Directing the Tunnellers' War: The Tunnelling Memoirs of Captain H Dixon MC RE

Directing the Tunnellers’ War

Directing the Tunnellers’ War

The Tunnelling Memoirs of Captain HR Dixon MC RE

Edited by Phillip Robinson and Nigel Cave

First published in Great Britain in 2020 by

Pen & Sword Military

An imprint of

Pen & Sword Books Ltd

Yorkshire – Philadelphia

Copyright © Phillip Robinson 2020

ISBN 978 1 52671 441 1

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Mobi ISBN 978 1 52671 442 8

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Contents

Editors’ Note

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Note for Official Reader: ‘The Lighter Side of a Tunneller’s Life’

To all Tunnellers and to their Inspector of Mines

Preface

Chapter 1255 Company RE

Chapter 2255 Company RE (continued)

Chapter 3First Days at GHQ

Chapter 4Routine Life at GHQ

Chapter 5Messines and Vimy Ridge

Chapter 6The Art of Uplifting

Chapter 7Minor Incidents of 1917

Chapter 8Passchendale

Chapter 9‘Controllers’ and Others

Chapter 10The GHQ Lines

Chapter 11Odd Jobs and Happenings

Chapter 12Tales That are Told

Chapter 13Mopping Up

Chapter 14Admiralty and Armistice

Chapter 15The Official Historian

Appendix I: Plan Showing Mining Areas on the BEF Front

Appendix II: 255 Tunnelling Company

Appendix III: Composition of 3rd Australian Tunnelling Company as at March 1917

Appendix IV: Extract from 255 Tunnelling Company Weekly Mine Report on 10 November 1916

Appendix V: First Army Report on Mining Situation on Taking Over from the French in the Artois in March 1916

Appendix VI: Nieuport 1917

Appendix VII: Biographical Notes on Selected Personalities

Appendix VIII: Analysis of Tunnelling Companies Fatal Casualties

Glossary

References and Recommendations for Further Reading

Editors’ Note

HR Dixon was evidently of the ‘pepper pot punctuation’ school and we have taken some modest liberties in removing excessive commas and other more glaring grammatical infelicities. He also had a penchant for employing capitals at the beginning of words he thought important and for an extensive use of hyphens, common at the time, which we have adjusted. It was then the practice to use full stops in abbreviations and acronyms (e.g. G.H.Q.) and we have rendered these in the modern form without the stops. Otherwise the text is as written by Dixon. Perhaps most controversially, we have changed his working title to clarify the subject of the book; but, as most authors know, after consultation it is the right of a publisher to decide the title. In the case of Dixon consultation, alas, is not possible.

After some discussion, we decided that the best option for the reader would be to insert editorial commentary in italics in the text. Dixon’s own handwritten annotations are included, but we have indicated when these originate with the author. These comments are inserted either within the text or as a separate paragraph. Appendix VII provides brief biographical notes on many of the personalities mentioned by Dixon. Some of these people are well known, some less so. In some cases a biographical caption has been added to a photograph of the person concerned.

We have also sought to enhance his work with photographs of people and situations to which he refers and diagrams, illustrations and plans covering some of the situations he describes.

The editors have made every effort to trace his descendants to seek their agreement to publication but without success. Despite this, we feel sure that Dixon would approve of the publication of his work, albeit eighty-five years or so late, with its many tributes to the men with whom he shared the perils of the tunnelling war and those with whom he worked at GHQ and elsewhere.

About the man himself we know little. He was probably born in the early 1890s, in China. He joined the army as a private soldier in the Middlesex Regiment, but his skills as an engineer soon had him commissioned in the Royal Engineers and he was working as a training officer in Shorncliffe before the memoirs begin. He was academically inclined; post war he went on to take a doctorate in engineering from Glasgow University. He spent a number of the interwar years in China, mainly engaged in developing the navigation of the Yangtse River. This involved extensive use of explosives, which would doubtless have made someone who enjoyed the nickname ‘Dynamite’ a happy man. He got involved to a limited degree in the civil war that raged in that country by becoming a member of the Shanghai Volunteers, a multi-national volunteer unit that dated back to the 1850s, organized by the Municipality of Shanghai, which was responsible for the internal government of the International Settlement in Shanghai. Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War he rejoined the army full time. Promoted to major, he served as a Royal Engineer in India, latterly as Chief of the Ammunition Inspectorate at Poona, a major Indian Army administrative centre, where he was still working in 1946.

He married in late 1917 and had two sons, one born in 1918 and one in 1922.

NB! An asterisk after a name (first mention only) means that there is an entry on that person in the biographical notes section, Appendix VII.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks are due to Major (retd) Andrew Hawkins MBE, QMG, who converted the original photocopied Dixon manuscript into ‘doc’ text.

We are very grateful to Martin Morton, the son of Captain Herbert Lea Morton of 255 Tunnelling Company, who kindly allowed us to copy all the photographs from his father’s album and from which we have taken most of the photographs of tunnelling officers. Lamentably, the album, sent back to Martin by registered post, was lost by the Royal Mail, a misfortune that he accepted philosophically. Fortunately all the photographs had been scanned, but the moral is to always use Special Delivery for uniquely precious material.

Phillip would like to acknowledge the patience of his wife Mary, who had to bear with his frequent absence in his study and also from some social events whilst working on this book.

Introduction

The Lighter Side of a Tunneller’s Life is an unpublished memoir of the First World War experiences of Captain Herbert Ridley Dixon MC.

After a period serving as an officer of 255 Tunnelling Company RE, interrupted by a few months with the 23rd Divisional Tunnelling Company, he was transferred towards the end of 1916, in all likelihood in August or September (he is not specific about the date), to the staff of Brigadier General (later Major General) Harvey∗, the Inspector of Mines at the BEF GHQ at Montreuil-sur-Mer.

In March 1916 this small, sleepy town, perched on high ground and surrounded by ancient defensive walls that had been renovated and modernized by Vauban in the late seventeenth century, was transformed into a hive of activity when Haig moved GHQ there from St Omer. The reason for this move was the extension in March 1916 of the British line southwards, replacing the intervening French Tenth Army. Thereafter the BEF’s line ran continuously from north of Ypres to the northern heights of the Somme. The move to Montreuil-sur-Mer (in reality, by 1914, well away from the sea) had relatively good transport links despite lacking a railway station; whilst its centralised position to both the front and the supply bases, coupled with extensive accommodation, the basis of which lay in the École Militaire, made the new location a sensible choice. It was a small place – yet big enough to accommodate the substantial administrative machine that was required to keep an army that would soon approach 2,000,000 men in the field. Surrounded by walls that provided a clear perimeter and could be held securely, access to and egress from the town could be readily controlled by guards at the two entrance gates. GHQ was to remain there until the end of the war; though it should be stressed that, during a major offensive in a particular sector, GHQ established an Advanced Headquarters for key staff as the operational situation required – for the Somme, for example, at Val Vion and later Haig also used a train to position himself close to the relevant part of the front.

Dixon’s posting to Montreuil was as an Assistant Inspector of Mines. His initial role was to handle plans and records; but in time he was appointed as one of the small group of junior, but experienced, officers who operated as the eyes and ears of the Inspector of Mines.

GHQ had a large number of junior officers from all arms who operated in a similar fashion. The Assistant Inspectors of Mines regularly visited all levels of the tunnelling command, from Army HQs down to the tunneling units at the front and elsewhere. All of these officers had experience with a tunnelling company in the field under their belt: in other words they had a very good understanding of the complex issues and problems at the front, many of which were unique to tunnellers. Their reports enabled the Inspector of Mines to comprehend fully what was happening at the front and in the intermediate commands between it and GHQ. This greatly facilitated coordination and through directives, technical advice and tactical notes, dissemination of lessons learned and best practice. In this way the experience gained by the men engaged against the enemy directly and their conclusions from particular actions or incidents, was passed up the line by those who understood the realities of this specialist type of warfare. In turn this led to various types of Army schools (each Army had its own mining school) in France to train tunnellers in a range of activities, such as the use of the latest rescue gear. At its peak, in mid 1916, the BEF probably had about 35,000 men engaged in the underground war, including infantry who were permanently attached to tunnelling companies as required. Personal communication like this provided direct contact between an officer commanding, say, a company of tunnellers working under Vimy Ridge, and the directing masters many miles away at Army HQs or GHQ. It was an important supplement to relying on written reports.

The Tunnelling Companies were almost entirely officered by non regulars; there were only two regular Sappers by the end of the war, one of whom was the General Inspector of Mines. They formed a relatively small group within the huge officer corps that the BEF had by 1916, so a knowledge of individuals played an important role in developing confidence in the command structure within tunnelling. One of the most important outcomes of the frequent visits from higher command (the Controller of Mines, responsible for mining at Army level, would also have his own team of junior officers, though at best only a couple of them) was to identify potential commanding officers for a tunnelling company – and in turn to assess their efficiency. Dixon’s job at GHQ, which initially he held in the lowly rank of lieutenant but later as temporary captain, explains the wide range of his experiences during the war. His service was distinguished enough to merit the award of the MC in the King’s Birthday Honours of 1918.

From early and primitive beginnings, the British army’s engagement in mine warfare became increasingly complex. The war underground played a considerable role in the fighting along much of the length of the Western Front, starting almost as soon as the line stabilised in the winter of 1914 and reached its zenith in June 1917 with the blowing of nineteen mines along Messines Ridge. Mining had been an operational tool in the most recent major war, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905; the Great War was to take it to new levels.

Given how quickly the Western Front evolved into static warfare, commencing offensive action underground was a logical operational tactic to employ, especially given the relative paucity of heavy artillery (and shells for the guns) at this early stage in the war. The different armies organised themselves to manage their mining operations in surprisingly different ways: an indication that no-one had anticipated tunnelling operations on any great scale. Although each of the major combatant armies had considered the possibility of tunnelling and made some reference to it in the tasking for their engineers in pre war directives, none of them was prepared for the scale of the tunnelling effort that grew so rapidly from December 1914. Given that there was no experience of this type of warfare amongst the combatants, the organization of tunnelling activity in the German and allied armies evolved rapidly through experience.

During the Great War the capability of Britain’s tunnellers became technically highly developed in a remarkably short space of time. It is an early example of the willingness of the commanders of the BEF (and even the War Office) to adapt to the realities of the battlefield and the new challenges that faced the combatants. Although pre-war the Royal Engineers had studied tunnelling, and in 1907 had actually undertaken some experimental work, the reality was that in 1914 there were no units designated to the purpose. In any event the field companies were fully committed to other essential engineer tasks. However, both the Germans and the French had been quick to take up offensive mining once the line stagnated at the end of 1914 and impromptu efforts were taken at brigade and divisional levels to counter developing German mining operations on the British sector. However, as the threat from German mining operations against the British line continued to grow through the early winter of 1914–15 the need to develop a counter capability became quickly apparent. It was then that the forceful personality of Major Norton Griffiths∗, already in France, came into play. A dynamic engineer, an entrepreneur with wide experience of major projects in Britain and elsewhere in the world, and a Member of Parliament, he had urged the recruiting of civilian miners for the war effort as early as the beginning of December 1914.

The Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, with whom Norton Griffiths had become well acquainted during the Boer War, summoned him to the War Office in January 1915. At a subsequent meeting in early February it was agreed that specialist Tunnelling Companies would be created under the Royal Engineers’ cap badge. Within the same month the nucleus of 170 Tunnelling Company had been formed and was undertaking operations in France. Manning these specialist companies, given the urgency of the situation, involved urgent recruiting and deployment of miners and other tunnelling specialists such as those working on excavating great sewerage systems. They brought a wealth of experience, not only of coal and mineral mining as one might expect, but also of working in a variety of geological conditions, not least clay, which reflected the geology of much of Flanders. (A source of contention was the specialist rates of pay that experienced miners and specialists such as Clay Kickers received, much more than their infantry or sapper equivalents.)

Officers were found with civil and, particularly, mining engineering knowledge and thus a substantial number of its officer corps were experienced engineers who had returned from the various far flung corners of the empire, as well as in developing economies such as South America. Civil mining techniques were quickly adapted to the battlefield situation and the mixed geology over which the war was fought. Specialists were brought in to advise the military. What was effectively a new branch of the army was swiftly created from scratch. By the beginning of 1916, as the mining war grew in intensity, and the number of formed tunnelling companies expanded, an effective command structure had been established, along with several training schools. Despite some set backs, within eighteen months of being first formed the Royal Engineer and Dominion tunnellers largely achieved dominance over the enemy across much of the BEF front. The British system, which developed from localized efforts at divisional level to the formation of the first tunnelling company in February 1915, soon placed mining operations under the responsibility of each Army (whose number gradually grew to five by mid 1916). The Army tunnelling staff had to coordinate, initiate and develop mining operations within their Army area. The task of the Inspector of Mines at GHQ was to set out an overview of mining tasks to each Army, to issue training manuals and develop best practice (in turn disseminated in Army Mining Schools of various types), to present at GHQ the case for the role of mining in the planning of operations – usually expressed through the office of the Engineer in Chief at GHQ – and to manage available resources, most notably in the form of the allocation of tunnelling companies to the individual Armies.

Mining operations were at their peak in 1915 and 1916 on the Western Front; the opening of the Battle of Messines on 7 June 1917 turned out to be the last great blast of major mining operations, at least as such things are generally understood, on the BEF’s front. It was a complex, technically challenging war conducted underground, often a cat and mouse situation in which the two sides tried to outmanoeuvre each other, punctuated by mighty blasts in the front line area and a nerve-wracking experience for all concerned. The tunnellers (and large numbers of infantry that were attached to them for greater or lesser periods of time) often worked in challenging geological conditions, cramped, in poor air and with very little concern for safety; often they laboured under the risk of counter strokes by the enemy in the form of camouflet mines. The infantry above them were never enthusiastic about being in a mining area. Although mines that were fired as part of an offensive are well known – think of the blowing of the Hawthorn, Lochnagar and Y Sap Mines as part of the opening of the Somme offensive on 1 July 1916 – in certain parts of the line they were almost a daily routine. This was the case in Belgian and French Flanders in 1915 and 1916, along Vimy Ridge for much of the summer of 1916; and on the Somme front along Redan Ridge, in front of La Boisselle, at Fricourt and before Dompierre, south of the river for much of 1915 and the first months of 1916. It was no less intense along the French front, where substantial operations took place in the Argonne, most notably at Vauquois, but also in the western part of the forest from the earliest days of stagnant warfare to late 1916 and into 1917. The list goes on.

By mid July 1916 the BEF had available thirty-two tunnelling companies (twenty-five ‘Imperial’, three Canadian, three Australian and one New Zealand, plus a specialist technical Australian Company). A Portuguese tunnelling company came under the control of the BEF in 1917. The companies generally had a higher proportion of officers to men than in other units – usually about nineteen officers to four or five hundred tunnellers. However, tunnelling companies often had large numbers of infantry attached, be it as temporary labour or semi-permanent (the distinction was important, as ‘attached’ infantry would usually become the rationing and administrative responsibility of the unit to which they were attached), and the effective strength of a tunnelling company sometimes comprised up to a thousand men. We have produced the tables for the composition of two different tunnelling companies, taken a few months apart, in Appendices II and III.

As regards casualties, identification of tunnellers can be very difficult, with the complication of attached or temporarily attached infantry to be considered as well. The post-war Tunnellers Old Comrades Association lists