Education by Choice: The Case for Family Control

EDUCATION BY

CHOICE

The best interests of the child shall be the guiding principle of those responsible for his education and guidance; that responsibility lies in the first place with his parents.

UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD

EDUCATION BY

CHOICE

The Case for

Family Control by

John E. Coons and

Stephen D. Sugarman

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley • Los Angeles • London

University of California Press

Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

University of California Press, Ltd.

London, England

Copyright © 1978 by

The Regents of the University of California

ISBN 0-520-03613-1

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 77-20318

Printed in the United States of America

123456789

To the parents who controlled us, the women who chose us, and the daughters and sons who educate us.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

INTRODUCTION

SETTING THE STAGE

HOBSON'S CHOICE: YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD PUBLIC SCHOOL, TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT

THE ROAD AHEAD

THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION

ROOTS

RECENT REVIVALS

POVERTY AND CHOICE: WHO LACKS CHOICE?

OTHER REFORMS DISTINGUISHED

CHOICE SYSTEMS DISTINGUISHED

THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

THE ELUSIVENESS OF THE CHILD'S INTEREST

CONFLICT AND PUZZLEMENT: THE EVIDENCE

A CERTAIN SAMENESS

AMID PERPLEXITY, WHO SHOULD DECIDE?

THE REAL QUESTION: WHO DECIDES?

DECISION-LOCATING CONSIDERATIONS

SUBSIDIARITY: THE PRESUMPTION FOR THE SMALL

THE SCOPE OF THE FAMILY/PROFESSIONAL DISPUTE

THE CASE FOR THE FAMILY AS DECIDER

OTHER SMALL DECISION UNITS CONSIDERED

CHILD CHOICE

TREATING EDUCATION LIKE CHILD-REARING GENERALLY

THE FAMILY AND THE MINIMUM

AUTONOMY AS THE GOAL: A PERSONAL VIEW

AUTONOMY DISSECTED

EDUCATION FOR AUTONOMY

PURSUING AUTONOMY THROUGH THE PUBLIC MONOPOLY

AUTONOMY UNDER A FAMILY CHOICE SYSTEM

CHOICE AND THE AMERICAN COVENANT

THE ISSUE OF IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM

IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND NATIONAL CONSENSUS

EDUCATIONAL PLURALISM IN AID OF CONSENSUS

EDUCATIONAL PLURALISM AS A BRAKE ON UNIFORMITY

CHOICE AND BEAUTY

RACIST IDEOLOGY: A SPECIAL CASE?

THE ISSUE OF RACIAL INTEGRATION

BODY-MIXING AND THE INDIVIDUAL CHILD

EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF FORCE

INTEGRATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF CHOICE

EXISTING LEGAL INCENTIVES TO INTEGRATION BY CHOICE

FUTURE LEGISLATIVE DESIGNS FOR INTEGRATION

IF WE DON’T ALL INTEGRATE

CONCLUSION: ON USING THE CHILD

DESIGNING THE INSTRUMENTS OF CHOICE

THE PROCESS OF CHOICE

MATCHING THE CHILD AND HIS SCHOOLING

SCHOOL SIZE

ADMISSION POLICIES

MECHANISMS FOR FAIR SELECTION

THE MUSICAL CHAIRS PROBLEM

EXPULSIONS

CONSUMER INFORMATION:

SCHOOL PROVIDERS AND SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

SHOULD PRIVATE SCHOOLS BE INCLUDED?

WHO MIGHT BE THE PRIVATE PROVIDERS?

STIMULATING PRIVATE PROVIDERS

CHOICE AMONG WHICH PUBLIC SCHOOLS?

TRANSPORTATION

GOVERNANCE AND FORMATION OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF CHOICE

FAMILY PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL POLICY MAKING

EDUCATIONAL STYLE

CURRICULUM

TEACHER CERTIFICATION

UNION POWER

CONTRACT AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF TEACHERS

TEACHER FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

ADMINISTRATORS

SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT

HOME INSTRUCTION

THE CLIMATE OF FREEDOM AND FAIRNESS: STUDENT RIGHTS

THE NATURE OF THE SUBSIDY

TUITION ADD-ONS: THE PROBLEM OF RICH AND POOR FAMILIES

GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY: THE PROBLEM OF RICH AND POOR PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS

SHOULD EACH CHILD RECEIVE THE SAME SUBSIDY? FOUR MODELS OF FINANCE

TRANSFER POLICIES

REGULATION OF COMPETITION AMONG PROVIDERS

COMPREHENSIVE VERSUS PARTIAL PLANS

A PREEMPTIVE MODEL?

CONCLUSION: SIGNS

EDUCATIONAL CHOICE AT WORK

CHOICE IN CHILDREN’S POLICY

THE FUTURE OF FAMILY POLICY

NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

FOREWORD

James S. Coleman

For a number of years, the possibility of an alternative to the present system of public education—an alternative in which the state is no longer the sole provider of publicly supported education, and in which children are no longer assigned to particular schools—has been discussed and debated. The plans for such an alternative have been referred to by a number of terms: vouchers, entitlements, education stamps. The plans, in all their variations, involve giving parents and children a choice of the school the child will attend, withdrawing that authority from the school officials who, acting as agents of the state, exercise it now. In most of the variations, this choice may extend beyond the public school, to private schools as well. The premise underlying all these plans is that better education would result if parents and children had a greater opportunity for educational choice than is now available to them.

The polarization of opinion about such plans reflects a division on very deeply held values, involving beliefs about the proper division of authority between the state and the family, beliefs about the dangers to social cohesion of deviant doctrines, beliefs about the relative abilities of professionals and their clients to decide what is best, and beliefs in the importance of maintaining the existing institutional order.

As a consequence, strange bedfellows appear, defying classification as liberals or conservatives, or egalitarians or elitists. Milton Friedman, Christopher Jencks, and Mario Fantini can be found among the advocates of some such plan; the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Federation of Teachers oppose it. It would be welcomed by the Black Muslims, the urban free schools, and the Catholic Church, and opposed by many Reagan Republicans and New Deal Democrats.

A thoughtful person might be led to ask why this alternative, the alternative of family choice, has arisen from so many quarters in recent years. I believe the answer lies in a fundamental clash between the locality-specific base on which education is built in this country, and increasing economic interdependence, including the increasing state and federal sources of educational funding. The organization of education around localities—neighborhoods, suburban towns, villages, rural areas, and sometimes counties—when coupled with the increasing separation of work from residence has meant that education has become increasingly differentiated by locality. More and more, families with sufficient income are able to group their children with others of like kind, by moving residence. Side by side, almost, will be two schools with very different levels of financing, very different curricula, very different quality of teachers, and very different student body mixtures. This disparity of finances, program, and personnel is far greater than that which existed when a school served an independent community, with all its economic levels. And what variation did exist had a reasonable justification when each school district raised its own funds from its own taxes, and when taxes raised in each district were principally a result of economic activity in that district as a self-contained economy. But now neither of these conditions holds. About half of school finances are now provided at state or federal level, and in all districts the taxable wealth depends on economic activity outside the district as well as within. Thus, the locality basis for education is increasingly undermined, and there is an increasing rationale for state or federal control of the education which is increasingly paid for at the state and federal levels.

As this occurs, as small residentially proximate groups which constitute a community become no longer able to make educational decisions collectively which affect their children, it becomes important to find an alternative to an increasing centralization of those decisions. One such alternative is to return that choice to the individual level, to the parents and children themselves. If that alternative was attractive and desirable when school districts were largely independent (and I believe it was even then), it becomes almost imperative now.

It is because of these social changes, I believe, that from diverse starting points and for diverse reasons more and more educators and persons interested in education are coming to see educational entitlements or vouchers as the correct way of organizing education in the future. But as the discussion of this alternative develops, extensive examination is necessary of the philosophical issues involved, the variations that are possible in a voucher plan, and the questions of implementation.

This book initiates exactly that kind of examination. Its authors have arrived at this voucher alternative from a different starting point than most, that of financial equity in education. Their earlier book (written with William Clune), Private Wealth and Public Education, has been probably the single most influential element in the court decisions, beginning with Serrano, that have led state legislatures to revise their school-aid formulae to bring about financial equity within the state. And it is their principle of district power equalizing which has served as the major conceptual tool behind the revision of these formulae.

But even in that earlier work, Coons and Sugarman noted that the ultimate (and one might say, proper) extension of the idea of power equalizing was not merely to the district level but to the family level, to give family power equalizing. And this is precisely what a voucher system does—provides equal educational resources to children, regardless of their family’s residential mobility or economic ability to afford private school. Indeed, as Coons and Sugarman have found, once the state undertakes to provide truly equal educational resources to the children of its residents, any solution other than a voucher system in which individual parents and children can exercise a wide range of choice involves serious complications that are difficult to resolve short of full state control of educational decisions.

In this book Coons and Sugarman examine most of the issues that must be resolved in instituting a system of family choice in education. They address head-on some of the strongest arguments against voucher plans, including the fear of indoctrinating children in ideological extremes, and the concern that a voucher system could lead to increased racial segregation. They argue convincingly that a voucher system could well reduce the ideological strains in society, rather than increase them, and they show ways that constraints can be imposed on, or incentives applied to, the schools (rather than the families) to protect against possible segregating effects. (I believe the segregating tendencies are somewhat stronger than they indicate, and consequently I feel that somewhat stronger constraints or incentives might be necessary than some of those they suggest.)

This book on family choice constitutes an important step in the developing conceptual base for systems of family choice in education. It is the product of a quest by Coons and Sugarman for equity in education, but the solution holds promise for far more than equity in the educational and social benefits it can bring.

INTRODUCTION

If … rebellion could found a philosophy, it would be a philosophy of limits, of calculated ignorance, and of risk. He who does not know everything cannot kill everything.

—ALBERT CAMUS, The Rebel

Imagine a people aspiring to live in harmony, to cooperate in production and defense, and to distribute society’s rewards in a just manner. Suppose, however, that they are divided a dozen ways about the nature of the good life—some valuing personal striving and acquisition, others pleasure, others quiet and the life of the spirit. How would such a people design the education of their children?

The question is important, for the society described is this one. America is, to be sure, one nation—even a people of sorts—and we think it on the whole a generous people with a concern for social justice. Yet in its vision of individual human perfection, America is a virtual menagerie. Despite a superficial sameness born of an industrial economy, there is no American ethic or, if there is, it is passing. Dedicated work and dedicated consumption remain a central theme but no longer dominate the mass of personal aspirations; the work ethic competes with challenging cultural, religious, and artistic world views for the loyalty of individuals. This pluralism of individual views about what it is that makes for a fully human life has its impact on education. If there ever was a national understanding about adult society’s responsibility for the young, there is no longer. There remains, nonetheless, a general conviction that a just society makes ample provision for the formal portion of children’s education and assures a measure of fairness and rationality in its distribution. But distribution of what? Given the diversity of values among American adults, in what should publicly supported education consist?

For us the answer lies in subsidizing a much wider range of private choice than is now the case. It is an approach freighted with personal values and, in particular, freedom. There will be much here about familiar libertarian institutions such as private schools, markets, and competition. Yet our theme is also egalitarian; it holds for one area of the child’s life the socialist ideal of an equal portion—his full share of a particular good. Our objective for education is an equality of freedom. We believe the traditional conflict between liberty and equality may here be tempered. By moving away from the distribution of compulsory packaged education, government can begin to redistribute the means of self-determination in the formation of will and intellect.

Arranging the redistribution of educational choice is complicated. Simply granting choice to the child is unfeasible. Liberty is an awkward ideal to implement for persons who are dependent by reason of age, illness, insanity, or any other condition. When the person is a child, the problem is compounded; children lack personal sovereignty, but not in the straightforward manner of an adult suffering permanent mental disability. Children constantly accumulate the stuff of self-determination; from the outset they have a portion of human independence, and they will have the whole. As the child’s own claim to liberty is not static, it may be protected only by an authority that is both ready to promote the child’s interest and adaptable to the stages of individual maturation.

Are there criteria for identifying such an authority? We will argue that the interests of children are best served in a decentralized polity giving maximum scope to free, chosen, communal relationships that are generally organized on a small scale. Systematic domination of education by large enterprise (public or private) ought, therefore, to be disfavored. This suggests to us the strengthening of the family’s role in education and the growth of a teaching fraternity which is related to the family as professional to client rather than as master to servant. Family choice for the nonrich could lead to an end of the American double standard: Among those who can afford private school, society leaves the goals and means of education to the family; for the rest of society, the informing principles are politically determined and implemented through compulsory assignment to a particular public school.

Our aspirations, however, are modest. There is here no intention to justify the prompt dismantling of the educational edifice. Our hope is only to show a new framework for debating the question of a just educational order and to stimulate tolerance for experimentation. We have not canvassed every justifying argument for our conclusion. And the prediction of every social consequence of family choice is plainly undesirable in a book designed only to support experimentation. Therefore, for example, we have fully analyzed neither the opportunities nor the risks for teachers under the regime we propose. Nor have we imagined all the ways in which family choice might affect the linkage between school and work. Our objective demands not proof but only plausibility. Nor does our argument need complex academic trapping. The paraphernalia of scholarly debate has been reduced to a minimum, and we address ourselves to the broad audience of those concerned with educational policy.

Some personal history may help clarify the context in which we write. Since the early 1960s, at Northwestern and at Berkeley, we have been involved (mostly in collaboration) in the analysis and practical reform of school policy. We have been interested primarily in school finance and governance and the pursuit of racial integration. In the mid-1960s, with William Clune, we developed and later published a constitutional argument that could, where adopted, eliminate wealth discrimination among public schools while enhancing the traditional systems of local control and governance.¹ In books and articles we have published statutory models for school finance schemes based on either political units (the school district) or primary social units (the family). Since 1968 we have participated actively in the process of legislative reform and in litigation, mostly as friends of the court.

The incubation of our views was assisted from 1972 by the Childhood and Government Project. This five-year enterprise, generously funded by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, was a part of the Earl Warren Legal Institute of the University of California, Berkeley. The faculty and staff of the project represented a broad spectrum of disciplines and an even broader set of value commitments. On issues as inflammatory as ours the project tended to become an intellectual bear-pit, and we thank our colleagues who always combined their intellectual assaults with personal affection—all to the enrichment of our work and our lives.

There are some deserving special thanks for special generosity. Dr. Gail Saliterman has been an enthusiastic critic with a keen nose for lurking absurdities. Professor Robert Mnookin of Berkeley at several points offered crucial substantive and organizing insights which we hope have received justice at our hands. Our sometime collaborator and permanent kibitzer Professor William Clune of Wisconsin has made his good judgment felt in a number of respects, and, as in our first book together, James Coleman has given us a head start with his generous and thoughtful foreword. Finally, while the typing could not have been much fun, we thank Judith Kahn, Eloise Schmidt, Laura Bergang, Barbara Lewis, Eva Scipio, and Pam Kolacy for their inspiring hypocrisy.

It is inevitable that certain of our criticisms of the existing order will be resented by some who have devoted their lives to the present scheme of public education. To them it may seem no expiation that elsewhere we continue to engage our energies in the improvement of that system in more traditional ways. Therefore it is important for our view of ourselves that we repudiate the demonology of the public school baiters. Although we would free the child from an unchosen education, our deepest hope is that the deliverance prove reciprocal. In the long run the public school itself could emerge the stronger for having surrendered its crutch.

SETTING THE STAGE

FOR EDUCATIONAL CHOICE

He may not, as unvalu'd persons do, Carve for himself, for on his choice depends The safety and health of the whole state.

—WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet

Chapter 1

HOBSON'S CHOICE: YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD PUBLIC SCHOOL, TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT

Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you. JOHN 15:13

Choice has never been wholly erased from public education. Typically children are assigned to school not by lot or I.Q. but by residence. Families may move, and there are some differences in style and curriculum among the school districts and among schools. A number of school systems even permit families living in the district to select among local public schools, allowing students to travel out of their neighborhood to schools with vacant desks. Among the school districts of Vermont and New Hampshire, family choice systems of substantial size have been quietly operating for generations; in recent years a federally supported family choice program— termed the voucher experiment—has been carried out within a public school district in California. Finally, almost everywhere there is some choice among offerings within the modern high school, both as to academic track—college prep, general, vocational—and as to individual courses. Thus, there appears to be some potential for personal choice within the public school system.

Such choice, however, is exceptional and narrow in scope when compared to the range of interests held by the families that use public education. Satisfying the preferences of individuals has rarely been a major objective of the system. In general the family gets what it wants only if it is lucky enough to live in a district where the local school officials and the majority of families, operating within the constraints of politics and state law, agree with the family’s own preferences. At least this is true for those families who cannot afford private schools or lack the resources, sophistication, or time to find the right public programs and then maneuver their children into them. And these are not only families with low incomes. Certainly most middle-income families with more than one child in school, high medical costs, a single working parent, or similar problems are also limited in their choice of education.

Consider the following case: Ann Orlov is eleven. She and her younger brother Larry live in the city with their parents Harry and Jean. Harry earns $14,000 as a policeman; Jean adds $3,000 as a part-time secretary. Ann attends Willis Elementary, the neighborhood public school. She is not unusually bright but has shown a strong interest in art and in the lives and work of artists. She dislikes Willis, in part because so little time is devoted to her special interest. She studies art in a community program on Saturdays, but otherwise—apart from a 45-minute once-a-week art class taught by a specialist—she regards her formal education as a waste of time. She would be delighted to spend her days following the art teacher around, but that is out of the question in view of all the other children to be served. Ann’s regular teacher finds it inconsistent both with his own role and with Ann’s needs for her to be allowed to sit alone in the back of the classroom all day and draw. The Orlovs have asked the principal at Willis, a sympathetic woman, for aid or advice. Unfortunately she sees no way to help Ann short of enrollment in another school.

Ann has begged to go to school elsewhere. She would prefer a school that emphasizes art, but would be happy even to be assigned to a teacher whose regular class routine responded to her interests. Her parents want to help, but there are problems. The Orlovs cannot afford Bellwood, the arty but expensive private school that Ann thinks she would like. The modestly priced local Catholic school might serve, but the Orlovs oppose this solution on religious grounds. They might discover a public school in the city with an attractive art program or teacher, one located within reasonable traveling distance; but the school authorities would have to approve Ann’s transfer from Willis, and this is not likely. Of course, the Orlovs could move to the attendance area of the other school. They could even move to a different school district. A number of their former neighbors have done so, and some are pleased with the outcome.

For the Orlovs, however, there are limiting conditions. Policemen are supposed to live in the city, so a change of districts for Harry might mean finding a new job. And for very many reasons—the park, the neighbors, shopping, the church, the cost of moving—the Orlovs prefer their present neighborhood and would find it painful and expensive to move. Their gravest concern is for little Larry, who loves Willis’s strong music program, including a boys’ chorus in which he solos. Harry and Jean feel any move would be a serious gamble for him. Even for Ann a move would be risky. If the student body in the new school is separated into ability groups, the school might assign Ann to the wrong program. More important, the Orlovs are worried that, even if the family moves, subsequent shifts in teaching personnel or official policy might leave the whole family even worse off than before.

Armin Schroeder is a young art teacher in the public schools of a blue-collar suburb adjoining the city. He has developed a proposal for a comprehensive elementary curriculum in which the teaching of basic subjects would be built around the symbols and materials of the artist’s world. Sdhroeder has tried to persuade his school authorities to give him an experimental school, but, though sympathetic to experimentation, they are already committed in other directions. In any event, Schroeder’s success in his own district would probably be of little help to Ann Orlov; even if there were spaces available, she is not likely to be granted a special transfer outside her district.

Schroeder does not have the capital to start such a school on a private basis. Even if he could raise the money, he would probably have to charge more than $1,400 a year tuition; he might be able to attract a rich clientele and survive, but he prefers not to run an elitist school. Possibly enough families like the Orlovs would try his school to make it viable—if they could afford it. Most would feel they could not. The Orlovs’ savings are insignificant and their responsibilities weighty; family resources are already diminished by $700 paid yearly in various taxes that support education, and the public school is free. Under these circumstances even wealthier people often forego the private alternative they might prefer.

There is no easy way to tell if the needs and wants of most families are served by the local public school. The widespread criticism of American education in the 1960s and 1970s suggests they are not. Rather it seems likely that the preferences and phobias of many go undiscovered and unsatisfied. In place of compulsory assignment, many children and their families might prefer programs emphasizing science, the classics, McGuffey’s reader, music, the Baltimore Catechism, or the sayings of Chairman Mao. Some might want an outdoor school, a school in a living room, a school that starts at 7:00 and ends at noon, a school with the long vacation in the fall, or a school whose teachers are artisans or otherwise employed part-time outside the school. Likewise, many teachers might wish they were free to enlist children in the enterprise of learning by offering the bait of their special abilities in dance, botany, French, Chinese culture, or the teachings of Muhammed. What we do know is that—even given a harmony of objectives among school, teacher, parent, and student— many families find it extremely difficult today to get the child and the preferred experience together except by happy accident.

These frustrations of the system tend to be taken for granted. Yet the lot of the Orlovs and Schroeders of our society is, in a major respect, abnormal. If what Ann and her parents want and what Schroeder has to offer were something other than education, the Orlovs could simply choose it and, if necessary and possible, buy it. Ann’s other needs—even those of the greatest importance—are ordinarily met in this way. The family purchases the food she eats and the shoes on her feet. In each case, the choices are made by the parents or child alone, or, more likely, they are the result of a process of selection in which the child and parents decide together. Of course, those marketing the product influence choices, and the government regulates some purchases. But generally, the state is content to trust the Orlovs with sophisticated decisions regarding food, hours of rest, and other important matters affecting the child. Only when it comes to education has the state, deliberately or otherwise, virtually emasculated the family’s options. In place of the family it has created an organizational structure which finds it difficult to provide for Ann—even where there are public school teachers who could and would provide it—the form of education that the Orlovs find most appropriate.

Why has the state adopted this policy? Is it the fear that some parents will choose inadequate education or none at all? This is a prudent concern. On grounds of simple fairness children should be guaranteed reasonable access to education whatever their parents’ views. There are also the social benefits that are supposed to flow from education. These individual and social considerations together suggest the state should strictly enforce the parent’s legal duty to educate. Would that not suffice? The humane response is that the right to education should not be limited by parental resources; parental duty means nothing to the child if the family cannot afford to educate him. Therefore, additional collective action is necessary, and unless the child is to be taken from his parents, this requires a subsidy of the parents by the state. Only in that way can the child’s hope for education be delivered from the economic limitations of his family.

Perhaps the poor could simply be given money. But in a cash