The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, including the Battle of South Mountain, September 2 - 20, 1862

© 2012 by Bradley M. Gottfried

The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, Including the Battle of South Mountain, September 2 - 20, 1862

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ISBN-13: 978-1-61121-086-6

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To my darling wife, Linda

Contents

Introduction

Foreword by Thomas G. Clemens

Map Set 1. The Invasion of Maryland

(September 2 - 13, 1862)

Map 1.1: September 2 - 4, 1862

Map 1.2: September 4 - 5, 1862

Map 1.3: September 6, 1862

Map 1.4: September 7 - 8, 1862

Map 1.5: September 9, 1862

Map 1.6: September 10, 1862

Map 1.7: September 11, 1862

Map 1.8: September 12, 1862

Map 1.9: September 13, 1862

Map Set 2. Preparing for Battle: The South Mountain Gaps

(September 13 - 14, 1862)

Map 2.1: September 13

Map 2.2: September 14

Map Set 3. South Mountain:

Fox’s Gap (Morning)

Map 3.1: Preliminary Movements (6:00 - 8:00 a.m.)

Map 3.2: Scammon and Garland Deploy (9:00 - 9:30 a.m.)

Map 3.3: The Buckeyes Attack (9:30 - 10:00 a.m.)

Map 3.4: The Death of Samuel Garland (10:00 - 10:15 a.m.)

Map 3.5: Confederate Reinforcements Arrive (10:15 - 11:00 a.m.)

Map 3.6: Most of Garland’s Brigade is Defeated (11:00 - 11:30 a.m.)

Map 3.7: The Buckeyes Battle the 13th North Carolina (11:30 a.m. - noon)

Map Set 4. South Mountain: Fox’s Gap

(noon - 8:00 p.m.)

Map 4.1: Midday Lull (noon - 2:00 p.m.)

Map 4.2: Additional Confederate Reinforcements Arrive (2:00 - 4:00 p.m.)

Map 4.3: Thomas Drayton’s Brigade Redeploys (4:00 - 4:30 p.m.)

Map 4.4: Scammon and Willcox Attack Drayton’s Brigade (4:30 - 5:00 p.m.)

Map 4.5: Drayton’s Brigade Collapses (5:00 - 5:30 p.m.)

Map 4.6: G. T. Anderson’s Dilemma (5:30 - 6:00 p.m.)

Map 4.7: George B. Anderson’s Failed Attack (6:00 - 6:45 p.m.)

Map 4.8: The Death of Jesse Reno (6:30 - 8:00 p.m.)

Map Set 5. South Mountain:

Frosttown Plateau (2:00 - 9:00 p.m.)

Map 5.1: Hooker’s I Corps Approaches the Field (2:00 - 3:45 p.m.)

Map 5.2: Meade’s Division Engages Rodes’ Brigade (4:00 - 6:00 p.m.)

Map 5.3: Rodes is Defeated (6:00 - 7:00 p.m.)

Map 5.4: The Arrival of Steven’s South Carolina Brigade (7:00 - 9:00 p.m.)

Map Set 6. South Mountain:

Turner’s Gap (3:30 - 9:00 p.m.)

Map 6.1: Hatch’s Division Advances (3:30 - 5:30 p.m.)

Map 6.2: Patrick’s Brigade Attacks Garnett’s Virginians (5:30 - 6:30 p.m.)

Map 6.3: Hatch’s Division Closes on Garnett and Kemper (6:30 - 7:00 p.m.)

Map 6.4: Garnett and Kemper are Defeated (7:00 - 7:30 p.m.)

Map 6.5: Doubleday Attacks, Walker’s Brigade Arrives (7:30 - 8:30 p.m.)

Map 6.6: Gibbon’s Iron Brigade Enters the Fight (5:15 - 6:30 p.m.)

Map 6.7: The Iron Brigade Defeats Colquitt’s Brigade (6:30 - 9:00 p.m.)

Map Set 7. South Mountain:

Crampton’s Gap (11:00 a.m. - 7:00 p.m.)

Map 7.1: The Confederates Deploy (11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.)

Map 7.2: Federal Troops Deploy (4:00 - 5:00 p.m.)

Map 7.3: Pre-Battle Positioning (5:00 - 5:30 p.m.)

Map 7.4: The Confederates Abandon their Defenses (5:30 - 5:45 p.m.)

Map 7.5: The Destruction of Cobb’s Legion (5:45 - 6:15 p.m.)

Map 7.6: The Federals Continue up the Mountainside (6:15 - 6:30 p.m.)

Map 7.7: The Fight at Padgett’s Field (6:30 - 7:00 p.m.)

Map Set 8. The Capture of Harpers Ferry

(September 12 - 15)

Map 8.1: Strategic Complications (September 12: Morning)

Map 8.2: The Federal Deployments (September 12: Afternoon)

Map 8.3: The Opening Fight for Maryland Heights

(September 13: 6:30 - 11:30 a.m.)

Map 8.4: Maryland Heights Falls (September 13: 11:30 a.m. - 4:30 p.m.)

Map 8.5: Jackson Closes the Loop (September 13)

Map 8.6: Both Sides Prepare for Action

(September 14: 7:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.)

Map 8.7: Confederate Artillery Opens

(September 14: 2:00 - 9:00 p.m.)

Map 8.8: The Confederate Vice Closes; Federal Cavalry Prepares to Escape

(September 15: 3:00 - 7:00 a.m.)

Map 8.9: Federal Cavalry Breaks Out (September 15: 3:00 - 7:00 a.m.)

Map 8.10: The Garrison Falls (September 15: 7:00 - 8:00 p.m.)

Map Set 9. To Sharpsburg

(September 14 - 16)

Map 9.1: Pleasant Valley (September 15: 8:00 a.m. - noon)

Map 9.2: The Confederates Move to Sharpsburg (September 14 - 15)

Map 9.3: The Union Army Moves to Antietam Creek (September 15)

Map 9.4: Jackson’s Command Leaves Harpers Ferry for Sharpsburg

(September 15 - 16)

Map 9.5: Jackson and McClellan Arrive (September 16)

Map 9.6: The Antietam Battlefield

Map Set 10. The Eve of Battle (September 16)

Map 10.1: McClellan and Lee Prepare for Battle at Sharpsburg

(September 16: noon - 4:00 p.m.)

Map 10.2: Hooker’s I Corps Crosses Antietam Creek

(September 16: 4:00 - 6:30 p.m.)

Map 10.3: Meade Deploys his Division for Battle

(September 16: 6:30 - 10:00 p.m.)

Map 10.4: The Night Before Antietam (September 16 - 17, 1862)

Map Set 11. Antietam:

Hooker Opens the Battle (5:15 - 7:00 a.m.)

Map 11.1: Hooker’s I Corps Attacks (5:15 - 6:15 a.m.)

Map 11.2: The Battle Spreads (5:15 - 6:15 a.m.)

Map 11.3: Ricketts’ Division Enters the Fight (5:15 - 6:15 a.m.)

Map 11.4: Hays and Walker Counterattack (6:15 - 7:00 a.m.)

Map 11.5: Gibbon’s Brigade Attacks (6:15 - 7:00 a.m.)

Map 11.6: Lee’s Imperiled Left Flank (6:15 - 7:00 a.m.)

Map Set 12. Antietam: Hood’s Division

Moves up and Attacks (6:45 - 7:45 a.m.)

Map 12.1: Hood Moves up from the Dunker Church

(6:45 - 7:15 a.m.)

Map 12.2: Hood Counterattacks (6:45 - 7:15 a.m.)

Map 12.3: Hood Enters the West Woods and Cornfield

(6:45 - 7:15 a.m.)

Map 12.4: Federal Reinforcements Arrive (6:45 - 7:15 a.m.)

Map 12.5: Hood Suffers Heavy Losses (6:45 - 7:15 a.m.)

Map 12.6: Hood’s Division Retreats (7:15 - 7:45 a.m.)

Map Set 13. Antietam: Mansfield’s XII Corps

Enters the Battle (7:15 - 8:45 a.m.)

Map 13.1: The XII Corps Drives South (7:15 - 7:45 a.m.)

Map 13.2: The XII Corps Deploys (7:15 - 7:45 a.m.)

Map 13.3: Crawford’s Brigade Enters the East Woods

(7:45 - 8:15 a.m.)

Map 13.4: D. H. Hill’s Division Moves North (7:45 - 8:15 a.m.)

Map 13.5: Colquitt’s Brigade Advances into the Cornfield

(8:15 - 8:45 a.m.)

Map 13.6: D. H. Hill’s Brigades are Defeated (8:15 - 8:45 a.m.)

Map Set 14. Antietam: Sedgwick’s Division Drives East

(8:15 - 9:30 a.m.)

Map 14.1: Sedgwick’s Division Arrives (8:15 - 8:45 a.m.)

Map 14.2: Sedgwick Advances to the West Woods (8:15 - 8:45 a.m.)

Map 14.3: Sedgwick’s Division Drives East and

McLaws’ Division Arrives (8:45 - 9:15 a.m.)

Map 14.4: Sedgwick’s Division Drives into

the West Woods (8:45 - 9:15 a.m.)

Map 14.5: The Confederates Counterattack (8:45 - 9:15 a.m.)

Map 14.6: The Tide Turns Against Sedgwick (8:45 - 9:30 a.m.)

Map 14.7: Sedgwick Retreats (8:45 - 9:30 a.m.)

Map Set 15. Antietam: Final Actions

on the Northern Front (9:30 - 10:30 a.m.)

Map 15.1: Confederates Storm out of the West Woods (9:30 - 10:00 a.m.)

Map 15.2: The XII Corps Takes the West Woods (10:00 - 10:30 a.m.)

Map 15.3: The Battle Transitions to the Sunken Road (10:00 - 10:30 a.m.)

Map Set 16. Antietam:

The Sunken Road (9:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.)

Map 16.1: French’s Division Moves South (9:00 - 9:30 a.m.)

Map 16.2: The Confederates Counterattack (9:30 - 10:00 a.m.)

Map 16.3: Confederate Reinforcements Approach (10:00 - 10:30 a.m.)

Map 16.4: The Attack of the Irish Brigade (10:00 - 10:30 a.m.)

Map 16.5: The Confederates are Driven from

the Sunken Road (10:30 - 11:00 a.m.)

Map 16.6: Combat at the Piper Farm (11:00 - 11:30 a.m.)

Map 16.7: Longstreet’s Counterattack (11:30 a.m. - noon)

Map 16.8: Stalemate Along the Sunken Road (noon - 1:00 p.m.)

Map Set 17. Antietam: The Lower

(Burnside’s) Bridge (9:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.)

Map 17.1: Both Sides Prepare for Battle (9:00 - 9:30 a.m.)

Map 17.2: The Repulse of the 11th Connecticut Infantry

(10:00 - 10:30 a.m.)

Map 17.3: Crook’s Attack Falters (11:00 - 11:30 a.m.)

Map 17.4: Nagle’s Brigade Attacks the Bridge (11:30 a.m. - noon)

Map 17.5: Ferrero’s Brigade Attacks the Bridge (Noon - 1:00 p.m.)

Map 17.6: Rodman’s Division Crosses Snavely’s Ford

(1:00 - 2:00 p.m.)

Map Set 18. Antietam: Burnside Advances

on Sharpsburg (Afternoon, September 17)

Map 18.1: The Federals Consolidate Their Bridgehead (2:00 - 3:30 p.m.)

Map 18.2: Both Sides Prepare for Battle (3:30 - 4:00 p.m.)

Map 18.3: Rodman’s Division Begins its Attack (3:30 - 4:00 p.m.)

Map Set 19. Antietam: A. P. Hill’s Division

Arrives from Harpers Ferry (3:00 a.m. - 5:30 p.m.)

Map 19.1: Hill’s March to the Battlefield (6:30 a.m. - 2:30 p.m.)

Map 19.2: D. R. Jones Battles Rodman’s Brigades (3:30 - 4:00 p.m.)

Map 19.3: Harland’s Federal Brigade Advances (4:00 - 5:00 p.m.)

Map 19.4: Gregg’s Brigade Attacks (4:00 - 5:00 p.m.)

Map 19.5: Harland’s Brigade Falls Back (4:00 - 5:00 p.m.)

Map 19.6: Archer’s Brigade Strikes Ewing’s Brigade (5:00 - 5:30 p.m.)

Map 19.7: A. P. Hill’s Division Sweeps the Field (5:00 - 5:30 p.m.)

Map Set 20. Antietam:

Evening Stalemate (September 17 - 18)

Map 20.1: Evening, September 17 & 18, 1862

Map Set 21. Aftermath: The Battle of

Shepherdstown (September 19 - 20, 1862)

Map 21.1: The Federal Artillery Arrives (September 19)

Map 21.2: Pendleton is Pressed (September 19: Noon - 3:00 p.m.)

Map 21.3: Federal Infantry Crosses the River

(September 19: 3:00 - 7:00 p.m.)

Map 21.4: Stonewall Jackson Prepares to Attack

(September 20: 6:30 - 8:00 a.m.)

Map 21.5: Barnes and Lovell Move into Position

(September 20: 8:00 - 9:00 a.m.)

Map 21.6: The Federal Retreat Begins (September 20: 9:00 - 9:30 a.m.)

Map 21.7: The 118th Pennsylvania’s Ordeal (September 20: 9:30 - 10:30 a.m.)

Appendix 1: Orders of Battle

Appendix 2: An Interview with Author Bradley M. Gottfried

Endnotes

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

What began several years ago with an idea to better visualize and understand the Battle of Gettysburg and the major campaigns in the Eastern Theater has developed into several volumes that are now part of the Savas Beatie Military Atlas series—a significant effort to research and illustrate the major campaigns of the Civil War in an original and useful manner. My initial effort in 2007 resulted in The Maps of Gettysburg, which spawned a second book two years later entitled The Maps of First Bull Run. Soon after the Gettysburg volume appeared my publisher expressed an interest in expanding the series to the Western campaigns. I agreed it was a good idea, but because my interest lies in the East, other historians would have to be brought aboard to assist. The first two were David Powell and David Friedrichs, who collaborated to produce The Maps of Chickamauga in 2009, the same year my First Bull Run study appeared. Other Western Theater campaign studies for this series are in the works, as are atlas books dealing with Napoleon’s 1812 invasion of Russia and various World War II campaigns. This is personally pleasing, for as so many people have shared with me, the only way you can really understand a military campaign is through maps, and this presentation unlocks other books on the same subjects.

All this explains why the book you hold in your hands, The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, Including the Battle of South Mountain, September 2 - 20, 1862, is my third effort but the fourth volume in this ongoing atlas series. My next volume, much of which is complete as of the date of this writing, covers the interesting but usually overlooked months following Gettysburg through the end of 1863 and into early 1864, including the campaigns of Bristoe Station and Mine Run and the various ancillary operations that took place during that period. The volume thereafter opens the Overland Campaign, with coverage of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania. Although I am not producing these in chronological order, it is my sincere hope that I will one day complete the major Civil War campaigns in the Eastern Theater of the Civil War from 1861-1865.

The Maps of Antietam is neutral in coverage and includes the entire campaign from both points of view. The text and maps cover the movement of the armies from the beginning of the campaign in early September to the battlefields in the various gaps slicing through South Mountain, the fascinating siege of Harpers Ferry, the maneuvering to the vicinity of Sharpsburg, and to the dramatic climax of the operation along Antietam Creek on September 17. The final segment of the book covers the withdrawal of Lee’s army into Virginia and the fighting at Shepherdstown on September 19-20. As anyone who is familiar with this series will attest, the purpose of these atlas books is to offer a broad and full understanding of the complete campaign, rather than a micro-history of a particular event or day.

To my knowledge, no single source until now has pulled together the myriad of movements and events of this mammoth campaign and offered it in a cartographic form side-by-side with reasonably detailed text complete with endnotes. Like the books that have come before, The Maps of Antietam dissects the actions within each sector of a battlefield for a deeper and hopefully more meaningful understanding and reading experience. Each section of this book includes a number of text and map combinations. Every left-hand page includes descriptive text corresponding with a facing original map on the right-hand page. One of the key advantages of this presentation is that it eliminates the need to flip through the book to try to find a map to match the text. Some sections, like the preliminary operations (September 13-14) immediately leading up to the fighting at South Mountain are short and required only two maps and two text pages. Others, like the fighting for the Sunken Road on September 17 at Antietam, required eight maps and their corresponding eight text pages. Wherever possible, I utilized firsthand accounts to personalize the otherwise straightforward text. I hope readers find this method of presentation useful.

As I have written in previous introductions, the plentiful maps and sectioned coverage make it much easier to follow and understand what was happening each day (and in some cases, each hour) of this complex campaign. The various sections may also trigger a special interest and so pry open avenues ripe for additional study. I am hopeful that readers who approach the subject with a higher level of expertise will find the maps and text not only interesting to study and read, but truly helpful. If someone, somewhere, places this book within reach to refer to it now and again as a reference guide while reading other studies on the campaign, the long hours invested in this project will have been worthwhile.

And now, a few caveats are in order. The Maps of Antietam is not the last word or definitive treatment of the campaign, the various battles, or any part thereof—nor did I intend it to be. Given space and time considerations, I decided to cover the major events of the campaign and battles, with smaller transition sections to flesh out the full campaign story. As a result, many aspects of the campaign are purposely not fleshed out deeply. For example, I included a light overview of the loss and discovery of General Lee’s Special Orders No. 191, but not a detailed explanation of how they were lost and who might have mishandled them. The importance to this book is that these important orders were written, lost, found, and utilized. The endnotes offer additional avenues of study on this and other interesting but tangential matters.

Original research was kept to a minimum. My primary reliance was upon firsthand accounts and battle reports, followed by quality secondary scholarship. Therefore, there are no new theories or evaluations of why the campaign or battles unfolded as they did. I am also very familiar with the battlefields described in this study and have walked them many times over the years, often in the company of other students of the war. Whenever a book uses short chapters or sections, as this one does, there will inevitably be some narrative redundancy. I have endeavored as far as possible to minimize this.

The sources can and often do conflict on many points, including numbers engaged, who moved when and where and why, what times specific things happened and, of course, casualties. I have tried to follow a generally accepted interpretation of the campaign and battles (I hope with some success) and portray the information accurately and with an even hand. Because of all these discrepancies, I have pieced the evidence together, discussed it with other historians, and reached my own conclusions. It is common to be confronted with multiple recollections by the men who were present of when and where events occurred. The simple fact is that we will never know or fully understand everything exactly how and when it transpired.

Inevitably, a study like this makes it likely that mistakes of one variety or another end up in the final text or on a map, despite endless hours of proofreading. I apologize in advance for any errors and assume full responsibility for them.

* * *

Everyone today studying the Maryland Campaign is indebted to Ezra A. Carman, who was a colonel in command of the 13th New Jersey infantry during the campaign (Brig. Gen. George Gordon’s brigade, Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams’ division, Maj. Gen. Joseph Mansfield’s XII Corps). Carman witnessed fighting in and around the Miller cornfield and the East Woods. After the war he devoted his life to researching the entire campaign. He spoke to and corresponded with hundreds of veterans on both sides and frequently walked the fields, compiling an impressive collection of notes and letters he eventually utilized to write a long and monumentally important history of the campaign. Carman’s manuscript has only recently been published.

The Maps of Antietam could not have been written without the assistance of a host of people. As always, Theodore P. Savas of Savas Beatie heads the list. A good friend and effective editor, he has always supported my efforts. Because Ted is also a distinguished historian and author in his own right, he understands the researching and writing process and is always supportive.

I am also indebted to Dr. Tom Clemens, who has superbly edited Carman’s manuscript for publication in two large volumes, and to Antietam park ranger John Hoptak. Both read the manuscript and provided invaluable suggestions on how to make it better. Steve Stotelmyer, an engineer by trade, has devoted much of his life to studying the South Mountain battles in general, and the action at Fox’s Gap in particular. Steve was very generous of his time and materials, tramped over the fields with me, and shared many of his resources.

Ted Alexander, the Chief Historian of the Antietam National Battlefield, allowed me to use the battlefield library on numerous occasions and patiently answered all of my questions. Ted is a good friend to historians everywhere.

Finally, I would like to thank Linda, my friend, my partner, and my wife. Linda traveled with me on my many trips to the battlefields, patiently listened to my endless stories, and allowed me the time to complete this important effort.

Bradley M. Gottfried

La Plata, Maryland

Foreword

The late summer and fall of 1862 was, by any measure, the most critical time of the Civil War. After achieving significant victories in the spring, the summer found Union armies bogged down or in retreat across the country. Conversely the Confederates, reaping the benefit of their Conscription Act, mounted several campaigns destined to create a thousand-mile offensive from the Mississippi River in the west all the way east to the Chesapeake Bay. The most important of these was Robert E. Lee’s Maryland Campaign, whose failure north of the Potomac River foreshadowed the outcome of the others.

In July of 1862, Gen. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was tethered to Richmond by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing barely twenty miles from the city. Lee did not dare abandon his capital to venture northward, yet his impatience grew with the knowledge that the South could not win independence by defending their key cities. Lee’s agitation increased in late July when President Abraham Lincoln sent a new army under Maj. Gen. John Pope to threaten Richmond from the north. Lee sent his able lieutenant Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson with a small force to confront Pope, and was soon relieved to learn that Union Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck ordered McClellan to withdraw from the James River and join forces with Pope in northern Virginia. Lee boldly set out with most of his army to destroy Pope prior to any unification with McClellan’s forces.

Through a series of maneuvers, Lee turned Pope’s western or right flank and forced the Federals back toward their own capital. Lee then confronted Pope on the same ground near Manassas where many of these men had struggled thirteen months ago, and with similar results: a routed Union army flooding toward Washington, DC. After an unsuccessful attempt to cut off the retreat, Lee received reinforcements and turned his aspirations northward to Union-held Maryland and perhaps Pennsylvania.

Now with an unfettered opportunity, Lee sent his ragged troops splashing across the Potomac on September 4 with the crossroads town of Frederick as their primary objective. Although the weak and unfit were sent to Winchester to recoup and re-supply, the Army of Northern Virginia still numbered 55,000 to 60,000 men. Many and varied are the reasons ascribed to Lee for this daring campaign. He explained to his president, Jefferson Davis, that threatening Pennsylvania and occupying Maryland would yield numerous advantages to the South. Beyond the mundane but necessary requirement to provision his army and its thousands of horse and mules, Lee believed political and morale advantages could be gained in Maryland, a state of divided loyalties and sympathies. By feeding his army on Northern foodstuffs Lee ensured Virginia farmers could harvest and store their crops as occupying Union troops would vacate Virginia to follow his bold move. Beyond these logistical considerations Lee believed threatening Washington, DC would negatively impact Northern morale and politics. With mid-term elections on the horizon, Lee thought a Southern victory on Northern soil might result in a peace Congress capable of forcing Lincoln’s hand and creating a negotiated settlement to end the war. In an effort to win the hearts of Marylander’s, Lee ordered his army to respect private property and issued a proclamation casting his army as liberators of a state oppressed by Union tyranny. On September 8 Lee wrote to Davis from Frederick suggesting the latter open discussions of peace with the Lincoln administration.

Never were Confederate hopes higher. Lee had under his command a mostly veteran force, with a larger percentage of all Confederate soldiers in service than any other time during the war. After assuming command a scant three months earlier Lee had advanced the war’s frontier from the James River north to the Potomac River, and now hoped to checkmate Lincoln’s beleaguered call for 300,000 more troops to suppress the rebellion. As his troops basked in the sun outside Frederick, all things seemed possible.

Meanwhile, Washington DC remained in chaos, the defeated and demoralized Federal troops gathered at fortifications surrounding the city and suffering in wants physical as well as spiritual. Lincoln swiftly reacted by sacking Pope and giving McClellan authority to defend the capital. When it became clear that Lee had crossed into Maryland east of the Blue Ridge and was a scant forty miles from the city, Lincoln and Halleck determined to send a field army to confront him. After offering this command to two other generals they approached McClellan, putting him in command of the field army he created at their behest. This decision was far from popular with political leaders. Two of Lincoln’s cabinet conspired to challenge the appointment, but Lincoln when avowed that no other leader could organize an army and move it toward the enemy as quickly as McClellan could, the cabinet acquiesced. McClellan hastily assembled some 70,000 men and on September 6 moved them toward Confederate-occupied Frederick. Given the exigency of the situation, Maj. Gens. Fitz John Porter and William B. Franklin were released from arrest to go with the army. Not only was this hastily composed army disorganized and poorly supplied, but nearly 19,000 men were new to military life, having served no more than two months in the ranks.

The goals and objective given to McClellan were twofold: protect and defend Washington and Baltimore and drive the Confederates from Maryland. Knowing the tenuous nature of his relationship with President Lincoln, McClellan was in no position to take risks with his new army. His primarily defensive mission was further hampered by the constant cautioning of Halleck, who routinely warned McClellan that Lee would swiftly re-cross the Potomac and attack Washington from the south. True to his word, Lincoln ordered Halleck to forward more troops and supplies to McClellan as they became available. By September 17, the Army of the Potomac fielded more than 87,000 men.

Unbeknownst to McClellan, Lincoln had decided to appease the radical wing of his party by escalating the conflict from a war to restore the Union to a war to also end slavery. Lincoln recognized the economic and military advantages slavery provided the South and moved to end them. He wrote a proclamation based on his authority from the Confiscation Act of 1862 that called upon Southern states to end their affiliation with the Confederacy and rejoin the Union, promising they could retain their slaves by doing so. It was a hedged bet. Lincoln realized compliance was unlikely, but his proclamation would weaken the war effort and economy in the South while making it unlikely that foreign powers would support a nation fighting to retain slavery. Ironically, if McClellan was successful in his mission, he would (unwittingly) create the victory that would allow Lincoln to announce a major shift in war policy that McClellan himself opposed.

Lee’s complacency was soon unsettled by the fact that the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry, which was closer to his supply depot at Winchester than Lee, did not evacuate its position. After deliberation with his subordinates, Lee moved to neutralize this Union threat side by dispatching Stonewall Jackson’s wing of the army to gain control of the vital gateway to the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan was requested to rescue the threatened Harpers Ferry garrison. He was fortuitously aided in this endeavor when a Union soldier resting on the site of an abandoned Confederate camp discovered a misplaced copy of Special Orders No. 191 delineating this operation. Moving to strike the scattered portions of Lee’s army on September 14, McClellan pushed through the various passes and gaps along South Mountain, triggering a series of battles that defeated the Southern defenders and triggered a desperate night retreat by Lee. After suffering nearly 3,000 losses at South Mountain Lee retired to concentrate his army with the hope that he could continue the campaign. McClellan’s victory at South Mountain sparked his pursuit, and he found Lee drawn up on the heights of Sharpsburg. Once again, McClellan moved to attack him.

The fighting at Sharpsburg on September 17, 1862, was the bloodiest struggle experienced by either army up to that time, nearly twelve hours of unrelenting bloodletting that still represents the bloodiest day in American history. The next day, September 18, the armies remained in position, but neither commander reopened the combat. With his Maryland offensive undone, Lee was once again forced to retire, this time south of the Potomac and back into Virginia. Active operations ended following Lee’s rebuff of an aggressive Union pursuit beyond the river at Shepherdstown on September 20.

The seizure of the South Mountain passes and long bloody struggle along Antietam Creek ended Lee’s high hopes for a long stay north of the river. His army rested and recuperated near Winchester while McClellan was content to guard against further invasion. Lincoln used McClellan’s strategic victory to issue his Emancipation Proclamation, which ensured a bitter and debilitating war for both sides. Although Lee would rebuild his army and go on to earn a reputation virtually unmatched in American history, his lack of success in Maryland that September, coupled with Confederate failures in Kentucky and Mississippi, doomed any chance the Southern cause had for independence. The Army of Northern Virginia would march farther north the following summer, but changed circumstances and fewer opportunities rendered the Gettysburg Campaign strategically less important than the events of September of 1862.

Dr. Thomas G. Clemens

Hagerstown, Maryland

Map Set 1. The Invasion of

Maryland (September 2-13, 1862)

Map 1.1: September 2-4, 1862

During the final days of August 1862, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s ascendant Confederate Army of Northern Virginia outmaneuvered, outfought, and routed from the field Maj. Gen. John Pope’s Federal Army of Virginia at the Battle of Second Manassas (Bull Run). Pope’s modest victories in the West had triggered his call to Washington to lead the new Federal army, an array of units lashed together for yet another campaign against Richmond. As Pope organized and planned, Maj. Gen. George McClellan’s Army of the Potomac remained inactive along the James River below the Southern capital. Given the size of his army and his audacious plan to capture Richmond, McClellan’s forced withdrawal during the series of heavy combats known as the Seven Days’ Battles (June 25 - July 1, 1862) was bitterly disappointing. Unwilling to allow McClellan to sit along the river and turn the initiative over to Lee, President Abraham Lincoln ordered him to abandon the peninsula and return his army to Washington that August. Using his interior position to advantage, Lee left a small force to watch McClellan and moved north to engage Pope. McClellan shuttled his units northward as ordered, but they did not arrive in time or in sufficient strength to prevent Lee’s stunning victory on the plains of Manassas.

With yet another army in disarray and plagued with low morale, Lincoln reluctantly (and against the advice of many in his Cabinet) consolidated the two armies under McClellan. An enlisted man’s general and outstanding organizer, Little Mac prepared the troops so they could fight again as soon as possible.¹

A panicked Washington, meanwhile, prepared for the onslaught of Lee’s army. Government workers were armed and valuable papers and supplies packed up and shipped away. Even a steamer stood ready to whisk Lincoln and other high-ranking officials to safety should such an event prove necessary.²

Foreign discontent with the war was approaching its zenith. The Federal blockade of Southern ports was choking off the flow of vital southern commodities, including cotton and tobacco, to England and France. Because of the reduction in cotton exports, large numbers of British textile workers were either out of work or working reduced hours. Talk of recognizing the fledgling Confederacy on some level was commonplace in many foreign capitals.³

Although rebuffed at Ox Hill (Chantilly) on September 1, Lee was still prepared to give battle the next day. The Federals, however, fell back to the safety offered by the ring of forts protecting Washington. Riding the wave of two major field victories that had carried his army from the James River all the way north to the Potomac, Lee found himself facing one of the most important decisions in his career: What to do next? Washington was too strong to attack, and falling back and giving up large swaths of Virginia was unthinkable. Remaining stationary in northern Virginia was also not viable because food and forage was scarce in that part of the state. Aggressive by nature, Lee believed that only field victories could win the war, by reducing the will of the North to continue fighting. Given the possibility of foreign recognition, Lee believed maneuvering and foraging for as long as possible above the Potomac River offered the best course of action. Lee broached the idea in a September 3 dispatch to President Jefferson Davis. A move into Maryland from Dranesville could supply the army with needed supplies, perhaps bring the state into the Confederacy’s fold, and keep Federals away from Richmond. A significant victory in Maryland might convince the North to sue for peace.⁴

On September 4, 1862, Federal troops were dispersed in and around Washington. The II Corps and XII Corps, with Darius Couch’s division of the IV Corps, ended the day in Tennallytown just northwest of the capital. The VI Corps was near the Alexandria Seminary, while the I Corps and V Corps camped near Upton’s Hill northwest of Washington; the IX Corps was in Washington. Lee’s army was on the move toward the Potomac to cross into Maryland. In fact, Daniel H. Hill’s division was already crossing the river at multiple sites (e.g., at Point of Rocks, at Noland’s Ferry, and near the mouth of the Monocacy River). Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson’s wing of the Southern army halted for the night between White’s Ford and Leesburg, with James Longstreet’s wing of divisions a few miles south of Leesburg at Newton Hall.⁵

Map 1.2: September 4-5, 1862

Both armies were reinforced prior to the opening of the Maryland Campaign. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac absorbed two of John Pope’s corps. McClellan’s army was well equipped and officially numbered nearly 160,000, but its men were demoralized by the string of recent defeats. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had been substantially reinforced while the Army of the Potomac stood on the doorstep of Richmond when units from other regions rode the rails to help save the capital. These units were not returned to their original armies and states, but instead incorporated into Lee’s army. With Lee poised to move north of the Potomac River, additional combat commands were shuttled north to swell his numbers to more than 70,000 men. However, excessive straggling, illness, and other reasons would trim tens of thousands from his ranks by the time the pivotal battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam) was fought.⁶

Once Lee’s army began moving north toward Leesburg, it largely disappeared from McClellan’s view. Federal cavalry from the Virginia peninsula provided McClellan with the intelligence he needed to make an educated guess about Lee’s plans, but little else. McCllellan knew Lee was in Leesburg on the evening of September 3, and his cavalry commander, Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, correctly surmised that a Southern cavalry attack on the forts near the Chain Bridge was merely a distraction from the main issue: Lee was crossing the Potomac into Maryland. Because of the Lincoln’s concerns about losing Washington, McClellan marched north with only about half of his men (some 70,000) by the end of September 4, leaving the remainder (including the III Corps, V Corps, and XI Corps) behind to guard the capital. Apparently, Lee did not decide on a full-blown thrust into Maryland until that morning, when he wrote to President Davis, should the results of the expedition justify it, I propose to enter Pennsylvania, unless you should deem it unadvisable upon political or other grounds. Two of Lee’s concerns were making sure he had adequate ammunition and subsistence to make the invasion. After deciding on this daring action he drafted General Orders No. 102, which dictated how the army was to behave while operating in Maryland.⁷

After committing to insert his army into Maryland, Lee had to determine where he would cross the Potomac. He had already sent D. H. Hill across the river south of Harpers Ferry. Crossing of the rest of the army in that sector would put considerable pressure on the Federals to leave the safe confines of the Washington defenses and march out to give battle. A crossing father north near Shepherdstown would safeguard Lee’s line of communications, but not provide the same impetus to pull McClellan’s army away from Washington. Lee decided by the evening of September 4 to take his chances on a more southerly crossing at White’s Ford.⁸

Lee met with Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet at his headquarters in Leesburg on the night of September 4 and told them of his plans to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. After crossing at White’s Ford opposite Leesburg, he explained, the army would march north to Frederick. Both subordinates greeted the news with optimism.⁹

By the end of September 5, the three infantry divisions under Jackson’s command led by John R. Jones (Jackson’s former division), A. P. Hill, and Alexander Lawton reached Buckeystown, Maryland, about nine miles south of Frederick. Although the first to cross the Potomac River, D. H. Hill’s division now brought up the rear of the column. James Ewell Brown (Jeb) Stuart’s cavalry division followed Jackson’s men across the Potomac and rode to Poolesville, where Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry brigade routed a Federal cavalry regiment. Longstreet’s four divisions under David R. Jones, Lafayette McLaws, Richard Anderson, and John B. Hood moved through Leesburg and approached the Potomac, camping on the same ground Jackson’s men had occupied the night before. John Walker’s small infantry division reached Leesburg by the end of the day.

McClellan, meanwhile, continued moving his corps slowly through Maryland. The II Corps and XII Corps marched north to Rockville, while the IV Corps’ only division under Maj. Gen. Darius Couch moved to Offutt’s Crossroads (now Potomac), Maryland. Pleasonton’s cavalry made its way north of Seneca in an attempt to discover Lee’s position and intentions.¹⁰

Map 1.3: September 6, 1862

The recent rains had swelled the Potomac River at White’s Ford to about one-half mile wide and chest deep. Most of the men took off not only their shoes, but also their trousers and undergarments. Rather than drive straight across the river, the wading column bowed to the right to take advantage of Mason’s Island, which broke up the trip, before veering back to the left to finish the journey. The steep banks on the Virginia side of the ford made it difficult for wheeled vehicles to cross, so the earth was dug down to provide a more gentle grade. Generally exuberant about the crossing, the men waded the broad river singing Maryland, My Maryland. The route took the Confederates through Poolesville, where Southerners found many residents less than overjoyed at the sight of the bedraggled invaders.¹¹

Jackson’s march began again early on September 6. The divisions under Lawton and A. P. Hill (the latter under Brig. Gen. Lawrence Branch because of Hill’s recent arrest) halted at Monocacy Junction with orders to capture the important Baltimore and Ohio Railroad bridge over the Monocacy River. J. R. Jones halted his brigades just outside of Frederick. Colonel Bradley Johnson’s brigade was thrown into the town to act as a provost guard. This morning about 10 o’clock the Rebels took possession of our good city of Frederick without opposition— no soldiers of the U.S. being there, recalled one resident. No commotion or excitement, but all peaceably and quiet the soldiers are around the town purchasing clothing—shoes, caps and eatables. . . . Many of our citizens left town last night. The locals were unimpressed with the Southern warriors. According to a physician’s diary, they did not have uniforms but multiforms which were uniformly filthy; their faces had not been acquainted with water for weeks, their hair was shaggy and unkempt. The men did not march through the town, he continued, but strolled . . . marching it could not be called without doing violence to the word. Their bands tried to play Dixie and Maryland in execrable style. Many of the men carried watermelons under their arms, recently liberated from a B & O Railroad depot.¹²

Longstreet’s wing, which had camped just short of the Potomac River on the evening of September 5, crossed at White’s Ford and followed Jackson’s route toward Frederick. The men camped in the area vacated by Jackson that morning at Three Springs near Buckeystown. Walker’s division brought up the rear and camped at Big Spring on the Virginia side of the Potomac, which had served as first Jackson’s and then Longstreet’s camp for the past two nights. The weather was hot and dry, and the thousands of feet, hooves, and wheeled vehicles kicked up considerable dust clouds, reducing visibility at times to less than fifty feet.¹³

Jeb Stuart led his troopers out of Poolesville during the morning and headed to Urbana. Lee ordered him to divide his command and threaten both Baltimore and Washington, reporting on Federal movements all the while.¹⁴

Unfortunately for the Southern cause, the three top commanders began the campaign in various levels of pain and immobility. Lee was holding the reins of his horse on August 31 when something spooked the animal. He reached for the reins, tripped, and fell forward, breaking a bone in one wrist/hand and badly spraining the other; both were splinted. Unable to hold the reins or even dress himself, Lee was forced to travel in an ambulance. Stonewall Jackson also had a mishap and was riding in an ambulance after an admirer gave him a horse that reared and fell on top of him. Although his aides were worried that he may have broken his back, it was only badly bruised. As for Longstreet, A boot chafed his heel, which took on an ugly look and refused to heal, recalled his staff officer Moxley Sorrel. He was forced to don a slipper, and at Sharpsburg he was in no good humor at such footwear … . In fact, Sorrel continued, "a wobbly carpet slipper was not a good looking thing for a commander on the field.¹⁵

As Lee’s army moved north, most of the Federal army remained in its camps. The I Corps and IX Corps marched through Washington to Leesborough (now Wheaton) and the VI Corps and George Sykes’ division of the V Corps marched to Tennallytown. By the end of September 6, McClellan had sixty percent of his army arrayed in a vast arc about ten miles north and west of the capital of Washington.¹⁶

Map 1.4: September 7-8, 1862

The Army of the Potomac became stronger by the day with the arrival of reinforcements. About twenty regiments of green troops joined prior to the campaign, but there was little time for orientation or drilling. Each was assigned to an existing brigade with the hope its men would learn their new trade from the veterans around them. The army also regained some of its confidence with McClellan in overall command. According to some historians, the troops were not as demoralized by the defeats as they were angry with their commanders at all levels for the poor strategic and tactical decisions they had demonstrated on several battlefields. Despite his poor