The Home Front in Britain: Then and Now

Preamble to War

Benito Mussolini — Il Duce — had been the fascist dictator in Italy since the ‘March on Rome’ by the Blackshirts in 1922. Italy then began flexing her muscles in North Africa, colonising Libya that had been ceded to her in 1912. In 1929 Mussolini joined Tripolitania and Cyrenaica into one colonial province, his appetite for expansion now being focussed on Ethiopia that he wanted to invade as early as 1932.

In January 1933, Adolf Hitler — Der Führer and leader of the Nazi Party — achieved a similar dictatorial role in Germany, and top of his wish-list was to incorporate Austria into a Greater German Reich. Being the place of his birth, it was a personal ambition close to his heart and Nazi supporters were already preparing the way by causing trouble there with organised riots on the streets.

The two dictators had yet to meet but, at the instigation of German diplomats who wanted to try to moderate Hitler’s obsession with Austria, a meeting was arranged for June 1934. The following year Mussolini’s forces invaded Ethiopia. The seven-month war began on October 2, 1935 during which poison gas was employed in defiance of the fact that Italy had signed the Geneva Protocol seven years earlier. The League of Nations quickly declared Italy the aggressor; nevertheless, Ethiopia was annexed and united with Italy’s other colonies to form the new colony of ‘Italian East Africa’ with King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy adopting the title: ‘Emperor of Abyssinia’.

In September 1937, Mussolini was invited to Germany for what would now be called a state visit. The visit lasted five days, encompassing troop reviews in Mecklenburg, a visit to Krupps in Essen, banquets and parades in Berlin, and a visit to Hermann Göring’s residence at Carinhall.

In 1938 Austria was just 20 years old. Formed out of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of the First War, the coming to power of Hitler in 1933 led to an increasingly vociferous campaign for Anschluss (union) with Germany. Italy had historically always been aligned with Austria but when Mussolini allied himself with Hitler in 1936, the Austrian Chancellor, Dr Kurt von Schuschnigg, realised that a formal agreement with the German dictator was the only insurance policy possible to try and preserve his country’s independence. In the Austro-German agreement signed in July 1936, Germany re-affirmed its recognition of Austrian sovereignty. This agreement to allow a Nazi element in Austria led to a terror campaign of bombings and demonstrations throughout 1937, and a police raid in January 1938 uncovered plans for an outright revolt that Spring. In order to sort out with the Austrian Chancellor ‘such misunderstandings and points of friction as have persisted’ since the 1936 agreement was signed, Hitler invited von Schuschnigg to the Obersalzberg for talks. The meeting on February 12 was not so much a discussion as a tirade by Hitler and an ultimatum that the Austrian government be turned over to German control within a week with the installation of Dr Arthur Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior. Brow-beaten into submission with threats of massive military intervention if he wavered, von Schuschnigg signed. German troops crossed the frontier at daybreak on Satur day, March 12.

Two days before the Germans marched into Austria, Hitler sent a letter by personal courier to Mussolini, explaining that ‘I am now determined to restore law and order in my homeland’. Now was the time for him to take up the invitation extended to him the previous September to visit Rome.

Six months before his visit to Rome, Hitler had disclosed to his generals that his next intention was to overthrow Czechoslovakia, if necessary by war, and incorporate it with the Reich. The Czech Republic, as it existed since 1918, included large German, Polish, Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities. The 3.5 million German-speaking Czechs lived largely in the Sudetenland, the borderlands of Bohemia and Moravia. This horseshoe-shaped region was vital to the Czech state both economically and militarily. It contained much of the country’s industry and, perhaps even more important, in it lay the strong frontier fortifications that were the backbone of the whole of the Czech defence system.

The Sudeten Germans were organised in 1933 in the Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront, founded by Konrad Henlein. Supported from the Reich, both financially and with propaganda, it was a useful tool in Hitler’s scheme for conquest. His policy was to have the Sudeten Germans demand ever-increasing minority rights hoping to create so much tension and unrest that he could intervene and act as saviour of his fellow Germans.

The most graphic reminder of the First World War raids is the damage still visible on the stonework of Cleopatra’s Needle on the Embankment in London. This was caused during the night raid on September 4/5, 1917, when a bomb dropped from a Gotha struck the edge of the pavement. The explosion blasted an opening into the tunnel of the Metropolitan District Railway that ran below the roadway. Three passengers in a passing tram were killed and nine injured by the blast.

In 1935, looking for allies against possible foreign aggression, Czechoslovakia had joined the French-Russian defensive Alliance but France was unwilling to go to war without Britain. Russia would only come to assist if France initiated help and would have to negotiate with other countries — Poland or Romania — for passage of troops. In April 1938, on Berlin’s instructions, Henlein, in a speech at Karlsbad, proclaimed his latest demands: full self-government for the Sudeten Germans within the Czech state and freedom to adhere to Nazi ideology. The Czech government, headed by President Edvard Beneš and Prime Minister Milan Hodža, had negotiated on and off with the Sudeten Germans since 1936 and tried its best to reach a settlement. But on May 20, when exaggerated reports of German troop movements led to a partial Czech mobilisation, Henlein immediately suspended negotiations.

The crisis that was to hold Europe in its grip for 18 days began on September 12, 1938. On that day, at the Nuremberg party rally, Hitler made a brutally abusive speech, denouncing the Czech government and demanding ‘justice’ for the Sudeten Germans. For the first time, he openly spoke of cession of the region to Germany. Two days later, the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, on his own initiative, sent a message to Hitler, asking for a meeting to discuss the current danger to peace in Europe. The proposal took Hitler completely by surprise, but he accepted. Chamberlain flew to Munich on the 15th and was received by Hitler at the Berghof on the Obersalzberg in their first-ever meeting.

On Chamberlain’s return, he and his Cabinet conferred with the French government of Premier Edouard Daladier and, on September 19, London and Paris produced a proposal that they put to Prague. If Czechoslovakia co-operated in a cession of the German-majority districts of Sudetenland, Britain and France would guarantee the country’s new frontiers. This ultimatum-like proposal presented the Czech Cabinet with a cruel dilemma as a refusal would mean war with Germany. The Czech general staff was consulted and advised fighting only if France stood by her commitments. Trusting that she would, Beneš and Hodža turned down the proposal but in a night of diplomatic frenzy, it was made clear to them that France was not perpared to go to war. Bitterly disillusioned, they accepted the Anglo-French proposal. Immediately, mass demonstrations broke out in Prague, forcing the Hodža Cabinet to resign. The new government, quickly formed by General Jan Syrový, was clearly more prepared to defend the country. The next day, September 23, after border incidents at Asch and Eger, it ordered the general mobilisation of the Czech armed forces.

Hitler’s first bone of contention was the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia (shaded green on this German propaganda map of the period). Once it was in his grasp, he declared it to be his ‘last territorial claim in Europe’, but in reality he could not believe how easy the acquisition had been.

Meanwhile, on the 22nd, Chamberlain had returned to Germany for his appointment with Hitler. This time they met at Bad Godesberg, on the banks of the Rhine near Bonn. The first session took place on the afternoon of September 22 at which Chamberlain was shocked to discover that, since their previous meeting, Hitler had now decided to move the goalposts and introduce new demands. To his astonishment and chagrin, the Czech acceptance of cession of the Sudetenland to Germany now no longer satisfied Hitler as he now insisted on a settlement of the Polish and Hungarian claims on Czech territory in connection with the Sudeten question.

Next morning, Chamberlain sent a letter across the river from his own hotel on the eastern bank proposing a traditional British compromise. This Hitler rejected out of hand, again playing the war of nerves by keeping the Prime Minister waiting all day for a reply.

The second meeting began at 10.30 p.m., the somewhat heated exchanges going on for three hours, until Chamberlain declared that ‘there was no point in continuing the conversation’. He told Hitler that ‘he was going away with a heavy heart for the hopes with which he had come to Germany were destroyed’. He immediately returned to London to deliberate with his Cabinet and with the French. Hitler’s Godesberg memorandum was put to Prague and categorically rejected on the 25th. Next day, Hitler delivered a fanatical speech at the Berlin Sportpalast, full of hate against the Czechs and declaring that the Sudetenland would be in German hands, by ‘peace or war’, on October 1.

The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, travelled to Germany three times in a matter of days to try to reach an accommodation with Hitler. On September 15, 1938, he flew to Munich and then travelled on by road to the Führer’s residence on the Obersalzberg.

A follow-up meeting was arranged at the Hotel Dreesen at Bad Godesberg on the banks of the Rhine. In the meantime, Britain and France had presented an ultimatum to the Czechs which Chamberlain thought would be the basis for an agreement. However, when he met with Hitler on the 22nd, he could not believe it when the German now came up with new demands.

With German troops deploying for attack along the Czech border and the Czech Army mobilising, war now seemed inevitable. For the many millions of people in western Europe, this was the peak of the crisis. French reserve units were dispatched to man the Maginot Line and the mobilisation of the British fleet was ordered. At this point Mussolini stepped in and, in response to an official British request, the Duce proposed to Hitler a Four-Power Conference to solve the crisis. When Mussolini agreed to represent Italy in person Hitler accepted and invitations were sent to Britain and France to attend. Mussolini was met by Hitler at Kiefersfelden station and the two dictators travelled to Munich together in Hitler’s personal train. On the journey, Hitler explained his demands to the Duce using an ethnographic map of Czechoslovakia. However, Czechoslovakia was not invited.

The news of a conference was received throughout Europe with great relief — everywhere except in Prague. As a result of Beneš’s anguished pleas that his country should be heard, the Czechs were, at the last hour, advised by London to send two ‘observers’ to Munich. The meeting was held at the Führerbau, Hitler’s newly-completed party headquarters facing the Königsplatz. With an agreement signed over the heads of the Czechs, the fate of their country had been sealed within 12 hours.

The following morning the British Prime Minister called on Hitler at his private apartment on the Prinzregentenstrasse for an unscheduled meeting. Dr Hans Schmidt (Hitler’s interpreter), who had worked non-stop for some 13 hours at the session at the Führerbau, was the sole witness. Chamberlain, exuberant in the thought that he had just secured the peace of the world, was anxious to add a final full stop to the proceedings. Hitler, ‘pale and moody, listened absent-mindedly to Chamberlain’s remarks about Anglo-German relations, disarmament and economic questions, contributing little’ wrote Schmidt in 1951. ‘Towards the end of the conversation Chamberlain drew the famous Anglo-German declaration from his pocket.’ Chamberlain later said that Hitler eagerly assented to this, but Schmidt felt that he only agreed to the wording ‘with a certain reluctance, and I believe he appended his signature only to please Chamberlain’. This was the piece of paper waved aloft when the latter returned to Heston. The paper ‘bears his name upon it as well as mine,’ declared Chamberlain, little realising the contempt with which Hitler viewed the whole matter.

When Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop complained to Hitler about signing the document, Hitler replied scornfully: ‘Don’t take it so seriously. This paper has no importance at all!’ Hitler later confided to the Hungarian Foreign Minister that he had not thought it possible that ‘Czechoslovakia would be served up to me by her friends’.

It was now Mussolini who proposed a Four-Power Conference between Germany, Italy, Britain and France to try to find a solution although Czechoslovakians were only allowed to attend as observers. The venue was to be Hitler’s brand-new national headquarters of the Nazi Party in Munich. On September 29, after discussions lasting 12-hours, the agreement handing over the Sudeten lands to Germany was signed by Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier, the French Prime Minister, Mussolini and Hitler in the early hours of the next day. No wonder the Führer is all smiles. Behind is his interpreter, Dr Hans Schmidt.

In fact, the victory had been won too easily for him and Chamberlain’s complaisance had taken him ‘by surprise’. On October 3, Hitler crossed the frontier personally to celebrate his bloodless conquest, while many in Britain lauded Munich with thanksgiving. One voice spoke out; that of Winston Churchill who declared it to be ‘a total, unmitigated defeat’.

Schmidt was the only person present at a remarkable meeting which took place between the British Prime Minister and German Chancellor the following morning in Hitler’s private quarters on the second floor of No. 16 Prinzregentenstrasse (now a police headquarters). Anxious to return to Britain with something positive, Chamberlain had drawn up what he called an Anglo-German Declaration that he pulled from his pocket and asked Hitler to sign. Now it was his turn to appease his opposite number by adding his signature although this document had nothing to do with the Munich Agreement signed earlier. As Hitler commented later: ‘This paper has no importance at all’.

When Chamberlain returned to Heston airport, he held it aloft. ‘This morning I had another talk with the German Chancellor, Herr Hitler, and here is the paper which bears his name upon it as well as mine. Some of you have already heard what it contains but I would just like to read it to you.’

Chamberlain’s impromptu ‘peace for our time’ document that he had persuaded Hitler to sign mentions the Anglo-German Naval Agreement that regulated the size of the Kriegsmarine in relation to the Royal Navy. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 imposed severe restrictions on the size and capacities of the German armed forces and Germany was not allowed to possess battleships, submarines or naval aircraft. All the navy was permitted were six heavy cruisers of no more than 10,000 tons; six light cruisers of no more than 6,000 tons; 12 destroyers not exceeding 800 tons and 12 torpedo boats. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which had been signed in June 1935, fixed a ratio whereby the total tonnage of the Kriegsmarine was to be 35 per cent of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy. Hitler renounced the agreement on April 28, 1939.

In 1936, Britain witnessed a possible portent of things to come when a full-blown Nazi funeral took place in London, complete with swastika flags and the stiff-arm Hitler salute. Leopold von Hoesch had been the German ambassador to the United Kingdom since November 1932 until he suddenly died of a heart attack on April 11. His relationship with Hitler had soured over the years, culminating with his opposition to the German take-over of the Rhineland — the buffer zone between Germany and France — just the month before. For the funeral, the British government arranged for Grenadier Guardsmen to act as pallbearers and provided a horse-drawn gun carriage for the procession from Carlton House Terrace, down the Mall to Victoria station. At Dover, a 19-gun salute was fired as the flag-draped coffin was carried aboard the destroyer HMS Scout for transport to Germany.

Von Hoesch was replaced in London by Joachim von Ribbentrop

Then Hitler’s favourite foreign policy adviser. He was appointed ambassador in August 1936 although the death of State Secretary Bernhard von Bülow delayed his arrival in London until October. His tenure was marked by a series of social gaffes, the first taking place the following month when he attended a church service at Durham Cathedral with the Marquess of Londonderry. The first hymn was Glorious Things of Thee Are Spoken and as the organ began playing the opening bars, identical to the German National Anthem, Ribbentrop jumped to his feet and gave the Nazi salute! Then, in February 1937, he greeted King George VI with the same greeting, nearly knocking the King over in the process as he walked forward to shake the German’s hand. Ribbentrop even compounded the damage to his image by suggesting that in future heads of state should respond with the Nazi salute! Much of von Ribbentrop’s time was wasted in trying to get Britain to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact (something that was really directed against British interests), and demanding that Britain sign an alliance with Germany and return former German colonies lost after the First World War. His bullying negotiating style, with the implied threat that if colonial restoration did not take place, then Germany would take back their former colonies, attracted a great deal of hostility over the inappropriateness of an ambassador threatening the host nation. Von Ribbentrop was recalled to Berlin in February 1938, taking part in the negotiations with Chamberlain later that year.

On August 23, 1939, while outwardly negotiating a German-Soviet Commercial Agreement, von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, his Soviet counterpart, agreed secret non-aggression protocols that divided Poland between Germany and the USSR. Eleven days after the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 1, the secret protocol in the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was modified by the German–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Demarcation allotting Germany a larger part of Poland and transferring the majority of Lithuania from the envisioned German sphere to the Soviets. On January 10, 1941, Germany and the Soviet Union then signed a further agreement with more secret protocols modifying the ‘Secret Additional Protocols’ of the German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty to cede a strip of Lithuanian territory to the Soviet Union in exchange for 31.5 million Reichsmarks.

Britain Prepares for War

Meanwhile, in Britain, defence preparations were underway outside Parliament — a statue of Churchill now standing where the sandbagged pillbox once stood.

As far as Hitler was concerned, the Non-Aggression Pact was a tactical manoeuvre to allow him to invade Poland without the fear of Soviet intervention so his message to Stalin on August 25 was somewhat two-faced: ‘On the occasion of your 60th [sic] anniversary, please accept my sincerest congratulations. With this I want to pass my best wishes, good health personally to you, and also happy future to the people of friendly Soviet Union.’ Stalin replied: ‘To the head of the State of Germany, Mr Adolf Hitler. Please accept my appreciation for your congratulations and for your kind wishes to the people of Soviet Union.’ The immediate response by the British Parliament was to pass the sweeping Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, which came into force on August 24. The Act made general provision for the government to prosecuting the war. In particular, it provided for the apprehension, trial, and punishment of persons offending against the regulations and for the detention of persons whose detention appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of the public safety or the defence of the realm. It also authorised the taking of possession or control of any property or undertaking and the power to enter and search any premises. Finally, it provided for amending any enactment, for suspending the operation of any enactment, and for applying any enactment with or without modification. The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1940 extended the 1939 Act for another year, and provided for annual extensions by parliamentary resolution. The Emergency Powers (Defence) (No. 2) Act 1940 enabled the creation of special courts to administer criminal justice in war zones, as well as authorising them to punish offenders for violating the Defence Regulations. The Act was not repealed until March 1959 although the last of the Second World War Defence Regulations did not expire until December 31, 1964.

On September 1, 1939, following a similar arrangement as adopted in the First World War, Chamberlain created a War Cabinet composed of nine men including Winston Churchill who had been out of office for ten years. His inclusion as First Lord of the Admiralty made it logical to include the other service ministers as well. L-R front row: Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary; Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister; Sir Stanley Hoare, Lord Privy Seal; Lord Chatfield, Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. Rear row: Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air; Winston Churchill; Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War; Lord Hankey, Minister without Portfolio.

Another time … another Chancellor … but the same place. This is the main reception/dining room at No. 10 Downing Street.

Sunday, September 3, 1939, ‘This is London. The following official communiqué has been issued from 10 Downing Street: On September 1st, His Majesty’s Ambassador in Berlin was instructed to inform the German Government that unless they were prepared to give His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfil their obligations to Poland. At 9 a.m. this morning, His Majesty’s Ambassador in Berlin informed the German Government that, unless not later than 11 a.m. British Summer Time, today September 3rd, satisfactory assurances to the above effect had been given by the German Government, and had reached His Majesty’s Government in London, a state of war would exist between the two countries as from that hour. His Majesty’s Government are now awaiting the receipt of any reply that may be made by the German Government. The Prime Minister will broadcast to the nation at 11.15. That is the end of the announcement.’

‘I am speaking to you from the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street. This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final Note stating that unless we heard from them by eleven o’clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us.

‘I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.

‘You can image what a bitter blow it is to me that all my long struggle to win peace has failed. Yet I cannot believe that there is anything more, or anything different that I could have done and that would have been more successful.

‘Up to the very last it would have been quite possible to have arranged a peaceful and honourable settlement between Germany and Poland, but Hitler would not have it.

‘He had evidently made up his mind to attack Poland whatever happened, and although he now says he put forward reasonable proposals which were