Alabaster Cities: Urban U.S. since 1950

Selected Titles from Space, Place, and Society

At Home: An Anthropology of Domestic Space

Irene Cieraad, ed.

The Boundless Self: Communication in Physical and Virtual Spaces

Paul C. Adams

From Abbotts to Zurich: New York State Placenames

Ren Vasiliev

Geographical Voices: Fourteen Autobiographical Essays

Peter Gould and Forrest R. Pitts, eds.

Imagined Country: Environment, Culture, and Society

John Rennie Short

Inventing Black-on-Black Violence: Discourse, Space, and Representation

David Wilson

Making Space: Revisioning the World, 1475–1600

John Rennie Short

Pleasure Zones: Bodies, Cities, Spaces

David Bell, et al.

The Politics of Landscapes in Singapore: Constructions of Nation

Lily Kong and Brenda S. A. Yeoh

Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa

Garth Andrew Myers

Copyright © 2006 by Syracuse University Press

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First Edition 2006

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ISBN: 978-0-8156-3105-7 (hardcover)978-0-8156-5185-7 (e-book)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Short, John R.

Alabaster cities : urban U.S. since 1950 / John Rennie Short. — 1st ed.

p. cm. — (Space, place, and society)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8156-3105-7 (cloth : alk. paper)

1. City planning—United States—History—20th century. I. Title.

HT167.S495 2006

307.1’21609730904—dc222006022053

Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Figures

Tables

Preface

1. The Rise of Metropolitan America

PART ONE | The War Against the Cities

2. Urban Renewal

We Must Start All Over Again from the Ground Up

3. Stimulating Suburbs, Starving Cities

I Should Prefer to See the Ash Heaps

4. Robert Moses Versus Jane Jacobs

Hack Your Way with a Meat Ax

PART TWO | The Social Geographies of the Metropolis

5. Downtown

The Heart That Pumps the Blood of Commerce

6. Creating a Suburban Society

A Landscape of Scary Places

7. New Suburban Realities

Trouble in Paradise

8. Metropolitan Fragmentation

Obsolescent Structure of Urban Government

PART THREE | The Social Dynamics of the Metropolis

9. Urban Economies

All That Is Solid Melts into Air

10. Race and Ethnicity

E Pluribus Unum

11. Housing and the City

Shaky Palaces

12. Politics and the City

Informal Arrangements . . . Formal Workings

PART FOUR | The Emergent Metropolis

13. Reimagining the City

Place Wars

14. Civic Engagement in the City

Civic Spirit

15. Emerging Trends

Appendix

The Cities of New York State

Notes

Guide to Further Reading

Works Cited

Index

Figures

1.1. Mean center of population, 1790–2000

1.2. Mean center of population, 1950–2000

1.3. Change in urban population by region, 1950–2000

1.4. Change in urban population by region, 1950–2000

1.5. Percentage of U.S. population in metropolitan areas, by size of metropolitan area, 1950–2000

1.6. Percentage of U.S. population in metropolitan areas, 1950–2000

1.7. MSA counties: Atlanta, Dallas, Detroit, and Pittsburgh

1.8. MSA population: Seattle, Pittsburgh, Phoenix, and Detroit

1.9. Map of the United States

1.10. U.S. population living in metropolitan areas in 1950

1.11. U.S. population living in metropolitan areas in 2000

2.1. Relocation of West End sample

7.1. Income variation in selected metropolitan areas, 2000

7.2. Income distribution in Atlanta MSA, 2000

7.3. Income diversity in Atlanta MSA, 1980 and 2000

7.4. Income distribution, Chicago PMSA, 2000

7.5. Black and immigrant suburbs in Washington, D.C., 2000

8.1. Syracuse, New York, metropolitan area and school districts

9.1. A tale of two cities: San Jose and Schenectady

10.1. U.S. population by percentage of race and ethnicity

10.2. Top ten U.S. city populations, 2000

10.3. Top ten U.S. city populations by percentage, 2000

11.1. U.S. mortgage rates and affordability index

12.1. Baltimore-Washington area population, 1950 and 2000

15.1. Twenty largest cities in the U.S. by population

15.2. Twenty largest metropolitan areas in the U.S. by population

Tables

1.1. Population change in six heartland counties

2.1. Urban renewal grants, 1949–1958

2.2. Characteristics of Hough in 1950, 1960, and 1990

5.1. Metropolitan areas by type of polycentrism

5.2. Stadium costs

5.3. Major League Baseball stadia built

7.1. Suburban places of selected metropolitan areas

7.2. Poor blue-collar suburbs

7.3. Black middle-class suburbs

7.4. Immigrant suburbs

7.5. Summary of findings for suburban places

7.6. Low-income suburbs lagging behind central city

8.1. Number of government units in the United States

9.1. Public-sector employment in 2001

10.1. Black populations in central cities

10.2. Cities with largest black populations in 2000

10.3. Cities with largest percentage of blacks in 2000

10.4. Immigration and metropolitan areas in 2004

10.5. Cities with largest number of Asians in 2000

10.6. Cities with largest percentage of Asians in 2000

10.7. Cities with largest number of Hispanics in 2000

10.8. Cities with largest percentage of Hispanics in 2000

11.1. Renting in U.S. cities, 2000

11.2. Housing affordability

11.3. Housing prices in selected metropolitan areas in 2001

11.4. Housing affordability in 2001

12.1. Credit rating of selected cities, 2001

12.2. Population change in the Baltimore-Washington corridor

13.1. City business and tourist slogans

13.2. Major repertoires in city advertisements

13.3. Host and candidate cities for the Summer Olympic Games

15.1. Internet measures of networked cities

15.2. U.S. cities and the global urban network

15.3. Share of national wealth, 1967 and 2003

An internationally recognized scholar, John Rennie Short is a professor of public policy and geography at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He is the author of twenty-eight books and numerous articles that cover a wide range of topics, including globalization, urban issues, environmental concerns, and the history of cartography. His recent books include Urban Theory (2006), Making Space (2004), Global Metropolitan (2004), The World Through Maps (2003), and Globalization and the Margins (coedited with Richard Grant, 2002).

Preface

ONE OF THE BEST-KNOWN American songs is the deeply patriotic America the Beautiful. Its origins lie in the travels of its author, Katharine Lee Bates. Born in Massachusetts and daughter to a Congregationalist minister, she graduated in 1880 from Wellesley College where she subsequently taught English literature for forty years. In 1893 she went on a trip west. She visited the Columbian Exposition in Chicago, nicknamed the White City, a complex of temporary neoclassical white buildings of faux marble made of plaster and steel on the shore of Lake Michigan, designed by Daniel Burnham, brightly illuminated at night by thousands of lightbulbs. The exposition boasted two full-scale replicas of the Liberty Bell, as well as an assembly of peoples from all over the world, including Egyptian belly dancers, Native Americans from the Pacific Northwest, and villagers from Dahomey (now Benin) in Africa. Later in July of that same year, Bates rode a mule to the summit of Pikes Peak and saw the plains sweeping to the far-distant horizon. The Pikes Peak part of the journey was the basis for her first verse of spacious skies and amber waves of grain that have become part of the language and popular imagination of the United States.

Her visit to Chicago inspired the less well-known, final verse that contains the phrase: Thine alabaster cities gleam / Undimmed by human tears. Both Chicago and Pikes Peak were part of the same journey. Yet what remains strongest in American popular consciousness is the first, not the final, verse. More people are familiar with the waves of grain than the alabaster cities. Aland of sweeping grandeur is remembered more than the country of great cities. National representation, especially of the simplistic patriotic kind, has focused on the West and the wilderness rather than the East and the city. There has long been an antiurban bias that has ignored or forgotten the city. There are many reasons. The West is considered distinctively American, whereas the cities are more often seen as part of a broader international picture. Cities are not perceived as distinctively American as, say, the Grand Canyon, so they often fail to register in discourses of national identity. Yet the story of the alabaster cities needs to be sung as well as that of the fruited plain.

I concentrate on the period after 1945. All dates are arbitrary, but the ending of World War II does mark a significant turning point in the United States. It was not just the ending of hostilities and the return of millions of service personnel; it was also the beginning of a new era in which the United States would soon emerge as the largest, richest economy and by the end of the twentieth century as the world’s single superpower. The urban condition of this nation is of significant interest. Cities were a focal point of important changes. The book’s focus is from 1950 since the first post–World War II census was undertaken in that year. The half-century point is our starting point. After 1950 there were massive urban renewal, growing suburbanization, and increasing metropolitan fragmentation. The country became more urban, more suburban, and more divided. It is not a straight trajectory—there were deviations and fluctuations—but the overall story is of the full emergence of a metropolitan nation, a suburban society, and a series of fragmented civic communities.

The text weaves theoretical warp and narrative woof into four general themes. The first is the globalization of U.S. cities. From 1950 to around the mid-1970s the U.S. economy was more self-sustaining than any of its competitors; it had an unrivaled manufacturing base that established a mass middle class increasingly housed in suburbs sprouting up all around the central cities. From the mid-1970s onward an economic globalization accompanied a decline of manufacturing jobs, thus squeezing the employment basis for that large part of the mass middle class comprising low-skilled workers. The resulting income polarization that no longer rewards such workers with the benefits of well-paid jobs and middle-class lifestyles has its roots in the globalizing economy. The era of ongoing economic globalization has witnessed a return to more pronounced forms of social polarization as the fortunes of individual families and even of whole cities began to slide. The distance between the rich and poor widened along with the differentiation between expanding and declining urban economics. There was a global shift in manufacturing that eliminated many of the high-paying middle-class jobs in addition to a new level of economic competition that operated to stifle wage increases of the majority of workers. But globalization is not a force above national politics. It is not so much globalization but the response to globalization that shaped the urban U.S. Throughout this period, the principles and practices of the New Deal were abandoned in favor of a neoliberal agenda of privatization, a reduced commitment of government to the welfare of its ordinary citizens, and an emphasis on enhancing corporate profitability and improving business competitiveness. The global shift in manufacturing reduced the power of labor, which in turn strengthened the hand of business in shaping government policy to meets its economic agenda. A Wal-Mart economy replaced a General Motors economy, and though it means better deals for consumers it worsens conditions for many workers.

Second, despite the continual calls for small government and endorsements of the private market, the economic history and political geography of the urban U.S. are fundamentally shaped by the public sector. The single most important architect of U.S. cities is the federal government. Public subsidies have underwritten the expansion of owner-occupation, the growth of the suburbs, the urban development of the Sun Belt, and the creation of new networks of roads, airline, and telecommunications that have determined patterns of urban growth and decline across the country. The U.S. federal government played a huge role in reorganizing the metropolitan structures and shaping the suburban character. The amount of federal spending in a city is the biggest determinant of growth. On closer inspection the calls for small government were really about the size of the government commitment to providing welfare services to its citizens. The rhetorical reliance on the market overlooked the realities of the mixed public-private market economy of the U.S. where most public subsidies went to rich private interests, and there was a socialization of costs and the privatization of benefits.

Third, there is an increased segmentation of urban life in the U.S. As suburbs spread out across metropolitan boundaries the population separates into different municipalities responsible for taxing and spending as well as for such vital services as education. With few effective means to equalize resources the inequalities between communities are exacerbated. The poor central cities experience fiscal crisis as they lose their tax base, while rich suburban communities can spend more on education. School districts soon divide into wealthy ones that can afford the educational platforms for social progress and poor ones that become funnels of failure.

This political geography explains much of the rhetoric for small government, restricted government. On closer inspection it is owing also to the demand of the wealthier communities to keep their tax dollars within their own municipalities. We have become a meaner, more segregated society as commitment to welfare fades and metropolitan fragmentation balkanizes us into ever more different urban social worlds. And here we encounter a paradox. Over the same period the U.S. has become a more multicultural, multiethnic society. From 1950 to the mid-1960s immigration was small, and the foreign-born constituted an insignificant proportion of the population. Since then immigration has grown dramatically to levels not seen since the early 1900s. The notion of a multicultural society is celebrated, but behind the national rhetoric and the veneer of mutual tolerance lies a new form of segregation now by class more than by race. Though we talk about a multicultural society, we live in separate social worlds.

Fourth, although I have outlined some of the more regressive trends, there is also a wider spread of active citizenship. In 1950 blacks were second-class citizens, as racism marked the character of life in the Republic. Today civil rights in principle as well as in practice extend to those previously denied them. Blacks, women, and gays all have greater access to full citizenship. The story of the urban U.S. is one of private dreams and collective aspirations competing with stark economic and political realities. Urban social movements have changed and improved life in the U.S. The prospect of building a city upon a hill continues to exercise the collective imagination just as it did for the early Puritans. And the nature of the city, that place that connects the public with the private, the collective and the individual, is a good place to test both the beliefs and the realities of a society.

I have adopted the material to a more narrative flow rather than to the academic concern with constant referencing and footnoting. The book is written for a general reader rather than the narrow specialist. The Guide to Further Reading at the end of this book directs the reader to other opinions and illuminates the main sources I have used. For those readers more interested in scholarly debates, my Urban Theory (2006) is written explicitly as a theoretical exegesis. Alabaster Cities and Urban Theory are companion volumes, with shared material; the former tells a story with the theoretical underpinnings embedded in the text, whereas the latter develops theoretical arguments with an implicit narrative structure. My Liquid Metropolis: Megalopolis Revisited (2007) uses material from both Urban Theory and Alabaster Cities in a detailed analysis of one urban region, Megalopolis.

Some of the ideas were first developed in previously published and collaborative work. The ideas in Chapters 8 and 14 saw a previous life in an article in the journal City, and the arguments in Chapter 13 were first elucidated in contributions to two edited volumes, The Entrepreneurial City (1998) and Urban Growth Machine (1999). Chapter 7 is based entirely on work done with Bernadette Hanlon and Tom Vicino, and Chapter 13 draws heavily on work done with Yeong Kim. The maps were drawn with the assistance of Joe School. Hieu Truong helped with the Guide to Further Reading and proofread a number of the chapters. Two anonymous reviewers made a number of useful suggestions. One reviewer, in particular, helped to polish a rough text into something much more smooth and refined. Unless otherwise specified, tables and figures are compiled from U.S. Census data.

The first chapter describes the empirical trends behind the urbanization, suburbanization, and metropolitanization of U.S. society. There is an emphasis on numbers that marks this chapter as the most data-laden. Those readers requiring a softer entry point may want to skip this chapter until later.

Part One tells the story of the evisceration of the central core of most U.S. cities and the stimulation of suburbanization. The turning point away from this destruction of the inner city is embodied in the confrontation between Robert Moses and Jane Jacobs. Their struggle took place in New York City, but the outcome influenced cities all over the country. Part Two focuses on the social geographies of the metropolis. Specific chapters look at the decline and attempted rise of the downtown, the creation of a suburban society, and the increasing heterogeneity of U.S. suburbs that belies the traditional dichotomy of central city and suburbs. The final chapter in this section evaluates the costs and consequences of metropolitan fragmentation into a myriad of separate municipalities. Part Three discusses the social dynamics of the metropolis through an analysis of urban economic change, race and ethnicity, the operation of the housing market, and the nature of urban politics. Parts Two and Three are related. There is no simple division between space and society, social geographies and social processes. Societies are spatially embodied, and space is socially constructed. The intimate connections between space and society are clearly visible in the U.S. city. Part Four identifies some of the more dominant themes of this social-spatial nexus. I consider the importance of the imagineering of the city in response to the rise of increased competition between cities. I also review the arguments about the decline of civic engagement in U.S. cities. The final chapter examines the emergence of trends that are defining, and will continue to define, the character of the metropolitan U.S.

The U.S. is made up of states. The federal structure has influenced urban development. The Appendix provides a brief description of urban development in just one state, New York. The Appendix also serves a double duty as it provides a thicker historical description. Cities did not just appear in 1945, so the Appendix gives historical depth and specificity in one state, New York, to some of the themes discussed at a more general level in the book.

Like millions before me, I am an immigrant to this country. I came from Britain when I was almost forty years old. I had both read and written about U.S. cities before I came. Now I am a participant as well as a spectator, a citizen as well as an observer. The immigrant experience is a complicated one; the shifting sense of home, the convoluting identity, and the divided loyalties make for a complex position. I am, in the binational format that has become so popular, Scottish American. My wife was born in California, so my extended family lives on coasts that border the North Sea as well as the Pacific Ocean. This book was produced in this sometimes awkward, always complicated space. Patriotism, as Samuel Johnson reminded us long ago, is the last refuge of a scoundrel. I shy away from an easy love of country. An adult immigrant’s experience is too complex to be expressed in easy slogans and trite formulas. I have been thinking about the material in this book for years, but began writing it only in the late summer of 2001. After 9/11 of that year I realized that this book was a long love letter to my adopted home. Avery critical missive, but a love letter all the same.

1

The Rise of Metropolitan America

THE UNITED STATES was an urban nation well before 1950, but after 1950 it became a truly metropolitan society.

In this chapter I want to provide an empirical basis for this statement and a factual context for later discussions. I will draw statistics derived from the U.S. Census. Figures of population growth and change are sometimes called vital statistics. The adjective is appropriate, as the population figures speak to the demographic pulse and heartbeat of the nation. A recounting of these data is an essential introduction to our discussion.¹

In 1950, 64 percent of Americans lived in urban places, but by 2000 this number had increased to almost 80 percent. We need some care with these data. The threshold definition of urban, as used by the U.S. Census, is comparatively low and includes all people living in settlements with more than 2,500 persons. The term urban covers a wide spectrum of places, from small communities with a population of 2,501 to large cities with a population of almost 8 million. Despite the broad sweep of the category, the figures clearly reveal a general trend over the past fifty years for more people to live in urban places. There has been a relative and an absolute increase in the number of people who now live in urban areas with the steady drift of people from the rural areas toward the larger cities. There has been a steady decline in the number and vitality of small places, especially those areas farthest away from large cities. This trend is particularly marked in the interior parts of the country away from the two coastal zones. In the past fifty years the U.S. has become a more urban society.

1.1. Mean center of population for the United States, 1790–2000.

The term heartland is consistently employed to refer to the agricultural areas of the Midwest. In one sense it is the center of the country. Each decade the U.S. Census calculates a mean center of population (fig. 1.1). This location is the population fulcrum of the nation. Over the years the mean center has moved steadily westward from Maryland in 1790 to the Midwest by the middle of the twentieth century. In 1950 the mean center was in Richland County in southern Illinois. Between 1970 and 1980 the mean center moved across the Mississippi River, and by 2000 it was in Phelps County, Missouri. In terms of population distribution, then, the Midwest is the heartland. But the metaphor of heartland also implies that it is the lifeblood of the nation. The population figures suggest otherwise. The population of Richland County was 16,889 in 1950, but by 2000 it had fallen to 16,149. In a fifty-year period the county lost population while the national picture was of a steady increase. Phelps County, the national population center in 2000, fared much better. Its population of 21,504 had almost doubled to 39,825. But compared to the absolute increase in the U.S. population, it still remained a quiet part of the country. Taking a random sample of other nonmetropolitan counties in this region reveals an interesting pattern (fig. 1.2; table 1.1). Some counties actually lost population over the fifty-year period from 1950 to 2000, and even the population gains were minimal. Whereas the total U.S. population increased by 80 percent over the half century, the population of these six nonmetropolitan heartland counties increased by only 1.6 percent. Population growth passed by these nonurban heartland counties.

1.2. Mean center of population for the United States, 1950–2000.

As the small, genuinely rural communities are becoming less a center for contemporary settlement, they are becoming more a symbolic space: a place of nostalgia and a site of enduring values and cultural stability in a fast-changing world. As these communities are becoming less important in the national settlement pattern, they are looming larger in the cultural landscape of national representation. Rural areas exist more in the collective imagination of the country than they do in the population geography of the country.

TABLE 1.1

Population change in six heartland counties, 1950–2000

Regional Trends in Urbanization

The national trend of urbanization hides some interesting regional variations (fig. 1.3). In 1950 the Northeast was already heavily urbanized, with almost 80 percent of the population living in urban areas, followed by the West and Midwest with urban percentages of 69.5 and 64.1, respectively, in 1950. The least-urbanized region was the South, where less than half of the population was considered urban in 1950. The states of Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee, for example, had less than 40 percent of their population in urban areas. By 2000 the nation had become more uniform in its percentage of urban population, with the largest increases over the period 1950 to 2000 in the South and West (fig. 1.4). By 2000 the South, in its urban population, as in so many other ways, had become more like the rest of the U.S. More than two out of every three people in the South now live in urban places, and even in the four states just mentioned, more than one out of every two live in urban places. Over the fifty-year period from 1950 to 2000, the entire country became more urban, and by 2000 the U.S. was an overwhelmingly urban nation with less regional variations.

1.3. Percentage change in urban population by region, 1950–2000.

1.4. Percentage change in urban population by region, 1950–2000.

A Metropolitan Society

We can make a distinction between cities and metropolitan areas. The formal city is the legally defined limit of municipal authority. Once established, formal urban boundaries tend to remain. Annexation is governed by state law, and requirements vary; some states are more permissive than others. In the more restrictive states annexations are rare, difficult to achieve, and rarely attempted. There is inertia to the formal boundaries of cities, but although the boundaries can remain fixed, they rarely stem the movement of commuters, the flows of trade and money. Cities cast a sphere of influence beyond their formal boundaries; they are often the center of metropolitan regions that reach beyond the formal boundaries of cities.

The U.S. Census uses the term metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and defines it as having a core area with a population of at least 50,000 and adjacent communities with a high degree of social and economic integration with the core, including having at least 15 percent of commuters working in the central area. Take the case of New York City. Its formal boundaries encompass the five boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Staten Island, and Queens, yet commuters flow into the city from surrounding areas of New York State as well as from the neighboring states of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. The metropolitan region of New York extends well beyond the five boroughs, spilling over into four separate states.

In 1950 there were 160 separate MSAs. With a combined population of almost 85 million, they constituted 56 percent of the total population and 7 percent of the land surface. Over the past fifty years there has been a steady rise in both the number of metropolitan areas and the proportion of the total population they contain. By 2000 there were 331 MSAs with a combined population of 226 million, and they constituted 80 percent of the total population and 20 percent of the land area. The U.S. is now