so far will be at an increasingly high risk of extinction for
18 every 1°C rise in global mean temperature, within the range of future scenarios modelled in impacts
19 assessments (typically <5°C global temperature rise). There is ample evidence that climate change
20 affects biodiversity. Although there is relatively limited evidence of current extinctions caused by
21 climate change, studies suggest that climate change could surpass habitat destruction as the greatest
22 global threat to biodiversity over the next several decades (Pereira et al. 2010). However, the
23 multiplicity of approaches and the resulting variability in projections make it difficult to get a clear
24 picture of the future of biodiversity under different scenarios of global climatic change (Pereira et al.
25 2010).

26 **7.3.3.3 Vulnerability of carbon sinks (e.g. BECCS)**

27 Mitigation scenarios stabilising temperature change at or below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels
28 typically rely heavily on BECCS and/or afforestation (AR5 WGIII, Ch11; SR1.5, Ch2; this report
29 Ch2; (Millar et al. 2017)). In essence, these strategies are transferring emitted carbon previously
30 stored in geological reservoirs into the terrestrial biosphere (afforestation) or back to a geological
31 layer or aquifer (BECCS) (Smith et al. 2015). The carbon sequestered in terrestrial ecosystems as in
32 the case of afforestation is directly exposed to changing climate conditions, climate extremes, fires,
33 insect outbreaks and other disturbances thus threatening the permanency of carbon storage and
34 therefore the overall effectiveness of the approach. This represents an emergent risk that is currently
35 not accounted for in future land use scenarios (Popp et al. 2017). E.g. forest mortality under climate
36 change (McDowell and Allen 2015) and wildfire (Balshi et al. 2009). The level of risk will be directly
37 affected by the magnitude and rate of future climate change. The AR5 WGII report highlighted that,
38 in medium to high-emission scenarios, increased tree mortality and associated forest dieback is
39 projected to occur in many regions over the 21st century, due to increased temperatures and drought
40 (*medium confidence*). In contrast, this risk remains limited in low emission scenarios and therefore
41 afforestation measures will be most effective when combined with a decarbonisation of the energy
42 sector consistent with the Paris Agreement goal. In addition to the vulnerability of the carbon stored
43 in the terrestrial biosphere, there is also the issue of the long-term stability of the carbon re-injected in
44 geological reservoirs (specifically for the case of BECCS).

45 **7.3.3.4 Migration**

46 The First Assessment Report of the IPCC (1990) included mention of environmentally induced
47 migration, and empirical studies have accelerated since this time (Warner 2010; Warner et al. 2010),

1 recognising that people respond to weather change and climate related factors (in tandem with other
2 variables) and people act as agents choosing their future about how and where to live (Hendrix and
3 Salehyan 2012). Displacement may occur because of extreme events, whereby people return once
4 conditions return to normal; weather dependent livelihood systems may deteriorate from slow onset
5 events causing people to move in search of alternative livelihoods in the short to medium term;
6 climate may interact with social conflict causing movement at larger scales (detailed below) and long
7 term deterioration in habitability of regions could trigger spatial population shifts (Denton et al.
8 2015).

9 **7.3.3.5 Urbanisation**

10 There is *low agreement and limited evidence* that people don't always move away from
11 environmental risks, but may move towards environmental risks, due to drivers of urbanisation
12 (Geddes et al. 2012; Adger et al. 2015). Growing urban areas from rural population migration may
13 lead to exposure to - and a state of being trapped in - serious risk due to health, poor building
14 standards and mud slides etc. (Geddes et al. 2012; Adger et al. 2015)

15 **7.3.3.6 Conflict over Resources**

16 Climate change and climate change migration could be a factor leading to tensions over scarce
17 strategic resources, exacerbating fragile States into socio-economic and political unrest (Carleton et
18 al. 2016). Increasing conflict could be in relation to land when rainfall patterns change, thereby
19 degrading land and vegetation and impacting productions systems, particularly where there is rain fed
20 agriculture or subsistence farming (Papaioannou 2016; Wario, Adano, R., Fatuma 2012). There is *low*
21 *agreement and limited evidence* on the extent that climate change versus politics link directly to
22 violent conflict (Barnett and Adger 2007; Scheffran et al. 2012; Nordaas and Gleditsch 2015), but
23 there is *medium agreement and medium evidence* that governance is key in magnifying or moderating
24 climate change impact and conflict (Oshiek 2015).

25 Climate change and climate change induced development responses in countries and regions are likely
26 to enhance conflicts over water and land its impact on agriculture, fisheries, livestock and drinking
27 water downstream (Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Vörösmarty et al. 2000). Shared pastoral landscapes
28 used by marginalised communities are particularly impacted by conflicts that are likely to become
29 more severe under future climate change (Hendrix and Glaser 2007). Extreme events could
30 considerably enhance these risks, in particular long-onset droughts (Wilhite and Pulwarty 2017).

31
32 Mitigation measures such as solar farms and hydro-electric projects could potentially impact
33 livelihoods and resources for marginalised communities and reduce socio-ecological resilience and
34 resistance to these could impact mitigation strategies (Turney and Fthenakis 2011; Chowdhury and
35 Kipgen 2013). Land based mitigation measures could benefit from additional criteria of quality of soil
36 for other potential competing uses under a changed climate such as food and livestock production.

37
38 Multi-national agreements on water sharing are currently inadequate in covering issues related to
39 shared resources and ecosystem services (Lebel et al. 2005). Poff et al. (2003) identify four key
40 elements for successful decision making to resolve conflicts: conduct ecosystem-scale experiments
41 through controlled river flow manipulations with existing projects; more cooperative interactions
42 among diverse stakeholders; experimental results be synthesised across studies to allow broader
43 generalisation to other regions; and new, innovative funding partnerships at local and regional scales
44 engage to broadly involve scientists, government, the private sector, and NGOs.

45
46 Adoption of wide scale BECCS and solar coupled with increasing demand for land from urban
47 development and resources substitution such as plastics has the potential for increased conflict and
48 displacement. This is an identified research gap.

49

1 **7.3.3.7 Cascading Risk of Migration and Conflict**

2 Biodiversity will be severely impacted by climate change induced land degradation and ecosystem
3 transformation (Pecl et al. 2017). This may impact humans directly and indirectly through cascading
4 impacts on ecosystem function and ecosystem services (Millennium Assessment 2005). Climate
5 change induced human migration is likely to impact biodiversity in two ways: movement into areas
6 that are suitable for biodiversity now and in the future, and; new areas that are suitable for migrating
7 biodiversity under changed climate but may be occupied by migrating humans under climate and land
8 degradation stress (Oglethorpe, J., Ericson, J., Bilsborrow, R.E. and Edmond 2007).

9
10 The policy and management approaches to conserving biodiversity in a changing climate include:
11 population restoration: reintroduction and reinforcement, conservation introductions, assisted
12 colonisation or migration, ecological replacements (Rebuilding ecosystems by removing invasive
13 species and introducing ecological replacements) as well rewilding (McLachlan et al. 2007; Seddon et
14 al. 2014). Interventions under the current scenarios of millions of people migrating across frontiers are
15 already being tested successfully (Oglethorpe, J., Ericson, J., Bilsborrow, R.E. and Edmond 2007).

16
17 Limiting greenhouse gas emissions will allow more time for species to adapt. However, movement of
18 biodiversity poleward or to higher elevations will be more complicated for aquatic biodiversity
19 compared to terrestrial biodiversity because of the linear nature of river systems especially those that
20 are east-west (Pereira et al. 2010). Combined with ongoing and future transformations of water
21 systems for other development goals, loss of aquatic biodiversity is a cascading risk. Policy and
22 decision support systems that go beyond narrow economic criteria to include socially valued
23 ecosystem functions and services such as EEDS offer promise for stakeholder defined metrics
24 under unknown climate states (Poff et al. 2016). Alien species and novel ecosystems that could
25 replace native biodiversity and displace existing ecosystems pose both challenges and opportunities
26 for adaptation and mitigation (Walther et al. 2009). Policy and management responses, such as
27 assisted migration of biodiversity or introduction of non-native biodiversity in new regions under
28 climate change or land sparing and land sharing approaches to conservation, are still being debated
29 and are a big source of uncertainty, disagreement and concern. Uncertainty and disagreement about
30 policy and management approaches can be reduced considerably by integrating social sciences in
31 conservation planning and scenario building (Perrings et al. 2011; Dawson et al. 2011).

32 33 **7.3.3.8 Food, Health and Nutrition**

34 There is little understanding of how food system shocks cascade through a modern interconnected
35 economy (Benton et al. 2017; Centeno et al. 2015; Puma et al. 2015a; Maynard 2015). Further,
36 reliance on global markets can carry a systemic risk and on-going globalisation of food trade networks
37 exposes the world food system to new impacts that have not been seen in the past. The global food
38 system is vulnerable to systemic disruptions and increasingly interconnected inter-country food
39 dependencies and changes in frequency and severity of extreme weather events may complicate future
40 responses (Puma et al. 2015a; Jones and Hiller 2017).

41 There is a complex interplay among different environmental changes, including land dynamics,
42 climate change, and resource scarcity that increase human exposure to infectious diseases, access to
43 food and water, protection from natural and other hazards, and impact negatively human health
44 (Myers et al. 2013). In addition, there can be insulating factors or processes that protect populations
45 from negative health outcomes, specifically, in the relationship between public health and climate
46 change at global scales. (Watts et al. 2015) shows how the inclusion of demographic trends including
47 ageing, migration and population growth, makes the affected population larger than expected in other
48 global reports (Smith et al. 2014a). Little capacity to respond to food production shocks exists at
49 global levels. Rather, most capacity exists at the national scale or lower and policy interventions are
50 prioritised for national interests. This leads to poor coordination at regional and global scales.
51 Coordinated responses at scale will require a holistic international framework (Jones and Hiller 2015,

1 2017). Responses in advance to address food production shocks could include investment in food
2 buffer stocks and protection of agriculturally productive lands (Puma et al. 2015a). Global or
3 regionally integrated food buffer stocks and emergency reserves need to be large enough to be of
4 assistance (Jones and Hiller 2015). To better model, predict, respond to and prepare for concurrent
5 agricultural failures, and gain a more systematic assessment of exposure to agricultural climate risk,
6 large data gaps need to be filled, as well as gaps in empirical foundation and analytical capabilities
7 (Janetos et al. 2017; Lunt et al. 2016). Data required include global historical datasets, many of which
8 are unreliable, inaccessible, or just unavailable (Maynard 2015; Lunt et al. 2016). Assessment of
9 socio-economic and spatial dynamics poses challenges (Jurgilevich et al. 2017). Challenges to
10 scenario-guided adaptive action on food security under climate change include developing long-term
11 shared capacity for strategic planning – both development of the capacity to produce anticipatory
12 knowledge and also the capacity to use it (Vervoort et al. 2014).

13 There is a well-established relationship between extremely high temperatures and morbidity and
14 mortality (Watts et al. 2015). Quantitative assessments and statistical modelling for all regions of the
15 world show an increase in *additional deaths* attributable to climate change induced heat waves, in
16 virtually all regions of the world (World Health Organization 2014); on average, 37,588 additional
17 deaths for 2030 and 94,621 additional deaths for 2050 will occur due to climate change induced heat
18 waves. Land cover and land use change is important to explain heat waves, specifically changes
19 related to the increase of impervious surfaces like asphalt, cement, roofs in urban centres, which can
20 produce 30°C to 40°C difference from surrounding air (Frumkin 2002) and increase 5°C to 11°C
21 compared to surrounding rural areas (Aniello et al. 1995). This phenomenon converts cities to “heat
22 islands,” which exacerbate the effect of extreme heat waves in cities (Li et al. 2015). On the other
23 hand, very strong cooling effect in terms of surface temperature has been identified in regions where
24 the proportion of vegetation cover was between 70% and almost 80% per square kilometre
25 (Alavipanah et al. 2015).

26 It is also well documented how vectors of infectious diseases, including mosquitos, ticks, sandflies
27 and others, and infectious agents, such as protozoa, bacteria, and viruses, are extremely dependent on
28 the dynamics of ecological conditions, including climate and land cover change (Smith et al. 2014a).
29 For example, for dengue and chikungunya, (Campbell et al. 2015) indicate complex global
30 rearrangements of potential distributional areas for the two main vectors, which are likely to translate
31 into actual distributional shifts across the globe.

32 Much attention has been put into the effects of climate and land change with regards to malaria. The
33 WHO (World Health Organization 2014) estimates 60,091 additional deaths for climate change
34 induced malaria for the year 2030 and 32,695 for 2050. There is an ongoing debate on the impacts of
35 climate change in relation to malaria, especially in Africa, where new research shows how changes in
36 temperature will change suitability areas for the transmission of malaria, and will shift very high-risk
37 areas and temporal cycles to places that did not experience it before (Ryan et al. 2015; Terrazas et al.
38 2015; Kweka et al. 2016), but also ameliorate the impact in areas previously impacted (Yamana et al.
39 2016). In terms of the nexus between land cover change and malaria, there is also contrasting
40 findings. In the Amazon for example, new research shows that deforestation will increase malaria,
41 where vectors are expected to increase their home range (Alimi et al. 2015) but also shows how the
42 association between forest status and malaria can be confounded with multiple factors such as water
43 bodies, social-economic conditions and immunity (Tucker Lima et al. 2017). Moreover, not only net
44 loss of forest is important, but also edge effects and fragmentation have been found to exacerbate
45 malaria transmission (Barros and Honório 2015). In Asia and specifically in China, taking into
46 consideration land use and urbanisation simultaneously, Ren et al. (2016) predict a substantial net
47 increase in the population exposed to the four dominant malaria vectors in the years 2030 to 2050.
48 Here, deforestation has been shown to enhance the survival and development of larvae major malaria

1 vectors (Wang et al. 2016). New research has found key differences across regions and there still is
2 considerable uncertainty related to the differences in data and climatic scenarios, spatial explicit
3 methods in infections modelling, and how to capture local climatic effects in disease prediction.

4 **7.3.4 Economic Costs – What is at stake?**

5 Healthy functioning land and ecosystems are essential for human health, food and livelihood security.
6 While many of the values are inestimable in an economic sense, others can be appraised, at least
7 partially, and the numbers are substantial. One study estimated the value of ecosystem services in
8 2011 at 125 trillion USD per year, showing a loss from 2007 due to land use change of 4.3 – 20.2
9 trillion USD per year (Costanza et al. 2014; Rockström et al. 2009). A preliminary regional
10 assessment suggested the economic value of ecosystems like coastal and freshwater wetlands in West
11 Asia to approach 7.2 billion USD in 2007 USD (Eppink et al. 2014). Land-climate change interactions
12 pose a significant threat to these values, and evidence about economic costs as a subset of these values
13 illustrates how substantial climate impacts may become.

14 Understanding the full cost of what is at stake from climate change presents challenges because of
15 inadequate accounting of how much climate change and land interactions impact society, and the
16 value of those impacts for society (Santos et al. 2016). Concerns related to negative impacts from
17 land-climate interactions pertain fundamentally to issues of valuation (Paracchini et al. 2016). Some
18 values people assign to land are inalienable when it becomes degraded or lost and when symbolic
19 value is high, such as ancestral ties to the land, or traditional and indigenous knowledge systems
20 (Morrissey and Oliver-Smith 2013; Boillat and Berkes 2013). Such inestimable values of land are
21 core to social cohesion—sense of community, social norms and institutions, and trust, which are
22 linked to shared symbolic understandings related to land and space. Symbolic value, and the systems
23 that maintain it, lie at the heart of social capital which is central to resilient societies (Adger 2009).
24 The destruction of such symbolically valuable goods can therefore result in major losses in human
25 well-being, which are not captured in economic terms.

26 There is a perception that acting on climate change involves a trade-off with economic growth.
27 However, a range of studies have attempted to estimate the economic impacts of climate change, and
28 while the values are not directly comparable (due to differences in modelling approaches, assumptions
29 and time periods) they range from a global average reduction in GDP from 0% of GDP to 11.5% of
30 GDP (Tol 2014). Another study estimated that global incomes would decline by 23% by 2100 with
31 unmitigated warming (Burke et al. 2015). This range includes earlier appraisals (e.g. Nordhaus 2014)
32 that have been criticised for the credibility of their damage functions (Stern 2016; Diaz and Moore
33 2017), and since then methods have been refined, resulting in higher magnitudes of costs. Most
34 studies show increasing effects on GDP as global mean temperatures increase. There is compelling
35 evidence (Schleussner et al. 2016; e.g. Pretis et al. 2018) that impacts in a 1.5°C warmer world will
36 fall within the range of natural variability, while 2°C of warming may mean a shift in the climate
37 regime (although some countries are identifying significant impacts at less than 1.5°C (Li et al. 2018) .

38 Although current economic models do not yet fully capture the negative economic impacts of a world
39 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, evidence suggests substantial threats to coastal communities,
40 fisheries and ecosystems related to coral reef tipping points within this range (Schleussner et al.
41 2016). Some of the places and systems most likely to be affected by this difference are those already
42 vulnerable to certain impacts, such as the Mediterranean (including North Africa and the Levant)
43 which is projected to become a hotspot for reductions in water availability and increases in dry spell
44 periods between 1.5°C and 2°C (Schleussner et al. 2016). Extreme heat and crop yield reductions are
45 expected to increase most in tropical regions in Africa and South-East Asia under 2°C warming,
46 which combined with the other stressors these regions already face, may be very difficult to adapt to.
47 Beyond localised economic effects, a 2°C warming scenario is likely to be associated with
48 significantly lower projected economic growth for a large set of countries (Pretis et al. 2018) (*medium*

1 *confidence, medium agreement*). The implications of this understanding are that limiting temperature
2 increase to below 1.5°C may avoid a number of impacts and implications that will be much harder to
3 adapt to.

4 At higher levels of mean global temperature, economic damages caused as a result of climate change
5 are estimated at between 7%-8% of global GDP for a 3°C increase, and between 9%–10% when
6 including catastrophic risks (Howard and Sterner 2017) (*medium confidence, medium agreement*).
7 While most studies project greater reductions in lower income countries, studies show that economic
8 activity in all regions is coupled to the global climate (Burke et al. 2015). However, warming is likely
9 to amplify global inequalities (*high evidence, high agreement*) (Burke et al. 2015; Tol 2018).

10 [Placeholder on or referring to evidence on costs of land degradation, desertification, etc.]

11 **7.3.4.1 The costs and timing of action**

12 The costs of adapting to these impacts are also projected to be substantial (recognising also that the
13 delineation between the cost of impacts and the cost of adaptation is blurred). The evidence for the
14 costs of adaptation at a global level is limited, and summarised in (Chambwera et al. 2014a). These
15 studies primarily identify the magnitude of adaptation finance needed and indicate huge values
16 ranging from 9 to 166 billion USD per year at various scales and types of adaptation, from capacity
17 building to specific projects. Other studies estimating residual costs suggest even higher values (Parry
18 et al. 2009). However the value and accuracy of these aggregated costs is questionable, compared
19 with more detailed sectoral level studies (Fankhauser 2017).

20 In the humanitarian sector, in areas such as food security, early action yields economic benefits
21 greater than costs (*high agreement, high evidence*) (Fankhauser 2017; Wilkinson et al. 2018; Venton
22 2018; Venton et al. 2012). Studies show that for every dollar spent on disaster mitigation and risk
23 reduction activities, between 4 and 11 USD in disaster-related economic losses can be prevented
24 (Clarvis et al. 2015). In Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, early humanitarian response for drought would
25 save an estimated 1.6 billion USD in aid costs over a 15-year period (Venton 2018). If avoided losses
26 are also included in cost estimates, such early response could save 2.5 billion USD or an average of
27 163 million USD per year (Venton 2018). Modeling of household level data for 2.6 million people in
28 the Zambezi Valley and Limpopo Basin suggests that early response to droughts and floods could
29 save between 330 million and 2 billion USD over 20 years (Venton et al. 2013). Similar trends exist
30 for health interventions. Prevention of diseases, including non-communicable diseases related to diet
31 and consumption, offers a higher return on investment than disease control (Nugent et al. 2018).
32 Benefit–cost ratios of non-communicable disease prevention vary by intervention but generate an
33 average economic return of 5.6 and social returns of 10.9 (Bertram et al. 2018). Early action in other
34 sectors can also result in win-win outcomes or co-benefits in the current climate (Fankhauser 2017),
35 for example through ecosystem-based adaptation measures that can provide biodiversity, water and
36 soil quality, carbon sequestration and recreation co-benefits (McVittie et al. 2018).

37 Despite this evidence, decision makers often discount future or geographically remote risks (Challinor
38 et al. 2017; Clarke and Dercon 2016). Lack of investment in early action reflects the lack of incentives
39 to allocate funds in advance of crisis (Clarvis et al. 2015; Clarke and Dercon 2016) A perceived risk
40 in responding early is that funds will be released unnecessarily for situations that turn out not to be
41 disasters. However, one study suggests that donors could mistakenly release funds six times in
42 Mozambique before the cost is equivalent to the cost of humanitarian aid for one event (Venton et al.
43 2013).

44 Not only is timing important, but the type of intervention itself can influence returns (*high agreement,*
45 *high evidence*). Policy packages that make people more resilient - expanding financial inclusion,
46 disaster risk and health insurance, social protection and adaptive safety nets, contingent finance and
47 reserve funds, and universal access to early warning systems – could save 100 billion USD a year, if

1 implemented globally (Hallegatte et al. 2017). In Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, every 1 USD spent on
2 safety net/resilience programming results in net benefits of between 2.3 and 3.3 USD (Venton 2018).
3 Investing in resilience building activities, which increase household income by 365 to 450 USD per
4 year in these countries, is more cost effective than providing ongoing humanitarian assistance.

5 There is a need to further examine returns on investment for land-based adaptation measures, both in
6 the short and long term. Other outstanding questions include identifying specific triggers for early
7 response. Food insecurity, for example, can occur due to a mixture of market and environmental
8 factors (changes in food prices, animal or crop prices, rainfall patterns) (Venton 2018). The efficacy
9 of different triggers, intervention times and modes of funding are currently being evaluated (see for
10 example forecast based finance study (Alverson and Zommers 2018). To reduce losses and maximise
11 returns on investments, this information can be used to develop: 1) coordinated, agreed plans for
12 action both pre and post-event action; 2) a clear, evidence-based decision-making process, and; 3)
13 financing models to ensure that the plans for early action can be implemented (Clarke, Daniel; Dercon
14 2016).

15 Early action on reducing emissions (mitigation) is also estimated to result in both lower temperature
16 increases as well as lower costs than delayed action (Luderer et al. 2013). Continued inaction reduces
17 the future policy option space, reduces economic growth and increases the challenges of mitigation
18 (Moore and Diaz 2015; Luderer et al. 2013).

19 The cost of reducing emissions is generally estimated to be considerably less than the costs of the
20 damages. A number of studies identify these costs on a global level (Klenk et al. 2015; Kainuma et
21 al. 2013) or at a national, subnational, sectoral or project level (e.g. (Moran 2011; Sanchez 2016).

22 The residual impacts of climate change that we are not able to avoid through emissions reductions and
23 that people have not been able to cope with or adapt to come under the category of ‘loss and damage’
24 (Warner and van der Geest 2013). While there is considerable overlap between all of these cost
25 categories, the implications are clear: the more harm from climate change we fail to avoid through
26 adaptation and mitigation, the more that will have to be addressed through contingency arrangements
27 (Verchick 2018), some of which may involve changing values and objectives or accepting that it may
28 no longer be possible to secure those objectives (Dow et al. 2013b; Kates et al. 2012). But while
29 some damages can be valued in economic terms, such as crop failure, others are less able to be valued,
30 or compensated for, such as irreversible land use change, species extinction, and loss of social
31 cohesion and social disarticulation (Romero Manrique et al. 2018; Below et al. 2012; Tschakert
32 2014). Finding the right balance between these types of costs is a complex question, informed by
33 local and global social, cultural, environmental and economic priorities.


34 **Case Study – Indonesia** (Mercy Corps Indonesia and EcoMetrix Solutions Group 2018)
35 (Placeholder)

36
37

38 **7.3.5 Conceptualising key, substantive and emergent risks**

39 Figure 7.1 embodies uncertainty and risk. It captures case studies and examples of key, substantive,
40 emerging and cascading risks from land-climate-society interactions defined along three dimensions:
41 The three axes are described as: x= scale (spatial and temporal), y= disagreement (norms, values, and
42 priorities) and z= uncertainty in knowledge. The level of risk is indicated by a simple sum of three
43 numbers. The level of uncertainty in respect of each case study is assessed from 1 (low
44 uncertainty/disagreement/local scale) to 3 (high uncertainty/disagreement/distant scale). The size and
45 the grey scale intensity shade of the bubble is proportional to the level risk (sum). The numbers inside
46 the bubble indicate trade-offs with respect to some specific combination of the 17 SDGs and three
47 additional goals related to including Life and Rivers, Ecosystem services, and Response to Land,

- 1 Climate interactions which are shown in Figure 7.1. Within the bubbles a number appears; in the box
- 2 below the figure these numbers appear with the associated references supporting the bubble.



3
4 **Figure 7.1 Characterising risk on dimensions of disagreement on norms and priorities, scale and**
5 **uncertainty**
6

7 7.4 Policy Response to Risk

8 This section outlines responses to risk. It describes limits and barriers to adaptation (7.4.1), policy
9 instruments responding to risk (7.4.2), effectiveness of instruments (7.4.3), policy mix and suites of
10 policy instruments (7.4.4) and multi-level response to risk (7.4.5).

11 7.4.1 Multi-level response to risk

12 Policy responses and planning in relation to land and climate interactions occur at and across multiple
13 levels, involve multiple actors, and utilise multiple planning mechanisms (Urwin and Jordan 2008).
14 Climate change is occurring on a global scale while the impacts of climate change vary from region to
15 region. Therefore, in addressing local climate impacts, local governments and communities are key

1 players since local areas have high vulnerabilities and great need for climate resilience. Advancing
2 governance of *climate change* across all *levels* of government and relevant stakeholders is crucial to
3 avoid policy gaps between local action *plans* and national policy frameworks (Corfee-Morlot et al.
4 2009).

5 The immediate challenge is incorporating ecological restoration and biodiversity concerns in top
6 down NDC and SDG climate mitigation and adaptation targets, as well as bottom up and
7 decentralised conservation. These could be combinations of land sharing, land sparing and ecosystem
8 based adaptation approaches using economic and normative instruments across both state, community
9 and private sectors (Busch and Mukherjee 2017; Agrawal et al. 2008; Colls et al. 2009). Although the
10 role of biodiversity (both wild and managed) in underpinning ecosystem services and enhancing
11 resilience of socio-ecological systems to perturbations, including extreme events and climate change
12 is now well recognised amongst the scientific community, its influence on policy and decision makers
13 is still limited (Elmqvist et al. 2003; Albert et al. 2014). One of the challenges is finding agreement
14 on “desirable” future states of ecosystems and integrating this with economic and other policy
15 instruments (Ring and Schröter-Schlaack 2011; Tallis et al. 2008). The incorporation of biodiversity
16 and ecosystem services perspectives in management responses and development planning under
17 climate change is a “wicked problem” in part due to disagreement on values, norms and priorities
18 (Perry 2015).

19 One of the response options agreed at COP21 was the effective implementation of restoration projects
20 and programmes which “helps to achieve many of the Aichi Targets under the CBD, but also
21 ecosystem-based adaptation and climate change mitigation under the UNFCCC, striving towards land
22 degradation neutrality and Zero Net Land Degradation under the UNCCD” (Aronson and Alexander
23 2013). Success of restoration approaches to conserving biodiversity and ecosystem services is often
24 based on incremental knowledge from pilot projects and can progress only with bold experiments at
25 various spatial scales across the globe (ibid.). Achieving a transformative 2012 United Nations
26 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development target of restoring 150 million ha of disturbed and
27 degraded land globally by 2020 is severely constrained by knowledge and technology capacity (Menz
28 et al. 2013). Many top down climate change mitigation initiatives are still largely carbon centric with
29 limited opportunities for decentralised ecological restoration at local and regional scales (Vijge and
30 Gupta 2014). The current IPBES initiative seeks to generate policy relevant knowledge for sustainable
31 management of biodiversity and ecosystem services at all relevant spatial scales using a “co-
32 constructive” approach that involves a diversity of stake-holders and may achieve the goal of
33 agreement on desirable state of human-nature interactions (Díaz et al. 2015).

34 **7.4.2 Policy instruments responding to risk**

35 Policy instruments are used to influence behaviour and affect a response to do, not do, or continue to
36 do certain things (Anderson 2010) and can be invoked at multiple levels (international, national,
37 regional, and local) by multiple actors. For efficiency, equity and effectiveness considerations, the
38 appropriate choice of instrument for the context is critical, and across the topics addressed in this
39 report the instruments will vary considerably. A key consideration is whether the benefits of the
40 action will generate private or public net benefits. (Pannell 2008) provides a widely-used framework
41 for identifying the appropriate type of instrument depending on whether the benefits of the actions are
42 private or public, and positive or negative. Positive incentives (such as financial or regulatory
43 instruments) are appropriate where the public net benefits are highly positive and the private net
44 benefits are close to zero. This is likely to be the case for many GHG mitigation measures. Extension
45 (knowledge provision) is recommended for when public net benefits are highly positive and private
46 net benefits slightly positive, again for some GHG mitigation measures, and many adaptation, food
47 security and sustainable land management measures. Where the private net benefits are slightly

1 positive but the public net benefits highly negative, negative incentives (such as regulations and
2 prohibitions) are appropriate, for example over-application of fertiliser.

3 While this is a useful framework, policy-makers should be aware that it does not address
4 considerations relating to the time-scale of actions and their consequences particularly in the long
5 time-horizons involved under climate change: private benefits may accrue in the short term but
6 become negative over time (Outka 2012) and some of the changes necessary will require
7 transformation of existing systems ((Park et al. 2012; Hadarits et al. 2017) and see section 7.3.2.2) for
8 which a more comprehensive suite of instruments would be necessary. Furthermore, the framework
9 applies to private land ownership, so where land is in different ownership structures, different
10 mechanisms will be required. Indeed, land tenure is recognised as a factor in barriers to decision-
11 making (see 7-74). A thorough analysis of the implications of tools temporally, spatially and across
12 other sectors and goals (e.g. climate v. development) is essential before implementation to avoid
13 unintended consequences (7-57) and policy incoherence (7-69).

14

15 Climate change increases disaster risk from both extreme events and slow onset events. Thereby,
16 climate change adaptation requires more comprehensive risk management. Comprehensive risk
17 management encompasses risk assessment, reduction, transfer, retention, including social protection
18 instruments such as insurance and transformational approaches to build resilience and to strengthen
19 adaptive capacity. Climate related risk could be categorised by climate impacts like event type, such
20 as flood, drought, cyclone etc. (Christenson et al. 2014). Table 7.2 outlines instruments relating to
21 impacts responding to the risk of climate change. Categories of instruments include regulatory
22 instruments (command and control measures), economic and market instruments (creating a market,
23 sending price signals, or employing a market strategy), voluntary or persuasive instruments
24 (persuading people to internalise behaviour), and managerial (arrangements including multiple actors
25 in cooperatively administering a resource or overseeing an issue) (Gupta, J., van der Grijp, N., Kuik
26 2013; Hurlbert 2018b).

27 Given the complex spatial and temporal dynamics of risk, a portfolio of responses is required to
28 comprehensively manage risk. Operationalising a portfolio response can mean layering, sequencing or
29 integrating approaches. *Layering* means that within a geographical area, households are able to benefit
30 from multiple interventions simultaneously (e.g. those for family planning and those for livelihoods
31 development). A *sequencing* approach starts with those interventions, which address the initial
32 binding constraints, and then further interventions are later added (e.g. the poorest households first
33 receive grant-based support before then gaining access to appropriate microfinance or market-oriented
34 initiatives). *Integrated* approaches involve cross-sectoral support within the framework of one
35 program (Scott et al. 2016).

36 It is important to understand the nature of risk. If shocks are temporary, then policies aimed at
37 stabilising short-term income fluctuations (such as increasing rural credit or providing social safety
38 net programs) may be appropriate (Ward 2016). Life cycle approaches to social protection are one
39 approach, which some countries (such as Bangladesh) are using when developing national social
40 protection policies. These policies acknowledge that households face risks across the life cycle from
41 which they need to be protected.








42 If shocks are persistent, or occur numerous times, then policies should address concerns of a more
43 structural nature (Glauben et al. 2012). (Barrett 2005) for example, distinguishes between the role of
44 safety nets (which include programs such as emergency feeding programs, crop or unemployment
45 insurance, disaster assistance, etc.) and cargo nets (which include land reforms, targeted microfinance,
46 targeted school feeding program, etc.). While the former prevents non-poor and transient poor from
47 becoming chronically poor, the latter is meant to lift people out of poverty by changing societal or

1 institutional structures. The graduation approach has adopted such systematic thinking to much
2 success (Banerjee et al. 2015).

3 The International Organization of Standardization provides risk management principles, guidelines,
4 and frameworks for explaining the elements of an effective risk management program (ISO 2009).
5 The standard provides practical risk management tools and makes a business case for risk
6 management investments (McClean et al. 2010). Insurance addresses impacts associated with extreme
7 weather events (storms, floods, droughts, temperature extremes), but it can provide disincentives for
8 reducing disaster risk at the local level through the transfer of risk spatially to other places or
9 temporally to the future (Cutter et al. 2012) and uptake is unequally distributed across regions and
10 hazards (Lal et al. 2012). Insurance instruments can take many forms (traditional indemnity based,
11 market based crop insurance, property insurance), and some are linked to livelihoods sensitive to
12 weather as well as food security (linked to social safety net programs) and ecosystems (coral reefs and
13 mangroves), and can provide a framework for risk signals to adaptation planning and implementation
14 and facilitate financial buffering when climate impacts exceed current capabilities to manage
15 delivered through both public and private finance (Bogale 2015; Greatrex et al. 2015; Surminski et al.
16 2016). A holistic consideration of all instruments responding to extreme impacts of climate change
17 (drought, flood etc.) is required in assessing if policy instruments are promoting livelihood capitals
18 and contributing to the resilience of people and communities (Hurlbert 2018b).

19

1 **Table 7.2 Policies/Programmes/Instruments that address multiple land-climate risks at different**
 2 **jurisdictional levels**

Scale	Policy/Programme/ Instrument	Food Securit 	Land degrad ation & desertif ication 	Sust aina ble land man age men t 	Ener gy acce s s 	Haza rds (Floo d) 	Haza rds (Dro ught) 	Haza rds (Fore st Fires) 	GHG flux clima te chan ge miti gation
Global	Multi-tier global tracking framework (IEA and World Bank)				X				
	Paris Commitments			X					
	Forest carbon offsets/REDD				X				X
	SENDAI Framework					X	X	X	
	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (World Bank)					X			
	International risk standards					X			
	Sustainability Certification of biomass			X	X				X
	Global Index Insurance Facility (World Bank)					X			
	Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves				X				X
	Weather Risk Insurance Facility	X				X			
Regional	Sustainable Energy for All				X				
	Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves				X				
	International Organization for Standardization (ISO)		X	X	X				X
	Global Alliance for Resilience (Africa)	X		X					
	Renewable Energy Standards/targets/Incentives (EU)				X				
	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP)	X							
	Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (World Bank)				X				
	Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN)			X					X
	Regional Forestry strategy			X				X	
	National	Forest Protection Policy/Plans		X			X		X
Index weather insurance		X				X			
Agriculture Insurance		X							
Bioenergy policies & targets					X				X
Clean cookstove programmes					X				X
Flood insurance						X			
Forest fire management								X	
Disaster bonds						X	X	X	
Disaster risk management Strategy						X	X	X	
National targets for forests and green cover/ forest carbon sequestration policies			X						X
Sub-national	Land tenure					X	X		
	Research and deployment of BECCS				X				X
	Climate-smart Agriculture policy	X							X

Watershed management	X	X				
Land use planning		X		X	X	X
State Flood Insurance policy				X		
State Disaster preparedness/mitigation plan				X	X	X
Early warning systems				X	X	
Landscape governance		X	X			
Agroforestry programmes	X					
Drought plans					X	
Clean Energy/ Biomass Energy Policies & Incentives				X		X
Hazard information & communication				X		X
Local Waste to energy/Bio-methanation				X		X
Flood plans/ zoning / management				X		
Relocation and migration policies				X		
Spatial planning				X	X	
Emergency management				X		X
Community based awareness programs				X	X	X
Microinsurance				X		
Skill and community development for livelihood diversification	X			X	X	X

1

2 **7.4.2.1 Food security**

3 A defining policy challenge for this century will focus on delivering food security to 9 to 10 billion
4 people by mid-century with safer, nutritious food from the same area without increasing pressure on
5 land and biodiversity (Rockström et al. 2017a; Smith 2013; Bajželj et al. 2014a; Molotoks et al.
6 2017). Agriculture contributes 17% of greenhouse gas emissions and uses approximately 40% of
7 terrestrial surfaces, and is the leading user of fresh water resources (Chartres and Noble 2015). Global
8 food demand is expected to increase 60% by 2050 relative to the mid-2000s (Davis et al. 2016). Even
9 greater increases in demand in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where population will increase 2.5-fold and
10 demand for cereals will approximately triple (Tittonell and Giller 2013; van Ittersum et al. 2016).

11 Understanding food systems and patterns of risk in food systems enables design of more resilient
12 systems (Hodbod and Eakin 2015). The scientific community can partner across sectors and industries
13 for better data sharing, integration, and improved modelling and analytical capacities (Janetos et al.
14 2017; Lunt et al. 2016). Participatory platforms, (such as co-design for scenario planning) can build
15 social and human capital while improving understanding of food system risks and creating innovative
16 ways for collectively planning for more equitable and resilient food system (Himanen et al. 2016).
17 There is *medium agreement and medium evidence* that connections must be made between outcomes
18 of analyses and policies and programs (World Food Programme 2017) and governance and long term
19 planning that target resilience of food systems, prioritising functions that create full food security at
20 multiple scales are key to bringing stability to overcome shocks and sudden changes (Hodbod and
21 Eakin 2015). (Puma et al. 2015a) conclude that policy effort should be on diet diversification to
22 mitigate dependency on major crops, while balancing the efficiency of international trade with
23 increased resilience of domestic productions and global demand diversity, when a crop makes up a
24 large percentage of the diet to reduce country dependency on imports (Puma et al. 2015b).

25 Food security has a variety of definitions, but key components are food availability, access and use.
26 Policy instruments are needed for each of these. In terms of food availability and supply, several
27 policy alternatives (including expansion and intensification of agriculture, conservation agriculture,
28 organic agriculture, and rewilding abandoned agricultural land) aim to increase yields at the same
29 time as managing or easing associated biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions (Lal 2013).

1 Provision of water through irrigation and other critical inputs are additional ways to improve food
2 security (Iglesias and Garrote 2015; Ababaei et al. 2014; Tripathi and Mishra 2017; Tittoneil and
3 Giller 2013)as well as increasing production, facilitating an increase in yield or in the number of
4 harvests a year_(Iglesias and Garrote 2015; Ababaei et al. 2014; Tripathi and Mishra 2017; Tittoneil
5 and Giller 2013). However, irrigation has to be carefully managed. Groundwater depletion by
6 irrigation is a growing risk to food security and already a major problem in large parts of the world
7 including Northern India, the Northern China Plain, the Middle East and California (Rodell et al.
8 2018). There is *strong evidence and strong agreement* that government policies that incentivise
9 conservation or regulate groundwater consumption are needed to avoid risks to food security
10 (Harootunian, 2018; Rodell et al., 2018). Mainstreaming of less water intensive crops (e.g. millets,
11 pulses) through public distribution or price support, for example, can also contribute to adaptation
12 (Khera 2011; Lin and Li 2011a).

13 Smallholder farmer-dominated agriculture is currently the backbone of global food security in the
14 developing world. Poor nutrient availability and soil fertility are the leading biophysical limitations to
15 crop yields, so that continued cropping with insufficient inputs of nutrients and organic matter
16 contributes to chronic poverty gaps as smallholder farmers face extensive local soil degradation
17 (Tittoneil and Giller 2013). Without incentives to manage land and forest resources in a manner that
18 allows regeneration of both the soils and wood stocks, smallholder farmers tend to generate income
19 through inappropriate land management practices, engage in agricultural production on unsuitable
20 land and use fertile soils, timber and firewood for brick production and construction and secondly
21 engage in charcoal production (deforestation) as a coping mechanism (increasing income) against
22 food deficiency (Munthali and Murayama 2013). Research suggests a correlation between conflict
23 risk and areas with food insecurity or a high risk of agricultural expansion into areas with high
24 biodiversity, particularly in the tropics (Molotoks et al. 2017). Today, the cost of soil degradation in
25 individual countries reaches into the billions of US dollars (Global Food Security Programme 2013),
26 in addition to rising implicit costs of biodiversity and ecosystem services like groundwater stress
27 (Tardieu et al. 2013).

28 Additionally, research finds that appropriate land use allocation from the outset (Law et al. 2015) ,
29 combined with land sparing (high-yielding agriculture on a small land footprint) for areas with more
30 common species and land sharing (low-yielding, wildlife-friendly agriculture on a larger land
31 footprint) for areas more sensitive to agricultural disturbance can increase agricultural production
32 while minimising the negative consequences for biodiversity (Baudron et al. 2012; Baudron and
33 Giller 2014; Baudron et al. 2014; Kremen 2015; Navarro and Pereira 2015). Discussions about land
34 sparing and land sharing do not capture the relationship between intact and functioning biodiversity
35 and conventional, conservation, and other forms of farm practices (Tscharntke et al. 2012).

36 To address soil fertility, smallholder farmers in mixed crop-livestock systems divide their crop
37 residues across mulching the soil, feeding livestock and for use as fuel. Farmers with greater access to
38 extension training retain more crop residues for mulch on their fields while farmers with more
39 livestock use less residues for soil mulch and more for animal feed (Jaleta et al. 2013, 2015; Baudron
40 et al. 2014). Research in Eastern Africa and the Amazon reveals barriers to the uptake of such
41 conservation practices, in part related to livestock-related livelihoods and policies (Baudron et al.
42 2012)(Lipper et al. 2014b; Branca et al. 2013; Baudron et al. 2012; Faria and Almeida 2016).

43 Evidence suggests that organic agriculture contributes to public goods and non-commodity outputs
44 (Niggli 2015), such as soil fertility, biodiversity maintenance and protection of the natural resources
45 of soil, water and air. Compared with conventional farming, organic farming systems are more
46 profitable and deliver equally or more nutritious foods with less (or no) pesticide residues which
47 provide co-benefits for soil, social benefits, and ecosystem services (Reganold and Wachter 2016).
48 Consumers in industrialised countries are increasingly willing to pay higher prices for organic
49 agriculture, which yields about 0.2%lower than conventional agriculture in part due to underfunding
50 of research and development (Crowder and Reganold 2015; Niggli 2015). Regulations and practices

1 of organic farming differ little between countries today and reflect the value consumers place on
2 chemical free food products, even though originally the practice aimed primarily to improve soil
3 health and indirectly improve human, animal, and societal health (Seufert et al. 2017). Findings
4 suggest that organic agriculture may be a good model for productive, sustainable food production and
5 livelihood security in disadvantaged sites – evidence suggests that subsistence farming in Sub-
6 Saharan Africa shows *higher* productivity of organic agriculture (Niggli 2015). Nevertheless, systems
7 that allow people to maximise their productive potential while protecting the ecosystem services may
8 not ensure food security in all contexts. Some household land holdings are so small that self-
9 sufficiency is not possible (Venton 2018). Food security cannot be achieved by increasing food
10 availability alone. Ultimately, a mix of production activities and consumption support is needed.

11 Consumption support can be used to help achieve the second important element of food security –
12 access to food. Policy instruments, which may increase access to food at the household level include
13 safety net programming and universal basic income. The graduation approach, developed and tested
14 over the past decade using randomised control trials in six countries, has lasting positive impacts on
15 income, as well as food and nutrition security (Banerjee et al. 2015; Raza and Poel 2016). The
16 graduation approach layers and integrates a series of interventions designed to help the poorest:
17 consumption support in the form of cash or food assistance, transfer of an income generating asset
18 (such as a livestock) and training on how to maintain the asset, assistance with savings and coaching
19 or mentoring over a period of time to reinforce learning and provide support. Due to its remarkable
20 success, the graduation approach is now being scaled up, now used in over 38 countries and included
21 by an increasing number of governments in social safety-net programs (Hashemi, S.M. and de
22 Montesquiou 2011).

23 At the national and global level, food prices and trade are critical policy instruments that impact
24 access to food. Fiscal policies, such as taxation or tariffs, can be used to regulate the prices and
25 consumption of certain foods as well as increase revenue. In Denmark, tax on saturated fat content of
26 food adopted to encourage healthy eating habits accounted for 0.14% of total tax revenues between
27 2011 and 2012 (Sassi et al. 2018). However, increases in prices might impose unfair financial burdens
28 on low-income households, and may not be well received by the public. A study examining the
29 relationship between food prices and social unrest found that between 1990 and 2011, food price
30 increases have led to increases in social unrest, whereas food price volatility has not been associated
31 with increases in social unrest (Bellemare 2015).

32 Some economists argue that trade can be a mechanism to increase access to foods and also increased
33 access to new markets in cases where enhanced transportation networks and greater national reserves
34 of cash and enhanced social safety nets can minimise risks of increased international competition and
35 market price volatility (Brown et al. 2017b). However, trade can have negative impacts as well. Some
36 research associates trade with deforestation in the Amazon (Nobre et al. 2016; Faria and Almeida
37 2016). Research on large-scale land acquisition reveals two patterns: targeting forested landscapes and
38 those that target existing cropland, both which can interfere with semi-subsistence farming systems
39 (Messerli et al. 2015).

40 Demand management for food, including promoting healthy diets, reducing food loss and waste, is
41 covered in chapter 5, however there is a gap in knowledge regarding what policies and instruments
42 support these forms of demand management. Conversely, the European Union promotes meat and
43 dairy production through voluntary coupled direct payments and does not yet internalise external
44 damage to climate, health, and groundwater (Velthof et al. 2014; Bryngelsson et al. 2016). However,
45 promise can be found in a variety of policy instruments that have been found effective in influencing
46 food use, and subsequently in nutrition. There is *strong evidence and strong agreement* that changes
47 in household wealth and parents' education can drive improvements in nutrition (Headey et al. 2017).
48 Bangladesh has managed to sustain a rapid reduction in the rate of child undernutrition for at least two

1 decades. Rapid wealth accumulation and large gains in parental education are the two largest drivers
2 of change (Headey et al. 2017). Educating consumers, and providing affordable alternatives, will be
3 critical to changing unsustainable food use habits relevant to climate change.

4 **Insurance, adaptive capacity, and food security**

5 Early forms of insurance developed in agricultural societies allowed individual households and groups
6 to share risks that climate variability posed to their livelihoods and food security. In villages,
7 customary rules governing access to land for common property as well as individual land parcels
8 fulfilled social security functions and helped achieve equity objectives (Awanyo 2009; Michler and
9 Shively 2015). When population growth and market pressure combine to intensify land use, land
10 tenure and land management arrangements are increasingly defined without regard for equity or risk
11 sharing concerns (Platteau 2005). This trend contributes to land management practices that decrease
12 productivity, decrease ecosystem services which also ameliorate risk (Sidibé et al. 2018; Ma et al.
13 2013), elevate reliance on credit for farm inputs like seeds and fertiliser, lower crop diversity, and
14 lower levels of agricultural risk sharing (Mohammed et al. 2018).

15 Modern insurance design affects the degree to which the tool improves or worsens adaptive capacity:
16 insurance itself is a complex adaptive system which must be embedded in a wider risk management
17 approach (Storey et al. 2015) so as not to dis-incentivise appropriate adaptation such as crop
18 diversification or less intensive land use, and to ensure intact ecosystem services in rural and urban
19 areas (Green et al. 2016) as has been the case with federal crop insurance in the United States (Lo
20 2013; Annan and Schlenker 2015; Jaworski 2016; Michel-Kerjan et al. 2015; Lamond and Penning-
21 Rowsell 2014).

22 In contrast, studies suggest that adaptive capacity of communities have improved vis-à-vis climate
23 variability like drought when ex ante tools including insurance have been employed holistically;
24 providing insurance in combination with early warning and institutional and policy approaches that
25 aim to reduce livelihood and food insecurity as well as strengthen social structures (Shiferaw et al.
26 2014; Lotze-Campen and Popp 2012). Work-for-insurance programs applied in the context of social
27 protection have been shown to improve livelihood and food security in Ethiopia (Berhane 2014;
28 Mohammed et al. 2018). Bundling insurance with early warning and seasonal forecasting can reduce
29 the cost of insurance premiums (Daron and Stainforth 2014). The regional risk insurance scheme
30 Africa Risk Capacity has the potential to significantly reduce the cost of insurance premiums (Siebert
31 2016) while bolstering contingency planning against food insecurity. In Europe, modelling suggests
32 that insurance incentives such as vouchers would be less expensive than total incentivised damage
33 reduction and may reduce residential flood risk by 12% in Germany and 24% by 2040 (Hudson et al.
34 2016).

35 The ability of insurance to contribute to adaptive capacity also depends on the overall risk
36 management and livelihood context of households — studies find that rain fed agriculturalists and
37 foresters with more years of education and credit but limited off-farm income are more willing to pay
38 for insurance than households who have access to remittances (such as from family members who
39 have migrated)(Bogale 2015; Gan et al. 2014; Hewitt et al. 2017; Nischalke 2015).

40 **7.4.2.2 Sustainable land management**

41 **Zero Net Land Degradation (ZNLDD)**

42 A land degradation neutral world could be achieved by reducing the rate of land degradation and
43 increasing the rate of restoration of degraded land. To enable this, the rate of global land degradation
44 should not exceed that of land restoration (Stavi and Lal 2015; Grainger 2015; Chasek et al. 2015;
45 Cowie et al. 2018; Montanarella 2015). Neutrality implies no net loss of the land-based natural
46 resource relative to a baseline or a reference state (UNCCD 2015; Kust et al. 2017; Easdale 2016;
47 Cowie et al. 2018; Stavi and Lal 2015; Grainger 2015; Chasek et al. 2015). Achieving the target of

1 land degradation neutrality would decrease the environmental footprint of agriculture, while
2 supporting food security and sustaining human wellbeing (Stavi and Lal 2015).

3 There are socio-economic determinants of land degradation that need to be addressed for achieving
4 sustainable management of land resources (Qasim et al. 2011; Kirui 2016). Studies from different
5 parts of the world (Pakistan, Mediterranean areas, Botswana) underline the importance of socio-
6 economic context in general and livelihoods in particular for reduction of land sensitivity to
7 degradation and for enhancement of the flow of ecosystem services that support livelihoods and for
8 sustainable land management (Salvati and Carlucci 2014; Reed et al. 2015; Easdale 2016)

9 For effectiveness of implementation of global ZNLD it is very important to integrate lessons learned
10 from existing offset programs designed for other environmental objectives. Furthermore it is
11 necessary to formulate/strengthen supportive policies and regulations for ZNLD (Stavi and Lal 2015;
12 Grainger 2015). ZNLD as a phenomenon of equilibrium of the land system needs further scientific
13 research and development of effective methods to measure the balance between different terrestrial
14 ecosystems' qualities, functions and services (Kust et al. 2017; Montanarella 2015). Scientific
15 knowledge is required to complement existing knowledge of desertification processes as well as those
16 of land use and land cover change processes generally (Grainger 2015).

17 Facing the challenges of climate change, desertification, land degradation and drought together with
18 population increase, ZNLD actions and activities play an essential role for a land-based approach to
19 climate change adaptation (UNCCD 2015). Achieving ZNLD also supports the achievement of
20 several of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 13 on climate action and
21 efforts to tackle other challenges such as poverty alleviation, food, water and energy security, human
22 health, migration, conflict and biodiversity loss. Accordingly, the monitoring of ZNLD should target
23 the quantification of the costs, benefits and impacts of sustainable land management on water
24 availability, food security, and climate change mitigation etc. (Sietz et al. 2017; Stavi and Lal 2015;
25 Cowie et al. 2018)

26 Operationalisation of ZNLD requires an effective enabling environment that can generate awareness,
27 motivation, human and financial resources as well as provide incentives to encourage adoption of local
28 actions (Chasek et al. 2015; Stavi and Lal 2015). Many researchers underline that monitoring the
29 ZNLD targets requires means of assessing levels of land degradation and restoration. Furthermore,
30 certain measures were identified for achievement of ZNLD which include; effective financial
31 mechanisms (for implementation of land restoration measures and the long-term monitoring of
32 progress), parameters for assessing land degradation, detailed plans with quantified objectives and
33 establishment of a feasibility of the offset program and setting a target year for achieving LDN goal
34 (Kust et al. 2017; Sietz et al. 2017; Cowie et al. 2018; Montanarella 2015; Stavi and Lal 2015).

35
36 The importance of the biophysical socio-economic aspects on achievement of ZNLD has been
37 underlined by many researchers. Accordingly, it has been recommended that the role of human
38 dimension on sustainability of drylands should be adequately tackled for successful efforts to reverse
39 degradation through restoration or rehabilitation of degraded land (e.g. consideration of the zero net
40 livelihood degradation) (Easdale 2016; Qasim et al. 2011; Cowie et al. 2018; Salvati and Carlucci
41 2014).

42
43 Monitoring ZNLD status involves quantifying the balance between the area of losses versus areas of
44 gain within different land types and landscape. However, as land degradation is not a static, but rather
45 a dynamic process, many authors underlined challenges related to monitoring of causes, rates, and
46 effects of land degradation. The difficulties associated with monitoring and evaluation are associated
47 with absence of baseline rates, limited national and international scientific capacities to measure
48 desertification and challenges related to mode of data monitoring and management and provision of
49 continuous and sequential updates. It has been argued that monitoring cuts in national rates of

1 desertification is more difficult than monitoring restoration of decertified land by revegetation (Stavi
2 and Lal 2015; Grainger 2015; Chasek et al. 2015; Cowie et al. 2018).

3
4 In spite of opportunities of implementation of restoration projects through payments for improving
5 ecosystem services, as well as other economic mechanisms, the implementation of ecosystem
6 restoration projects that have ZNLD targets is challenged by lack of access and vulnerability to global
7 markets and risk of widespread failure in ecosystem restoration and degradation prevention (even with
8 massive investments). Both opportunities and challenges for cost effectiveness were identified
9 moving towards the ZNLD targets (Sietz et al. 2017; Stavi and Lal 2015; Grainger 2015). Many
10 developing countries are challenged with lack of incentives under UNCCD as well as facing the
11 reality of having resources that are not as economically valuable as those in humid areas (Grainger
12 2015). In addition to economic barriers to the implementation of non-degrading land use and
13 restoration of degraded land, there are other barriers that include; cultural, social, scientific
14 knowledge, technology and policy (Grainger 2015; Chasek et al. 2015; Stavi and Lal 2015).

16 **Conserving biodiversity and ecosystem services**

17 Climate change and biodiversity are interconnected. Climate change is one of the significant drivers
18 for biodiversity loss. The ecosystem services connected with biodiversity contribute greatly to both
19 climate change mitigation and adaptation. Biodiversity and ecosystem services are fundamental to all
20 life, protection from natural disasters, and human economic activities. There is *high agreement but*
21 *limited evidence* that ecosystem-based adaptation (biodiversity and ecosystem services) plays a
22 critical part of an overall strategy to help people adapt to the adverse effects of climate change
23 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009), can be cost-effective, generate social,
24 economic and cultural co-benefits, and contribute to the conservation of biodiversity. Ecosystem
25 based adaptation can also promote socio-ecological resilience by enabling people to adapt to the
26 impacts of climate change and reduce their vulnerability (Ojea 2015). Ecosystem based adaptation can
27 promote nature conservation while alleviating poverty and even provide a co-benefits by removing
28 greenhouse gas (Scarano 2017) and protecting livelihoods (Munang et al. 2013). One example is
29 ecosystem-based adaptation utilising mangrove forests at the climate prone coastal zone. Mangroves
30 provide diverse ecosystem services such as erosion protection, water purification, shore-line
31 stabilisation and also regulate storm surge and flooding damages, thus enhancing resilience and
32 reducing climate risk (Rahman, M.M., Khan, M.N.I., Hoque, A.K.F., Ahmed 2014).

33 Accelerated loss of biodiversity is now considered a major threat to human well-being (Cardinale et
34 al. 2012). Biodiversity and associated ecosystem services are likely to be severely impacted by
35 climate change (Scholze et al. 2006). Furthermore impacts of non-climatic stressors on key ecosystem
36 functions such as pollination are posing an emerging risk to food security and agro-diversity (Potts et
37 al. 2016). Biological invasions are a now a major global threat to ecosystem integrity, biodiversity
38 and ecosystem services, but there are still knowledge gaps which makes communication and policy
39 responses difficult (Simberloff et al. 2013). The loss of fresh-water aquatic ecosystems and their
40 simplification due to degradation, abstraction and regulation is likely to pose risks to future adaptation
41 under global change (Russi et al. 2013). Enhancing the resilience of socio-ecological systems requires
42 careful attention to maintenance of biodiversity and ecological functions to avoid risks of tipping
43 points and thresholds (Rockström et al. 2009).

44 **Land tenure**

45 Land tenure, defined as “the terms under which land and natural resources are held by individuals,
46 households or social groups”, is a key dimension in any discussion of land-climate interactions,
47 including the prospects for both rural adaptation and land-based mitigation, and possible impacts on
48 tenure and thus land security of both climate change and climate action (Quan and Dyer 2008)

1 (*limited evidence, high agreement*). Research focussed on land tenure under climate change remains
2 dominated by reports of development donors, with limited coverage in the peer-reviewed literature.

3 Discussion of land tenure in the context of land-climate interactions in developing countries,
4 especially in Africa but also in forest zones of other regions has to address the prevalence of informal,
5 customary and modified customary systems of land tenure: in 2005 only 1% of land in Africa was
6 legally registered (Easterly 2008), and forest commons comprise at least 18% of *global* forest area
7 (Chhatre and Agrawal 2008). Research in this area, such as (Fraser et al. 2011; Barbier and Tesfaw
8 2012, 2013). (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015a), therefore necessarily recognises earlier literature, for
9 example (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Toulmin and Quan 2000; Bruce and Migot-Adholla 1994;
10 Easterly 2008) that demonstrates that under certain circumstance, informal and customary systems can
11 provide considerable land tenure security and enable long-term investment in land management such
12 as tree-planting, and that formal titling of land is not a necessary condition for tenure security and
13 may be cost-ineffective or counter-productive. These general insights, particularly applicable to
14 systems where land ownership is communal, but individual usufruct is allocated for cropping, are
15 complemented by findings that communal management of rangelands in pastoral systems is a rational
16 and internally sustainable response to climate variability and the need for mobility (Behnke 1994).
17 For forests, (Robinson et al. 2014) demonstrate through meta-analysis that land tenure security is
18 associated with less deforestation, regardless of whether the tenure form is private, customary or
19 communal. However, this same literature on land tenure recognises that customary and communal
20 systems in various agroecosystems may be subject to institutional weakening and external
21 encroachment, resulting from non-recognition by governments (Lane 1998; Toulmin and Quan 2000).

22 In dryland areas of developing countries, erosion of traditional communal tenure of rangelands has
23 been identified by many authors as a determinant of increasing vulnerability to drought and climate
24 variability (Morton 2007; López-i-Gelats et al. 2016; Oba 1994) and as a driver of dryland
25 degradation (Fraser et al. 2011). (Dougill et al. 2011), using primarily qualitative data, show that a
26 process of rangeland privatisation in Botswana has increased the vulnerability of pastoralists to
27 drought and therefore to climate change. (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015b) compare a semi-arid and a more
28 humid area of Ghana, under different systems of modified customary land tenure, and are able to
29 disaggregate impacts of land tenure on climate change adaptation to specific categories of household.
30 In the more humid area, a very large proportion of migrants to the area, some of whom have enjoyed
31 usufruct rights to farm there for decades, see land tenure as a barrier to climate change adaptation,
32 compared with much smaller proportions of households from the land-owning community,
33 specifically as a disincentive to long-term land management. Within each of the migrant and local
34 categories, there is very little difference between male and female farmers. In the drier area, where
35 there are no migrants, female farmers overwhelmingly see land tenure as a barrier to climate change
36 adaptation while only a small proportion of male farmers do. Overall, there is *limited evidence but*
37 *high agreement* that weak land tenure security, either for households disadvantaged within a
38 customary tenure system, or more widely as such a system is eroded, can be associated with increased
39 vulnerability and decreased adaptive capacity.

40 Land tenure systems have complex interactions with deforestation processes (Robinson et al. 2014)
41 and interact with REDD+ and other land-based mitigation actions in complex ways (*moderate*
42 *evidence, high agreement*). (Barbier and Tesfaw 2012) in an extensive review at a time when REDD+
43 programmes were in their infancy, highlight several risks to forest communities and especially their
44 poorer members in REDD+ schemes. Where tenure security is weak and poorly enforced, increased
45 forest value under REDD+ may encourage private companies or governments to dispossess forest
46 dwellers. Individual freehold land titling programmes risk excluding the poor. There is also a risk
47 that communities who perceive a risk of expropriation may be incentivised to short term exploitation
48 of forest resources, defeating the carbon sequestration objective. There may be positive benefits for

1 REDD+ schemes of operating through common property tenure systems, through lower transaction
2 costs of working with traditional leaders rather than multiple private owners, although there is a risk
3 that payments for forest management may be captured by elites abusing their leadership roles.
4 (Barbier and Tesfaw 2013) discussing REDD+ initiatives in farmed or partly farmed systems under
5 African customary land tenure, note the incentives such systems give to farmers for planting trees.

6 Sunderlin et al. (2018), also reviewing earlier studies, note that clarification and strengthening of
7 tenure have been recognised as priorities for fulfilling REDD+, but that these are difficult tasks, both
8 in practical and in political-economic terms. Analysing original data from REDD+ programmes in
9 five countries, (Sunderlin et al. 2018) conclude that national sub-samples present very diverse
10 findings on both direction of change in tenure security and extent to which this has been influenced by
11 REDD+, and positive changes in land tenure in some areas cannot be attributed to the programmes.
12 Pooling the sample, REDD+ programmes tend slightly to increase land tenure insecurity on
13 agricultural (but not on forest) lands. Forest-dwellers attribute increasing land tenure insecurity with
14 weak titles, and problems with external businesses and with governments. However, Quan et al.
15 (2017), reporting on the early stages of REDD+ in Mozambique, report positive attitudes from the
16 private sector toward partnerships with civil society and communities. Work on land tenure within
17 REDD+ programmes needs to be integrated with national-level forest tenure reform (Sunderlin et al.
18 2018).

19 Climate change has implications for land policy, land administration and land information systems
20 that cut across vulnerability, adaptation and mitigation concerns. (Quan and Dyer 2008) see the need
21 for land policies to provide both security and flexibility in the face of climate change, through a
22 diversity of forms rather than a sole focus on freehold title, and land policy itself to be climate-
23 proofed and integrated with national policies such as National Adaptation Programme of Action
24 NAPAs. (van der Molen and Mitchell 2016) conclude that land administration systems have a vital
25 role in providing land tenure security, especially for the poor, and that land information systems
26 should include or be linked to an expanded range of information relevant to both mitigation and
27 adaptation.

28 **Standards and certification for sustainability of biomass and land use sectors**

29 During the past two decades, standards and certification have emerged as an important instrument to
30 address sustainability in agriculture, forestry, and other land use sectors, as well as for bio-based
31 products and materials. Standards aim to provide environmental and social sustainability
32 management. While they are normally voluntary they may become obligatory if introduced into the
33 legislative system. It is important to distinguish between standards and certification, which are
34 normally carried out by separate organisations in order to preserve the integrity of these processes. A
35 standard provides specifications, guidelines or characteristics to ensure that materials, products,
36 processes and services are fit for their purpose while certification is the procedure through which a
37 third accredited party provides assurances to companies, organisations or consumers that a product,
38 process or service is in conformity with certain standard. The International Organization for
39 Standardization is a key source for global environmental standards; a recent standard with special
40 relevance for land use management focuses on good practices for combatting land degradation and
41 desertification (ISO 2017). The standard aims at providing guidance on actions or interventions to
42 prevent or minimise degradation of land while proposing forms to recovery degraded land.

43
44 Efforts to increase production and use of agricultural and woody biomass can contribute to land
45 degradation, loss of soil fertility and a variety of undesirable environmental and social impacts. As the
46 world transitions away from a primarily fossil-based economy to a bio economy, there are various
47 pathways available to achieve sustainability as the demand for land and biomass increase; there is
48 *medium evidence* on the sustainability implications of different pathways but low agreement as to
49 which pathways are socially and environmentally desirable (Priefer et al. 2017; Johnson 2017).
50 Standards and certification have been seen by many actors in both public and private sectors as

1 providing a set of instruments that can better guide these pathways. Table 7.3 provides a summary of
2 selected standards and certification schemes and shows inclusion of different elements of
3 environmental and social sustainability; nearly all recognise the inherent linkages between the
4 biophysical and social aspects of land use. There are many certification schemes, best practice
5 guidelines and/or technical standards that are specific to a particular agriculture crop (e.g. soy,
6 sugarcane) or a tree (oil palm) that are not included in **Error! Reference source not found.** for
7 reasons of brevity. There is *low evidence and low agreement* on how the application and use of
8 standards and certification has actually improved sustainability outside of the farm or plantation level
9 (Endres et al. 2015).

10
11 Different methods, techniques and guidelines have been disseminated by international organisations
12 to promote sustainable land use management. These can generally be classified in four categories:
13 good practices, guidelines, voluntary standards and jurisdictional approaches. The stringency of
14 application and enforcement varies depending on the region and their jurisdictional and governance
15 system as well as on the environmental local conditions (e.g. climatic, edaphic, geological) and the
16 nature of the feedstock produced. Good practices and guidelines focused on land management have
17 been provided by international research organisations: of particular interest are those addressing
18 climate change in drylands in terms of technical measures, policies and governance approaches to
19 reduce risk and increase productivity for small farmers (Pedrick 2012). The Economics of Land
20 Degradation Initiative (ELD) emphasises economic impacts of land degradation, using the Total
21 Economic Value (TEV) framework to provide a common basis for economic assessments of land
22 degradation and aims to develop guidelines for practitioners and decision-makers to avoid or reverse
23 land degradation (Nkonya et al. 2013).

24
25 In addition to addressing land use management, agriculture and forestry, there have been an
26 increasing number of efforts during the past decade or so focusing on the sustainability of biomass
27 and especially in relation to biofuels and bioenergy (van Dam et al. 2010; Scarlat and Dallemand
28 2011). Analyses on the implementation of standards and certification for biomass use have focused on
29 their stringency, effectiveness, geographical application and governance as well as impacts related to
30 the choice of feedstock and socio-economic issues such as land tenure and gender and environmental
31 effectiveness such as land use (Diaz-Chavez 2011; German and Schoneveld 2012; Meyer and Priess
32 2014). There is *medium evidence and low agreement* as to whether sustainability certification for
33 biomass and bioenergy insures positive socio-economic impacts in general terms. More recently the
34 landscape governance approach is aiming at both conservation of productive and non-productive areas
35 as well as engaging stakeholders in multi-use land areas (Pacheco et al. 2016). While the landscape
36 governance approach has been used in some standards and has potential to address land use and
37 biomass use in an integrated manner, there is not yet a sufficient record of research concerning its
38 effectiveness in terms of sustainable land use management. Certification approaches for biofuel
39 imports are now in place for sugar cane, soya, palm oil with impacts on land management practices in
40 Europe and areas that grow these biofuels (Banse et al. 2011; Kavallari et al. 2014). Certification
41 approaches for biofuel imports are now in place for sugar cane, soya, palm oil with impacts on land
42 management practices in Europe and areas that grow these biofuels (Banse et al. 2011; Kavallari et al.
43 2014).

44
45 The Renewable Energy Directive of the European Union (EU-RED) established sustainability criteria
46 in relation to the EU renewable energy targets in the transport sector, which subsequently also had
47 impacts on land use and trade with third countries (Johnson et al. 2012). In particular, the EU-RED
48 marked a departure in the context of Kyoto/UNFCCC guidelines by extending responsibility for
49 emissions beyond the borders of the end-use market, thus making EU bioenergy users responsible for
50 supply-chain emissions throughout the world and at the same time shifting some of the burden (via
51 the requirements for sustainability certification) to developing countries wishing to sell into the EU
52 market (Johnson 2011b). Another key concern in the EU and also globally, as reflected in Table 7.3
53 was the impact on food security when developing countries produce non-food crops and export
54 biomass, biofuels or bioenergy products. Increased biofuel production has been found to have rather
55 small effects on food prices and more generally the relation between biofuels and food security is site

1 and context-specific and can be characterised by synergies or conflicts depending on specific
2 baselines conditions and governance approaches (Araujo Enciso et al. 2016; Kline et al. 2017).
3 Certification and standards normally cannot address such wider market effects but are generally aimed
4 at best practices in the local context.
5

1

Table 7.3 Selected standards and certification schemes and their components or coverage

Acronym	Name	Commodity/process	Certification scheme	Sustainability issues covered by scheme										
				Land Degradation/Desertification	Environmental GHG	Biodiversity	Carbon stock	Soils	Air	Water	Land use management	Social Land rights	Labour conditions	Food security
ISCC	International Sustainability and Carbon Certification	All feedstocks, all supply chain	√		√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
RSB	Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials	Biomass, biofuels, bio-based materials	√		√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
SAN	Sustainable Agriculture	Framework related to Rain Forest Alliance focused on agriculture				√	√	√	√	√	√			√
PEFC	Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification	Forest management	√			√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council	Forest Management	√			√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
SBP	Sustainable Biomass Programme	woody biomass, mainly pellets and wood chips	√		√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
ISO 13065:2015	Bioenergy	biomass and processes			√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√

ISO 14055- 1:2017	Land Degradation and Desertificati on	land use management	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
----------------------------------	---	------------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

1
2 Source: adapted from (Rosillo-Calle et al. 2015)

1 **7.4.2.3 Energy access and biomass use**

2 An estimated 1.1 billion persons lack access to electricity while more than 2 billion rely primarily on
3 traditional biomass (fuelwood, agriculture residues, animal dung, charcoal) for household energy
4 needs (IEA 2017). Access to modern energy is significant in the context of land-climate systems
5 because heavy reliance on traditional biomass can contribute to land degradation, household air
6 pollution, GHG emissions and food insecurity. A number of hotspots have been identified around the
7 world, particularly in East Africa and South Asia, where overharvesting of biomass leads to net loss
8 of land and net GHG emissions (Bailis et al. 2015). Charcoal production in East Africa is a major
9 source of land degradation (Kiruki et al. 2017; Ndegwa et al. 2016). Indoor air pollution associated
10 with household energy is estimated to lead to nearly 4 million premature deaths per year, making it
11 the highest environmental risk factor in the world (Smith et al. 2014b). There is a high correlation
12 between lack of energy access and food insecurity, as these populations coincide, often in poor rural
13 or peri-urban areas. More generally the lack of energy access coincides with those deficient in other
14 services and capacities that are highlighted in the Sustainable Development Goals (Fuso Nerini et al.
15 2018). There are also significant constraints on adaptive capacity for these vulnerable households, so
16 that access to modern energy can promote a triple-win for adaptation, mitigation and development
17 (Suckall et al. 2015).

18 A variety of approaches and policy instruments are aimed at improving energy access and reducing
19 the heavy reliance on traditional biomass. A focus on delivered energy services through specific
20 metrics applied to rural households can support more efficient use of biomass and land and thereby
21 reduce impacts while improving energy provisions (Fuso Nerini et al. 2017). Standards and
22 certification systems can be used to incentivise best practices for both the biomass supply and the
23 demand sides of the value chain (Endres et al. 2015). Certification and standards in the case of
24 commodity crops, including those used for energy purposes, tend to be applied and/or have greater
25 impact for land use and biomass use in developed and emerging economies, whereas in poorer
26 countries or among poorer segments of the population, their impact is lower and thus their role is seen
27 as addressing environmental concerns rather than poverty reduction (Tayleur et al. 2018). In
28 developing countries, best practice guidelines for household energy are found in strategy documents
29 and are normally promoted at Energy Ministries but in practice the poorest households have no
30 margin to pay for higher-cost efficient stoves and there is *medium evidence and medium agreement*
31 that a focus on product-specific characteristics could improve the market take-up (Takama et al.
32 2012). Subsidies for more efficient end-use technologies in combination with promotion of
33 sustainable harvesting techniques would provide the highest emissions reductions while at the same
34 time improving energy services, since non-renewable biomass harvesting along with low efficiency
35 cookstoves constitute the primary sources of emissions (Cutz et al. 2017).

36 **7.4.2.4 Hazards**

37 Risk management addressing climate change has broadened to include mitigation, adaptation and
38 disaster preparedness in a process of risk management through contingency (Hurlimann and March
39 2012; Oels 2013) through cross-sectoral planning, social community planning, and strategic, long
40 term planning (Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015a). This comprehensive consideration integrates principles
41 from informal support mechanisms to enhance formal social protection programming (Mobarak and
42 Rosenzweig 2013; Stavropoulou et al. 2017) such that the social safety net, disaster risk management,
43 climate change adaptation are all considered to enhance livelihoods of the chronic poor (see char
44 dwellers and recurrent floods in Jamuna and Brahmaputra basins of Bangladesh (Awal 2013).

45 Safety nets and social protection schemes have been found very effective for combating poverty and
46 vulnerability (Baulch et al. 2006; Barrientos 2011; Harris 2013; Fiszbein et al. 2014; Kiendrebeogo et
47 al. 2017; Kabeer et al. 2010) and protecting people from shocks thereby enabling them to participate
48 in economic growth in both rural and urban areas. Social protection instruments aim to raise

1 household income and enhance crop production, (e.g. agricultural input subsidies or input trade fairs
2 (Giovannetti et al. 2011; Béné et al. 2012; Tevera and Simelane 2014; Devereux 2016). The use of
3 social safety nets is on the rise in different part of the world, particularly in Africa. From 2010 to
4 2015, the number of countries in Africa with social safety net programs doubled (Ellis et al. 2009;
5 Kabeer et al. 2010) Safety nets provide additional support in times of crisis, recurring droughts,
6 preventing people from falling further into poverty. Social protection can support very effectively
7 resilience building at scale if early action and preparedness are integrated. It has been recommended
8 that strengthening of social protection schemes could provide concrete solutions, namely linking a
9 forecast-based financing mechanism to a social protection system to enable anticipatory actions based
10 on forecast triggers and guaranteed funding ahead of a shock. Accordingly scaling up social
11 protection based on an early warning could enhance timeliness, predictability and adequacy of social
12 protection benefits (Kuriakose et al. 2012; Costella et al. 2017; Wilkinson et al. 2018; O'Brien, C.O.,
13 Scott, Z., Smith, G., Barca, V., Kardan, A., Holmes, R. Watson 2018). Social protection systems can
14 respond to shocks through vertical or horizontal expansion, piggybacking on pre-established
15 programmes, aligning social protection and humanitarian systems or refocusing existing resources
16 (Wilkinson et al. 2018; O'Brien, C.O., Scott, Z., Smith, G., Barca, V., Kardan, A., Holmes, R. Watson
17 2018).

18 In spite of the usefulness of social protection systems and its role in improving households' food
19 security and wellbeing, some researchers underline that its positive effects might not be robust enough
20 to shield recipients completely against the impacts of severe shocks. Furthermore it has also been
21 suggested that social protection designed to limit damages from shocks and stresses may not be
22 sufficient in the longer term (Davies et al. 2009; Umukoro 2013; Béné et al. 2012; Ellis et al. 2009).
23 Social protection systems have also been seen as an unaffordable luxury in many developing and low-
24 income countries (Harris 2013).

25 National systems may be rather patchwork and piecemeal. Safety net programs in low-income
26 countries are primarily donor funded. For example, over 80% of safety net spending in Burkina Faso,
27 Liberia, Mali, and Sierra is donor funded. Fragmented donor support often leaves low-income
28 countries with a set of small, isolated programs. For example, Liberia and Madagascar each have five
29 different public works programs, each with different donor organisations and different implementing
30 agencies. In contrast, the Ethiopian Productive Safety Net Program is 100% donor financed and is
31 considered very effective (Monchuk 2014).

32 Crop insurance and instruments providing agricultural producers with income stability to respond to
33 drought and poor crops are important adaptation instruments; in the event of continued financial
34 stress bankruptcy and debt restructuring instruments can assist in adaptation and livelihood transition
35 (Hurlbert 2018b). There is a limitation of economic instruments to manage drought risk because
36 drought effects have public good properties although there is still potential to manage part of drought
37 risks using financial risks (Garrido and Gómez-Ramos 2009)

38 There is increasing support for establishment of public-private safety nets to address climate related
39 shocks by setting insurance related instruments that are affordable to the poor and combining them
40 with activities for proactive preventative (adaptation) measures (Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler
41 2006). A paradigm shift is required for business to fully integrate the value associated with managing
42 climate risks, and development of policies needed to incentivise private investments by creating
43 stronger public-private partnerships to augment opportunities and create the correct enabling
44 environment (Biagini and Miller 2013; Crichton 2008; Pauw and Pegels 2013; Surminski et al. 2016).
45 Weather index insurance (such as index based crop insurance) is being presented to low-income
46 farmers and pastoralists in developing countries (e.g. Ethiopia, India, Kazakhstan, China, South Asia)
47 as an alternative to classic insurance to reduce revenue risk in crops production caused by yield
48 variations to complement informal risk sharing (Bogale 2015; Conradt et al. 2015; Dercon et al. 2014;
49 Greatrex et al. 2015; Mcintosh et al. 2013).

50

1 **Drought**

2 The feedbacks between drought and people are not fully understood and therefore drought
3 management is inefficient; the human role in mitigating and enhancing drought resilience needs to be
4 considered in relation to drought planning (Van Loon et al. 2016). Drought plans are still
5 predominantly reactive crisis management plans rather than proactive risk management and reduction
6 plans; Reactive crisis management plans treat only the symptoms and are ineffective drought
7 management practices. There is a need for national drought policies focused on reducing risk
8 complemented by drought mitigation or preparedness plans at various levels of government in order
9 to improve the coping capacity of nations (Wilhite 2015). There is a gap in knowledge in empirically
10 examining how well state plans are to what extent they incorporate risk management theory and
11 practice on a nation basis (Fu et al. 2013).

12 In response to drought some governments have declared emergencies and adopted a system of water
13 rationing while in other jurisdictions water property rights dictate through seniority preference rights
14 who does or does not receive water; a diversity of water property instruments and instruments
15 allowing water transfer, together with the technological and institutional ability to adjust water
16 allocation can improve responsive timely adjustment to drought (Hurlbert 2018b). Supply side
17 managed water that only provides for proportionate reductions in water delivery, prevents the
18 important adaptation of managing water according to need or demand (Hurlbert and Mussetta 2016).
19 Exclusive use of a water market to govern water allocation similarly prevents the recognition of the
20 human right to water at times of drought preventing an important adaptation (Hurlbert 2018b).
21 Effective drought preparedness instruments are those that address the underlying vulnerability
22 associated with the impacts of drought building agricultural producer adaptive capacity (Wilhite et al.
23 2014) Programs that provide financial assistance to agricultural producers to build water
24 infrastructure (such as water storage dugouts, pipelines to provide water to livestock etc.) have
25 improved the adaptive capacity of agricultural programs as well as programs that assist producers in
26 planning for environmental risk including drought, soil degradation, pests etc. (Hurlbert 2018b).

27 Early warning systems, drought monitoring systems or triggers are useful risk management tools and
28 a critical component of drought risk management plan (Botterill and Hayes 2012; Knutson and Fuchs
29 2016). Monitoring and forecasting systems are practical tools of risk assessment as well as simple,
30 objective criteria to select and implement appropriate drought mitigation measures and key elements
31 for successful drought management strategy (Knutson 2008). Effective early warning systems depend
32 on multi-sectoral, interdisciplinary and collaborative links with the community. Thus far there are
33 weak links with community early warning systems and national and international ones (Wilhite et al.
34 2014). These indicators have been successfully linked with social media (Tang et al. 2015) There
35 must be care exercised in these instruments not leading to perverse outcomes when linked to some
36 forms of government support (Botterill and Hayes 2012)

37 Adaptive governance (see 7-78) can be applied to manage drought assistance as a common property
38 resource managing complex, interacting goals to create innovative policy options, facilitated through
39 nested and polycentric systems of governance effected by arenas of natural resource management
40 including landscape care and watershed or catchment management groups (Nelson et al. 2008).

41 **Fire**

42 Instinctively forest fire management includes increasing fire suppression capacity. However this can
43 result in an unintended consequence of degrading the effectiveness of forest fire management in the
44 long run (Collins et al. 2013). Strategies in addition to fire suppression include prescribed fire,
45 mechanical treatments (such as thinning the canopy), and allowing wildfire with little or no active
46 management (Rocca et al. 2014). Different forest types have different fire regimes and require
47 different fire management policies. (Dellasala et al. 2004). For instance Cerrado, a fire dependent

1 savannah, requires a clear fire management policy different than the current fire suppression policy
2 (Durigan and Ratter 2016). The choice of strategy depends on local considerations including land
3 ownership patterns, budgets, logistics, federal and local policies, tolerance for risk and landscape
4 contexts. In addition there are trade-offs among the management alternatives and often no single
5 management strategy will simultaneously optimise ecosystem services including water quality and
6 quantity, carbon sequestration, run off erosion prevention (Rocca et al. 2014). Fire strategies need to
7 be tailored to site specific conditions in an adaptive application that is assessed and reassessed over
8 time (Dellasala et al. 2004; Rocca et al. 2014).

9 **Flood**

10 Flood risk is dominated by planned adaptation, primarily command and control measures including
11 spatial planning and engineered flood defences (Filatova 2014). However if autonomous adaptation is
12 downplayed, (Filatova 2014) found that people are more likely to make land use choices that
13 collectively lead to increased flood risks and leave costs to governments. As a result governments
14 need to provide stimuli including taxes, non-perverse subsidies, flood insurance, marketable permits
15 and transferable development rights to provide price signals to stimulate autonomous adaptation
16 countering barriers of path dependency and the time lag between private investment decision and
17 consequences (Filatova 2014). To build resilience, consideration needs to be made of policy
18 instruments responding to flood including flood zone mapping, flood zone building restrictions,
19 business and crop insurance, and disaster assistance payments, and preventative instruments including
20 environmental farm planning and farm infrastructure projects, and recovery from debilitating flood
21 losses ultimately through bankruptcy (Hurlbert 2018a). Non Structural measures have been found to
22 advance sustainable development as they are more reversible, commonly acceptable and
23 environmentally friendly (Kundzewicz 2002).

24 **Economic instruments: catastrophe bonds, contingency finance, forecast-based finance**

25 A range of economic instruments are used to address impacts from climate change and considering
26 the totality of approaches available as well as their limitations is important (Surminski
27 2016)(Surminski et al. 2016). One way to organise consideration of these instruments is to
28 distinguish between those that are risk-based (such as catastrophe bonds, insurance and risk pools)
29 and those not based on transferring risk. The latter category includes a range of contingency finance
30 approaches, with finance from donors (humanitarian), national savings, or sovereign debt-based
31 finance (contingent credit/loan, ex post bonds). A second axis for organising analysis extends between
32 risk (ex-ante) financing and loss (ex post) financing. Ex-ante measures are the main instruments for
33 reducing fatalities and limiting damage from disasters (Surminski et al. 2016). Without these, in a
34 warming world post-disaster assistance and insurance will be increasingly unsustainable (Surminski et
35 al. 2016).

36 Risk layering is an important concept in understanding the use of financial instruments in
37 comprehensive climate risk management. Different financial tools may be used for different
38 categories of risk or different phases (preparedness, relief, recovery, reconstruction) of financial need.
39 For example, catastrophe bonds might be appropriate for ex post finance for recovery and
40 reconstruction from very high impact and very low frequency events. Contingency finance approaches
41 would be appropriate for low to medium risk events and slow onset processes, across the phases of
42 need. As there is no one-size-fits-all instrument or approach, risk layering is a suggested approach to
43 combining financial instruments (Mechler et al. 2014; Surminski et al. 2016).

44 Catastrophe (CAT) bonds are high-yield debt instruments used to transfer risks from issuer (a
45 company or government) to an investor in the event of a specified catastrophe. In the case of
46 sovereign CAT bonds, the investor provides a certain sum of money, and the recipient government
47 regularly pays coupon interest on the amount. In the case of the pre-defined catastrophe, the

1 requirement to pay the coupon interest or repay the principal may be deferred or forgiven (Nguyen
2 and Lindenmeier 2014). CAT bonds are typically short-term instruments (3-5 years) and are
3 parametric in that the payout is triggered once a particular threshold of disaster/damage is passed
4 (Härdle and Cabrera 2010; Campillo, G., Mullan, M., Vallejo 2017; Estrin and Tan 2016a; Hermann,
5 A., Kofler, P., Mairhofer 2016; Michel-Kerjan et al. 2011; Roberts 2017) . The primary advantage of
6 CAT bonds is their ability to quickly disburse money in the event of a catastrophe (Estrin and Tan
7 2016b).

8 Another means of catastrophe finance is the catastrophe risk pool, where multiple countries in a
9 region might pool risks in a diversified portfolio. Examples include ARC, CCRIF, and PCRAFI
10 (Bresch et al. 2017).

11 There are significant barriers for developing country governments to entry into the CAT bond market:
12 lack of familiarity with the instruments; lack of capacity and resources to deal with complex legal
13 arrangements; limited or non-existent data and modelling of disaster exposure; and other political
14 disincentives linked to insurance. For these reasons the utility and application of CAT bonds is limited
15 to higher-income developing countries (Campillo, G., Mullan, M., Vallejo 2017; Le Quesne 2017).

16 A broad range of sources make up the category of contingency finance; examples exist at all levels of
17 government of dedicated contingency funds, set aside for unpredictable climate-related disasters.
18 Contingency finance ranges from household savings to Development Policy Loans with Catastrophe
19 Risk Deferred Drawdown Option , a contingent line of credit for immediate disbursement of funds in
20 the event of a disaster, granted by the World Bank to IBRD-eligible governments. Contingency
21 finance is best suited to manage frequently occurring, low-impact events (Campillo, G., Mullan, M.,
22 Vallejo 2017; Mahul and Ghesquiere 2010; Roberts 2017) and may be linked with social protection
23 systems. Multilateral development banks manage risk at relatively low cost by providing contingent
24 lines of credit (Mahul & Ghesquiere, 2010). These instruments are limited by uncertainty
25 surrounding the size of contingency fund reserves given unpredictable climate disasters (Roberts
26 2017) and lack of borrowing capacity of a country (such as small island states) (Mahul & Ghesquiere,
27 2010).

28 Forecast based finance links financing with early action as a response to forecasts of hazards and
29 disaster impacts (Wilkinson 2018). Forecast-based mechanisms use “climate or other forecasts to
30 trigger funding and action prior to a shock or before acute impacts are felt, to reduce the impact on
31 vulnerable people and their livelihoods, improve the effectiveness of emergency preparedness,
32 response and recovery efforts, and reduce the humanitarian burden.” (Wilkinson 2018). It can also be
33 linked with social protection systems to effect ex ante impacts of disasters on food security by
34 providing contingent scaled-up finance quickly to vulnerable populations enhancing scalability,
35 timeliness, predictability and adequacy of social protection benefits (Wilkinson 2018; Costella et al.
36 2017; Programme 2018).

37

38 ***7.4.2.5 GHG fluxes and climate change mitigation***

39 A significant gap still exists between NDCs and achieving commitments to keep global warming
40 below 1.5°C (Höhne et al. 2017; Rogelj et al. 2016) creating a significant risk of global warming.
41 Mitigation actions to achieve NDCs, which include renewable energy, may have trade-offs with food
42 security. The promotion of small hydro-power (<25 MGW) as a clean low carbon alternative to fossil
43 fuels under the NDCs has given a new thrust and justification for small dams (Chakrabarty and
44 Chakraborty 2018). Small dams and solar farms are however already showing trade-offs with fresh-
45 water biodiversity regionally (Jumani et al. 2017b) and with food security locally (Turney and
46 Fthenakis 2011). Large new dams being planned in many countries are clearly linked to national food,

1 water and energy security planning that could be justified under the SDGs but could generate
2 irreversible trade-offs with respect to downstream ecosystem services. The emerging global boom in
3 dam building for renewable energy and water demands has severe consequences for rivers and
4 riverine ecosystem services (Zarfl et al. 2014). The absence of a clear commitment to conserving
5 aquatic ecosystems under the SDGs or NDCs makes the trade-offs with respect to aquatic ecosystem
6 services both a key and an emerging risk.

7 The Paris Agreement reaffirmed the UNFCCC target that ‘developed country parties provide USD
8 100 billion annually by 2020 for climate action in developing countries’ (Rajamani 2011) and a new
9 collective quantified goal above this floor is to be set taking into account the needs and priorities of
10 developing countries (Fridahl and Linnér 2016). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is to: (1) provide a
11 paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways for developing
12 countries (Lattanzio 2012); (2) achieve a balanced allocation of resources between adaptation and
13 mitigation (allocating 50% to LDCs, SIDS, and African States and 3 million USD for development of
14 National Adaptation Plans (GCF (Green Climate Fund) 2017; Brechin and Espinoza 2017)), Intended
15 Nationally Determined Contributions and Nationally Determined Contributions

16 There is a risk of not meeting the goal set in the Paris Agreement of holding global warming to well
17 below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels and of pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C.
18 Although NDCs constitute only one third of the emission reductions needed to be on a least cost
19 pathway for the goal of staying well below 2°C, the gap can be closed by 2030 by adopting already
20 known cost effective technology (United Nations Environment Programme 2017). Agriculture is well
21 represented in adaptation and mitigation strategies of parties to the Paris Agreement and the Intended
22 Nationally Determined Contributions with much attention to conventional agricultural practices such
23 as livestock and crop management that can be climate smart, but less to the enabling services that can
24 facilitate uptake that include information services, insurance and credit; 73 parties reference food
25 security and 25 note nutritional security as an important concern, but few specify concrete actions
26 (Richards, M., Bruun, T.B., Campbell, B.M., Gregersen, L.E., Huyer 2015). Much is expected out of
27 the finance, capacity building and technology transfer mechanisms of the UNFCCC (ibid).

28 Developments in attribution science are improving the ability to detect human influence on extreme
29 weather and some authors argue this broadens the legal duty of government, business and others to
30 manage foreseeable harms and may lead to more climate change litigation (Marjanac et al. 2017);
31 these authors anticipate the first climate litigation most likely to emerge will be claims against
32 governments for failure to adopt or prepare for climate change (Marjanac et al. 2017). Courts are
33 becoming increasingly receptive to employ rights claims in climate change lawsuits (Peel and
34 Osofsky 2017); citizen suits in domestic courts can result in potentially effective enforcement of
35 individual state responsibility for limiting emissions and their impacts and even if these suits are not a
36 universal phenomenon and are unsuccessful, they are important in underlining the high level of public
37 concern (Estrin 2016).

38 **Financing mechanisms**

39 The costs of adaptation needed range from 140 billion to 300 billion USD by 2030, and between 280
40 billion and 500 billion USD by 2050; (UNEP 2014). (These figures vary according to methodologies
41 and approaches used (de Bruin et al. 2009; IPCC 2014a; Organization for Economic Cooperation and
42 Development 2008; Nordhaus 1999; UNFCCC 2007; Plambeck et al. 1997; World Bank 2010). While
43 the provision of adaptation finance from developed to developing countries has increased from less
44 than 2 billion USD in 2010 to about 12 billion USD in 2014, most developed countries tend to prefer
45 allocating their funding to mitigation rather than adaptation actions. (Abadie et al. 2013). While the
46 Green Climate Fund (GCF) provides opportunity, it is still a new institution with policy gaps, a
47 lengthy and cumbersome process related to approval (Brechin and Espinoza 2017; Khan and Roberts

1 2013; Mathy and Blanchard 2016) and challenges with adequate and sustained funding (Schalatek and
2 Nakhooda 2013).

3 A range of financing mechanisms exists (e.g. from the World Bank, the IMF, IFC, and regional
4 development banks, as well as specialized multi-lateral institutions such as the GCF, the Global
5 Environmental Fund (GEF), REDD+, CDM, and the EU Solidarity Fund). Most public finance
6 provided to developing countries flows through bilateral and multilateral institutions, often in the
7 form of concessional loans and grants. Some governments have established state investment banks
8 (SIBs) to close the financing gap, including the UK (Green Investment Bank), Australia (Clean
9 Energy Finance Corporation) and in Germany (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) the Development
10 Bank has been involved in supporting low-carbon finance (Geddes et al. 2018). Private adaptation
11 finance exists, but is difficult to define, track, and coordinate; efforts are being made to increase its
12 inclusiveness (Nakhooda et al. 2016). A global stocktake of climate finance sources indicates a
13 startling array of diverse and fragmented sources: more than 50 international public funds, 60 carbon
14 markets, 6000 private equity funds, 99 multilateral and bilateral climate funds (Samuwai and Hills
15 2018).

16 In 2015, 95% of reported climate finance related to mitigation (Klein Goldewijk and Verburg 2013).
17 The 1.5°C report also addresses finance for achieving the 1.5°C target and emphasises that even
18 greater changes are required to meet the 1.5°C target. Both volume and patterns of investment need to
19 be transformed to get the world on a 2°C pathway, as well as changes to the type and structure of
20 financial institutions as well as the method of financing (Hoch 2017). However, the dominance of
21 finance for mitigation disregards the financing needs of vulnerable countries with minimal GHG
22 emissions. The returns on investment in countries such as Pacific Small Island Developing States are
23 humanitarian in nature rather than financial as in many mitigation projects (Samuwai and Hills 2018).

24 Of these climate finance sources, the amount of funding dedicated to climate change in agriculture is
25 very small compared to total climate finance, and significant gaps exist in the provision of resources
26 for agriculture in general (FAO 2010). Much of the funding for agriculture is accessed through
27 adaptation funds, rather than the much larger pool for mitigation, and they may potentially be in
28 competition with each other (Lobell et al. 2013). Focusing on synergies, or triple wins (such as
29 Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA), which promotes the ‘triple wins’ of mitigation, adaptation, and
30 increased productivity (Lipper et al. 2014a)), may leverage greater financial resources (Suckall et al.
31 2015). Concerns do exist around the conditions for finance for CSA however, where agricultural
32 mitigation may be required as a precondition of financing adaptation or development projects
33 (Tompkins et al. 2013) and the dominance and influence of the prevailing food regime (Newell and
34 Taylor 2018). Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are another emerging area to encourage
35 environmentally desirable practices, although they need to be carefully designed to be effective
36 (Engel and Muller 2016).

37 Insurance and risk transfer tools face challenges around market imperfections, low insurance
38 education/capacity, low affordability and accessibility (Mechler et al. 2014) and coverage is much
39 broader in developed than developing countries (Marie-Justine Labelle Matthew Johns and Morris
40 2016).

41 **Innovative financing approaches**

42 Traditional financing mechanisms have not been sufficient in facilitating a rapid transition to a low
43 carbon economy or building resilience – a ‘financing gap’ (Geddes et al. 2018). More recently there
44 have been developments in more innovative mechanisms including crowdfunding (Lam and Law
45 2016), often supported by national governments. For example, the UK government has supported the
46 development of crowd funding through regulatory and tax support, and guarantees to support peer to

1 peer lending (Owen et al. 2018). Crowdfunding has no financial intermediaries and thus low
2 transaction costs, and the projects have a greater degree of independence than bank or institution
3 funding (Miller et al. 2018). Other examples of innovative mechanisms are community shares for
4 local projects, such as renewable energy (Holstenkamp and Kahla 2016)

5 Corporate Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) are increasingly being used by companies such as
6 Google and Apple to purchase renewable energy directly or virtually from developers, and expected
7 to continue to grow (Miller et al. 2018). The investing companies benefit from avoiding unpredictable
8 price fluctuations as well as increasing their environmental credentials.

9 Auctioned price floors can be applied to a variety of sectors and are currently being trialled to reduce
10 GHG emissions in developing countries, developed by the World Bank Group, known as the Pilot
11 Auction Facility (PAF). The PAF issues tradeable bonds, providing a guaranteed floor price for
12 future emission reductions (Bodnar et al. 2018).

13 Distributed ledger technology, such as blockchain, has potential to transform climate finance and
14 environmental governance (*high agreement, low evidence*) (Chapron 2017). Blockchain is a digital
15 ledger that lists ownership of a set of assets as well as a tamper-proof transaction history for those
16 assets, and is operated by a peer-to-peer network of computers (Urban 2018). Such technology has
17 been used to create virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, launched in 2008 (Conte de Leon et al. 2017).
18 It has enabled a new class of enterprises to raise capital by selling coins or tokens, sometimes with
19 characteristics such as rights to service, to other individuals (Urban 2018). One of the key benefits of
20 distributed ledger technology is that it makes transfers of assets fully transparent and can be used in an
21 environment that is not trust-based and without a central authority (Chapron 2017). Digital contracts
22 can be created that automatically trigger payments to individuals. “Gainforest” has used this
23 technology to enable individuals (“donors”) to make payments to small-scale farmers (“caretakers”)
24 in the Amazon for preserving patches of rainforest over a three to six-month period. The technology
25 also has applications for insurance and for governance (Gatteschi et al. 2018). But such applications
26 are still nascent and uncertainties about the benefits and risk exist (*high agreement, high evidence*).

27 In order for climate finance to be as effective and efficient as possible, it is necessary for the private,
28 public and third sectors to work together to create an enabling environment for innovation (Owen et
29 al. 2018). While innovative private sector approaches are making significant progress, the existence
30 of a stable policy environment that provides certainty and incentives for long term private investment
31 is critical.

32 **Mitigation instruments**

33 Carbon pricing incorporates the polluter pay principle and adjusts the prices of all goods and services
34 to reflect direct, indirect, and social GHG emission costs (based on the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC))
35 – the incremental impact of emitting an additional tonne of CO₂, or the benefit of slightly reducing
36 emissions (Tol 2018). Higher costs throughout the entire economy results in reduction of carbon
37 intensity as consumers and producers adjust their decisions in relation to prices corrected to reflect the
38 climate externality (Baranzini et al. 2017). A carbon tax and a cap and trade system are two
39 predominant policy instruments that implement carbon pricing. The advantage of carbon pricing is
40 environmental effectiveness at relatively low cost; non-price policy instruments have considerably
41 higher abatement cost and are less effective at covering diverse sources of emissions (Baranzini et al.
42 2017). Furthermore, carbon pricing can be used to raise revenue to reinvest in public spending, either
43 to help certain sectors transition to lower carbon systems, or to invest in public spending unrelated to
44 climate change. Both of these options may make climate policies more attractive and enhance overall
45 welfare (Siegmeier et al. 2018).

46 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that a carbon tax, if designed properly, can reduce
47 GHG emissions with the advantage of environmental effectiveness at relatively low cost (Metcalf and

1 Weisbach 2009; Martin et al. 2014; Baranzini et al. 2017). For a small additional cost, one study
2 identifies that a carbon tax in the United States could reduce a large proportion (between 80% and
3 90%) of emissions (Metcalf and Weisbach 2009). However, the effectiveness of a carbon tax is
4 negated if it is poorly designed (Bruvoll and Larsen 2004); poor design might relate to the scope and
5 nature of tax exemptions and the usage of the tax revenue. For example a broad range of exemption
6 for fossil fuel intensive industries will negate the carbon tax effectiveness (Lin and Li 2011b). A
7 fuel tax has also reduced emissions in the transportation sector (Rivers, Nicholas, Schaufele 2015).

8 A cap and trade (also known as a carbon market, or emissions trading scheme (ETS)) regulatory
9 option imposes a cost on emissions by regulating specific sectors of the economy, limiting emissions
10 from a specific entity or enterprise by imposing a cap and then allowing the entity to exceed the
11 imposed limit by buying permits in a carbon trading market from entities that have used less than their
12 allowed limit. The trading system allows the achievement of emission reductions in the most cost-
13 effective manner possible and results in a market and price on emissions that create incentives for the
14 reduction of carbon pollution. There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that properly designed,
15 a cap and trade system can be a powerful policy instrument (Wagner 2013) and may collect more
16 rents than a variable carbon tax (Siegmeier et al. 2018).

17 A cap and trade system has successfully reduced SO₂ in electrical power plants (Assigns et al. 1990).
18 However, depending on how the cap and trade system is established, it can result in little incentive to
19 invest in improvement given the regulator has less ability to control price of energy while ensuring
20 productive efficiency (full diffusion of technology to all producers). Because there will be little
21 incentive to invest in larger improvements than will be fully diffused, it may be that cap and trade
22 limits innovation in comparison to a carbon tax (Scotchmer 2011). Depending on design, a cap and
23 trade system may not adequately capture the dynamic opportunities for allowance banking,
24 borrowing, and inter-temporal arbitrage in response to unfolding information (Murray et al. 2009).
25 Remedies in design might include a set aside reserve to automatically retire emission trading permits
26 and cure the problem of emission cap floors constituting a discouragement from ethically motivated
27 reductions (Twomey et al. 2012). Further, having a cap and trade system adopted in only one
28 jurisdiction and not in surrounding closely connected economies may result in ‘leakage’ or reduced
29 effectiveness. Products with lower prices not reflecting carbon prices are imported. This leakage can
30 be prevented by banning such resource shuffling (Caron et al. 2015). The opportunity for leakage is
31 reducing as more jurisdictions adopt a cap and trade system. For example, such expansion has
32 recently occurred in China (Deng et al. 2018), Korea (Suk et al. 2017), and Japan (Wakabayashi and
33 Kimura 2018).

34 In the land use sector, carbon markets present specific implementation challenges due to the large
35 number of small entities based on biological systems, with high uncertainty relating to the volume of
36 emissions and the most efficient point of obligation (the point in the supply chain obliged to report on
37 and surrender units for emissions). New Zealand is currently investigating mechanisms to incorporate
38 agriculture into a national emission trading system after an earlier attempt was reversed (Kerr and
39 Sweet 2008). The two potential points of obligation are at the processor level or at the individual farm
40 level. Setting the point of obligation at the processor level means that farmers would face little
41 incentive to change their management practices, unless the processors themselves rewarded farmers
42 for lowered emissions. Setting it at the individual farm level would provide a direct incentive for
43 farmers to adopt mitigation practices, however the reality of having thousands of individual points of
44 obligation would be administratively complex and result in high transaction costs. Despite these
45 challenges, New Zealand is working to develop an effective system.

46 Policy instruments that target specific climate mitigation technologies or reductions play an important
47 role in climate mitigation (Bertram et al. 2015; Kriegler et al. 2014). Carbon pricing and technology
48 policies are largely complimentary (Baranzini et al. 2017). However, these policy instruments may

1 have considerably higher abatement cost and be less effective at covering diverse sources of
2 emissions (Baranzini et al. 2017). Technology policies play an important role in achieving zero
3 carbon targets in the short term and there is a concern that delay in taking action on mitigation might
4 result in technology lock in and higher abatement costs in the future (*high confidence*) (Riahi et al.
5 2015; Kriegler et al. 2015; Bertram et al. 2015). There is *medium agreement and limited evidence* that
6 climate targets can be kept within reach despite a sub-optimal policy mix that includes targeted low-
7 carbon technology policies and fragmented and moderate carbon pricing schemes together with a
8 moratorium on new coal-fired power plants to limit stranded assets (Bertram et al. 2015).

9 **Technology Transfer, land use sectors and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement**

10 Technology transfer has been a key aim under the UNFCCC since its inception and is one of the
11 pillars of international climate mitigation and adaptation efforts embodied in the Paris Agreement.
12 The definition of technology transfer adopted by IPCC is somewhat broader than that used under the
13 UNFCCC by including the notion that technology transfer also:

14 “...comprises the process of learning to understand, utilise, and replicate the technology,
15 including the capacity to choose it, adapt it to local conditions, and integrate it with
16 indigenous technologies (Metz et al. 2000).

17 This broader definition of technology transfer suggests greater heterogeneity in the applications for
18 climate mitigation and adaptation, especially in land use sectors where indigenous knowledge is
19 perceived as important for long-term climate resilience (Nyong et al. 2007b). More generally,
20 technology transfer encompasses the enabling conditions, including ‘orgware’ as well as hardware,
21 where ‘orgware’ refers to the organisational capacity to absorb and apply technology to reach the
22 desired aims (Haselip et al. 2015). However, it is difficult to objectively or empirically analyse such
23 organisational impacts in relation to technology transfer as they are not easily formalised.
24 Furthermore, in the case of land use sectors, the typical reliance on trade and patent data for empirical
25 analyses is generally not feasible as the “technology” in question is often related to resource
26 management and is neither patentable nor tradable (Glachant and Dechezleprêtre 2017).

27 Technology transfer was a key aim of the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto protocol. A detailed
28 study for nearly 4000 CDM projects showed that 39% of projects had a stated and actual technology
29 transfer component, accounting for 59% of emissions reductions; however, the more land-intensive
30 projects (e.g. afforestation, biomass energy) showed somewhat lower percentages (Murphy et al.
31 2015). In relation to broader development benefits, bioenergy projects that rely on agricultural
32 residues are found to offer substantially more benefits than those dependent on industrial residues
33 from forests (Lee and Lazarus 2013). Collaborative Research and Development (R&D) offers longer-
34 term means of technology transfer, although more difficult to measure compared to specific
35 cooperation projects and international mechanisms; empirical research on the effects of R&D
36 collaboration could help to avoid the “one-policy-fits-all” approach that sometimes characterises
37 technology transfer efforts in the international negotiations (Ockwell et al. 2015). For land use sectors,
38 the implications of R&D collaboration are likely to be even more pronounced than might be the case
39 for energy or industry since there are often issues of improved resource management that require
40 many years of interaction between researchers, practitioners and policy-makers rather than simple
41 sharing or financing of technologies or identification of new applications.

42 Technology transfer has tended to be more associated with mitigation, however there is increasing
43 recognition of its role in climate adaptation. Unlike mitigation there has been a tendency to rely on
44 existing technologies rather than new or innovative technologies, which is due in part to the additional
45 inherent uncertainty in adoption that is associated with adaptation, particularly in land use sectors.
46 Such uncertainties arise from changing climatic conditions, changing agricultural prices and the
47 uncertain suitability of technology applications under future conditions (Biagini et al. 2014).

1 Engaging the private sector in adaptation efforts is important in this context, as bringing new
2 technologies can only be replicated with significant private sector involvement and furthermore those
3 private companies are also more likely to incorporate adaptation strategies into their modes of work
4 and their technology investments so as to better manage risk (Biagini and Miller 2013). A further
5 distinction with mitigation can be made in that adaptation processes themselves are often intertwined
6 with the processes for adopting technologies for adaptation, so that greater coordination will be
7 needed between technology transfer mechanisms and adaptation strategies, including between the
8 Cancún Adaptation Framework and the Technology Mechanism of the UNFCCC (Olhoff 2015). Such
9 roles are also evolving under the Paris Agreement in light of its new mechanisms for cooperation.

10 Article 6 of the Paris Agreement brings new opportunities for cooperation between Parties and
11 between Parties and non-state entities in reducing GHG emissions and increasing resilience of land-
12 climate systems while achieving their NDCs (UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on
13 Climate Change) 2016). It sets out several options for international cooperation:

- 14 • Cooperative approaches under Articles 6.2-3 that are understood to refer to government-led
15 initiatives giving rise to emission reductions in the form of internationally transferred
16 mitigation outcomes (ITMOs).
- 17 • A mechanism under Articles 6.4-7 that establishes a centralised, international crediting
18 mechanism under the governance of the UNFCCC that is to contribute to both mitigation and
19 sustainable development.
- 20 • A framework for non-market approaches to sustainable development (which are normally
21 assumed not to involve transfers) under Articles 6.8-9 is seen by many Parties as a means of
22 facilitating improved coordination and exploiting synergies across non-market-oriented policy
23 instruments and institutional arrangements (Obergassel 2017). These approaches can
24 effectively include any combination of measures or instruments related to adaptation,
25 mitigation, finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, which should be of particular
26 interest in land use sectors where such aspects are more intertwined than might the case in
27 energy or industry sectors.

28
29 Cooperation under Article 6.2 or 6.4 Paris Agreement is based on principles of environmental
30 integrity, which includes the avoidance of double counting of emissions. There has been good
31 progress in accounting for land-based emissions (mainly forestry and agriculture), but various
32 challenges remain (Macintosh 2012; Pistorius et al. 2017; Krug 2018). The close relationship between
33 emission reductions, adaptive capacity, food security and other sustainability and governance
34 objectives in the AFOLU sector means that Article 6 could bring co-benefits that increase its
35 attractiveness and the availability of finance, while also bringing risks that need to be monitored and
36 mitigated against, such as uncertainties in measurements and the risk of non-permanence (Thamo and
37 Pannell 2016; Olsson et al. 2016; Schwartz et al. 2017).

38 Considering the special characteristics and challenges associated with land use sectors, the transfer of
39 capacities as well as technologies to developing country Parties will be important to enable full
40 participation. The new mechanisms also illustrate a shift in the technology transfer approach away
41 from an emphasis on obligations of developed country Parties to a more pragmatic, decentralised and
42 cooperative approach compared to the Kyoto protocol (Savaresi 2016; Jiang et al. 2017). While the
43 rules for the implementation of the new mechanisms are still under development, lessons from
44 REDD+ may be useful, which is perceived as more democratic and participative than the CDM
45 (Maraseni and Cadman 2015).

46 As well as new opportunities for finance and support, the cooperation mechanisms in the Paris
47 Agreement bring new challenges, particularly in emissions accounting in land use sectors. Since
48 developing countries must now achieve, measure and communicate emission reductions, they now
49 have value for both developing and developed countries in achieving their NDCs, but reductions must

1 not be double-counted (i.e. towards multiple NDCs). Developing countries have less incentive to
2 convert emission reductions to ITMOs and transfer them, at least not until they have met their NDCs
3 (Streck et al. 2017). This challenge is particularly prominent in land use sectors where emission
4 reductions take more time to achieve and are less predictable. There is also no agreement whether the
5 cooperative systems that give rise to an “ecological civilization” (Jiang et al. 2017) can or should be
6 facilitated by offsetting and transfers of emission reductions. Experts argue in favour (van der Gaast et
7 al. 2018) and against (Dooley and Gupta 2017) a role for carbon projects and mitigation programs in
8 land use sectors under the Paris Agreement. International emission trading may also lead to welfare
9 loss of developing countries (Fujimori et al. 2016). The benefits of interventions and mechanisms are
10 highly context specific and will most likely continue to be considered on a case-by-case basis and will
11 need to be backed by strong safeguards (Bustamante et al. 2014).

12 **7.4.3 Policy mix and suites of policy instruments**

13 Existing responses to risk provide challenges as well as opportunities. In addition to the uncertainty
14 described (7.3), challenges exist with assessing multiple hazards and sectors (Aalto et al. 2017;
15 Brander and Keith 2015; Williams and Abatzoglou 2016). Mainstreaming adaptation and risk
16 management into on-going development planning and decision making is challenging, faced by
17 developed as well as developing countries (Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler 2015), overly
18 focused on sectors instead of sustainable use of biodiversity and ecosystem services (Huq et al. 2017),
19 and often policy capacity and human, financial and technical resource availability act as barriers
20 (Ayers et al. 2014; Huq et al. 2017).

21 Scaling up is a key challenge for community-based and ecosystem-based adaptation initiatives.
22 Although difficult and often ignored, CBA and EBA initiatives should ensure that communities are
23 central to planning (Reid 2016). There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that one of the
24 greatest challenges is posed by inequalities that influence local coping and adaptive capacity (Field
25 and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2012; Kunreuther et al. 2013). Effective and
26 reliable social safety nets will be required to address impacts on the neediest (Jones and Hiller 2017).
27 Social protection coverage is low across the world and informal support systems continue to be the
28 key means of protection for a majority of rural poor and vulnerable (Stavropoulou et al. 2017). There
29 is a need to better understand both positive and negative synergies between formal and informal
30 systems of social protection and how local support institutions might be used to implement more
31 formal forms of social protection (Stavropoulou et al. 2017).

32 The optimal climate mitigation policy portfolio includes different instruments targeted at emissions
33 reductions, learning, and research and development (*high confidence*) (Fischer and Newell 2008).
34 Consideration of the interactions of policy instruments is important. Research in the area of the
35 interaction of suites of policies working together is just commencing. For instance, dedicated
36 renewable energy programs may not support emissions trading as the price of renewable energy is
37 supplemented by government. However, the addition of a carbon tax can remedy these negative
38 interactions (del Río and Cerdá 2017). The integration between climate policy and public finance is
39 critical in ensuring the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of mitigation policy, and ultimately to
40 make stringent mitigation policy more feasible (Siegmeier et al. 2018).

41

42 **7.4.4 Effectiveness of instruments**

43 An enabling environment for policy effectiveness must include: 1) the development of comprehensive
44 policies, strategies and programs; 2) human and financial resources that ensure policies, programs and
45 legislation are translated into action; 3) governance coordination mechanisms and partnerships; 4)
46 decision making that draws on evidence generated from functional information systems that make it

1 possible to monitor trends; track and map actions; and assess impact in a manner that is timely and
2 comprehensive (FAO 2017). (Di Gregorio et al. 2017) have found that in Indonesia while internal
3 policy coherence between mitigation and adaptation is increasing, external policy coherence between
4 climate change policy and development objectives is needed. Bureaucratic structures undermine
5 vertical and horizontal policy integration (vertical policy integration to mainstream climate change
6 into sectoral policies and horizontal policy integration by overarching governance structures for cross-
7 sectoral coordination (Di Gregorio et al. 2017)).

8 Iterative risk management is an on-going process of assessment, action, reassessment and response
9 (Mochizuki et al. 2015). This will be important for developing responsive policies in a changing
10 environment. However, gauging effectiveness of policy instruments is challenging. Timescale may
11 influence outcomes. In order to evaluate effectiveness researchers, program managers and
12 communities should strive to develop consistency, comparability, comprehensiveness and coherence
13 in their tracking. In other words, practitioners should utilise a consistent and operational
14 conceptualisation of adaptation; focus on comparable units of analysis; develop comprehensive
15 datasets on adaptation action; and be coherent_with our understanding of what constitutes real
16 adaptation (Ford and Berrang-Ford 2016). Increasing the use of systematic reviews or randomised
17 evaluations will also be helpful (Alverson and Zommers 2018).

18 **7.4.4.1 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Coherence**

19 Unlike the Millennium Development Goals, the SDGs apply to all countries, and measure progress of
20 sustainable and socially just development of human societies at all scales of governance (Griggs et al.
21 2013b). The UN SDGs rest on the premise that the goals are mutually reinforcing with global policies
22 and agreements. There exist inherent linkages, synergies and trade-offs between and within the sub-
23 goals. There is high agreement that opportunities, trade-offs and co-benefits are context specific and
24 depend on a variety of political, national and socio-economic factors. “Implicit in the SDG logic is
25 that the goals depend on each other — but no one has specified exactly how. International
26 negotiations gloss over tricky trade-offs” (Nilsson et al. 2016b). Some thematic areas covered by the
27 SDGs are well connected with one another, whereas other parts have weaker connections with the rest
28 (Le Blanc 2015).

29
30 At least one gap has been identified in the SDGs relevant to land and climate interactions - the
31 absence of an explicit goal related to sustainable management of rivers and fresh-water ecosystems,
32 especially given the trade-offs with goals related to water supply and clean energy production. This
33 has occurred despite emerging knowledge about the role that rivers and riverine ecosystems play in
34 human development and in generating global, regional and local ecosystem services (Nilsson and
35 Berggren 2000; Hoeninghaus et al. 2009). A goal related to sustaining marine life (“Life under Water”)
36 is included, even though sustainable management of marine life especially in estuaries, deltas and
37 coastal ecosystems, would need corresponding management of rivers and life in rivers (Barbier et al.
38 2011). Therefore there are twin policy threats to fresh-water biodiversity and ecosystems because of
39 limitations in framing of the SDGs and the proliferation of small dams in biodiversity hotspots
40 (Jumani et al. 2017b) due to INDC commitments made under the Paris Agreement.

41 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that SDGs must not be pursued independently, but in a
42 manner that recognises trade-offs and synergies with each other, consistent with a goal of ‘policy
43 coherence.’ Policy coherence also refers to spatial trade-offs and geo-political implications within and
44 between regions and countries implementing SDGs. For instance, food security initiatives of land-
45 based agriculture are impacting marine fisheries globally through creation of dead-zones due to
46 agricultural run-off (Diaz and Rosenberg 2008). There are also spatial trade-offs related to large river

1 diversion projects and export of “virtual water” through water intensive crops produced in one region
2 exported to another, with implications for food-security, water security and downstream ecosystem
3 services of the exporting region (Hanasaki et al. 2010; Verma et al. 2009). Synergies include cropping
4 adaptation that increase food system production and eliminate hunger (SDG2) (Rockström et al.
5 2017a; Lipper et al. 2014a; Neufeldt et al. 2013). Well-adapted agricultural systems have shown to
6 have positive returns on investment and contribute to safe drinking water, health, biodiversity and
7 equity goals (DeClerck 2016).

8 There is also *limited agreement and limited evidence* that binary evaluations of individual SDGs and
9 synergies and trade-offs that categorise interactions as either ‘beneficial’ or ‘adverse’ may be
10 subjective and challenged further by the fact that feedbacks can often not be assigned as
11 unambiguously positive or negative (Blanc et al. 2017). The Special Report on Global Warming of
12 1.5°C notes, “A reductive focus on specific SDGs in isolation may undermine the long-term
13 achievement of sustainable climate change mitigation (Holden et al. 2017)“. Greater work is needed
14 to tease out these relationships, and studies that include quantitative modelling (see Karnib 2017) and
15 nuanced scoring scales (ICSU 2017) of these relationships have started.

16 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that to be effective, truly sustainable, and to reduce or
17 mitigate emerging risks, SDGs need knowledge and policy initiatives that recognise and assimilate
18 concepts of co-production of ecosystem services in socio-ecological systems, cross-scale linkages,
19 uncertainty, spatial and temporal trade-offs between SDGs and ecosystem services that recognise
20 biophysical, social and political constraints and an understanding of how social change occurs at
21 various scales (Rodríguez et al. 2006; Norström et al. 2014; Palomo et al. 2016). Complex
22 interactions exist between these goals and within the sub-goals and further research is needed to
23 understand the various relationship dimensions (*high agreement, limited evidence*). These could
24 include temporal and spatial trade-offs, trade-offs at different scales and across sectors. Several
25 methods and tools are proposed in literature to address and understand these interactions. Nilsson et
26 al. (2016a) suggest using a going beyond a simplistic synergies-trade-offs framing to understanding
27 various relationship dimensions proposing a seven-point scale to understand these interactions.

28 A nexus approach is increasingly being adopted to explore synergies and trade-off between a select
29 subset of goals and targets (such as the interaction between water, energy, and food (see, e.g.
30 Yumkella and Yillia 2015; Conway et al. 2015; Ringler et al. 2015)).

31 However, even this approach ignores systemic properties and interactions across the system as a
32 whole (Weitz et al. 2017). Pursuit of certain targets in one area can generate rippling effects across the
33 system, and these effects in turn can have secondary impacts on yet other targets. (Weitz et al. 2017)
34 found that SDG target 13.2 (climate change policy/ planning) is influenced by actions in six other
35 targets. SDG 13.1 (climate change adaption) and also 2.4 (food production) receive the most positive
36 influence from progression in other targets. This approach, and the identification of clusters of
37 synergy, can help indicate to government ministries should work together or establish collaborations
38 to reach their specific goals. Finally, context specific analysis is needed. Synergies and trade-offs will
39 depend on the natural resource base (such as land or water availability), governance arrangements,
40 available technologies, and political ideas in a given location (Nilsson et al. 2016b).

41

Cross-chapter Box: Gender in integrative approaches for land, climate change and sustainable development

When developing integrated responses, it is important to consider social dynamics and interactions, including inequalities. As discussed in the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, negative impacts can occur when existing inequalities are exacerbated. By contrast “Policy frameworks and strong institutions that align development, equity objectives and climate have the potential to deliver ‘triple-wins’.” (Chapter 5, SR1.5°C).

The Framework

Women played a dominant role in agriculture (Boserup 1970) and rural economy, forming 43% of the agriculture workforce and taking care of food security (FAO 2011); in sub-Saharan Africa 59% of women are in informal agriculture employment, largely as small-scale farmers (Razavi and Turquet 2016) in the context of male outmigration for work in general or as response to decline in pasture lands or drought (Brockhaus et al. 2013; Djoudi et al. 2016). However, overarching patriarchy in a majority of the countries, in particular the developing ones, has meant, less than 20% of landholders globally are women (FAO 2011); in only 37% of 161 countries men and women have equal land rights to use and control and in 59% the customary, traditional and religious practices discriminate against women (OECD 2014) even if the law grants equal rights. In particular, widows are the victims of land grabbing (Razavi and Turquet 2016).

There are multiple barriers to women participating in land-based adaptive and mitigating actions in response to climate change. They (i) are burdened with unpaid domestic work including care-giving activities (Beuchelt and Badstue 2013); (ii) constantly face risk of violence that restricts their mobility for capacity-building activities (Jost et al. 2016); (iii) face violence at home as well, that reduces their long-term participation in capacity building as well as productive work outside home (Day et al, 2005); (iv) lack ownership of productive assets and resources (Kristjanson et al. 2014; Meinzen-dick et al. 2010) including land, their creditworthiness is low and hence have low access to finance (Jost et al. 2016); (v) are not organised (while organisational membership helps in accessing credit (Carroll et al. 2012))and (vi) have lower endowments such as various capital that increase their individual resilience.

Integrative approaches should focus on ‘gender’ and not just ‘women’. Women are not a homogenous group. Gender, being a socially, economically, culturally, politically and institutionally constructed reality, focuses on what women miss out on, in the dynamics of how gendered inequalities are constructed (Mersha and Van Laerhoven 2016). This understanding helps in action programmes. In particular, contemporary institutions are expected to mediate gender inequalities, however, their effectiveness is constrained through gendered rules, the implementation of which results in unequal gendered outcomes (Lowndes and Robert 2013). (Djoudi et al. 2016) suggest using a framework of intersectionality to integrate gender in climate change discourse as it deals with overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvantage. SDG 5 and its interpretation in the context of Climate Change SDG 13, would mean fulfilling women’s economic rights, achieving women’s equal leadership, influence and participation in decision-making and reducing women’s time burden by recognising, reducing and redistributing unpaid care (Rosche 2016; Esquivel and Sweetman 2016).

1
2

Gender and climate change literature

Literature on integrating Gender in Climate Change action is limited and is largely adaptation focused (Mersha and Van Laerhoven 2016; Djoudi et al. 2016). All studies report gendered impacts of climate change in rural areas with women of all communities at the lower level of resilience than the men in their communities, albeit through different pathways (Goh 2012; Kakota et al. 2011; Djoudi et al. 2016; Jost et al. 2016). At the same time, women's overwhelming presence in agriculture provides opportunity to bring gender dimensions into climate change adaptation, in particular with regards to food security, through climate-smart agriculture. Quantitative methods have not helped in mapping these relationships and hence, identifying integrative approaches; in particular there is suggestion participatory adaptation should be adopted (Jost et al. 2016). Literature discusses gender barriers to climate change adaptation (Mersha and Van Laerhoven 2016), suggesting that female-headed households adapt through diversification in livelihood strategies (labour-intensive public-works and individual-based diversity) and communal-pooling of resources; male-headed households have more diverse sets of adaptation measures such as on-farm adaptation (cropping time adjustment, mixed cropping, planting commercial trees, soil conservation), temporary migration and storage of grains.

Climate change adaptation is multi-sectoral and existing literature has attempted to identify, and examine the national and sectoral policies geared towards better climate change adaptation; discussion of gender and its inclusions in natural resources policy documents remain just rhetoric (Ampaire et al. 2015). In particular, there has been introduction of or amendment to the existing land policies to include gender dimensions; however, there seems to be no progress on their implementation (Djoudi et al. 2016).

Some studies do point to an emancipatory role played by adaptation interventions, albeit in a limited manner. Women in socially disadvantaged groups engage in new livelihood activities after adult men out-migrate (Djoudi and Brockhaus 2011); collective action and agency of women, in the case of widows particularly, have led to prevention of crop failure, reduced workload, increased nutritional intake, increased sustainable water management, diversified and increased income and improved strategic planning (Andersson and Gabriellsson 2012). In a developed country context, there has been a shift from agriculture to salaried position (Ford and Goldhar 2012).

Land-based mitigation approaches include policy, technology and market activities in the agricultural, livestock and forestry sectors, such as policies supporting the cultivation of crops like corn, oil palm, sugarcane or soybeans that can be used to produce biofuels; global forest carbon markets to incentivise reductions in deforestation and degradation or increases in forest carbon stocks (one example being REDD+); policies supporting conservation agriculture to reduce emissions from soils; and energy infrastructure that impacts large areas of land, including hydroelectric projects, wind farms and concentrated solar power projects. Each of these options can produce environment and development trade-offs as well as social conflicts (Hunsberger et al. 2017). Their impacts need to be studied in gendered ways. But preliminary theories are that these interfere with traditional livelihoods in rural areas, cause conflicts, lead to decline in women's livelihoods (Hunsberger et al. 2017), and reinforce existing inequities and social exclusions, if elite capture is not prevented (Mustalahti and Rakotonarivo 2014; Chomba et al. 2016; Poudyal et al. 2016). These activities also can lead to land grabs, which then remain focal point for research and local activism (Borras Jr. et al. 2011; White et al. 2012; Lahiff 2015).

1

If women's livelihoods get affected due to either land alienation through the creation of a market or appropriation (acquisition) by the government for climate mitigation efforts, the family slips into poverty. Land alienation for biofuels' production unequally impact as they do not adequately address land rights (Hunsberger et al. 2017). In certain contexts, they lead to increased conflicts. In a conflictual situation women are highly vulnerable to personal violence. REDD+ initiatives could be aligned with the SDGs to achieve complementary synergies with gender dimension, examples of which are yet unavailable in literature.

National Determined Contributions (NDCs)

In NDCs, 57 Parties refer to gender but mostly in relation to impacts of climate change; there is less provision for supporting women in actively addressing and participating in adaptation and mitigation actions (Richards Bruun et al. 2015). Richards et al. (2015) conclude that the lack of substantive references and commitments in the INDCs to women and gender equality is due to the limited approach to gender within the UNFCCC but that global climate funds take stronger approaches. They conclude that global institutions still fall short of the gender-transformative approach needed. Recommendations to address gender inequity include earmarking resources to contract women to participate on an equal basis with men in adaptation and disaster recovery responses, and building capacity and ensuring equal access for equal participation in climate decision making and leadership (Meikle et al. 2016)

Enhancing Social Resilience through Empowering Women and Other vulnerable Populations

Policy instrument responses to climate impacts are more successful if they account for the needs of a wide range of actors, target the poor and vulnerable, and incorporate inclusive decision making (Chu et al. 2015). Two policy areas are essential in empowering vulnerable populations: Early warning systems and community-based adaptation and disaster risk reduction.

Early warning systems improve resilience of households to climate related hazards by providing information for early actions. However, to be effective they must include diversity, flexibility, local relevance, learning, acceptance of change and considerations of justice and equity (UNEP 2015). Addressing factors that increase vulnerability such as poverty, inequality, lack of education, can improve early warning systems.

There is high agreement, but limited evidence that community based risk assessment and adaptation, both bottom up approaches to tackle climate change impacts, are superior for operationalising local inclusiveness and prioritising local communities' priorities, needs, knowledge, and capacities, empowering the community to plan and cope with immediate climate variability and climate impacts (van Aalst et al. 2008; Pelling 2007; Carcellar et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2016) moving beyond assessing only physical climate risks (Ayers and Forsyth 2009). However, occasionally local level projections of climate change impacts are unavailable (Forsyth 2013), or local elite capture may occur in the participatory processes (Lucas 2016) inhibiting the reduction of vulnerability..

2

3

4 **7.4.5 Adaptation limits and barriers**

5 The adverse effects of climate change cannot be avoided as mitigation efforts can no longer prevent
6 climate change impacts in the next few decades (Klein et al. 2015). Only a small fraction of
7 adaptation measures suggested can be implemented due to financial, institutional, technical, and
8 physical limits giving rise to implementation barriers, which illustrates the narrowing of adaptation

1 from the space of all possible adaptation, to the space of what actual adaptations will be implemented.
2 Forces impacting this narrowing process appear in each respective circle.

3 An adaptation limit is, “the point at which an actor’s objectives or system’s needs cannot be secured
4 from intolerable risks through adaptive actions” and implying there are ‘no options that could be
5 implemented over a given time horizon to achieve one or more management objectives, maintain
6 values, or sustain natural systems” (Klein et al. 2015). Hard limits include water supply in fossil
7 aquifers, limits to retreat on islands, and loss of biodiversity; soft limits refer to situations where
8 adaptation options could become available in the future, due to changing attitudes or values or
9 innovation and resources becoming available. Constraint, barrier and obstacle are used synonymously
10 and in contrast to adaptation limit which is more restrictive.

11 Some examples of limits include: uncertainty, lack of coordination, government failures, behavioural
12 obstacles to adaptation, market failures and missing markets, transaction costs and political economy,
13 ethical and distributional issues (Chambwera et al. 2014b). Constraints or barriers identified by
14 (Klein, et al. 2014) potentially surround lack of knowledge, awareness and technology; or consist of
15 physical; biological; economic; financial; human resource; social and cultural; governance and
16 institutional. Considerable literature exists around understanding social and cultural barriers to
17 changing behaviours (Rosin 2013; Eakin; Marshall et al. 2012); literature examining the role of
18 governance and institutions in creating or overcoming barriers in the land use sector exists in pockets
19 around the role of insurance (Foudi and Erdlenbruch 2012; Linnerooth-Bayer and Hochrainer-Stigler
20 2015) and the existence of perverse incentives and misaligned policies. (Wreford et al. 2017)
21 summarise the literature on barriers to the adoption of adaptation and mitigation practices in
22 agriculture in OECD countries, and identify cost, lack of knowledge and information, social and
23 cultural factors, as well as perceived negative effect on performance as important barriers.

24 Land tenure can present a barrier to adaptation, most commonly where tenanted farmers are less likely
25 to invest in longer term adaptation or conservation measures due to the insecurity or complexity of
26 their tenure, and particularly among women (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015a; Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012).
27 Understanding the nature of constraints to adaptation is critical in determining how these may be
28 overcome. Evidence shows that understanding the local context and targeted approaches are generally
29 most successful (Rauken et al. 2014).

30 Incremental adaptation consists of ‘actions where the central aim is to maintain the essence and
31 integrity of a system or process at a given site’ whereas transformational adaptation is ‘adaptation the
32 changes the fundamental attributes of a system in response to climate and its effects;’ the former is
33 characterised as doing different things and the latter, doing things differently (Noble et al. 2014).
34 Transformational adaptation is most likely necessary in situations where there are hard limits to
35 adaptation or desirable to address deficiencies in sustainability, adaptation, inclusive development
36 and social equity (Kates et al. 2012; Mapfumo et al. 2015). In other situations, incremental changes
37 may be sufficient (Hadarits et al. 2017).

38 For food production systems, the highest potential to build resilience and adaptive capacity lies in
39 diversity of local land, water, risk, and farm management. Research has documented diverse
40 agroecological practices of small scale agriculture to deal with climatic variability which have led to
41 superior recovery from climate stressors (Ahmed and Stepp 2016; Altieri et al. 2015). Additional
42 research has suggested that high levels of on-farm biodiversity, polycultures, agroforestry systems,
43 crop-livestock mixed systems accompanied by organic soil management, water conservation and
44 harvesting, and traditional farming and risk management practices may present the only viable and
45 robust ways to increase the productivity, sustainability and resilience of peasant-based agricultural
46 production under predicted climate scenarios (Nalau and Handmer 2015; Altieri and Nicholls
47 2017)(Ahmed and Stepp 2016). Fostering or undermining of equity and participation are correlated
48 with the efficacy and limits of local adaptation to secure food and livelihood security (Laube et al.

1 2012). Additional factors like formal education and knowledge of traditional farming systems, secure
2 tenure rights, access to electricity and social institutions in rice-farming areas of Bangladesh have
3 played a positive role in reducing adaptation barriers (Alam 2015). A review of over 168 publications
4 over 15 years about adaptation of water resources for irrigation in Europe found the highest potential
5 for action is in improving adaptive capacity and responding to changes in water demands, in
6 conjunction with alterations in current water policy, farm extension training, and viable financial
7 instruments (Iglesias and Garrote 2015). Research on the Great Barrier Reef, the Olifants River in
8 Southern Africa, and fisheries in Europe, North America, and the Southern Ocean suggests the
9 leading factors in harnessing the adaptive capacity of ecosystems is to reduce human stressors by
10 enabling actors to collaborate across diverse interests, institutional settings, and sectors (Biggs et al.
11 2017; Schultz et al. 2015; Johnson and Becker 2015).

12 **Limits in relation to society-land-climate interactions**

13 Combinations of society-land-climate interactions pose barriers and limits to the adaptive capacity of
14 food production systems and ecosystems (Biesbroek et al. 2013; Denton et al. 2015; Fan et al. 2017) .
15 Predicted changes in the key factors of crop growth and productivity—temperature, water, and soil
16 quality—are expected to pose barriers and limits to adapting in ways that allow the world’s population
17 to get enough food in the future (Altieri et al. 2015; Altieri and Nicholls 2017). Barriers and limits to
18 adaptation help determine the degree to which society can achieve its sustainable development
19 objectives through adapting to risks arising from land-climate interactions (Dow et al. 2013a;
20 Langholtz et al. 2014; Klein et al. 2015). Research has investigated biophysical limits to adaptation
21 such as heat stress impacts on crop yields and on mammals including humans, water, and ecosystems.
22 For example, loss of biodiversity in the Amazon and continued deforestation approaching 20% will
23 lead to likely irreversible “savannization” beyond a temperature increase of 4°C or deforestation
24 exceeding 40% of the forest area (Nobre et al. 2016). Freshwater scarcity is increasingly perceived as
25 a limit to adaptation, and is a systemic global risk today. (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2016) estimate that
26 four billion people today –half of which live in China and India—face severe water scarcity for at
27 least one month per year and an additional half a billion people face severe water scarcity year-round.
28 Limits are also encountered in certain sectors, such as modelled temperature increase limits for the
29 West African cocoa belt, which produces about 70% of the world’s cocoa and provides livelihoods for
30 two million farmers. Continued production in this region would require a combination of more shade
31 trees (a reversal of current policy to reduce shade) and offsetting disadvantaged local damages, and
32 could possibly exacerbate deforestation and land degradation (Schroth et al. 2016). Further,
33 improvements in human health have been achieved by economic growth patterns that now drive
34 climate change and land degradation, suggesting that future human health gains could face limits
35 (Whitmee et al. 2015).

36 **Barriers to adaptation in food production**

37 Literature on barriers to adaptation has focused particularly on water-related issues in developed
38 countries, and does not yet provide clear indicators, or systematic assessments (Biesbroek et al. 2014).
39 Literature since the AR5 has cast a light on barriers related to underlying patterns in institutions and
40 groups of people that reinforce inequities or particular development pathways (Denton et al. 2015).
41 Despite substantial and growing investment in coastal adaptation, the capacity for change and
42 transformation is bounded by interconnected systems of values, institutional rules and norms, and
43 knowledge which defines the set of practical, permissible decisions that are considered (Gorddard et
44 al. 2016; Wise et al. 2014). For example, contemporary approaches to environmental and spatial
45 planning in municipal areas can work against building adaptive capacity in greater metropolitan areas,
46 as one study in the conurbation of Greater Manchester showed (Carter et al. 2015). Another study in
47 Sydney, Australia found that locally-based planning processes widely accept climate adaptation yet
48 sectoral biases, silos, and imbalance between mitigation and adaptation priorities pose barriers to

1 meaningful adaptation (Biesbroek et al. 2014, 2013; Measham et al. 2011). 100 or more studies
2 covering more than 100 cities on ecosystem based adaptation in urban areas find conventional, "hard"
3 adaptation measures are often associated with high costs, inflexibility and conflicting interests in
4 urban areas (Matthews et al. 2015). Ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) has focused mostly on heat or
5 flooding in cities, and reducing risks of hazards through the use of green space including parks and
6 wetlands (Brink et al. 2016).

7 Barriers to adaptation also arise from a lack of policy coherency, such as when interlinkages between
8 land use, water, and energy are not considered, as documented in case studies in South Asia (Rasul
9 and Sharma 2016). One study in Southern Brazil illustrated that “organised irresponsibility” is
10 purposefully used by some institutions in society to cover up political, scientific, and legal
11 shortcomings in addressing current risks (Bonatti et al. 2016). In other cases, conceptual and empathy
12 failures such as over-reliance on gross domestic product as a measure of human progress, not
13 accounting for future health and environmental harms over present day gains, and disproportionate
14 effect of externalities on vulnerable groups and developing countries also get in the way of adaptation
15 (Whitmee et al. 2015). Additionally, in developing countries the underlying causes of vulnerability
16 and low adaptive capacity pose under-documented barriers (Shackleton et al. 2015).

17

18 **7.5 Decision-making for climate change adaptation and mitigation to meet** 19 **sustainable development**

20 The risks posed by climate change generate considerable uncertainty and complexity for decision-
21 makers that are responsible for land use decisions (*robust evidence, high agreement*). At the same
22 time, decision-makers must balance climate ambitions, and Nationally Determined Contributions
23 (NDCs), with other SDGs, which will differ considerably across different regions, sociocultural
24 conditions and economic levels (Griggs et al. 2014). The interactions across SDGs also need to be
25 considered in decision-making processes (Nilsson et al. 2016b). The challenge is particularly acute in
26 Least Developed Countries where a large share of the population is vulnerable to climate change. The
27 structure of decision-making processes and norms should be matched to local needs but also must
28 connect to national strategies and international regimes (Nilsson and Persson 2012). This section
29 explores methods of decision-making to address the risks and inter-linkages outlined in previous
30 sections.

31 Land-climate-society interactions influence key and emerging risks, and result in trade-offs and
32 synergies in various dimensions of human development and ecosystem services. There is *high*
33 *agreement and medium evidence* that the risk to human systems is increasing from climate-land
34 interactions and loss of ecosystem services underpinned by biodiversity (Pascual et al. 2017).
35 However, “Interactions of climate change impacts on one sector with changes in exposure and
36 vulnerability, as well as adaptation and mitigation actions affecting the same or a different sector, are
37 generally not included or well-integrated into projections of risk” (Oppenheimer et al., 2015).

38 It is also important that the interactions across SDGs are considered in particular assessments (Nilsson
39 et al. 2016b). As a result, this section outlines policy inter-linkages including with SDGs and NDCs,
40 trade-offs and synergies in specific measures, possible challenges as well as opportunities going
41 forward. The section then continues the discussion of lenses of assessment for these inter-linkages
42 including livelihood capitals and windows of opportunity.

43 **7.5.1 Formal and Informal decision-making**

44 Decision-making processes and support systems for climate mitigation and adaptation adopted at
45 different levels are often considered as being “formal” in the sense of having a particular structure,

1 specific goals, a key set of participants, etc. (*medium evidence, medium agreement*). Formal decision
2 support tools can be used, for example, by farmers, to answer “what-if” questions as to how to
3 respond to the effects of changing climate on soils, rainfall and other conditions (Wenkel et al. 2013).
4 Other decision-making approaches rely on multi-criteria methods or multi-attribute decision matrices,
5 which examine in detail trade-offs or options that might be faced or chosen under different climate
6 scenarios and response measures (Kueppers et al. 2004).

7 Formal decision-making structures should be based on realistic behaviour of actors that are important
8 in land-climate systems, through participatory approaches, stakeholder consultations and by
9 incorporating results from empirical analyses. Mathematical simulations and games have also been
10 used to address stylised cases and facilitate participatory approaches (Lamarque et al. 2013).
11 Behavioural models in land-based sectors have been explored in a variety of settings, although there is
12 clearly scope for improvements and more in-depth analyses (Brown et al. 2017a). Agent-based
13 models (ABMs) and micro-simulations that can be used to more formally consider non-economic
14 variables and to capture interactions between actors and their Data visualisation methods are
15 important for making climate futures comprehensible and useful to decision-makers (Bishop et al.
16 2013).

17 Although decision-making per se may be viewed as formal, there are nevertheless different ways to
18 incorporate local knowledge, informal institutions and other contextual characteristics that capture
19 non-deterministic elements as well as social and cultural beliefs and systems more generally (*medium
20 evidence, medium agreement*). Decision support systems have evolved considerably from classic
21 scientific tools to a variety of participatory and interdisciplinary methods and approaches (Jones et al.
22 2014). Consequently, this broader range of approaches may very well capture informal and
23 indigenous knowledge. Incorporation of informal procedures and institutions can improve the
24 participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making processes and thereby promote their rights to
25 self-determination (Malogdos and Yujuico 2015). The role of informal institutions can be particularly
26 relevant for land use decisions and practices in rural areas (Huisheng 2015).

27 ***7.5.1.1 Role of informal institutions in relation to sustainable natural resources management***

28 Many studies underline the role of local/informal traditional institutions in the management of natural
29 resources in different part of the world (Yami et al. 2009; Zoogah et al. 2015; Bratton 2007; Mowo et
30 al. 2013; Grzymala-Busse 2010). Conditions that influence the effectiveness of informal institutions
31 include population growth, land use change and the lack of human and financial capacities. Informal
32 institutions have contributed to sustainable resources management (common pool resources) through
33 creating a suitable environment for decision-making. Social, political and demographic conditions are
34 factors that influence institutions’ effectiveness (Yami et al. 2009).

35 Traditional systems have been shaped over time to provide sustainable utilisation of natural resources.
36 There are numerous examples from different parts of the world to support this idea, including:
37 traditional silvo-pastoral management (Iran), management of rangeland resources (South Africa),
38 natural resource management (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Bangladesh) communal grazing land management
39 (Ethiopia) and management of conflict over natural resources (Siddig et al. 2007; Yami et al. 2011;
40 Valipour et al. 2014; Bennett 2013; Mowo et al. 2013).

41 It has been argued that informal institutions can replace, undermine, and reinforce formal institutions
42 irrespective of strength of the formal institutions (Grzymala-Busse 2010). In the absence of formal
43 institutions, informal institutions gain importance. Therefore, a focus on informal institutions may be
44 most relevant in developing countries with relatively underdeveloped formal institutions for natural
45 resources management and for rights protection of shareholders (Estrin and Prevezer 2011; Helmke

1 and Levitsky 2004; Kangalawe.R.Y.M, Noe.C, Tungaraza.F.S.K 2014; Sauerwald and Peng 2013;
2 Zoogah et al. 2015).

3 Formal-informal institutional interaction could take different shapes such as: complementary,
4 accommodating, competing, and substitutive. There are also many examples that formal institutions
5 might obstruct and hinder informal institutions (Rahman et al. 2014; Helmke and Levitsky 2004;
6 Bennett 2013). Informal institutions of the traditional community have been exposed to fundamental
7 changes due to government interventions with implications for the regulation of land use, informal
8 institutional functions, and joint-decision-making (Osei-Tutu et al. 2014)

9 Improving the conditions that obstruct the contributions of informal institutions is crucial to enhance
10 its effectiveness in sustainable resources management. Furthermore, development interventions and
11 policies should strengthen the involvement of effective informal institutions in decision-making in
12 order to achieve sustainable resources management (Yami et al. 2009; Kangalawe.R.Y.M, Noe.C,
13 Tungaraza.F.S.K 2014; Sauerwald and Peng 2013). Research may enhance understanding of the
14 major problems facing organisational effectiveness (Zoogah et al. 2015). furthermore, formation of
15 policy and reform of land tenure have been advocated for complementarity of powers over local land
16 administration. (Bennett 2013; Kangalawe.R.Y.M, Noe.C, Tungaraza.F.S.K 2014)

17 Need for research on the interaction between formal and informal institutions as well as for advancing
18 the understanding of the role of formal institutions, has been underlined by some researchers (Waylen
19 2014; Zoogah et al. 2015; Sauerwald and Peng 2013; Helmke and Levitsky 2004).

20

21 **7.5.2 Decision making tools**

22 **7.5.2.1 Decision making under uncertainty**

23 A principal challenge for climate change adaptation decisions is the incorporation and treatment of
24 uncertainty (Hallegatte 2009; Wilby and Dessai 2010). Uncertainty can present particular challenges
25 where long lead-times or lifetimes of projects exist and in these cases uncertainty regarding the
26 timing, location and magnitude of impacts can present barriers. The AR5 Chapter on Decision-making
27 emphasised the importance of targeting the approach to the context: in the context of uncertainty,
28 science first approaches are less appropriate than policy first. Since the AR5 considerable advances
29 have been made in decision making under uncertainty, both conceptually and in the social/qualitative
30 research areas as well as in economics.

31 There is *medium evidence and high agreement* in the literature that uncertainty need not present a
32 barrier to taking action, and there are growing methodological developments and empirical
33 applications to support decision-making. Many of these approaches involve principles of robustness,
34 diversity, flexibility, learning, or choice editing.

35 Many of the approaches to handling uncertainty have built on the principles of adaptive management,
36 which uses a monitoring, research, evaluation and learning process (cycle) to improve future
37 management strategies (Tompkins and Adger 2004). More recently these techniques have been
38 advanced with iterative risk management (IPCC 2014b) adaptation pathways (Downing 2012) and
39 dynamic adaptation pathways (Haasnoot et al. 2013). Dynamic adaptation pathways (Haasnoot et al.
40 2013; Wise et al. 2014) identify and sequence potential actions based on alternative potential futures.
41 Decisions are made at identified decision nodes based on tipping points, linked to scenarios or the
42 changing performance over time (Kwakkel et al. 2016). In order to identify and prioritise threats and
43 opportunities associated with the risks of tipping points and regime shifts, a significant shift from
44 accepted institutional decision making processes towards more socially disruptive – those suggesting
45 the very nature of a system may change – which do not privilege equilibrium may be required
46 (Knight-Lenihan 2016). A key characteristic is rather than make an irreversible decision now,

1 decisions evolve over time, accounting for learning, knowledge and values. This is particularly
2 important for large infrastructure projects and urban expansion which in time may reduce the ability
3 for the landscape/ecosystems to adapt to a changing climate (Hurlimann and Wilson 2018) .

4 Scenario analysis is also important in identifying technology, policy instruments and ensuring spatial-
5 temporal coherence of land use allocation simulations with scenario storylines (Brown and Castellazzi
6 2014) and identifying technology and policy instruments for mitigation of land degradation (Fleskens
7 et al. 2014). Multi-criteria decision making continues to be important for making sustainable
8 construction practices and selecting sustainable materials (Govindan et al. 2015).

9 *Economic approaches to DMUU*

10 The approaches described under Section 7.5.2.1 can be complemented by economic approaches for
11 economic or investment appraisal. Traditional approaches to economic appraisal, including cost
12 benefit analysis (CBA) and cost effectiveness analysis (CEA) do not handle uncertainty well
13 (Hallegatte 2009). Improvements have been made to address some limitations of these approaches
14 including modifications to address normatively unappealing negative expected values of future
15 climate information or unfeasible solutions (Neubersch et al. 2014), probabilistic inversions to
16 improve numerical models used in climate change projections (Oppenheimer et al. 2016).

17 Alternative decision making approaches to appraise and select adaptation options are being explored,
18 both in the academic and policy literature (Dessai and van der Sluijs 2007; Hallegatte et al. 2012;
19 Ranger et al. 2010; UNFCCC 2009). The aim is to better incorporate uncertainty while still delivering
20 adaptation goals, by selecting projects that meet their purpose across a variety of plausible futures
21 (Hallegatte et al. 2012); so-called ‘robust’ decision-making approaches. These are designed to be less
22 sensitive to uncertainty about the future and are thus particularly suited for deep uncertainty (Lempert
23 and Schlesinger 2000). Instead of optimising for one specific scenario, optimisation is obtained across
24 scenarios: robust approaches do not assume a single climate change projection, but integrate a wide
25 range of climate scenarios through different mechanisms to capture as much of the uncertainty on
26 future climates as possible.

27 Much of the research for adaptation to climate change has focused around three main economic
28 approaches: Real Options Analysis (ROA), Portfolio Analysis (PA) and Robust Decision-Making
29 (RDM). ROA originates from option trading in financial economics (Black and Scholes 1973; Dixit
30 and Pindyck 1994) and develops flexible strategies that can be adjusted when additional climate
31 information becomes available. It is most appropriate for large irreversible investment decisions.
32 Applications to climate adaptation are growing quickly, with most studies addressing flood risk, sea-
33 level rise (Gersonius et al. 2013; Woodward et al. 2014; Dan 2016) and water storage (Sturm et al.
34 2017; Kim et al. 2017), but studies in land use decisions are also emerging (Sanderson et al. 2016).
35 PA combines several adaptation options in a portfolio to reduce risk by diversification (Markowitz
36 1952) , and RDM identifies how different strategies perform under many climate outcomes, trading
37 off optimality for resilience (Lempert 2013). More detail discussing the relative merits of each are
38 provided in (Dittrich et al. 2016; Watkiss et al. 2015).

39 Different approaches are appropriate in different contexts. Dittrich et al. (2017) provide a guide to the
40 appropriate application in different contexts for adaptation in the livestock sector in developed
41 countries. While considerable advances have been made in the theoretical approaches, a number of
42 challenges arise when applying these in practice (Watkiss et al.), and partly relate to the necessity of
43 assigning probabilities to climate projects. Formalised expert judgement can improve characterisation
44 of uncertainty (Kunreuther et al. 2014) and these methods have been improved utilising Bayesian
45 belief networks to synthesise 150 expert judgements and include fault trees and reliability block

1 diagrams to overcome standard reliability techniques (Sigurdsson et al. 2001) as well as mechanisms
2 incorporating transparency (Ashcroft et al. 2016).

3 There is *low agreement and limited evidence* that subjective expected utility theory is perhaps of
4 limited value to inform climate policy and alternatives should be explored that assume no
5 probabilistic information (maximin decision rules and minimax regret) and others that recognise many
6 probability distributions (Multiple priors approach such as Maximin expected utility approach and
7 smooth ambiguity model) (Heal and Millner 2014). (Kunreuther et al. 2014) recognise that risk
8 perception, both deliberative and intuitive thinking, emotional thinking of laypersons, uncertainties
9 surrounding the prior agreement on framing of problems and ways to scientifically investigate them
10 (paradigmatic uncertainty), epistemic uncertainty, and incomplete or conflicting scientific findings
11 (translational uncertainty) impact decision making and policy choices surrounding climate change risk
12 management strategies.

13 **7.5.2.2 Windows of opportunities**

14 Windows of opportunity are important learning moments when significant change can be made.
15 These may include: (1) times when ecosystem feedbacks in a degraded system are recognised and
16 strategies can be proposed to break a degraded state (Nyström et al. 2012); (2) Crisis or climate
17 related disasters that trigger latent local adaptive capacities leading to systemic equitable
18 improvement (McSweeney and Coomes 2011), or novel and innovative recombining of sources of
19 experience and knowledge allowing navigation to transformative social ecological transitions (Folke
20 et al. 2010). Windows of opportunity may also occur on the macro level when: (1) a disturbance from
21 an ecological, social, or political crisis is sufficient to trigger emergence of new approaches to
22 governance (Olsson et al. 2006); (2) a shift in power in relation to natural resource management
23 occurs that leads to emergent processes and novel solutions due to a disturbance that causes
24 inconvenience, cost of compliance, or intersection of multiple regulatory requirements not adequately
25 addressed through piecemeal compliance (Cosens et al. 2017). Windows of opportunity may also
26 occur when a series of punctuated crisis such as floods that enhance society's capacity to adapt over
27 the long term (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013). Lastly, windows of opportunity can be created by policy mixes
28 that provide for creative destruction of old social processes and thereby encourage new innovative
29 solutions (Kivimaa et al. 2017).

30 Climate change impacts, especially climate extremes, in many cases, are catastrophic. Usually
31 catastrophic climate events awaken the people, making them keenly aware of the disasters caused by
32 the climate change. Studies have been done, and efforts have been made to respond to climate change
33 related disasters (IPCC, 2012).

34 PLACE HOLDER - figure illustrating decision making and windows of opportunity

35

36 **7.5.3 Best practices of decision making toward sustainable land management**

37 There is *medium agreement and medium evidence* that sustainable development must be a decision
38 making strategy in order to achieve it (Waas et al. 2014). In order to achieve sustainable land
39 management, there has been an important rise in sustainable remediation practices as well as critical
40 interventions that are reshaping norms and standards (Hou and Al-Tabbaa 2014).

41 There is *medium agreement and limited evidence* about what factors consistently determine the
42 adoption of agricultural best management practices - procedures to control toxic pollutants and
43 advance pollution prevention farming methods, control soil erosion and runoff (through shelterbelts,
44 conservation tillage etc. (Herendeen and Glazier 2009), but more often than not, there is positive
45 correlation with education levels, income, acres, capital, diversity, access to information, and social

1 network as well as attending workshops for information and trust in crop consultants (Ulrich-Schad,
2 J.D., Garcia de Jalon, S., Babin, N., Paper, A. 2017; Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012). More research is
3 needed in relation to their sustained adoption over time (Prokopy et al. 2008).

4 There is *high agreement, and medium evidence* that ecological service mapping practices to support
5 decision-making should be: (1) robust (robust modelling, measurement, and stakeholder-based
6 methods for quantification of ecosystem service supply, demand and/or flow, as well as measures of
7 uncertainty and heterogeneity across spatial and temporal scales and resolution); (2) transparent (to
8 contribute to clear information-sharing and the creation of linkages with decision support processes);
9 and (3) stakeholder-relevant (people-central in which stakeholders are engaged at different stages)
10 (Willemsen et al. 2015; Ashcroft et al. 2016). There is medium agreement and medium evidence that
11 environmental decision making takes place in complex adaptive systems where there is often limited
12 information and information processing ability and differing stakeholders make differing decisions on
13 the best future course of action thus experiencing bounded rationality in considering trade-offs and
14 making decisions (Waas et al. 2014).

15 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that sustainable land management practices and
16 incentives require mainstreaming into relevant policy; appropriate market based approaches, including
17 payment for ecosystem services and public private partnerships, need better integration into payment
18 schemes (Tengberg et al. 2016). There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that many of the best
19 sustainable land management decisions are made taking into consideration the participation of
20 stakeholders (7.6.4) and social learning (7.6.5) (Stringer and Dougill 2013). As stakeholders may not
21 be in agreement, either practices of mediating agreement, or modelling that depicts and mediates the
22 effects of stakeholder perceptions in decision making may be applicable (Hou 2016; Wiggering and
23 Steinhardt 2015).

24 *Policy to encourage innovation*

25 Innovation can be defined narrowly as new technological or organisational creations that have
26 economic significance (Edquist 2005) or more broadly, as the collective and collaborative dimensions
27 of innovation reflected in adaptation to climate change that is dependent on multi-level institutional
28 linkages (Rodima-Taylor et al. 2012). An innovation can arise from a change in technology,
29 processes, products or practices that gives rise to learning, experimentation, serendipity, and
30 breakthroughs from any sector in any given country (Araujo 2017). National research and
31 development systems as well as social learning play key roles in innovations (Edquist 2005).
32 Disruptive innovation may be needed rather than traditional innovation pathways that begin with
33 particular niches (Kivimaa and Kern 2016). In the context of the land-climate interface, innovation is
34 more likely to be related to longer-term processes of stakeholder engagement and social learning
35 rather than major technology breakthroughs of the kind that can be significant in energy sectors or
36 end-uses. Adaptation itself has a close relation to innovation in certain contexts (Rodima-Taylor et al.
37 2012).

38 **7.5.4 Adaptive management**

39 Adaptive management is an evolving approach to natural resource management founded on decision
40 making approaches in other fields (such as business, experimental science, and industrial ecology) and
41 structured decision making (Allen et al. 2011; Williams 2011). Structured decision making
42 overcomes management paralysis and mediates multiple stakeholder interests through use of simple
43 steps. These steps include evaluating a problem and integrating planning, analysis and management
44 into a transparent process to build a road map focused on achieving fundamental objectives;
45 requirements of success are clearly articulated fundamental objectives, the explicit acknowledgment
46 of uncertainty, and a transparent response to all stakeholder interests in the decision making process
47 (Allen et al. 2011). Adaptive management builds on this foundation by incorporating a formal

1 iterative process acknowledging uncertainty and achieving management objectives through a
2 structured feedback process (Foxon et al. 2009). In the adaptive management process the problem
3 and desired goals are identified, the system boundaries and context are ascertained, hypotheses are
4 developed and tested which leads to the implementation of policy strategies and monitoring of results
5 in a continuous management cycle of monitoring, assessment and revision (Hurlbert 2015; Newig et
6 al. 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).

7 A key focus on adaptive management is the identification and reduction of uncertainty (as described
8 in Chapter 1 and 7.3.1) and partial controllability whereby policies used to implement an action are
9 only indirectly responsible (for example setting a harvest rate) (Williams 2011). There is *high*
10 *agreement and medium evidence* that adaptive management is an ideal method to resolve uncertainty
11 when uncertainty and controllability (resources will respond to management) are both high (Allen et
12 al. 2011). Where uncertainty is high, but controllability is low, developing and analysing scenarios
13 may be more appropriate (Allen et al. 2011). Anticipatory governance has developed combining
14 scenarios and forecasting in order to creatively design strategy to address complex, fuzzy and wicked
15 challenges (Ramos 2014; Quay 2010). Even where there is low controllability, such as in the case of
16 climate change, adaptive management can help mitigate impacts including changes in water
17 availability and shifting distributions of plants and animals (Allen et al. 2011). There is *high*
18 *agreement and medium evidence* that adaptive management can help mitigate anthropogenic impacts
19 of changes of land and climate including: species decline and habitat loss (Fontaine 2011; Smith
20 2011), harvest of animals (Johnson 2011a), human participation in natural resource-based recreational
21 activities (Martin and Pope 2011), managing competing interests in public lands (Moore et al. 2011),
22 managing endangered species and minimising fire risk through land cover management (Breininger et
23 al. 2014), land use change in hardwood forestry (Leys and Vanclay 2011), and sustainable land
24 management protecting biodiversity, increasing carbon storage, and improving livelihoods (Cowie et
25 al. 2011). There is *medium agreement and medium evidence* that despite abundant literature and
26 theoretical explanation, there has remained imperfect realisation of adaptive management in the real
27 world natural resource management because of several challenges: lack of clarity in definition and
28 approach, few success stories on which to build, management, policy and funding paradigms that
29 favour reactive approaches instead of the proactive adaptive management approach, shifting
30 objectives, and failure to acknowledge social uncertainty (see 7.3.1) (Allen et al. 2011).

31 **7.5.5 Participation**

32 **7.5.5.1 Indigenous knowledge**

33 The importance of indigenous or traditional knowledge for climate action has long been recognised
34 (for example, Nyong et al. 2007b; Tschakert 2007; Green and Raygorodetsky 2010; Speranza et al.
35 2010; Alexander et al. 2011a). It was extensively discussed in IPCC AR5, most importantly by Adger
36 et al. (2014), but also by (Burkett et al. 2015; Porter et al. 2014; Dasgupta et al. 2014; Niang, et al.
37 2013). In these discussions a variety of terminology is used; Alexander et al. (2011) favour
38 *traditional ecological knowledge* (TEK), defined following (Berkes 1999) as “a cumulative body of
39 knowledge, practice and belief, evolving by adaptive processes and handed down by cultural
40 transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and their
41 environment”. TEK in different contexts and geographical regions variously covers perceptions of
42 local climate change, and strategies for adaptation and to a lesser extent mitigation. (Alexander et al.
43 2011a) at a global level, and authors such as Speranza et al. (2010) and Ayanlade et al. (2017) at a
44 local level, show strong correlation between local perceptions and climate trends. Numerous studies
45 demonstrate the underlying importance of TEK for adaptation, among farmers, pastoralists and
46 hunter-gatherers. Nyong et al (2007) show the congruence of traditional practices like agroforestry
47 based on TEK with the requirements for climate mitigation. However, (Apraku et al.) follow another
48 strand in analysis of TEK by stressing the positive hybridisation of traditional and scientific

1 knowledge in farmers' practices, and the practical and often tacit nature of traditional knowledge that
2 differentiates it from scientific knowledge.

3 Several important findings are of relevance to a discussion of traditional knowledge in the context of
4 governance and social learning. Nyong et al (2007) see respect for traditional knowledge as both a
5 requirement and an entry strategy for participatory planning of climate action and effective
6 communication of climate action strategies. However, Speranza et al. (2010) stress that non-climate
7 factors such as poverty and lack of resources limit the freedom of action of Kenyan agro-pastoralists
8 to change practices according to their knowledge of drought. In many areas inter-generational
9 transfer of traditional knowledge is weakening, through the decline of direct contact with the
10 environment with livelihood diversification and urbanisation, the modern education system, the
11 association of modernity with scientific and "western" knowledge (Apraku et al.; Speranza et al.
12 2010). Attempts to integrate traditional and scientific knowledge may be affected by power relations
13 (Alexander et al. 2011b). (Apraku et al.) give examples of policy and programming in Kenya to
14 integrate traditional and scientific knowledge: the Agricultural Sector Development Programme
15 mandates national and county governments in Kenya to use indigenous knowledge in agricultural
16 development, and the Radio Africa Network (RANET) initiative uses the combination of modern
17 science and indigenous knowledge to educate and inform farmers on climate change and agricultural
18 issues; while they found an absence of comparable initiatives in South Africa.

19

20 **7.5.5.2 Citizen Science**

21 Citizen science is a new democratic approach to science involving citizens in collecting, classifying,
22 and interpreting data to influence policy and assist decision processes involving the environment
23 (Kullenberg and Kasperowski 2016). It has flourished in recent years due to easily available technical
24 tools for collecting and disseminating information (e.g., cell based apps, the Internet, ground sensors,
25 satellite imagery), recognition of the free source of labour provided, and funding agencies requiring
26 project related outreach (Silvertown 2009). There is *medium agreement and medium evidence* that
27 citizen science improves landscape scale conservation planning (Lange and Hehl-Lange 2011; Bonsu
28 et al. 2017; Graham et al. 2015), addressing conflicting societal demands on forest landscapes (Bonsu
29 et al. 2017), creating consensus landscapes (Lange and Hehl-Lange 2011), securing citizen
30 engagement in landscape conservation initiatives (Sayer, J. Margules, C., Boedhihartono 2015)
31 informing land management (McKinley et al. 2017), and boosting advocacy and environmental
32 awareness (Johnson et al. 2017, 2014). (Ballard et al. 2017) found limited evidence of conservation
33 impact and concluded the impact on social learning was not straightforward and (Loos et al. 2015)
34 concluded most cases derive from rich industrialised countries (Loos et al. 2015).

35 More benefits are derived when citizens actively participate in conservation and management
36 decisions, thus transcending the deficit model (Jansujwicz et al. 2013), drawing on local knowledge,
37 challenging external scientists, and are supported by strong laws, institutions, collaborative platforms,
38 transparency effective solution of conflict and have credible leadership (Couvet and Prevot 2015;
39 Sayer, J. Margules, C., Boedhihartono 2015). There are a variety of practical issues to the concept of
40 citizen science at the local level, which includes the lack of universal implementation framework to
41 communities and differing methods that have been contrasted and debated throughout the literature
42 (Conrad and Hilchey 2011; Jalbert and Kinchy 2016; Stone et al. 2014). Although the literature is
43 sparse, there is medium agreement that combining citizen science and participatory modelling has
44 favourable outcomes and improves environmental decision making (Gray et al. 2017).

45 **7.5.5.3 Stakeholder and citizen participation in policy**

46 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that including stakeholders and people in decision
47 making and policy formation improves governance (Coenen and Coenen 2009; Hurlbert and Gupta

1 2015). Participation must be meaningful as: (1) there is *medium agreement, but limited evidence* that
2 proceduralising participation or using models of public acceptance of a policy solution, technology or
3 infrastructure project lowers the value of participation, reducing it to a tool of persuading participants
4 to accept decisions already made (Lee et al. 2013; Armeni 2016; Pieraccini 2015), and; (2) there is
5 *high agreement, but limited evidence* that stakeholder and citizen participation in policy making
6 should go beyond provision of sound technical scientific information, and include deliberation about
7 climate change impacts to determine shared responsibilities creating genuine opportunity to construct,
8 discuss, and promote alternatives (Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015b; Armeni 2016).

9 The notion of participation, the mechanisms, construction or framing of climate change and
10 environmental problems underpinning participation, are often ambiguous (Serrao-Neumann et al.
11 2015b). Multiple methods of engagement exist and a limited selection include multi-stakeholder
12 forums, consideration of scenario analyses, public forums and citizen juries (Coenen and Coenen
13 2009). However, there is *high agreement and medium evidence* that no one method is superior, but
14 each method must be tailored for local context (Blue and Medlock 2014; Voß and Amelung 2016).
15 Strategic innovation in developing policy initiatives requires a strategic adaptation framework
16 involving pluralistic and adaptive processes such as multi-stakeholder forums, consideration of
17 scenario analyses and use of boundary organisations (Head 2014). There is *medium agreement and
18 medium evidence* that sustained, focused, iterative public participation in the issue of climate change
19 is absent in many communities (Hurlbert 2018b).

20 Although participation is often romanticised, there is *medium agreement and limited evidence* that
21 consideration of the level of uncertainty in respect of science, and/or uncertainty in respect of
22 outcomes of norms, values, and political decision making, can influence the manner of public
23 engagement (Hurlbert and Gupta 2015). (Singh and Swanson 2017) found little evidence that framing
24 climate change as a matter of national security, a human rights issue, or a problem of environmental
25 consequence alters overall perceptions of its importance as a policy issue, however, other studies find
26 local frames of climate change are particularly important (Hornsey et al. 2016; Spence et al. 2012).
27 Consideration of the method of citizen engagement with climate change science in order that reflexive
28 citizen engagement can occur through connected trans-local knowledge development whereby techno-
29 scientific closure is prevented and reflexive opening endorsed (Blue and Medlock 2014; Voß and
30 Amelung 2016).

31 Citizen science can contribute to policy adoption, implementation, and evaluation through providing
32 valuable systematic scientific observations, identifying public issues, helping in formulating public
33 policy and evaluating the impact of policy.

34
35 **Figure 7.2 Public and Private Benefits of Decision making (placeholder)**

36
37 **7.5.5.4 Stakeholder and citizen participation in scenario modelling**

38 Despite the need to better coordinate citizen science projects around the world to understand
39 significant issues, such as climate change (Bonney et al. 2014), there is large potential in combining
40 citizen science and participatory modelling to obtain favourable outcomes and improving
41 environmental decision making (Gray et al. 2017).

42 Despite the general consensus about the value of public participation in environmental decision
43 making, it cannot be decreed nor imposed; participation is an emerging quality of collective-action
44 and social-learning processes (Castella et al. 2014). There is vast experience of public participation in
45 land use and land cover change simulation that can be used in climate scenario modelling. Inclusion in

1 citizen participation in land change simulation has been made in different fronts, for example, in how
2 stakeholders parameterise and evaluate models in analytical and discursive approaches (Hewitt et al.
3 2014), translation of narrative scenarios to quantitative outputs (Mallampalli et al. 2016), development
4 of digital tools to enable the involvement of stakeholders in co-designing decision making
5 participatory foresight (Bommel et al. 2014), and use of games to understand the preferences of a
6 local decision maker when exploring various (more or less balanced) policies about risks (Adam et al.
7 2016).

8 *7.5.5.5 Participation and Collective Action*

9 Coinciding pressures of climate change and land use create diverse collective action issues for land
10 use policies and planning practices (Moroni 2018) at local, national, and regional levels. This section
11 examines evidence of land- and climate- related local participation, and what influences the efficacy
12 of collective action in addressing emerging risks. The challenges of addressing emerging risks like
13 land becoming less available or productive for human use and ecosystems can make it implausible
14 that any single actor would act to address the issue alone. In climate change adaptation and mitigation,
15 collective action is important because it may offer solutions for emerging risks, covering a spectrum
16 of options including mutually binding agreements, government regulation, privatisation, and incentive
17 system (IPCC 2014a). Therefore, collective action is viewed as one core mechanism in social
18 transformation but there is currently no systematic research on collective climate action (Bamberg et
19 al. 2015). (Bamberg et al. 2015) in a short survey found that social identity was the core predictor of
20 collective climate action across studies. Most collective action strategies target maintenance or change
21 of land use practices, and sometimes also aim to promote social and economic goals such as reducing
22 poverty. Although several programs and approaches claim to be successful in executing public
23 participation exercises, these practices have rarely been scaled up or replicated in other places
24 (Samaddar et al. 2015).

25 In a systematic review of public participation studies toward climate change in cities, Sarzynski
26 (2015) finds limited number of cases where robust and sustained civic capacity, which requires
27 participants “pulling together” to solve common problems, occurred in governance of climate
28 adaptation. Specific cases where the inclusion of individuals and communities in land management
29 and climate, include, Liu and Ravenscroft (2017) , which find that, in Chengdu, China, participation
30 of local communities is a key factor in successfully implementing national-level land transfer policy.
31 In Indonesia, Jelsma et al. (2017) find that involving local communities and collective action made it
32 possible to draw on the advantages of both smallholder and large-scale forestry in ways that
33 contributed to rural development and land sparing. Scenario-planning has been found useful as a tool
34 to help rural communities “articulate a shared development trajectory,” and identify trade-offs and
35 barriers for collective action (Nieto-Romero et al. 2016). Further, a case study of two Canadian First
36 Nations showed how communication methods like “collective reflection” of community members
37 affected land use preferences, particularly the perception of the collective benefits associated with
38 specific Indigenous Peoples land use decisions (Nikolakis et al. 2016).

39 While current research recognises the critical importance to include individuals and communities in
40 the planning process, it has also been important to understand the factors that determine successful
41 participation in climate adaptation and mitigation (Nkoana et al. 2017). In northern Ghana, (Samaddar
42 et al. 2015) reports six critical outcome factors for effectively involving local communities in disaster
43 management and climate change adaptation: ownership, empowerment or self-reliance, time
44 effectiveness, livelihood security, and plan implementation. In land-related decisions, it is common
45 for the efficacy of collective action to be affected by the interests of a few, or by particular
46 constellations of stakeholder groups. Djurfeldt et al. (2018) found that in spite of matrilineal systems
47 where women’s rights to land are relatively strong, decision making about land in rural communities
48 in Malawi depends on control of productive resources like labour and access to institutions—land

1 reform does not necessarily resolve gender or other inequalities, with implications for adaptation
2 policy.

3 Research also recognised that participation is not always fully necessary, structured climate change
4 problems require minimal participation and can be responded to in a technocratic manner, while
5 moderately structured problems can entail differing degrees of participation depending on trust
6 (Hurlbert and Gupta 2015). There is interest in new methods of public participation, such as on-line
7 action, which have been tested to mobilise citizens using pre-existing online networks, Bojovic et al.
8 (2015) reports successful use of an on-line platform to collect data, validate results and communicate
9 messages.

10 In terms of adoption of policies, collective action has been shown to be affected by a number of
11 factors, including economic incentives in the form of tenure, payments, subsidies, and other income-
12 targeting approaches are widespread in promoting sustainable land use management. Collective action
13 in land use policy has been shown to be more effective when implemented as bundles of actions rather
14 than as single-issue actions. For example, land tenure, food security, and market access can mutually
15 reinforce each other when they are interconnected (Corsi et al. 2017). For example, (Liu and
16 Ravenscroft 2017) found that financial incentives embedded in collective forest reforms in China have
17 increased forest land and labour inputs in forestry.

18 In a comparison of local land use planning in Galicia and the Netherlands, (Sánchez and Maseda
19 2016) found that local adoption of policies depended on whether municipalities were obliged to adopt
20 a land use plan, and the willingness or resistance of municipalities to adopt the policy related to
21 economic or behavioural interests. Local resistance to cooperative action can occur when farm-level,
22 individual agreements do not align with dynamic trust relations among members around specific
23 issues, as was found among UK farmers in a study evaluating the potential of agri-environmental
24 schemes to offer landscape-scale environmental protection (Riley et al. 2018). Some policies target
25 one group, such as land-owners, which can limit the cooperation or even disadvantage those who are
26 not considered in collective policies.

27 *7.5.5.6 Corruption and elite capture*

28 The risks of corruption and elite capture of benefits from planned climate action, that reduce the
29 effectiveness of such action, are closely related to maladaptation but conceptually separate from it, as
30 they concern intentional malfeasance. Peer-reviewed empirical studies that focus on corruption in
31 climate finance and climate interventions are rare, due in part to the obvious difficulties of researching
32 illegal and clandestine activity (Fadairo et al. 2017). (Brown 2010), defining corruption as “misuse of
33 public office for private gain” and reviewing early prospects for REDD (including REDD+),
34 highlights risks arising from the interaction of perverse incentives within emissions reduction schemes
35 in general with the history of corruption in the broader forest sector stemming from the remote and
36 sparsely populated nature of forests, making monitoring difficult, long supply chains for timber with
37 low traceability, and the understaffing and under-resourcing of forest agencies, particularly in the light
38 of the complex trade-offs between production and conservation they are mandated to administer.
39 (Brown 2010) sees three likely inlets of corruption into REDD: in the setting of baselines, the
40 reconciliation of project and natural credits, and the implementation of control of illegal logging. The
41 article does not directly refer to corruption in the actual process of paying forest dwellers for forest
42 protection services,

43 (Fadairo et al. 2017) do examine the latter types of corruption. Following the position of the
44 international NGO Transparency International (Transparency International 2013b) they defend the use
45 of perception data in assessing corruption levels, reporting a structured survey in south eastern Nigeria
46 of perceptions of households in forest-edge communities served by REDD+, as well as those of local
47 officials. They report high rates of agreement that allocation of carbon rights is opaque and uncertain,

1 distribution of benefits is untimely, uncertain and unpredictable, and REDD+ decision-making
2 process is vulnerable to political interference that benefits powerful individuals. Only 35% of
3 respondents had an overall perception of transparency in REDD+ process as “good”. Of eight
4 institutional processes or facilities previously identified by Government of Nigeria and international
5 agencies as indicators of commitment to transparent and equitable governance, only three were
6 evident in the local REDD+ office as “very functional” or “fairly functional”.

7 Corruption is only one of the processes by which elites (local or national, economic or official) can
8 capture the benefits of climate intervention. An illustration of the range of types of such capture is
9 given by (Sovacool 2018), combining document review and key informant interviews in Bangladesh,
10 for adaptation initiatives including coastal afforestation. Using an analytical approach from political
11 ecology (Sovacool 2018) discusses four processes: enclosure, including land grabbing and preventing
12 the poor establishing new land rights; exclusion of the poor from decision-making over adaptation;
13 encroachment on the resources of the poor by new adaptation infrastructure; and entrenchment of
14 community disempowerment through patronage. The article notes that observing these processes does
15 not imply they are always present, nor that adaptation efforts should be abandoned.

16 **7.5.5.7 Barriers and enablers to participation**

17 Place holder

18 **7.5.6 Social learning**

19 Social learning is learning in and with social groups through interaction (Argyris 1999) including
20 collaboration and organisation which occurs in networks of interdependent stakeholders (Mostert et
21 al. 2007). It is an important factor contributing to long term climate adaptation whereby individuals
22 and organisations engage in a multi-step social process, managing different framings of issues while
23 raising awareness of climate risks and opportunities, exploring policy options and institutionalising
24 new rights, responsibilities, feedback and learning processes (Tàbara et al. 2010). There is *high*
25 *agreement and limited evidence* that it is important in engaging with uncertainty (Newig et al. 2010)
26 and addressing the increasing unequal geography of food security and including those excluded by the
27 discourses of food security whose narrow focus is on the two ends of the food system (production by
28 farmers and consumption) (Sonnino et al. 2014). In the context of climate change adaptation and
29 mitigation within agricultural systems, the opportunities presented by social learning approaches have
30 been assessed and case studies presented (Harvey et al. 2012; Ensor and Harvey 2015). Important
31 factors emerging from these studies are a shared view of how change might happen and of how social
32 learning and specific tools fit within it; skilled facilitation; and the need to attend to social difference
33 and power.

34 There is *low agreement and limited evidence* on the theoretical basis and meaning of social learning,
35 or how to define, measure, and achieve social learning (Baird et al. 2014; Reed et al. 2010). Some
36 literature defines social learning as a change in understanding that is measured by a change in
37 behaviour, and perhaps worldview, by individuals and wider social units, communities of practice and
38 social networks (Reed et al. 2010). Single loop learning is a change in understanding measured by
39 altered behaviour or routine; double loop learning is a change in values, norms and assumptions
40 measured by a revised viewpoint; triple loop learning is a transformative change in context beyond
41 patterns of behaviour and insight, measured by a change in worldviews (beliefs about the world and
42 reality) and understanding of power dynamics (Gupta 2014). Social learning is achieved through
43 reflexivity or the ability of a social structure, process, or set of ideas to reconfigure itself after
44 reflection on performance though open minded people interacting iteratively to produce reasonable
45 and well-informed opinions (Dryzek and Pickering 2017).

1 **7.5.7 Performance indicators**

2 Measuring performance is important in decision-making and governance and can help evaluate policy
3 effectiveness (*high agreement, limited evidence*) (Wheaton and Kulshreshtha 2017). It is necessary to
4 monitor and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of performing climate actions to ensure the
5 long-term success of *climate* initiatives or plans. Measurable indicators are useful for climate policy
6 development and decision-making process since they can provide quantifiable information regarding
7 the progress of climate actions. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015) made great focus on reporting
8 the progress of implementing countries' pledges, i.e., Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
9 (INDC) and national adaptation needs in order to examine the aggregated results of mitigation and
10 adaptation actions that have already been implemented. For individual sector level, specific key
11 indicators should be used. For the case of measuring progress toward achieving land degradation
12 neutrality, it was suggested to use land based indicators, i.e., trend in land cover, trends in land
13 productivity or functioning of the land, and trends in carbon stock above and below ground (IUCN
14 2015).

15 There is limited research on the effect of climate change using agri-environmental indicators of
16 environment sustainability (soil water quality, desertification, water supply and demand, soil erosion,
17 soil salinisation, water quality and quantity, soil contamination)(Wheaton and Kulshreshtha 2017).
18 Metrics and indicators for measuring biodiversity and ecosystem services in response to governance at
19 local to international scale need to meet the criteria of parsimony, scale specificity, linked to some
20 broad social, scientific and political consensus on desirable states of ecosystems and biodiversity and
21 ensuring that normative aspects such as environmental justice or socially just conservation are
22 included (Layke 2009) (Van Oudenhoven et al. 2012) (Turnhout et al. 2014)(Häyhä and Franzese
23 2014), (Guerry et al. 2015)(Díaz et al. 2015). Furthermore the choices of metrics and indicators needs
24 to incorporate understanding that the science, linkages and dynamics in systems are complex, not
25 amenable to simple economic instruments and often unrelated to short term management or
26 governance scales (Naeem et al. 2015) (Muradian and Rival 2012). Thus, use of indicators for
27 biodiversity and ecosystem services for monitoring impacts of governance and management regimes
28 on land-climate interfaces need participation of relevant stake-holders as well as periodic and
29 effective communication.

30 Recent studies increasingly incorporate the role of stakeholders and decision makers for land systems
31 (Verburg et al. 2015) including agriculture (Kanter et al. 2016) and for bioenergy sustainability (Dale
32 et al. 2015). Kanter et al. (2016) propose a four-step cradle-to-grave approach for agriculture trade-off
33 analysis, which involves co-evaluation of indicators and trade-offs with stakeholders and decision-
34 makers. Local communities understand local dynamics of deforestation and can be involved in
35 mapping drivers, data validation and carbon stock measurement.

36 PLACEHOLDER - figure illustrating decision making for sustainable land, climate, food
37 management

38

39 **7.5.8 Coherence and maladaptation**

40 While opportunities exist to capitalise on the synergies outlined above, ensuring policy coherence,
41 minimising costs and risks of maladaptation are challenges that need to be addressed.

42 If policy mixes are designed appropriately, acknowledging and incorporating trade-offs and synergies,
43 there is *medium evidence and medium agreement* that they can be expected to have a higher
44 probability of delivering an outcome like transitioning to sustainability (Howlett and Rayner 2013;
45 Huttunen et al. 2014). Further, this transition is encouraged by having policies within the suite that
46 stimulate 'elements of creative destruction' whereby disruptive innovation can occur through

1 processes by which resources, skills and knowledge held by incumbent old technologies become
2 obsolete (Kivimaa and Kern 2016). However, there is *medium agreement and medium evidence* that
3 evaluating policies for coherence in responding to climate change and its impacts is not occurring, and
4 policies are instead reviewed in a fragmented manner (Hurlbert and Gupta 2016).

5 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that a suite of agricultural business risk programs
6 (which would include crop insurance and income stability programs) increase farm financial
7 performance, reduce risk, and also reinforce incentives to adopt stewardship practices (beneficial
8 management practices) improving the environment (Jeffrey et al. 2017). Consideration of the suite of
9 instruments responding to climate change and its associated risks, and the interaction of policy
10 instruments, improve agricultural producer livelihoods (Hurlbert 2018b).

11 Coherent policies can also reduce the likelihood of maladaptation, which is the opposite of
12 sustainable adaptation (Magnan et al. 2016) -adaptation that “contributes to socially and
13 environmentally sustainable development pathways including both social justice and environmental
14 integrity” (Eriksen et al. 2011). In AR5 there was medium evidence and high agreement that
15 maladaptation is ‘a cause of increasing concern to adaptation planners, where intervention in one
16 location or sector could increase the vulnerability of another location or sector, or increase the
17 vulnerability of the target group to future climate change’ (Noble et al. 2014). AR5 recognised that
18 maladaptation arises not only from inadvertent badly planned adaptation actions, but also from
19 deliberate decisions where wider considerations place greater emphasis on short-term outcomes ahead
20 of longer-term threats, or that discount, or fail to consider, the full range of interactions arising from
21 planned actions (Noble et al. 2014).

22 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that maladaptation is a process and:

23 “A result of an intentional adaptation policy or measure directly increasing vulnerability for the
24 targeted and/or external actor(s), and/or eroding preconditions for sustainable development by
25 indirectly increasing society’s vulnerability” (Juhola, Glaas, Linnér, & Neset, 2016 at p. 139).

26 Three types of maladaptation are identified by (Juhola et al. 2016): (1) Rebounding vulnerability –
27 increased current or future climate change vulnerability of implementing actor (or one targeted by
28 policy) by increasing exposure, increasing sensitivity, or decreasing adaptive capacity; (2) Shifting
29 vulnerability – increasing current or future vulnerability for one or several external actors through a
30 spill over effect by increasing exposure, increasing sensitivity, or decreasing adaptive capacity; and
31 (3) Eroding sustainable development – adaptation action that increases GHG emissions and negatively
32 impact environmental conditions and/or social and economic values (Juhola et al. 2016).
33 Maladaptation has temporal and spatial scales (Magnan 2014). Maladaptation may result from
34 adaptation action that does not adequately account for multiple drivers or neglects direct and/or
35 indirect drivers of vulnerability such as social characteristics of cultural values (Magnan 2014). There
36 is *low agreement and limited evidence* that maladaptation also includes (1) high opportunity costs
37 (including economic, environmental, and social such as when water desalinisation is chosen instead of
38 less costly options that do less environmental harm); (2) reducing incentives to adapt (adaptation
39 measures that reduce incentives to adapt by not addressing underlying causes); and (3) path
40 dependency or trajectories that are difficult to change (Barnett and O’Neill 2010).

41 In practice, identifying maladaptation requires a framework specifying the type, aim and target
42 audience of an adaptation action, decision, project, plan, or policy designed initially for adaptation,
43 but actually at high risk of inducing adverse effects either on the system in which it was developed, or
44 another connected system, or both. The assessment requires identifying system boundaries including
45 temporal and geographical scales at which the outcome are assessed (Magnan 2014; Juhola et al.

1 2016). Excluded from maladaptation are negative outcomes resulting from autonomous adaptation
2 (that adaptation that occurs without explicitly occurring to manage the effects of climate change) as
3 well as avoidant adaptation actions (built on perceptions such as denial of a threat, wishful thinking or
4 fatalism); exclusion advances the operationalisation of the term and delineation of the methodological
5 boundaries.

6 **7.5.9 Trade-offs and synergies**

7 As new knowledge about trade-offs and synergies amongst land-climate processes emerges regionally
8 and globally, concerns over emerging risks and the need for planning policy responses grow. There is
9 *medium agreement and medium evidence* that trade-offs currently do not figure into existing climate
10 policies including NDCs and SDGs being vigorously pursued by some countries (Woolf et al. 2018).
11 Clearly, there is an urgent need to evaluate and mitigate risks due to the social, economic, and
12 ecological inter-linkages mentioned above.

13 There is *very high confidence* that significant synergies and trade-offs exist between mitigation and
14 adaptation measures (AR5, SPM3.3). Since the challenge for adaptation increases with increasing
15 global temperature, there is a strong co-benefit of combining adaptation and mitigation policies from a
16 global perspective. But adaptation and mitigation measures can involve both synergies or trade-offs at
17 the local scale (Duguma et al. 2014) and can in addition generate synergies and trade-offs with other
18 SDGs such as food security, biodiversity conservation, water quality, etc.

19 Examples of trade-offs include the implications for food security due to reduced micronutrients under
20 enhanced CO₂ (Myers et al. 2014), the impact of afforestation as a climate change mitigation response
21 on water resources (Farley et al. 2005). The introduction of exotic and invasive species while
22 providing alternative food security in some regions is possibly approaching biodiversity tipping points
23 unless regulated and managed (Canonica et al. 2005).

24 The subsequent sub-sections outline land based GHG mitigation and associated trade-offs and
25 synergies in terms of food security, biodiversity, bio-geophysical processes. The desirable low carbon
26 pathways in line with Goal 13 on climate action could be achieved through land-based mitigation
27 options including forest conservation, biofuel production, and negative emissions technologies.
28 However, such mitigation policies could result in could lead to large scale land acquisition and
29 changes in land ownership and cause adverse outcomes such as counteracting food security or
30 increasing land conflicts (Hunsberger et al. 2017). Conversely, evidence from Nordic countries show
31 positive impacts of bioenergy markets on new and diversified market opportunities and farmers'
32 incomes (Nilsson et al. 2016a).

33 **7.5.9.1 Trade-offs and synergies from land-based mitigation measures**

34 **7.5.9.1.1 Re/afforestation and Avoided deforestation (e.g. REDD+)**

35 Re/afforestation and avoided deforestation are very important components of climate mitigation and
36 are expected to play a key role in low carbon pathways in line with SDG 13 on climate action
37 (Griscom et al. 2017; Popp et al. 2017). However, policies promoting these land-based mitigation
38 approaches are facing trade-offs and synergies in terms of food security, biodiversity, biogeophysical
39 processes. For instance, such mitigation policies could lead to large scale land acquisition and changes
40 in land ownership and cause adverse outcomes increasing land conflicts (Hunsberger et al. 2017) or
41 threatening food security (Erb et al. 2016) and biodiversity (Griscom et al. 2017). Reforestation can
42 also create emerging opportunities to foster mitigation and adaptation co-benefits. For instance,
43 reforestation in tropical or arid regions provides adaptation benefits (in addition to the GHG
44 mitigation effect) through the local cooling effect of forests (Bright et al. 2017; Duveiller et al. 2018)

1 which is particularly significant during heat waves (Lejeune et al. 2018). In temperate or boreal
2 regions, surface albedo change may lead to trade-offs (Bright et al. 2017; Duveiller et al. 2018), but
3 there is *low confidence* concerning the magnitude and temporal variability of these effects (Chapter
4 2). These adaptation co-benefits or trade-offs from biogeophysical processes are usually not
5 accounted for in the design of policies addressing re/afforestation/avoided deforestation (e.g. REDD+
6 and the Paris Agreement) but there is increasing scientific evidence that they should be part of the
7 policy design (Findell et al. 2017; Hirsch et al. 2018; Bright et al. 2017).

8 Adopted by the Conference of Parties in 2007, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and
9 Degradation (REDD+) was a mechanism to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest
10 degradation in developing countries. The Paris Agreement recognises and encourages policies and
11 incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Initial findings from
12 Myanmar and Indonesia show that it is possible to align REDD+ and SDGs to ensure both mitigation
13 and sustainable development benefits (Bastos Lima et al. 2017). A recent assessment of the California
14 forest offset program shows that such programs, by compensating individuals and industries for forest
15 conservation, can deliver mitigation and sustainability co-benefits (Anderson et al. 2017).

16 7.5.9.1.2 *Bioenergy plantations and BECCS*

17 Bioenergy has the potential to be a carbon-neutral means of energy production (assuming steady state
18 conditions where the same amount of carbon is sequestered by biomass growth as is released during
19 energy generation), or even a carbon sink if combined with CCS (Fuss et al. 2014). Bioenergy and
20 BECCS are currently put forward as an almost unavoidable element of climate mitigation in scenarios
21 compatible with the Paris Agreement goal (Rockström et al. 2017b; Popp et al. 2017; Fuss et al.
22 2014), but various concerns have been raised about the sustainability of bioenergy production. Most
23 of these concerns relate to trade-offs with food production, biodiversity and local biogeophysical
24 effects (Humpeöder et al. 2017; Krause et al. 2017; Robledo-Abad et al. 2017; Boysen et al. 2016,
25 2017a,b). Examples of synergies are between carbon stocks and biodiversity-oriented conservation
26 (Strassburg et al. 2010) and some agro-ecosystems that provide regulating services such as flood
27 control, water quality control, carbon storage and climate regulation (Power 2010). The extent of
28 these trade-offs will largely depend on the land area affected to bioenergy production [placeholder for
29 the input coming from ch2 about range of estimates for land area affected to bioenergy in IAM
30 scenarios]. Forest and water protection schemes, improved fertilization efficiency, and agricultural
31 intensification could alleviate the trade-offs from bioenergy production (Humpeöder et al. 2017).
32 Trade-offs with biodiversity can be managed for instance by prioritising bioenergy trees (e.g. willow,
33 poplar or eucalyptus) over bioenergy crops (e.g. miscanthus or switchgrass) since there is evidence
34 that the former are more compatible with biodiversity conservation and can provide local bio-
35 geophysical cooling effect (O'Halloran and Bright 2017). Locating new bioenergy plantations
36 strategically by considering landscape context and impact to biodiversity and ecosystem services
37 could help mitigate some of the adverse impacts (Manning et al. 2015). Synergies between bioenergy
38 and food security could be achieved by investing in a combination of strategies including technology
39 and innovations, infrastructure, pricing, flex crops, and improved communication and stakeholder
40 engagement (Kline et al. 2017). Managing these trade-offs might also require demand side
41 interventions including shift in dietary patterns.

42 7.5.9.2 *Trade-offs and synergies in the agricultural sector*

43 In the agricultural sector, there has been little published empirical work on interactions between
44 adaptation and mitigation strategies. (Smith and Olesen 2010) describe potential relationships,
45 focussing particularly on the arable sector and predominantly on mitigation efforts. The important
46 potential of the agro-forestry sector for synergies and contributing to increasing resilience of tropical

1 farming systems is discussed in (Verchot et al. 2007) with examples from Africa. Many adaptation
2 and mitigation measures will be complementary, but there are also examples of trade-offs. These
3 often result from increasing productive efficiency in livestock with a resulting lack of resilience to
4 stress (Hoffmann 2010).

5 ‘Climate Smart Agriculture’ has emerged in recent years as an approach to integrate food security and
6 climate challenges. The three pillars of CSA are: (1) to adapt and build resilience to climate change;
7 (2) to reduce GHG emissions, and; (3) to sustainably increase agricultural productivity, ultimately
8 delivering ‘triple-wins’ (Lipper et al. 2014c). While the concept is conceptually appealing, a range of
9 criticisms, contradictions and challenges exist in using CSA as the route to resilience in global
10 agriculture, notably around the political economy (Newell and Taylor 2017), the vagueness of the
11 definition and consequent assimilation by the mainstream agricultural sector, as well as issues around
12 monitoring, reporting and evaluation, and the requirement to include mitigation in resilience building
13 projects (Arakelyan et al. 2017). Nonetheless, CSA does highlight the potential for synergies and
14 examples are presented in Table 7.4.

15 **Table 7.4 Examples of potential CSA measures**

Measure	Adaptation/Resilience	Mitigation	Productivity
On-farm tree planting	Shelter/shade for livestock	Carbon sequestration	Reduced heat stress for livestock
Planting hedgerows and buffers	Preventing drought through reducing run-off	Carbon sequestration	Avoided pasture/crop loss
Soil management practices	Increased crop/pasture resilience	Increased soil organic Carbon	Avoided pasture/crop losses
Manage animal health and disease	Avoid disease outbreaks	Unwell animals are less efficient & emit more methane per unit	Avoided mortality and illness
Livestock diet management	An appropriate diet can reduce heat stress	Appropriate diet can reduce methane emissions	Avoided mortality or reduced production
Natural flood management (e.g. woodland and peatland restoration, riparian planting)	Reduced flood damage	Carbon sequestration	Avoided or reduced pasture/crop/livestock loss

16

17 Agroecology has been identified as an alternative to CSA, and has at its core the principle that
18 agroecosystems should mimic the biodiversity levels and functioning of natural ecosystems
19 (PIMBERT 2015). While there are some areas of overlap with CSA, agroecology does not include
20 practices that undermine the health of the ecosystem and has a much greater focus on alternative
21 forms of knowledge and practice.

22

23 There are opportunities to minimise trade-offs related to food security. Since human diet will be a key
24 driver of future food demand, promoting healthier diets (reduced meat consumption) is an effective
25 way to prevent further cropland expansion thus preventing further deforestation and leaving more land
26 available for afforestation and bioenergy production (Bajželj et al. 2014b; Erb et al. 2016)

27 **7.5.9.3 Trade-offs and synergies in fresh-water and river systems**

28 The transformation of river ecosystems for irrigation, hydro-power and water requirements of
29 societies worldwide is the biggest threat to fresh-water and estuarine biodiversity and ecosystems

1 services (Nilsson and Berggren 2000; Vörösmarty et al. 2010). These projects address important
2 energy and water related demands, but their economic benefits are often overestimated in relation to
3 trade-offs with respect to biodiversity and downstream ecosystem services (Winemiller et al. 2016).
4 The changes in sediment transport, reduction in silica and organic carbon transportation due to hydro-
5 power dams under construction or proposed in the Himalayan region as well inter-linking of rivers in
6 in India could potentially alter regional and global carbon sinks and coastal and marine food-webs
7 (Humborg et al. 2000; Galy et al. 2007; Higgins et al. 2018).

8 The Sustainable Development Goals were defined to maximise synergies and minimise trade-offs
9 (Griggs et al. 2013a), however while there is an explicit goal to conserve and sustainably use marine
10 biodiversity and ecosystems (Life Under Water, SDG 17), there is no equivalent explicit goal for
11 conservation of fresh-water biodiversity in rivers making them vulnerable to irreversible changes and
12 transformations. Furthermore hydro-power development on head-water streams in many countries is
13 emerging as a new threat to aquatic biodiversity (Abbasi et al. 2011; Jumani et al. 2017b) even as it
14 forms an important part of NDC based decarbonisation in energy production (Vedachalam et al.
15 2017).

16 There are however now powerful new analytical approaches, high-resolution data and decision
17 making tools that help to predict cumulative impacts of dams and assess trade-offs between
18 engineering and environmental goals and can help funders and decision makers to compare alternative
19 sites for dam building as well manage flows in regulated rivers based on experimental releases and
20 adaptive learning which could minimise ecological costs and maximising synergies with other
21 development goals under climate change (Poff et al. 2003; Winemiller et al. 2016)

22 **7.5.9.4 Trade-offs and synergies arising from land-based adaptation measures**

23 *7.5.9.4.1 Adaptive forest management*

24 Forest management can both promote carbon sinks (*high confidence, low evidence*) while improving
25 the resilience of forests thus safeguarding their economic and ecological value (Astrup et al. 2018).
26 There has been claims that historical forest management did not contribute to climate mitigation and
27 even contributed to a slight warming effect over Europe due to the replacement of broadleaf species
28 by coniferous trees (Naudts et al. 2016). However, there is scientific evidence that adaptive forest
29 management, for example by a careful selection of drought-resilient species, can deliver both
30 mitigation and adaptation co-benefits (Astrup et al. 2018) compatible with biodiversity conservation
31 (O'Halloran and Bright 2017).

32 *7.5.9.4.2 Adaptive cropland management*

33 *PLACE HOLDER*-climate-smart agriculture - There are opportunities to minimise trade-offs related
34 to food security. Since human diet will be a key driver of future food demand, promoting healthier
35 diets (reduced meat consumption) is an effective way to prevent further cropland expansion thus
36 preventing further deforestation and leaving more land available for afforestation and bioenergy
37 production (Bajželj et al. 2014b; Erb et al. 2016).

38 *7.5.9.4.3 Climate-smart/green cities*

39 *PLACE HOLDER*

40 **7.5.10 Barriers of implementation**

41 Despite the growing understanding of the challenges and increasing advances in approaches to
42 tackling them, gaps exist both in the area of adapting to climate change (the adaptation deficit (Burton
43 2009) as well as mitigation. The reasons for this are varied and related to the trade-offs involved in
44 making decisions about land. A large and increasing body of literature exists around the barriers to
45 adoption or implementation of desirable practices with regard to the environment. Many of these

1 barriers relate to cognitive and behavioural barriers (Hornsey et al. 2016; Prokopy et al. 2015) , others
2 relate to social and cultural factors (Burton et al. 2008); others to finance and economics
3 (Rochecouste et al. 2015; Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012), as well as institutional and structural barriers
4 (Sánchez et al. 2016; Greiner and Gregg 2011) (*high evidence, medium agreement*).

5 Many of these barriers and their drivers are captured in the Values, Rules and Knowledge Framework
6 of (Gorrdard et al. 2016). Decision-makers at all levels require a combination of values, rules
7 (system that empowers actors to make decisions) and knowledge in order to be able to make effective
8 decisions. They have to want to make a change (values), they have to be allowed to make a change
9 (rules), and they have to know what their options are and what their implications will be (knowledge).
10 The space where these elements overlap is the decision-making space: all of these elements must be
11 present and changes in any one may drive changes in others.

13 **7.6 Governance: Governing the land-climate interface**

14 An important concept used in this chapter, and not previously well defined in IPCC reports, is
15 governance. Governance situates decision making and selection or calibration of policy instruments
16 within the reality of the multitude of actors operating in respect of land and climate interactions. The
17 act of governance “is a social function centred on steering collective behaviour toward desired
18 outcomes and away from undesirable outcomes” (Young 2017). This definition of governance allows
19 for it to be decoupled from the more familiar concept of government and studied in the context of
20 complex human-environment relations and environmental and resource regimes (Young 2017).
21 Emphasizing governance also represents a shift of traditional resource management (focused on
22 hierarchical state control) towards recognition that political and decision making authority can be
23 exercised through interlinked groups of diverse actors (Kuzdas et al. 2015)

24 Governance includes all of the processes, structures, rules and traditions that govern and these
25 processes may be undertaken by actors including a government, market, organisation, or family
26 (Bevir 2012). They determine how people in societies make decisions (Patterson et al. 2017) and
27 involves the interactions among formal and informal institutions through which people articulate their
28 interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their legal obligations, and mediate their differences
29 (Plummer and Baird 2013). Institutions (defined in 7.6.4) are a fundamental component of
30 governance.

31 Governance encompasses the development and implementation of laws, regulations, and
32 organisations, as well as governmental policies and actions, domestic activities, and networks of
33 influence including international market forces, the private sector, and civil society (Demetropoulou
34 et al. 2010). The institutional context of adaptive capacity can be studied through an investigation of
35 the institutions involved in governance (Hurlbert and Diaz 2013). There is *high agreement and robust*
36 *evidence* that resource and disaster crises are crises of governance (Pahl-Wostl 2017; Villagra and
37 Quintana 2017; Gupta et al. 2013).

38 **7.6.1 Adaptive Management and governance**

39 There is *high agreement and robust evidence* that more research to improve understanding of
40 institutions and adaptation is needed as appropriate institutions are increasingly regarded as essential
41 to advancing adaptation (Eisenack et al. 2014; Adger et al. 2009).

42 In the 1990s adaptive governance emerged from adaptive management (Holling 1978, 1986),
43 combining resilience and complexity theory, and reflecting the trend of moving from government to
44 governance (Hurlbert 2018b). Adaptive governance is “a process of resolving trade-offs and charting
45 a course for sustainability” (Boyle, Michelle; Kay, James J.; Pond, 2001 at p. 28) through a range of

1 “political, social, economic and administrative systems that develop, manage and distribute a resource
2 in a manner promoting resilience through collaborative, flexible and learning based issue management
3 across different scales” (Margot A. Hurlbert, 2018 at p. 25). Few alternative governance theories
4 handle processes of change characterised by nonlinear dynamics, threshold effects, cascades and
5 limited predictability; however, the majority of literature relates to the United States or Canada
6 (Karpouzoglou et al. 2016). Combining adaptive governance with other theories has demonstrated
7 good evaluation of important governance features such as power and politics, inclusion and equity,
8 short term and long term change, and the relationship between public policy and adaptive governance
9 (Karpouzoglou et al. 2016).

10 Closely related to (and even arguably components of) adaptive governance are adaptive management
11 (a regulatory environment that manages ecological system boundaries through hypothesis testing,
12 monitoring, and re-evaluation (Mostert et al. 2007)), adaptive co-management (flexible community
13 based resource management (Plummer and Baird 2013), and anticipatory governance (flexible
14 decision making through use of scenario planning and reiterative policy review (Boyd et al. 2015)).

Box 7.4: Governance and inter-linkages of food, water, energy and land

Emerging literature and case studies recognise the connectedness of the environment and human activities and the interrelationships of multiple resource-use practices in an attempt to understand synergies and trade-offs (Albrecht et al. 2018). Case studies of integrated water resources management (IWRM), landscape approaches, and ecosystem based approaches illustrate important dimensions of institutions, institutional coordination, resource coupling and local and global connections (Scott et al. 2011). Case studies in this box will illustrate integrated governance, policy coherence, and use of multi-functional systems that advance synergies across land, water, energy and food sectors (Liu et al. 2017). This box will summarise policy and governance approaches that have advanced sustainable land management (for example: Ethiopia (policy improving response to drought) South and North Korea (policy impacts on food security)) and trade-offs (for example: Jamaica (trade-offs between food security and trade)). Sustainable adaptation - or actions contributing to environmentally and socially sustainable development pathways (Eriksen et al. 2011) - requires consideration of the interlinkage of different sectors (Rasul and Sharma 2016). Integrating considerations can address sustainability (Hoff 2011) showing promise (Allan et al. 2015) for effective adaptation to climate impacts in many drylands (Rasul and Sharma 2016).

15

7.6.2 Resilient Institutions

17 “Institutions are rules and norms held in common by social actors that guide, constrain, and shape
18 human interaction. Institutions can be formal, such as laws and policies, or informal, such as norms
19 and conventions. Organisations – such as parliaments, regulatory agencies, private firms, and
20 community bodies – develop and act in response to institutional frameworks and the incentives they
21 frame. Institutions can guide, constrain, and shape human interaction through direct control, through
22 incentives, and through processes of socialization” (AR5, 2014 at p. 1768). Nations with “well
23 developed institutional systems are considered to have greater adaptive capacity,” and better
24 institutional capacity to help deal with risks associated with future climate change (IPCC, 2001 at p.
25 896). Institutions contribute to the management of a community’s assets, the community members’
26 interrelationship, and their relationships with natural resources (Hurlbert and Diaz 2013).

27 Thinking on adaptive governance, adaptive institutions and kindred concepts in relation to climate
28 change and land has been advanced by incorporating into it concepts of resilience, and specifically of
29 the resilience of socio-ecological systems (Boyd and Folke 2011). In their characterisation, “resilience
30 is the ability to reorganise following crisis, continuing to learn, evolving with the same identity and

1 function, and also innovating and sowing the seeds for transformation. It is a central concept of
2 adaptive governance” (Boyd and Folke 2012). In the context of complex and multi-scale socio-
3 ecological systems, important features of adaptive institutions that contribute to resilience include
4 “shared visions, social capital, networks, collaborative decision-making and learning platforms”
5 (Boyd and Folke 2012). Traditional or locally-evolved institutions, backed by cultural norms, can
6 contribute to resilience and adaptive capacity: (Anderson et al. 2010) suggest these are particularly a
7 feature of dryland societies that are highly prone to environmental risk and uncertainty. Because of
8 the multi-scale nature of the challenges to resilience, dissemination of ideas, networking and learning
9 need to be undertaken across different scales and sectors, implying the importance of social
10 Indigenous knowledge

11 **7.6.3 Multi-level and polycentric governance**

12 Different types of governance can be distinguished according to their intended levels (e.g. local,
13 regional, global), domains (national, international, transnational), modes (market, network, hierarchy),
14 and scales (global regimes to local community groups) (Jordan et al. 2015b). Sub-national governance
15 efforts for climate policy, especially at the level of cities and communities, have become significant
16 during the past decade or so (*medium evidence, medium agreement*).

17 Transnational governance efforts have increased in number, with application across different
18 economic sectors, geographical regions, civil society groups and non-governmental organisations.
19 When it comes to climate mitigation, transnational mechanisms generally focus on networking and
20 may not necessarily be effective in terms of promoting real emissions reductions (Michaelowa and
21 Michaelowa 2017). There is a tendency for transnational governance mechanisms to lack monitoring
22 and evaluation procedures (Jordan et al. 2015a).

23 Implementation of climate change adaptation has been impeded by institutional barriers including
24 multi-level governance and policy integrations issues (Biesbroek et al. 2010). Climate governance
25 has evolved significantly beyond the national and multilateral domains that tended to dominate
26 climate efforts and initiatives during the early years of the UNFCCC. The climate challenge has also
27 been placed in an “earth system” context, showing the existence of complex interactions and
28 governance requirements across different levels and thus calls for a radical transformation in
29 governance rather than minor adjustments (Biermann et al. 2012). A transformation of sorts has
30 indeed been underway through deepening engagement from the private sector and NGOs as well as
31 Government involvement at multiple levels. Polycentric governance considers the interaction between
32 actors at different levels of governance (local, regional, national, and global) for a more nuanced
33 understanding of the variation in diverse governance outcomes in the management of common-pool
34 resources (such as forests) based on the needs and interests of citizens (Nagendra and Ostrom 2012).
35 A more “polycentric climate governance” system has emerged that incorporates bottom-up initiatives
36 that can support and synergise with national efforts and international regimes (Ostrom 2010).
37 Although it is clear that many more actors and networks are involved, the effectiveness of a more
38 polycentric system remains unclear (Jordan et al. 2015a). At the same time, climate adaptation and
39 mitigation goals must be integrated or mainstreamed into existing governance mechanisms around
40 key land use sectors such as forestry and agriculture. In the EU, mitigation has generally been well-
41 mainstreamed in regional policies but not adaptation (Hanger et al. 2015). Climate change adaptation
42 has been impeded by institutional barriers including the inherent challenges of multi-level governance
43 and policy integration (Biesbroek et al. 2010).

44 Integrative approaches to land use and climate interactions take different forms and operate with
45 different institutions and governance mechanisms. Integrative approaches can provide coordination
46 and linkages to improve effectiveness and efficiency and minimise conflicts. Different types of
47 integration with special relevance for the land-climate interface can be characterised as follows:

- 1 1. Cross-level integration: local and national level efforts must be coordinated with national and
- 2 regional policies and should also be capable of drawing direction and financing from global
- 3 regimes, thus requiring multi-level governance.
- 4 2. Cross-sectoral integration: rather than approach each application or sector (e.g. energy,
- 5 agriculture, forestry) separately, there is a conscious effort at co-management and
- 6 coordination in policies and institutions, such as with the energy-water-food nexus (Biggs et
- 7 al. 2015).
- 8 3. Landscape integration: rather than physical separation of activities (e.g. agriculture, forestry,
- 9 grazing), uses are spatially integrated by exploiting natural variations while incorporating
- 10 local and regional economies (Harvey et al. 2014).
- 11 4. End-use/market integration: often involves exploiting economies of scope across products,
- 12 supply chains, and infrastructure (Nuhoff-Isakhanyan et al. 2016; Ashkenazy et al. 2017).

13 Another way to analyse or characterise governance approaches or mechanisms might be according to
 14 a temporal scale with respect to relevant events, e.g. those that may occur gradually vs. abruptly (Cash
 15 et al. 2006). Desertification and land degradation are drawn-out processes that occur over many years,
 16 whereas extreme events are abrupt and require immediate attention. Similarly, the frequency of events
 17 might be of special interest, e.g. events that occur periodically vs. those that occur infrequently and/or
 18 irregularly. In the case of food security, there is a distinction between “hunger months” and longer-
 19 term food insecurity. Some indigenous practices already incorporate hunger months whereas
 20 structural food deficits have to be addressed differently. Governance mechanisms that facilitate rapid
 21 response to crises are quite different from those aimed at monitoring slower changes and responding
 22 with longer-term measures.

23 **7.6.4 Institutional dimensions of adaptive governance**

24 There is *high agreement and medium evidence* that the characteristics of governance systems in Table
 25 7.5 facilitate adaptation and enhance the adaptive capacity of institutions. The table represents a
 26 summation of characteristics, evaluative criteria, elements, or institutional design principles of
 27 institutions that advance adaptive governance.

28

29

Table 7.5 Institutional Dimensions of Adaptive Governance

Characteristics	Description	References
Variety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Room for a variety of problem frames reflecting different opinions and problem definitions • Involving different actors at different levels, sectors, and dimensions • Availability of a wide range or diversity of policy options to address a particular problem • Redundancy or duplication of measures, back-up systems 	(Biermann 2007; Gunderson and Holling 2001; Hurlbert and Gupta 2017; Bastos Lima et al. 2017; Gupta, J., van der Grijp, N., Kuik 2013; Mollenkamp and Kasten 2009; Nelson et al. 2010; Olsson et al. 2006; Ostrom 2011; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Verweij et al. 2006; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001)
Learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust • Single loop learning or ability to improve routines based on past experience • Double loop learning or changed underlying assumptions of institutional patterns • Discussion of doubts (openness to uncertainties, monitoring and evaluation of policy experiences) • Institutional memory (monitoring and evaluation of policy experiences over time) 	
Room for autonomous change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous access to information (data institutional memory and early warning systems) 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acting according to plan (especially in relation to disasters) • Capacity to improvise (in relation to self-organization and fostering social capital)
Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visionary (Long term and reformist) • Entrepreneurial which leads by example • Collaborative
Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authority resources or legitimate forms of power • Human resources of expertise, knowledge and labour • Financial resources
Fair governance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimacy or public support • Equity in relation to institutional fair rules • Responsiveness to society • Accountability in relation to procedures

1 This table represents a summation of characteristics, evaluative criteria, elements or institutional design
2 principles of institutions that advance adaptive governance

3 Institutional systems that are strong in relation to the characteristics on Table 7.5, or demonstrate
4 these performance characteristics are more resilient and enhance the adaptive capacity of the system
5 to a greater degree than institutional systems that do not demonstrate these dimensions (Gupta et al.
6 2010; Mollenkamp and Kasten 2009).

7

8 **7.6.5 Inclusive governance**

9 In governing natural resources focus has been on rights of citizens in relation to natural resources; as
10 there are increasing pressures on natural resources a change of focus is needed to include citizen
11 obligations and responsibilities. This citizen engagement is important in enhancing service delivery
12 by including citizens and engagement with them in management and governance decisions (Karar and
13 Jacobs-Mata 2016; Chaney and Fevre 2001). This style of governance makes important contributions
14 to the management of risk. Inclusive risk governance integrates people's knowledge and values by
15 involving them in decision making processes where they are able to contribute their respective
16 knowledge and their variety of values in order to make effective, efficient, fair, and morally
17 acceptable decisions (Renn and Schweizer 2009). Representation in decision making would include
18 major actors including government, economic sectors, the scientific community and representatives of
19 civil society (Renn and Schweizer 2009).

20 PLACE HOLDER - Figure illustrating governance in relation to scenarios, risk and sustainable land
21 management

22

23 **7.7 Key uncertainties and knowledge gaps**

24 Uncertainties exist in the science of land-climate processes (7.3.1.1) including in observations,
25 unknown futures, methods for near-term forecasting, model structures, parameterisations, and inputs
26 (Chapter 1) and in social and political dimensions including: uncertainty of consequences of economic
27 and political measures; moral uncertainty; uncertainty of demarcation (Chapter 1) and; uncertainty or
28 disagreement in norms, values and priorities in decision making (7.3.1.2). These uncertainties make
29 decision-making in regard to land, climate, society, ecosystem services and food interactions complex
30 (where cause and effect may be determined after the event) or chaotic (where cause and effect are not
31 discernible) (Snowden 2002) and unknown unknowns may be present. However, uncertainty need not
32 present a barrier to taking action and decision-making can occur in iterative manners to account for
33 uncertainties (7.5.2.1).

1 More research is required to understand the complex interconnections of land, climate, society,
2 ecosystem services and food, including:

- 3 • Interactions of land, climate and society that are changing vulnerability, hazards, and
4 exposures over time and at different spatial scales in relation to short-term or acute shocks,
5 and slow-onset or chronic events such as drought and flood;
- 6 • How policy instruments and responses can augment or reduce risks in relation to these acute
7 shocks and slow-onset events when implemented in a manner considering the entire policy
8 mix;
- 9 • How policy response and instrument mix can reduce or augment the cascading impacts of
10 land, climate and food security and ecosystem services interactions through different domains
11 such as health, livelihoods, and infrastructure especially in relation to non-linear and tipping-
12 point changes in natural and human systems. There is a gap in considering trade-offs in
13 climate, land, ecosystem services and food policies and an urgent need to evaluate and
14 mitigate risks (7.5.7);
- 15 • Increasing use of land due to climate mitigation measures such as BECCS, carbon centric
16 afforestation/REDD+ and/or solar energy, increasing urban development, and resource
17 substitution to replace plastics, and their impacts on human conflict, livelihoods and
18 displacement (7.3.3.6);
- 19 • Understanding the full cost of climate change is not fully understood in the context of
20 disagreement on accounting for climate change interactions and their impact on society as
21 well as issues of valuation (7.3.4), and attribution uncertainties (7.3.1.1).

22 More research is required into the feedbacks between drought and people and the human role in
23 mitigating drought and enhancing drought resilience including how effective state drought plans are
24 and which specific suite of policy instruments are appropriate and at which level (7.4.2).

25 Actions to mitigate climate change are rarely evaluated in relation to impact on adaptation, sustainable
26 development goals, and trade-offs with food security. For instance, there are many renewable energy
27 and irrigation initiatives around the building of small and big dams, however, these may have
28 irreversible trade-offs with downstream ecosystem services impacting food security and ecosystem
29 services (7.3.3.6,7.4.2.5). It is not clear that the sustainable development goals are all implemented in
30 a coherent manner advancing each goal and more research is required to determine this. Further,
31 research is needed to identify if any gaps exist in relation to sustainable development goals and land,
32 climate, food interactions (7.5.2; 7.4.4.1). Incorporation of social sciences in fostering inter-
33 disciplinary approaches and new decision-making tools that build on experiments is likely to reduce
34 disagreement and uncertainty about conservation planning for biodiversity and ecosystem services
35 under future climate-land scenarios (7.5.4; 7.5.9). Policy mixes are not assessed in relation to
36 multiple hazards or interconnected sectors such as health and agriculture. More research is needed in
37 relation to scaling up community-based adaptation and selection of optimal climate mitigation
38 portfolios (7.4.3). There is growing research concerning agri-environmental indicators, but more
39 research on how climate change and policy measures can be evaluated using these indicators and
40 which indicators are optimal is needed (7.5.7).

41 There is a gap in understanding the institutional governance system and policy mix that will advance
42 adaptation and integrate across levels, sectors, landscapes, supply chains and infrastructure (7.6.1).
43 How policy instruments advance adaptation to climate change and mitigation, interact and change
44 values and norms and the role of informal institutions are research gaps (7.5.1; 7.6.1). More research
45 is required to understand the interconnections of land with water, food and energy (7.6).

46

47

References

- 1
2 van Aalst, M. K., T. Cannon, and I. Burton, 2008: Community level adaptation to climate change: The
3 potential role of participatory community risk assessment. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **18**, 165–179,
4 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.06.002.
- 5 Aalto, J., M. Kämäräinen, M. Shodmonov, N. Rajabov, and A. Venäläinen, 2017: Features of
6 Tajikistan’s past and future climate. *Int. J. Climatol.*, **37**, 4949–4961, doi:10.1002/joc.5135.
- 7 Ababaei, B., T. Sohrabi, and F. Mirzaei, 2014: Development and application of a planning support
8 system to assess strategies related to land and water resources for adaptation to climate change.
9 *Clim. Risk Manag.*, doi:10.1016/j.crm.2014.11.001.
- 10 Abadie, L. M., I. Galarraga, and D. Rübbelke, 2013: An analysis of the causes of the mitigation bias
11 in international climate finance. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang.*, **18**, 943–955,
12 doi:10.1007/s11027-012-9401-7.
- 13 Abbasi, T., S. A. Abbasi, T. Abbasi, and S. A. Abbasi, 2011: *Renewable & sustainable energy*
14 *reviews*. Elsevier Science, 2134–2143 pp.
- 15 Adam, C., F. Taillandier, E. Delay, O. Plattard, and M. Toumi, 2016: SPRITE – Participatory
16 Simulation for Raising Awareness About Coastal Flood Risk on the Oleron Island. Springer,
17 Cham, 33–46.
- 18 Adger, W. N., 2009: Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change. *Econ.*
19 *Geogr.*, **79**, 387–404, doi:10.1111/j.1944-8287.2003.tb00220.x.
- 20 Adger, W. N., and Coauthors, 2009: Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? RID D-
21 4219-2009. *Clim. Change*, **93**, 335–354, doi:10.1007/s10584-008-9520-z.
- 22 Adger, W. N., N. W. Arnell, R. Black, S. Dercon, A. Geddes, and D. S. G. Thomas, 2015: Focus on
23 environmental risks and migration: Causes and consequences. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **10**,
24 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/10/6/060201.
- 25 Agrawal, A., A. Chhatre, and R. Hardin, 2008: Changing Governance of the World’s Forests. *Science*
26 (80-), **320**, 1460–1462, doi:10.1126/science.320.5882.1435.
- 27 Ahmed, S., and J. R. Stepp, 2016: Beyond yields: Climate change effects on specialty crop quality
28 and agroecological management. *Elem. Sci. Anthr.*, doi:10.12952/journal.elementa.000092.
- 29 Alam, K., 2015: Farmers’ adaptation to water scarcity in drought-prone environments: A case study of
30 Rajshahi District, Bangladesh. *Agric. Water Manag.*, doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2014.10.011.
- 31 Alavipanah, S., M. Wegmann, S. Qureshi, Q. Weng, and T. Koellner, 2015: The Role of Vegetation in
32 Mitigating Urban Land Surface Temperatures: A Case Study of Munich, Germany during the
33 Warm Season. *Sustainability*, **7**, 4689–4706, doi:10.3390/su7044689.
- 34 Albert, C., J. Hauck, N. Buhr, and C. von Haaren, 2014: What ecosystem services information do
35 users want? Investigating interests and requirements among landscape and regional planners in
36 Germany. *Landsc. Ecol.*, **29**, 1301–1313, doi:10.1007/s10980-014-9990-5.
- 37 Albrecht, T. R., A. Crootof, and C. A. Scott, 2018: The water-energy-food nexus: A comprehensive
38 review of nexus-specific methods. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aaa9c6.
- 39 Alexander, C., and Coauthors, 2011a: Linking Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge of Climate
40 Change. *Bioscience*, **61**, 477–484, doi:10.1525/bio.2011.61.6.10.
- 41 ———, and Coauthors, 2011b: Linking Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge of Climate Change.
42 *Bioscience*, **61**, 477–484, doi:10.1525/bio.2011.61.6.10.
- 43 Alexander, P., and Coauthors, 2017: Assessing uncertainties in land cover projections. *Glob. Chang.*
44 *Biol.*, **23**, 767–781, doi:10.1111/gcb.13447.
- 45 Alimi, T. O., D. O. Fuller, W. A. Qualls, S. V. Herrera, M. Arevalo-Herrera, M. L. Quinones, M. V.

- 1 G. Lacerda, and J. C. Beier, 2015: Predicting potential ranges of primary malaria vectors and
2 malaria in northern South America based on projected changes in climate, land cover and human
3 population. *Parasit. Vectors*, **8**, 431, doi:10.1186/s13071-015-1033-9.
- 4 Allan, T., M. Keulertz, and E. Woertz, 2015: The water–food–energy nexus: an introduction to nexus
5 concepts and some conceptual and operational problems. *International Journal of Water
6 Resources Development*.
- 7 Allen, C. D., and Coauthors, 2010: A global overview of drought and heat-induced tree mortality
8 reveals emerging climate change risks for forests. *For. Ecol. Manage.*, **259**, 660–684,
9 doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2009.09.001.
- 10 Allen, C. R., J. J. Fontaine, K. L. Pope, and A. S. Garmestani, 2011: Adaptive management for a
11 turbulent future. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **92**, 1339–1345, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.11.019.
- 12 Altieri, M. A., and C. I. Nicholls, 2017: The adaptation and mitigation potential of traditional
13 agriculture in a changing climate. *Clim. Change*, doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0909-y.
- 14 Altieri, M. A., C. I. Nicholls, A. Henao, and M. A. Lana, 2015: Agroecology and the design of
15 climate change-resilient farming systems. *Agron. Sustain. Dev.*, **35**, 869–890.
- 16 Alverson, K., and Z. Zommers, eds., 2018: *Resilience The Science of Adaptation to Climate Change*.
17 ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, 360 pp.
- 18 Ampaire, E., P. Happy, and P. Van Asten, 2015: *The Role of Policy in Facilitating Adoption of
19 Climate smart Agriculture in Uganda*. Copenhagen, Denmark,.
- 20 Anderson, C. M., C. B. Field, and K. J. Mach, 2017: Forest offsets partner climate-change mitigation
21 with conservation. *Front. Ecol. Environ.*, **15**, 359–365, doi:10.1002/fee.1515.
- 22 Anderson, J. E., 2010: *Public policymaking: An Introduction*. Cengage Learning, Hampshire,.
- 23 Anderson, S., J. Morton, and C. Toulmin, 2010: Climate Change for Agrarian Societies in Drylands:
24 Implications and future pathways. *Social Dimensions of Climate Change: Equity and
25 vulnerability in a warming world*, R. Mearns and A. Norton, Eds., The World Bank,
26 Washington, DC, 199–230.
- 27 Andersson, E., and S. Gabrielsson, 2012: “Because of poverty, we had to come together”: Collective
28 action for improved food security in rural Kenya and Uganda. *Int. J. Agric. Sustain.*, **10**, 245–
29 262, doi:10.1080/14735903.2012.666029.
- 30 Aniello, C., K. Morgan, A. Busbey, and L. Newland, 1995: Mapping micro-urban heat islands using
31 LANDSAT TM and a GIS. *Comput. Geosci.*, **21**, 965–969, doi:10.1016/0098-3004(95)00033-5.
- 32 Annan, F., and W. Schlenker, 2015: Federal Crop Insurance and the Disincentive to Adapt to Extreme
33 Heat. *Am. Econ. Rev.*, **105**, 262–266, doi:10.1257/aer.p20151031.
- 34 Antwi-Agyei, P., A. J. Dougill, and L. C. Stringer, 2015a: Impacts of land tenure arrangements on the
35 adaptive capacity of marginalized groups: The case of Ghana’s Ejura Sekyedumase and Bongo
36 districts. *Land use policy*, **49**, 203–212, doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.08.007.
- 37 —, —, and —, 2015b: Impacts of land tenure arrangements on the adaptive capacity of
38 marginalized groups: The case of Ghana’s Ejura Sekyedumase and Bongo districts. *Land use
39 policy*, **49**, 203–212, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2015.08.007.
- 40 Apraku, A., J. Morton, and S. Dulo, Climate Change and small-scale agriculture in Africa: Does
41 Indigenous Knowledge matter? Insights from Kenya and South Africa. *J. Rural Stud.*,
42 AR5, 2014: *Glossary*. 1757-1776 pp.
- 43 Arakelyan, I., D. Moran, and A. Wreford, 2017: *Climate smart agriculture: A critical review*. F.
44 Nunan, Ed. Rout.,.
- 45 Araujo Enciso, S. R., T. Fellmann, I. Pérez Dominguez, and F. Santini, 2016: Abolishing biofuel
46 policies: Possible impacts on agricultural price levels, price variability and global food security.

- 1 *Food Policy*, **61**, 9–26, doi:10.1016/J.FOODPOL.2016.01.007.
- 2 Araujo, K. M., 2017: *Low Carbon Energy Transitions*.
- 3 Argyris, C., 1999: *On organizational learning*. 1-4 pp.
- 4 Armeni, C., 2016: Participation in environmental decision-making: Reflecting on planning and
5 community benefits for major wind farms. *J. Environ. Law*, **28**, 415–441,
6 doi:10.1093/jel/eqw021.
- 7 Aronson, J., and S. Alexander, 2013: Ecosystem restoration is now a global priority: Time to roll up
8 our sleeves. *Restor. Ecol.*, **21**, 293–296, doi:10.1111/rec.12011.
- 9 Ashcroft, M., R. Austin, K. Barnes, D. MacDonald, S. Makin, S. Morgan, R. Taylor, and P. Scolley,
10 2016: Expert judgement. *Br. Actuar. J.*, **21**, 314–363, doi:10.1017/S1357321715000239.
- 11 Ashkenazy, A., T. Calvão Chebach, K. Knickel, S. Peter, B. Horowitz, and R. Offenbach, 2017:
12 Operationalising resilience in farms and rural regions – Findings from fourteen case studies. *J.*
13 *Rural Stud.*, doi:10.1016/J.JRURSTUD.2017.07.008.
- 14 Ashley, R. M., D. J. Balmforth, A. J. Saul, and J. D. Blanskby, 2005: Flooding in the future--
15 predicting climate change, risks and responses in urban areas. *Water Sci. Technol.*, **52**, 265–273.
- 16 Asner, G. P., A. J. Elmore, L. P. Olander, R. E. Martin, and A. T. Harris, 2004: Grazing Systems,
17 Ecosystem Responses, and Global Change. *Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour.*, **29**, 261–299,
18 doi:10.1146/annurev.energy.29.062403.102142.
- 19 Assigns, A. A., C. Emissions, S. Clear, A. Trading, F. Cost, and E. Reductions, 1990: Cap and Trade :
20 Acid Rain Program. *Rain.*,
- 21 Astrup, R., R. M. Bright, P. Y. Bernier, H. Genet, and D. A. Lutz, 2018: A sensible climate solution
22 for the boreal forest. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*,
- 23 Awal, M. A., 2013: Social Safety Net , Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation:
24 Examining Their Integration Potential in Bangladesh. *Int. J. Sociol. Study*, **1**, 62–72.
- 25 Awanyo, L., 2009: Exploring the connections: land tenure, social identities, and agrobiodiversity
26 practices in Ghana. *Geogr. Ann. Ser. B, Hum. Geogr.*, **91**, 137–155, doi:10.1111/j.1468-
27 0467.2009.00311.x.
- 28 Ayanlade, A., M. Radeny, and J. Morton, 2017: Comparing smallholder farmers' perception of
29 climate change with meteorological data: A case study from southwestern Nigeria. *Weather*
30 *Clim. Extrem.*, **15**, 24–33.
- 31 Ayers, J., and T. Forsyth, 2009: Community-Based Adaptation to Climate Change - Strengthening
32 Resilience through Development. *Environment*, **51**, 22–31,
33 doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
- 34 —, S. Huq, H. Wright, A. M. Faisal, and S. T. Hussain, 2014: Mainstreaming climate change
35 adaptation into development in Bangladesh. *Clim. Dev.*, **6**, 293–305,
36 doi:10.1080/17565529.2014.977761.
- 37 Bailis, R., R. Drigo, A. Ghilardi, and O. Masera, 2015: The carbon footprint of traditional woodfuels.
38 *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 266–272, doi:10.1038/nclimate2491.
- 39 Baird, J., R. Plummer, C. Haug, and D. Huitema, 2014: Learning effects of interactive decision-
40 making processes for climate change adaptation. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **27**, 51–63,
41 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.04.019.
- 42 Bajželj, B., K. S. Richards, J. M. Allwood, P. Smith, J. S. Dennis, E. Curmi, and C. A. Gilligan,
43 2014a: Importance of food-demand management for climate mitigation. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*,
44 doi:10.1038/nclimate2353.
- 45 —, —, —, —, —, —, and —, 2014b: Importance of food-demand management for
46 climate mitigation. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **4**, 924–929, doi:10.1038/nclimate2353.

- 1 Di Baldassarre, G., M. Kooy, J. S. Kemerink, and L. Brandimarte, 2013: Towards understanding the
2 dynamic behaviour of floodplains as human-water systems. *Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci.*, **17**, 3235–
3 3244, doi:10.5194/hess-17-3235-2013.
- 4 Ballard, H. L., C. G. H. Dixon, and E. M. Harris, 2017: Youth-focused citizen science: Examining the
5 role of environmental science learning and agency for conservation. *Biol. Conserv.*, **208**, 65–75,
6 doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2016.05.024.
- 7 Balshi, M. S., A. D. MCGUIRE, P. DUFFY, M. FLANNIGAN, D. W. KICKLIGHTER, and J.
8 MELILLO, 2009: Vulnerability of carbon storage in North American boreal forests to wildfires
9 during the 21st century. *Glob. Chang. Biol.*, **15**, 1491–1510, doi:10.1111/j.1365-
10 2486.2009.01877.x.
- 11 Bamberg, S., J. Rees, and S. Seebauer, 2015: Collective climate action: Determinants of participation
12 intention in community-based pro-environmental initiatives. *J. Environ. Psychol.*, **43**, 155–165,
13 doi:10.1016/J.JENVP.2015.06.006.
- 14 Banerjee, A., and Coauthors, 2015: A multifaceted program causes lasting progress for the very poor:
15 Evidence from six countries. *Science (80-.)*, **348**, doi:10.1126/science.1260799.
- 16 Banse, M., H. van Meijl, A. Tabeau, G. Woltjer, F. Hellmann, and P. H. Verburg, 2011: Impact of EU
17 biofuel policies on world agricultural production and land use. *Biomass and Bioenergy*,
18 doi:10.1016/j.biombioe.2010.09.001.
- 19 Baranzini, A., J. C. J. M. van den Bergh, S. Carattini, R. B. Howarth, E. Padilla, and J. Roca, 2017:
20 Carbon pricing in climate policy: seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political
21 economy considerations. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **8**, doi:10.1002/wcc.462.
- 22 Barbier, E. B., and A. T. Tesfaw, 2012: Can REDD+ Save the Forest? The Role of Payments and
23 Tenure. *Forests*, **3**, 881–895, doi:10.3390/f3040881.
- 24 Barbier, E. B., and A. T. Tesfaw, 2013: Tenure Constraints and Carbon Forestry in Africa. *Am. J.*
25 *Agric. Econ.*, **95**, 964–975, doi:10.1093/ajae/aat014.
- 26 Barbier, E. B., S. D. Hacker, C. Kennedy, E. W. Koch, A. C. Stier, and B. R. Silliman, 2011: The
27 value of estuarine and coastal ecosystem services. *Ecol. Monogr.*, **81**, 169–193.
- 28 Barnett, J., and W. N. Adger, 2007: Climate change, human security and violent conflict. *Polit.*
29 *Geogr.*, **26**, 639–655, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.03.003.
- 30 —, and S. O'Neill, 2010: Maladaptation. *Global Environmental Change*.
- 31 Barnett, T. P., J. C. Adam, and D. P. Lettenmaier, 2005a: Potential impacts of a warming climate on
32 water availability in snow-dominated regions. *Nature*, **438**, 303–309, doi:10.1038/nature04141.
- 33 —, —, and —, 2005b: Potential impacts of a warming climate on water availability in snow-
34 dominated regions. *Nature*, **438**, 303–309, doi:10.1038/nature04141.
- 35 Barrett, C. B., 2005: Rural poverty dynamics: development policy implications. *Agric. Econ.*, **32**, 45–
36 60, doi:10.1111/j.0169-5150.2004.00013.x.
- 37 Barrientos, A., 2011: Social protection and poverty. *Int. J. Soc. Welf.*, **20**, 240–249,
38 doi:10.1111/j.1468-2397.2011.00783.x.
- 39 Barros, F. S. M., and N. A. Honório, 2015: Deforestation and Malaria on the Amazon Frontier: Larval
40 Clustering of *Anopheles darlingi* (Diptera: Culicidae) Determines Focal Distribution of Malaria.
41 *Am. J. Trop. Med. Hyg.*, **93**, 939–953, doi:10.4269/ajtmh.15-0042.
- 42 Bastos Lima, M. G., and Coauthors, 2017: The Sustainable Development Goals and REDD+:
43 assessing institutional interactions and the pursuit of synergies. *Int. Environ. Agreements Polit.*
44 *Law Econ.*, **17**, 589–606, doi:10.1007/s10784-017-9366-9.
- 45 Baudron, F., and K. E. Giller, 2014: Agriculture and nature: Trouble and strife? *Biol. Conserv.*,
46 doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2013.12.009.

- 1 —, J. A. Andersson, M. Corbeels, and K. E. Giller, 2012: Failing to Yield? Ploughs, Conservation
2 Agriculture and the Problem of Agricultural Intensification: An Example from the Zambezi
3 Valley, Zimbabwe. *J. Dev. Stud.*, doi:10.1080/00220388.2011.587509.
- 4 —, M. Jaleta, O. Okitoi, and A. Tegegn, 2014: Conservation agriculture in African mixed crop-
5 livestock systems: Expanding the niche. *Agric. Ecosyst. Environ.*,
6 doi:10.1016/j.agee.2013.08.020.
- 7 Baulch, B., J. Wood, and A. Weber, 2006: Developing a social protection index for asia. *Dev. Policy*
8 *Rev.*, **24**, 5–29, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.2006.00311.x.
- 9 Baumgart-Getz, A., L. S. Prokopy, and K. Floress, 2012: Why farmers adopt best management
10 practice in the United States: A meta-analysis of the adoption literature. *J. Environ. Manage.*,
11 **96**, 17–25, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2011.10.006.
- 12 Behnke, R., 1994: Natural Resource Management in Pastoral Africa. *Dev. Policy Rev.*, **12**, 5–28,
13 doi:10.1111/j.1467-7679.1994.tb00053.x.
- 14 Belcher, B., M. Ruíz-Pérez, and R. Achdiawan, 2005: Global patterns and trends in the use and
15 management of commercial NTFPs: Implications for livelihoods and conservation. *World Dev.*,
16 **33**, 1435–1452, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.10.007.
- 17 Bellemare, M. F., 2015: Rising food prices, food price volatility, and social unrest. *Am. J. Agric.*
18 *Econ.*, doi:10.1093/ajae/aau038.
- 19 Below, T. B., K. D. Mutabazi, D. Kirschke, C. Franke, S. Sieber, R. Siebert, and K. Tscherning, 2012:
20 Can farmers' adaptation to climate change be explained by socio-economic household-level
21 variables? *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.11.012.
- 22 Béné, C., S. Devereux, and R. Sabates-Wheeler, 2012: *Shocks and social protection in the Horn of*
23 *Africa: analysis from the Productive Safety Net programme in Ethiopia*. 1-120 pp.
- 24 Bennett, J. E., 2013: Institutions and governance of communal rangelands in South Africa. *African J.*
25 *Range Forage Sci.*, **30**, 77–83, doi:10.2989/10220119.2013.776634.
- 26 Benton, T. G., and Coauthors, 2017: Environmental tipping points and food system dynamics: Main
27 Report. 28.
- 28 Berhane, G., 2014: Can Social Protection Work in Africa? The Impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety
29 Net Programme. *Econ. Dev. Cult. Change*, doi:10.1086/677753.
- 30 Berkes, F., 1999: *Sacred Ecology: Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Resource Management*.
31 Taylor and Francis,.
- 32 Bertram, C., G. Luderer, R. C. Pietzcker, E. Schmid, E. Kriegler, and O. Edenhofer, 2015:
33 Complementing carbon prices with technology policies to keep climate targets within reach. *Nat.*
34 *Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 235–239, doi:10.1038/nclimate2514.
- 35 Bertram, M. Y., and Coauthors, 2018: Investing in non-communicable diseases: an estimation of the
36 return on investment for prevention and treatment services. *The Lancet*.
- 37 Betts, R. A., C. D. Jones, J. R. Knight, R. F. Keeling, and J. J. Kennedy, 2016: El Niño and a record
38 CO₂ rise. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 806–810, doi:10.1038/nclimate3063.
- 39 Beuchelt, T. D., and L. Badstue, 2013: Gender, nutrition- and climate-smart food production:
40 Opportunities and trade-offs. *Food Secur.*, **5**, 709–721, doi:10.1007/s12571-013-0290-8.
- 41 Bevir, M., 2012: *Governance: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press, United Kingdom,
42 144 pp.
- 43 Biagini, B., and A. Miller, 2013: Engaging the private sector in adaptation to climate change in
44 developing countries: Importance, status, and challenges. *Clim. Dev.*, **5**, 242–252,
45 doi:10.1080/17565529.2013.821053.
- 46 —, L. Kuhl, K. S. Gallagher, and C. Ortiz, 2014: Technology transfer for adaptation. *Nat. Clim.*

- 1 *Chang.*, **4**, 828–834, doi:10.1038/NCLIMATE2305.
- 2 Biermann, F., 2007: “Earth system governance” as a crosscutting theme of global change research.
3 *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **17**, 326–337, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2006.11.010.
- 4 Biermann, F., and Coauthors, 2012: Science and government. Navigating the anthropocene:
5 improving Earth system governance. *Science*, **335**, 1306–1307, doi:10.1126/science.1217255.
- 6 Biesbroek, G. R., R. J. Swart, T. R. Carter, C. Cowan, T. Henrichs, H. Mela, M. D. Morecroft, and D.
7 Rey, 2010: Europe adapts to climate change: Comparing National Adaptation Strategies. *Glob.*
8 *Environ. Chang.*, **20**, 440–450, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.03.005.
- 9 —, J. E. M. Klostermann, C. J. A. M. Termeer, and P. Kabat, 2013: On the nature of barriers to
10 climate change adaptation. *Reg. Environ. Chang.*, doi:10.1007/s10113-013-0421-y.
- 11 —, C. J. A. M. Termeer, J. E. M. Klostermann, and P. Kabat, 2014: Analytical lenses on barriers in
12 the governance of climate change adaptation. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang.*,
13 doi:10.1007/s11027-013-9457-z.
- 14 Biggs, E. M., and Coauthors, 2015: Sustainable development and the water-energy-food nexus: A
15 perspective on livelihoods. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **54**, 389–397, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.08.002.
- 16 Biggs, H. C., J. K. Clifford-Holmes, S. Freitag, F. J. Venter, and J. Venter, 2017: Cross-scale
17 governance and ecosystem service delivery: A case narrative from the Olifants River in north-
18 eastern South Africa. *Ecosyst. Serv.*, doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2017.03.008.
- 19 Bishop, I. D., C. J. Pettit, F. Sheth, and S. Sharma, 2013: Evaluation of Data Visualisation Options for
20 Land-Use Policy and Decision Making in Response to Climate Change. *Environ. Plan. B Plan.*
21 *Des.*, **40**, 213–233, doi:10.1068/b38159.
- 22 Black, F., and M. Scholes, 1973: Black and Scholes, The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. *J.*
23 *Polit. Econ.*, **81**, 637–654, doi:10.1086/260062.
- 24 Le Blanc, D., 2015: Towards integration at last? The sustainable development goals as a network of
25 targets. *Sustain. Dev.*, **23**, 176–187.
- 26 Blanc, D. Le, C. Freire, and M. Vierro, 2017: Mapping the linkages between oceans and other
27 Sustainable Development Goals : A preliminary exploration. *DESA Work. Pap.*.
- 28 Blue, G., and J. Medlock, 2014: Public Engagement with Climate Change as Scientific Citizenship: A
29 Case Study of World Wide Views on Global Warming. *Sci. Cult. (Lond.)*, **23**, 560–579,
30 doi:10.1080/09505431.2014.917620.
- 31 Bodnar, P., C. Ott, R. Edwards, S. Hoch, E. F. McGlynn, and G. Wagner, 2018: Underwriting 1.5°C:
32 competitive approaches to financing accelerated climate change mitigation. *Clim. Policy*, **18**,
33 368–382, doi:10.1080/14693062.2017.1389687.
- 34 Bogale, A., 2015: Weather-indexed insurance: an elusive or achievable adaptation strategy to climate
35 variability and change for smallholder farmers in Ethiopia. *Clim. Dev.*, **7**, 246–256,
36 doi:10.1080/17565529.2014.934769.
- 37 Boillat, S., and F. Berkes, 2013: Perception and interpretation of climate change among quechua
38 farmers of bolivia: Indigenous knowledge as a resource for adaptive capacity. *Ecol. Soc.*,
39 doi:10.5751/ES-05894-180421.
- 40 Bojovic, D., L. Bonzanigo, C. Giupponi, and A. Maziotis, 2015: Online participation in climate
41 change adaptation: A case study of agricultural adaptation measures in Northern Italy. *J.*
42 *Environ. Manage.*, **157**, 8–19, doi:10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2015.04.001.
- 43 Bommel, P., and Coauthors, 2014: A Further Step Towards Participatory Modelling. Fostering
44 Stakeholder Involvement in Designing Models by Using Executable UML. *J. Artif. Soc. Soc.*
45 *Simul.*, **17**, doi:10.18564/jasss.2381.
- 46 Bonatti, M., and Coauthors, 2016: Climate vulnerability and contrasting climate perceptions as an

- 1 element for the development of community adaptation strategies: Case studies in Southern
2 Brazil. *Land use policy*, doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.06.033.
- 3 Bonney, R., J. L. Shirk, T. B. Phillips, A. Wiggins, H. L. Ballard, A. J. Miller-Rushing, and J. K.
4 Parrish, 2014: Citizen science. Next steps for citizen science. *Science*, **343**, 1436–1437,
5 doi:10.1126/science.1251554.
- 6 Bonsu, N. O., Á. N. Dhubbáin, and D. O’Connor, 2017: Evaluating the use of an integrated forest
7 land-use planning approach in addressing forest ecosystem services conflicting demands:
8 Experience within an Irish forest landscape. *Futures*, **86**, 1–17,
9 doi:10.1016/j.futures.2016.08.004.
- 10 Borrás Jr., S. M., R. Hall, I. Scoones, B. White, and W. Wolford, 2011: Towards a Better
11 Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: an Editorial Introduction. *J. Peasant Stud.*, **38**, 209–
12 216, doi:10.1080/03066150.2011.559005.
- 13 Boserup, E., 1970: *Woman’s role in economic development*. 283 pp.
- 14 Botterill, L. C., and M. J. Hayes, 2012: Drought triggers and declarations: Science and policy
15 considerations for drought risk management. *Nat. Hazards*, **64**, 139–151, doi:10.1007/s11069-
16 012-0231-4.
- 17 Boyd, E., and C. Folke, 2011: *Adapting institutions: Governance, complexity and social–ecological*
18 *resilience*. 1-290 pp.
- 19 —, and —, 2012: Adapting Institutions, Adaptive Governance and Complexity: an introduction.
20 *Adapting Institutions: Governance, complexity and social-ecological resilience*, E. Boyd and C.
21 Folke, Eds., Cambridge UP, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1–8.
- 22 —, B. Nykvist, S. Borgström, and I. A. Stacewicz, 2015: Anticipatory governance for social-
23 ecological resilience. *Ambio*, **44**, 149–161, doi:10.1007/s13280-014-0604-x.
- 24 Boyle, Michelle; Kay, James J.; Pond, B., 2001: MONITORING IN SUPPORT OF POLICY: AN
25 ADAPTIVE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH. *Encyclopedia Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **4**, 116–137.
- 26 Boysen, L. R., W. Lucht, D. Gerten, and V. Heck, 2016: Impacts devalue the potential of large-scale
27 terrestrial CO₂ removal through biomass plantations. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **11**, 095010,
28 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/9/095010.
- 29 Boysen, L. R., W. Lucht, and D. Gerten, 2017a: Trade-offs for food production, nature conservation
30 and climate limit the terrestrial carbon dioxide removal potential. *Glob. Chang. Biol.*, **23**, 4303–
31 4317, doi:10.1111/gcb.13745.
- 32 —, —, —, V. Heck, T. M. Lenton, and H. J. Schellnhuber, 2017b: The limits to global-
33 warming mitigation by terrestrial carbon removal. *Earth’s Futur.*, **5**, 463–474,
34 doi:10.1002/2016EF000469.
- 35 Branca, G., L. Lipper, N. McCarthy, and M. C. Jolejole, 2013: Food security, climate change, and
36 sustainable land management. A review. *Agron. Sustain. Dev.*, **33**, 635–650,
37 doi:10.1007/s13593-013-0133-1.
- 38 Brander, K., and Keith, 2015: Improving the Reliability of Fishery Predictions Under Climate
39 Change. *Curr. Clim. Chang. Reports*, **1**, 40–48, doi:10.1007/s40641-015-0005-7.
- 40 Bratton, M., 2007: Formal versus informal institutions in Africa. *J. Democr.*, **18**, 96–110,
41 doi:10.1353/jod.2007.0041.
- 42 Brechin, S. R., and M. I. Espinoza, 2017: A case for further refinement of the green climate fund’s
43 50:50 ratio climate change mitigation and adaptation allocation framework: Toward a more
44 targeted approach. *Clim. Change*, **142**, 311–320, doi:10.1007/s10584-017-1938-8.
- 45 Breininger, D., B. Duncan, M. Eaton, F. Johnson, and J. Nichols, 2014: Integrating Land Cover
46 Modeling and Adaptive Management to Conserve Endangered Species and Reduce Catastrophic
47 Fire Risk. *Land*, **3**, 874–897, doi:10.3390/land3030874.

- 1 Bresch, D. N., and Coauthors, 2017: Sovereign Climate and Disaster Risk Pooling. *World Bank Tech.*
2 *Contrib. to G20*,.
- 3 Bright, R. M., E. Davin, T. O’Halloran, J. Pongratz, K. Zhao, and A. Cescatti, 2017: Local
4 temperature response to land cover and management change driven by non-radiative processes.
5 *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **7**, doi:10.1038/nclimate3250.
- 6 Brink, E., and Coauthors, 2016: Cascades of green: A review of ecosystem-based adaptation in urban
7 areas. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.11.003.
- 8 Brockhaus, M., H. Djoudi, and B. Locatelli, 2013: Envisioning the future and learning from the past:
9 Adapting to a changing environment in northern Mali. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **25**, 94–106,
10 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2012.08.008.
- 11 Brook, B. W., E. C. Ellis, M. P. Perring, A. W. Mackay, and L. Blomqvist, 2013: Does the terrestrial
12 biosphere have planetary tipping points? *Trends Ecol. Evol.*, **28**, 396–401,
13 doi:10.1016/j.tree.2013.01.016.
- 14 Brown, C., P. Alexander, S. Holzhauer, and M. D. A. Rounsevell, 2017a: Behavioral models of
15 climate change adaptation and mitigation in land-based sectors. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim.*
16 *Chang.*, **8**, e448, doi:10.1002/wcc.448.
- 17 Brown, I., and M. Castellazzi, 2014: Scenario analysis for regional decision-making on sustainable
18 multifunctional land uses. *Reg. Environ. Chang.*, **14**, 1357–1371, doi:10.1007/s10113-013-0579-
19 3.
- 20 Brown, M. E., E. R. Carr, K. L. Grace, K. Wiebe, C. C. Funk, W. Attavanich, P. Backlund, and L.
21 Buja, 2017b: Do markets and trade help or hurt the global food system adapt to climate change?
22 *Food Policy*, doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.02.004.
- 23 Brown, M. L., 2010: Limiting Corrupt Incentives in a Global REDD Regime. *Ecol. Law Q.*, **37**, 237–
24 267, doi:10.15779/Z38HC41.
- 25 Bruce, J. W., and S. E. Migot-Adholla, 1994: Introduction: Are Indigenous African Tenure Systems
26 Insecure? *Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa*, Ohn W Bruce and Shem E Migot-
27 Adholla, Ed., Kendall/Hunt, p. 282.
- 28 de Bruin, K., R. Dellink, S. Agrawala, and R. Dellink, 2009: Economic Aspects of Adaptation to
29 Climate Change: Integrated Assessment Modelling of Adaptation Costs and Benefits. *OECD*
30 *Environ. Work. Pap.*, **22**; 36--38, doi:10.1787/225282538105.
- 31 Bruvoll, A., and B. M. Larsen, 2004: Greenhouse gas emissions in Norway: Do carbon taxes work?
32 *Energy Policy*, **32**, 493–505, doi:10.1016/S0301-4215(03)00151-4.
- 33 Bryngelsson, D., S. Wirsenius, F. Hedenus, and U. Sonesson, 2016: How can the EU climate targets
34 be met? A combined analysis of technological and demand-side changes in food and agriculture.
35 *Food Policy*, doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2015.12.012.
- 36 Burke, M., S. M. Hsiang, and E. Miguel, 2015: Global non-linear effect of temperature on economic
37 production. *Nature*, **527**, 235–239, doi:10.1038/nature15725.
- 38 Burkett, V. R., and Coauthors, 2015: Point of departure. *Climate Change 2014 Impacts, Adaptation*
39 *and Vulnerability: Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects*, 169–194.
- 40 Burton, I., 2009: Climate change and the adaptation deficit. *The Earthscan Reader on Adaptation to*
41 *Climate Change*, E.L.F. Schipper and I. Burton, Eds., Earthscan, London, 89–98.
- 42 Burton, R. J. F., C. Kuczera, and G. Schwarz, 2008: Exploring farmers’ cultural resistance to
43 voluntary agri-environmental schemes. *Sociol. Ruralis*, **48**.
- 44 Busch, J., and A. Mukherjee, 2017: Encouraging State Governments to Protect and Restore Forests
45 Using Ecological Fiscal Transfers: India’s Tax Revenue Distribution Reform. *Conserv. Lett.*, **00**,
46 1–10, doi:10.1111/conl.12416.

- 1 Bustamante, M., and Coauthors, 2014: Co-benefits, trade-offs, barriers and policies for greenhouse
2 gas mitigation in the agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) sector. *Glob. Chang.*
3 *Biol.*, **20**, 3270–3290, doi:10.1111/gcb.12591.
- 4 Cai, W. J., and Coauthors, 2015: *Nature climate change*. Nature Pub. Group, 849-859 pp.
- 5 Caldeira, K., G. Bala, and L. Cao, 2013: The Science of Geoengineering. *Annu. Rev. Earth Planet.*
6 *Sci.*, **41**, 231–256, doi:10.1146/annurev-earth-042711-105548.
- 7 Cameron, C., S. Pachauri, N. D. Rao, D. McCollum, J. Rogelj, and K. Riahi, 2016: Policy trade-offs
8 between climate mitigation and clean cook-stove access in South Asia. *Nat. Energy*, **1**,
9 doi:10.1038/nenergy.2015.10.
- 10 Campbell, L. P., C. Luther, D. Moo-Llanes, J. M. Ramsey, R. Danis-Lozano, and A. T. Peterson,
11 2015: Climate change influences on global distributions of dengue and chikungunya virus
12 vectors. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci.*, **370**, 20140135, doi:10.1098/rstb.2014.0135.
- 13 Campillo, G., Mullan, M., Vallejo, L., 2017: *Climate Change Adaptation and Financial Protection:*
14 *Synthesis of Key Findings from Colombia and Senegal*. Paris,.
- 15 Cane, M. A., 2005: The evolution of El Niño, past and future. *Earth Planet. Sci. Lett.*, **230**, 227–240,
16 doi:10.1016/J.EPSL.2004.12.003.
- 17 Canonico, V., F. Fortunato, R. Sepe, and F. Rengo, 2005: Studi Express ed Exceed: Ricadute cliniche.
18 *Giornale di Gerontologia*, Vol. 53 of, 288–296.
- 19 Carcellar, N., J. C. R. Co, and Z. O. Hipolito, 2011: Addressing disaster risk reduction through
20 community-rooted interventions in the philippines: Experience of the homeless people’s
21 federation of the philippines. *Environ. Urban.*, **23**, 365–381, doi:10.1177/0956247811415581.
- 22 Cardinale, B. J., and Coauthors, 2012: Biodiversity loss and its impact on humanity. *Nature*, **486**, 59–
23 67.
- 24 Carleton, T., S. M. Hsiang, and M. Burke, 2016: THE EUROPEAN PHYSICAL JOURNAL
25 SPECIAL TOPICS Conflict in a changing climate. *Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top.*, **225**, 489–511,
26 doi:10.1140/epjst/e2015-50100-5.
- 27 Caron, J., S. Rausch, and N. Winchester, 2015: Leakage from sub-national climate policy: The case of
28 California’s cap-and-trade program. *Energy J.*, **36**, 167–190, doi:10.5547/01956574.36.2.8.
- 29 Carroll, R., A. Stern, D. Zook, R. Funes, A. Rastegar, and Y. Lien, 2012: *Catalyzing Smallholder*
30 *AGricultural Finance*.
- 31 Carter, J. G., G. Cavan, A. Connelly, S. Guy, J. Handley, and A. Kazmierczak, 2015: Climate change
32 and the city: Building capacity for urban adaptation. *Prog. Plann.*,
33 doi:10.1016/j.progress.2013.08.001.
- 34 Cash, D. W., W. N. Adger, F. Berkes, P. Garden, L. Lebel, P. Olsson, L. Pritchard, and O. Young,
35 2006: Scale and Cross-Scale Dynamics: Governance and Information in a Multilevel World.
36 *Ecol. Soc.*, **11**, art8, doi:10.5751/ES-01759-110208.
- 37 Castella, J.-C., J. Bourgoïn, G. Lestrelin, and B. Bouahom, 2014: A model of the science–practice–
38 policy interface in participatory land-use planning: lessons from Laos. *Landsc. Ecol.*, **29**, 1095–
39 1107, doi:10.1007/s10980-014-0043-x.
- 40 Centeno, M. A., M. Nag, T. S. Patterson, A. Shaver, and A. J. Windawi, 2015: The Emergence of
41 Global Systemic Risk. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.*, doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-073014-112317.
- 42 Chakrabarty, R., and S. Chakraborty, 2018: COP21 and India’s Intended Nationally Determined
43 Contribution Mitigation Strategy. *Pathways to a Sustainable Economy*, Springer International
44 Publishing, Cham, 149–166.
- 45 Challinor, A. J., W. N. Adger, and T. G. Benton, 2017: Climate risks across borders and scales. *Nat.*
46 *Clim. Chang.*, **7**, 621–623, doi:10.1038/nclimate3380.

- 1 Chambwera, M., G. Heal, C. Dubeux, S. Hallegatte, L. Leclerc, A. Markandya, B. A. McCarl, and R.
2 Mechler, 2014a: Economics of adaptation. *Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A:
3 Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report
4 of the IPCC*, 945–977.
- 5 —, —, —, —, —, —, —, and —, 2014b: *Economics of adaptation*.
- 6 Chaney, P., and R. Fevre, 2001: Inclusive governance and “minority” groups: The role of the third
7 sector in Wales. *Voluntas*, **12**, 131–156, doi:10.1023/A:1011286602556.
- 8 Chapron, G., 2017: The environment needs cryptogovernance. *Nature*, **545**, 403–405,
9 doi:10.1038/545403a.
- 10 Chartres, C. J., and A. Noble, 2015: Sustainable intensification: overcoming land and water
11 constraints on food production. *Food Secur.*, doi:10.1007/s12571-015-0425-1.
- 12 Chasek, P., U. Safriel, S. Shikongo, and V. F. Fuhrman, 2015: Operationalizing Zero Net Land
13 Degradation: The next stage in international efforts to combat desertification? *J. Arid Environ.*,
14 **112**, 5–13, doi:10.1016/j.jaridenv.2014.05.020.
- 15 Chevin, L. M., and R. Lande, 2010: When do adaptive plasticity and genetic evolution prevent
16 extinction of a density-regulated population? *Evolution (N. Y.)*, **64**, 1143–1150,
17 doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2009.00875.x.
- 18 —, —, and G. M. Mace, 2010: Adaptation, plasticity, and extinction in a changing environment:
19 Towards a predictive theory. *PLoS Biol.*, **8**, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000357.
- 20 Chhatre, A., and A. Agrawal, 2008: Forest commons and local enforcement. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.
21 S. A.*, **105**, 13286–13291, doi:10.1073/pnas.0803399105.
- 22 Chomba, S., J. Kariuki, J. F. Lund, and F. Sinclair, 2016: Roots of inequity: How the implementation
23 of REDD+ reinforces past injustices. *Land use policy*, **50**, 202–213,
24 doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.09.021.
- 25 Chowdhury, A. R., and N. Kipgen, 2013: Deluge amidst conflict: Hydropower development and
26 displacement in the North-east region of India. *Prog. Dev. Stud.*, **13**, 195–208,
27 doi:10.1177/1464993413486545.
- 28 Christenson, E., M. Elliott, O. Banerjee, L. Hamrick, and J. Bartram, 2014: Climate-related hazards:
29 A method for global assessment of urban and rural population exposure to cyclones, droughts,
30 and floods. *Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health*, **11**, 2169–2192, doi:10.3390/ijerph110202169.
- 31 Chu, E., I. Anguelovski, and J. Carmin, 2015: Inclusive approaches to urban climate adaptation
32 planning and implementation in the Global South. *Clim. Policy*, **3062**, 1–21,
33 doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1019822.
- 34 Clarke, Daniel; Dercon, S., 2016: *Dull Disasters? How Planning Ahead Will Make a Difference*. First.
35 Oxford University Press, Oxford,.
- 36 Clarke, D., and S. Dercon, 2016: *Dull Disasters? How Planning Ahead Will Make a Difference*.
37 Oxford University Press, Oxford,.
- 38 Clarvis, M. H., E. Bohensky, and M. Yarime, 2015: Can resilience thinking inform resilience
39 investments? Learning from resilience principles for disaster risk reduction. *Sustain.*, **7**, 9048–
40 9066, doi:10.3390/su7079048.
- 41 Coenen, F., and F. H. J. M. Coenen, 2009: *Public Participation and Better Environmental Decisions*.
42 183–209 pp.
- 43 Cohen, W. B., Z. Yang, S. V Stehman, T. A. Schroeder, D. M. Bell, J. G. Masek, C. Huang, and G.
44 W. Meigs, 2016: Forest disturbance across the conterminous United States from 1985–2012:
45 The emerging dominance of forest decline. *For. Ecol. Manage.*, **360**, 242–252,
46 doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2015.10.042.

- 1 Collins, R. D., R. de Neufville, J. Claro, T. Oliveira, and A. P. Pacheco, 2013: Forest fire management
2 to avoid unintended consequences: A case study of Portugal using system dynamics. *J. Environ.*
3 *Manage.*, **130**, 1–9, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.08.033.
- 4 Colls, A., N. Ash, and N. Ikkala, 2009: Ecosystem-based Adaptation : A natural response to climate
5 change. *Iucn*, 16.
- 6 Conrad, C. C., and K. G. Hilchey, 2011: A review of citizen science and community-based
7 environmental monitoring: issues and opportunities. *Environ. Monit. Assess.*, **176**, 273–291,
8 doi:10.1007/s10661-010-1582-5.
- 9 Conradt, S., R. Finger, and M. Spörri, 2015: Flexible weather index-based insurance design. *Clim.*
10 *Risk Manag.*, **10**, 106–117, doi:10.1016/j.crm.2015.06.003.
- 11 Conte de Leon, D., A. Q. Stalick, A. A. Jillepalli, M. A. Haney, and F. T. Sheldon, 2017: Blockchain:
12 properties and misconceptions. *Asia Pacific J. Innov. Entrep.*, **11**, 286–300, doi:10.1108/APJIE-
13 12-2017-034.
- 14 Conway, D., and Coauthors, 2015: Climate and southern Africa’s water–energy–food nexus.
15 *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 837.
- 16 Corfee-Morlot, J., L. Kamal-Chaoui, M. Donovan, I. Cochran, A. Robert, and P. Teasdale, 2009:
17 *Cities, Climate Change and Multilevel Governance*. 0-125 pp.
- 18 Corsi, S., L. V. Marchisio, and L. Orsi, 2017: Connecting smallholder farmers to local markets:
19 Drivers of collective action, land tenure and food security in East Chad. *Land use policy*, **68**, 39–
20 47, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2017.07.025.
- 21 Cosens, B., and Coauthors, 2017: The role of law in adaptive governance. *Ecol. Soc.*, **22**,
22 doi:10.5751/ES-08731-220130.
- 23 Costanza, R., R. De Groot, P. Sutton, S. Van Der Ploeg, S. J. Anderson, I. Kubiszewski, S. Farber,
24 and R. K. Turner, 2014: Changes in the global value of ecosystem services. *Glob. Environ.*
25 *Chang.*, **26**, 152–158, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.04.002.
- 26 Costella, C., C. Jaime, J. Arrighi, E. Coughlan de Perez, P. Suarez, and M. van Aalst, 2017: Scalable
27 and Sustainable: How to Build Anticipatory Capacity into Social Protection Systems. *IDS Bull.*,
28 **48**, doi:10.19088/1968-2017.151.
- 29 Couvet, D., and A.-C. Prevot, 2015: Citizen-science programs: Towards transformative biodiversity
30 governance. *Environ. Dev.*, **13**, 39–45, doi:10.1016/J.ENVDEV.2014.11.003.
- 31 Cowie, A. L., and Coauthors, 2011: Towards sustainable land management in the drylands: Scientific
32 connections in monitoring and assessing dryland degradation, climate change and biodiversity.
33 *L. Degrad. Dev.*, **22**, 248–260, doi:10.1002/ldr.1086.
- 34 Cowie, A. L., and Coauthors, 2018: Land in balance: The scientific conceptual framework for Land
35 Degradation Neutrality. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **79**, 25–35, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2017.10.011.
- 36 Craig, R. K., 2010: “Stationary is dead” - long live transformation: five principles for climate change
37 adaptation law. *Harvard Environ. Law Rev.*, **34**, 9–73, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1357766.
- 38 Crichton, D., 2008: Role of insurance in reducing flood risk. *Geneva Pap. Risk Insur. Issues Pract.*,
39 **33**, 117–132, doi:10.1057/palgrave.gpp.2510151.
- 40 Crowder, D. W., and J. P. Reganold, 2015: Financial competitiveness of organic agriculture on a
41 global scale. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, doi:10.1073/pnas.1423674112.
- 42 Cutter, S., B. Osman-Elasha, J. Campbell, S.-M. Cheong, S. McCormick, R. Pulwarty, S. Supratid,
43 and G. Ziervogel, 2012: Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes at the Local Level.
44 *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation:*
45 *Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 291–338.
- 46 Cutz, L., O. Masera, D. Santana, and A. P. C. Faaij, 2017: Switching to efficient technologies in

- 1 traditional biomass intensive countries: The resultant change in emissions. *Energy*, **126**, 513–
2 526, doi:10.1016/J.ENERGY.2017.03.025.
- 3 Dale, V. H., R. A. Efroymson, K. L. Kline, and M. S. Davitt, 2015: A framework for selecting
4 indicators of bioenergy sustainability. *Biofuels, Bioprod. Biorefining*, **9**, 435–446,
5 doi:10.1002/bbb.1562.
- 6 van Dam, J., M. Junginger, and A. P. C. Faaij, 2010: From the global efforts on certification of
7 bioenergy towards an integrated approach based on sustainable land use planning. *Renew.*
8 *Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **14**, 2445–2472, doi:10.1016/J.RSER.2010.07.010.
- 9 Dan, R., 2016: Optimal adaptation to extreme rainfalls in current and future climate. *Water Resour.*
10 *Res.*, **53**, 535–543, doi:10.1002/2016WR019718.
- 11 Daron, J. D., and D. A. Stainforth, 2014: Assessing pricing assumptions for weather index insurance
12 in a changing climate. *Clim. Risk Manag.*, doi:10.1016/j.crm.2014.01.001.
- 13 Dasgupta, P., J. F. Morton, D. Dodman, B. Karapinar, F. Meza, M. G. Rivera-Ferre, A. Toure Sarr,
14 and K. E. Vincent, 2014: Rural Areas. *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and*
15 *Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the*
16 *Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 613–657.
- 17 Davies, M., B. Guenther, J. Leavy, T. Mitchell, and T. Tanner, 2009: *Climate change adaptation,*
18 *disaster risk reduction, and social protection : complementary roles in agriculture and rural*
19 *growth ?* 1-37 pp.
- 20 Davis, K. F., J. A. Gephart, K. A. Emery, A. M. Leach, J. N. Galloway, and P. D'Odorico, 2016:
21 Meeting future food demand with current agricultural resources. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*,
22 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.05.004.
- 23 Dawson, T. P., S. T. Jackson, J. I. House, I. C. Prentice, and G. M. Mace, 2011: Beyond predictions:
24 biodiversity conservation in a changing climate. *Science (80-.)*, **332**, 53–58,
25 doi:10.1126/science.1200303.
- 26 DeClerck, F., 2016: IPBES: Biodiversity central to food security. *Nature*, **531**, 305.
- 27 Dellasala, D. A., J. E. Williams, C. D. Williams, and J. F. Franklin, 2004: Beyond smoke and mirrors:
28 A synthesis of fire policy and science. *Conserv. Biol.*, **18**, 976–986, doi:10.1111/j.1523-
29 1739.2004.00529.x.
- 30 Demetropoulou, L., and Coauthors, 2010: Water framework directive implementation in Greece:
31 Introducing participation in water governance - the Case of the Evrotas River Basin management
32 plan. *Environ. Policy Gov.*, **20**, 336–349, doi:10.1002/eet.553.
- 33 Deng, Z., D. Li, T. Pang, and M. Duan, 2018: Effectiveness of pilot carbon emissions trading systems
34 in China. *Climate Policy*.
- 35 Denton, F., and Coauthors, 2015: Climate-resilient pathways: Adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable
36 development. *Climate Change 2014 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Part A: Global and*
37 *Sectoral Aspects*, 1101–1131.
- 38 Dercon, S., R. V. Hill, D. Clarke, I. Outes-Leon, and A. Seyoum Taffesse, 2014: Offering rainfall
39 insurance to informal insurance groups: Evidence from a field experiment in Ethiopia. *J. Dev.*
40 *Econ.*, **106**, 132–143, doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.09.006.
- 41 Dessai, S., and J. . van der Sluijs, 2007: *Uncertainty and Climate Change Adaptation - a Scoping*
42 *Study*. Utrecht,.
- 43 Devereux, S., 2016: Social protection for enhanced food security in sub-Saharan Africa. *Food Policy*,
44 **60**, 52–62, doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2015.03.009.
- 45 Diaz-Chavez, R. A., 2011: Assessing biofuels: Aiming for sustainable development or complying
46 with the market? *Energy Policy*, **39**, 5763–5769, doi:10.1016/J.ENPOL.2011.03.054.

- 1 Diaz, D., and F. Moore, 2017: Quantifying the economic risks of climate change. *Nat. Publ. Gr.*, **7**,
2 774–782, doi:10.1038/nclimate3411.
- 3 Diaz, R. J., and R. Rosenberg, 2008: Spreading dead zones and consequences for marine ecosystems.
4 *Science (80-.)*, **321**, 926–929.
- 5 Díaz, S., and Coauthors, 2015: The IPBES Conceptual Framework—connecting nature and people.
6 *Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain.*, **14**, 1–16.
- 7 Dittrich, R., A. Wreford, and D. Moran, 2016: A survey of decision-making approaches for climate
8 change adaptation: Are robust methods the way forward? *Ecol. Econ.*, **122**,
9 doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.12.006.
- 10 ———, ———, C. F. E. Topp, V. Eory, and D. Moran, 2017: A guide towards climate change adaptation
11 in the livestock sector: adaptation options and the role of robust decision-making tools for their
12 economic appraisal. *Reg. Environ. Chang.*, **17**, doi:10.1007/s10113-017-1134-4.
- 13 Dixit, A., and R. Pindyck, 1994: Investment Under Uncertainty. *Invest. Under Uncertain.*, 1–17,
14 doi:10.2307/1909571.
- 15 Djoudi, H., and M. Brockhaus, 2011: Is adaptation to climate change gender neutral? Lessons from
16 communities dependent on livestock and forests in northern Mali. *Int. For. Rev.*, **13**, 123–135,
17 doi:10.1505/146554811797406606.
- 18 Djoudi, H., B. Locatelli, C. Vaast, K. Asher, M. Brockhaus, and B. Basnett Sijapati, 2016: Beyond
19 dichotomies: Gender and intersecting inequalities in climate change studies. *Ambio*, **45**, 248–
20 262, doi:10.1007/s13280-016-0825-2.
- 21 Djurfeldt, A. A., E. Hillbom, W. O. Mulwafu, P. Mvula, and G. Djurfeldt, 2018: “The family farms
22 together, the decisions, however are made by the man” —Matrilineal land tenure systems,
23 welfare and decision making in rural Malawi. *Land use policy*, **70**, 601–610,
24 doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2017.10.048.
- 25 Dooley, K., and A. Gupta, 2017: Governing by expertise: the contested politics of (accounting for)
26 land-based mitigation in a new climate agreement. *Int. Environ. Agreements Polit. Law Econ.*,
27 **17**, 483–500, doi:10.1007/s10784-016-9331-z.
- 28 Dougill, A. J., E. D. G. Fraser, and M. S. Reed, 2011: Anticipating Vulnerability to Climate Change
29 in Dryland Pastoral Systems : Using Dynamic Systems Models for the Kalahari. *Ecol. Soc.*, **15**,
30 doi:10.2307/26268132.
- 31 Douglas, I., K. Alam, M. Maghenda, Y. McDonnell, L. Mclean, and J. Campbell, 2008: Unjust waters:
32 climate change, flooding and the urban poor in Africa. *Environ. Urban.*, **20**, 187–205,
33 doi:10.1177/0956247808089156.
- 34 Dow, K., F. Berkhout, and B. L. Preston, 2013a: Limits to adaptation to climate change: A risk
35 approach. *Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain.*, doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2013.07.005.
- 36 ———, ———, ———, R. J. T. Klein, G. Midgley, and M. R. Shaw, 2013b: Limits to adaptation. *Nat.*
37 *Clim. Chang.*, doi:10.1038/nclimate1847.
- 38 Downing, T. ., 2012: Views of the frontiers in climate change adaptation economics. *Wiley*
39 *Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **3**, 161–170, doi:10.1002/wcc.157.
- 40 Dryzek, J. S., and J. Pickering, 2017: Deliberation as a catalyst for reflexive environmental
41 governance. *Ecol. Econ.*, **131**, 353–360, doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.09.011.
- 42 Duguma, L. A., P. A. Minang, and M. van Noordwijk, 2014: Climate Change Mitigation and
43 Adaptation in the Land Use Sector: From Complementarity to Synergy. *Environ. Manage.*, **54**,
44 420–432, doi:10.1007/s00267-014-0331-x.
- 45 Durigan, G., and J. A. Ratter, 2016: The need for a consistent fire policy for Cerrado conservation. *J.*
46 *Appl. Ecol.*, **53**, 11–15, doi:10.1111/1365-2664.12559.

- 1 Duveiller, G., J. Hooker, and A. Cescatti, 2018: The mark of vegetation change on Earth's surface
2 energy balance. *Nat. Commun.*, **9**, 679, doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02810-8.
- 3 Eakin, H. C., Cognitive and institutional influences on farmers' adaptive capacity: insights into
4 barriers and opportunities for transformative change in central Arizona.
- 5 Easdale, M. H., 2016: Zero net livelihood degradation-the quest for a multidimensional protocol to
6 combat desertification. *SOIL*, **2**, 129–134, doi:10.5194/soil-2-129-2016.
- 7 Easterly, W., 2008: Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up? *Am. Econ. Rev.*, **98**, 95–99,
8 doi:10.1257/aer.98.2.95.
- 9 Edquist, C., 2005: Systems of innovation. *Oxford Handb. Innov.*, 181–208.
- 10 Eisenack, K., S. C. Moser, E. Hoffmann, R. J. T. Klein, C. Oberlack, A. Pechan, M. Rotter, and C. J.
11 A. M. Termeer, 2014: Explaining and overcoming barriers to climate change adaptation. *Nat.*
12 *Clim. Chang.*, **4**, 867–872, doi:10.1038/nclimate2350.
- 13 Eldridge, D. J., M. A. Bowker, F. T. Maestre, E. Roger, J. F. Reynolds, and W. G. Whitford, 2011:
14 Impacts of shrub encroachment on ecosystem structure and functioning: towards a global
15 synthesis. *Ecol. Lett.*, **14**, 709–722, doi:10.1111/j.1461-0248.2011.01630.x.
- 16 Ellis, F., S. Devereux, and P. White, 2009: Social Protection in Africa. *Enterp. Dev. Microfinance*, **20**,
17 158–160, doi:10.3362/1755-1986.2009.015.
- 18 Elmqvist, T., C. Folke, M. Nyström, G. Peterson, J. Bengtsson, B. Walker, and J. Norberg, 2003:
19 Response diversity, ecosystem change, and resilience. *Front. Ecol. Environ.*, **1**, 488–494,
20 doi:10.1890/1540-9295(2003)001[0488:rdecar]2.0.co;2.
- 21 Endres, J., R. Diaz-Chavez, S. R. Kaffka, L. Pelkmans, J. E. A. Seabra, and A. Walter, 2015:
22 Sustainability Certification. *Bioenergy & Sustainability: Bridging the gaps*, L. Souza, G. M.,
23 Victoria, R., Joly, C., Verdade, Ed., SCOPE, Paris.
- 24 Engel, S., and A. Muller, 2016: Payments for environmental services to promote “climate-smart
25 agriculture”? Potential and challenges. *Agric. Econ.*, **47**, 173–184, doi:10.1111/agec.12307.
- 26 Ensor, J., and B. Harvey, 2015: Social learning and climate change adaptation: evidence for
27 international development practice. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 509–522,
28 doi:10.1002/wcc.348.
- 29 Eppink, F., L. Brander, and A. Wagtendonk, 2014: An Initial Assessment of the Economic Value of
30 Coastal and Freshwater Wetlands in West Asia. *Land*, **3**, 557–573, doi:10.3390/land3030557.
- 31 Erb, K.-H., C. Lauk, T. Kastner, A. Mayer, M. C. Theurl, and H. Haberl, 2016: Exploring the
32 biophysical option space for feeding the world without deforestation. *Nat. Commun.*, **7**, 11382,
33 doi:10.1038/ncomms11382.
- 34 ———, and Coauthors, 2017: Land management: data availability and process understanding for global
35 change studies. *Glob. Chang. Biol.*, **23**, 512–533, doi:10.1111/gcb.13443.
- 36 Eriksen, S., and Coauthors, 2011: When not every response to climate change is a good one:
37 Identifying principles for sustainable adaptation. *Clim. Dev.*, **3**, 7–20,
38 doi:10.3763/cdev.2010.0060.
- 39 Esquivel, V., and C. Sweetman, 2016: Gender and the Sustainable Development Goals. *Gend. Dev.*,
40 **24**, 1–8, doi:10.1080/13552074.2016.1153318.
- 41 Estrin, D., 2016: *LIMITING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE THE CRITICAL ROLE OF*
42 *CITIZEN SUITS AND DOMESTIC COURTS — DESPITE THE PARIS AGREEMENT*. 36 pp.
- 43 ———, and S. V. Tan, 2016a: Thinking Outside the Boat about Climate Change Loss and Damage.
- 44 ———, and ———, 2016b: Thinking Outside the Boat about Climate Change Loss and Damage.
- 45 Estrin, S., and M. Prevezer, 2011: The role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil,

- 1 Russia, India, and China compared. *Asia Pacific J. Manag.*, **28**, 41–67, doi:10.1007/s10490-010-
2 9229-1.
- 3 Fadairo, O. S., R. Calland, Y. Mulugetta, and J. Olawoye, 2017: A Corruption Risk Assessment for
4 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Nigeria. *Int. J. Clim. Chang.*
5 *Impacts Responses*, **10**, 1–21, doi:10.18848/1835-7156/CGP/v10i01/1-21.
- 6 Fan, X., C. Fei, and B. McCarl, 2017: Adaptation: An Agricultural Challenge. *Climate*,
7 doi:10.3390/cli5030056.
- 8 Fankhauser, S., 2017: Adaptation to Climate Change.
- 9 FAO, 2010: *Climate-Smart Agriculture: Policies, Practices and Financing for Food Security,*
10 *Adaptation and Mitigation*. Rome,.
- 11 —, 2011: *State of Food and Agriculture 2010-2011*. 147 pp.
- 12 —, 2017: FAO Cereal Supply and Demand Brief | FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization of the
13 United Nations. *Fao*, 1.
- 14 Faria, W. R., and A. N. Almeida, 2016: Relationship between openness to trade and deforestation:
15 Empirical evidence from the Brazilian Amazon. *Ecol. Econ.*,
16 doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.11.014.
- 17 Farley, K. A., E. G. Jobbagy, and R. B. Jackson, 2005: Effects of afforestation on water yield: a
18 global synthesis with implications for policy. *Glob. Chang. Biol.*, **11**, 1565–1576,
19 doi:10.1111/j.1365-2486.2005.01011.x.
- 20 Field, C. B., and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change., 2012: *Managing the risks of extreme*
21 *events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation: special report of the*
22 *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge University Press, 582 pp.
- 23 Filatova, T., 2014: Market-based instruments for flood risk management: A review of theory, practice
24 and perspectives for climate adaptation policy. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **37**, 227–242,
25 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2013.09.005.
- 26 Findell, K. L., A. Berg, P. Gentine, J. P. Krasting, B. R. Lintner, S. Malyshev, J. A. Santanello, and E.
27 Shevliakova, 2017: The impact of anthropogenic land use and land cover change on regional
28 climate extremes. *Nat. Commun.*, **8**, 989, doi:10.1038/s41467-017-01038-w.
- 29 Fischer, C., and R. G. Newell, 2008: Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation. *J.*
30 *Environ. Econ. Manage.*, **55**, 142–162, doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2007.11.001.
- 31 Fischhoff, B., S. R. Watson, and C. Hope, 1984: Defining risk. *Policy Sci.*, **17**, 123–139,
32 doi:10.1007/BF00146924.
- 33 Fiszbein, A., R. Kanbur, and R. Yemtsov, 2014: Social protection and poverty reduction: Global
34 patterns and some targets. *World Dev.*, **61**, 167–177, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.04.010.
- 35 Fitzpatrick, M. J., and A. H. Edelsparre, 2018: The genomics of climate change. *Science (80-.)*, **359**,
36 29–30, doi:10.1126/science.aar3920.
- 37 Fleskens, Luuk, Stringer, L. ., 2014: Land management and policy responses to mitigate
38 desertification and land degradation. *L. Degrad. Dev.*, **25**, 1–4, doi:10.1002/ldr.2272.
- 39 Fleskens, L., D. Nainggolan, and L. C. Stringer, 2014: An Exploration of Scenarios to Support
40 Sustainable Land Management Using Integrated Environmental Socio-economic Models.
41 *Environ. Manage.*, **54**, 1005–1021, doi:10.1007/s00267-013-0202-x.
- 42 Fleurbaey, M., and Coauthors, 2014: Sustainable Development and Equity. *Climate Change 2014:*
43 *Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment*
44 *Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 283–350.
- 45 Folke, C., S. R. Carpenter, B. Walker, M. Scheffer, T. Chapin, and J. Rockström, 2010: Resilience
46 thinking: Integrating resilience, adaptability and transformability. *Ecol. Soc.*, **15**,

- 1 doi:10.5751/ES-03610-150420.
- 2 Fontaine, J. J., 2011: Improving our legacy: Incorporation of adaptive management into state wildlife
3 action plans. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **92**, 1403–1408, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.10.015.
- 4 Ford, J. D., and C. Goldhar, 2012: Climate change vulnerability and adaptation in resource dependent
5 communities: A case study from West Greenland. *Clim. Res.*, **54**, 181–196,
6 doi:10.3354/cr01118.
- 7 Ford, J. D., and L. Berrang-Ford, 2016: The 4Cs of adaptation tracking: consistency, comparability,
8 comprehensiveness, coherency. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang.*, **21**, 839–859,
9 doi:10.1007/s11027-014-9627-7.
- 10 Forsyth, T., 2013: Community-based adaptation: a review of past and future challenges. *Wiley*
11 *Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **4**, 439–446, doi:10.1002/wcc.231.
- 12 Foudi, S., and K. Erdlenbruch, 2012: The role of irrigation in farmers' risk management strategies in
13 France. *Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ.*, **39**, 439–457.
- 14 Foxon, T. J., M. S. Reed, and L. C. Stringer, 2009: Governing Long-Term Social – Ecological
15 Change : What Can the Adaptive Management and Transition Management Approaches Learn
16 from Each Other ? *Change*, **20**, 3–20, doi:10.1002/eet.
- 17 Fraser, E. D. G., W. Mabee, and F. Figge, 2005: A framework for assessing the vulnerability of food
18 systems to future shocks. *Futures*, **37**, 465–479, doi:10.1016/J.FUTURES.2004.10.011.
- 19 Fraser, E. D. G., A. J. Dougill, K. Hubacek, C. H. Quinn, J. Sendzimir, and M. Termansen, 2011:
20 Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change in Dryland Livelihood Systems: Conceptual
21 Challenges and Interdisciplinary Solutions. *Ecol. Soc.*, **16**, art3, doi:10.5751/ES-03402-160303.
- 22 French, S., 2015: Cynefin: Uncertainty, small worlds and scenarios. *J. Oper. Res. Soc.*, **66**, 1635–
23 1645, doi:10.1057/jors.2015.21.
- 24 Fridahl, M., and B. O. Linnér, 2016: Perspectives on the Green Climate Fund: possible compromises
25 on capitalization and balanced allocation. *Clim. Dev.*, **8**, 105–109,
26 doi:10.1080/17565529.2015.1040368.
- 27 Frumkin, H., 2002: Urban Sprawl and Public Health. *Public Health Rep.*, **117**, 201–217,
28 doi:10.1093/phr/117.3.201.
- 29 Fu, X., M. Svoboda, Z. Tang, Z. Dai, and J. Wu, 2013: An overview of US state drought plans: Crisis
30 or risk management? *Nat. Hazards*, **69**, 1607–1627, doi:10.1007/s11069-013-0766-z.
- 31 Fujimori, S., and Coauthors, 2016: Will international emissions trading help achieve the objectives of
32 the Paris Agreement? *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **11**, 104001, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/10/104001.
- 33 Fuso Nerini, F., C. Ray, and Y. Boulkaid, 2017: The cost of cooking a meal. The case of Nyeri
34 County, Kenya. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **12**, 065007, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa6fd0.
- 35 —, and Coauthors, 2018: Mapping synergies and trade-offs between energy and the Sustainable
36 Development Goals. *Nat. Energy*, **3**, 10–15, doi:10.1038/s41560-017-0036-5.
- 37 Fuss, S., and Coauthors, 2014: Betting on negative emissions. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **4**, 850–853,
38 doi:10.1038/nclimate2392.
- 39 van der Gaast, W., R. Sikkema, and M. Vohrer, 2018: The contribution of forest carbon credit projects
40 to addressing the climate change challenge. *Clim. Policy*, **18**, 42–48,
41 doi:10.1080/14693062.2016.1242056.
- 42 Galy, V., C. France-Lanord, O. Beyssac, P. Faure, H. Kudrass, and F. Palhol, 2007: Efficient organic
43 carbon burial in the Bengal fan sustained by the Himalayan erosional system. *Nature*, **450**, 407–
44 410.
- 45 Gan, J., A. Jarrett, and C. J. Gaither, 2014: Wildfire risk adaptation: propensity of forestland owners
46 to purchase wildfire insurance in the southern United States. *Can. J. For. Res.*, **44**, 1376–1382,

- 1 doi:10.1139/cjfr-2014-0301.
- 2 Garcia-Menendez, F., E. Monier, and N. E. Selin, 2017: The role of natural variability in projections
3 of climate change impacts on U.S. ozone pollution. *Geophys. Res. Lett.*, **44**, 2911–2921,
4 doi:10.1002/2016GL071565.
- 5 Garrido, A., and A. Gómez-Ramos, 2009: Risk management instruments supporting drought planning
6 and policy. *Advances in Natural and Technological Hazards Research*, Vol. 26 of, 133–151.
- 7 Gatteschi, V., F. Lamberti, C. Demartini, C. Pranteda, and V. Santamaría, 2018: Blockchain and
8 Smart Contracts for Insurance: Is the Technology Mature Enough? *Futur. Internet*, **10**, 20,
9 doi:10.3390/fi10020020.
- 10 GCF (Green Climate Fund), 2017: *Report of the fifteenth meeting of the Board , 13-15 December*
11 2016. 13-15 pp.
- 12 Geddes, A., W. Neil Adger, N. W. Arnell, R. Black, and D. S. G. Thomas, 2012: Migration,
13 environmental change, and the “challenges of governance.” *Environ. Plan. C Gov. Policy*, **30**,
14 951–967, doi:10.1068/c3006ed.
- 15 Geddes, A., T. S. Schmidt, and B. Steffen, 2018: The multiple roles of state investment banks in low-
16 carbon energy finance: An analysis of Australia, the UK and Germany. *Energy Policy*, **115**,
17 158–170, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2018.01.009.
- 18 German, L., and G. Schoneveld, 2012: A review of social sustainability considerations among EU-
19 approved voluntary schemes for biofuels, with implications for rural livelihoods. *Energy Policy*,
20 **51**, 765–778, doi:10.1016/J.ENPOL.2012.09.022.
- 21 Gersonius, B., R. Ashley, A. Pathirana, and C. Zevenbergen, 2013: Climate change uncertainty:
22 building flexibility into water and flood risk infrastructure. *Clim. Change*, **116**, 411–423.
- 23 Ghosh, S., H. Vittal, T. Sharma, S. Karmakar, K. S. Kasiviswanathan, Y. Dhanesh, K. P. Sudheer, and
24 S. S. Gunthe, 2016: Indian Summer Monsoon Rainfall: Implications of Contrasting Trends in the
25 Spatial Variability of Means and Extremes. *PLoS One*, **11**, e0158670,
26 doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0158670.
- 27 Giovannetti, G., A. De Haan, R. Sabates-Wheeler, and M. Sanfilippo, 2011: Successes in social
28 protection: What lessons can be learned? *Can. J. Dev. Stud.*, **32**, 439–453,
29 doi:10.1080/02255189.2011.647446.
- 30 Glachant, M., and A. Dechezleprêtre, 2017: What role for climate negotiations on technology
31 transfer? *Clim. Policy*, **17**, 962–981, doi:10.1080/14693062.2016.1222257.
- 32 Glauben, T., T. Herzfeld, S. Rozelle, and X. Wang, 2012: Persistent Poverty in Rural China: Where,
33 Why, and How to Escape? *World Dev.*, **40**, 784–795,
34 doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.023.
- 35 Global Food Security Programme, 2013: The importance of soil for ensuring food security. *Insight*,.
- 36 Goh, A. H. X., 2012: A Literature Review of the Gender-differentiated Impacts of Climate Change
37 On Women’s and Men’s Assets and Well-being in Developing Countries. *Int. Food Policy Res.*
38 *Inst.*, **CAPRI Work**, doi:10.2499/CAPRIWP106.
- 39 Gordard, R., M. J. Colloff, R. M. Wise, D. Ware, and M. Dunlop, 2016: Values, rules and
40 knowledge: Adaptation as change in the decision context. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **57**, 60–69,
41 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.12.004.
- 42 Govindan, K., K. Madan Shankar, and D. Kannan, 2015: Sustainable material selection for
43 construction industry - A hybrid multi criteria decision making approach. *Renewable and*
44 *Sustainable Energy Reviews*.
- 45 Graham, L. J., R. H. Haines-Young, and R. Field, 2015: Using citizen science data for conservation
46 planning: Methods for quality control and downscaling for use in stochastic patch occupancy
47 modelling. *Biol. Conserv.*, **192**, 65–73, doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2015.09.002.

- 1 Grainger, A., 2015: Is Land Degradation Neutrality feasible in dry areas? *J. Arid Environ.*, **112**, 14–
2 24, doi:10.1016/j.jaridenv.2014.05.014.
- 3 Grainger, T. N., and B. Gilbert, 2017: Multi-scale responses to warming in an experimental insect
4 metacommunity. *Glob. Chang. Biol.*, **23**, 5151–5163, doi:10.1111/gcb.13777.
- 5 Gray, S., and Coauthors, 2017: Combining participatory modelling and citizen science to support
6 volunteer conservation action. *Biol. Conserv.*, **208**, 76–86, doi:10.1016/J.BIOCON.2016.07.037.
- 7 Greatrex, H., and Coauthors, 2015: Scaling up index insurance for smallholder farmers: Recent
8 evidence and insights. *CCAFS Rep.*, **14**, 1–32, doi:1904-9005.
- 9 Green, D., and G. Raygorodetsky, 2010: Indigenous knowledge of a changing climate. *Clim. Change*,
10 **100**, 239–242.
- 11 Green, T. L., J. Kronenberg, E. Andersson, T. Elmqvist, and E. Gómez-Baggethun, 2016: Insurance
12 Value of Green Infrastructure in and Around Cities. *Ecosystems*, **19**, 1051–1063,
13 doi:10.1007/s10021-016-9986-x.
- 14 Di Gregorio, M., and Coauthors, 2017: Climate policy integration in the land use sector: Mitigation,
15 adaptation and sustainable development linkages. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **67**, 35–43,
16 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2016.11.004.
- 17 Greiner, R., and D. Gregg, 2011: Farmers’ intrinsic motivations, barriers to the adoption of
18 conservation practices and effectiveness of policy instruments: Empirical evidence from northern
19 Australia. *Land use policy*, **28**, 257–265.
- 20 Griggs, D., and Coauthors, 2013a: Policy: Sustainable development goals for people and planet.
21 *Nature*, **495**, 305–307, doi:10.1038/495305a.
- 22 ———, and Coauthors, 2013b: Sustainable development goals for people and planet. *Nature*, **495**, 305.
- 23 ———, and Coauthors, 2014: An integrated framework for sustainable development goals. *Ecol. Soc.*,
24 **19**, art49-art49, doi:10.5751/ES-07082-190449.
- 25 Griscom, B. W., and Coauthors, 2017: Natural climate solutions. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, **114**,
26 11645–11650, doi:10.1073/pnas.1710465114.
- 27 Grumbine, R. E., J. Dore, and J. Xu, 2012: Mekong hydropower: Drivers of change and governance
28 challenges. *Front. Ecol. Environ.*, **10**, 91–98, doi:10.1890/110146.
- 29 Grundmann, R., 2016: Climate change as a wicked social problem. *Nat. Geosci.*, **9**, 562–563,
30 doi:10.1038/ngeo2780.
- 31 Grzymala-Busse, A., 2010: The best laid plans: The impact of informal rules on formal institutions in
32 transitional regimes. *Stud. Comp. Int. Dev.*, **45**, 311–333, doi:10.1007/s12116-010-9071-y.
- 33 Guerry, A. D., and Coauthors, 2015: Natural capital and ecosystem services informing decisions:
34 From promise to practice. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, **112**, 7348–7355.
- 35 Gunderson, L. H., and C. . Holling, 2001: Panarchy: Understanding transformations. *Hum. Nat. Syst.*,
36 507.
- 37 Gupta, J., van der Grijp, N., Kuik, O., 2013: *Climate Change, Forests, and REDD Lessons for*
38 *Institutional Design*.
- 39 Gupta, J., 2014: *The History of Global Climate Governance*. 1-244 pp.
- 40 ———, C. Termeer, J. Klostermann, S. Meijerink, M. van den Brink, P. Jong, S. Nooteboom, and E.
41 Bergsma, 2010: The Adaptive Capacity Wheel: A method to assess the inherent characteristics
42 of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **13**, 459–471,
43 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2010.05.006.
- 44 ———, C. Pahl-Wostl, and R. Zondervan, 2013: “Glocal” water governance: a multi-level challenge in
45 the anthropocene. *Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain.*, **5**, 573–580, doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2013.09.003.

- 1 Haasnoot, M., J. H. Kwakkel, W. E. Walker, and J. ter Maat, 2013: Dynamic adaptive policy
2 pathways: A method for crafting robust decisions for a deeply uncertain world. *Glob. Environ.*
3 *Chang.*, **23**, 485–498, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.12.006.
- 4 Hadarits, M., J. Pittman, D. Corkal, H. Hill, K. Bruce, and A. Howard, 2017: The interplay between
5 incremental, transitional, and transformational adaptation: a case study of Canadian agriculture.
6 *Reg. Environ. Chang.*, **17**, 1515–1525.
- 7 Hallegatte, S., 2009: Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **19**, 240–247.
8 ———, and J. Rentschler, 2015: Risk management for development—assessing obstacles and prioritizing
9 action. *Risk Anal.*, **35**, 193–210, doi:10.1111/risa.12269.
- 10 Hallegatte, S., A. Shah, R. J. Lempert, C. Brown, and S. Gill, 2012: *Investment decision making under*
11 *deep uncertainty—application to climate change*. W. Bank, Ed. Washington,.
- 12 Hallegatte, S., A. Vogt-Schilb, M. Bangalore, and J. Rozenberg, 2017: *Unbreakable: Building the*
13 *Resilience of the Poor in the Face of Natural Disasters*. Washington, DC,.
- 14 Hamududu, B., and A. Killingtveit, 2012: Assessing climate change impacts on global hydropower.
15 *Energies*, **5**, 305–322, doi:10.3390/en5020305.
- 16 Hanasaki, N., T. Inuzuka, S. Kanae, and T. Oki, 2010: An estimation of global virtual water flow and
17 sources of water withdrawal for major crops and livestock products using a global hydrological
18 model. *J. Hydrol.*, **384**, 232–244.
- 19 Hanger, S., C. Haug, T. Lung, and L. M. Bouwer, 2015: Mainstreaming climate change in regional
20 development policy in Europe: five insights from the 2007–2013 programming period. *Reg.*
21 *Environ. Chang.*, **15**, 973–985, doi:10.1007/s10113-013-0549-9.
- 22 Härdle, W. K., and B. L. Cabrera, 2010: Calibrating CAT bonds for Mexican earthquakes. *J. Risk*
23 *Insur.*, **77**, 625–650, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2010.01355.x.
- 24 Harootunian, G., 2018: CALIFORNIA: IT'S COMPLICATED: DROUGHT, DRINKING WATER,
25 AND DRYLANDS. *Resilience: The Science of Adaptation to Climate Change*, K. Alverson and
26 Z. Zommers, Eds., Elsevier, London.
- 27 Harris, E., 2013: Financing social protection floors: Considerations of fiscal space. *Int. Soc. Secur.*
28 *Rev.*, **66**, 111–143, doi:10.1111/issr.12021.
- 29 Harvey, B., J. Ensor, L. Carlile, B. Garside, and Z. Patterson, 2012: Climate change communication
30 and social learning—Review and strategy development for CCAFS.
- 31 Harvey, C. A., and Coauthors, 2014: Climate-Smart Landscapes: Opportunities and Challenges for
32 Integrating Adaptation and Mitigation in Tropical Agriculture. *Conserv. Lett.*, **7**, 77–90,
33 doi:10.1111/conl.12066.
- 34 Haselip, J., U. E. Hansen, D. Puig, S. Trærup, and S. Dhar, 2015: Governance, enabling frameworks
35 and policies for the transfer and diffusion of low carbon and climate adaptation technologies in
36 developing countries. *Clim. Change*, **131**, 363–370, doi:10.1007/s10584-015-1440-0.
- 37 Hashemi, S.M. and de Montesquiou, A., 2011: Reaching the Poorest: Lessons from the Graduation
38 Model. *Focus Note 69*,.
- 39 Häyhä, T., and P. P. Franzese, 2014: Ecosystem services assessment: A review under an ecological-
40 economic and systems perspective. *Ecol. Modell.*, **289**, 124–132.
- 41 Head, B. W., 2014: Evidence, uncertainty, and wicked problems in climate change decision making in
42 Australia. *Environ. Plan. C Gov. Policy*, **32**, 663–679, doi:10.1068/c1240.
- 43 Headey, D., J. Hoddinott, and S. Park, 2017: Accounting for nutritional changes in six success stories:
44 A regression-decomposition approach. *Glob. Food Sec.*, **13**, 12–20,
45 doi:10.1016/j.gfs.2017.02.003.
- 46 Heal, G., and A. Millner, 2014: Uncertainty and decision making in climate change economics. *Rev.*

- 1 *Environ. Econ. Policy*, **8**, 120–137, doi:10.1093/reep/ret023.
- 2 Helmke, G., and S. Levitsky, 2004: Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research
3 Agenda. *Perspect. Polit.*, **2**, 725–740, doi:10.1017/S1537592704040472.
- 4 Hendrix, C. S., and S. M. Glaser, 2007: Trends and triggers: Climate, climate change and civil
5 conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Polit. Geogr.*, **26**, 695–715, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.06.006.
- 6 Hendrix, C. S., and I. Salehyan, 2012: Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa. *J. Peace*
7 *Res.*, **49**, 35–50, doi:10.1177/0022343311426165.
- 8 Herendeen, N., and N. Glazier, 2009: Agricultural best management practices for Conesus Lake: The
9 role of extension and soil/water conservation districts. *J. Great Lakes Res.*, **35**, 15–22,
10 doi:10.1016/j.jglr.2008.08.005.
- 11 Hermann, A., Koferl, P., Mairhofer, J. P., 2016: *Climate Risk Insurance: New Approaches and*
12 *Schemes*.
- 13 Hewitt, K., I. R. Jahn, L. Guadagno, E. Gandia, V. Bonnefoy, and K. Hewitt, 2017: Identifying
14 Emerging Issues in Disaster Risk Reduction, Migration, Climate Change and Sustainable
15 Development. *Identifying Emerg. Issues Disaster Risk Reduction, Migr. Clim. Chang. Sustain.*
16 *Dev.*, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-33880-4.
- 17 Hewitt, R., H. van Delden, and F. Escobar, 2014: Participatory land use modelling, pathways to an
18 integrated approach. *Environ. Model. Softw.*, **52**, 149–165,
19 doi:10.1016/J.ENVSOF.2013.10.019.
- 20 Higgins, S. A., I. Overeem, K. G. Rogers, and E. A. Kalina, 2018: River linking in India: Downstream
21 impacts on water discharge and suspended sediment transport to deltas. *Elem Sci Anth*, **6**, 20,
22 doi:10.1525/elementa.269.
- 23 Himanen, S. J., P. Rikkinen, and H. Kahiluoto, 2016: Codesigning a resilient food system. *Ecol. Soc.*,
24 **21**, doi:10.5751/ES-08878-210441.
- 25 Hirsch, A. L., and Coauthors, 2018: Biogeophysical Impacts of Land-Use Change on Climate
26 Extremes in Low-Emission Scenarios: Results From HAPPI-Land. *Earth's Futur.*, **6**,
27 doi:10.1002/2017EF000744.
- 28 Hisschemoller, M., and J. Gupta, 1999: Problem-Solving through International Environmental
29 Agreements: The Issue of Regime Effectiveness. *Int. Polit. Sci. Rev.*, **20**, 151–174,
30 doi:10.1177/0192512199202003.
- 31 Hoch, 2017: Underwriting 1.5°C: Competitive Approaches to Financing Accelerated Climate
32 Mitigation. *Clim. Policy*,.
- 33 Hodbod, J., and H. Eakin, 2015: Adapting a social-ecological resilience framework for food systems.
34 *J. Environ. Stud. Sci.*, **5**, 474–484.
- 35 Hoeninghaus, D. J., A. A. Agostinho, L. C. Gomes, F. M. Pelicice, E. K. Okada, J. D. Latini, E. A. L.
36 Kashiwaqui, and K. O. Winemiller, 2009: Effects of river impoundment on ecosystem services
37 of large tropical rivers: Embodied energy and market value of artisanal fisheries. *Conserv. Biol.*,
38 **23**, 1222–1231, doi:10.1111/j.1523-1739.2009.01248.x.
- 39 Hoff, H., 2011: Understanding the Nexus. *Backgr. Pap. Bonn2011 Conf. Water, Energy Food Secur.*
40 *Nexus*, 1–52.
- 41 Hoffmann, I., 2010: Climate change and the characterization, breeding and conservation of animal
42 genetic resources. *Anim. Genet.*, **41**, 32–46, doi:10.1111/j.1365-2052.2010.02043.x.
- 43 Höhne, N., and Coauthors, 2017: The Paris Agreement: resolving the inconsistency between global
44 goals and national contributions. *Clim. Policy*, **17**, 16–32, doi:10.1080/14693062.2016.1218320.
- 45 Holden, E., K. Linnerud, and D. Banister, 2017: The Imperatives of Sustainable Development.
46 *Sustain. Dev.*, **25**, 213–226, doi:10.1002/sd.1647.

- 1 Holling, C. S., 1978: Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. *Int. Ser. Appl. Syst.*
2 *Anal.*, 402.
- 3 Holling, C. S., 1986: Adaptive environmental management. *Environment*, **28**, 39,
4 doi:10.1080/00139157.1986.9928829.
- 5 Holstenkamp, L., and F. Kahla, 2016: What are community energy companies trying to accomplish?
6 An empirical investigation of investment motives in the German case. *Energy Policy*, **97**, 112–
7 122, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2016.07.010.
- 8 Holzmann, R., and S. Jørgensen, 2000: Social Risk Management : A new conceptual framework for
9 Social Protection , and beyond. *Soc. Prot. Discuss. Pap. 21314*, *World Bank.*, 1–30,
10 doi:10.1023/A:1011247814590.
- 11 Homer-Dixon, T., and Coauthors, 2015: Synchronous failure: The emerging causal architecture of
12 global crisis. *Ecol. Soc.*, **20**, doi:10.5751/ES-07681-200306.
- 13 Hoppe, R., 2011: Institutional constraints and practical problems in deliberative and participatory
14 policy making. *Policy Polit.*, **39**, 163–186, doi:10.1332/030557310X519650.
- 15 Hornsey, M. J., E. A. Harris, P. G. Bain, and K. S. Fielding, 2016: Meta-analyses of the determinants
16 and outcomes of belief in climate change. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 622–626,
17 doi:10.1038/nclimate2943.
- 18 Hou, D., 2016: Divergence in stakeholder perception of sustainable remediation. *Sustain. Sci.*, **11**,
19 215–230, doi:10.1007/s11625-015-0346-0.
- 20 —, and A. Al-Tabbaa, 2014: Sustainability: A new imperative in contaminated land remediation.
21 *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **39**, 25–34, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2014.02.003.
- 22 Howard, P. H., and T. Sterner, 2017: Few and Not So Far Between: A Meta-analysis of Climate
23 Damage Estimates. *Environ. Resour. Econ.*, **68**, 197–225, doi:10.1007/s10640-017-0166-z.
- 24 Howlett, M., and J. Rayner, 2013: Patching vs Packaging in Policy Formulation: Assessing Policy
25 Portfolio Design. *Polit. Gov.*, **1**, 170, doi:10.17645/pag.v1i2.95.
- 26 Hudson, P., W. J. W. Botzen, L. Feyen, and J. C. J. H. Aerts, 2016: Incentivising flood risk adaptation
27 through risk based insurance premiums: Trade-offs between affordability and risk reduction.
28 *Ecol. Econ.*, **125**, 1–13, doi:10.1016/J.ECOLECON.2016.01.015.
- 29 Huisheng, S., 2015: Between the Formal and Informal: Institutions and Village Governance in Rural
30 China. *An Int. J.*, **13**, 24–44.
- 31 Humborg, C., D. J. Conley, L. Rahm, F. Wulff, A. Cociasu, and V. Ittekkot, 2000: Silicon retention in
32 river basins: far-reaching effects on biogeochemistry and aquatic food webs in coastal marine
33 environments. *Ambio*, **29**, 45–50, doi:10.1639/0044-7447(2000)029[0045:SRIRBF]2.0.CO;2.
- 34 Humpenöder, F., and Coauthors, 2017: Large-scale bioenergy production: How to resolve
35 sustainability trade-offs? *Environ. Res. Lett.*, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa9e3b.
- 36 Hunsberger, C., and Coauthors, 2017: Climate change mitigation, land grabbing and conflict: towards
37 a landscape-based and collaborative action research agenda. *Can. J. Dev. Stud.*, **38**, 305–324,
38 doi:10.1080/02255189.2016.1250617.
- 39 Huq, N., A. Bruns, L. Ribbe, and S. Huq, 2017: Mainstreaming Ecosystem Services Based Climate
40 Change Adaptation (EbA) in Bangladesh: Status, Challenges and Opportunities. *Sustainability*,
41 **9**, 926, doi:10.3390/su9060926.
- 42 Hurlbert, M., 2015: Learning, participation, and adaptation: exploring agri-environmental
43 programmes. *J. Environ. Plan. Manag.*, **58**, 113–134, doi:10.1080/09640568.2013.847823.
- 44 —, 2018a: The challenge of integrated flood risk governance: case studies in Alberta and
45 Saskatchewan, Canada. *Int. J. River Basin Manag.*, doi:10.1080/15715124.2018.1439495.
- 46 —, and J. Gupta, 2015: The split ladder of participation: A diagnostic, strategic, and evaluation tool

- 1 to assess when participation is necessary. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **50**, 100–113,
2 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.01.011.
- 3 —, and —, 2016: Adaptive Governance, Uncertainty, and Risk: Policy Framing and Responses
4 to Climate Change, Drought, and Flood. *Risk Anal.*, **36**, 339–356, doi:10.1111/risa.12510.
- 5 —, and P. Mussetta, 2016: Creating resilient water governance for irrigated producers in Mendoza,
6 Argentina. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **58**, 83–94, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2016.01.004.
- 7 —, and J. Gupta, 2017: The adaptive capacity of institutions in Canada, Argentina, and Chile to
8 droughts and floods. *Reg. Environ. Chang.*, **17**, doi:10.1007/s10113-016-1078-0.
- 9 Hurlbert, M. A., 2018b: *Adaptive Governance of Disaster: Drought and Flood in Rural Areas*.
10 Springer, Cham, Switzerland,.
- 11 Hurlbert, M. A., and H. Diaz, 2013: Water governance in Chile and Canada: A comparison of
12 adaptive characteristics. *Ecol. Soc.*, **18**, doi:10.5751/ES-06148-180461.
- 13 Hurlimann, A., and E. Wilson, 2018: Sustainable Urban Water Management under a Changing
14 Climate : The Role of Spatial Planning. 1–22, doi:10.3390/w10050546.
- 15 Hurlimann, A. C., and A. P. March, 2012: The role of spatial planning in adapting to climate change.
16 *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **3**, 477–488, doi:10.1002/wcc.183.
- 17 Huttunen, S., P. Kivimaa, and V. Virkamäki, 2014: The need for policy coherence to trigger a
18 transition to biogas production. *Environ. Innov. Soc. Transitions*, **12**, 14–30,
19 doi:10.1016/j.eist.2014.04.002.
- 20 ICSU, 2017: *A Guide to SDG Interactions: from Science to Implementation*. Paris,.
- 21 IEA, 2017: *World Energy Outlook 2017*. International Energy Agency, Paris,.
- 22 Iglesias, A., and L. Garrote, 2015: Adaptation strategies for agricultural water management under
23 climate change in Europe. *Agric. Water Manag.*, doi:10.1016/j.agwat.2015.03.014.
- 24 IPCC, 2001: CLIMATE CHANGE 2001 : impacts , adaptation and vulnerability. *Work. Gr. II*
25 *Impacts Adapt. vulnerability*, 10, doi:10.1002/joc.775.
- 26 —, 2014a: *Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to*
27 *the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. 151 pp.
- 28 —, 2014b: *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and*
29 *Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the*
30 *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. C.B. [Field et al., Eds. Cambridge University
31 Press, Cambridge,.
- 32 ISO, 2009: *Australia and New Zealand Risk Management Standards 31000:2009*. AS/NZS,.
- 33 —, 2017: *Environmental management -- Guidelines for establishing good practices for combatting*
34 *land degradation and desertification -- Part 1: Good practices framework*. 31 pp.
- 35 van Ittersum, M. K., and Coauthors, 2016: Can sub-Saharan Africa feed itself? *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*,
36 doi:10.1073/pnas.1610359113.
- 37 IUCN, 2015: *Land Degradation Neutrality: implications and opportunities for conservation | IUCN*.
- 38 Jalbert, K., and A. J. Kinchy, 2016: Sense and Influence: Environmental Monitoring Tools and the
39 Power of Citizen Science. *J. Environ. Policy Plan.*, **18**, 379–397,
40 doi:10.1080/1523908X.2015.1100985.
- 41 Jaleta, M., M. Kassie, and B. Shiferaw, 2013: Tradeoffs in crop residue utilization in mixed crop-
42 livestock systems and implications for conservation agriculture. *Agric. Syst.*,
43 doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2013.05.006.
- 44 —, —, and O. Erenstein, 2015: Determinants of maize stover utilization as feed, fuel and soil
45 amendment in mixed crop-livestock systems, Ethiopia. *Agric. Syst.*,

- 1 doi:10.1016/j.agsy.2014.08.010.
- 2 Janetos, A., C. Justice, M. Jahn, M. Obersteiner, J. Glauber, and W. Mulhern, 2017: *The Risks of*
3 *Multiple Breadbasket Failures in the 21st Century: A Science Research Agenda*. 24 pp.
- 4 Janicke, M., and H. Jorgens, 2000: Strategic Environmental Planning and Uncertainty: A Cross-
5 National Comparison of Green Plans in Industrialized Countries. *Policy Stud. J.*, **28**, 612–632,
6 doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2000.tb02051.x.
- 7 Jansujwicz, J. S., A. J. K. Calhoun, and R. J. Lillieholm, 2013: The maine vernal pool mapping and
8 assessment program: Engaging municipal officials and private landowners in community-based
9 citizen science. *Environ. Manage.*, **52**, 1369–1385, doi:10.1007/s00267-013-0168-8.
- 10 Jaworski, A., 2016: Encouraging Climate Adaptation Through Reform of Federal Crop Insurance
11 Subsidies. *NYU Law Review*, doi:10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004.
- 12 Jeffrey, S. R., D. E. Trautman, and J. R. Unterschultz, 2017: Canadian Agricultural Business Risk
13 Management Programs: Implications for Farm Wealth and Environmental Stewardship. *Can. J.*
14 *Agric. Econ. Can. d'agroeconomie*, **65**, 543–565, doi:10.1111/cjag.12145.
- 15 Jelsma, I., M. Slingerland, K. Giller, J. B.-J. of R. Studies, and undefined 2017, Collective action in a
16 smallholder oil palm production system in Indonesia: The key to sustainable and inclusive
17 smallholder palm oil? *Elsevier*.
- 18 Jiang, J., W. Wang, C. Wang, and Y. Liu, 2017: Chinese Journal of Population Resources and
19 Environment Combating climate change calls for a global technological cooperation system
20 built on the concept of ecological civilization) Combating climate change calls for a global
21 technological cooperation system built on the concept of ecological civilization Combating
22 climate change calls for a global technological cooperation system built on the concept of
23 ecological civilization. *Chinese J. Popul. Resour. Environ.*, **15**, 21–31,
24 doi:10.1080/10042857.2017.1286145.
- 25 Johnson, B. B., and M. L. Becker, 2015: Social-ecological resilience and adaptive capacity in a
26 transboundary ecosystem. *Soc. Nat. Resour.*, doi:10.1080/08941920.2015.1037035.
- 27 Johnson, F. A., 2011a: Learning and adaptation in the management of waterfowl harvests. *J. Environ.*
28 *Manage.*, **92**, 1385–1394, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.10.064.
- 29 Johnson, F. X., 2011b: Regional-global Linkages in the Energy-Climate-Development Policy Nexus:
30 The Case of Biofuels in the EU Renewable Energy Directive. *Renew. Energy Law Policy Rev.*,
31 **2**, 91–106, doi:10.2307/24324724.
- 32 —, 2017: Biofuels, Bioenergy and the Bioeconomy in North and South. *Ind. Biotechnol.*, **13**, 289–
33 291, doi:10.1089/ind.2017.29106.fxj.
- 34 Johnson, F. X., H. Pacini, and E. Smeets, 2012: Transformations in EU biofuels markets under the
35 Renewable Energy Directive and the implications for land use, trade and forests.
- 36 Johnson, M. F., C. Hannah, L. Acton, R. Popovici, K. K. Karanth, and E. Weinthal, 2014: Network
37 environmentalism: Citizen scientists as agents for environmental advocacy. *Glob. Environ.*
38 *Chang.*, **29**, 235–245, doi:10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2014.10.006.
- 39 —, and Coauthors, 2017: Combining participatory modelling and citizen science to support
40 volunteer conservation action. *Biol. Conserv.*, **208**, 76–86, doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2016.07.037.
- 41 Jones, A., and B. Hiller, 2015: Review of the Responses to Food Production Shocks. 1–100.
- 42 —, and —, 2017: Exploring the Dynamics of Responses to Food Production Shocks.
43 *Sustainability*, **9**, 960, doi:10.3390/su9060960.
- 44 Jones, A. E., and A. P. Morse, 2012: Skill of ENSEMBLES seasonal re- forecasts for malaria
45 prediction in West Africa. *Geophys. Res. Lett.*, **39**.
- 46 Jones, R. N., and Coauthors, 2014: 95 2 Foundations for Decision Making Coordinating Lead

- 1 Authors: Lead Authors: Volunteer Chapter Scientist. 195–228.
- 2 Jordan, A. J., and Coauthors, 2015a: Emergence of polycentric climate governance and its future
3 prospects. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 977–982, doi:10.1038/nclimate2725.
- 4 Jordan, R., A. Crall, S. Gray, T. Phillips, and D. Mellor, 2015b: Citizen science as a distinct field of
5 inquiry. *Bioscience*, **65**, 208–211, doi:10.1093/biosci/biu217.
- 6 Jost, C., and Coauthors, 2016: Understanding gender dimensions of agriculture and climate change in
7 smallholder farming communities. *Clim. Dev.*, **8**, 133–144,
8 doi:10.1080/17565529.2015.1050978.
- 9 Juhola, S., E. Glaas, B. O. Linnér, and T. S. Neset, 2016: Redefining maladaptation. *Environ. Sci.*
10 *Policy*, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.09.014.
- 11 Jumani, S., S. Rao, S. Machado, and A. Prakash, 2017a: Big concerns with small projects: Evaluating
12 the socio-ecological impacts of small hydropower projects in India. *Ambio*, **46**, 500–511,
13 doi:10.1007/s13280-016-0855-9.
- 14 —, —, —, and —, 2017b: Big concerns with small projects: Evaluating the socio-ecological
15 impacts of small hydropower projects in India. *Ambio*, **46**, 500–511.
- 16 Jurgilevich, A., A. Räsänen, F. Groundstroem, and S. Juhola, 2017: A systematic review of dynamics
17 in climate risk and vulnerability assessments. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **12**, doi:10.1088/1748-
18 9326/aa5508.
- 19 Kabeer, N., K. Mumtaz, and A. Sayeed, 2010: Beyond risk management: Vulnerability, social
20 protection and citizenship in Pakistan. *J. Int. Dev.*, **22**, 1–19, doi:10.1002/jid.1538.
- 21 Kainuma, M., K. Miwa, T. Ehara, O. Akashi, and Y. Asayama, 2013: A low-carbon society: Global
22 visions, pathways, and challenges. *Clim. Policy*, doi:10.1080/14693062.2012.738016.
- 23 Kakota, T., D. Nyariki, D. Mkwambisi, and W. Kogi-Makau, 2011: Gender vulnerability to climate
24 variability and household food insecurity. *Clim. Dev.*, **3**, 298–309,
25 doi:10.1080/17565529.2011.627419.
- 26 Kandlikar, M., J. Risbey, and S. Dessai, 2005: Representing and communicating deep uncertainty in
27 climate-change assessments. *Comptes Rendus Geosci.*, **337**, 443–455,
28 doi:10.1016/j.crte.2004.10.010.
- 29 Kangalawe.R.Y.M, Noe.C, Tungaraza.F.S.K, N. . & M. ., 2014: Understanding of Traditional
30 Knowledge and Indigenous Institutions on Sustainable Land Management in Kilimanjaro
31 Region , Tanzania. *Open J. Soil Sci.*, **4**, 469–493,
32 doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojss.2014.413046.
- 33 Kanter, D. R., and Coauthors, 2016: Evaluating agricultural trade-offs in the age of sustainable
34 development. *Agric. Syst.*, doi:10.1016/J.AGSY.2016.09.010.
- 35 Karar, E., and I. Jacobs-Mata, 2016: Inclusive Governance: The Role of Knowledge in Fulfilling the
36 Obligations of Citizens. *Aquat. Procedia*, **6**, 15–22, doi:10.1016/j.aqpro.2016.06.003.
- 37 Karnib, A., 2017: A Quantitative Nexus Approach to Analyse the Interlinkages across the Sustainable
38 Development Goals. *J. Sustain. Dev.*, **10**, 173–180.
- 39 Karpouzoglou, T., A. Dewulf, and J. Clark, 2016: Advancing adaptive governance of social-
40 ecological systems through theoretical multiplicity. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **57**, 1–9,
41 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.11.011.
- 42 Kasperson, R. E., O. Renn, P. Slovic, H. S. Brown, J. Emel, R. Goble, J. X. Kasperson, and S. Ratick,
43 1988: The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework. *Risk Anal.*, **8**, 177–187,
44 doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1988.tb01168.x.
- 45 Kates, R. W., W. R. Travis, and T. J. Wilbanks, 2012: Transformational adaptation when incremental
46 adaptations to climate change are insufficient. *Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. Usa*, **109**, 7156–7161.

- 1 Kavallari, A., E. Smeets, and A. Tabeau, 2014: Land use changes from EU biofuel use: A sensitivity
2 analysis. *Oper. Res.*, doi:10.1007/s12351-014-0155-8.
- 3 Keogan, K., and Coauthors, 2018: Global phenological insensitivity to shifting ocean temperatures
4 among seabirds. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **8**, 313–317, doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0115-z.
- 5 Kerr, S., and A. Sweet, 2008: Inclusion of agriculture into a domestic emissions trading scheme: New
6 Zealand’s experience to date. *Farm Policy J.*, **4**.
- 7 Khan, M. R., and J. T. Roberts, 2013: Adaptation and international climate policy. *Wiley Interdiscip.*
8 *Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **4**, 171–189, doi:10.1002/wcc.212.
- 9 Khera, R., 2011: Revival of the public distribution system: evidence and explanations. *Econ. Polit.*
10 *Wkly.*, **46**, 36–50.
- 11 Kiendrebeogo, Y., K. Assimaidou, and A. Tall, 2017: Social protection for poverty reduction in times
12 of crisis. *J. Policy Model.*, **39**, 1163–1183, doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2017.09.003.
- 13 Kim, K., T. Park, S. Bang, and H. Kim, 2017: Real Options-based framework for hydropower plant
14 adaptation to climate change. *J. Manag. Eng.*, **33**.
- 15 Kirui, O. K., 2016: Drivers of Sustainable Land Management in Eastern Africa. *2016 World Bank*
16 *Conference on “Land and Poverty” The World Bank - Washington Dc, March 14-18, 2016*, 1–
17 18.
- 18 Kiruki, H. M., E. H. van der Zanden, Ž. Malek, and P. H. Verburg, 2017: Land Cover Change and
19 Woodland Degradation in a Charcoal Producing Semi-Arid Area in Kenya. *L. Degrad. Dev.*, **28**,
20 472–481, doi:10.1002/ldr.2545.
- 21 Kivimaa, P., and F. Kern, 2016: Creative destruction or mere niche support? Innovation policy mixes
22 for sustainability transitions. *Res. Policy*, **45**, 205–217, doi:10.1016/j.respol.2015.09.008.
- 23 —, H. L. Kangas, and D. Lazarevic, 2017: Client-oriented evaluation of “creative destruction” in
24 policy mixes: Finnish policies on building energy efficiency transition. *Energy Research and*
25 *Social Science*.
- 26 Klein, R.J.T., G.F. Midgley, B.L. Preston, M. Alam, F.G.H. Berkhout, K. D., and M. . Shaw, 2014:
27 Adaptation opportunities, constraints, and limits. *In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts,*
28 *Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working*
29 *Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,*
30 *Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee,*
31 *K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P..*
32 *Mastreanda, and L.. White, Eds., Cambridge University Press, 899–943.*
- 33 Klein Goldewijk, K., and P. H. Verburg, 2013: Uncertainties in global-scale reconstructions of
34 historical land use: an illustration using the HYDE data set. *Landsc. Ecol.*, **28**, 861–877,
35 doi:10.1007/s10980-013-9877-x.
- 36 Klein, R. J. T., and Coauthors, 2015: Adaptation opportunities, constraints, and limits. *Climate*
37 *Change 2014 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects*, 899–
38 944.
- 39 Klenk, N. L., K. Meehan, S. L. Pinel, F. Mendez, P. T. Lima, and D. M. Kammen, 2015: Stakeholders
40 in climate science: Beyond lip service? *Science (80-.)*, doi:10.1126/science.aab1495.
- 41 Kline, K. L., and Coauthors, 2017: Reconciling food security and bioenergy: priorities for action.
42 *GCB Bioenergy*, **9**, 557–576, doi:10.1111/gcbb.12366.
- 43 Knight-Lenihan, S., 2016: Benefit cost analysis, resilience and climate change. *Clim. Policy*, **16**, 909–
44 923, doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1052957.
- 45 Knutson, C., 2008: Methods and Tools for Drought Analysis and Management. *Eos, Trans. Am.*
46 *Geophys. Union*, **89**, 206, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-5924-7.

- 1 —, and B. Fuchs, 2016: New Tools for Assessing Drought Conditions for Rangeland Management.
2 *Rangelands*, **38**, 177–182, doi:10.1016/j.rala.2016.05.003.
- 3 Kolstad, C., and Coauthors, 2014: Social , Economic and Ethical Concepts and Methods. *Climate*
4 *Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth*
5 *Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, O. Edenhofer et al.,
6 Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
- 7 Koppenjan, J., and E.-H. Klijn, 2004: *Managing uncertainties in networks: a network approach to*
8 *problem solving and decision making*. 289 pp.
- 9 Kosugi, T., 2013: Fail-safe solar radiation management geoengineering. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob.*
10 *Chang.*, **18**, 1141–1166, doi:10.1007/s11027-012-9414-2.
- 11 Krause, A., and Coauthors, 2017: Global consequences of afforestation and bioenergy cultivation on
12 ecosystem service indicators. *Biogeosciences*, **14**, 4829–4850, doi:10.5194/bg-14-4829-2017.
- 13 Kremen, C., 2015: Reframing the land-sparing/land-sharing debate for biodiversity conservation. *Ann.*
14 *N. Y. Acad. Sci.*, doi:10.1111/nyas.12845.
- 15 Kriegler, E., and Coauthors, 2014: The role of technology for achieving climate policy objectives:
16 Overview of the EMF 27 study on global technology and climate policy strategies. *Clim.*
17 *Change*, **123**, 353–367, doi:10.1007/s10584-013-0953-7.
- 18 —, K. Riahi, V. Bosetti, P. Capros, N. Petermann, D. P. van Vuuren, J. P. Weyant, and O.
19 Edenhofer, 2015: Introduction to the AMPERE model intercomparison studies on the economics
20 of climate stabilization. *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*.
- 21 Kristjanson, P., A. Waters-Bayer, N. Johnson, A. Tipilda, J. Njuki, I. Baltenweck, D. Grace, and S.
22 MacMillan, 2014: Livestock and women’s livelihoods. *Gender in Agriculture: Closing the*
23 *Knowledge Gap*, 209–234.
- 24 Krug, J. H. A., 2018: Accounting of GHG emissions and removals from forest management: a long
25 road from Kyoto to Paris. *Carbon Balance Manag.*, **13**, 1, doi:10.1186/s13021-017-0089-6.
- 26 Kueppers, L. M., P. Baer, J. Harte, B. Haya, L. E. Koteen, and M. E. Smith, 2004: A Decision Matrix
27 Approach to Evaluating the Impacts of Land-Use Activities Undertaken to Mitigate Climate
28 Change. *Clim. Change*, **63**, 247–257, doi:10.1023/B:CLIM.0000018590.49917.50.
- 29 Kullenberg, C., and D. Kasperowski, 2016: What Is Citizen Science? – A Scientometric Meta-
30 Analysis. *PLoS One*, **11**, e0147152, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147152.
- 31 Kundzewicz, Z. W., 2002: Non-structural Flood Protection and Sustainability. *Water Int.*, **27**, 3–13,
32 doi:10.1080/02508060208686972.
- 33 Kunreuther, H., G. Heal, M. Allen, O. Edenhofer, C. B. Field, and G. Yohe, 2013: Risk management
34 and climate change. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **3**, 447–450, doi:10.1038/nclimate1740.
- 35 Kunreuther, H., and Coauthors, 2014: Integrated Risk and Uncertainty Assessment of Climate Change
36 Response Policies. *Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of*
37 *Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate*
38 *Change*, O. Edenhofer et al., Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom
39 and New York, NY, USA.
- 40 Kuriakose, A. T., R. Heltberg, W. Wiseman, C. Costella, R. Cipryk, and S. Cornelius, 2012: Climate-
41 Responsive Social Protection Climate - responsive Social Protection. *Strategy*.
- 42 Kust, G., O. Andreeva, and A. Cowie, 2017: Land Degradation Neutrality: Concept development,
43 practical applications and assessment. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **195**, 16–24,
44 doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.10.043.
- 45 Kuzdas, C., A. Wiek, B. Warner, R. Vignola, and R. Morataya, 2015: Integrated and participatory
46 analysis of water governance regimes: The case of the Costa Rican dry tropics. *World Dev.*, **66**,
47 254–266, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.018.

- 1 Kwakkel, J. H., M. Haasnoot, and W. E. Walker, 2016: Comparing Robust Decision-Making and
2 Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways for model-based decision support under deep uncertainty.
3 *Environ. Model. Softw.*, **86**, 168–183, doi:10.1016/j.envsoft.2016.09.017.
- 4 Kweka, E. J., E. E. Kimaro, and S. Munga, 2016: Effect of Deforestation and Land Use Changes on
5 Mosquito Productivity and Development in Western Kenya Highlands: Implication for Malaria
6 Risk. *Front. public Heal.*, **4**, 238, doi:10.3389/fpubh.2016.00238.
- 7 Lahiff, E., 2015: The great African land grab? Agricultural investments and the global food system. *J.*
8 *Peasant Stud.*, **42**, 239–242, doi:10.1080/03066150.2014.978141.
- 9 Lal, P. N., T. Mitchell, P. Aldunce, H. Auld, R. Mechler, A. Miyan, L. E. Romano, and S. Zakaria,
10 2012: National Systems for Managing the Risks from Climate Extremes and Disasters.
11 *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A*
12 *Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*
13 *(IPCC)*, C.B. Field et al., Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York,
14 NY, USA, 339–392.
- 15 Lal, R., 2013: Food security in a changing climate. *Ecohydrol. Hydrobiol.*,
16 doi:10.1016/j.ecohyd.2013.03.006.
- 17 Lam, P. T. I., and A. O. K. Law, 2016: Crowdfunding for renewable and sustainable energy projects:
18 An exploratory case study approach. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **60**, 11–20,
19 doi:10.1016/j.rser.2016.01.046.
- 20 Lamarque, P., A. Artaux, C. Barnaud, L. Dobremez, B. Nettier, and S. Lavorel, 2013: Taking into
21 account farmers' decision making to map fine-scale land management adaptation to climate and
22 socio-economic scenarios. *Landsc. Urban Plan.*, **119**, 147–157,
23 doi:10.1016/j.landurbplan.2013.07.012.
- 24 Lambin, E. F., and Coauthors, 2001: The causes of land-use and land-cover change: moving beyond
25 the myths. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **11**, 261–269, doi:10.1016/S0959-3780(01)00007-3.
- 26 Lamond, J., and E. Penning-Rowsell, 2014: The robustness of flood insurance regimes given
27 changing risk resulting from climate change. *Clim. Risk Manag.*, **2**,
28 doi:10.1016/j.crm.2014.03.001.
- 29 Lane, C. R., 1998: *Custodians of the commons: pastoral land tenure in East and West Africa*.
30 Earthscan, 238 pp.
- 31 Lange, E., and S. Hehl-Lange, 2011: Citizen participation in the conservation and use of rural
32 landscapes in Britain: The Alport Valley case study. *Landsc. Ecol. Eng.*, **7**, 223–230,
33 doi:10.1007/s11355-010-0115-2.
- 34 Langholtz, M., and Coauthors, 2014: Climate risk management for the U.S. cellulosic biofuels supply
35 chain. *Clim. Risk Manag.*, doi:10.1016/j.crm.2014.05.001.
- 36 Lattanzio, R. K., 2012: International climate change financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF). *Int.*
37 *Financ. Efforts to Address Clim. Chang.*, 119–138.
- 38 Laube, W., B. Schraven, and M. Awo, 2012: Smallholder adaptation to climate change: Dynamics and
39 limits in Northern Ghana. *Clim. Change*, doi:10.1007/s10584-011-0199-1.
- 40 Lavell, A., and Coauthors, 2012: Climate change: New dimensions in disaster risk, exposure,
41 vulnerability, and resilience. *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance*
42 *Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*,
43 Vol. 9781107025 of, 25–64.
- 44 Law, E. A., E. Meijaard, B. A. Bryan, T. Mallawaarachchi, L. P. Koh, and K. A. Wilson, 2015: Better
45 land-use allocation outperforms land sparing and land sharing approaches to conservation in
46 Central Kalimantan, Indonesia. *Biol. Conserv.*, doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2015.03.004.
- 47 Lawrence, J., A. Reisinger, B. Mullan, and B. Jackson, 2013: Exploring climate change uncertainties

- 1 to support adaptive management of changing flood-risk. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **33**, 133–142,
2 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2013.05.008.
- 3 Layke, C., 2009: Measuring nature’s benefits: a preliminary roadmap for improving ecosystem
4 service indicators. *World Resour. Inst. Washingt.*,.
- 5 Lebel, L., P. Garden, and M. Imamura, 2005: The Politics of Scale, Position, and Place in the
6 Governance of Water Resources in the Mekong Region. *Ecol. Soc.*,.
- 7 Lee, C. M., and M. Lazarus, 2013: Bioenergy projects and sustainable development: which project
8 types offer the greatest benefits? *Clim. Dev.*, **5**, 305–317, doi:10.1080/17565529.2013.812951.
- 9 Lee, M., C. Armeni, J. de Cendra, S. Chaytor, S. Lock, M. Maslin, C. Redgwell, and Y. Rydin, 2013:
10 Public participation and climate change infrastructure. *J. Environ. Law*, **25**, 33–62,
11 doi:10.1093/jel/eqs027.
- 12 Lejeune, Q., E. L. Davin, L. Gudmundsson, J. Winckler, and S. I. Seneviratne, 2018: Historical
13 deforestation locally increased the intensity of hot days in northern mid-latitudes. *Nat. Clim.*
14 *Chang.*, **8**, 386–390, doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0131-z.
- 15 Lempert, R., 2013: Scenarios that illuminate vulnerabilities and robust responses. *Clim. Change*, **117**,
16 627–646, doi:10.1007/s10584-012-0574-6.
- 17 Lempert, R. J., and M. E. Schlesinger, 2000: Robust strategies for abating climate change. *Clim.*
18 *Change*, **45**, 387–401.
- 19 Leys, A. J., and J. K. Vanclay, 2011: Social learning: A knowledge and capacity building approach
20 for adaptive co-management of contested landscapes. *Land use policy*, **28**, 574–584,
21 doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2010.11.006.
- 22 Li, D., T. Sun, M. Liu, L. Yang, L. Wang, and Z. Gao, 2015: Contrasting responses of urban and rural
23 surface energy budgets to heat waves explain synergies between urban heat islands and heat
24 waves. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **10**, 054009, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/10/5/054009.
- 25 Li, D., T. Zhou, L. Zou, W. Zhang, and L. Zhang, 2018: Extreme High-Temperature Events Over East
26 Asia in 1.5°C and 2°C Warmer Futures: Analysis of NCAR CESM Low-Warming Experiments.
27 *Geophys. Res. Lett.*, **45**, 1541–1550, doi:10.1002/2017GL076753.
- 28 Lin, B., and X. Li, 2011a: The effect of carbon tax on per capita CO₂ emissions. *Energy Policy*, **39**,
29 5137–5146, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.05.050.
- 30 —, and —, 2011b: The effect of carbon tax on per capita CO₂ emissions. *Energy Policy*, **39**,
31 5137–5146, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.05.050.
- 32 Linnerooth-Bayer, J., and R. Mechler, 2006: Insurance for assisting adaptation to climate change in
33 developing countries: A proposed strategy. *Clim. Policy*, **6**, 621–636,
34 doi:10.1080/14693062.2006.9685628.
- 35 —, and S. Hochrainer-Stigler, 2015: Financial instruments for disaster risk management and
36 climate change adaptation. *Clim. Change*, **133**, 85–100, doi:10.1007/s10584-013-1035-6.
- 37 Lipper, L., and Coauthors, 2014a: Climate-smart agriculture for food security. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **4**,
38 1068–1072, doi:10.1038/nclimate2437.
- 39 Lipper, L., and Coauthors, 2014b: Climate-smart agriculture for food security. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*,
40 doi:10.1038/nclimate2437.
- 41 Lipper, L., and Coauthors, 2014c: Climate-smart agriculture for food security. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **4**,
42 1068–1072, doi:10.1038/nclimate2437.
- 43 Liu, J., and Coauthors, 2017: Challenges in operationalizing the water–energy–food nexus. *Hydrol.*
44 *Sci. J.*, **62**, 1714–1720, doi:10.1080/02626667.2017.1353695.
- 45 Liu, P., and N. Ravenscroft, 2017: Collective action in implementing top-down land policy: The case
46 of Chengdu, China. *Land use policy*, **65**, 45–52, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2017.03.031.

- 1 Liu, Y., K. Yin, L. Chen, W. Wang, and Y. Liu, 2016: A community-based disaster risk reduction
2 system in Wanzhou, China. *Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct.*, **19**, 379–389,
3 doi:10.1016/j.ijdr.2016.09.009.
- 4 Lo, A. Y., 2013: The role of social norms in climate adaptation: Mediating risk perception and flood
5 insurance purchase. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.07.019.
- 6 Lobell, D. B., U. L. C. Baldos, and T. W. Hertel, 2013: Climate adaptation as mitigation: The case of
7 agricultural investments. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **8**, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/015012.
- 8 Van Loon, A. F., and Coauthors, 2016: Drought in the Anthropocene. *Nat. Geosci.*, **9**, 89–91,
9 doi:10.1038/ngeo2646.
- 10 Loos, J., A. I. Horcea-Milcu, P. Kirkland, T. Hartel, M. Osváth-Ferencz, and J. Fischer, 2015:
11 Challenges for biodiversity monitoring using citizen science in transitioning social–ecological
12 systems. *J. Nat. Conserv.*, **26**, 45–48, doi:10.1016/j.jnc.2015.05.001.
- 13 López-i-Gelats, F., E. D. G. Fraser, J. F. Morton, and M. G. Rivera-Ferre, 2016: What drives the
14 vulnerability of pastoralists to global environmental change? A qualitative meta-analysis. *Glob.*
15 *Environ. Chang.*, **39**, 258–274, doi:10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2016.05.011.
- 16 Lotze-Campen, H., and A. Popp, 2012: Agricultural Adaptation Options: Production Technology,
17 Insurance, Trade. *Climate Change, Justice and Sustainability*, Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht,
18 171–178.
- 19 Lowndes, V., and M. Robert, 2013: *Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political*
20 *Science*. Palgrave Macmillan,.
- 21 Lucas, A., 2016: Elite Capture and Corruption in two Villages in Bengkulu Province, Sumatra. *Hum.*
22 *Ecol.*, **44**, 287–300, doi:10.1007/s10745-016-9837-6.
- 23 Luderer, G., R. C. Pietzcker, C. Bertram, E. Kriegler, M. Meinshausen, and O. Edenhofer, 2013:
24 Economic mitigation challenges : how further delay closes the door for achieving climate
25 targets. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/8/3/034033.
- 26 Lunt, T., A. W. Jones, W. S. Mulhern, D. P. M. Lezaks, and M. M. Jahn, 2016: Vulnerabilities to
27 agricultural production shocks: An extreme, plausible scenario for assessment of risk for the
28 insurance sector. *Clim. Risk Manag.*, **13**, 1–9, doi:10.1016/j.crm.2016.05.001.
- 29 Ma, X., N. Heerink, E. van Ierland, M. van den Berg, and X. Shi, 2013: Land tenure security and land
30 investments in Northwest China. *China Agric. Econ. Rev.*, **5**, 281–307,
31 doi:10.1108/17561371311331133.
- 32 Macintosh, A. K., 2012: LULUCF in the post-2012 regime: fixing the problems of the past? *Clim.*
33 *Policy*, **12**, 341–355, doi:10.1080/14693062.2011.605711.
- 34 Magnan, A., 2014: Avoiding maladaptation to climate change: towards guiding principles.
35 *S.A.P.I.E.N.S.*,
- 36 Magnan, A. K., and Coauthors, 2016: Addressing the risk of maladaptation to climate change. *Wiley*
37 *Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **7**, 646–665, doi:10.1002/wcc.409.
- 38 Mahul, O., and F. Ghesquiere, 2010: Financial protection of the state against natural disasters : a
39 primer. doi:10.1596/1813-9450-5429.
- 40 Mallampalli, V. R., and Coauthors, 2016: Methods for translating narrative scenarios into quantitative
41 assessments of land use change. *Environ. Model. Softw.*, **82**, 7–20,
42 doi:10.1016/J.ENVSOFT.2016.04.011.
- 43 Malogdos, F. K., and E. Yujuico, 2015: Reconciling formal and informal decision-making on
44 ecotourist infrastructure in Sagada, Philippines. *J. Sustain. Tour.*, **23**, 1482–1503,
45 doi:10.1080/09669582.2015.1049608.
- 46 Mann, M. E., S. Rahmstorf, K. Kornhuber, B. A. Steinman, S. K. Miller, and D. Coumou, 2017:

- 1 Influence of Anthropogenic Climate Change on Planetary Wave Resonance and Extreme
2 Weather Events. *Sci. Rep.*, **7**, doi:10.1038/srep45242.
- 3 Manning, P., G. Taylor, and M. E. Hanley, 2015: Bioenergy, Food Production and Biodiversity - An
4 Unlikely Alliance? *GCB Bioenergy*, **7**, 570–576, doi:10.1111/gcbb.12173.
- 5 Mapfumo, P., and Coauthors, 2015: Pathways to transformational change in the face of climate
6 impacts: an analytical framework. *Clim. Dev.*, **5529**, 1–13,
7 doi:10.1080/17565529.2015.1040365.
- 8 Maraseni, T. N., and T. Cadman, 2015: A comparative analysis of global stakeholders' perceptions of
9 the governance quality of the clean development mechanism (CDM) and reducing emissions
10 from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). *Int. J. Environ. Stud.*, **72**, 288–304,
11 doi:10.1080/00207233.2014.993569.
- 12 Marie-Justine Labelle Matthew Johns, A. J., and T. Morris, 2016: Closing the Protection Gap
13 ClimateWise Principles Independent Review 2016. *Best's Rev.*,.
- 14 Marjanac, S., L. Patton, and J. Thornton, 2017: Acts of god, human influence and litigation. *Nat.*
15 *Geosci.*, **10**, 616–619, doi:10.1038/ngeo3019.
- 16 Markowitz, H., 1952: Portfolio selection. *J. Finance*, **77**.
- 17 Marshall, N. ., S. . Park, W. N. Adger, K. Brown, and S. . Howden, 2012: Transformational capacity
18 and the influence of place and identity. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **7**.
- 19 Martin, D. R., and K. L. Pope, 2011: Luring anglers to enhance fisheries. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **92**,
20 1409–1413, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.10.002.
- 21 Martin, R., L. B. de Preux, and U. J. Wagner, 2014: The impact of a carbon tax on manufacturing:
22 Evidence from microdata. *J. Public Econ.*, **117**, 1–14, doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.04.016.
- 23 Marzluff, J. M., and E. Neatherlin, 2006: Corvid response to human settlements and campgrounds:
24 Causes, consequences, and challenges for conservation. *Biol. Conserv.*, **130**, 301–314,
25 doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2005.12.026.
- 26 Mathy, S., and O. Blanchard, 2016: Proposal for a poverty-adaptation-mitigation window within the
27 Green Climate Fund. *Clim. Policy*, **16**, 752–767, doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1050348.
- 28 Matthews, T., A. Y. Lo, and J. A. Byrne, 2015: Reconceptualizing green infrastructure for climate
29 change adaptation: Barriers to adoption and drivers for uptake by spatial planners. *Landsc.*
30 *Urban Plan.*, doi:10.1016/j.landurbplan.2015.02.010.
- 31 Maynard, T., 2015: *Food system shock: The insurance impacts of acute disruption to global food*
32 *supply*.
- 33 McClean, C., R. Whiteley, and N. M. Hayes, 2010: *ISO 31000 — The New , Streamlined Risk*
34 *Management Standard*. 1-4 pp.
- 35 McDowell, N. G., and C. D. Allen, 2015: Darcy's law predicts widespread forest mortality under
36 climate warming. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 669–672, doi:10.1038/nclimate2641.
- 37 Mcintosh, C., A. Sarris, and F. Papadopoulos, 2013: Productivity, credit, risk, and the demand for
38 weather index insurance in smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia. *Agric. Econ. (United Kingdom)*,
39 **44**, 399–417, doi:10.1111/agec.12024.
- 40 McKinley, D. C., and Coauthors, 2017: Citizen science can improve conservation science, natural
41 resource management, and environmental protection. *Biol. Conserv.*, **208**, 15–28,
42 doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2016.05.015.
- 43 McLachlan, J. S., J. J. Hellmann, and M. W. Schwartz, 2007: A framework for debate of assisted
44 migration in an era of climate change. *Conserv. Biol.*, **21**, 297–302, doi:10.1111/j.1523-
45 1739.2007.00676.x.
- 46 McSweeney, K., and O. T. Coomes, 2011: Climate-related disaster opens a window of opportunity for

- 1 rural poor in northeastern Honduras. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, **108**, 5203–5208,
2 doi:10.1073/pnas.1014123108.
- 3 McVittie, A., L. Cole, A. Wreford, A. Sgobbi, and B. Yordi, 2018: Ecosystem-based solutions for
4 disaster risk reduction: Lessons from European applications of ecosystem-based adaptation
5 measures. *Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct.*, doi:10.1016/j.ijdr.2017.12.014.
- 6 Measham, T. G., B. L. Preston, T. F. Smith, C. Brooke, R. Gorddard, G. Withycombe, and C.
7 Morrison, 2011: Adapting to climate change through local municipal planning: Barriers and
8 challenges. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang.*, doi:10.1007/s11027-011-9301-2.
- 9 Mechler, R., L. M. Bouwer, J. Linnerooth-Bayer, S. Hochrainer-Stigler, J. C. J. H. Aerts, S.
10 Surminski, and K. Williges, 2014: Managing unnatural disaster risk from climate extremes. *Nat.*
11 *Clim. Chang.* 2014 44,.
- 12 Meikle, M., J. Wilson, and T. Jafry, 2016: Climate justice: between Mammon and Mother Earth. *Int.*
13 *J. Clim. Chang. Strateg. Manag.*, **8**, 488–504, doi:10.1108/IJCCSM-06-2015-0089.
- 14 Meinzen-dick, R., A. Quisumbing, J. Behrman, P. Biermayr-Jenzano, V. Wilde, M. Noordeloos, C.
15 Ragasa, and N. Beintema, 2010: Engendering Agricultural Research. *IFPRI Discussion Pap.*
16 *973*, 72.
- 17 Mekonnen, M. M., and A. Y. Hoekstra, 2016: Sustainability: Four billion people facing severe water
18 scarcity. *Sci. Adv.*, doi:10.1126/sciadv.1500323.
- 19 Menz, M. H. M., K. W. Dixon, and R. J. Hobbs, 2013: Hurdles and opportunities for landscape-scale
20 restoration. *Science (80-.)*, **339**, 526–527.
- 21 Mercy Corps Indonesia, and EcoMetrix Solutions Group, 2018: *Transform: Watershed*
22 *Characterization and Flood Risk Reduction Assessment*. Portland,.
- 23 Mersha, A. A., and F. Van Laerhoven, 2016: A gender approach to understanding the differentiated
24 impact of barriers to adaptation: responses to climate change in rural Ethiopia. *Reg. Environ.*
25 *Chang.*, **16**, 1701–1713, doi:10.1007/s10113-015-0921-z.
- 26 Messerli, P., A. Peeters, O. Schoenweger, and V. Nanthavong, 2015: Marginal Land or Marginal
27 People? Analysing Patterns and Processes of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions in South-East Asia.
28 *Large-Scale Land Acquisitions: Focus on South-East Asia*.
- 29 Metcalf, G. E., and D. Weisbach, 2009: The Design of a Carbon Tax. *Harvard Environ. Law Rev.*, **33**,
30 499–556, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1324854.
- 31 Metz, B., J. K. Turkson, and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Working Group III., 2000:
32 *Methodological and technological issues in technology transfer*. Published for the
33 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [by] Cambridge University Press, 466 pp.
- 34 Meyer, M. A., and J. A. Priess, 2014: Indicators of bioenergy-related certification schemes – An
35 analysis of the quality and comprehensiveness for assessing local/regional environmental
36 impacts. *Biomass and Bioenergy*, **65**, 151–169, doi:10.1016/J.BIOMBIOE.2014.03.041.
- 37 Michaelowa, K., and A. Michaelowa, 2017: Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives: Designed
38 for Effective Climate Change Mitigation? *Int. Interact.*, **43**, 129–155,
39 doi:10.1080/03050629.2017.1256110.
- 40 Michel-Kerjan, E., I. Zelenko, V. Cardenas, and D. Turgel, 2011: Catastrophe Financing for
41 Governments. *OECD Work. Pap. Financ.*, doi:10.1787/5kgcjf7wkvhb-en.
- 42 ———, J. Czajkowski, and H. Kunreuther, 2015: Could flood insurance be privatised in the United
43 States? A primer. *Geneva Pap. Risk Insur. Issues Pract.*, doi:10.1057/gpp.2014.27.
- 44 Michler, J. D., and G. E. Shively, 2015: Land Tenure, Tenure Security and Farm Efficiency: Panel
45 Evidence from the Philippines. *J. Agric. Econ.*, **66**, 155–169, doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12082.
- 46 Millar, R. J., and Coauthors, 2017: Emission budgets and pathways consistent with limiting warming

- 1 to 1.5 °C. *Nat. Geosci.*, **10**, 741–747, doi:10.1038/ngeo3031.
- 2 Millennium Assessment, 2005: *Millennium ecosystem assessment*.
- 3 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: *Ecosystems and human well-being*. 1-100 pp.
- 4 Miller, L., R. Carriveau, and S. Harper, 2018: Innovative financing for renewable energy project
5 development – recent case studies in North America. *Int. J. Environ. Stud.*, **75**, 121–134,
6 doi:10.1080/00207233.2017.1403758.
- 7 Mimura, N., R. S. Pulwarty, D. M. Duc, I. Elshinnawy, M. H. Redsteer, H. Q. Huang, J. N. Nkem,
8 and R. a. S. Rodriguez, 2014: 15. Adaptation Planning and Implementation. *Assess. Rep. 5-*
9 *Clim. Chang. 2014 Impacts, Adapt. Vulnerability. Part A Glob. Sect. Asp.*, 869–898,
10 doi:10.1029/2003JD004173.Aires.
- 11 Mobarak, A. M., and M. R. Rosenzweig, 2013: Informal risk sharing, index insurance, and risk taking
12 in developing countries. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 103 of, 375–380.
- 13 Mochizuki, J., S. Vitoontus, B. Wickramarachchi, S. Hochrainer-Stigler, K. Williges, R. Mechler, and
14 R. Sovann, 2015: Operationalizing iterative risk management under limited information: Fiscal
15 and economic risks due to natural disasters in Cambodia. *Int. J. Disaster Risk Sci.*, **6**, 321–334,
16 doi:10.1007/s13753-015-0069-y.
- 17 Modarres, R., A. Sarhadi, and D. H. Burn, 2016: Changes of extreme drought and flood events in
18 Iran. *Glob. Planet. Change*, **144**, 67–81, doi:10.1016/j.gloplacha.2016.07.008.
- 19 Mohammed, A., and Coauthors, 2018: Assessing drought vulnerability and adaptation among farmers
20 in Gadaref region, Eastern Sudan. *Land use policy*, **70**, 402–413,
21 doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.11.027.
- 22 Moleele, N. M., S. Ringrose, W. Matheson, and C. Vanderpost, 2002: More woody plants? the status
23 of bush encroachment in Botswana’s grazing areas. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **64**, 3–11,
24 doi:10.1006/JEMA.2001.0486.
- 25 van der Molen, P., and D. Mitchell, 2016: Climate change, land use and land surveyors. *Surv. Rev.*,
26 **48**, 148–155, doi:10.1179/1752270615Y.0000000029.
- 27 Mollenkamp, S., and B. Kasten, 2009: Institutional Adaptation to Climate Change: The Current Status
28 and Future Strategies in the Elbe Basin, Germany. *Climate change adaptation in the water*
29 *sector*, 227–249.
- 30 Molotoks, A., M. Kuhnert, T. Dawson, and P. Smith, 2017: Global Hotspots of Conflict Risk between
31 Food Security and Biodiversity Conservation. *Land*, doi:10.3390/land6040067.
- 32 Monchuk, V., 2014: Reducing Poverty and Investing in People The New Role of Safety Nets in
33 Africa Human Development. *World Bank*,.
- 34 Montanarella, L., 2015: The Importance of Land Restoration for Achieving a Land Degradation-
35 Neutral World. *Land Restoration: Reclaiming Landscapes for a Sustainable Future*, 249–258.
- 36 Moore, C. T., E. V. Lonsdorf, M. G. Knutson, H. P. Laskowski, and S. K. Lor, 2011: Adaptive
37 management in the U.S. National Wildlife Refuge System: Science-management partnerships
38 for conservation delivery. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **92**, 1395–1402,
39 doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.10.065.
- 40 Moore, F. C., and D. B. Diaz, 2015: Temperature impacts on economic growth warrant stringent
41 mitigation policy. **5**, 127–132, doi:10.1038/NCLIMATE2481.
- 42 Moran, D., 2011: Marginal Abatement Cost Curves for UK Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Emissions.
43 *J. Agric. Econ.*, **62**, 93–118.
- 44 Moroni, S., 2018: Property as a human right and property as a special title. Rediscussing private
45 ownership of land. *Land use policy*, **70**, 273–280, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2017.10.037.
- 46 Morrissey, J., and A. Oliver-Smith, 2013: *Perspectives on Non-Economic Loss and Damage*.

- 1 Morton, J. F., 2007: The impact of climate change on smallholder and subsistence agriculture. *Proc.*
2 *Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, **104**, 19680–19685, doi:10.1073/pnas.0701855104.
- 3 Mostert, E., C. Pahl-Wostl, Y. Rees, B. Searle, D. Tàbara, and J. Tippett, 2007: Social learning in
4 European river-basin management: Barriers and fostering mechanisms from 10 river basins.
5 *Ecol. Soc.*, **12**, doi:19.
- 6 Mowo, J., Z. Adimassu, D. Catacutan, J. Tanui, K. Masuki, and C. Lyamchai, 2013: The Importance
7 of Local Traditional Institutions in the Management of Natural Resources in the Highlands of
8 East Africa. *Hum. Organ.*, **72**, 154–163, doi:10.17730/humo.72.2.e1x3101741127x35.
- 9 Munang, R., I. Thiaw, K. Alverson, M. Mumba, J. Liu, and M. Rivington, 2013: Climate change and
10 Ecosystem-based Adaptation: A new pragmatic approach to buffering climate change impacts.
11 *Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain.*, **5**, 67–71, doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2012.12.001.
- 12 Munthali, K., and Y. Murayama, 2013: Interdependences between Smallholder Farming and
13 Environmental Management in Rural Malawi: A Case of Agriculture-Induced Environmental
14 Degradation in Malingunde Extension Planning Area (EPA). *Land*, doi:10.3390/land2020158.
- 15 Muradian, R., and L. Rival, 2012: Between markets and hierarchies: the challenge of governing
16 ecosystem services. *Ecosyst. Serv.*, **1**, 93–100.
- 17 Murphy, K., G. A. Kirkman, S. Seres, and E. Haites, 2015: Technology transfer in the CDM: an
18 updated analysis. *Clim. Policy*, **15**, 127–145, doi:10.1080/14693062.2013.812719.
- 19 Murray, B. C., R. G. Newell, and W. A. Pizer, 2009: Balancing cost and emissions certainty: An
20 allowance reserve for cap-and-trade. *Review of Environmental Economics and Policy*, Vol. 3 of,
21 84–103.
- 22 Mustalahti, I., and O. S. Rakotonarivo, 2014: REDD+ and Empowered Deliberative Democracy:
23 Learning from Tanzania. *World Dev.*, **59**, 199–211, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.01.022.
- 24 Myers, B., Wiendiyati, S. Pickering, and V. Tennisanna, 2014: Food security of households with
25 access to subsidized rice in west Timor where maize is the traditional staple. *Food Secur.*, **6**,
26 385–395, doi:10.1007/s12571-014-0353-5.
- 27 Myers, S. S., L. Gaffikin, C. D. Golden, R. S. Ostfeld, K. H. Redford, T. H. Ricketts, W. R. Turner,
28 and S. A. Osofsky, 2013: Human health impacts of ecosystem alteration. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*
29 *U. S. A.*, **110**, 18753–18760, doi:10.1073/pnas.1218656110.
- 30 Naeem, S., and Coauthors, 2015: Get the science right when paying for nature’s services. *Science (80-*
31 *.)*, **347**, 1206–1207.
- 32 Nagendra, H., and E. Ostrom, 2012: Polycentric governance of multifunctional forested landscapes.
33 *Int. J. Commons*, **6**, 104–133, doi:10.18352/ijc.321.
- 34 Nakhooda, S., C. Watson, and L. Schalatek, 2016: The Global Climate Finance Architecture. *Clim.*
35 *Financ. Fundam.*, **5**.
- 36 Nalau, J., and J. Handmer, 2015: When is transformation a viable policy alternative? *Environ. Sci.*
37 *Policy*, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.07.022.
- 38 Naudts, K., Y. Chen, M. J. McGrath, J. Ryder, A. Valade, J. Otto, and S. Luysaert, 2016: Europe’s
39 forest management did not mitigate climate warming. *Science*, **351**, 597–600,
40 doi:10.1126/science.aad7270.
- 41 Navarro, L. M., and H. M. Pereira, 2015: Rewilding abandoned landscapes in Europe. *Rewilding*
42 *European Landscapes*.
- 43 Ndegwa, G. M., U. Nehren, F. Grüninger, M. Iiyama, and D. Anhof, 2016: Charcoal production
44 through selective logging leads to degradation of dry woodlands: a case study from Mutomo
45 District, Kenya. *J. Arid Land*, **8**, 618–631, doi:10.1007/s40333-016-0124-6.
- 46 Nelson, G. C., and Coauthors, 2006: Anthropogenic drivers of ecosystem change: An overview. *Ecol.*

- 1 *Soc.*, **11**, doi:10.5751/ES-01826-110229.
- 2 Nelson, R., M. Howden, and M. S. Smith, 2008: Using adaptive governance to rethink the way
3 science supports Australian drought policy. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **11**, 588–601,
4 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2008.06.005.
- 5 Nelson, R., P. Kokic, S. Crimp, P. Martin, H. Meinke, S. M. Howden, P. de Voil, and U. Nidumolu,
6 2010: The vulnerability of Australian rural communities to climate variability and change: Part
7 II-Integrating impacts with adaptive capacity. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **13**, 18–27,
8 doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2009.09.007.
- 9 Neubersch, D., H. Held, and A. Otto, 2014: Operationalizing climate targets under learning: An
10 application of cost-risk analysis. *Clim. Change*, **126**, 305–318, doi:10.1007/s10584-014-1223-z.
- 11 Neufeldt, H., and Coauthors, 2013: Beyond climate-smart agriculture: toward safe operating spaces
12 for global food systems. *Agric. Food Secur.*, **2**, (30 August 2013), doi:10.1186/2048-7010-2-12.
- 13 Newell, P., and O. Taylor, 2017: Contested landscapes: the global political economy of climate-smart
14 agriculture. *J. Peasant Stud.*, **0**, 1–22, doi:10.1080/03066150.2017.1324426.
- 15 ———, and ———, 2018: Contested landscapes: the global political economy of climate-smart
16 agriculture. *J. Peasant Stud.*, **45**, 108–129, doi:10.1080/03066150.2017.1324426.
- 17 Newig, J., D. Gunther, and C. Pahl-Wostl, 2010: Synapses in the Network : Learning in Governance
18 Networks in the. *Ecol. Soc.*, **15**, 24, doi:10.1197/jamia.M2338.
- 19 Nguyen, T., and J. Lindenmeier, 2014: Catastrophe risks, cat bonds and innovation resistance. *Qual.*
20 *Res. Financ. Mark.*, **6**, 75–92, doi:10.1108/QRFM-06-2012-0020.
- 21 Niang, I., O.C. Ruppel, M.A. Abdrabo, A. Essel, C. Lennard, J. Padgham, and P. Urquhart
22 Niang, I., O.C. Ruppel, M.A. Abdrabo, A. Essel, C. Lennard, J. Padgham, and P. U., 2013: Africa.
23 *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects.*
24 *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental*
25 *Panel on Climate Change*, 1199–1265.
- 26 Niang, I., O. C. Ruppel, M. A. Abdrabo, A. Essel, and and P. U. L. J. Padgham, 2014: Human
27 Security. *Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and*
28 *Sectoral Aspects*, Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 755–791.
- 29 Nieto-Romero, M., A. Milcu, J. Leventon, F. Mikulcak, and J. Fischer, 2016: The role of scenarios in
30 fostering collective action for sustainable development: Lessons from central Romania. *Land use*
31 *policy*, **50**, 156–168, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2015.09.013.
- 32 Niggli, U., 2015: Sustainability of organic food production: Challenges and innovations. *Proceedings*
33 *of the Nutrition Society*.
- 34 Nikolakis, W., S. Akter, and H. Nelson, 2016: The effect of communication on individual preferences
35 for common property resources: A case study of two Canadian First Nations. *Land use policy*,
36 **58**, 70–82, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2016.07.007.
- 37 Nilsson, C., and K. Berggren, 2000: Alterations of Riparian Ecosystems Caused by River Regulation:
38 Dam operations have caused global-scale ecological changes in riparian ecosystems. How to
39 protect river environments and human needs of rivers remains one of the most important
40 questions of ou. *AIBS Bull.*, **50**, 783–792.
- 41 Nilsson, M., and Å. Persson, 2012: Can Earth system interactions be governed? Governance functions
42 for linking climate change mitigation with land use, freshwater and biodiversity protection. *Ecol.*
43 *Econ.*, **75**, 61–71, doi:10.1016/J.ECOLECON.2011.12.015.
- 44 Nilsson, M., D. Griggs, and M. Visbeck, 2016a: Map the interactions between Sustainable
45 Development Goa. *Nature*, **534**, 320–322, doi:10.1038/534320a.
- 46 Nilsson, M., D. Griggs, and M. Visbeck, 2016b: Map the interactions between sustainable
47 development goals: Mans Nilsson, Dave Griggs and Martin Visbeck present a simple way of

- 1 rating relationships between the targets to highlight priorities for integrated policy. *Nature*, **534**,
2 320–323.
- 3 —, —, —, M. Visback, and M. Visbeck, 2016c: Map the interactions between sustainable
4 development goals: Mans Nilsson, Dave Griggs and Martin Visbeck present a simple way of
5 rating relationships between the targets to highlight priorities for integrated policy. *Nature*, **534**,
6 320–323, doi:10.1038/534320a.
- 7 Nischalke, S. M., 2015: Adaptation Options Adaptation options to Improve Food Security in a
8 Changing Climate in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan Region. *Handbook of Climate Change*
9 *Adaptation*, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1423–1442.
- 10 Nkoana, E. M., T. Waas, A. Verbruggen, C. J. Burman, and J. Hugé, 2017: Analytic framework for
11 assessing participation processes and outcomes of climate change adaptation tools. *Environ.*
12 *Dev. Sustain.*, **19**, 1731–1760, doi:10.1007/s10668-016-9825-4.
- 13 Nkonya, E., J. von Braun, A. Mirzabaev, Q. B. Le, H. Y. Kwon, and O. Kirui, 2013: Economics of
14 Land Degradation Initiative: Methods and Approach for Global and National Assessments.
15 *SSRN Electron. J.*, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2343636.
- 16 Noble, I. R., S. Huq, Y. a. Anokhin, J. Carmin, D. Goudou, F. P. Lansigan, B. Osman-Elasha, and A.
17 Villamizar, 2014: *IPCC 5th report - WGII: Adaptation Needs and Options*. 833-868 pp.
- 18 Nobre, C. A., G. Sampaio, L. S. Borma, J. C. Castilla-Rubio, J. S. Silva, and M. Cardoso, 2016: Land-
19 use and climate change risks in the Amazon and the need of a novel sustainable development
20 paradigm. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, doi:10.1073/pnas.1605516113.
- 21 Nordaas, R., and N. P. Gleditsch, 2015: Climate change and conflict. *Compet. Conflicts Resour. Use*,
22 **26**, 21–38, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-10954-1_3.
- 23 Nordhaus, W., 2014: Estimates of the social cost of carbon: concepts and results from the DICE-
24 2013R model and alternative approaches. *J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ.*, **1**, 273–312.
- 25 Nordhaus, W. D., 1999: Roll the DICE Again: The Economics of Global Warming. *Draft Version*, **28**,
26 1999.
- 27 Norström, A., and Coauthors, 2014: Three necessary conditions for establishing effective Sustainable
28 Development Goals in the Anthropocene. *Ecol. Soc.*, **19**.
- 29 Nugent, R., M. Y. Bertram, S. Jan, L. W. Niessen, F. Sassi, D. T. Jamison, E. G. Pier, and R.
30 Beaglehole, 2018: Investing in non-communicable disease prevention and management to
31 advance the Sustainable Development Goals. *The Lancet*.
- 32 Nuhoff-Isakhanyan, G., E. Wubben, and S. W. F. Omta, 2016: Sustainability Benefits and Challenges
33 of Inter-Organizational Collaboration in Bio-Based Business: A Systematic Literature Review.
34 *Sustainability*, **8**, 307, doi:10.3390/su8040307.
- 35 Nyong, A., F. Adesina, and B. Osman Elasha, 2007a: The value of indigenous knowledge in climate
36 change mitigation and adaptation strategies in the African Sahel. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob.*
37 *Chang.*, **12**, 787–797, doi:10.1007/s11027-007-9099-0.
- 38 —, —, and —, 2007b: The value of indigenous knowledge in climate change mitigation and
39 adaptation strategies in the African Sahel. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang.*, **12**, 787–797,
40 doi:10.1007/s11027-007-9099-0.
- 41 Nyström, M., and Coauthors, 2012: Confronting Feedbacks of Degraded Marine Ecosystems.
42 *Ecosystems*, **15**, 695–710, doi:10.1007/s10021-012-9530-6.
- 43 O’ Brien, K., and Coauthors, 2012: Toward a sustainable and resilient future. *Managing the Risks of*
44 *Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the*
45 *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, Vol. 9781107025 of, 437–486.
- 46 O’Brien, C.O., Scott, Z., Smith, G., Barca, V., Kardan, A., Holmes, R. Watson, C., 2018: *Shock-*
47 *Responsive Social Protection Systems Research Synthesis REport*.

- 1 O'Halloran, T. L., and R. M. Bright, 2017: More diverse benefits from timber versus dedicated
2 bioenergy plantations for terrestrial carbon dioxide removal. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **12**, 021001,
3 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa54ec.
- 4 Oba, G., 1994: THE IMPORTANCE OF PASTORALISTS' INDIGENOUS COPING STRATEGIES
5 FOR PLANNING DROUGHT MANAGEMENT IN THE ARID ZONE OF KENYA. *Nomad.*
6 *People.*, **5**, 89–119, doi:10.2307/43123620.
- 7 Obergassel, W., 2017: Shaping the Paris mechanisms part II : an update on submissions on article 6 of
8 the Paris Agreement.
- 9 Ockwell, D., A. Sagar, and H. de Coninck, 2015: Collaborative research and development
10 (R&D) for climate technology transfer and uptake in developing countries: towards a needs
11 driven approach. *Clim. Change*, **131**, 401–415, doi:10.1007/s10584-014-1123-2.
- 12 OECD, 2014: *Social Institutions and Gender Index*. Paris, France,.
- 13 Oels, A., 2013: Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency.
14 *Geoforum*, **45**, 17–29, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.09.007.
- 15 Oglethorpe, J., Ericson, J., Bilsborrow, R.E. and Edmond, J., 2007: People on the Move: Reducing the
16 Impact of Human Migration on Biodiversity. *World Wildl. Fund Conserv. Int. Found.*,
17 doi:10.13140/2.1.2987.0083.
18 [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267327782_People_on_the_Move_Reducing_the_Imp](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267327782_People_on_the_Move_Reducing_the_Impact_of_Human_Migration_on_Biodiversity)
19 [act_of_Human_Migration_on_Biodiversity](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267327782_People_on_the_Move_Reducing_the_Impact_of_Human_Migration_on_Biodiversity) (Accessed May 22, 2018).
- 20 Ojea, E., 2015: Challenges for mainstreaming Ecosystem-based Adaptation into the international
21 climate agenda. *Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain.*, **14**, 41–48, doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2015.03.006.
- 22 Olhoff, A., 2015: Adaptation in the context of technology development and transfer. *Clim. Policy*, **15**,
23 163–169, doi:10.1080/14693062.2014.873665.
- 24 Olsson, A., S. Grö Nkvist, M. Rten Lind, and J. Yan, 2016: The elephant in the room – A comparative
25 study of uncertainties in carbon offsets. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.11.004.
- 26 Olsson, P., L. H. Gunderson, S. R. Carpenter, P. Ryan, L. Lebel, C. Folke, and C. S. Holling, 2006:
27 Shooting the rapids: Navigating transitions to adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.
28 *Ecol. Soc.*, **11**, doi:18.
- 29 Oppenheimer, M., and Coauthors, 2015: Emergent risks and key vulnerabilities. *Climate Change*
30 *2014 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects*, 1039–1100.
- 31 —, C. M. Little, and R. M. Cooke, 2016: Expert judgement and uncertainty quantification for
32 climate change. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 445–451, doi:10.1038/nclimate2959.
- 33 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008: *Economic aspects of adaptation to*
34 *climate change: Costs, benefits and policy instruments*. 133 pp.
- 35 Osei-Tutu, P., M. Pregernig, and B. Pokorny, 2014: Legitimacy of informal institutions in
36 contemporary local forest management: insights from Ghana. *Biodivers. Conserv.*, **23**, 3587–
37 3605, doi:10.1007/s10531-014-0801-8.
- 38 Oshiek, A., 2015: Conflict and Forest Resources in Darfur. *Food Agric. Organ. United Nations*, 62–
39 66.
- 40 Ostrom, E., 1998: A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action. *Am. Polit.*
41 *Sci. Rev.*, **92**, 1–22, doi:10.2307/2585925.
- 42 —, 2010: Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems. *Am.*
43 *Econ. Rev.*, **100**, 641–672, doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.641.
- 44 —, 2011: Background on the Institutional Analysis and. *Policy Stud. J.*, **39**, 7–27,
45 doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2010.00394.x.
- 46 Van Oudenhoven, A. P. E., K. Petz, R. Alkemade, L. Hein, and R. S. de Groot, 2012: Framework for

- 1 systematic indicator selection to assess effects of land management on ecosystem services. *Ecol.*
2 *Indic.*, **21**, 110–122.
- 3 Outka, U., 2012: Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy. *Vanderbilt Law*
4 *Rev.*, **65**, 1679–1721.
- 5 Owen, R., G. Brennan, and F. Lyon, 2018: Enabling investment for the transition to a low carbon
6 economy: government policy to finance early stage green innovation. *Curr. Opin. Environ.*
7 *Sustain.*, **31**, 137–145, doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2018.03.004.
- 8 Pacheco, P., R. Pocard-Chapuis, I. Garcia Drigo, M.-G. Piketty, and M. Thales, 2016: Linking
9 sustainable production and enhanced landscape governance in the Amazon: towards territorial
10 certification (TerraCert).
- 11 Pahl-Wostl, C., 2009: A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and multi-level
12 learning processes in resource governance regimes. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **19**, 354–365,
13 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.06.001.
- 14 ———, 2017: An Evolutionary Perspective on Water Governance: From Understanding to
15 Transformation. *Water Resour. Manag.*, **31**, 2917–2932, doi:10.1007/s11269-017-1727-1.
- 16 ———, J. Sendzimir, P. Jeffrey, J. Aerts, G. Berkamp, and K. Cross, 2007: Managing change toward
17 adaptive water management through social learning. *Ecol. Soc.*, **12**, doi:30.
- 18 ———, C. Vörösmarty, A. Bhaduri, J. Bogardi, J. Rockström, and J. Alcamo, 2013: Towards a
19 sustainable water future: shaping the next decade of global water research. *Curr. Opin. Environ.*
20 *Sustain.*, **5**, 708–714, doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2013.10.012.
- 21 Palomo, I., M. R. Felipe-Lucia, E. M. Bennett, B. Martín-López, and U. Pascual, 2016: *Disentangling*
22 *the Pathways and Effects of Ecosystem Service Co-Production*. 1st ed. Elsevier Ltd., 245-283
23 pp.
- 24 Pannell, D., 2008: Public Benefits, Private Benefits, and Policy Mechanism Choice for Land-Use
25 Change for Environmental Benefits. *Land Econ.*, **84**, 225–240.
- 26 Papaioannou, K. J., 2016: Climate shocks and conflict: Evidence from colonial Nigeria. *Polit. Geogr.*,
27 **50**, 33–47, doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.07.001.
- 28 Paracchini, M. L., T. P. Correia, I. Loupa-Ramos, C. Capitani, and L. Madeira, 2016: Progress in
29 indicators to assess agricultural landscape valuation: How and what is measured at different
30 levels of governance. *Land use policy*, doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.05.025.
- 31 Park, S. E., N. . Marshall, E. Jakku, A. . Dowd, S. . Howden, E. Mendham, and A. Fleming, 2012:
32 Informing adaptation responses through theories of transformation. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **22**,
33 115–126.
- 34 Parry, M.; Canziani, O.; Palutikof, J.; van der Linden, P.; Hanson, C., 2007: Climate Change 2007:
35 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. *IPPC Clim. Chang. 2007 Impacts, Adapt. Vulnerability*,
36 976, doi:10.2134/jeq2008.0015br.
- 37 Parry, M., N. Arnell, P. Berry, D. Dodman, and S. Fankhauser, 2009: Adaptation to climate change:
38 Assessing the costs. *Environment*, **51**, 29–36.
- 39 Pascual, U., and Coauthors, 2017: Valuing nature’s contributions to people: the IPBES approach.
40 *Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain.*, **26–27**, 7–16, doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2016.12.006.
- 41 Patterson, J., and Coauthors, 2017: Exploring the governance and politics of transformations towards
42 sustainability. *Environ. Innov. Soc. Transitions*, **24**, 1–16, doi:10.1016/j.eist.2016.09.001.
- 43 Pauw, P., and A. Pegels, 2013: Private sector engagement in climate change adaptation in least
44 developed countries: an exploration. *Clim. Dev.*, **5**, 257–267,
45 doi:10.1080/17565529.2013.826130.
- 46 Paz, S., and J. C. Semenza, 2016: El Niño and climate change—contributing factors in the dispersal of

- 1 Zika virus in the Americas? *Lancet*, **387**, 745, doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00256-7.
- 2 Pecl, G. T., and Coauthors, 2017: Biodiversity redistribution under climate change: Impacts on
3 ecosystems and human well-being. *Science* (80-.), **355**, eaai9214, doi:10.1126/science.aai9214.
- 4 Pedrick, C., 2012: *Strategies for Combating Climate Change in Drylands Agriculture*. The
5 International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) and CGIAR
6 Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), 36pp pp.
- 7 Peel, J., and H. M. Osofsky, 2017: A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?†. *Transnational*
8 *Environmental Law*.
- 9 Pelling, M., 2007: Learning from others: The scope and challenges for participatory disaster risk
10 assessment. *Disasters*, **31**, 373–385, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7717.2007.01014.x.
- 11 —, 2012: *The vulnerability of cities: Natural disasters and social resilience*. Routledge, 1-212 pp.
- 12 Pereira, H. M., and Coauthors, 2010: Scenarios for global biodiversity in the 21st century. *Science*
13 (80-.), **330**, 1496–1501, doi:10.1126/science.1196624.
- 14 Perrings, C., A. Duraiappah, A. Larigauderie, and H. Mooney, 2011: Ecology. The biodiversity and
15 ecosystem services science-policy interface. *Science*, **331**, 1139–1140,
16 doi:10.1126/science.1202400.
- 17 Perry, J., 2015: Climate change adaptation in the world’s best places: A wicked problem in need of
18 immediate attention. *Landsc. Urban Plan.*, **133**, 1–11.
- 19 Pielke, R. A., G. Marland, R. A. Betts, T. N. Chase, J. L. Eastman, J. O. Niles, D. d. S. Niyogi, and S.
20 W. Running, 2002: The influence of land-use change and landscape dynamics on the climate
21 system: relevance to climate-change policy beyond the radiative effect of greenhouse gases.
22 *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A Math. Phys. Eng. Sci.*, **360**, 1705–1719, doi:10.1098/rsta.2002.1027.
- 23 Pieraccini, M., 2015: Rethinking participation in environmental decision-making: Epistemologies of
24 marine conservation in South-East England. *J. Environ. Law*, **27**, 45–67, doi:10.1093/jel/equ035.
- 25 PIMBERT, M., 2015: Agroecology as an Alternative Vision to Conventional Development and
26 Climate-smart Agriculture. *Development*, **58**, 286–298, doi:10.1057/s41301-016-0013-5.
- 27 Pistorius, T., S. Reinecke, and A. Carrapatoso, 2017: A historical institutionalist view on merging
28 LULUCF and REDD+ in a post-2020 climate agreement. *Int. Environ. Agreements Polit. Law*
29 *Econ.*, **17**, 623–638, doi:10.1007/s10784-016-9330-0.
- 30 Plambeck, E. L., C. Hope, and J. Anderson, 1997: The Page95 model: Integrating the science and
31 economics of global warming. *Energy Econ.*, **19**, 77–101, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
32 9883(96)01008-0.
- 33 Platteau, J. P., 2005: The Gradual Erosion of the Social Security Function of Customary Land Tenure
34 Arrangements in Lineage-based Societies. *Insurance Against Poverty*.
- 35 Plummer, R., and J. Baird, 2013: Adaptive co-management for climate change adaptation:
36 Considerations for the barents region. *Sustain.*, **5**, 629–642, doi:10.3390/su5020629.
- 37 Poff, N. L., and Coauthors, 2003: River flows and water wars: emerging science for environmental
38 decision making. *Front. Ecol. Environ.*, **1**, 298–306, doi:10.1890/1540-
39 9295(2003)001[0298:RFAWWE]2.0.CO;2.
- 40 Poff, N. L., and Coauthors, 2016: Sustainable water management under future uncertainty with eco-
41 engineering decision scaling. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 25–34, doi:10.1038/nclimate2765.
- 42 Popp, A., and Coauthors, 2017: Land-use futures in the shared socio-economic pathways. *Glob.*
43 *Environ. Chang.*, **42**, 331–345, doi:10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2016.10.002.
- 44 Porter, J. R., L. Xie, A. J. Challinor, K. Cochrane, S. M. Howden, M. M. Iqbal, D. B. Lobell, and M.
45 I. Travasso, 2014: Food security and food production systems. *Climate Change 2014: Impacts,*
46 *Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working*

- 1 *Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,*
2 485–533.
- 3 Potts, S. G., and Coauthors, 2016: Summary for policymakers of the assessment report of the
4 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services on
5 pollinators, pollination and food production.
- 6 Poudyal, M., B. S. Ramamonjisoa, N. Hockley, O. S. Rakotonarivo, J. M. Gibbons, R.
7 Mandimbiniaina, A. Rasoamanana, and J. P. G. Jones, 2016: Can REDD+ social safeguards
8 reach the “right” people? Lessons from Madagascar. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **37**, 31–42,
9 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.01.004.
- 10 Power, A. G., 2010: Ecosystem services and agriculture: tradeoffs and synergies. *Philos. Trans. R.*
11 *Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci.*, **365**, 2959–2971, doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0143.
- 12 Pretis, F., F. Pretis, M. Schwarz, K. Tang, K. Haustein, and M. R. Allen, 2018: Subject Areas : Author
13 for correspondence : Uncertain impacts on economic growth when stabilizing global
14 temperatures at 1 . 5 ° C or 2 ° C warming.
- 15 Priefer, C., J. Jörissen, and O. Frör, 2017: Pathways to Shape the Bioeconomy. *Resources*, **6**, 10,
16 doi:10.3390/resources6010010.
- 17 Programme, W. F., 2018: *Food Security Climate RESilience Facility (FoodSECuRE)*.
- 18 Prokopy, L. S., K. Floress, D. Klotthor-Weinkauff, and A. Baumgart-Getz, 2008: Determinants of
19 agricultural best management practice adoption: Evidence from the literature. *J. Soil Water*
20 *Conserv.*, **63**, 300–311, doi:10.2489/jswc.63.5.300.
- 21 Prokopy, L. S., J. G. Arbuckle, A. P. Barnes, V. R. Haden, A. Hogan, M. T. Niles, and J. Tyndall,
22 2015: Farmers and Climate Change: A Cross-National Comparison of Beliefs and Risk
23 Perceptions in High-Income Countries. *Environ. Manage.*, **56**, 492–504, doi:10.1007/s00267-
24 015-0504-2.
- 25 Puma, M. J., S. Bose, S. Y. Chon, and B. I. Cook, 2015a: Assessing the evolving fragility of the
26 global food system. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/10/2/024007.
- 27 ———, ———, ———, and ———, 2015b: Assessing the evolving fragility of the global food system.
28 *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **10**, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/10/2/024007.
- 29 Qasim, S., R. P. Shrestha, G. P. Shivakoti, and N. K. Tripathi, 2011: Socio-economic determinants of
30 land degradation in Pishin sub-basin, Pakistan. *Int. J. Sustain. Dev. World Ecol.*, **18**, 48–54,
31 doi:10.1080/13504509.2011.543844.
- 32 Quan, J., and N. Dyer, 2008: Climate change and land tenure: The implications of climate change for
33 land tenure and land policy. *FAO L. Tenure Work. Pap.*,.
- 34 ———, L. O. Naess, A. Newsham, A. Siteo, and M. C. Fernandez, 2017: The political economy of
35 REDD+ in mozambique: Implications for climate compatible development. *Mak. Clim. Compat.*
36 *Dev. Happen*, 151–181, doi:10.4324/9781315621579.
- 37 Quay, R., 2010: Anticipatory Governance. *J. Am. Plan. Assoc.*, **76**, 496–511,
38 doi:10.1080/01944363.2010.508428.
- 39 Le Quesne, F., 2017: The role of insurance in integrated disaster and climate risk management:
40 Evidence and lessons learned. *UNU-EHS Publ. Ser.*,.
- 41 Rahman, M.M., Khan, M.N.I., Hoque, A.K.F., Ahmed, I., 2014: Carbon stockin the Sundarbans
42 mangrove forest: spatial variations in vegetation types and salinity zones. *Wetl. Ecol. Manag.*,.
- 43 Rahman, H. M. T., S. K. Sarker, G. M. Hickey, M. Mohasinul Haque, and N. Das, 2014: Informal
44 Institutional Responses to Government Interventions: Lessons from Madhupur National Park,
45 Bangladesh. *Environ. Manage.*, **54**, 1175–1189, doi:10.1007/s00267-014-0325-8.
- 46 Rajamani, L., 2011: The cancan climate agreements: Reading the text, subtext and tea leaves. *Int.*

- 1 *Comp. Law Q.*, **60**, 499–519, doi:10.1017/S0020589311000078.
- 2 Raleigh, C., and H. Urdal, 2007: Climate change, environmental degradation and armed conflict.
3 *Polit. Geogr.*, **26**, 674–694, doi:10.1016/J.POLGEO.2007.06.005.
- 4 Ramos, J. M., 2014: Anticipatory governance: Traditions and trajectories for strategic design. *J.*
5 *Futur. Stud.*, **19**, 35–52.
- 6 Ranger, N., A. Millner, S. Dietz, S. Fankhauser, A. Lopez, G. Ruta, and L. Environment Agency;
7 Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment; Centre of Climate
8 Change Economics and Policy, 2010: *Adaptation in the UK: a decision-making process*.
- 9 Rasul, G., and B. Sharma, 2016: The nexus approach to water–energy–food security: an option for
10 adaptation to climate change. *Clim. Policy*, **16**, 682–702, doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1029865.
- 11 Rauken, T., P. K. Mydske, and M. Winsvold, 2014: Mainstreaming climate change adaptation at the
12 local level. *Local Environ.*, **20**, 408–423, doi:10.1080/13549839.2014.880412.
- 13 Raza, W., and E. Poel, 2016: Impact and spill-over effects of an asset transfer program on
14 malnutrition: Evidence from a randomized control trial in Bangladesh.
15 doi:10.13140/RG.2.1.2283.0967.
- 16 Razavi, S., and L. Turquet, 2016: Progress of the world’s women 2015–2016: Transforming
17 economies, realizing rights. *Glob. Soc. Policy*, **16**, 86–93, doi:10.1177/1468018115624314.
- 18 Reed, M., and Coauthors, 2010: What is Social Learning? *Ecol. Soc.*, **15**, r1, doi:Article.
- 19 Reed, M. S., L. C. Stringer, A. J. Dougill, J. S. Perkins, J. R. Atlhopheng, K. Mulale, and N. Favretto,
20 2015: Reorienting land degradation towards sustainable land management: Linking sustainable
21 livelihoods with ecosystem services in rangeland systems. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **151**, 472–485,
22 doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.11.010.
- 23 Reganold, J. P., and J. M. Wachter, 2016: Organic agriculture in the twenty-first century. *Nat. plants*,
24 doi:10.1038/nplants.2015.221.
- 25 Reid, H., 2016: Ecosystem- and community-based adaptation : learning from community-based
26 natural resource management management. *Clim. Dev.*, **8**, 4–9,
27 doi:10.1080/17565529.2015.1034233.
- 28 Ren, Z., and Coauthors, 2016: Predicting malaria vector distribution under climate change scenarios
29 in China: Challenges for malaria elimination. *Sci. Rep.*, **6**, 20604, doi:10.1038/srep20604.
- 30 Renn, O., 2011: The social amplification/attenuation of risk framework: Application to climate
31 change. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, **2**, 154–169, doi:10.1002/wcc.99.
- 32 ———, and P. Schweizer, 2009: Inclusive Risk Governance : Concepts and. *Environ. Policy Gov.*, **19**,
33 174–185, doi:10.1002/eet.
- 34 Riahi, K., and Coauthors, 2015: Locked into Copenhagen pledges - Implications of short-term
35 emission targets for the cost and feasibility of long-term climate goals. *Technol. Forecast. Soc.*
36 *Change*, **90**, 8–23, doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.016.
- 37 Richards, M., Bruun, T.B., Campbell, B.M., Gregersen, L.E., Huyer, S. et al., 2015: *How countries*
38 *plan to address agricultural adaptation and mitigation*. 1-8 pp.
- 39 Riley, M., H. Sangster, H. Smith, R. Chiverrell, and J. Boyle, 2018: Will farmers work together for
40 conservation? The potential limits of farmers’ cooperation in agri-environment measures. *Land*
41 *use policy*, **70**, 635–646, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2017.10.049.
- 42 Ring, I., and C. Schröter-Schlaack, 2011: *Instruments mixes for biodiversity policies*. 119-144 pp.
- 43 Ringler, E., A. Pašukonis, W. T. Fitch, L. Huber, W. Hödl, and M. Ringler, 2015: Flexible
44 compensation of uniparental care: female poison frogs take over when males disappear. *Behav.*
45 *Ecol.*, **26**, 1219–1225, doi:10.1093/beheco/arv069.

- 1 del Río, P., and E. Cerdá, 2017: The missing link: The influence of instruments and design features on
2 the interactions between climate and renewable electricity policies. *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.*, **33**,
3 49–58, doi:10.1016/j.erss.2017.09.010.
- 4 Rivers, Nicholas, Schaufele, B., 2015: Salience of carbon taxes in the gasoline market. *J. Environ.*
5 *Econ. Manage.*, **74**, 23–26.
- 6 Roberts, J. T., 2017: How will we pay for loss and damage? *Ethics, Policy Environ.*, **20**, 208–226.
- 7 Robinson, B. E., M. B. Holland, and L. Naughton-Treves, 2014: Does secure land tenure save forests?
8 A meta-analysis of the relationship between land tenure and tropical deforestation. *Glob.*
9 *Environ. Chang.*, **29**, 281–293, doi:10.1016/J.GLOENVCHA.2013.05.012.
- 10 Robledo-Abad, C., and Coauthors, 2017: Bioenergy production and sustainable development: science
11 base for policymaking remains limited. *GCB Bioenergy*, **9**, 541–556, doi:10.1111/gcbb.12338.
- 12 Rocca, M. E., P. M. Brown, L. H. MacDonald, and C. M. Carrico, 2014: Climate change impacts on
13 fire regimes and key ecosystem services in Rocky Mountain forests. *For. Ecol. Manage.*, **327**,
14 290–305, doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2014.04.005.
- 15 Rochecouste, J.-F., P. Dargusch, D. Cameron, and C. Smith, 2015: An analysis of the socio-economic
16 factors influencing the adoption of conservation agriculture as a climate change mitigation
17 activity in Australian dryland grain production. *Agric. Syst.*, **135**, 20–30,
18 doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.agry.2014.12.002.
- 19 Rockström, J., and Coauthors, 2009: A safe operating space for humanity. *Nature*, **461**, 472–475,
20 doi:10.1038/461472a.
- 21 ———, and Coauthors, 2017a: Sustainable intensification of agriculture for human prosperity and
22 global sustainability. *Ambio*, **46**, 4–17.
- 23 ———, O. Gaffney, J. Rogelj, M. Meinshausen, N. Nakicenovic, and H. J. Schellnhuber, 2017b: A
24 roadmap for rapid decarbonization. *Science*, **355**, 1269–1271, doi:10.1126/science.aah3443.
- 25 Rodell, M., I. Velicogna, and J. S. Famiglietti, 2009: Satellite-based estimates of groundwater
26 depletion in India. *Nature*, **460**, 999–1002, doi:10.1038/nature08238.
- 27 Rodell, M., J. S. Famiglietti, D. N. Wiese, J. T. Reager, H. K. Beaudoin, F. W. Landerer, and M.-H.
28 Lo, 2018: Emerging trends in global freshwater availability. *Nature*, doi:10.1038/s41586-018-
29 0123-1.
- 30 Rodima-Taylor, D., M. F. Olwig, and N. Chhetri, 2012: Adaptation as innovation, innovation as
31 adaptation: An institutional approach to climate change. *Appl. Geogr.*, **33**, 107–111,
32 doi:10.1016/j.apgeog.2011.10.011.
- 33 Rodríguez, J., T. D. Beard Jr, E. Bennett, G. Cumming, S. Cork, J. Agard, A. Dobson, and G.
34 Peterson, 2006: Trade-offs across space, time, and ecosystem services. *Ecol. Soc.*, **11**.
- 35 Rogelj, J., and Coauthors, 2016: Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming
36 well below 2 °C. *Nature*, **534**, 631–639, doi:10.1038/nature18307.
- 37 Romero Manrique, D., S. Corral, and Â. Guimarães Pereira, 2018: Climate-related displacements of
38 coastal communities in the Arctic: Engaging traditional knowledge in adaptation strategies and
39 policies. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **85**, 90–100, doi:10.1016/J.ENVSCI.2018.04.007.
- 40 Rosche, D., 2016: Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals: gender equality at last? An
41 Oxfam perspective. *Gend. Dev.*, **24**, 111–126, doi:10.1080/13552074.2016.1142196.
- 42 Rosillo-Calle, F., P. de Groot, S. L. Hemstock, and J. Woods, 2015: *The Biomass Assessment*
43 *Handbook: Energy for a sustainable environment*. Taylor and Francis, 337 pp.
- 44 Rosin, C., 2013: Food security and the justification of productivism in New Zealand. *J. Rural Stud.*,
45 **29**, 50–58, doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.01.015.
- 46 Roy, J., Tschakert, P., Waisman, H., Sustainable Development, Poverty Eradication and Reducing

- 1 Inequalities. *Special Report 1.5 degrees*, IPCC, New York.
- 2 Russi, D., P. ten Brink, A. Farmer, T. Badura, D. Coates, J. Förster, R. Kumar, and N. Davidson,
3 2013: The economics of ecosystems and biodiversity for water and wetlands. *IEEP, London and*
4 *Brussels*,.
- 5 Ryan, S. J., A. McNally, L. R. Johnson, E. A. Mordecai, T. Ben-Horin, K. Paaijmans, and K. D.
6 Lafferty, 2015: Mapping Physiological Suitability Limits for Malaria in Africa Under Climate
7 Change. *Vector-Borne Zoonotic Dis.*, **15**, 718–725, doi:10.1089/vbz.2015.1822.
- 8 Salvati, L., and M. Carlucci, 2014: Zero Net Land Degradation in Italy: The role of socioeconomic
9 and agro-forest factors. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **145**, 299–306, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2014.07.006.
- 10 Samaddar, S., M. Yokomatsu, F. Dayour, M. Oteng-Ababio, T. Dzivenu, M. Adams, and H. Ishikawa,
11 2015: Evaluating Effective Public Participation in Disaster Management and Climate Change
12 Adaptation: Insights From Northern Ghana Through a User-Based Approach. *Risk, Hazards*
13 *Cris. Public Policy*, **6**, 117–143, doi:10.1002/rhc3.12075.
- 14 Samuwai, J., and J. . Hills, 2018: Assessing Climate Finance Readiness in the Asia-Pacific Region. 1–
15 18, doi:10.3390/su10041192.
- 16 Sanchez, B., 2016: Management of agricultural soils for greenhouse gas mitigation: Learning from a
17 case study in NE Spain 37-49. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **170**, 37–49.
- 18 Sánchez, B., A. Iglesias, A. McVittie, J. Álvaro-Fuentes, J. Ingram, J. Mills, J. P. Lesschen, and P. J.
19 Kuikman, 2016: Management of agricultural soils for greenhouse gas mitigation: Learning from
20 a case study in NE Spain. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **170**, 37–49,
21 doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.01.003.
- 22 Sánchez, J. M. T., and R. C. Maseda, 2016: Forcing and avoiding change. Exploring change and
23 continuity in local land-use planning in Galicia (Northwest of Spain) and The Netherlands. *Land*
24 *use policy*, **50**, 74–82, doi:10.1016/J.LANDUSEPOL.2015.09.006.
- 25 Sanderson, T., G. Hertzler, T. Capon, and P. Hayman, 2016: A real options analysis of Australian
26 wheat production under climate change. *Aust. J. Agric. Resour. Econ.*, **60**, 79–96,
27 doi:10.1111/1467-8489.12104.
- 28 Santos, J. L., L. Madureira, A. C. Ferreira, M. Espinosa, and S. Gomez y Paloma, 2016: Building an
29 empirically-based framework to value multiple public goods of agriculture at broad
30 supranational scales. *Land use policy*, doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.12.001.
- 31 Sarzynski, A., 2015: Public participation, civic capacity, and climate change adaptation in cities.
32 *Urban Clim.*, **14**, 52–67, doi:10.1016/J.UCLIM.2015.08.002.
- 33 Sassi, F., and Coauthors, 2018: Equity impacts of price policies to promote healthy behaviours. *The*
34 *Lancet*.
- 35 Sauerwald, S., and M. W. Peng, 2013: Informal institutions, shareholder coalitions, and principal-
36 principal conflicts. *Asia Pacific J. Manag.*, **30**, 853–870, doi:10.1007/s10490-012-9312-x.
- 37 Savaresi, A., 2016: Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law The Paris Agreement: a new
38 beginning? The Paris Agreement: a new beginning? *J. Energy Nat. Resour. Law*, **34**, 16–26,
39 doi:10.1080/02646811.2016.1133983.
- 40 Sayer, J. Margules, C., Boedhihartono, A., 2015: The Role of Citizen Science in Landscape and
41 Seascape Approaches to Integrating Conservation and Development. *Land*, **4**, 1200–1212.
- 42 Scarano, F. R., 2017: Ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change: concept, scalability and a role
43 for conservation science. *Perspect. Ecol. Conserv.*, **15**, 65–73, doi:10.1016/j.pecon.2017.05.003.
- 44 Scarlat, N., and J.-F. Dallemand, 2011: Recent developments of biofuels/bioenergy sustainability
45 certification: A global overview. *Energy Policy*, **39**, 1630–1646,
46 doi:10.1016/J.ENPOL.2010.12.039.

- 1 Schalatek, L., and S. Nakhooda, 2013: The Green Climate Fund. *Clim. Financ. Fundam.*, **11**, 1–4.
- 2 Scheffer, M., 2010: Foreseeing tipping points. *Nature*, **467**, 411–412, doi:10.1038/467411a.
- 3 Scheffran, J., M. Brzoska, J. Kominek, P. M. Link, and J. Schilling, 2012: Climate change and violent
4 conflict. *Science*, **336**, 869–871, doi:10.1126/science.1221339.
- 5 Schlager, E., and E. Ostrom, 1992: Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual
6 Analysis. *Land Econ.*, **68**, 249, doi:10.2307/3146375.
- 7 Schleussner, C. F., and Coauthors, 2016: Differential climate impacts for policy-relevant limits to
8 global warming: The case of 1.5 °c and 2 °c. *Earth Syst. Dyn.*, **7**, 327–351, doi:10.5194/esd-7-
9 327-2016.
- 10 Schmidhuber, J., and F. N. Tubiello, 2007: Global food security under climate change. *Proc. Natl.*
11 *Acad. Sci. U. S. A.*, **104**, 19703–19708, doi:10.1073/pnas.0701976104.
- 12 Scholze, M., W. Knorr, N. W. Arnell, and I. C. Prentice, 2006: A climate-change risk analysis for
13 world ecosystems. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, **103**, 13116–13120.
- 14 Schroth, G., P. Läderach, A. I. Martinez-Valle, C. Bunn, and L. Jassogne, 2016: Vulnerability to
15 climate change of cocoa in West Africa: Patterns, opportunities and limits to adaptation. *Sci.*
16 *Total Environ.*, doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2016.03.024.
- 17 Schultz, L., C. Folke, H. Österblom, and P. Olsson, 2015: Adaptive governance, ecosystem
18 management, and natural capital. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, doi:10.1073/pnas.1406493112.
- 19 Schuur, E. A. G., and Coauthors, 2015: Climate change and the permafrost carbon feedback. *Nature*,
20 **520**, 171–179, doi:10.1038/nature14338.
- 21 Schwartz, N. B., M. Uriarte, R. DeFries, V. H. Gutierrez-Velez, and M. A. Pinedo-Vasquez, 2017:
22 Land-use dynamics influence estimates of carbon sequestration potential in tropical second-
23 growth forest. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **12**, 074023, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aa708b.
- 24 Scotchmer, S., 2011: Cap-and-trade, emissions taxes, and innovation. *Innov. Policy Econ.*, **11**, 29–53,
25 doi:10.1086/655817.
- 26 Scott, C. A., S. A. Pierce, M. J. Pasqualetti, A. L. Jones, B. E. Montz, and J. H. Hoover, 2011: Policy
27 and institutional dimensions of the water-energy nexus. *Energy Policy*, **39**, 6622–6630,
28 doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2011.08.013.
- 29 Scott, D., C. M. Hall, and S. Gössling, 2016: A report on the Paris Climate Change Agreement and its
30 implications for tourism: Why we will always have Paris. *J. Sustain. Tour.*, **24**, 933–948.
- 31 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009: *Connecting biodiversity and climate*
32 *change mitigation and adaptation: report of the second ad hoc technical expert group on*
33 *biodiversity and climate change*. 126 pp.
- 34 Seddon, P. J., C. J. Griffiths, P. S. Soorae, and D. P. Armstrong, 2014: Reversing defaunation:
35 restoring species in a changing world. *Science*, **345**, 406–412, doi:10.1126/science.1251818.
- 36 Serrao-Neumann, S., F. Crick, B. Harman, G. Schuch, and D. L. Choy, 2015a: Maximising synergies
37 between disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation: Potential enablers for improved
38 planning outcomes. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **50**, 46–61, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2015.01.017.
- 39 —, B. Harman, A. Leitch, and D. Low Choy, 2015b: Public engagement and climate adaptation:
40 insights from three local governments in Australia. *J. Environ. Plan. Manag.*, **58**, 1196–1216,
41 doi:10.1080/09640568.2014.920306.
- 42 Seufert, V., N. Ramankutty, and T. Mayerhofer, 2017: What is this thing called organic? – How
43 organic farming is codified in regulations. *Food Policy*, doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2016.12.009.
- 44 Shackleton, S., G. Ziervogel, S. Sallu, T. Gill, and P. Tschakert, 2015: Why is socially-just climate
45 change adaptation in sub-Saharan Africa so challenging? A review of barriers identified from
46 empirical cases. *Wiley Interdiscip. Rev. Clim. Chang.*, doi:10.1002/wcc.335.

- 1 Shiferaw, B., K. Tesfaye, M. Kassie, T. Abate, B. M. Prasanna, and A. Menkir, 2014: Managing
2 vulnerability to drought and enhancing livelihood resilience in sub-Saharan Africa:
3 Technological, institutional and policy options. *Weather Clim. Extrem.*, **3**, 67–79,
4 doi:10.1016/j.wace.2014.04.004.
- 5 Siddig, E. F. A., K. El - Harizi, and B. Prato, 2007: Managing Conflict Over Natural Resources in
6 Greater Kordofan, Sudan: Some Recurrent Patterns and Governance Implications. *Int. Food*
7 *Policy Res. Cent.*.
- 8 Sidibé, Y., S. Foudi, U. Pascual, and M. Termansen, 2018: Adaptation to Climate Change in Rainfed
9 Agriculture in the Global South: Soil Biodiversity as Natural Insurance. *Ecol. Econ.*, **146**, 588–
10 596, doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.12.017.
- 11 Siebert, A., 2016: Analysis of Index Insurance Potential for Adaptation to Hydroclimatic Risks in the
12 West African Sahel. *Clim. Change*, doi:10.1007/s10584-015-1508-x.
- 13 Siegmeier, J., and Coauthors, 2018: The fiscal benefits of stringent climate change mitigation : an
14 overview. **3062**, doi:10.1080/14693062.2017.1400943.
- 15 Sietz, D., L. Fleskens, and L. C. Stringer, 2017: Learning from Non-Linear Ecosystem Dynamics Is
16 Vital for Achieving Land Degradation Neutrality. *L. Degrad. Dev.*, **28**, 2308–2314,
17 doi:10.1002/ldr.2732.
- 18 Sigurdsson, J. H., L. A. Walls, and J. L. Quigley, 2001: Bayesian belief nets for managing expert
19 judgement and modelling reliability. *Qual. Reliab. Eng. Int.*, **17**, 181–190, doi:10.1002/qre.410.
- 20 Silvertown, J., 2009: A new dawn for citizen science. 467–471, doi:10.1016/j.tree.2009.03.017.
- 21 Simberloff, D., and Coauthors, 2013: Impacts of biological invasions: what’s what and the way
22 forward. *Trends Ecol. Evol.*, **28**, 58–66, doi:10.1016/J.TREE.2012.07.013.
- 23 Singh, S. P., and M. Swanson, 2017: How issue frames shape beliefs about the importance of climate
24 change policy across ideological and partisan groups. *PLoS One*, **12**,
25 doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0181401.
- 26 Smith, C. B., 2011: Adaptive management on the central Platte River. *J Env. Manag.*, **92**, 1414–1419.
- 27 Smith, K. R., and Coauthors, 2014a: Human health: impacts, adaptation, and co-benefits. *Climate*
28 *Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects.*
29 *Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental*
30 *Panel of Climate Change*, C.B. Field et al., Eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
31 United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 709–754.
- 32 Smith, K. R., and Coauthors, 2014b: Millions Dead: How Do We Know and What Does It Mean?
33 Methods Used in the Comparative Risk Assessment of Household Air Pollution. *Annu. Rev.*
34 *Public Health*, **35**, 185–206, doi:10.1146/annurev-publhealth-032013-182356.
- 35 Smith, P., 2013: Delivering food security without increasing pressure on land. *Glob. Food Sec.*,
36 doi:10.1016/j.gfs.2012.11.008.
- 37 Smith, P., and J. E. Olesen, 2010: Synergies between the mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate
38 change in agriculture. *J. Agric. Sci.*, **148**, 543–552.
- 39 Smith, P., and Coauthors, 2015: Biophysical and economic limits to negative CO2 emissions. *Nat.*
40 *Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 42–50, doi:10.1038/nclimate2870.
- 41 Snowden, D., 2002: Complex acts of knowing: paradox and descriptive self- awareness. *J. Knowl.*
42 *Manag.*, **6**, 100–111, doi:10.1108/13673270210424639.
- 43 Soizic Le Saout, and A. S. L. R. Michael Hoffmann, Yichuan Shi, Adrian Hughes, Cyril
44 Bernard, Thomas M. Brooks, Bastian Bertzky, Stuart H.M. Butchart, Simon N. Stuart, Tim
45 Badman, 2013: Protected areas and effective biodiversity conservation. *Science (80-.)*, **342**,
46 803–805.

- 1 Somanthan, E., and Coauthors, 2014: 15. National and Sub-national Policies and Institutions. *Clim.*
2 *Chang. 2014 Mitig. Clim. Chang. Contrib. Work. Gr. III to Fifth Assess. Rep. Intergov. Panel*
3 *Clim. Chang.*, 1141–1206, doi:DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781107415416.021.
- 4 Sonnino, R., C. Lozano Torres, and S. Schneider, 2014: Reflexive governance for food security: The
5 example of school feeding in Brazil. *J. Rural Stud.*, **36**, 1–12,
6 doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.06.003.
- 7 Sovacool, B. K., 2018: Bamboo Beating Bandits: Conflict, Inequality, and Vulnerability in the
8 Political Ecology of Climate Change Adaptation in Bangladesh. *World Dev.*, **102**, 183–194,
9 doi:10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2017.10.014.
- 10 Spence, A., W. Poortinga, and N. Pidgeon, 2012: The Psychological Distance of Climate Change.
11 *Risk Anal.*, **32**, 957–972, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01695.x.
- 12 Speranza, C. I., B. Kiteme, P. Ambenje, U. Wiesmann, and S. Makali, 2010: Indigenous knowledge
13 related to climate variability and change: Insights from droughts in semi-arid areas of former
14 Makueni District, Kenya. *Clim. Change*, **100**, 295–315, doi:10.1007/s10584-009-9713-0.
- 15 Stavi, I., and R. Lal, 2015: Achieving Zero Net Land Degradation: Challenges and opportunities. *J.*
16 *Arid Environ.*, **112**, 44–51, doi:10.1016/j.jaridenv.2014.01.016.
- 17 Stavropoulou, M., R. Holmes, and N. Jones, 2017: Harnessing informal institutions to strengthen
18 social protection for the rural poor. *Glob. Food Sec.*, **12**, 73–79, doi:10.1016/j.gfs.2016.08.005.
- 19 Stern, N., 2016: Economics: current climate models are grossly misleading. *Nature*, **530**, 407–409.
- 20 Stone, J., J. Barclay, P. Simmons, P. D. Cole, S. C. Loughlin, P. Ramón, and P. Mothes, 2014: Risk
21 reduction through community-based monitoring: the vigías of Tungurahua, Ecuador. *J. Appl.*
22 *Volcanol.*, **3**, 11, doi:10.1186/s13617-014-0011-9.
- 23 Storey, B., I. Noy, W. Townsend, S. Kerr, R. Salmon, D. Middleton, O. Filippova, and V. James,
24 2015: INSURANCE, HOUSING AND CLIMATE ADAPTATION: CURRENT
25 KNOWLEDGE AND FUTURE RESEARCH SUMMARY HAIKU. *Motu Note*, **27**.
- 26 Strassburg, B. B. N., and Coauthors, 2010: Global congruence of carbon storage and biodiversity in
27 terrestrial ecosystems. *Conserv. Lett.*, **3**, 98–105, doi:10.1111/j.1755-263X.2009.00092.x.
- 28 Streck, C., A. Howard, and R. Rajão, 2017: *Options for Enhancing REDD+ Collaboration in the*
29 *Context of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement*. Washington, DC, 22 pp.
- 30 Stringer, L. C., and A. J. Dougill, 2013: Channelling science into policy: Enabling best practices from
31 research on land degradation and sustainable land management in dryland Africa. *J. Environ.*
32 *Manage.*, **114**, 328–335, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.10.025.
- 33 Sturm, M., M. . Goldstein, H. P. Huntington, and T. . Douglas, 2017: Using an option pricing
34 approach to evaluate strategic decisions in a rapidly changing climate: Black – Scholes and
35 climate change. *Clim. Change*, **140**.
- 36 Suckall, N., L. C. Stringer, and E. L. Tompkins, 2015: Presenting Triple-Wins? Assessing Projects
37 That Deliver Adaptation, Mitigation and Development Co-benefits in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa.
38 *Ambio*, **44**, 34–41, doi:10.1007/s13280-014-0520-0.
- 39 Suk, S., S. Y. Lee, and Y. S. Jeong, 2017: The Korean emissions trading scheme: business
40 perspectives on the early years of operations. *Climate Policy*.
- 41 Sunderlin, W. D., B. Belcher, L. Santoso, A. Angelsen, P. Burgers, R. Nasi, and S. Wunder, 2005:
42 Livelihoods, forests, and conservation in developing countries: An overview. *World Dev.*, **33**,
43 1383–1402, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.10.004.
- 44 Sunderlin, W. D., and Coauthors, 2018: Creating an appropriate tenure foundation for REDD+: The
45 record to date and prospects for the future. *World Dev.*, **106**, 376–392,
46 doi:10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2018.01.010.

- 1 Surminski, S., 2016: *Submission to the UNFCCC Warsaw International Mechanism by the Loss and*
2 *Damage Network.*
- 3 Surminski, S., L. M. Bouwer, and J. Linnerooth-Bayer, 2016: How insurance can support climate
4 resilience. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 333–334, doi:10.1038/nclimate2979.
- 5 Tàbara, J. D., X. Dai, G. Jia, D. McEvoy, H. Neufeldt, A. Serra, S. Werners, and J. J. West, 2010: The
6 climate learning ladder. A pragmatic procedure to support climate adaptation. *Environ. Policy*
7 *Gov.*, **20**, 1–11, doi:10.1002/eet.530.
- 8 Takama, T., S. Tsephel, and F. X. Johnson, 2012: Evaluating the relative strength of product-specific
9 factors in fuel switching and stove choice decisions in Ethiopia. A discrete choice model of
10 household preferences for clean cooking alternatives. *Energy Econ.*, **34**, 1763–1773,
11 doi:10.1016/J.ENERCO.2012.07.001.
- 12 Tallis, H., P. Kareiva, M. Marvier, and A. Chang, 2008: An ecosystem services framework to support
13 both practical conservation and economic development. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.*, **105**, 9457–9464.
- 14 Tang, Z., L. Zhang, F. Xu, and H. Vo, 2015: Examining the role of social media in California’s
15 drought risk management in 2014. *Nat. Hazards*, **79**, 171–193, doi:10.1007/s11069-015-1835-2.
- 16 Tardieu, L., S. Roussel, and J. M. Salles, 2013: Assessing and mapping global climate regulation
17 service loss induced by Terrestrial Transport Infrastructure construction. *Ecosyst. Serv.*,
18 doi:10.1016/j.ecoser.2013.02.007.
- 19 Tayleur, C., and Coauthors, 2018: Where are commodity crops certified, and what does it mean for
20 conservation and poverty alleviation? *Biol. Conserv.*, **217**, 36–46,
21 doi:10.1016/J.BIOCON.2017.09.024.
- 22 Taylor, R. G., and Coauthors, 2013: Ground water and climate change. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **3**, 322–
23 329, doi:10.1038/nclimate1744.
- 24 Tengberg, A., F. Radstake, K. Zhang, and B. Dunn, 2016: Scaling up of Sustainable Land
25 Management in the Western People’s Republic of China: Evaluation of a 10-Year Partnership.
26 *L. Degrad. Dev.*, **27**, 134–144, doi:10.1002/ldr.2270.
- 27 Terrazas, W. C. M., V. de S. Sampaio, D. B. de Castro, R. C. Pinto, B. C. de Albuquerque, M.
28 Sadahiro, R. A. dos Passos, and J. U. Braga, 2015: Deforestation, drainage network, indigenous
29 status, and geographical differences of malaria in the State of Amazonas. *Malar. J.*, **14**, 379,
30 doi:10.1186/s12936-015-0859-0.
- 31 Tesfamariam, Y., and M. Hurlbert, 2017: Gendered adaptation of Eritrean dryland farmers. *Int. J.*
32 *Clim. Chang. Strateg. Manag.*, **9**, doi:10.1108/IJCCSM-07-2016-0096.
- 33 Tevera, D., and N. Simelane, 2014: Food for the Urban Poor: Safety Nets and Food-Based Social
34 Protection in Manzini, Swaziland. *Urban Forum*, **25**, 241–252, doi:10.1007/s12132-014-9226-4.
- 35 Thamo, T., and D. J. Pannell, 2016: Challenges in developing effective policy for soil carbon
36 sequestration: perspectives on additionality, leakage, and permanence. *Clim. Policy*, **16**, 973–
37 992, doi:10.1080/14693062.2015.1075372.
- 38 Tittonell, P., and K. E. Giller, 2013: When yield gaps are poverty traps: The paradigm of ecological
39 intensification in African smallholder agriculture. *F. Crop. Res.*, doi:10.1016/j.fcr.2012.10.007.
- 40 Tol, R. S. J., 2014: Correction and Update: The Economic Effects of Climate Change. *J. Econ.*
41 *Perspect.*, **28**, 221–226, doi:10.1257/jep.28.2.221.
- 42 Tol, R. S. J., 2018: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change. *Rev. Environ. Econ. Policy*, **12**, 4–25,
43 doi:10.1093/reep/rex027.
- 44 Tompkins, E. L., and W. N. Adger, 2004: Does Adaptive Management of Natural Resources Enhance
45 Resilience to Climate Change? *Ecol. Soc.*, **9**, 10.
- 46 Tompkins, E. L., and Coauthors, 2013: An investigation of the evidence of benefits from climate

- 1 compatible development. *Cent. Clim. Chang. Econ. Policy*, 1–31.
- 2 Toulmin, C., and J. Quan, 2000: *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. IIED, 324 pp.
- 3 Trenberth, K. E., J. T. Fasullo, and T. G. Shepherd, 2015: Attribution of climate extreme events. *Nat.*
4 *Clim. Chang.*, **5**, 725–730, doi:10.1038/nclimate2657.
- 5 Tribbia, J., and S. C. Moser, 2008a: More than information: what coastal managers need to plan for
6 climate change. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **11**, 315–328, doi:10.1016/J.ENVSCI.2008.01.003.
- 7 ———, and ———, 2008b: More than information: what coastal managers need to plan for climate
8 change. *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **11**, 315–328, doi:10.1016/J.ENVSCI.2008.01.003.
- 9 Tripathi, A., and A. K. Mishra, 2017: Knowledge and passive adaptation to climate change: An
10 example from Indian farmers. *Clim. Risk Manag.*, **16**, doi:10.1016/j.crm.2016.11.002.
- 11 Trisos, C. H., G. Amatulli, J. Gurevitch, A. Robock, L. Xia, and B. Zambri, 2018: Potentially
12 dangerous consequences for biodiversity of solar geoengineering implementation and
13 termination. *Nat. Ecol. Evol.*, **2**, 475–482, doi:10.1038/s41559-017-0431-0.
- 14 Tschakert, P., 2007: Views from the vulnerable: Understanding climatic and other stressors in the
15 Sahel. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **17**, 381–396.
- 16 ———, 2014: The socioeconomic capability to adapt to climate change. *Global Environmental Change*.
- 17 Tschardt, T., Y. Clough, T. C. Wanger, L. Jackson, I. Motzke, I. Perfecto, J. Vandermeer, and A.
18 Whitbread, 2012: Global food security, biodiversity conservation and the future of agricultural
19 intensification. *Biol. Conserv.*, doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2012.01.068.
- 20 Tucker Lima, J. M., A. Vittor, S. Rifai, and D. Valle, 2017: Does deforestation promote or inhibit
21 malaria transmission in the Amazon? A systematic literature review and critical appraisal of
22 current evidence. *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B. Biol. Sci.*, **372**, 20160125,
23 doi:10.1098/rstb.2016.0125.
- 24 Turney, D., and V. Fthenakis, 2011: Environmental impacts from the installation and operation of
25 large-scale solar power plants. *Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev.*, **15**, 3261–3270,
26 doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2011.04.023.
- 27 Turnhout, E., K. Neves, and E. de Lijster, 2014: ‘Measurementality’ in biodiversity governance:
28 knowledge, transparency, and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity
29 and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). *Environ. Plan. A*, **46**, 581–597.
- 30 Twomey, P., R. Betz, and I. MacGill, 2012: Achieving additional emission reductions under a cap-
31 and-trade scheme. *Clim. Policy*, **12**, 424–439, doi:10.1080/14693062.2011.649591.
- 32 Tyler, S., and M. Moench, 2012: A framework for urban climate resilience. *Clim. Dev.*, **4**, 311–326,
33 doi:10.1080/17565529.2012.745389.
- 34 Ulrich-Schad, J.D., Garcia de Jalon, S., Babin, N., Paper, A., P. L. S., 2017: Measuring and
35 understanding agricultural producers’ adoption of nutrient best management practices. *J. Soil*
36 *Water Conserv.*, **72**, 506–518, doi:10.2489/jswc.72.5.506.
- 37 Umukoro, N., 2013: Poverty and Social Protection in Nigeria. *J. Dev. Soc.*, **29**, 305–322,
38 doi:10.1177/0169796X13494281.
- 39 UNCCD, 2015: *Land Degradation Neutrality: The Target Setting Programme*. 22 pp.
- 40 UNEP, 2014: *The Adaptation Finance Gap Report 2016*.
- 41 ———, 2015: *Early Warning as a Human Right*.
- 42 UNFCCC, 2007: Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries.
43 *United Nations Framew. Conv. Clim. Chang.*, 68, doi:10.1029/2005JD006289.
- 44 ———, 2009: *Potential costs and benefits of adaptation options: A review of existing literature*.

- 1 UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change), 2016: Paris Agreement.
2 *Paris Agreem. - Pre 2020 Action.*,.
- 3 United Nations Environment Programme, 2017: *The Emissions Gap Report 2017*. 1-86 pp.
- 4 Urban, M., 2018: *A Drive Around the Block: A Policymakers' Introduction to Blockchain, Distributed*
5 *Ledger Technology and the Internet of Value*. Toronto,.
- 6 Urwin, K., and A. Jordan, 2008: Does public policy support or undermine climate change adaptation?
7 Exploring policy interplay across different scales of governance. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **18**,
8 180–191, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.08.002.
- 9 Valipour, A., T. Plieninger, Z. Shakeri, H. Ghazanfari, M. Namiranian, and M. J. Lexer, 2014:
10 Traditional silvopastoral management and its effects on forest stand structure in northern Zagros,
11 Iran. *For. Ecol. Manage.*, **327**, 221–230, doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2014.05.004.
- 12 Vaughan, N. E., and C. Gough, 2016: Expert assessment concludes negative emissions scenarios may
13 not deliver. *Environ. Res. Lett.*, **11**, 095003, doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/9/095003.
- 14 Vedachalam, N., S. Surendar, and S. Srinivasalu, 2017: An assessment of decarbonization in the
15 strategic Indian electricity generation sector. *Electr. J.*, **30**, 47–53.
- 16 Velthof, G. L., J. P. Lesschen, J. Webb, S. Pietrzak, Z. Miatkowski, M. Pinto, J. Kros, and O.
17 Oenema, 2014: The impact of the Nitrates Directive on nitrogen emissions from agriculture in
18 the EU-27 during 2000-2008. *Sci. Total Environ.*, doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2013.04.058.
- 19 Venton, C. C., 2018: *The economics of resilience to drought*.
- 20 Venton, C. C. C., C. Fitzgibbon, T. Shitarek, L. Coulter, and O. Dooley, 2012: *The Economics of*
21 *Early Response and Disaster Resilience: Lessons from Kenya and Ethiopia*. 1-84 pp.
- 22 ———, ———, ———, ———, and ———, 2013: *The Economics of Early Response and Disaster Resilience:*
23 *Lessons from Mozambique*. TEER Mozambique,.
- 24 Verburg, P. H., and Coauthors, 2015: Land system science and sustainable development of the earth
25 system: A global land project perspective. *Anthropocene*, **12**, 29–41,
26 doi:10.1016/j.ancene.2015.09.004.
- 27 Verchick, R. R. M., 2018: Can ‘loss and damage’ carry the load? *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A Math. Phys.*
28 *Eng. Sci.*, **376**, doi:10.1098/rsta.2017.0070.
- 29 Verchot, L. V., and Coauthors, 2007: Climate change: linking adaptation and mitigation through
30 agroforestry. *Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang.*, **12**, 901–918.
- 31 Verma, S., D. A. Kampman, P. van der Zaag, and A. Y. Hoekstra, 2009: Going against the flow: a
32 critical analysis of inter-state virtual water trade in the context of India’s National River Linking
33 Program. *Phys. Chem. Earth, Parts A/B/C*, **34**, 261–269.
- 34 Vervoort, J. M., and Coauthors, 2014: Challenges to scenario-guided adaptive action on food security
35 under climate change. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **28**, 383–394,
36 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.03.001.
- 37 Verweij, M., and Coauthors, 2006: Clumsy solutions for a complex world: The case of climate
38 change. *Public Adm.*, **84**, 817–843, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00614.x.
- 39 Vijge, M. J., and A. Gupta, 2014: Framing REDD+ in India: Carbonizing and centralizing Indian
40 forest governance? *Environ. Sci. Policy*, **38**, 17–27.
- 41 Villagra, P., and C. Quintana, 2017: Disaster Governance for Community Resilience in Coastal
42 Towns: Chilean Case Studies. *Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health*, **14**, 1063,
43 doi:10.3390/ijerph14091063.
- 44 Viner, D., 2002: A qualitative assessment of the sources of uncertainty in climate change impacts
45 assessment studies. *Clim. Chang. Implic. Hydrol. cycle water Manag.*, 139–149.

- 1 Vörösmarty, C. J., P. Green, J. Salisbury, and R. B. Lammers, 2000: Global water resources:
2 Vulnerability from climate change and population growth. *Science* (80-.), **289**, 284–288,
3 doi:10.1126/science.289.5477.284.
- 4 Vörösmarty, C. J., and Coauthors, 2010: Global threats to human water security and river
5 biodiversity. *Nature*, **467**, 555–561, doi:10.1038/nature09440.
- 6 Voß, J.-P., and N. Amelung, 2016: Innovating public participation methods: Technoscientization and
7 reflexive engagement. *Soc. Stud. Sci.*, **46**, 749–772, doi:10.1177/0306312716641350.
- 8 Waas, T., J. Hugé, T. Block, T. Wright, F. Benitez-Capistros, and A. Verbruggen, 2014: Sustainability
9 assessment and indicators: Tools in a decision-making strategy for sustainable development.
10 *Sustain.*, **6**, 5512–5534, doi:10.3390/su6095512.
- 11 Wada, Y., L. P. H. van Beek, C. M. van Kempen, J. W. T. M. Reckman, S. Vasak, and M. F. P.
12 Bierkens, 2010: Global depletion of groundwater resources. *Geophys. Res. Lett.*, **37**, n/a-n/a,
13 doi:10.1029/2010GL044571.
- 14 Waddock, S., 2013: The wicked problems of global sustainability need wicked (good) leaders and
15 wicked (good) collaboraative solutions. *J. Manag. Glob. Sustain.*, **1**, 91–111,
16 doi:10.13185/JM2013.01106.
- 17 Wagner, G., 2013: Carbon Cap and Trade. *Encycl. Energy, Nat. Resour. Environ. Econ.*, **1–3**, 1–5,
18 doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-375067-9.00071-1.
- 19 Wakabayashi, M., and O. Kimura, 2018: The impact of the Tokyo Metropolitan Emissions Trading
20 Scheme on reducing greenhouse gas emissions: findings from a facility-based study. *Climate*
21 *Policy*.
- 22 Walther, G.-R., and Coauthors, 2009: Alien species in a warmer world: risks and opportunities.
23 *Trends Ecol. Evol.*, **24**, 686–693, doi:10.1016/j.tree.2009.06.008.
- 24 Wang, X., G. Zhou, D. Zhong, X. Wang, Y. Wang, Z. Yang, L. Cui, and G. Yan, 2016: Life-table
25 studies revealed significant effects of deforestation on the development and survivorship of
26 *Anopheles minimus* larvae. *Parasit. Vectors*, **9**, 323, doi:10.1186/s13071-016-1611-5.
- 27 Ward, P. S., 2016: Transient poverty, poverty dynamics, and vulnerability to poverty: An empirical
28 analysis using a balanced panel from rural China. *World Dev.*, **78**, 541–553,
29 doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.10.022.
- 30 Wario, Adano, R., Fatuma, D., 2012: Link between Climate change, Conflict and Governance in
31 Aftica. *Inst. Secur. Stud.*, **234**.
- 32 Warner, K., 2010: Global environmental change and migration: Governance challenges. *Glob.*
33 *Environ. Chang.*, **20**, 402–413, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.12.001.
- 34 ———, and K. van der Geest, 2013: Loss and damage from climate change: local-level evidence from
35 nine vulnerable countries. *Int. J. Glob. Warm.*, **5**, 367–386.
- 36 Warner, K., M. Hamza, A. Oliver-Smith, F. Renaud, and A. Julca, 2010: Climate change,
37 environmental degradation and migration. *Nat. Hazards*, **55**, 689–715, doi:10.1007/s11069-009-
38 9419-7.
- 39 Watkiss, P., A. Wreford, A. Hunt, and R. Dittrich, Decision-making under uncertainty: lessons from
40 current practice, insights for future applications. *forthcoming*,.
- 41 ———, A. Hunt, W. Blyth, and J. Dyzynski, 2015: The use of new economic decision support tools for
42 adaptation assessment: A review of methods and applications, towards guidance on
43 applicability. *Clim. Change*, **132**, 401–416, doi:10.1007/s10584-014-1250-9.
- 44 Watts, N., and Coauthors, 2015: Health and climate change: policy responses to protect public health.
45 *Lancet*, **386**, 1861–1914, doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60854-6.
- 46 Waylen, G., 2014: Informal Institutions, Institutional Change, and Gender Equality. *Polit. Res. Q.*, **67**,

- 1 212–223, doi:10.1177/1065912913510360.
- 2 Weick, K. E., and K. M. Sutcliffe, 2001: *Managing the Unexpected. Resilient performance in a time*
3 *of change*. 200 pp.
- 4 Weitz, N., H. Carlsen, M. Nilsson, and K. Skånberg, 2017: Towards systemic and contextual priority
5 setting for implementing the 2030 Agenda. *Sustainability Science*.
- 6 Wenkel, K.-O., M. Berg, W. Mirschel, R. Wieland, C. Nendel, and B. Köstner, 2013: LandCaRe DSS
7 – An interactive decision support system for climate change impact assessment and the analysis
8 of potential agricultural land use adaptation strategies. *J. Environ. Manage.*, **127**, S168–S183,
9 doi:10.1016/J.JENVMAN.2013.02.051.
- 10 Wheaton, E., and S. Kulshreshtha, 2017: Environmental sustainability of agriculture stressed by
11 changing extremes of drought and excess moisture: A conceptual review. *Sustain.*, **9**,
12 doi:10.3390/su9060970.
- 13 White, B., S. M. Borrás, R. Hall, I. Scoones, and W. Wolford, 2012: The new enclosures: Critical
14 perspectives on corporate land deals. *J. Peasant Stud.*, **39**, 619–647,
15 doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.691879.
- 16 Whitmee, S., and Coauthors, 2015: Safeguarding human health in the Anthropocene epoch: Report of
17 the Rockefeller Foundation-Lancet Commission on planetary health. *Lancet*,
18 doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(15)60901-1.
- 19 Wiggering, H., and U. Steinhardt, 2015: A conceptual model for site-specific agricultural land-use.
20 *Ecol. Modell.*, **295**, 42–46, doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2014.08.011.
- 21 Wilby, R. L., 2007: A Review of Climate Change Impacts on the Built Environment. *Built Environ.*,
22 **33**, 31–45, doi:10.2307/23289471.
- 23 —, and S. Dessai, 2010: Robust adaptation to climate change. *Weather*, **65**, 180–185,
24 doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wea.543.
- 25 Wilhite, D., and R. S. Pulwarty, 2017: *Drought as hazard: understanding the natural and social*
26 *context*.
- 27 Wilhite, D. A., 2015: Drought-Management Policies and Preparedness Plans: Changing the Paradigm
28 from Crisis to Risk Management. *Land Restoration: Reclaiming Landscapes for a Sustainable*
29 *Future*, D.A. Wilhite, Ed., 442–462.
- 30 —, M. V. K. Sivakumar, and R. Pulwarty, 2014: Managing drought risk in a changing climate: The
31 role of national drought policy. *Weather Clim. Extrem.*, **3**, 4–13,
32 doi:10.1016/j.wace.2014.01.002.
- 33 Wilkinson, E., 2018: *Forecasting hazards: averting disasters early action at scale*.
- 34 Wilkinson, E., L. Weingärtner, R. Choularton, M. Bailey, M. Todd, D. Kniveton, and C. C. Venton,
35 2018: *Implementing forecast-based early action at scale*.
- 36 Willemen, L., B. Burkhard, N. Crossman, E. G. Drakou, and I. Palomo, 2015: Editorial: Best practices
37 for mapping ecosystem services. *Ecosystem Services*.
- 38 Williams, A. P., and J. T. Abatzoglou, 2016: Recent Advances and Remaining Uncertainties in
39 Resolving Past and Future Climate Effects on Global Fire Activity. *Curr. Clim. Chang. Reports*,
40 **2**, 1–14, doi:10.1007/s40641-016-0031-0.
- 41 Williams, B. K., 2011: Adaptive management of natural resources-framework and issues. *J. Environ.*
42 *Manage.*, **92**, 1346–1353, doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2010.10.041.
- 43 Winemiller, K. O., and Coauthors, 2016: DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT. Balancing
44 hydropower and biodiversity in the Amazon, Congo, and Mekong. *Science*, **351**, 128–129,
45 doi:10.1126/science.aac7082.
- 46 Wise, R. M., I. Fazey, M. Stafford Smith, S. E. Park, H. C. Eakin, E. R. M. Archer Van Garderen, and

- 1 B. Campbell, 2014: Reconceptualising adaptation to climate change as part of pathways of
2 change and response. *Glob. Environ. Chang.*, **28**, 325–336,
3 doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.12.002.
- 4 Wisner, B., P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, and I. Davis, 2003: At Risk: natural hazards, people's
5 vulnerability and disasters Second edition. *Framework*, 134.
- 6 Wolter, K., and M. S. Timlin, 1998: Measuring the strength of ENSO events: How does 1997/98
7 rank? *Weather*, **53**, 315–324, doi:10.1002/j.1477-8696.1998.tb06408.x.
- 8 Woodward, M., Z. Kapelan, and B. Gouldby, 2014: Adaptive flood risk management under climate
9 change uncertainty using real options and optimisation. *Risk Anal.*, **34**.
- 10 Woolf, D., D. Solomon, and J. Lehmann, 2018: Land restoration in food security programmes:
11 synergies with climate change mitigation. *Clim. Policy*, 1–11,
12 doi:10.1080/14693062.2018.1427537.
- 13 Woollen, E., and Coauthors, 2016: Charcoal production in the Mopane woodlands of Mozambique:
14 what are the trade-offs with other ecosystem services? *Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci.*, **371**,
15 20150315, doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0315.
- 16 World Bank, 2010: *The costs to developing countries of adapting to climate change: New methods
17 and estimates*. Washington, DC, 84 pp.
- 18 World Food Programme, 2017: *How Climate Drives Hunger: Food Security Climate Analyses, ,
19 Methodologies & Lessons 2010-2016*.
- 20 World Health Organization, 2014: *Quantitative risk assessment of the effects of climate change on
21 selected causes of death, 2030s and 2050s*.
- 22 Wreford, A., A. Ignaciuk, and G. Gruère, 2017: Overcoming barriers to the adoption of climate-
23 friendly practices in agriculture. *OECD Food, Agric. Fish. Pap.*, **101**, doi:10.1787/97767de8-en.
- 24 Yamana, T. K., A. Bomblies, and E. A. B. Eltahir, 2016: Climate change unlikely to increase malaria
25 burden in West Africa. *Nat. Clim. Chang.*, **6**, 1009–1013, doi:10.1038/nclimate3085.
- 26 Yami, M., C. Vogl, and M. Hauser, 2009: Comparing the Effectiveness of Informal and Formal
27 Institutions in Sustainable Common Pool Resources Management in Sub-Saharan Africa.
28 *Conserv. Soc.*, **7**, 153, doi:10.4103/0972-4923.64731.
- 29 —, —, and —, 2011: Informal institutions as mechanisms to address challenges in communal
30 grazing land management in Tigray, Ethiopia. *Int. J. Sustain. Dev. World Ecol.*, **18**, 78–87,
31 doi:10.1080/13504509.2010.530124.
- 32 Young, O. R., 2017: *Governing Complex Systems. Social Capital for the Anthropocene*.
33 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Massachusetts,.
- 34 Yumkella, K. K., and P. T. Yillia, 2015: Framing the Water-energy Nexus for the Post-2015
35 Development Agenda. *Aquat. Procedia*, **5**, 8–12,
36 doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aqpro.2015.10.003.
- 37 Zarfl, C., A. E. Lumsdon, J. Berlekamp, L. Tydecks, and K. Tockner, 2014: A global boom in
38 hydropower dam construction. *Aquat. Sci.*, **77**, 161–170, doi:10.1007/s00027-014-0377-0.
- 39 Zinn, J. O., 2008: *Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction*. J.O. Zinn, Ed. Wiley-
40 Blackwell, 266 pp.
- 41 Zomer, R. J., A. Trabucco, D. A. Bossio, and L. V. Verchot, 2008: Climate change mitigation: A
42 spatial analysis of global land suitability for clean development mechanism afforestation and
43 reforestation. *Agric. Ecosyst. Environ.*, **126**, 67–80, doi:10.1016/j.agee.2008.01.014.
- 44 Zoogah, D. B., M. W. Peng, and H. Woldu, 2015: Institutions, Resources, and Organizational
45 Effectiveness in Africa. *Acad. Manag. Perspect.*, **29**, 7–31, doi:10.5465/amp.2012.0033.
- 46

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4