Mountain Commandos at War in the Falklands: The Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre in Action During the 1982 Conflict

Introduction

Shortly after sunset on 8 June 1982 two of the eight four-man teams of the Royal Marines Mountain & Arctic Warfare Cadre* (M&AW Cadre) infiltrated into Goat Ridge, a long rocky ridge between Mount Harriet and Two Sisters. Each mountain was occupied by a 600-strong battalion of Argentine infantry soldiers dug-in in well established defensive positions. These men were prepared to defend their locations against the soon-to-arrive British troops aiming to restore the Falklands Islands to their rightful owners after the Argentine invasion of 2 April 1982. The task for the two patrols was to gain as much intelligence as they could about the enemy positions on the two mountains and to provide battlefield sketches, in as much detail as possible, of any and all enemy locations on the relevant sides of the two features.

After a very difficult move through wet and dangerously slippery terrain, they established an observation post (OP) location at the eastern end of Goat Ridge. The OP consisted of the two team leaders seated back to back in a concealed position and supported (about 15m away) by the remaining six members of the two teams, who were prepared to provide any fire support and assistance needed should either location be compromised by the enemy. The joint patrol stayed put throughout the daylight hours of 9 June and then exfiltrated after sunset and withdrew to the west to return to safer ground free of the enemy, carrying the details of their highly successful patrol with them.

On their return the two team leaders went immediately to see the commanding officers of 42 Commando (Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux) and 45 Commando (Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Whitehead) to debrief and to pass on the field sketches they had produced. The information they provided would prove vital in the plans made by both COs for the successful assaults made on those features on 11 June 1982.

This very professional and courageous patrol will be described in more detail later in the book but is introduced here to demonstrate the extent of the work carried out by the thirty-six men of the M&AW Cadre during Operation Corporate, the recovery of the Falkland Islands in the summer (in the UK) of 1982. This book also tells the wider story of the M&AW Cadre on operations in the South Atlantic in 1982, and covers in detail the period from September 1979 until September 1982.

The M&AW Cadre is an organisation within the Royal Marines that can trace its history back to the birth of the commandos early in the Second World War and the establishment of the Commando Snow and Mountain Training Centre in Braemar, Scotland, in 1942. The Cadre existed throughout the war. After the war the Royal Marines retained the commando role, and the Commando Cliff Assault Centre Royal Marines was opened in St Ives in Cornwall in 1946.

Since those early days there was a growing need within the Corps for a specialist group of climbers within the commandos, as described in Mark Bentinck’s book Vertical Assault – The story of the Royal Marines Mountain Leaders Branch.* It would be both unnecessary and fatuous to do anything other than praise Mark’s accurate and knowledgeable publication and I do not intend to do so. Suffice to say that it is a clear and detailed history of the evolution of Royal Marines climbing qualifications from cliff leaders through reconnaissance leaders to the mountain leaders of today, and covers the entire history from 1942 until its publication in 2007.

This book tells of the period immediately before and during Operation Corporate in 1982 and introduces the team of MLs serving within the M&AW Cadre at that time, providing a record of the efforts they made to produce the 3 Cdo Bde Recce Tp that was so successful during operations in the South Atlantic.

The gestation period of this book has been a long one and it has come about for two main reasons. The first and most obvious is that we are not getting any younger and, at the time of writing, six of our number from 1982 have already died. The pool of accurate and clear memories is thus reducing, so the book needs to be written now whilst a majority are still hale and hearty. Secondly, other people and organisations are seeking to take the credit for work carried out by the M&AW Cadre in 1982 and this must be corrected.

The Argentine Special Forces in particular have attempted to rewrite history to the extent that the raid on Top Malo House, which was a successful patrol action by the Cadre in 1982, has now become accepted by the Argentines as almost being a victory for them, despite the actual outcome. This book aims to illustrate how the Cadre was prepared for its role in 1982 and the operations it accomplished, and to ensure the truth is told. The story is told largely in the words of those who took part; I am simply the editor of their reports and collator of the details. It is not a task I would have chosen, but as their OC in 1982 I see this as my final responsibility to all those who participated in the period 1979 to 1982.

In August 1979 I was appointed to take over as OC M&AW Cadre in April 1980. I had gained a ‘just’ pass on my ML course in 1974. I felt at the time that it was an exceptional mobility course designed to teach people how to move and survive in very difficult terrain. The mix of latitude, altitude and the transition from sea to land required specialist training and a group of very fit and dedicated men who were totally at ease in those difficult climatic and geographic locations and conditions. I also came to the view that it had become more of a physical fitness climbing course than a military training course for specialist reconnaissance operators. I decided therefore that when I finished my course I would try to return and change the syllabus with the intention of increasing the operational emphasis without reducing the climbing component at all.

My first thought when I received my posting order was to make an appointment with Colonel Julian Thompson RM, the chief of staff at HQ Commando Forces in Plymouth. The senior instructor at the Officers’ Training Wing (OTW)* when I went through training, he had also been my commanding officer at 40 Commando Royal Marines when I had commanded his Recce Tp for two years. Colonel Julian and I had very similar thoughts about the future of the M&AW Cadre and agreed that a detailed and specifically operational war role would be the way ahead for the ML branch and for Commando Forces as a whole. I was reasonably sure that Colonel Julian would be the next commander of 3 Cdo Bde and I wanted to be sure that he would ask for M&AW Cadre assistance should some future conflict occur. With this mindset, he and I agreed that we would seek to find a way to prepare for that eventuality. We kept our meeting very close to our chests and I then set about preparing to take over the Cadre on completion of the 1980 winter deployment to Norway.

At that time the M&AW Cadre had no formal wartime role apart from a poorly recorded option that they would provide four four-man teams to ski from the Norwegian border to Murmansk to provide assistance and terminal control of air raids directed at the USSR’s largest military complex at that time. The physical aspect of this task was well within the ability of the M&AW Cadre. The lack of any cover en route, however, and the amount of Soviet radio intelligence around Murmansk ensured that it was an almost certain death sentence for any troops who attempted it. I for one was very glad that I was never called upon to carry out this suicide mission.

The programme of the Cadre at that time was an annual circuit beginning in September, with the start of the ML1 and ML2 courses in west Cornwall for rock climbing and cliff assault training. In October it moved to North Wales, where the emphasis was on longer climbs, long mountain marches and the development of higher altitude mountain skills. The final ten days consisted of survival training in the Inner Hebrides, followed by resistance to interrogation training. November was a mix of ski courses in Norway for novice Arctic personnel and the mountain training of 45 Commando Royal Marines for the remainder. December revolved around consolidation of personnel and preparation for the winter deployment to Norway with the brigade, plus Christmas leave. January to March was spent on the full winter warfare training course, with the emphasis on training the trainers to prepare the ML2 personnel for their next appointments within commando units. In late March the courses went to northern Norway to climb in the Lyngen Alps, where Norway’s highest mountains are located, and to participate in the relevant NATO exercises in the years they were held. Returning to the UK in late March, the Cadre moved to Fort William and the Ben Nevis area for final climbing assessments and snow and ice climbing in the region. The courses then finished just before Easter and personnel went on leave before posting to their next units. Qualified ML2s were physically fit and strong climbers who could operate in all weathers in the harshest climates in the world.

From late April to early June the Cadre staff worked on administrative duties in Arbroath and undertook a small amount of military training, which included annual range courses and parachute training if possible. June and July were spent in preparation for and participation in Exercise Ice Flip, the annual high-altitude training in the European Alps. This was also available for Commando Recce Tps if they were not otherwise engaged and participation significantly improved the knowledge and ability of the MLs to operate at altitudes in excess of 10,000ft above sea level. (It was argued that ML course volunteers were mostly from the Corps Recce Tps and thus were already well-trained soldiers who did not need further military training. I disagreed, feeling that the type of skills needed for long-range patrolling work required learning in the right military and geographical context and being completely at ease in the environment was not enough.)

This annual programme had evolved since the early 1970s when the Cadre was established in Arbroath. In my opinion, since then the training programme had increasingly emphasised the climbing aspect whilst slowly reducing the military skills levels. I wished to change that approach and knew that the only way to do so was to become the OC and work from within. At the time I rejoined the Cadre it was nineteen men strong, of whom seventeen were MLs, plus the storeman and the driver. What follows is the story of how the required changes to the M&AW Cadre were made, the people who made them and how the Cadre rose to the ultimate test of modern warfare during the Falklands conflict. I trust it will withstand scrutiny by all those who were involved and certainly by those who seek to write their own version of history.

Note that ranks used in the book are those held by the participants in 1982 and do not reflect the promotions subsequently earned by all participants during their careers.

* The term ‘cadre’ when used by military personnel refers to an organisation of ‘experts’ put together for a short-term solution either to an operational requirement or to a specific change of training. On completion of the operation or training, the ‘cadre’ is shut down and all ranks involved return to their home units. The Royal Marines M&AW Cadre was established as a permanent unit in order to maintain a core of experts to assist with training for operations in mountains and in the Arctic climate of northern Norway. It was and remains to this day a permanent part of the Royal Marines chain of command and is not just a temporary solution to a short-term training requirement. (It is not to be confused with the term ‘cadre’ as used by Communist-inspired guerrillas and terrorists. They use the term in its original manner but adapt it to mean the core of special groups of terrorists almost anywhere in the world.)

* Special Publication 34 by the Royal Marines Historical Society.

* Officers’ Training Wing, Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, Lympstone, Devon.

Chapter 1

M&AW Cadre

(April 1980–April 1982)

After completing the winter deployment of 1980, I finished my time with the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) where I had been the tame Royal Marine officer on exchange. I left the Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment of Yorkshire (PWO) where I had been the operations officer for two years and drove to Arbroath to take over as OC M&AW Cadre (known as the Cadre) from Captain David Nicholls. David had been the OC for the previous three years and was a very professional ML and skilled infantry soldier with a lot of combat experience, so I knew I was taking over a well-oiled machine. My new sergeant major was Warrant Officer 2 (WO2) Brian Snowdon, a man I knew by reputation as a fine professional, capable and knowledgeable ML. He had been the Recce Tp sergeant in 41 Cdo when I was in 40 Cdo. In his own words,

Sitting in my office in May 1980, a figure appeared at the office door dressed in civvies. I said ‘Who the hell are you?’ The reply came, ‘I’m the new OC’ and from that moment onwards we forged a tremendous working relationship and friendship with the same aim to create an operational unit. The OC, myself and TQ [Tactical Quartermaster, Colour Sergeant Everett Young] formed a great working relationship, that is, apart from the OC’s driving.

I received a tremendous handover from David Nicholls. The sting in the tail (and the last snippet he passed on) was that the Corps was very short of ML2s and it had been decided that in 1980 the Cadre would run two ML2 courses, the first starting in May and the second at the normal time in September. This was a double blow for me, meaning that my initial plan to start changing the Cadre’s courses and preparing for an operational role would have to be delayed because of the requirement for the entire Cadre to be involved in ML2 training. It also meant that my intention to start the build-up of ancillary skills required for the new role would have to be delayed. The NCOs needed to attend the courses would all be involved in the ML2 course training until at least April 1981.

I learned very early on that I had joined a group of MLs whose attitude towards a future operational role was very close to mine. They mostly fully agreed with my future plans for the Cadre. This was a great boost to me as I had not been at all sure how my ideas would be taken. But I should have expected the quality of the ML personnel to shine through and, of course, it did. Brian Snowdon again:

Having rejoined the Cadre in May 1979 as sergeant major it was without doubt the pinnacle of my career. However, I believed the Cadre was perceived as a ‘private climbing club’ and had lost the vast military potential it was capable of. After all, the Commando Recce Troops were largely made up of ML officers and NCOs and most of the Marines went on from Recce Troops to either become MLs or to join the SBS (Special Boat Service) or other specialist recce organisations. My ambition was to change this perception and introduce the operational role as I believed in the Cadre having a military capability as the brigade Recce Troop.

Very early on in our working relationship I called a meeting of all the SNCOs within the Cadre and laid out my intentions for my time as the OC. I was absolutely delighted that my plans were given unanimous support by those in attendance. Unfortunately, my immediate plan to begin altering the content of the ML2 and ML1 courses had to be put on the back-burner because of the need for an additional ML2 course. However, we were able to spend valuable time pooling knowledge and contacts for when we would start fully on the preparations which we intended to begin in April