Understanding the Japanese Mind

© Porirua Publishing 2024, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

DEDICATION 4

PREFACE 5

INTRODUCTION 6

1 — AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM, JAPANESE CONFORMITY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 11

2 — CHILD TRAINING AND JAPANESE CONFORMITY 21

3 — CONFORMITY AND RAGE IN THE JAPANESE MALE 26

4 — CONFORMITY AND RAGE IN THE JAPANESE FEMALE 30

5 — JAPANESE CONFORMITY AND INSANITY 33

6 — PSYCHO-DYNAMICS OF JAPANESE HATE DISPERSAL 41

7 — THE EXTRA-NATIONAL DISPERSAL OF JAPANESE HATE 51

8 — THE ACADEMIC AND LEGAL STATUS OF JAPANESE PSYCHOANALYSIS 67

9 — DO THE JAPANESE INTEGRATE, OR MERELY COPY WESTERN PSYCHOANALYSIS? 70

10 — THE AMERICAN BLUEPRINT COPIED BY JAPANESE IMPERIALISTS 73

11 — JAPANESE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE ENEMY 81

12 — THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MOVEMENT IN JAPAN 87

13 — THE KEY TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF JAPANESE PSYCHOANALYSIS 95

14 — EXAMPLES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF JAPANESE PSYCHOANALYTIC WRITINGS 103

15 — THE GOALS OF JAPANESE PSYCHOANALYSIS 127

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 138

UNDERSTANDING THE JAPANESE MIND

BY

JAMES CLARK MOLONEY, M.D.

DEDICATION

This book is

affectionately dedicated

to

Margaret

James

and

Sue Ann

It does not seem as if man could be brought by any sort of influence to change his nature into that of the ants; he will always, one imagines, defend his claim to individual freedom against the will of the multitude.

—Sigmund Freud: Civilization and Its Discontents

PREFACE

It is the natural tendency, and probably the right, of every profession to regard the world through its own particular set of binoculars. Accordingly, each calling’s evaluation of what it sees is apt to be regarded by the others as limited by the range of the viewer’s lenses—much as the sighted onlooker would evaluate the description of the elephant made by the blind men. Yet, with the world in its present chaotic state, it behooves the serious thinker to consider well the interpretations of all commentators upon the scene.

My curiosity about the unique qualities of the Japanese was whetted by two visits I made to their islands in the 1940’s; it began at the point of my acquaintance with some of my professional counterparts in Japan, but has gradually broadened and deepened to include an interest in the whole people. It would be quite understandable and justifiable for the lay reader to accuse a psychoanalyst like myself of snap-judgments, were I to have arrived at my conclusions about Japan out-of-context. For this reason, I have endeavored to support my deductions by borrowing freely from recorded disciplines other than my own: anthropology, history, sociology, and religion.

My principal departure from the thinking of many previous writers on Japan is my conviction that its people are neither mysterious, inscrutable, nor unpredictable; but that they are, in fact, entirely reasonable, understandable, and predictable when one fully understands the restrictions which have been placed upon their behavior, individual and collective, by the traditions of the ages.

The significance of such predictability to the nations of the world today—to the United States most of all, concerned as we are with the revamping of the governmental and social systems of Japan, and even with the behavior and attitudes of the Japanese people—should be evident. Not only can one readily foresee the result of each step taken by this nation in the administrative handling of Japan through the period of the Occupation; it is also evident what must surely befall if the Japanese government should revert to its own pre-war militarist pattern, or if it should become an independent, but only partially-trained, democracy, or if, unhappily it should fall under communist domination. To be able to predict with certainty the response of the Japanese should mean that the course of policy of other nations toward Japan should be equally possible to plot.

Other professional observers are coming to regard the situation in Japan as not so simple and clear-cut as some of the early investigators into the Occupation’s apparent effects have believed it to be. Closely paralleling my own conclusions are the views of such men as New York Times correspondent Lindesay Parrott, whose article, Japan at Her Time of Decision, in the New York Times Magazine, April 15, 1951, should help to discourage the skeptical layman from believing that my ideas are those of a hasty viewer or an arm-chair theorist.

INTRODUCTION

"Let Mikado’s empire stand

Till a thousand years, ten thousand years shall roll,

Till the sand in the brooklets grow to stone,

And the moss these pebbles emeralds make."{1}

Kenji Ohtski, a lay psychoanalyst, who practices psychoanalysis in Tokyo, Japan, contributed to the Tokyo Journal for Psychoanalysis, July, 1952, an article entitled, Three Types of Japanese Characters. In this article Ohtski said:

...he (Nobunaga Oda) was, indeed, the original inventor of tactics of sudden attack. His battle at Okehasama (1500) [1560] against Imagawa was a prototype of that at Pearl Harbour. The tactics were very relevant, rational, and daring, when the less force should stand against the larger. After that there have been given so many imitations. So if one should know well of Japanese history, the Pearl Harbour attack might have been inferentially expected. Someone maintains, indeed, that it was really expected, and the Japanese air forces fell ensnared in the trick. I know not, of course, if it is true or not; nor if there has ever been prototype of atomic assault at Hiroshima in the American History.

This is a puzzling statement. In fact, it is a startling statement. But it suddenly dawned on me my reason for being startled. Ohtski, in his paper, Three Types of Japanese Characters, is delivering a communication that is of grave significance to the United States. I sincerely suspected that he voiced a message within a message, and that the key to this riddle would be found in an analysis of certain features of the socio-politic history of Sixteenth Century Japan.

During that Century and during the early days of Nobunaga Oda, the Shogun resided at Kyoto. Without going into all of the intricate details that would establish the difference in rank between the Shogun and the Emperor or Mikado, it is enough for the purpose of this narrative to say that the Shogun was theoretically, at least, the Emperor’s administrative officer.

Despite the fact that the Shogun symbolized the temporal power of Japan and despite the fact that his physical character rather than his spiritual character seemed to outweigh the influence of the Mikado during these days that prefaced the prestige of Nobunaga Oda, he was nevertheless not particularly cogent. There were many feudal lords who were intrinsically more powerful. Many of these feudatories were more talented military-wise and more ingenious.

And these feudal lords were jealous of each other. Border incidents were numerous. Each lord lived in a state of intolerable suspense. Often they attempted to reduce this suspense by political marriages, and by other types of intrigue. For political reasons, but executed strictly in accordance with their institutions, mores, and codes, betrayal was frequent. Treachery toward and assassinations of men in power added to the unrest. In these riotous times a solution, for reasons that will be detailed later, would not only afford unity to Japan, but it would also position in official power the feudal lord or aggregate of lords able to accomplish this coup.

In 1540 A.D., four central and eastern chiefs were interested in solving their political differences. They were Uyesugi in Echigo, the most northern and western of the involved provinces; Daimyo Hojo of Odawara in the Kwanto; Imagawa in Totomi; Mikawa and Suruga and Takeda in Kai. Takeda was the most accomplished and talented of them all.

These Daimyos understood very well that to resolve their difficulties the proper formula must include one essential ingredient. This ingredient was the peaceful coercion of the Shogun, at Kyoto. It is to be emphasized that this coercion idea did not entail a plan to attack the forces of the Shogun nor to do violence to his person. The plan in its entirety was dependent upon the realization that the Shogun would be and must be persuaded by a show of force.

However, it was not until 1560 that any one of the competing feudatories was ready for the march upon Kyoto. Then the Daimyo Imagawa levied men from his three provinces and trekked westward on his way to the Shogun’s stronghold. Scarcely had he passed the western frontiers of his own area when he was pounced upon by the numerically inferior forces of Nobunaga Oda. The men of Imagawa were annihilated and Imagawa himself was slain.

Though Nobunaga previously had repelled a threat from the Province of Ise, and though he was selected by Hideyoshi as being the most talented leader in Japan, still at the time that he routed the superior forces of Imagawa he was referred to as, Baka-dono or Lord Fool. The rout of Imagawa is recorded in history as the famous battle of Okehasama—the Okehasama mentioned by Ohtski!

Ethnocentric occidentals might wonder about the actual fashion of the feudatory approach to the quest for Japanese power. The western world has always been mystified by the jejune, rigid, and compulsive methods employed by the feudal antagonists. Naive politicos of Europe and America were puzzled by the indirection. Why couldn’t the Shogun be assassinated or why didn’t the Daimyos ignore the Shogun and fight it out between themselves?

As a matter of fact, the fourteenth Shogun of the Ashikaga family was assassinated by his ministers, Miyoshi and Matsunaga. But this did little to alter the frame of reference subsuming the official concept and the official operations of the Shogun. Yoshiaki, a younger brother of the assassinated Ashikaga Yoshiteru, set about dethroning the puppet supported by Miyoshi and Matsunaga.

What is important in all this is the fact that the warring feudal Daimyos, steeped in internecine conflict, felt compelled to wage war against each other in a precise fashion subscribed to by their mores and institutions. They felt compelled to march upon Kyoto for the express purpose of establishing influence over the Shogun—the administrative, the temporal officer for the Mikado. Even the whisper of a rebellious act must not be levelled against the Mikado.

The history of the family [Taira] had so far been full of honor, a record of distinguished service to the Emperor; but Masakado, the grandson of the founder of the Taira, was destined to earn an unenviable notoriety in history as a rebel, the only personage in all the long history of Japan who dared to raise sacrilegious eyes to the throne.{2}

This item of information is teased out of context from the main corpus of Japanese history for the purpose of illustrating a characteristic feature that expresses the Japanese principle of coevality. It is almost unbelievable that the imperial succession could exist for so many centuries with but one single rebel aspirant to the throne. But this is Japan!

According to their mores, a Daimyo given over to the idea of control of Japan by weight of arms did not dare direct his attack against the person of the Mikado. In fact as it has already been discussed, any conquering activity must be manipulated in a manner that would bring about the coercion of the Shogun. The Daimyo that accomplished this coercion would gain the Shogun’s approbation of the Daimyo’s military activities. Further, his future conquests then could be made officially in the name of the Shogun. Also, by his influence over the Shogun, he could expunge his past military record from evidences of disloyalty.

Nobunaga was the first of these self-appointed catalysts and guardians of Japanese integrity conceived and formulated on a national level. But to my mind it was not only the suddenness and the daring of the surprise attack upon Imagawa at Okehazama executed by Nobunaga and his captain, Hideyoshi, for the synthesis of Japan, that preoccupied Ohtski in his article, Three Types of Japanese Characters. In my opinion Ohtski, not in the spirit of a threat, but in a veiled warning was referring to the cardinal principles of the national entity of Japan. The Japanese believe in and have repetitiously and compulsively experienced the concept of coevality. In brief, to the Japanese, Japan always was and always will be. Because of their compulsivity significant accidental happenings to Japan either from the inside or from the outside are repeated over and over again. They become a part of the Japanese ritual executed on a national scale. Even during the last war, during the struggle with the United States, the Japanese continued to celebrate Matthew Perry Day (the day, April 10, 1853, that Commodore Matthew Perry, USN, invaded Japan, in the name of the President of the United States). It was a sad day for the Japanese when Perry set foot upon Japanese soil. Yet so much enslaved by their compulsive customs, the day was honored despite the new outbreak and current hostilities with Perry’s government.

Perry’s enterprises, I am sure, entered into Ohtski’s calculations about the predictability of the Japanese attack upon the United States. Perry, not knowing that the Shogun was not the Emperor, forced the unprotected Shogun on March 31, 1854 to conclude a trade treaty with the United States. Perry’s objective was the same as was the objective of Hojo, Imagawa, and Takeda in Nobunaga’s time. It was Perry’s intent to force the capitulation of the Shogun, and he did.

It might be said that Perry’s attack not only was a daring but a surprise attack upon Japan. But just as daring and just as surprising was the sudden appearance of Townsend Harris upon the Japanese horizon in the year of 1856.

Harris, after suddenly appearing in Japan, blandly announced that he was there to represent the United States as an accredited consul. The Japanese were thunderstruck. They knew of no such arrangement with Perry nor with the United States. They thought that consuls were to be exchanged between the two countries only if each country desired consular representation. When the Japanese repaired to reread their copy of the treaty, which was written in Dutch, they were amazed to find that the actual wording of the treaty said if either country requested consular representation, a consular exchange was to be effected.

In this contingency, the Japanese were without Japanese precedent. Not knowing the proper protocol, the proper procedure, they attempted delaying actions to give them time to meet this undesirable denouement. But Harris was not only arrogant, he was persistent, tenacious, insistent. Peculiar as it may seem he, too, did not know that the Shogun was not the Emperor, and he, like Perry, believed that the Shogun was the undisputed ruler of Japan. Accordingly, he demanded to see the Shogun. But despite his insistence, the Japanese, by delaying tactics, successfully obstructed the meeting for many months.

Eventually, however, Harris with cajolery and finally with threats, holding over the heads of the uninformed Japanese the mystical information possessed by himself that the piratical blood thirstiness of the British and Russian fleets was about to be let loose on Japan, forced an audience with the Shogun.

That audience took place on December 7, 1857!

It was on December 7, 1941 that the Japanese after the fashion of Perry, Harris, and Nobunaga executed their surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor.

I know Ohtski to be a courageous man, not given to threats. But I also know that he is aware of certain peculiarities in the Japanese makeup, peculiarities which I have tried to explain and to cover in this book, that fit them as a nation into the psychiatric formula known as the repetition compulsion.

When Ohtski casually inquires about an American prototype for the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, we all know immediately that there is no American prototype for the atom bombing of Hiroshima. The attack upon Hiroshima by the atom bomb, was the first atom bomb attack ever made by one warring nation upon another warring nation.

But now, unfortunately, the atom bomb attack upon Hiroshima has established a precedent in Japan, a precedent analogous to the precedent established by Perry’s sudden attack and coercion of the Shogun, and Harris’ sudden declaration and execution of his intent to overwhelm the Shogun! Both acts were conducted in the name of the President of the United States.

In answer to Ohtski’s inquiry as to whether the United States had a prototype for the atom bomb attack upon Hiroshima, I would venture to say that there is a much more important subject involved than an immediate and direct answer to Ohtski’s question.

If the Perry-Harris sneak attack upon Japan led to Pearl Harbor, what might we eventually expect in return from the desolation of Hiroshima by our first atom bomb?

THE AUTHOR

1 — AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM, JAPANESE CONFORMITY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

IT is unfortunate that when an individual has been accustomed to policing during infancy, life in a liberal environment where policing does not exist produces anxiety in him; he is like a fish out of water. Conscious co-operation with society is one thing and unconscious self-policing is another, even though, to unsophisticated eyes, they may appear the same.

On rare occasions, poets have sensed that their striving for liberty is directed against unhealthy restrictions to which they were subjected during infancy.{3} As adults they seek liberty because the infantile restrictions are unconsciously represented and continue to bind them for the remainder of their lives. One poet, Michael Chazarian Nalbandian, while in a Russian prison, identified and associated the lack of national liberty with the lack of liberty occasioned by swaddling the new-born infant:

"Wrapped round with many swaddling bands,

all night I did not cease to weep,

And in the cradle, restless still,

My cries disturbed my mother’s sleep.

"O Mother! in my heart I prayed,

Unbind my arms and leave me free!

And even from that hour I vowed

To love thee ever, Liberty!"{4}

Is there mental health in liberty itself, or merely in slavishly conforming to the established cultural institutions, or to authority?

There appear to be two distinct and diametrically opposed cultural concepts affecting both the individual and national culture of peoples. Borrowing from Hamlet’s famous quandary,{5} I have christened these the to be free concept and the not to be free concept. The Japanese insist upon the insignificance of the individual, the not to be free concept; while American political theory stresses individualism, the to be free idea. The Japanese psychiatrist, Tsuneo Muramatsu, drawing upon his knowledge of the Tokugawa era, described the traditional difference between the development of American and Japanese national goals and the difference between the character structure of the Japanese adult and the American adult: "Americans were emphasizing individuality,{6} spontaneity, efficiency, progressivism, rationalism and mutual co-operation in a ‘gesellschaftlich’{7} or ‘contractual’ relationship between individuals. In contrast the Japanese were still stressing the concept of society as a unit under the direction of a single authority uniformity, in each defined status, the insignificance of the individual,{8} with conservatism, conventionalism, traditionalism and loyalty in a ‘gemeinschaftlich’{9} or ‘family’ relationship between individuals."{10}

One should realize, however, that American individualism, the to be free idea, has largely degenerated into an American myth. Holly Whyte, (in an article entitled The Class of ‘49){11} assembled pertinent information regarding the students graduated by American colleges and universities in that year. Whyte’s findings were, I think, a reflection of our modern culture, and give evidence of the type of individual it is producing.

The Class of ‘49 wants material security, first and foremost. For that reason, the majority ignores the possibilities of independent business and looks toward a position with a large, safe company which is representative of this type of security. Economic depression, an integer of our complicated economic system, has molded these young people into security-conscious individuals. The