The Transformation of Capacity in International Development: Afghanistan and Pakistan (19772017)

The Transformation of Capacity in International Development

The Transformation of Capacity in International Development

Afghanistan and Pakistan (1977–2017)

Avideh K. Mayville

Anthem Press

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Copyright © Avideh K. Mayville 2020

The author asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work. All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019952769

ISBN-13: 978-1-78527-155-7 (Hbk)

ISBN-10: 1-78527-155-5 (Hbk)

This title is also available as an e-book.

This book is dedicated to my parents, who devoted their lives to making my dreams possible and for allowing me to think that getting a PhD was a normal thing to do. I would never have achieved anything in life if it were not for your love, support, encouragement, and belief in my abilities. I have been so lucky to have you both. This is your accomplishment.

CONTENTS

List of Figures

Acknowledgments

Chapter One Introduction

Introduction

USAID Vaccination Campaign or CIA Plot?

Case Background

Methodology

Overview of Chapters

Impact and Conclusion

Chapter Two Development Agendas and Donor Spaces: How Capacity Gained Salience

Modernization and the Birth of Development: Security, Human Rights, and the Discursive Emergence of Capacity

Expertise and the Tensions of Development Knowledge Production

Traditional Donor Systems and the Development Space

The Globalization of the Donor Architecture and the Salient Obscurity of Capacity

Summary and Conclusion

Chapter Three Capacity in Development Policy and Practice: The Quest for Performance Excellence in the Governance of Disabling Environments

Capacity: Basic Definitions and Attributes

Sites of Capacity Development

Contexts and the Tensions between Processes and Ownership

USAID Frameworks and Methodologies on Capacity

Summary and Conclusion

Chapter Four Capacity and Fragility: The Sociological Framework for the Capacity Project and Developing Fragile States

Themes of Capacity: State Power, Community, and Social Capital

Fragility and the Role of the State, in Theory and in Practice

USAID and Counterinsurgency Operations in Fragile States

Capacity: The Remedy for Fragility

Taking a HRBA? Counterinsurgency and USAID’s Approach to Fragility

Summary and Conclusion

Chapter Five The Capacity Project in AfPak: Development Experiments, Subnational Spaces, and Transnational Networks

Territorial Vagabonds and the System of States

Battle for Hegemony: The Early Decades of Development (1950–1980)

Donors or Invaders? Development Under Occupation and the Architecture of Civilian–Military Development

Transnational Networks of Resistance and Building Local Capacity

Network Transformation During the 1990s

The Globalization of Transnational Networks Post-9/11

Summary and Conclusion: The Problem of Existing Networks and State Capacity

Chapter Six The Battle for Power in Disabling Environments: Statecraft and Developing Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Donor Statecraft and State Planning Schemes: Building Social Capital in Disabling Environments

Statecraft in Practice: USAID and the Donor Community in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Provision of Services

Facilitating Trade and Economic Opportunity

Security and Rule of Law

Political Processes and Institutions

Human Rights Approaches within Statecraft

Conclusion

Chapter Seven Developing Capacity to Manage Global Threats: Statemaking, the Militarization of Development, and Human Rights Approaches

The Transformation of Capacity in Donor Spaces

Relationships of Development: Capital, Autonomy, and Recipient Ownership

Recipient State Networks and the Scale of Donor Operation

Responding to Transnational Militancy: Crafting the State and Militarizing Development

Considering Human Rights and Security in Development: Recommendations and Next Steps for Scholars and Practitioners

References

Index

FIGURES

2.1 Spaces and Actors of Knowledge Production on Development

2.2 Donor Systems in the Development Space

2.3 OECD/DAC Member States

2.4 Discursive Phases of Development Concepts

2.5 Primary Areas of Donor Collaboration

3.1 Definitions of Capacity, Capacity Building, and Capacity Development

3.2 Capacity Requirements for Emerging Market Economies

3.3 Factors of Performance

3.4 HICD Model (Expanded)

3.5 HICD Model (Condensed)

3.6 USAID HICD Framework: Capacity Development as Performance Management

5.1 Afghanistan Boundary Transformation and Conflict Map (1849–Present)

5.2 Ethnic Population Distribution Map of Afghanistan and Pakistan

5.3 Pashtun Tribal Population Map

5.4 Post-9/11 Development–Security Nexus

5.5 PRT Models

5.6 Leaders of the Peshawar Seven

5.7 Cold War Transnational Networks of Resistance

5.8 Sources of the Taliban Network

5.9 Post-9/11 Networks of Resistance

5.10 Major Transnational Insurgent Networks in Pakistan

6.1 Web of Donor Statecraft

6.2 Statecraft: Developing State Infrastructure

6.3 Statecraft and Capacity Development of the Enabling Environment

7.1 Phases of Capacity Transformation

7.2 Spaces and Scales of Operation

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am truly lucky to have had so many great mentors, teachers, and fundamentally incredible humans inspiring me to commit my life to learning, scholarship, and service. I would like to thank some of them here.

From preschool to college: Ms. Peggy Sanford, Ms. Lane, Mrs. Torpy, Mrs. Kerri Cook, Ms. Allison Bailey, Mrs. Linda Holloway, Mr. Seth DeRose, and Mrs. Christy Edgar. You have devoted your lives not only to your subjects but also to the potential and mess of unfiltered youth. Thank you for being the first teachers who made a difference in my life.

To the faculty at St. Mary’s College of Maryland—a truly magical place of undergraduate learning by the river. Dr. Michael J. G. Cain, thank you for being my first real mentor, encouraging my curiosity, making me feel like my questions mattered, and for not letting me get away with surface-level answers. Dr. Dustin Howes—may you rest in peace. You brought a passion into the classroom, a creativity toward your discipline, and a commitment toward your students that I seek to emulate in my own career. Dr. Sahar Shafqat—for demonstrating the importance of activism as a scholar. Dr. Kate Norlock—the funniest philosopher I have ever met. Dr. Iris Ford—it is ironic that my first introduction to sociology was from an anthropologist!

Thank you to the IPCR faculty in the School of International Service at American University (AU) who have dedicated their lives to peace. Dr. Abdul Aziz Said—the legend who has inspired generations, myself included—your wisdom made the pursuit of knowledge mystical. Dr. Anthony Wanis St. John, who stepped in near the end of my time at AU and became an unexpected mentor as I raced to finish my thesis.

Thank you to my doctoral committee who were instrumental in the development of this project. Dr. Agnieszka Paczynscka and Dr. Lester Kurtz—your feedback has been critical in making my work stronger. Dr. John G. Dale: you are the model of mentor, teacher, researcher, critic, scholar, practitioner, leader, colleague, facilitator, mediator, and friend that I will forever strive to emulate in my life and career. I have no idea how you do it all. Thank you for investing your time in me as I’ve found my voice as a scholar. I will be forever grateful for your insight and guidance, particularly as I navigated a complex topic during a trying time in my life.

My ACP family—who bore witness my early mornings and cheered me on throughout the trials and turmoil involved in the construction of this beast.

Thank you also to Dr. Mark Frezzo, the editor of this series, for being a true colleague in helping me to navigate the book publishing world. Your guidance has been invaluable and the future of young scholars (and of scholarship) depends on the mentorship of those who have walked the path before us. I also thank the reviewers who provided feedback on this manuscript before publication.

Finally, I think it is important to acknowledge the artists of sound whose rhymes and melodies fueled me through many days of reading, writing, coding, note taking, figure drawing, head wringing, and exasperated dance breaks: Oddisee, Jamiroquai, Basement Jaxx, Daft Punk, Grace Jones, Gil Heron, Hiromi, Lloyd Miller, Breakbot, Flight Facilities, Flamingosis, Nightmares on Wax, and countless others.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

USAID often engages with governments that lack the capacity for full country ownership (my emphasis), even if there is political will to address development challenges fomenting violent extremism and/or insurgency. In other places, capacity may exist, but demonstrated political will is lacking. Ultimately, USAID must leverage and further develop local capacity and good governance principles, such as transparency and accountability, to respond to drivers of violent extremism and/or insurgency.—USAID Policy Task Team (PTT) publication, The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency. (USAID 2011a, 10)

Capacity development remains one of the most slippery and unsatisfactory concepts in development—a refuge for the scoundrel, as one colleague recently noted. There is no agreed definition, there is no formal academic body of knowledge discussing it and there are no university courses teaching it. (Tesky 2011, 44)

Introduction

Much of the aid to developing countries in recent decades has fallen under the broad umbrella of building capacity. Buzzwords such as capacity building and capacity development have permeated the development discourse and are employed in a variety of ways, typically identified as an issue, a need, and a solution to the challenges of growth and progress. Furthermore, the wide-ranging and all-encompassing nature of the usage of the term capacity obscures how exactly it is manifested in projects. For this reason, there is a need for clarification of the concept of capacity, in both its theoretical origins and the way in which it has been applied as a project of development.

With this aim in mind, this project explores a particular case of the transformation of capacity as a concept and a practice within international development, tracing the relationship between this transformation and the rise of transnational militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I situate my analysis of this transformation through a close examination of the policies and projects to build capacity in these two countries between 1977 and 2017, implemented by the largest institutional donor driving them—the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

As we near the end of the second decade in this new century, the donor community faces significant global security challenges. In spite of a concentrated so-called Global War on Terror, global terrorism continues to threaten the livelihoods of individuals, communities, and the system of states. As these security challenges become more complex, so does development. Nearly eighty years removed from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this century is also marked by a greater call for the integration of human rights approaches to development practice by the major development institutions. This project examines the transformation of capacity within this context—amid a world increasingly defined by growing global security concerns and greater calls for human rights approaches to development.

This research tackles a complex web of questions. First of all, what is capacity? How and why has it gained salience in the donor discourse on development and what does its emergence show us about the transformation of development projects and donor methods? Furthermore, does the transformation of the concept actually reveal changes in USAID’s frameworks for development? If not, what does capacity mask?

Considering the cases of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must also ask, what does this transformation show us about human rights approaches to development, particularly in the context of development in so-called fragile or failed states? Can we determine a relationship between the continued efforts of donors to build capacity and the rise of transnational Islamic militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan? Why do capacity development efforts fail, particularly in so-called fragile state contexts, and what implications does this failure have on the relationships and networks surrounding development and transnational militancy and on the relevance and legitimacy of the state? Finally, what does USAID’s efforts to build capacity reveal about how donors attempt to craft the state? How does this empirical example inform our sociological understanding of statebuilding processes and the role and function of the development agency within the context of bilateral relationships?

I argue that capacity is actually a discursive tool of statemaking that reveals the flow of international and transnational power in the construction and circumvention of the state—as a site for the intersection of globalization and capitalist development. My research also sheds light on the discursive significance and function of major development concepts as they relate to competing narratives and agendas within Western frameworks for progress. This project exposes the tensions in donor discourses and agendas on the cultivation of markets, prioritization of human rights, and concerns over security threats as they coalesce under the umbrella of development and are obscured through the language of capacity.

I also specifically ask what the relationship is between the transformation of capacity and the rise of the security–development nexus in donor activity and transnational militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan over the past forty years. I argue that donors fail to recognize their role in relationships of development within project methodology designed to build capacity and superficially conceive of how to construct relationships and networks for sustained centralized governance. This argument is significant because it is central to understanding how donor efforts at statebuilding and counterinsurgency fundamentally fail as donors attempt to build capacity through superficially and ideologically conceiving of relationships and networks of power.

In this introductory chapter, I begin by providing a brief background on my case selection and conclude with an overview of my methodology and introduction to the chapters that follow. However, before diving into the background of this case, I highlight the following story not only to display and illuminate the tension between donor objectives for global security and development but also to provide some context for the challenges facing USAID and other donors in the development of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

USAID Vaccination Campaign or CIA Plot?

On September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden planned and executed an act of terrorism against the United States that spawned a new era in global politics and US foreign policy: the so-called Global War on Terror. After the Taliban refused to hand over bin Laden, the United States led an international coalition of military forces into Afghanistan. This manhunt turned into a two-decades-long war that saw the rise of new forms of collaboration, cooperation, and integration of international military, humanitarian, and development efforts. On May 2, 2011, a decade after the 9/11 attacks, US Special Operations forces penetrated Pakistani airspace from a base in Afghanistan and assassinated Osama bin Laden in his home in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Chased out of Afghanistan by coalition forces, bin Laden had eventually settled in Abbottabad, located in the heart of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (a province of Pakistan in the tribal belt near Afghanistan) less than a mile from Pakistan’s top military academy (Sherwell 2011), begging questions about how such a high-profile and wanted militant leader could go unnoticed by the government of Pakistan (GOP).

Following bin Laden’s assassination, the GOP commissioned a report investigating the events surrounding (1) the failure of Pakistan to capture bin Laden on their own soil and (2) the events surrounding his assassination by US Special Operations forces. The report, subsequently known as the Abbottabad Report, was leaked to the media by Al Jazeera in 2013. The report recommended trying Dr. Shakil Afridi, a Pakistani doctor and district health officer of Khyber Agency who had worked with Save the Children on a USAID-funded vaccination campaign program in the areas near Abbottabad, for treason (Abbottabad Commission 2013, 110–14). Why was this local doctor and aid worker to be tried for treason? Nine days before the assassination, Dr. Afridi had visited the compound in which bin Laden and his family were in hiding and, while turned away at the door, was able to obtain a name to contact the head of the household so that he could return to complete the vaccinations (ibid., 115). This name happened to belong to bin Laden’s courier, which when identified by CIA agents led to the attack and subsequent assassination the following week (Mullaney and Hassan 2015).

In the report, Dr. Afridi claimed while being interrogated that he was recruited by the CIA through USAID (Abbottabad Report 2013, 115). Whether or not the CIA had actually infiltrated USAID or Save the Children is contested and unknown, but claims that the CIA manipulated a vaccination campaign for intel gathering seriously angered public health experts in the United States who worried this incident would cause a rise in local suspicion toward aid workers in other developing countries. In the tribal regions of Pakistan, there is already considerable hostility to vaccination campaigns, where some village imams claim that polio vaccines are a part of a Western plot to sterilize Pakistani Muslims. In January 2013, the deans of 12 public health schools wrote a letter to the Obama administration demanding that it cease using health workers in covert operations, citing the resurgence of polio in Pakistan—to which the CIA agreed to comply. Meanwhile, the Taliban has a death warrant out for Afridi. He is now top of our list, Pakistan Taliban spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan said, gruesomely adding, We will cut him into pieces when and where we manage to reach him (Sayah 2012).

I present this example as it demonstrates how US counterterrorism priorities took precedence and also manipulated development project activities. This incident not only was damaging to the ability of any group to conduct public health campaigns in rural areas (consider that while he was an international healthcare worker, Dr. Afridi was also a local resident of the areas he worked in) but also increased stigma and suspicion around aid workers and development activity. In examining the capacity-building efforts of USAID in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I explore these nuances surrounding the donor challenge of development and the rise of transnational militancy. I do so to show that donor efforts to build capacity in these contexts are extremely delicate and are contingent upon building relationships and networks based on trust and the cultivation of a shared framework for development.

Case Background

The empirical basis for this project consists of an examination of USAID’s work in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Why USAID? As a government development agency that has been in existence since the 1960s, USAID occupies a unique role in the international development space. It has existed and evolved through cycles of development discourse, from the initial thrust of modernization with industrialization and poverty reduction tactics to structural adjustment and global market integration. Following the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944, the United States led the charge on international development and aid. As a US foreign policy tactic, aid was fashioned not only to combat the perceived threat of communism—to reduce poverty and facilitate the development of Third World states—but also to prevent the spread of communism and create foreign markets for the United States to increase capitalist production and the profitability of US-based corporations. Part of this process resulted in the establishment of three organizations in the 1950s that would eventually converge to unite as the USAID in 1961 (2017e). While now many countries have their own national development agencies, the scale of USAID’s operations is unparalleled, in part due to the United States’ investment in the agency as furthering foreign policy interests.

USAID is also uniquely situated in Afghanistan and Pakistan. During the Cold War and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, USAID’s activity provided a vantage point from which to deepen the understanding of the United States’ relationship to Pakistan, its attempts to contain the spread of communism, and the nascent beginnings of a budding nexus of military and development activities. After September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States conjured an international military coalition to hunt Osama bin Laden in the War on Terror and invaded Afghanistan. As a consequence, USAID and other development agencies embarked on the coordination of an unprecedented effort to reconstruct and develop the capacity of the Afghan state in a struggle to contain the spread of Islamic global militancy that continues to this day.

Most institutions of development present their approaches to Afghanistan and Pakistan separately, as distinct states, or as part of the Middle East or South Asian region. USAID designates Afghanistan and Pakistan together as its own special region, alongside Europe and Eurasia and the Middle East. USAID explicitly states that the countries are vital to US national security and cite the security and governance challenges in each country as reasons for sustained efforts in development. In this way, their institutional approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan is unique and explicitly linked to US foreign policy interests. While this blatantly political logic may not raise eyebrows among practitioners, it still raises important questions about the nature of projects of capacity as projects of development assistance are inextricably linked to foreign policy interests.

Afghanistan and Pakistan share fundamental challenges as states; their past, present, and future are inextricably linked. The colonial demarcation of their shared border by the British has fomented and complicated ethnic and tribal conflicts that inherently disrupt efforts to adapt to the territoriality of a state system. In the border regions, tribal affiliations and loyalties take precedence over ethnicity-based or nationalist sentiments unless threatened by foreign invasion, serving as a continual source of conflict and a hotbed of global insurgent activity. The internal state dynamics of each country are complex and volatile and impact the politics and internal conflict dynamics of the other. It has been over a century since Afghanistan has been spared from foreign military intervention, with central rule shifting largely among warring Pashtun and also Tajik tribes. The state of Pakistan, parts of which used to fall under undemarcated territory between British India and Afghanistan, has spent much of its existence negotiating the role of the military in the central government, with enduring Punjab dominance.

Pakistan has been relying on foreign aid to meet public expenditures and to build infrastructure and institutional capacity of the state since its inception (Shirazi et al. 2010, 853). With the exception of the period of Taliban rule in the 1990s, Afghanistan has remained dependent on donor regimes, replicating the cycle of aid dependence the country experienced during the Soviet period (Minkov and Smolynec 2010). Yet, from the Cold War and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to the US-led War on Terror after 9/11, the centralization and expansion of state authority has remained an elusive objective for the foreign invaders and donors seeking to manage threats in the region.

As an ideological battleground between communism and capitalism, Islamic fundamentalism and liberal democracy, Afghanistan and Pakistan have become home to transnational insurgency networks whose objectives are global in reach and whose agendas and activities over the years have involved collusion with donor agencies and organizations, foreign governments, as well as the central government and militaries of both countries. These relationships have developed convoluted networks and structures that provide incentives for opportunism and have resulted in pervasive and chronic systemic state corruption. Furthermore, the continuous situation of conflict, particularly during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, facilitated an Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan that strengthened and granted legitimacy to transnational networks and infrastructure circumventing the state, providing an ideal site from which insurgent groups can carry out agendas against the central governments of both countries and foreign governments. Donors that seek to build capacity for the purpose of expanding the reach and legitimacy of governing institutions face significant challenges in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Furthermore, the prevalence of transnational militant networks built upon Pashtunwali, a cultural and social code that places value on autonomy, loyalty, hospitality, and revenge, fundamentally challenges the attempted expansion and reach of centralized state institutions. The reality of transnational militancy, sustained by such groups as the Taliban and Haqqani Network, has led to a situation where development assistance efforts in many cases require partnering with state military or security forces, foreign governments, or local militias. This complicates development project efforts to build capacity and compromises the cultivation of local ownership of the very institutions that donors seek to build (Goodhand and Sedra 2010, 595). Often the poorest areas of the country, which are also those least affected by insurgency, are overlooked as candidate sites for programs, and the decisions to allocate development assistance—usually to areas that are prone to insurgency—are politically motivated. This increasing role of foreign militaries in development initiatives supports a rescue industry, in which security becomes a prerequisite for development activities (Ryerson 2012, 68). In Chapter 5, I highlight the history of USAID’s efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, situating foreign-led development during the Cold War alongside the transformation of Islamic and Marxist insurgencies into transnational militant networks of today, as well as the implications this example has for donors’ capacity-building efforts.

These convoluted and polluted hierarchies of loyalty prevent centralized state institutions from gaining a foothold, commanding loyalty and establishing legitimacy in subnational environments. Particularly in Afghanistan (which harbors a greater degree of fragmentation than Pakistan), nationalist sentiments have historically only successfully been invoked to unify warring groups to dispel foreign invaders under the banner of Islam (though the face of this banner has not been consistent over time) (Blatt et al. 2009, 20; 25–6). However, this nationalism (if it can accurately be called that) in Afghanistan has historically been divorced from the centralization of institutions. A culture of autonomy is fundamental to tribal existence, and this point is key in framing the donor challenge of building the capacity of a central government to manage power dynamics and threats of transnational militancy. I unpack these messy issues in Chapter 5 to explore the core of the capacity problem facing donors, particularly in relation to states battling transnational militancy.

Methodology

This book exposes and deconstructs the transformation of the capacity project within the development discourse, illuminating the relationship between human rights, security, insurgency, terrorism, and the development of so-called fragile states. I take an inductive approach and carry out this task through a discursive institutional analysis of development projects, focusing on the USAID in Afghanistan and Pakistan as a case study. The agency’s initiatives provide a wide-angled empirical wellspring of project and policy literature from which to examine the donor community’s attempts to build capacity.

My objectives in this project are fourfold:

1. reveal the narratives behind the capacity project, as well as the forces behind the transformation of the concept in theory and in practice;

2. examine donor methodologies that set the framework for integrating capacity development into development projects;

3. contextualize the donor capacity project in states harboring transnational militant groups; and

4. examine the reach (and limits) of donor operation to build capacity within subnational spaces.

This discursive institutional analysis of capacity involves an examination of donor discourses. Donor discourse occurs within many spaces and scales of operation. Much discursive institutional analysis is used as an analytical tool to shed light on institutions and processes of institutionalization. Indeed, this project does shed light on the development institution itself and processes of knowledge production within development institutions. However, this type of discursive analysis focuses not merely on USAID as an institution or specific process of institutionalization but on how a concept gains salience both within and among a set of diverse cooperative institutions and stakeholders.

Through this process of gaining salience, the relationships, networks, and tensions of power become exposed at varying scales—in global agenda-setting processes, in implementing global agendas within institutional policies and methodologies, and in project implementation. Further, an examination of how a major development concept gains salience illuminates the distance (and overlap) between donor and recipient spaces of discourse and operation. A discursive deconstruction of capacity also reveals the variation in how major concepts are interpreted within institutional frameworks and the tension caused by this discursive diversity in how donors, military, and other stakeholders coordinate the implementation of programs in the development of so-called fragile states in situations of terrorism and insurgency.

The sample of documents I selected and reviewed is wide-ranging, but most pertain to USAID programming in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 1977 and 2017. I examined documents produced by USAID, private contractors, and consulting firms, as well as implementing partners on USAID projects and initiatives. My sample includes activity/project/program overviews, annual reports, assessments, audit reports, design and implementation plans, evaluations/final evaluation reports, periodic reports, reports to Congress, and strategic planning documents. My initial selection included 761 documents, 189 of which I physically copied and converted into PDF format from USAID’s physical archives at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) of the United States, located at the University of Maryland, College Park, and 572 downloaded from the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) online.

The DEC is "USAID’s institutional memory, spanning over 50 years; including documents, images, video and audio materials (DEC 2017)." With the passage of ADS Chapter 540 in 2012, it became required for all documents and development assistance activity descriptions produced or funded by USAID to be submitted for inclusion in the DEC database, making it the largest online resource of USAID-funded technical and programmatic documentation (USAID 2012a). The DEC is housed under USAID’s Knowledge Services Center. I reduced this sample further for analysis, and I discuss this process as well as the parameters of my selection throughout this book, particularly in Chapter 6 on USAID’s statecraft in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

This lengthy process of document selection was largely one of familiarizing myself with the nature of the literature available, as well as the scope of programming and projects over the years of USAID activity. I proceeded in this way also to ensure that, first of all, in the course of my own analysis, I would be better able to situate the stylistic and formulaic attributes of USAID’s institutional discourse surrounding the notions and usage of capacity and, secondly, that my selection of documents covered a representative range of projects. From the sample I collected, I further reduced my selection to roughly 200 documents for a more thorough review and coded 94 using NVivo textual analysis software. Nevertheless, given the nuanced nature of my research objectives, I conducted my analysis of this coded data manually. I created spreadsheets to track the selection of projects, as well as specific project activities, assumptions behind projects and activities, justifications for projects, needs identified (both donor and beneficiary), impediments to project success, objectives, outcomes, donor agenda/strategy, donor shortcomings, and recipient framing surrounding the concept of capacity in the project literature.

There are two important aspects to note about the documents I reviewed. First, the sample skews largely toward programming after 9/11. I rely heavily on bilateral assistance program evaluations and assessments for projects during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and more on evaluations and reports on specific projects post-2000. There are a few reasons for this. The sheer scope of assistance is much greater post-2000 than it was during the 1980s, paralleling the globalization of the architecture of the donor space and due to the (donor-identified) need for development in Afghanistan post-ISAF invasion in order to prevent a Taliban resurgence. US bilateral assistance to both Afghanistan and Pakistan largely waned in the 1990s, so projects during this period were mostly closing out by the mid-1990s, save for a few small-scale humanitarian programs.

Additionally, while I focused my collection of documents on specific projects, programs, and initiatives over the past forty years, I also reviewed evaluations of bilateral programming in both countries from the beginning of bilateral assistance in the 1950s (I cover most of this in Chapter 5). From 1950 until roughly 1990, evaluations of individual projects and programs were largely included in evaluations of bilateral programming as a whole, primarily because processes of producing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports on the progress and outcomes of individual projects were not as institutionalized in development practice as it is today. This, to some extent, has to do with both the transformation of the relationship between individual projects and bilateral assistance strategy and the transformation of development project methodologies. Especially between 1950 and 1990, individual projects were largely tied to multiyear bilateral assistance programs, with evaluations and assessments contracted to evaluate these multiyear bilateral assistance programs that involved multiple projects. These evaluations are hundreds of pages long, review specific projects, and examine the reasons behind successes and failures.

The second important aspect to note is that while I kept my selection of documents fairly even in terms of projects conducted in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, my analysis leans heavily toward Afghanistan post-9/11. Primarily, the task of development is much more significant and challenging in Afghanistan than it is in Pakistan (or most other countries in the world for that matter). I devote much of Chapter 5 to describing the context of global wars, tribal feuds, migration of militant fighters, and integration of foreign Islamic extremism into the Pashtun social fabric, as well as the institutionalization of covert transnational networks in the final decades of the twentieth century. I do not intend to introduce those points here, but make a mere mention to highlight the complexity of the situation. Perhaps most critically influencing my analysis is the fact that the militaries of the donor community defeated the existing Taliban government, making the task of development that much more challenging than in a state such as Pakistan, which actually has a functioning central government (regardless of the challenges this government faces). Donor coordination reached a new, unprecedented level following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11. Donor coordination in Pakistan has never been to the extent that it has been in Afghanistan, because the central GOP has been a legitimate party to negotiations and agreement of bilateral assistance, whereas in Afghanistan, donors sought to build a government with which they would have this kind of engagement.

There are also some general limitations regarding the nature of the documents I examined. Donor processes of M&E generally fail to measure the long-term impact of development projects. Evaluations and audits are usually conducted within a year of programming. This time frame limits donors’ framing of impact. This is in no small part a budget issue. Conducting preprogram assessments, audits, evaluations, and so on is a part of program budget, supplied by donor governments, and so there are budget cycle restrictions on the presentation of outcomes and findings. Periodic reports and annual reports will note successes and challenges to programs, but as these documents are produced for funders (institutions representing the various publics funding donor governments), the focus is usually to highlight outcomes or achievements in a manner that is almost