Agricultural Policy in Disarray: Volume 2

Introduction

About 45 years ago, in 1973, D. Gale Johnson published a seminal study of agricultural policy. For his title, Johnson settled on World Agriculture in Disarray to reflect the chaotic incentives and economic inefficiencies created by the agricultural policies of many countries, including Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.

Beginning in the mid-1980s with a set of radical reforms to New Zealand’s and Australia’s agricultural policies, many member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development initiated reforms to their agricultural policies. Those reforms involved reducing levels of support (measured percentages of the value of production) and changing how farm revenues are enhanced. The shift has been away from support tied to production and input use and toward either fixed payments or payments tied to the provision of environmental amenities. Not surprisingly, in those countries, farmers have generally become more entrepreneurial and efficient, and agricultural productivity has improved more quickly than in other countries whose programs have sustained inefficient farms and reduced incentives for innovation.

So what about the United States? While the United States appeared to be moving away from subsidies that distorted agricultural markets in the early and mid-1990s, since then the House and Senate Agriculture Committees that largely determine the structure of US farm programs have indulged in a 180-degree turn, boosting support to provide protection against falling market prices and revenues. In many ways, recent US policy initiatives, including several programs introduced in the 2014 Farm Bill, have only made matters worse. Most of those programs will likely remain unchanged, and possibly even be expanded, in any future US agricultural policy legislation.

These sacred cows include the two most expensive programs in terms of federal outlays on subsidy payments. One is a major new (in 2014) direct subsidy program that offers farm businesses a choice between two alternative methods by which they can obtain tax dollars. The other is the much older federal crop insurance program that benefits both farm businesses and, perhaps especially, crop insurance companies.

As a result, despite some major changes over the past four decades, in many respects US agricultural policy continues to vividly reflect the disarray about which Johnson wrote so elegantly almost half a century ago—hence the title of this two-volume examination of US agricultural policy, Agricultural Policy in Disarray, which includes 19 studies of a wide range of US agricultural policies authored by many of the world’s leading agricultural economists.

The purpose of this work is to examine the complex and, in many ways, conflicted structure of contemporary US agricultural policy through a series of studies that are designed to be accessible to students, policymakers, and the general public. Each study examines a set of current programs that affect a particular subsector of the US agricultural economy (e.g., cotton, dairy, and sugar), a broader program area (e.g., conservation programs, the federal crop insurance program, and competition policy), or a major issue (e.g., domestic poverty alleviation) and evaluates the impacts of potential options for policy change.

Unfortunately, these studies are likely to be relevant for a long time, as the current chaotic amalgam of US agricultural programs appears unlikely to be altered in the near future. As this introduction is being written, the US House and Senate have passed separate versions of a new 2018 or 2019 Farm Bill. In the context of agricultural policy, the two draft bills are similar and essentially represent a stay the course approach. Both bills simply extend the current provisions of most agricultural subsidy programs while making some changes to, but maintaining overall funding for, conservation programs. Neither bill does anything substantive for public agricultural research funding. Therefore, in real terms, support is likely to continue to decline for one of the few initiatives that clearly generates widespread benefits for the economy as a whole.

Many of the studies reflect similar realities with respect to agricultural policy in the United States. First, policies are largely designed to benefit and are effectively determined by relatively small interest groups. Many of these organizations consist of farm businesses (e.g., the National Cotton Council and the American Soybean Association), producer organizations (e.g., the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Farmers Union), and industries that service the agricultural sector, such as crop insurance companies and input supply organizations.

Second, other players in the agricultural policy process do include environmental and other more broadly focused interest groups (e.g., the World Wildlife Fund and the Sierra Club), but often the polices those groups seek involve payoffs to the agricultural sector (e.g., through paid land retirement programs and subsidies for changes to working-lands programs).

Third, little attention, if any, is paid to consumers or the poor in forming and implementing farm subsidy programs, despite assertions to the contrary from vested farm interest groups. Consumers, including the poor, are more likely to pay for farm programs either through higher taxes or higher prices for agricultural commodities because of tariffs and other forms of supply control. In fact, much of the recent debate on farm policy has focused on tightening work requirements for recipients of nutritional support and reductions in spending on such programs.

Fourth, US agricultural policies rarely take account of the international trade and trade relations implications associated with how they operate, notwithstanding that the US is a net exporter of agricultural commodities. Finally, in almost all cases, subsidy programs are intentionally structured to funnel federal funds to large farm businesses that in most cases would be financially successful without any help from the US taxpayer or consumer.

Volume I of this study focuses on policies and regulations intended to benefit farm businesses through direct subsidy payments (e.g., the federal crop insurance program), price controls (e.g., dairy marketing orders), and output restrictions through limits on domestic production or imports (e.g., the sugar program). It also examines the consequences of such policies on US trade relations. Volume II includes analyses of the effects of US domestic policies and international food aid programs on poverty and hunger (e.g., food stamp programs versus agricultural subsidies), the impacts of US conservation, environmental and renewable fuels programs and regulations, public agricultural research funding, the regulation of genetically modified (GM) technologies, and regulations affecting market operations, including agricultural commodity future markets and contracts.

As Vincent Smith et al. demonstrate in their detailed overview of contemporary US agricultural policy (Chapter 1, Volume I), in general, programs authorized by the 2014 Farm Bill channel substantial amounts of federal funds to households whose incomes and wealth are well above those of the average US household. Many of those programs also create incentives for farm businesses to operate in ways that waste economic resources, and the owners and managers of those businesses respond accordingly.

The issue of which farm businesses benefit from agricultural subsidy programs is considered in more detail by Anton Bekkerman, Eric Belasco, and Vincent Smith in Chapter 2 of Volume I. Using US Department of Agriculture (USDA) data, they examine the distribution of payments through the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs, which average over $6 billion a year, and crop insurance subsidy payments, which average just under $6 billion a year. Their analysis shows that farms in the top 10 percent of the crop sales distribution received approximately 68 percent of all crop insurance premium subsidies in 2014, and farms in the top 20 percent received more than 82 percent of ARC and PLC payments in 2015. Further, the astonishingly concentrated nature of those subsidy payments on the largest farm businesses was reflected by the fact that, in 2015, farms in the bottom 80 percent of crop sales received approximately the same total amount of ARC, PLC, and crop insurance subsidy payments as farms in the top 2 percent.

Vincent Smith, Joseph Glauber, and Barry Goodwin discuss the complex nature of the US federal crop insurance program in Chapter 3 of Volume I. They argue that, in effect, the US federal crop insurance program is a poster child for policies that waste economic resources, are poorly targeted, and involve substantial subsidies to an ancillary industry (the crop insurance industry) that, in response, becomes an effective and well-resourced lobby for the continuation and expansion of the program. From small beginnings, since 1981, the program has become a major source of subsidies for farmers, currently with more than 300 million acres and 130 crops enrolled in the program. In addition to being expensive—the program costs taxpayers over $8 billion a year, of which (one way or another) $2.5 billion is paid to crop insurance companies—as discussed by Bekkerman, Belasco, and Smith (Chapter 2, Volume I), federal crop insurance subsidies are targeted mainly to large farm businesses. Premium subsidies average about 60 percent, ensuring that a typical farm business receives more than $2 in indemnity payments for every $1 it pays in premiums. The program also encourages farmers to waste resources and has the potential to engage the US in World Trade Organization (WTO) disputes with other countries over the trade impacts of US agricultural policy.

Two programs, ARC and PLC, were established by Congress in the 2014 Farm Bill. On a commodity-by-commodity basis, for a set of 17 program commodities, many of which have received farm subsidies for seven or more decades, a farm business can select one of these two programs as a source of direct subsidy payments. In Chapter 4 of Volume I, Barry Goodwin explores the structure and economic implications of these PLC and ARC subsidy programs, which as discussed above involve income transfers averaging more than $6 billion annually. One important issue is whether subsidy payments made under these two programs are linked to current production decisions and therefore substantively affect resource-allocation decisions and distort markets. Payments under both programs are linked to historical production decisions within the period covered by the 2014 Farm Bill (2014–18) and therefore may appear to be decoupled from current production choices. However, as Goodwin notes, allowing farm businesses periodically to update their historical basis for payments, as in the 2008 and 2014 Farm Bills, reties such payments to current production choices. Such recoupling of support seems likely to occur in the future and raises substantial concerns regarding trade agreement obligations.

The US crop insurance and ARC and PLC programs are not the only elements of US agricultural policy that have spillover effects on global markets, with consequences for the country’s international relations with other countries. Joseph Glauber and Daniel Sumner (Chapter 5, Volume I) examine the interactions between US agricultural programs and international trade in agricultural and food products, demonstrating that trade has always been important for US agriculture. However, over the past 50 years, US consumers and producers of agricultural commodities have become increasingly linked to global markets. Since the 1980s, several changes to US programs, many due to trade agreements and the WTO’s influence, have lowered tariffs and increased trade, fostering income growth for farm businesses and lowering prices for consumers. Nevertheless, distortionary policies that are problematic for the US in its trade relations remain, and the impacts of some have expanded, which has adverse implications for global commodity prices and US trade relations. These include high tariffs for some commodities (e.g., sugar); substantial increases in price and income subsidies for other major commodities such as corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, peanuts, and milk; and the expansion of the federal crop insurance program.

Chapters 6–9 of Volume I focus on four sets of commodity-specific policies for sugar (Chapter 6), milk (Chapter 7), cotton (Chapter 8), and peanuts (Chapter 9). John Beghin and Amani Elobeid (Chapter 6) review the structure, welfare, trade, and world price implications of the US sugar program. The sugar program is a protectionist policy based on supply controls that increases the domestic price of sugar above the corresponding world price. It restricts imports of raw and refined sugar, depresses world sugar prices, and substantially changes the mix of sweeteners used in processed food. Domestic markets are distorted, sugar users are effectively taxed, and sugar producers are subsidized by the program. The welfare transfer to sugar growers and processors is quite large in the aggregate, hovering around $1.2 billion. Losses to households are diffused, about $11 per person per year, but are large for the population as a whole, in the range of $2.4–$4 billion. Gains to producers are concentrated in a few hands, especially in the cane sugar industry. Labor effects from lost activity in food processing are estimated to be between 17,000 and 20,000 jobs annually.

Daniel Sumner examines US dairy policy (Chapter 7, Volume I). Productivity gains in the US dairy industry, which now involves substantial exports of US dairy products, have shifted policies away from border protection, price supports, export subsidies, and government regulations. The 2014 Farm Bill terminated several outmoded programs but left some long-standing programs in place (e.g., marketing orders) and created new government programs. Those programs continue to be expensive for US consumers and taxpayers and create incentives for dairy farms to waste economic resources. They include dozens of high tariffs for specific dairy products and complex Federal Milk Marketing Orders that are costly to administer, and they generate resource misallocations within and beyond the dairy sector. A new income subsidy program was also introduced in 2014. The program is called the Margin Protection Program, which is notionally designed as a risk-management insurance program.

Joseph Glauber examines cotton subsidies (Chapter 8, Volume I). They have been a major source of controversy in international trade relations and historically have been viewed as highly distortionary. However, as Glauber notes, among the reforms enacted in the 2014 Farm Bill, few were more significant than the changes made to the suite of federal subsidy programs for cotton. Direct and countercyclical payments were eliminated and replaced by a heavily subsidized supplemental insurance program, the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX), a program designed and promoted by the US cotton industry. The changes were made to resolve a long-standing trade dispute brought by Brazil to the WTO against US cotton price and income support programs. Subsequently, the US cotton industry became disenchanted with its own self-selected STAX program and pushed for access to the new ARC and PLC income and price support programs, which it eventually obtained for seed cotton. The seed cotton proposal was presented as a budget neutral initiative, but given the volatility of cotton prices, the potential for large subsidy payments exists. Moreover, the program clearly violates the US agreement with Brazil over cotton subsidies, will likely create market distortions, and could have detrimental effects on world prices. The new initiative is a classic example of a policy solely intended to benefit a relatively small but wealthy and politically influential interest group at a potentially substantial cost to US trade relations and other sectors of the economy.

Barry Goodwin and Vincent Smith examine the peanut program (Chapter 9, Volume I). They argue that the program is another compelling example of how relatively small, well-funded interest groups often successfully obtain funds from federal legislators. The peanut industry consists of about 6,000 generally affluent and financially secure farm businesses located in a small number of states. The peanut lobby’s exceptional effectiveness in obtaining taxpayer funds is illustrated by the fact that between 2014 and 2016 peanut producers received, on average, over $340 an acre annually in taxpayer subsidies. Those payments amounted to almost half the total revenues farm businesses received from all sources of funds, almost matching their revenues from the sale of peanuts in the marketplace. Further, farm businesses raising peanuts enjoy exceptionally generous treatment in terms of limits on the subsidy payments they can receive. No other group of farm businesses, producing commodities such as rice, corn, and wheat, comes close to receiving such levels of government subsidies for a specific crop, and the program represents an extreme among extremes in the context of agricultural policy.

Farm interest groups have historically claimed that a major objective, if not the major purpose, of agricultural subsidy programs is to reduce rural poverty, especially poverty among farmers, and to mitigate urban poverty by lowering the prices paid by urban consumers for food. In the first study presented in Volume II (Chapter 1), Joseph Glauber, Daniel Sumner, and Parke Wilde review the current evidence about such impacts. They conclude that farm subsidy programs have little impact on food consumption, food security, or nutrition in the United States, despite any claims to the contrary. Further, as also discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of Volume 1, the people whose household incomes are most improved by agricultural policies are the owners of large farm businesses, not struggling small-scale farmers or other rural families with low incomes who are at risk of poverty and hunger.

Farm bills include several nutrition assistance programs that do provide resources for low-income families. By a considerable margin, the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), examined by Diane Whit-more Schanzenbach (Chapter 2, Volume II), is the largest of these programs for both the number of people participating in the program and federal spending. Since 1960, SNAP has relied on the market system to increase access to nutrition by supplementing the resources that low-income families have to purchase food through regular channels of trade. The program is a cornerstone of the social safety net—estimated to have kept 8.4 million people, including 3.8 million children, out of poverty in 2014—and responds quickly to increased needs in times of economic downturns. Schanzenbach concludes that block granting the program would fundamentally undermine its ability to perform these benefits. However, access to SNAP is strictly time limited for able-bodied, unemployed adults without dependents during normal economic times and could be strengthened by doing more to assist participants with finding employment and rewarding work. Further, smart federal investments in monitoring could improve the program’s integrity by reducing fraud and error. The SNAP program is frequently caught in the middle of debates between supporters and fiscal conservatives. The current debate over the 2018 Farm Bill is no different, with considerable rhetoric directed at restricting benefits through tighter work requirements, while many of the same legislators also argue that wealthy farmers in their constituencies need large subsidy payments.

Since 1954, the structure of US international food aid policy has largely been determined by farm bill legislation. Erin Lentz, Stephanie Mercier, and Christopher Barrett examine the current suite of food aid programs (Chapter 3, Volume II). They emphasize that US food aid programs have played a crucial role in saving and improving the lives of hundreds of millions of people around the world over the past 60 years. However, relative to other countries’ food assistance programs, which have been extensively reformed over the past 30 years, the costs of US food aid are excessive, delivery of assistance is slow, and the programs have not kept pace with global emergency needs. They argue that three main opportunities exist to improve program efficiency and impact: (1) relaxing cargo preference requirements on shipments of US food aid, (2) expanding access to cash-based instruments rather than commodities, and (3) relaxing procurement requirements that compel food aid to be purchased in the US. Those changes are strongly opposed by the private companies that own US-flagged ships that benefit financially from cargo preference and the mandate to source food aid from the United States. Thus, even key elements of the current US international humanitarian food aid program represent a costly example of the role of rent-seeking by a small interest group at the expense of economic efficiency and, in this case, real lives.

Productivity growth is tied to, and in important ways driven by, public and private investments in research and development (R&D). Further, the productivity of private R&D investment is affected by public R&D investments, which continue to yield high rates of return for the economy as a whole. However, as Philip Pardey and Vincent Smith show (Chapter 4, Volume II), beginning in the 1980s the rate of growth in US public R&D investments slowed down in real terms, and since the mid-2000s public R&D spending has been shrinking. The United States now spends less on both public and private R&D than China does, and, significantly, as the rate of growth in US public R&D investments has declined, so too has the US agricultural sector’s productive growth rate. Pardey and Smith suggest that one important reason for the slowdown in the growth and eventual decline of public R&D investments has been the willingness of agricultural interest groups to sacrifice spending on R&D to maintain or increase spending on direct subsidies to farmers.

Technology regulation can also substantially affect productivity growth by impeding or encouraging innovation. Gary Brester and Joseph Atwood (Chapter 5, Volume II) explore whether GM crops have been responsible for increased crop yields. Comparing US yields to EU yields (where GM crops are banned) provides evidence that GM technologies have increased crop yields in the United States. They conclude, however, that such yield and productivity increases are not a fait accompli. Rather, they result from the development of new technologies. Banning investments in and the use of yield-enhancing technologies has potentially serious consequences; food crop production will be lower than would otherwise be the case, and more water, land, and other inputs will be needed to increase global food production.

In the United States, some programs and regulations intended to sustain or reduce the degradation of natural resources are determined by the provisions of the conservation title in the farm bill and managed by the USDA. Other policies and regulations are established by non–farm bill legislation and fall under the purview of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). These include the recent EPA Waters of the United States (WOTUS) rule and the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) that mandate the use of minimum annual levels of biofuels by the nation’s transportation system.

Erik Lichtenberg (Chapter 6, Volume II) considers the conservation provisions of the farm bill. He points out that, from the beginning, conservation provisions in the farm bill have been linked with farm income support. Further, beginning in the mid-1980s, spending on conservation programs in the farm bill increased and has subsequently remained relatively stable, so conservation now accounts for about 30 percent of direct farm program payments. Farm bill conservation programs are justified as ways of preventing farmland degradation and mitigating environmental externalities, notably, damage to water quality, wildlife habitat, and air quality. Clear economic efficiency grounds exist for policies that address environmental externalities from agriculture, and the empirical evidence indicates that conservation programs have resulted in reductions in the environmental damage associated with farming and forestry. In addition, the USDA has made some progress in reorienting conservation programs toward environmental goals rather than mainly income enhancements for farm businesses. Thus, prioritizing conservation spending, as in the most recent farm bills, has had some positive outcomes. However, the conservation budget has not been allocated in ways that most efficiently improve environmental outcomes. Shifts in the allocation of federal funds among and within the different conservation programs could increase the efficiency of conservation spending in the sense of getting the most environmental-quality protection from the federal conservation budget.

In Chapter 7 of Volume II, Nathan Hendricks examines the issues associated with the WOTUS rule promulgated by the EPA under the provisions of the 2015 Clean Waters of the United States Act. The rule, which addresses water pollution, extends the jurisdiction of the 2015 act to all waters linked to navigable waters. He points out that many farm businesses do not know whether, as a result, they are subject to those provisions, and, if they are, then even simply obtaining permits for their operations is a costly endeavor. Further, nonpoint source pollution (emissions from sources that cannot readily be identified) is a major source of pollution in navigable waters, and the WOTUS rule does nothing to mitigate such emissions. Thus, Hendricks argues, a completely different market-based approach to reduce pollution and reach the optimal cost and benefit trade-off should be considered. As theorized by Ronald Coase in 1960, property rights should be assigned to either farm businesses (right to pollute) or environmentalists (right to clean water). They would then make contracts in which a party would accept not to exercise its rights fully in exchange for compensation. Hendricks argues that initial allocations of property rights could be established by state governments. Those governments would then be responsible for ensuring that parties comply with their contracts and use their resources to support the development of the organizations that would represent the interests of the different groups of individuals.

Aaron Smith (Chapter 8, Volume II) examines the viability and efficiency of the current RFS managed by the EPA. The RFS requires that biofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel be blended into the national transportation fuel supply. Nevertheless, the RFS is at a crossroads. Under the RFS, cellulosic biofuels would supposedly generate most greenhouse gas emissions reductions, and, as authorized by Congress, the RFS mandate requires immediate and substantial increases in their production. However, technologies have not been developed to make cellulosic biofuels cost-effective, and most bio-fuels continue to be produced from corn or soybeans. Moreover, the RFS now requires more biofuel than the fuel industry can easily absorb. Congress and the EPA, which administers the program, face important decisions about the future path of the RFS. Aaron Smith draws three lessons from the RFS that are relevant to government policymaking in this and other areas. First, in developing policies based on speculative assessments about future technologies, policymakers should account for uncertainty when making and implementing new programs. Second, they should not give regulators in government agencies too much discretion because it enables political forces and legal challenges to undermine policy. Third, policymakers should not mandate the use of things that do not exist.

Scott Irwin (Chapter 9, Volume II) examines regulatory and other issues associated with recent technological innovations and other changes that affect the way commodity futures markets function. A global uproar about speculation in commodity futures markets ensued after the spike in food commodity prices during 2007–08, which coincided with emerging large-scale participation by a new type of speculator in commodity futures markets: financial index investors. Some market participants, regulators, and civic organizations argued that the inflow into new commodity index investments was the principal driver of the spike in agricultural and energy prices. The subsequent policy debate focused on more restrictive speculation position limits in commodity futures markets. The issue was largely resolved when most of the evidence indicated that commodity index trading was at most a minor player in recent price spikes. As the commodity prices spiked, coincidentally a serious episode of convergence failures in grain futures and cash markets occurred. When contract rules were altered to raise artificially low storage rates, most problems disappeared, although more recent moderate non-convergence events suggest that the issue needs continued monitoring and that further increases in storage rates may be necessary. In addition, the transition from a telephone and open outcry trading platform to a computer and electronic order matching platform represents a major structural change in how futures markets operate. The issues associated with this shift are currently not well understood and are likely to be the subject of considerable research and regulatory attention in coming years.

Periodically, farm interest and other groups raise concerns about potential anticompetitive behaviors associated with contracting between farm businesses and downstream processors or upstream agribusiness input suppliers. Tomislav Vukina and Xiaoyong Zheng examine these issues in Chapter 10 of Volume II, focusing mainly on contracting in the livestock sector. They point out that two main types of contracts are widely used in the US agricultural sector: marketing contracts and production contracts, which are sometimes jointly described as alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs). They conclude that AMAs benefit not only farmers and packers by eliminating marketing timing and capacity underutilization risks but also consumers because such contracts provide consumers with better-quality products. The authors conclude that AMAs should not be banned by regulators but that regulators should protect spot markets, improve mandatory price reports, and leave tournament settlements of broiler contracts intact, all of which would enable markets to function more effectively. Policymakers should also support the 2012 Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration rule regarding additional capital investment requirement and provisions regarding breaches of contract and suspension of delivery of animals, again to ensure the more efficient operation of markets.

In summary, the 19 studies included in this two-volume examination of US agricultural policy provide insights about a wide range of issues. Those issues range from the economic welfare effects and environmental consequences of direct and indirect agricultural subsidy programs such as crop insurance and the sugar program to the efficiency and effectiveness or ineffectiveness of environmental and conservation policies such as the Conservation Reserve Program and the RFS managed by the EPA. The relevance and consequences of international agricultural trade and trade policies are investigated, as are important issues about the impacts of agricultural subsidies on poverty and hunger in the United States (of which there are few, if any) and the efficiency of US international emergency food aid programs. The causes and consequences of the changing trajectory of public R&D funding are investigated, as are the potential impacts of different technology regulation regimes. And policy issues associated with the management of futures markets and the regulation of contracting are explored.

Finally, each of the studies, while using state-of-the-art knowledge, is designed to be accessible to the nonspecialist—students, policymakers, public interest groups, and the general public—and of interest to economists and graduate students seeking insights about contemporary US agricultural policies.

Section I

Poverty and US Agricultural Policy

1

Poverty, Hunger, and US Agricultural Policy: Do Farm Programs Affect the Nutrition of Poor Americans?

JOSEPH W. GLAUBER, DANIEL A. SUMNER, AND PARKE E. WILDE

Farm policy in what is now the United States began with trade barriers, taxes, and regulations in the earliest colonial times, when agriculture dominated the economy. The modern era of federal farm commodity subsidies began with the New Deal more than 80 years ago. Since then, subsidy programs, related international trade measures, and associated commodity regulations have been repeatedly modified. The current version of these programs operates under the provisions of the Agriculture Act of 2014 (the 2014 Farm Bill).

This chapter focuses on the economic consequences of current US farm subsidy policies for the food consumption and nutritional well-being of low-income Americans. We assess how the current policies affect prices paid by US food consumers and the incomes of