The German Way of War: A Lesson in Tactical Management

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: Defeat as a Basis for Learning

In 1806, the Prussians suffered a painful defeat by Napoleon’s armies at the Battle of Jena (there were actually two battles, one at Jena and one at Auerstadt). To give an impression of the magnitude of the battle and the effects of the ensuing defeat, the French deployed 121,000 men and the Prussians 117,000, with resultant losses of 12,000 and 38,000 respectively. This defeat had a profound impact. While Prussia lost large parts of its territory and inhabitants to France, perhaps more importantly the loss underlined the need for reform of both the army and the feudal state of Prussia. Reformers such as Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz had fought at Jena, and in the following years they laid the foundations for much needed reforms and sparked the transformation of Prussia into a modern state. Under the leadership of this renewed Prussia, France would eventually be expelled from German territory. It was the starting point of the leading role that Germany would come to play in Europe, a role that it still plays today.

After Jena, contrary to common practice in other armies at the time, the Prussians evaluated in detail the reasons for their defeat. They came to the conclusion that the battlefield was ‘a chaos’. We can imagine this when we consider the sheer number of people fighting in a relatively small area. The Prussians concluded that this chaos doomed every attempt at centralized command and control, since the time lag between messages from the front to the commanders and back again was so great that they were only applicable to the situation of a couple of hours earlier.

The Prussians concluded, in fact, that the battlefield was so complex and unpredictable that using detailed plans and orders actually put them at a serious disadvantage: after the first shots had been fired, plans and orders were immediately irrelevant and did not reflect the reality of battle. Moreover, a commander actually wants his soldiers to react positively to unexpected situations in real time, rather than having to wait for orders. Troops must learn to deal with these situations and the chaos of the battlefield themselves. Very significantly, it is this very chaos that creates the ideal environment for troops to seize the advantage, provided that they have been trained to respond to opportunities. Therefore, if there is no chaos, you must create it to unbalance your opponent. This view was, and is, contrary to that of most army organizations which, then and now, attempt to control the battlefield and the course of the fighting. This Prussian analysis formed the basis of Auftragstaktik, a command concept with highly decentralized decision-making and ample room for initiative.

The evolution of what we now call Auftragstaktik started in 1812, when the rules for infantry were adjusted based on the above analysis; the classic rigid combat formation was replaced by a more flexible one, with units directly under divisional commanders who were given more room to use their own initiative and freedom of thought and action. However, at lower levels in the organization, manoeuvring with large formations of soldiers as one group remained commonplace.

It was a technological change in the middle of the nineteenth century that forced everyone to fundamentally rethink battlefield operations, when the classic musket was replaced by the breech-loading rifle. The speed of fire of the latter and the range at which this fire was effective made manoeuvring in larger formations on the battlefield far more dangerous. This marked the onset of major changes in the way infantry operated and can be regarded as one of the decisive arguments used by the Prussian Army in introducing Auftragstaktik in both depth and breadth in its organization. The Wars of German Unification of 1864 against Denmark, 1866 against Austria and 1870–71 against France confirmed that technological development, not only of weapon systems but also, for example, of the telegraph, had definitively undermined prevailing doctrines and tactics. These new weapons and technologies forced military organizations to split existing formations into ever-smaller units and spread these over an ever-wider area. Army commanders, corps commanders and the commanders of divisions and regiments could no longer physically overlook and control their units, and were thus forced to drastically devolve decision-making to lower echelons. However, the results could be disastrous, as these lower levels of command were not always able to cope with these new responsibilities. It was clear that it was necessary to develop a new command concept that, on the one hand, placed responsibilities and decision-making capabilities lower in the organization while, on the other, guaranteed that the commanders of these units would not take counter-productive decisions.

Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the General Stab (General Staff) from 1857 to 1888, played a decisive role in the development of Auftragstaktik and can be seen as the spiritual father of this new command concept. From him came the dictum, ‘No plan survives the first contact with the enemy’. Von Moltke was a diligent student of Frederick the Great’s campaigns and philosophy, and of military history in general.

‘No plan survives the first contact with the enemy.’

Von Moltke, Chief of Staff, Prussian Army, 1857–87

When he attended the annual Kriegsspiele (war games) of the General Stab in 1858 he was not yet famous; his victories in three wars were in the future. However, he was upset by the slurry of paper and the degree of detail in the orders, because he knew that in war there was no time for such nonsense. In his review of the Kriegsspiele he stated that ‘as a rule an order should only contain what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on his own’; in other words everything else must be left to the discretion of the commander on the spot. In the following decades under von Moltke’s leadership, the Prussians developed a new command concept for their armies, a concept eventually known as Auftragstaktik: Führen durch Aufträge (leading by assignment).

Auftragstaktik, the British way

The British also had a form of decentralized decision making, but in their case based on the inherent hierarchy of their class society. Members of the upper classes could buy an officer’s commission without necessarily knowing anything about war. In practice, this was not a problem, since they gave orders to their ‘best men’ i.e. the professional officers who commanded their companies and who in turn depended on non-commissioned officers (NCOs). These NCOs were professionals who led their units, often consisting of mercenaries, with regard to the limits of the ruling doctrine. These could be adapted because the doctrines differed; for example, that of Hessian soldiers was different from that of Spanish mercenaries.

Auftragstaktik did not evolve without controversy, and the years after 1871 were characterized by a struggle between the ‘moderates’ and the ‘hard-liners’. The first were the adopters of Auftragstaktik who wanted to decentralize decision-making to the lower echelons and preferred independently operating units. The latter were those who wanted to keep command and control centralized, particularly as more modern weapons threatened to disrupt the traditional ways in which troops were controlled. Hard-liners were contemptuous of Auftragstaktik because, in their eyes, it would undermine discipline and thereby put the entire military command and control system at risk. However, its development continued and Auftragstaktik eventually gained a permanent position in the thinking of the imperial army. In 1888 the term was first recorded in the Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie der Königliche Preussischen Armee (exercise regulations for the infantry of the Royal Prussian Army).

The American Civil War (1861–5)

The American Civil War was in every sense a terrible war, with more than 750,000 soldiers and probably as many civilians killed. European military observers were shocked by the way in which both parties fought. On the American battlefields new weapon technologies collided with what were the often archaic tactics of both sides. The observers noted that:

•Cavalry without infantry in a supporting role was used to carry out meaningless charges at enemy lines

•Guns were dispersed across the units, so there was no central fire control, each gun firing at its own discretion

•Bayonets were used as weapons and not, as on the European continent, as deterrents or a means to threaten the opponent’s units until one or the other gave way and beat a retreat. Mobs of men fought each other with bayonets, resulting in large numbers of wounded and killed

Possibly the worst feature was that lines of infantry faced each other in ‘classical’ formations but fired using modern rifles. As a result, row after row of men was hit and fell dead or wounded, only to be replaced by fresh ranks. This resulted in mass slaughter, particularly when the Northerners started using the first rapid-fire repeating rifles.

These observations clearly indicated the consequences if armies did not adapt their doctrine and tactics to new technological realities. They underlined the need for European armies to look for new command and control concepts.

The fact that no plan survives the first contact with the enemy does not mean that plans should not exist. In fact, the opposite is true: planning is a necessary element in war. The reality is that account should always be taken of the need for improvisation by those operating in the front line, where planning and reality meet; in other words, between the command and control system and the harsh reality of the battlefield. Soldiers and local commanders need professional leeway to put formal plans aside when reality requires. This is the nucleus of Auftragstaktik: decision-making wherever an ever-changing reality is most manifest. Von Moltke and others realized that the army leadership was not omniscient. They understood that the complexity of the battlefield necessitated a style of leadership that left room for independent thinking by officers and their men. Thus they placed ‘thinking’ and ‘acting’ at the right level within Auftragstaktik: the level of soldiers and their officers in the front line.

This was in contrast to Befehlstaktik, where ‘thinking’ and ‘acting’ were strictly divided and men only had to follow precise orders. In Befehlstaktik, ‘thinking’ is done by planners at the top of the organization (general staff, army and divisional staff) and ‘acting’ is delegated to the troops in the field. This separation of ‘thinking’ and ‘acting’ makes troops dependent on orders from above and results in extended reaction times in an ever-changing environment.

As a consequence, Auftragstaktik made a clear distinction between the what and the how questions. An order should clearly describe what should be accomplished, for example to take an ultimate target such as a bridge or a hill. How the target should be won was left, however, to the discretion of the commander in the field. This created room for flexibility on the part of the troops in the field. Put another way, there was no ‘one best way’ laid down in a plan, as Befehlstaktik might try to do, but rather ‘many roads leading to Rome’. As a result, the commander and his soldiers in the field could choose the one they wanted to use.

Decentralization in the genes

This new command concept is in the German DNA. Germany as a nation state has had a relatively short existence, only since 1871. The area we now know as Germany comprised for centuries a colourful collection of cities, principalities and kingdoms, totalling more than three hundred entities, each with its own characteristics and legal status. There was no central power, so that all these cities and sovereign states, while having to co-exist and cooperate with each other, also had to learn to stand up for themselves and take their own decisions. In other words, this made for an optimal form of decentralization and individuality.

Until 1806 this combination had formed the Holy Roman Empire, not a state in the modern sense of the word but a political association of worldly or ecclesiastical entities directly or indirectly subject to the Roman-German emperor. Until the Battle at Jena in 1806 this sovereign was almost always the oldest man in the Habsburg dynasty. In addition to this political and administrative reality, the Germans had, as a result of the arrival of Protestantism in 1517, also disconnected themselves from the most centralist organization of that period, the Roman Catholic Church. Luther, in his book Von der Freiheit einer Christenmenschen (On the Freedom of a Christian Man) laid the responsibility for the interpretation of faith on the individual and not the leadership of the Church. This was an early and remarkable form of decentralization of responsibilities in which one took faith in one’s own hands, thereby confirming the strong German tradition of self-reliance.

In this way, the Prussian Army and its successors, the Kaiser Heer, Reichswehr and the Heer as part of the Wehrmacht, were primarily guided by targets and not by the way these targets should be reached. However, it should be remembered that this was in part embedded in the prevailing doctrine, the standard approach for certain situations. This doctrine was nothing more than a basis for further elaboration and allowed for all kind of variations. Although Auftragstaktik was not a licence to act entirely at one’s own discretion, it greatly enhanced the freedom of decision-making at the lower levels of command.

1.1 Auftragstaktik and battlefield performance

A closer examination of Auftragstaktik produces a surprisingly different image of the Prussian and later German Army to the one familiar from books and movies. The authoritative military historian Martin van Creveld rightly points out:

Contrary to the widely held clichés about ‘blind obedience’ or Kadavergehorsamkeit [zombie obedience] and Prussian discipline, the German Army had, at least from the time of Moltke the Elder, emphasized the crucial importance of individual initiative and responsibility, even at the lowest levels.

There are many ways in which a war can be won or lost. With the fundamental willingness to grant subordinates the freedom to act at their own discretion, and with confidence in their professionalism, the Prussians made a quantum leap in thinking about the way a military organization should be managed. They introduced a new paradigm that none of their future adversaries recognized, let alone understood.

In recent decades, Hollywood has created an inaccurate impression of the German soldier by depicting him as a brainless, mechanical creature with stereotypical behaviour, led by unscrupulous officers who do not hesitate to send their men to a certain death. This is a false representation of reality, as the Americans were well aware. Both during and after the Second World War they conducted extensive research into the psychological and sociological dimensions of the Wehrmacht and its modus operandi. In reality, the reverse of the Hollywood version was true. The Americans, or more broadly the Allies, with their bureaucratic planning and rigid operational methods, frequently suffered in confrontations with the more flexible and efficient German forces. As Colonel Trevor Dupuy points out in his book A Genius for War:

The record shows that the Germans consistently outfought the far more numerous Allied armies that eventually defeated them … On a man for man basis the German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 per cent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.

This was true even when the Wehrmacht had seen better days and possibly 80 per cent of Germans divisions (arguably the best ones) were fighting in the east, since the Germans saw the Soviets as the real danger. As a footnote, the higher casualty rate inflicted on the Allies in the Second World War still remained relatively meagre compared with the battlefield performance of the German Army on the Western Front in the Great War. This was an astonishing 225 per cent; in other words, for every German soldier killed or wounded, 2.25 Allied soldiers fell.

Splendid ignorance: relative battlefield performance in the Great War

Battlefield performance and, in particular, relative battlefield performance is an indication of the efficiency of military units. To demonstrate this we might compare two equally strong soccer teams. Two teams of eleven play against each other and, because they are equal in numbers, you might expect that the number of goals they score will approximately balance, although one of them may win in the end. However, you would also expect that if one of the teams has fifteen players, this will be reflected in the final score. If this is not the case, the team with more players has recorded a lower field performance than the other. This can be translated into military organizations in terms of deaths and injuries, and in this way you can calculate what is termed the absolute battlefield performance. If you then take into consideration other factors, for example that one party is fighting from a defensive position, you can calculate what is termed the relative battlefield performance. We know from Dupuy’s calculations that the relative battlefield performance of the Wehrmacht in the last year of the war in the west was 50 per cent higher than that of the Allies. This is already pretty remarkable, taking into account that 80 per cent of the Wehrmacht was fighting on the Eastern Front, often deploying their best units there.

The battlefield performance of the combatants in the First World War is particularly interesting, as initially there was a fairly even balance in men and materiel between the two sides. When calculating performance, however, we must be aware of the fact that while our focus is usually and primarily on the Western Front, we often ignore the fact that the Germans made at least as great an effort in the east. What has been termed ‘The Forgotten War’ cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Germans and Austrians and several million Russians and was the spark that ignited the Russian revolution. It was only after March 1918 that the Germans were able to deploy their troops from the Eastern to the Western Front. Because this war in the east is mostly not taken into account, the differences in numbers of deaths and soldiers involved between the combatants are not really surprising at first sight. There were 13.5 million Germans under arms of whom 1.8 million were killed, 5.7 million Britons with 510,000 killed in France (of a total of 743,000) and 7.9 million Frenchmen with 1.3 million killed. So on the Allied side 1.8 million British and French were killed. In addition, 100,000 Americans were killed from a total of 1 million deployed. Therefore, at first glance, if we compare these figures, there seems to be an even balance, with 1.8 million Germans killed from a force of 13.5 million, and 1.8 million British and French from a force of 13.6 million, without taking the Americans into account.

However, as discussed, the 13.5 million Germans fought on two fronts and, although the exact distribution is unclear, most sources assume the numbers on each were more or less equal. The number of German casualties on the Eastern Front amounted to between 400,000 and 800,000; for the purpose of this calculation, let us call it about 600,000. If we then position about one third of the total number of German troops, namely 4.5 million, on the Eastern Front, a figure lower than mentioned by the sources, this distribution has a dramatic effect on the absolute battlefield performance in the west. Compared with 1.2 million (1.8 million minus 600,000) Germans killed in the west from a force of now 9 million Germans, 13.6 million Allies still counted a loss of 1.8 million killed. Therefore, had the Germans been able to deploy the same number of troops as the Allies, the latter’s casualties would have been 13.6/9 or 1.51 times 1.8 million; in other words, 2.7 million killed. This, when compared with the 1.2 million Germans killed, gives a ratio of 2.7/1.2 or 225 per cent, in other words 2.25 Allied soldiers killed for each German. In such a situation with so many more men, the Germans would probably have killed even more Allies and arguably won the war. Furthermore, as the Germans launched more, and larger, offensives than their adversaries, so their relative battlefield performance was even higher.

If we pursue a scenario in which half of the German Army fought in the east, one that is very likely according to some sources, the battlefield performance escalates dramatically. In this scenario 6.75 million German soldiers fight 13.6 million Allied soldiers, a formula that gives a very clear result: 13.6/6.75 or 2.1 times 1.8 million killed results in 3.78 million Allied soldiers killed versus 1.2 million Germans, a battlefield performance of more than 300 per cent.

The Americans are not taken into account in these figures. During their relatively short period at the front, of little over a year, they lost 10 per cent of their men. The British reached this percentage after some four years of war, the French somewhat earlier. This meant that the Americans had a very low battlefield performance; in other words, they were slaughtered.

In the latter stages of the Second World War the Germans had a relative battlefield performance of 150 per cent, and it is clear that in the earlier years their relative performance was much higher. For instance, at the first encounter between US and German troops in 1943, at Kasserine, the relative battlefield performance was a staggering 500 per cent in favour of the German units involved; for every German soldier injured or killed, five Americans were killed or wounded. This forced the Americans to fundamentally revise their doctrine.

The conclusion must be that only serious mismanagement on the Allied side can explain the difference in relative battlefield performance. These figures are seldom seen in history books because most authors focus on the victors, who tend to write them. Moreover, historians are generally poor mathematicians. In this book we will try to discover why the Prussian/German Army had a much higher battlefield performance and what role Auftragstaktik played in this.

1.2 In search of excellence

To get a grip of the phenomenon of Auftragstaktik we can use a ‘light’ version of the well-known management consultant’s ‘7-S’ model from Peters and Waterman. The pair published this model in 1984 in their book In Search of Excellence and, while some might argue that the model is dated, it is still extensively used today because of its comprehensiveness and strongly analytical character. The model analyzes an organization from seven different angles, each of which starts with an ‘S’, hence the name. These are:

•Strategy

•Structure

•Systems

•Staff

•Style of leadership and operating

•Skills

•Shared values

An added dimension of the 7-S model is the combination of the ‘hard’ elements of the organization (strategy, structure, systems) and ‘soft’ elements (staff, style, skills and shared values). The idea behind the model is that all these elements within an organization are interrelated and influence each other. As a consequence, changing one of the elements will lead to changes in the others. Ideally, the elements should be developed in conjunction with each other on the basis of a shared vision of the organization.

In Search of Excellence: Peters and Waterman

The model of Peters and Waterman was based on a study of success factors in sixty-four organizations. Their research showed that successful organizations keep things simple: a simple structure, simple strategies, simple communications, and so on. Such organizations have the following characteristics:

•Strong action and task-oriented

•Simple structure with limited staff departments

•Constant and intensive contact with customers

•Increased productivity through investing in people

•A high degree of autonomy for various departments to make full use of their entrepreneurship

•Strong emphasis on what the company stands for (its core values)

•Focus on the things the company is good at

•Being at the same time flexible and rigid: hard on achieving targets and accountability, but giving freedom on how to reach these goals

As we will see, this reads much like the guiding principles of the Prussian/German Army; or