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The Invasion of Ukraine - Beginning of WW3?: The Military and Intelligence Aspects of the War
The Invasion of Ukraine - Beginning of WW3?: The Military and Intelligence Aspects of the War
The Invasion of Ukraine - Beginning of WW3?: The Military and Intelligence Aspects of the War
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The Invasion of Ukraine - Beginning of WW3?: The Military and Intelligence Aspects of the War

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On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine in a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which began in 2014. The invasion has likely resulted in tens of thousands of deaths on both sides and caused Europe's largest refugee crisis since the Second World War, with an estimated 8 million people being displaced within the country by late May as well as 7.7 million Ukrainians fleeing the country as of October 2022. Within five weeks of the invasion, Russia experienced its greatest emigration since the 1917 October Revolution. The ongoing invasion has also caused global food shortages. This book tries to shed light on the causes which led to this war. It presents the historical background of the conflict and the military actions during the war.
LanguageEnglish
Publishere-artnow
Release dateNov 9, 2022
ISBN4066338128126
The Invasion of Ukraine - Beginning of WW3?: The Military and Intelligence Aspects of the War

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    The Invasion of Ukraine - Beginning of WW3? - e-artnow

    Andrew S. Bowen, Congressional Research Service

    The Invasion of Ukraine - Beginning of WW3?

    The Military and Intelligence Aspects of the War

    e-artnow, 2022. No claim to original U.S. Government Works

    Contach: [email protected]

    EAN 4066338128126

    Table of Contents

    Introduction

    Prelude to Invasion: Military Buildup and Force Posture

    Initial Invasion

    Analysis of Russia and Ukraine's Initial Military Performance

    Russian Performance

    Ukrainian Performance

    Possible Russian Intentions and Expectations

    March-May 2022

    May-September 2022

    Kherson Region Offensive

    Kharkiv Offensive

    War Crimes

    Outlook

    Introduction

    Table of Contents

    Russia’s renewed invasion of neighboring Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of Europe’s deadliest armed conflict in decades. It also prompted intensive international efforts to respond to the war. Multiple Members of Congress have engaged with U.S. and international measures, including by supporting sanctions against Russia, providing assistance to Ukraine, and bolstering support to neighboring NATO countries. The immediate and long-term implications of the war are likely to be far-reaching, affecting numerous policy dimensions of concern to Congress.

    This report addresses Russian and Ukrainian military and intelligence aspects of the war, which are of interest to many in Congress as Congress considers various legislative measures and conducts oversight of U.S. policy. It provides an overview of the conflict, including the run-up to the invasion, the performance and conduct of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, possible Russian intentions, and recent developments on the ground. For other CRS products related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including U.S. policy dimensions, see CRS Report R47054, Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Related CRS Products.

    Prelude to Invasion: Military Buildup and Force Posture

    Table of Contents

    In mid-October 2021, social media and news outlets began to report significant movement by Russian military forces, with limited Russian transparency, on or near the Ukrainian border and within Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region. The buildup came after a sustained increase in Russia’s permanent force posture on the Ukrainian border.¹ Since 2014, Russia has created two new Combined Arms Armies (CAAs), one in the Western Military District (20th CAA, headquartered in Voronezh) and one in the Southern Military District (8th CAA, headquartered in Rostov-on-Don and Novocherkassk) bordering Ukraine. Russia created these CAAs to oversee, coordinate, and manage command and control of units transported to the border. The 8th CAA also reportedly commands the separatist units in two Russia-controlled areas in eastern Ukraine (the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, or DNR/LNR).

    Throughout December 2021, Russia continued to build up its forces in the region. Prior to the February 2022 invasion, Russia had mobilized between 150,000 and 190,000 personnel and 120 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) on its border with Ukraine,² in Belarus, and in Ukraine’s occupied Crimea region, according to U.S. government estimates.³

    During this buildup, analysts and observers documented the movement of Russian units from across Russia toward Ukraine.⁴ The 41st and 2nd CAAs moved from the Central Military District into Belarus and to Ukraine’s northeast border with Russia; the 1st Guards Tank Army and the 6th CAA moved from the Western Military District to Ukraine’s eastern border with Russia; the 49th and 58th CAAs moved from the Southern Military District to occupied Crimea and to Ukraine’s southeast border with Russia; and the 35th and 36th CAAs (and elements of the 29th and 5th CAAs) moved from the Eastern Military District to Belarus.⁵ In addition, Russia deployed elite units— such as Russian Airborne (VDV), Naval Infantry, and spetsnaz (elite light infantry units used for reconnaissance and direct action)—around Ukraine’s borders.⁶

    These forces included the full range of Russian military capabilities, including artillery and support systems. The ground forces included air defense, artillery and rocket artillery, long-range precision missile systems (Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile [SRBM] systems), electronic warfare, support, and logistics units.⁷ Additionally, by February 2022, Russia had mobilized large numbers of Aerospace Forces (VKS) fighter, fighter-bomber, and helicopter squadrons, which some observers believed would play a key role in the initial invasion.⁸

    On February 21, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would recognize the independence of the DNR and LNR. Russian recognition appeared to include the entire regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (collectively known as the Donbas), most of which had remained under Ukrainian control since Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and not just territory controlled by DNR/LNR.

    Shortly after February 21, Putin announced Russia would send peacekeepers into the DNR/LNR, claiming they were to defend against Ukrainian plans for invasion and sabotage attempts. These Russian charges had no basis in fact. Despite denials from Russian officials, Russia had spent months amassing a significant portion of its military capabilities around Ukraine.

    On February 24—following months of warning and concern from the Biden Administration, European allies, NATO, and some Members of Congress—Russia invaded Ukraine.¹⁰ Russia claimed its invasion was to conduct a special military operation to protect the civilian population and to demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine; many observers understood the latter term as a false pretext for overthrowing the democratically elected Ukrainian government.¹¹

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