21st Century Prometheus: Managing CBRN Safety and Security Affected by Cutting-Edge Technologies

Part IThe Changing CBRN Risk Landscape

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

M. Martellini, R. Trapp (eds.)21st Century Prometheushttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28285-1_2

The Twenty-first Century: The Epoch of Advanced Missile Systems and Growing Vulnerabilities

Matteo Frigoli¹  

(1)

Independent Researcher, Parma, Italy

Matteo Frigoli

1 The New Strategic Layer

International security has been impaired by the fact that the underpinning material scenario to which it applies has undergone a technological evolutionary and revolutionary process which has boosted its complexity and the difficulty to manage it through exhaustive measures. The complexity element is linked to the continuous process of creation of new military capabilities which add new layers within the international security structure, requiring wholly fresh approaches for managing their destabilizing impacts.

Indeed, there has been a rise in the number of military technologies with strategic effects which are influencing nuclear postures¹. These technologies do not necessarily belong to the nuclear realm, but, instead, are conventional capabilities able to exploit the vulnerabilities of nuclear deterrents and to disrupt the military systems on which the functioning of strategic arsenals is based. The evolving nature of threat to which key-defensive systems are exposed has brought a deep uncertainty on inter-state security relationships and, in particular, among the three great competitors, the U.S., China and Russia. Uncertainty has highlighted the need for more flexibility and diversity about the envisioned use of nuclear and advanced conventional weapons².

Relevant destabilizing elements of the current international security scenario are:

New advanced strategic military architectures with intertwined conventional and nuclear elements vulnerable to asymmetric means of warfare (e.g. anti-satellite weapons, cyber-weapons).

The development of new military technologies with strategic or long-term implications.

The vulnerability of critical dual-use infrastructures on which the functioning of advanced military capabilities is based.

In the discussion about new advanced military architectures, the attention is focused on strategic stability relationships between the U.S., China and Russia. Strategic Stability relationships cannot be addressed exhaustively with a fixed and determined set of arms control measures. Arms control actions focused on reductions of strategic warheads, of delivery systems, fixed places of strategic forces deployment, encouraging survivability of strategic delivery platforms and strategic sensors would not be suitable for addressing the new concept of strategic stability open to include advanced conventional capabilities, i.e. cyber weapons, ASATs, advanced conventional missiles and the envisioned growing role of low-yield nuclear weapons. There is a set of military technologies which constitute a "New Strategic Layer" which needs to be managed.

This New Strategic Layer of military technologies is identified here as a fixed number of systems with strategic implications, but this concept is suitable for embracing new advancements in warfare technology outside the nucleus of issues which are managed with business-as-usual measures arms control instruments.

The most relevant destabilizing military capabilities taken into consideration in this paper are: boost-phase defence, hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered missiles, ASAT weapons, development of new generation low-yield nuclear weapons, AI security implications.

The New Strategic Layer of military capabilities, it is to be understood both by looking at the single elements and at the interaction between the individual elements.

1.1 Boost-Phase Defence

Ballistic missile trajectories are typically divided into three phases. The boost-phase, the mid-course phase³ and the terminal phase (Chen and Speyer 2008, p. 1). The Boost phase is the portion of flight immediately after launch when the booster accelerates to lift the munitions into the air which lasts from the missile’s launch until the rocket booster shuts (Ibid). Boost phase is relatively short in duration. For ICBMs, which typically have two- or three-stage boosters, the boost phase lasts until the final stage burns out (IFPA 2009, p. 16). The second, or midcourse, phase lasts from the end of boost-phase until the warhead reenters the atmosphere (i.e. at more or less 100 km in altitude), during the midcourse phase the warhead has separated from the booster and is flying un-powered (Regan and Anandakrishnan 1993, pp. 27–28)⁴. The terminal phase is the portion of flight when the warhead reenters the atmosphere and reaches its target, which lasts approximately 30 s (Chen and Speyer 2008, n. 5, p. 1) (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1

Ballistic missile trajectory

While the objective of midcourse and terminal missile defenses is to intercept and destroy the warhead (i.e. a little target travelling at hypersonic speeds (Mallik 2004, p. 110)⁵, boost-phase defense systems are aimed at destroying or damaging the warhead while its attached to a large rocket in the ascent phase. In the boost-phase, damaging the booster alone may prevent the warhead from achieving enough velocity to reach its target (Wilkening 2004, p. 1; Congressional Budget Office 2004, p. x.).

A reliable boost phase defense system has long been considered the holy grail of missile defense, as boosting missiles are much slower than missiles during the midcourse or terminal phase. For example, it is reported that an average liquid-fuel ICBM after 30 s from launch has reached an altitude of about 3 km (a solid-fuel ICBM has, instead, a better acceleration ratio and can travel faster than liquid-fuel ICBM) (Congressional Budget Office 2004, p. 12). Moreover, during boost-phase, the hot exhaust gas put out by the booster rocket constitute a very visible target for infrared sensors and the rocket body itself is larger and more visible to radars than the much smaller warhead which will separate from the booster and travel unpowered when it reaches the midcourse phase. In addition, ICBM countermeasures such as decoys, which would be difficult to distinguish from the real warhead during the midcourse phase (Goodby and Postol 2018, p. 210), are complex to deploy during the boost-phase (Wilkening 2004, p. 45).

The challenges of boost-phase defense systems are linked to: the very short time available for the engagement and the access to the necessary deployment locations for interceptors which must be near to the ICBM launch point (whether the interceptors are based on kinetic or directed energy). The required velocity of a kinetic interceptor is dependent on these two variables (Congressional Budget Office 2004, p. 9; NRC 2012, p. 5; Wilkening 2004).

In concept, the architecture of a boost-phase missile defense system is composed of a set of sensors, infrared or/and radar systems, and a given kinetic or directed energy interceptor system which could be ground-based, ship-based, air-based or space-based (Congressional Budget Office 2004; NRC 2012). The system should be able to detect, track, fire and intercept the hostile ballistic missile before the end of the boost-phase, or, in the case of a kinetic interceptor, before the hostile ballistic missile reaches a speed higher than that of the interceptor (ibid.). In order to meet this timeline, the sensor system should be able to detect and track the target shortly after launch. It has been reported that ground-based radars should be positioned not farther than 550 km from the launch point, while airborne radar could allow for a boost-phase detection from as far as 800 km (ibid.).

Because of horizon limitations⁶ ground-based radar systems could provide a full coverage against small countries, but an ICBM launched from the interior of a large country will not be visible to surface or airborne radars in time for a useful boost-phase detection (Congressional Budget Office 2004). Also, land-based or sea-based interceptor systems would be greatly constrained if the target is shot from deep inland of a large country, airborne interceptors could solve the problem where air supremacy has been achieved or where they can get close enough to the launch point of the hostile ballistic missile without being threatened by an effective air defense system.

Space-basing for boost-phase defense could overcome these disadvantages. Space sensors are not horizon-limited and can be oriented to guarantee a persistent coverage of a selected objective (NRC 2012, p. 6); space-based interceptors are not geographically limited. The disadvantage is that there would be the need of a very large constellation (hundreds or maybe thousands) of space interceptors in order to have at least one interceptor always in range for a boost-phase engagement (Congressional Budget Office 2004, n. 10; NRC 2012) (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2

Example of a space-based missile interception. (Source: Adapted from Barton et al. 2004)

At the time of this writing, no nation has a proven realistic capability to destroy a ballistic missile during the boost phase. The U.S. are currently developing the technology for boost-phase intercept of ballistic missiles, with the intent to counter threats from regional actors such as North Korea and (potentially) Iran (NRC 2012; Williams 2017). Indeed, the Pentagon has been required to study and formulate an initial plan to develop a boost phase missile defense capability according to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (US Congress 2018).

Either space-basing or ground-basing for boost-phase defense would entail that the interceptors could target missiles coming from other multiple countries (NRC 2012; Williams 2017). As regards the sensor architecture, a constellation of space sensors could be oriented to focus on specific latitude bands, they cannot be concentrated against individual countries (NRC 2012, p. 3). The U.S. have been working on boost-phase missile defense concepts to counter missiles fired from North Korea or Iran (Williams 2017, p. 2). It has been reported that a space-based system with orbits capable of covering North Korea could cover about 75% of the world’s countries and about 90% of those that might now be considered potential threats of the U.S. (Congressional Budget Office 2004, p. xvi). It is noteworthy that even if the U.S. boost-phase defense would be committed to target Russia or China, such defense is not practical, given the size, sophistication, and capabilities of Russian and Chinese forces to respond to U.S. defense efforts, including by increasing the size of the attack to the point at which defenses are overwhelmed by numbers (NRC 2012); indeed, Russia and China could field warheads and decoys at a dramatically less cost than the United States can add missile defense interceptors (Rose 2018).

Nonetheless, a perfect defense is not necessary to introduce important uncertainties into an enemy’s offensive power by devaluing its offensive missiles strikes capabilities. In addition, it is well-known how Russia feels threatened by U.S. missile defense in general.

The build-up of the envisioned space sensor architecture alone could feed Russia’s concerns. Indeed, sensors are required across the entire intercept cycle: early warning, tracking, fire control, discrimination, and kill assessment. Improvements in sensors may, at the margin, be one of the best ways to improve lethality and contribute to a more robust existing defense (Williams 2017, p. xxii). The Missile Defense Review indicate that the U.S. are looking to counter threats from Russia and China in regional theaters such as Europe and Asia (Sonne 2018). Instead of looking for a defense from Russia or China strategic arsenals, the U.S. may be looking to expand the role of missile defense to defend NATO forces in regions like Eastern Europe or Eastern Asia (Fedasiuk 2018, p. 7), adding a layer to counter, if not short, intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In fact, one of the options considered is to integrate the F-35s aircraft as both a sensor and interceptor platform for boost-phase defense (Defense News 2019).

Nevertheless, the politics governing theater missile defenses and strategic missile defense are bounded, setting down a system capable to defend against one kind of weapon necessarily affects the strategy underpinning the use of other weapons (Fedasiuk, pp. 7–10), showing how delicate could be the equilibrium that sustains thrust and stability between competitors.

2 Hypersonic Missiles

The United States, China and Russia are by far the nations with the most developed hypersonic technologies. They are engaged in what can be regarded as a hypersonic arms race (Gubrud 2015, p. 1; Nagappa 2015, p. 9), these nations have conducted several tests of hypersonic missiles in the last decade and are near to deploying a limited hypersonic capacity (Lele 2019, pp. 71–74). Hypersonic missiles are now well-tested and near to be deployed. Hypersonic missiles are likely to impact on the international security scenario in the short-term. It is reported that Russia will deploy a limited number of hypersonic missiles during 2019 while the U.S. could do the same in a few years; China is strongly committed to the development of hypersonic missiles having undergone at least 7 tests between 2014 and 2017.

The new missile technologies referred to as hypersonic missiles consist of two new systems: boost-glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). Before analysing the specific capabilities of each system, it is useful to mention their common characteristics.

Hypersonic missiles could reach and maintain hypersonic speeds, i.e. speeds above Mach 5. Speed is not the only element that characterizes hypersonic missiles, indeed even the existing re-entry vehicles (RV) mounted atop of ballistic missiles can reach hypersonic speeds in the terminal phase of their flight⁷.

The game-changing capabilities of hypersonic missiles derive from the missile’s speed, manoeuvrability and unusual altitudes that make them complex to detect and difficult to intercept by the most advanced missile defence systems.

Hypersonic missiles follow a non-ballistic trajectory, flying between 30 and 100 km in altitude, thus they would operate at altitudes above those of conventional aircraft, but significantly below those of ballistic missiles. Their maneuverability allows them to change their impact point and the associated trajectory throughout their flight time (Rand 2017, p. 8; CNS 2015, p. 8) and they can achieve a high degree of targeting precision. By contrast, existing cruise missiles offer good maneuverability but relatively low speeds, and ballistic missiles offer hypersonic speed but little or no maneuverability.

The unusual altitudes and unpredictable flight path of hypersonic missiles have implications for the detection: hypersonic missiles will likely be invisible to existing missile early-warning radars for much of their trajectory. It is reported that hypersonic missiles could be detected during their boost-phase⁸ by satellite early-warning systems (or by surface radars sufficiently close to the launch point), but after the boost-phase they may disappear from view (Acton 2013, p. 118). After the unobservable phase, they could be detected once again if they fly 400–600 km from ground-based early-warning radars but, even if detected, there will be a high degree of uncertainty about their target since in-flight updates can program the missile to attack a different target from the originally planned (Rand 2017; NRC 2007, p. 7; NRC 2008, p. 128). In short, hypersonic missiles will leave to the target a few minutes to elaborate a reaction before the impact. By contrast, it is possible to predict the impact point of any given ballistic missile, allowing an opponent to calculate the warning-time at his disposal.

These characteristics make hypersonic missiles a suitable system for surprise long-range strikes. Thanks to their capabilities hypersonic missiles will:

Highly compress target’s reaction time (and the time at disposal to decision-makers to elaborate and communicate a response).

Hold extremely large areas and targets at risk (given that the actual targets of a hypersonic missile attack might not be apparent until the last minutes of flight).

Potentially overcome the most advanced missile defense systems.

As will be better discussed, HCMs and HGVs may be used as either strategic or tactical systems, armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, introducing not only flexibility but ambiguity of intent.

2.1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile

An HCM is a cruise missile capable of operating at hypersonic speeds, flying at 20–50 km in altitude (Rand 2017, pp. 8–10). In concept, these systems consist of two stages: the first-stage rocket booster and the second stage powered by a scramjet engine (i.e., supersonic combustion ramjet) which generates thrust from a supersonic airflow (Rand 2017, p. 12). The first-stage would accelerate the missile at the right supersonic speed needed for properly starting the second stage and begin to cruise at hypersonic speeds (Acton 2013, p. 68).

Existing subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles are difficult to defend against because they are hardly detectable and follow unpredictable trajectories. The additional speed provided by HCMs, relative to other cruise missiles, would pose a highly complex defensive challenge (Acton 2013, p. 73). They could be launched from land, air or sea and would provide a regional strike capability, being able to fly up to 1000 km in range (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3

Hypersonic Cruise Missile. (Source: Adapted from Boeing Graphics)

2.2 Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicles

An HGV is an unpowered vehicle capable of gliding on the upper atmosphere at hypersonic speeds for long-range distances. It is equipped with a small propulsion system (RCS thrusters) for orientation and directional control (Rand 2017, p. 9). The HGV is mounted atop of a large rocket, usually an existing type of ICBM, that will propel the HGV at hypersonic speeds (Wiener 2017, p. 142; Woolf 2019a, p. 17). The separation from the rocket will take place, depending on the target location, between 40 and 100 km above the earth’s surface⁹. After the separation, the HGV descends into the atmosphere where a pull-up manoeuvre¹⁰ is executed in order to enable the HGV to enter in the glide-phase of the flight. The HGV will then glide to its target along a relatively flat trajectory (Acton 2015, pp. 195–196). In contrast to existing ballistic missiles, HGVs would fly at much lower altitudes, they would follow a flat trajectory, and would be capable of maneuvering and changing the point of impact throughout their glide-flight, lasting for thousands of kilometers in range (Rand 2017, p. 3) (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4

Flight portions of a hypersonic glide vehicle. (Source: adapted from DARPA graphics)

It is important to stress the difference between the HGV and the existing Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicle (MaRV) (Rand 2017, p. 9). It is true that HGV and MaRV are both able to glide, but there are decisive differences.

Indeed, MaRVs can offer a change of direction only in the terminal phase of their flight, and given that the majority of the movement trajectory is ballistic, they could be detected and tracked from thousands of kilometers of distance by early-warning radars. In addition, MaRVs follow a ballistic trajectory, they are vulnerable to mid-course ballistic missile defenses, while these last defenses would not be effective against HGVs (Rand 2017, p. 9). In other words, MaRVs have all the attributes and vulnerabilities of ballistic missiles, except for the opportunity to maneuver in the terminal-phase of the flight.

The figure below compares MaRV and HGV trajectories (Fig. 5).

Fig. 5

MaRV versus HGV. (Source: RAND 2017)

2.3 Consequences for International Security and Strategic Stability Between U.S., China and Russia

The military characteristics of hypersonic missiles bring critical ambiguities likely to have a relevant impact on strategic stability relationships, especially among U.S., China and Russia which are near to deploy an operational hypersonic strike capability.

Warhead ambiguity: i.e. the impossibility of discerning whether a hypersonic missile is carrying a nuclear or a conventional warhead.

Target ambiguity: due to the susceptibility of HCMs and HGVs to multiple in-flight course corrections, a nuclear possessor-state could believe that its nuclear assets were at risk even though in fact conventional assets were the intended targets.

Destination ambiguity: an observing state could assume that HCMs and/or HGVs were targeting its territory even though the actual targets were located in the territory of a neighboring state.

These key-ambiguities could bring a scenario in which the risks of accidental war and the difficulties of escalation management will likely increase by quickly climbing the different steps of the escalation ladder. It is noteworthy to mention that the U.S. are developing hypersonic missiles only as a conventional weapon system, while, at the time of this writing, it is unclear if China and Russia are going to arm hypersonic missiles with nuclear warheads.

Indeed, hypersonic missiles may compress the warning-time that will follow the detection of a hypersonic missile fleet, the targets of a hypersonic strike will be unpredictable, and the nature of the threat posed by any given strike – conventional or nuclear – will be ambiguous. These factors will affect the strategic postures of states engaged in the hypersonic arms race and of other states which have reason to fear being in the gunsight of these weapons.

In fact, if nuclear-armed, hypersonic missiles could impair the nuclear equilibrium between competitors destabilizing one of the pillars of strategic stability: first-strike stability. Even if there would be a numerical equality in arsenals, the unique characteristics of hypersonic missiles will compound first-strike stability as both the possessor states would perceive each other as enhancing their first-strike capability (Acton 2013, p. 144).¹¹

Indeed, the super-accuracy of these weapons could lead one state to believe that a surgical low-yield nuclear attack would be acceptable to an adversary. The surgical precision of these weapons could boost the confidence of a state leadership that strike the enemy’s forces with precision and with a low-yield nuclear weapon could be a useful tool of escalation control (Leah 2017, p. 192). While in the event of a hypersonic low-yield nuclear strike, even with both states willing to accept a mutual exchange of low-yield nuclear weapons, the one who would then find himself at a disadvantage could prefer to escalate.

As has been said above, hypersonic missiles are being conceived as providing a conventional strike capability by the U.S.. Nonetheless, conventionally-armed hypersonic missiles represent as a dangerous issue for strategic stability and arms control as nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles. It is not by looking at ‘first-strike stability’ that it is possible to catch the core of the destabilizing effects of conventionally-armed hypersonic missiles as conventional hypersonic missiles are not suitable to conduct purely counter-nuclear missions. There is no assurance that conventionally-armed hypersonic missiles could effectively destroy small hardened targets such as silo-based nuclear missiles (Dvorking 2019; Acton 2013, pp. 84–87; Gormley 2015, p. 133). The destabilizing impact of conventionally-armed hypersonic missiles derives primarily from their employment as the leading edge of major combat operations, targeting early-warning radars, dual-use (nuclear/conventional) command and control nodes, air and missile defence assets (Acton 2018, pp. 61–62; NRC 2007, p. 2). Indeed, the so-called strategic conventional weapons are now part of the deterrence equation and are influencing nuclear postures. Both the Russian and the U.S. nuclear postures foresee the possible use of nuclear weapons in front of a purely conventional aggression to key-defense assets like command and control infrastructure and early-warning radars. China argues that a hypersonic conventional attack could put in a disadvantaged, passive position the Chinese nuclear counterstrike capability (Chinese Academy of Military Science 2013, pp. 170–171). Moreover, it is reported that the command and control infrastructure of nuclear weapon states are controlling both conventional and nuclear forces (a phenomenon named entanglement), even an accidental hypersonic strike on these infrastructures could degrade the communication systems required for operating nuclear weapons, triggering a potential nuclear response. This could bring a rise of the alert level of nuclear forces which will add further risks of accidental nuclear actions.

3 Nuclear-Powered Engine for Cruise Missiles and Torpedoes: Burevestnik and Status 6

These two nuclear powered weapons system are being treated in the same paragraph as they have in common the fact that for both systems a compact nuclear reactor represents a pre-requisite; both are potentially conceived as weapons of pure retribution in the case of a nuclear attack, and for both systems there are doubts over their real deployment and capabilities.

The Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile was unveiled during a speech by the Russian President Vladimir Putin before the Russian Federal Assembly in March 2018, he affirmed that In late 2017, Russia successfully launched its latest nuclear-powered missile at the Central training ground (GlobalSecurity.Org 2019a). At the time of this writing, the Burevestnik, also known to U.S. observers as Skyfall, has undergone at least 13 tests (Missile Defense Project 2019). The only two positive tests achieved a moderate success (Ibid.).

It is clear that the nuclear-powered cruise missile is a possible future weapon system, made feasible by the fact that Russia has created a new, compact, nuclear power unit that can be installed in a cruise missile (Cooper 2018). Russian analysts tend to agree that the nuclear unit acts as a heat source for what is essentially a ramjet engine (Hacker 1995. pp. 91–92).

This technology has a long history. In the early 1960s, the United States built a nuclear-powered missile known as Project Pluto. The program begun in 1957 and terminated in 1964 (Hacker 1995, p. 90). The Department of Defense decided to rely on strategic bombers and ICBM as means for strategic delivery. In addition, there was no way to fly it without spreading dangerous levels of radiations. Analyst Stephen Schwartz noted that the reactor was unshielded, emitting dangerous levels of gamma and neutron radiation. And as it flew, it would spew radioactive fission fragments in its exhaust, including over allies [states] en route to the U.S.S.R (GlobalSecurity.Org 2019b). To be small enough to reasonably fit inside a missile, the nuclear ramjet which the United States developed for Project Pluto had no shielding to contain the dangerous radiation spreading. The exhaust plume also contained unspent fissile material that would have contaminated any area, enemy controlled or not.

In fact, it is reported that Norway’s Radiation Protection Authority and the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety detected small amounts of radioactive substances called ruthenium-106 tracing back to Russia in October 2017 (IRSN 2018, p. 10). Also, unusual amounts of Iodine-131 were detected in the same period (Nilsen 2018). The particles may have come from the test of the nuclear-powered missile (Gertz 2018). Further reports indicate that Rosatom (Russian State Nuclear Energy Corp.) was monitoring the site during at least one of the tests of the Burevestnik-Skyfall, an indication that nuclear material was used in the test (Gertz 2018).

From a purely technical point of view, and despite these grave and critical issues, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile would provide unique military capabilities. Indeed, it has been described by Russian officials as A low-flying, barely noticeable cruise missile carrying a nuclear warhead with virtually unlimited range, an unpredictable flight path and the possibility of circumvention of interception lines is invulnerable to all existing and prospective systems of both missile defense and air defense. In fact, an unlimited-range cruise missile could fly intricate routes to exploit holes in enemy air defenses. Though, the exact missions of this system in the overall Russian deterrence strategy is not yet clear (Trenin 2019, p. 16). The Burevestnik or Sky-fall could be a bet with more to lose than to gain. Indeed, the spreading of dangerous radioactive material during the flight aside, some of the risks could regard: the consequences of the destruction (whether intentionally or accidentally) of these missiles’ storage facilities during a combat operation; the implications of the interception of the missile while overflying a neutral state; the potential detection of the missile by neutral states and the consequent risk of accidental war as the same state could conclude to be the target (so called target ambiguity).

In addition, it is difficult to imagine what kind of purpose the nuclear-powered missile could have in war planning. What are the advantages of this missile over existing cruise and ballistic missiles in a real warfare scenario? It is true that with an unlimited thrust it could exploit holes in hostile missile defense systems and follow unpredictable long-routes where the hostile radar/sensor coverage is less focused. Will it be capable to destroy high value targets? Or there will be the need to build hundreds of these missiles to bypass point and area missile defense systems? Moreover, in case of the decision to carry out long-range nuclear strikes, strategic bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs will surely reach the targets faster than the Burevestnik¹², in these circumstances what could be the purpose of this missile? Another doubt could be the real undetectable capability, indeed if the missile will spew even a small amount of radioactive substances in the air, it could be easily detected by following its radioactive cloud (The Aviationist 2017). It seems more a weapon of destabilization rather than a system to increase the deterrence of the overall Russia nuclear arsenal.

The same concepts behind the allegedly developed Russian compact nuclear reactor used to propel the Burevestnik could work as a propulsion system for other relatively small Russian warhead delivery systems. Russia is developing an autonomous nuclear-powered torpedo designed to travel autonomously across thousands of miles to detonate a multi-megaton bomb near to a coastal objective, creating a massive radioactive tsunami (Sutyagin 2016, p. 1, GlobalSecurity.Org 2019c).¹³ The torpedo, named Status-6 (also known as Kanyon), it supposed to be 1.6 m in diameter, and 24 m long (GlobalSecurity.Org 2019c). The existence of these weapon systems has been revealed for the first time by a video of Russia’s state-owned Channel One shot at a meeting of Russian military officials held by President Vladimir Putin on November 9, 2015 (Sutyagin 2016, p. 1; Podvig 2015). The camera briefly focused on a slide showing diagrams of a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, torpedo-like device labeled as Oceanic Multipurpose System Status-6. The leak has been labeled as a staged performance (Sutyagin 2016, p. 1).

The slide described the mission of the weapon as Damaging the important components of the adversary’s economy in a coastal area and inflicting unacceptable damage to a country’s territory by creating areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be unsuitable for military, economic, or other activity for long periods of time (Podvig 2015). The drone would reportedly have a maximum range of 5400 nautical miles (10,000 km) while traveling at a depth of 1000 m (GlobalSecurity.Org 2019c).

Nonetheless, there are doubts over its real capabilities (Cooper 2018). It is reported that even if the drone could reach the claimed top speed of 100 knots throughout a 10,000 km journey (the claimed range of the drone), the combat launch of the vessel would mean a 54-hour-long potential loss of effective control of a high-yield thermonuclear weapon by Russia’s. Extremely low-frequency (ELF) communication, while possible in theory at a cruise speed much lower than 100 knots, does not provide an effective means of control of the submarine drone (Sutyagin 2016, p. 3). Despite this, the autonomous nuclear-drone has been mentioned in the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, signaling that it is considered a real threat by the