The Allied Air Campaign Against Hitler's U-boats: Victory in the Battle of the Atlantic

Preface

This is the first book-length study of the Allied air campaign against the German U-boats in the Second World War. The Battle of the Atlantic has received attention from historians in countless publications. However, the attention has been focused on either the overall story of the battle – such as Clay Blair’s two-volume work entitled Hitler’s U-Boat War , S.W. Roskill’s multi-volume The War at Sea: 1939–1945 and Dan Van der Vat’s The Atlantic Campaign: The Great Struggle at Sea – or centred on limited aspects of the campaign such as U-boat operations, escort carrier operations or specific geographic areas. The Allied air campaign receives compartmentalised coverage, as evidenced in Alan C. Carey’s Sighted Sub: The United States Navy’s Air Campaign against the U-Boat , William T. Y’Blood’s Hunter Killer: U.S. Navy Escort Carriers in Gallant Battle Against the Nazi U-Boat Menace , Andrew Hendrie’s The Cinderella Service: RAF Coastal Command, 1939–1945 , and Marc Milner’s The U-Boat Hunters: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Offensive against Germany’s Submarines . No previous studies have comprehensively studied the Allied aircrafts’ critical importance through the evaluation of all Allied anti-submarine air operations.

No weapon platform sank more U-boats than aircraft. Whether it was American aircraft from American escort carriers, American aircraft from Royal Air Force bases, or British aircraft from bases throughout the world, these officers and men became the most decisive factor in turning the tide against the U-boat threat. While German crews could threaten escort vessels with torpedoes, or successfully avoid them by remaining submerged, their leaders never developed an effective strategy against aircraft. A surfaced U-boat discovered by a depth-charge-laden aircraft had little recourse besides crash diving or employing flak guns.

However, the Allied aircraft effort did not commence with success. British, Canadian and Australian air crews that fought the U-boats from 1939–1941 achieved few triumphs. They possessed neither the aircraft nor the bases necessary to deliver consistent lethal attacks against German submarines. While radar, the breaking of the Nazi code, and improved depth charges all contributed to Allied victory, the aircraft is the one platform that brought all the technological advances together. And in 1941 the RAF finally began implementing an effective aircraft response when it initiated training on American-built B-24 Liberators. These aircraft would prove to be decisive.

With America’s entry into the war, the United States Navy and the United States Army Air Forces also began employing the four-engine Liberators against U-boats so that by mid–1943, the German Admiral Karl Dönitz, commander of U-boat forces, withdrew his submarines from the North Atlantic in recognition of the Allied aircraft’s new dominance. The B-24s, flown by American, British, Canadian and Czechoslovakian crews, could cruise for over twelve hours, could carry a significant payload of depth charges, and with their speed, they could surprise and attack a surfaced U-boat before a crash dive. The German’s only defence – flak guns – proved to be of limited success against a fast, large aircraft such as the Liberator, which could absorb significant punishment while delivering its fatal payload. The B-24s would sink more U-boats than any other Allied aircraft.

From Dönitz’s retreat to the end of the war, Allied aircraft continued to dominate the U-boat battle as it shifted to other areas including the Bay of Biscay. Dönitz eventually ordered his U-boats to remain on the surface and engage Allied aircraft as opposed to submerging. This failed approach did lead to the demise of some Allied aircraft, but it also resulted in more U-boat sinkings. Most critically, Dönitz acknowledged with his new policy that he knew of no tactics or weapons that would defend his U-boats from Allied aircraft. In the end, it was a matter of choosing whether his submariners would die submerged or die surfaced. Either way, Allied aircraft had prevailed.

Chapter 1

The Second Happy Time

On 14 April 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt dispatched a letter to Nazi Chancellor Adolf Hitler. The American leader reminded the German leader that: ‘On a previous occasion I have addressed you on behalf of the settlement of political, economic, and social problems by peaceful methods and without resort to arms.’ Roosevelt noted that ‘the tide of events seems to have reverted to the threat of arms’ and warned the dictator that ‘If such threats continue, it seems inevitable that much of the world must become involved in common ruin. All the world,’ he predicted, ‘victor nations, vanquished nations, and neutral nations, will suffer. I refuse to believe that the world is, of necessity, such a prisoner of destiny. On the contrary, it is clear that the leaders of great nations have it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impends. It is equally clear that in their own minds and in their own hearts the peoples themselves desire that their fears be ended.’

The president further requested that Hitler respect the boundaries of thirty-one nations for the next decade. Two weeks later, Hitler publicly responded to Roosevelt’s request before the Reichstag in a two-hour speech in which he mocked and ridiculed the American’s requests. And the assembled Nazis laughed. Again and again, they laughed. The moment served as a prime example of Hitler’s and the Nazi Party’s contempt for the American people and their president.¹

Two years later, when the Japanese assaulted Pearl Harbor, both the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Roosevelt faced a quandary. They both considered Nazi Germany as the main aggressor, but the Japanese attack failed to provide the president with justification to declare war on Hitler’s empire. The German Chancellor though, solved the Allies’ predicament by declaring war against the United States, an action that Roosevelt quickly reciprocated.

Hitler’s declaration is most easily explained by his growing anger at the Americans. His bitterness as displayed in 1939 had only increased over time, and now he had the opportunity to bring the war to America. While his forces had ravaged much of Europe, the continental United States remained untouched, a fact that Hitler now sought to change. And, he had the ideal weapon with which to accomplish his terror: the U-boat. He unleashed his forces on the unprepared Americans for eight months, from January to August 1942, a period that German submariners referred to as the ‘Second Happy Time’.²

If the Americans sought to anticipate what disaster to which Hitler intended to subject them, they had only to study the ‘First Happy Time’, as the U-boat commanders referred to the period from the commencement of war in September 1939 until the end of 1940. During those months, Nazi submarines terrorised British shipping and sank over 215 merchant vessels and two warships. In response, the Allies destroyed only twenty-four U-boats. Admiral Karl Dönitz began this campaign with fifty-seven U-boats and ended with fifty-one of them. By all calculations, his men devastated Allied shipping. Of especial note, 195 of the ships – 90 per cent – sunk by U-boats during this multi-month assault had been unescorted. The British did not possess the escort vessels or aircraft necessary to protect their merchantmen, and neither did the Americans. When Hitler now focused on the United States, his U-boat commanders would encounter dozens of American ships traversing the Atlantic waters unescorted and unarmed, hence their phrase, ‘Second Happy Time’.³

Two days after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Dönitz, recorded in his diary: ‘The attempt must be made to exploit these advantages, which will disappear in the foreseeable future, and to strike a blow at the American coast with a drumbeat.’ This was Operation Paukenschlag, translated as either ‘drumbeat’ or ‘thunderbolt’. Either way, it would prove to be a disastrous period for the Allies.⁴ Dönitz unleashed five of his Type IX U-boats on the Americans. The Germans designed these larger boats to operate over greater distances and for longer patrols. Slower than other designs, they nevertheless proved to be ideal for the task at hand. Additionally, these boats were well commanded; all five commanders had already achieved numerous successes. For example, Reinhard Hardegen, U-123’s commander, had sunk five Allied vessels prior to his mission to America.⁵

From 16 December to 25 December, these massive Nazi submarines departed their French Bay of Biscay ports. Dönitz noted the distances from their home ports to Western Hemisphere targets: Sydney, Nova Scotia, 2,200 miles; Halifax, Nova Scotia, 2,400 miles; New York, 3,000 miles; Trinidad, 3,800 miles; Key West 4,000 miles; and Aruba 4,000 miles. The German admiral realised that the ‘big Type IX boats could reach all these places and still have enough fuel in hand to operate for two or three weeks’. To achieve surprise, he ‘selected as the site of our first offensive the area between St Lawrence and Cape Hatteras’ and, to ensure that they arrived safely at his intended destination, he ordered the boats ‘to keep out of sight between Newfoundland and the east coast of America’. Regarding the transatlantic passage, he further stipulated that ‘en route they were to restrict their attack to really worth-while targets – ships of 10,000 tons and over’. His strategy would serve his Führer well.⁶

The first U-boat sinking illustrated the Allies’ vast unpreparedness. On 12 January, U-123 discovered the large British steamship Cyclops of over 9,000 tons, just a little over 100 miles south of Nova Scotia, and most critically, unescorted.⁷ At almost two hours after midnight, the German U-boat hit the merchant vessel with a single torpedo and then, about twenty minutes later, fired a second one that also struck the doomed ship, causing it to sink in minutes. Despite the report of the attack having been sent and received at the time of the sinking, an Allied Catalina aircraft did not sight the survivors until the next day, followed by retrieval by a minesweeper. Nearly 100 of the 181 crew members died due to exposure. The lengthy time for rescue well demonstrated the complete lack of forces available to respond to U-boat attacks.⁸

Dönitz did not consider the five Type IX boats sufficient for his American operations. He contemplated the ‘possibility of making use of the medium Type VIIC boats (517 tons), whose radius of action was considerably smaller’ than the Type IX ‘for operations in these distant areas’. Yet, the German ‘calculations’ proved that the Type VIIC boats ‘could reach the shipping lanes of Nova Scotia and still have enough fuel to remain there for a reasonable period’. However, Dönitz realised that ‘their radius of action’ would not allow them to operate ‘farther to the south and west, off the coast of the United States’. Dönitz recalled, ‘when Naval High Command’s order of January 2, 1942, released for operations in the Atlantic all the new Type VIIC boats which had been originally earmarked for the Mediterranean, I at once diverted seven of them … and sent them to the Nova Scotia-Newfoundland area’. The Allies would now face twelve U-boats along the Atlantic seaboard.⁹

The large Type IX Nazi submarines sank sixteen other Allied merchant vessels in January in the American eastern seaboard vicinity.¹⁰ After the destruction of the Cyclops, Reinhard Hardegen in Type IXB U-123 achieved his second sinking, that of the Panamanian tanker Norness, on the 14th.¹¹ Fortunately, all but one of the forty-one crew members survived. Five days later, Hardegen’s U-123 struck again by sinking the unarmed American steamship City of Atlanta off the North Carolina coast, bringing his total of merchantmen sunk to three in just a week. The railroad ferry Seatrain Texas saved three men from the forty-six-man crew. Remaining off the North Carolina coast, U-123 completed its fourth sinking for January when it encountered the unarmed American freighter Norvana. None of her crew survived Hardegen’s assault. Type IXC boat U-130, commanded by the highly capable commander Ernst Kals, also devastated Allied shipping this month. He sank the Norwegian Frisco on the 12th and the Panamanian Friar Rock the next day. After an eight-day lull, Kals delivered one successful assault after another. He destroyed the Norwegian Alexandra Hoegh on the 21st, the Panamanian Olympic on the 22nd, and the Norwegian Varanger on the 25th. Then, on 27 January, Kals sank the unarmed American tanker Francis E. Powell just 8 miles from the Winter Quarter Lightship off New Jersey. Of the thirty-two-man crew, a Coast Guard boat and an American tanker, the W.C. Fairbanks, saved twenty-eight. Richard Zapp, having already sunk five Allied vessels before Dönitz sent him to the American coast, continued his successful career. In U-66, he commenced his assault along the American seaboard by sinking the unarmed American tanker Allan Jackson only 50 miles east of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. The American destroyer USS Roe rescued thirteen men of the thirty-five-man crew. Zapp then destroyed the Canadian Lady Hawkins on the 19th, the British Empire Gem on the 24th before his last victory, the fatal torpedoing of the unarmed American collier Venore. U-125 inaugurated its highly successful career with the sinking of the American freighter West Ivis on the 26th and no one heard from the vessel’s forty-five crew members again.¹²

Dönitz’s Type VIIC boats also terrorised Allied shipping in January. On the 15th, U-552, commanded by Erich Topp, sank the British vessel Dayrose and three days later Topp found the American freighter Frances Salman off St John’s, Newfoundland, and fatally torpedoed her. All twenty-eight crew members died in the attack. This sinking did not mark Topp’s first encounter with an American vessel; he had previously sunk the American destroyer Reuben James on 30 October 1941, the first US Navy vessel lost in the Second World War.¹³ U-106 completed the Nazi terror for January by using gun fire and torpedoes to sink the unarmed American tanker Rochester. The American destroyer USS Roe (DD-418) saved twenty-nine of the thirty-two crew members.

The news thrilled Hitler. In late January, a German official recorded in the Naval Command War Diary that: ‘Captain von Puttkamer telephoned to say that the Fuehrer had noted with great satisfaction the rising figures of sinkings off the American coast.’ When Hitler had been informed about the number of U-boats operating there, ‘he expressed the desire that these boats should remain thus employed’. And the sinkings continued.¹⁴

U-boats destroyed twenty Allied vessels in February with the large Type IX boats continuing their depredations. Werner Winter, commanding the Type IXB boat U-103, claimed four in just four days. He sighted and sank the unarmed American tanker W.L. Steed on 2 February less than 100 miles east of the Delaware River. The freezing temperatures killed thirty-four of the thirty-eight-man crew. The next day, Winter attacked the Panamanian freighter San Gil with torpedoes and shells to sink her. This attack occurred just 15 miles south of the Delaware coast. The German assault killed two crew members while the Coast Guard cutter Nike (WPC-112) rescued the remaining thirty-eight. The same day, Werner found the unarmed American tanker India Arrow just 20 miles off the New Jersey shoreline. He torpedoed, shelled and sank the merchant vessel. The shelling killed two crew members, while twenty-four drowned when their lifeboats swamped. Twelve miles from the New Jersey coastline, the fishing skiff Gitana found and rescued the twelve remaining crew. Werner completed his shocking and successful patrol the following day with the destruction of the unarmed American tanker China Arrow.

Four other Type IX boats combined for seven sinkings in February. Hans-Georg Friedrich Poske, commanding Type IXC U-504, sank three Allied merchantmen. On 21 February, he torpedoed unarmed American tanker Republic just 3 miles off the Florida coast. The following day, Poske sank the unarmed American tanker W.D. Anderson. One crew member survived and successfully swam to the Florida shoreline. Five days later, he sank the Dutch merchantmen Mamura.¹⁵ On the 19th, commander Ulrich Heyse achieved his first victory when Type IXC U-128 fatally torpedoed the unarmed American tanker Pan Massachusetts 20 miles off Cape Canaveral, Florida. Fortunately, Coast Guard lighthouse tender Forward (WAGL-160) and British tanker Elizabeth Massey rescued eighteen members of the thirty-eight-man crew. Three days later, Heyse struck again by sinking the American tanker Cities Service Empire. On the sixth day of the month, Type IXB U-107 torpedoed and sank unarmed American freighter Major Wheeler. None of the thirty-five-man crew survived. On the 20th, Type IXC U-156 destroyed American freighter Delplata but fortunately the flying boat tender Lapwing (AVP-1) saved all fifty-two crew members.¹⁶

The smaller Type VIIC boats contributed to the Nazi cause as well. Heinz-Otto Schultze, commander of Type VIIC U-432, could not claim to have matched Winter’s four sinkings in four days, but he did destroy six Allied merchant vessels in February. On the 15th, he torpedoed Brazilian steamship Buarque 30 miles from the North Carolina coast. Three days later Schultze struck another Brazilian vessel, the tanker Olinda. The next day, he sank British merchant vessel Miraflores and on the 20th, Schultze torpedoed the American freighter Azalea City a little over 100 miles from the Maryland shoreline. None of the thirty-eight-man crew survived. He then destroyed the American merchant vessel Norlavore four days later. On the 26th, he shelled and torpedoed the unarmed American bulk carrier Marore.¹⁷

Ernst-August Rehwinkel, in Type VIIC U-578, achieved his first sinking in February. On the 26th, he fatally torpedoed American tanker R.P. Resor only 5 miles from the Delaware coastline. Most critically, U-578 also demonstrated to the Americans the vulnerability of their naval vessels when the destroyer Jacob Jones, DD-130, entered the hunting ground. The warship departed New York harbour a day after the strike on Resor and found the tanker’s burning remains. The American destroyer remained in the area for a couple of hours hoping to locate survivors before turning south again. As sunlight emerged on the morning of the 28th, Rehwinkel fired multiple torpedoes. The destroyer crew noticed neither the U-boat nor the wakes of the oncoming threat. Rehwinkel’s first hits struck the ship’s magazine and fuelled an explosion that eviscerated ‘the bridge, the chart room, and the officers’ and petty officers’ quarters’. The destroyer lost all speed. Rehwinkel launched another torpedo. This strike wrecked the rear ‘part of the ship above the keel plates and shafts and destroyed’ the rear crew’s quarters. Approximately two dozen men survived at this point. An aircraft spotted the destroyer’s life rafts but once rescued, only eleven returned to shore. A total of 102 Americans perished.¹⁸

Three other U-boat commanders each sank a single Allied vessel in Type VIIC boats in February. On the 11th, U-564 destroyed the Canadian motor tanker Victolite, while on the 19th, U-96 torpedoed the American freighter Lake Osweya. The Germans recorded witnessing multiple lifeboats from this sinking but the Americans found none of the thirty-man crew. Then, on the 28th, U-653 sank the Norwegian merchant vessel Leif. After two months of attacks, the Americans had initiated no successful responses to the German assaults.¹⁹

In March, Dönitz’s U-boats continued their terror off the Atlantic seaboard by sinking eleven Allied merchant vessels, with two U-boats claiming multiple sinkings. On the fifth of the month, Type VIIC U-404 fatally torpedoed the unarmed United States freighter Collamer, which had fallen behind its convoy, HX 178. British freighter Empire Woodcock rescued twenty-four survivors from the thirty-one-man crew.²⁰ For U-404’s commander, Otto von Bülow, the Collamer would mark the first of many destroyed Allied ships. Later that month, he sank the Chilean freighter Tolten off the New Jersey coast. Of over a dozen crew members, only one survived.

On 10 March, Type VIIC U-588 sank American tanker Gulftrade within sight of the New Jersey shore and a day later, 14 miles off the North Carolina coast, U-158 fatally torpedoed the unarmed American freighter Caribsea and then, twenty-four hours later, severely damaged the American tanker John D. Gill.²¹

A variety of U-boats destroyed the remainder of Allied vessels. Another of Dönitz’s large U-boats, Type IXC U-155, made its presence known to the Americans on 7 March. Cruising off the Virginia coast, Adolf Piening, one of the most successful U-boat commanders, having sunk two Allied vessels when transiting the Atlantic on his mission to the American seaboard, added to his total when he fatally torpedoed the Brazilian steamship Arabutan.²² On 9 March, Type VIIC U-94 struck the Brazilian steamship Cayru. Type VIIC U-332 sank the unarmed American schooner Albert F. Paul and none of the crew survived. On 25 March, Type VIIC U-552 fatally torpedoed the Dutch tanker Ocana. The American destroyer Mayo (DD-422) located four survivors. One of America’s two Q-ships, anti-submarine armed vessels disguised as merchantmen, engaged Type IXB U-123 in battle. While sustaining some damage, the U-boat sank her and the Americans found no crew members. Three days later, less than 50 miles from the North Carolina coast, Type IXC U-160 destroyed the American steamship City of New York.

Finally, on the last day of the month, Dönitz’s commanders attacked multiple targets. Just 50 miles from the American naval base at Norfolk, Virginia, Type VIIC U-753 assaulted the unarmed American tug Menominee with gun fire, killing sixteen of her eighteen crew, and also fired on her three barges: Allegheny, Barnegat, and Ontario. Type VIIC U-754 fatally torpedoed the unarmed American tanker Tiger, resulting in the death of one crew member.²³

U-boats continued their depredations in April with the destruction of nine Allied merchant vessels. Type IXB U-123’s commander Hardegen continued his successful patrol by claiming four American vessels, the first three of which he torpedoed within 15 miles of the Georgia coast. He commenced his successful month by attacking two American tankers. The U-boat torpedoed and shelled the unarmed tanker Oklahoma, then targeted the unarmed tanker Esso Baton Rouge. From both vessels, fifty-four were rescued and twenty-two died. The tankers though, survived. The Americans refloated and repaired both of them so that they would sail again. U-123 also fatally torpedoed the unarmed American freighter Esparta, en route from Honduras to New York. By 10 April, the U-boat had moved to the Florida coast where, with the lights of Jacksonville illuminating the area, it assaulted the American tanker Gulfamerica with torpedoes and shells that killed dozens of the crew. Many also drowned and only twenty-two of the forty-one-man crew survived.²⁴

Topp, in Type VIIC U-552, continued to terrorise American shipping in April by sinking multiple vessels. On the second day of the month, surfaced U-552, just 10 miles off the Virginia coastline, fired on the unarmed American freighter David H. Atwater. Coast Guard cutter Legare (WPC-144) located only three members of the twenty-five-man crew. The US Navy ordered two destroyers – Noa (DD-343) and Herbert (DD-160) – to the Atwater’s location but both arrived after U-552 had disappeared. Two days later, Topp also sank the unarmed American tanker Byron D. Benson 8 miles off the North Carolina coast. Nine of the thirty-seven-man crew perished in the resulting blaze and Hamilton (DMS-18), an American minesweeper, brought twenty-seven men aboard, while a British vessel rescued another one. Topp lingered off the North Carolina coast and fatally torpedoed the unarmed American tanker Atlas. Coast Guard cutter CG 462 saved thirty-two of the thirty-four-man crew from the tanker’s gasoline-fuelled fire. Hours later, he attacked tanker Tamaulipas, which sank the next morning due to the intensity of the fire on board.²⁵

Type IXCs U-160 and U-154 also sank multiple Allied vessels in April. U-160 fatally torpedoed the British steamship Rio Blanco on the 1st, and attacked the unarmed Bidwell, 30 miles east of the North Carolina coastline three days later. Bidwell, though, arrived at Hampton Roads. Then, on the 9th, only 50 miles off the Cape Hatteras coast, U-160 sank the unarmed American freighter Malchace, followed by the British steamship Ulysses on the 11th. On 4 April, U-154 destroyed American tanker Comol Rico and the next day this U-boat fatally attacked another American tanker, the Catahoula.²⁶

While the U-boat sinkings through April only involved merchant vessels, Nazi commanders also targeted passenger vessels, which often carried hundreds of people. U-160 found one, the British steamship Ulysses, carrying 195 crew members and 95 passengers, and torpedoed her. Remarkably, the high-speed transport Manley (APD-1) arrived and saved all hands.²⁷

In May, six merchantmen fell victim to German assaults, one by Type VIIC U-404, one by Type VIIC U-656, and the other four by Type VIIC U-588. U-404 sank the American Alcoa Shipper,²⁸ while U-588, commanded by Victor Vogel, destroyed the British merchant vessel Kittys Kitty’s Brook on 10 May and the Norwegian Skottland on 15 May. Two days later, U-656 fatally torpedoed the British merchant vessel Peisander. On the 21st, crew members on the American freighter Plow City misidentified a lifeboat from the Peisander as a U-boat and increased speed to escape. U-588’s crew spotted the exhaust smoke from the fleeing freighter and pursued, torpedoed and sank her. The attack killed one of Plow City’s crew members outright, while the U-boat crew captured and interrogated another on U-588. Vogel returned the crew member to his shipmates with ‘rum and cigarettes’ and assisted the Americans in righting a capsized lifeboat.²⁹ U-588 concluded its patrol in American hunting grounds with the sinking of the British merchant vessel Margot two days later. Vogel safely returned to France after this patrol but his next foray into the North Atlantic proved to be more challenging. On 19 July, the Royal Canadian Navy delivered a fatal depth charge attack with the destroyer HMCS Skeena and the corvette HMCS Wetaskiwin. All hands perished in the sinking.³⁰

During June, U-boats sank six American vessels near the Atlantic seaboard. On the first day of the month, the commander of U-404, so confident of the ineptness of the American defences, actually assaulted the American freighter West Notus with shellfire while surfaced off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. The following day, the U-boat crew boarded the freighter and sank her with explosive charges.³¹ On 1 June, in the Gulf of Mexico, Type IXB U-106 fatally torpedoed the unarmed American freighter Hampton Roads. Type IXC U-502, cruising about the Florida Keys on 3 June, struck the American tanker M.F. Elliott. The Germans seized two crew members but during interrogation the U-boat had to crash dive upon sight of a US Navy aircraft. Later, the crew returned the captured crew members with supplies and a life raft. On the 7th, Type VIIC U-653 destroyed the American patrol vessel Gannet, while three days later Type IXC U-157 torpedoed American tanker Hagan, killing six crew members. The remaining twenty-nine men arrived in Cuba via lifeboat the next day.³²

U-boats even targeted vessels transiting along the American Gulf of Mexico shoreline. On 12 June, Type IXC U-158 sighted the unescorted United States tanker Cities Service Toledo just off the Louisiana coast. The American vessel carried 84,000 barrels of crude oil. U-158’s torpedoes struck the tanker and a massive explosion erupted. Eleven of the thirty-six-man crew died in the fire, along with four of the nine-man Armed Guard. Three vessels came to the survivors’ aid: the Norwegian tanker Belinda, the American tanker Gulf King, and the American steamship San Antonio. These three vessels saved thirty men.³³

Dönitz considered this period highly successful, as he attested in his war diary for 15 April. ‘What counts in the long run,’ he argued, ‘is the preponderance of sinkings over new construction.’ The German admiral fully recognised that ‘shipbuilding and arms production are centred in the United States, while England is the European outpost and sally-port. By attacking the supply-traffic – particularly the oil – in the US zone, I am striking at the root of the evil, for here,’ Dönitz insisted, ‘the sinking of each ship is not only a loss to the enemy but also deals a blow at the source of his shipbuilding and war production. Without shipping,’ he believed, ‘the sally-port cannot be used for an attack on Europe.’ He argued that Nazi Germany ‘should continue to operate the U-boats where they can sink the greatest tonnage with the smallest losses, which at present is in American waters’.³⁴ Dönitz rightly recognised the critical importance of petroleum and America’s vulnerability. When he unleashed his U-boats on the American coastline, 95 per cent of petroleum destined for east coast ports arrived by ship.³⁵

American General George C. Marshall, in considering the necessity of winning the war in Europe by having to transit the Atlantic, agreed with Dönitz’s assessment and expressed his frustration to the commander of the US Navy, Admiral Ernest King, to whose responsibility the Battle of Atlantic fell. On 19 June, two months after Dönitz’s diary entry, Marshall wrote: ‘The losses by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and in the Caribbean now threaten our entire war effort. The following statistics bearing on the subject have been brought to my attention.’

The general noted that ‘of the seventy-four ships allocated to the Army for July by the War Shipping Administration, seventeen have already been sunk. Twenty-two percent of the bauxite fleet has already been destroyed. Twenty percent of the Puerto Rican fleet has been lost’ Referring to the issue that Dönitz considered most crucial, he also related that ‘tanker sinkings have been 3.5 percent per month of tonnage in use’.

Marshall understood that ‘we are all aware of the limited number of escort craft available but has every conceivable improvised means been brought to bear on this situation? I am fearful that another month or two of this will so cripple our means of transport that we will be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the enemy in critical theatres to exercise a determining influence on the war.’

In response, on 21 June, King confessed that he had ‘long been aware, of course, of the implications of the submarine situation as pointed out in your memorandum’. He claimed to ‘have employed – and will continue to employ – not only regular forces but also such improvised means to give any promise of usefulness’. After this statement, he blamed the British for not destroying the European U-boat infrastructure such as submarine bases and construction yards. The admiral contended that ‘if all shipping can be brought under escort and air-cover our losses will be reduced to an acceptable figure’. King further asserted, in ignoring the benefit of air cover, that ‘escort is not just one way of handling the submarine menace; it is the only way that gives any promise of success’. The two words emphasized by the admiral further demonstrate his bias toward surface vessels. He dismissed ‘the so-called patrol and hunting operations’ as ‘futile’ and concluded with the statement that ‘we must get every ship that sails the seas under constant protection’.³⁶

The official US Navy historian, Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, arrived at a different conclusion by admitting that ‘the writer cannot avoid the conclusion that the US Navy was woefully unprepared, materially and mentally,