Knowledge and Evolution: How Theology, Philosophy, and Science Converge in the Question of Origins

Preface

The question of the origin of species is an abstract one concerning a distant past, and people can prosper without knowing the answer. However, after Darwin, it happened that precisely this question became the keystone of a number of broader and more influential ideas that affect everyone’s life on a daily basis. This is why the problem ignites so much controversy and public excitement. Your attitude toward evolution does not reduce to a few highly specified biological convictions, such as whether or not random mutations can generate new functional genetic information. In fact, your position in the debate about the origin of species implies and heavily determines your attitude toward a number of other scientific, philosophical, and theological issues. What is the role of science in explaining the origins of the universe? What can necessity and chance accomplish in nature? Who is man? What is the foundation for human morality and dignity? How do you understand the Bible? How does God relate to the universe? All these and many other fundamental questions come together in the single question of origins.

Our ideas about the universe are as much connected with one another as the universe constitutes one entity. This is why convictions about one part of reality influence the perception of another. Having a coherent worldview is not just a means to living a fulfilled and peaceful life. It is an obligation and call for every human being—an obligation justified by the fact that man is a rational animal. Aristotle begins his greatest book by stating, All men by nature desire to know.¹ Hence, to know means to fulfill the desire of human nature. The truth that satisfies people comes from different sources: from our senses, from our rational reflection on surrounding reality, and—not less importantly—from supernatural revelation by God. This last type of knowledge cannot be obtained by human endeavor, yet it is crucial for fully understanding the reality in which humans exist. This is why we cannot entertain a coherent worldview if we exclude any of the available sources of human knowledge. Instead of choosing, for whatever reason, only some facts and data while ignoring others, we need to formulate a great synthesis of faith, philosophy, and science. This book is intended to help you understand how different theories and concepts regarding the origin of species come together to constitute one coherent worldview. Surely, not all of the concepts fit equally into the picture. There are some ideas that exclude others and others that include them. Our intention is to show how some of the concepts surrounding the problem of faith and science are harmonious and why some are inherently contradictory. Thus, the objective of this work is to develop three major themes present in the debate about origins: the relationship between science and faith, the relationship between evolution and human natural knowledge, and the relationship between evolution and Christianity.

In today’s debate we find a few different attempts to synthesize human knowledge based on different paradigms. The evolutionary paradigm is the one that prevails in culture. Its influence is so great that one of the ardent atheists of our times calls it the universal solvent capable of cutting right through the heart of everything in sight.² I believe that the Christian paradigm greatly differs from the evolutionary one and constitutes a better background for the ultimate answer to the question of origins and all the derivative problems. Therefore, our great task is to restore the Christian paradigm in contemporary culture and to build upon it a new science-faith synthesis.

This book is designed to present the Reader with the concepts involved in the debate about the origin of species in a clear and philosophically sound way. You may discover that many of the ideas you have considered obvious and unquestionable actually leave much room for further inquiry. And furthermore, you may find that ideas which you deem obscure, irrelevant, or untenable can actually make sense. They can be put together in a broader picture that satisfactorily combines the scientific, the philosophical, and the theological level of discussion. This book provides you with a map by which to navigate between these levels. The starting-point of our journey is the current confusion in the debate over evolution; the intended destination is an understanding of the concepts involved in this debate and their mutual relations. This map does not make you go anywhere; it does not choose the goals for you. But it helps you to not get lost, and it invites you to choose your own position more consciously.

Michael Chaberek, O.P., S.T.D.

1

. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Part

1

.

2

. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea,

521

.

Chapter I

Religion and Science

This first chapter, Religion and Science, is designed to explain the mutual relations between supernatural knowledge revealed to people by God and natural knowledge that people obtain by studying nature. The relation of science and religion can be considered in two aspects—the systematic and the historical.

The systematic approach refers to the mutual dependence of science and religion outside of particular historical circumstances. Theoretically there can be several models of this relation.¹ For example, one can deny the validity of religious knowledge, reducing it to just a subjective or emotional conviction that is not rooted in any objective data or reality. Then the only source of true, objective, or useful knowledge is natural science. This is an approach of atheists. One variant of this kind of a reductive approach is saying that science is the matter of reality (how things are) and religion is just a matter of values (how things should be). Religion does not provide any worldview, or any description of reality; it only establishes moral norms and serves human spiritual needs.

The opposite extreme is a form of fideism, in which religious knowledge is extended to the greatest details of natural realm. According to this approach, science is a never-ending enterprise, a stock of contradictory, ever-changing theories, whereas religion gives us ultimate knowledge not only regarding the supernatural but also regarding nature. On this approach, religious belief displaces empirical knowledge based on observation and experiments.

Another possible position is isolationism, which postulates that science and religion are two completely different realms without any common field. There is no conflict between religion and science, because divine activity revealed by religion does not leave empirically detectable marks in nature. These two types of knowledge exist on two separate levels. One example of isolationism is the concept of non-overlapping magisteria, which we will discuss later (see I,1,d).

Both the reductionist and the isolationist models do not seem to meet the requirements of Christianity or any religion that seriously takes into account supernatural revelation, human reason, and the order of nature. Therefore, in this first chapter I will promote a model that can be adequately called supplementary or synthetic. This assumes that religion and science are neither competitive, nor disjointed, nor reducible to one another. They exist simultaneously on different levels, but they have common fields of interest and supplement each other. On this approach, the human being needs both religion and science to understand the world, himself, and God.

In Section 1 we will develop a three-level division of human knowledge which consists of theology, philosophy, and science. Thus, our binary division into religion and science gains a third level, which is philosophy. As we will show, philosophy is an independent domain that allows us to make transitions between the scientific and theological truths without falling into confusion of methods and notions. The distinction of these three levels will help us define what is naturalism (in Section 2).

The historical approach explains how the theoretical relations between faith and science have been realized throughout centuries in different historical circumstances. Therefore, in Section 3 we consider how religion, philosophy, and science have interacted throughout history. Our account includes eight stages of the development of the three domains from antiquity to postmodernity. The goal of this section is to properly balance the contribution of science and theology in answering questions of origins. For this reason, we will return to the systematic approach in order to establish the limits of science. This will allow us to see when a transition from science to philosophy and from philosophy to theology is necessary in order to answer the ultimate questions regarding the universe (Section 4).

In the history of Western thought, sometimes conflicts between scientists and theologians took place. In Section 5 we will summarize the Galileo affair. This will reveal how Galileo understood the limits of science and religion, which made room for the heliocentric model of the solar system. This and the following section (Sections 5 and 6) explain the crucial difference between Galileo’s and Darwin’s cases. The comparison of the theories promoted by these two famous scholars will inform us that there is no simple analogy between Galileo and Darwin. Consequently, Galileo’s affair cannot be presented as a historical argument for accepting Darwinian theory of origins.

1. Theology, Philosophy, and Science

a. The Three Levels of Human Knowledge

People generally may be divided into two categories, monists and dualists. Monists believe that all reality consists of just one type of being: material or spiritual. Materialistic monists say that reality consists of material being alone, whereas spiritual monists (often known as pantheists) believe that all reality is of a spiritual (i.e., immaterial) nature. The other group, dualists, believe that reality includes both types of being: material, that we detect with our senses, and immaterial, that we can approach only through our intellect. The basic assumption adopted in this chapter and the entire book is that reality is dualistic and it exists outside of the human mind. But the ways in which we know these two different realms are also different. This is why in order to know both—the entire reality—we need to employ two very different types of knowing which are called science (natural science) and theology.

What is knowledge? Roughly speaking, it is a content of a mind. It differs from the unconscious content of our mind or—more broadly—the entire content of the spiritual soul. Therefore, knowledge is something that we can reflect upon and bring to our consciousness when we need it. There are two ways of understanding knowledge. According to the first one, knowledge is the subjective content of one’s mind. In this sense, we can call it knowledge for myself. This is all that I know, regardless of whether it is true or not, verifiable or not, accessible to other people or not. It is any content of the mind that a person is conscious of. The second understanding of knowledge deems it everything that can be made known to others by means of communication. We can call it intersubjective knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is everything that can be reduced to human ideas and passed on to other minds by means of a language. These two understandings of human knowledge are not two disjoint things; rather, the second may be seen as encompassing the first. This is because any intersubjective knowledge is also knowledge for myself, but not vice versa—knowledge for myself is not always intersubjective.

To make the distinction more clear, let us present a few examples. A mystical experience enriches subjective knowledge, but it is essentially incommunicable. Only some part of it might be passed on to others by means of a language. The same applies to an aesthetic experience and to intuition. They may teach a person about things, but inasmuch as they cannot be passed on to other humans, they remain just knowledge for oneself. There are types of knowledge, like secrets, that are communicable but are never communicated. In this case we can say that it is intersubjective knowledge only potentially, whereas actually it is knowledge for myself. In contrast, any knowledge about physical facts must be intersubjective. Also, any science, literature, or knowledge existing in a written form is intersubjective, because not only can it be communicated, but it already exists in a communicable form. From this point on, whatever we say in this work about human knowledge refers to the intersubjective type of knowledge.

In the middle of Diagram 1 there is a rectangle that represents the human mind and its contained knowledge. Knowledge can be divided into three domains: theology, philosophy, and science.² These three differ according to their subject matter (object), method, and goal.

Diagram

1

. The three levels of human knowledge in the mind, as related to external reality.

There are many definitions of science, as well as of philosophy and theology. For our purpose, we need to define these three domains in a way that highlights the differences between them. Thus, we need to pin down what is essential for each domain of knowledge, as opposed to other domains. Let’s begin with theology.

Theology consists of knowledge revealed to man in a supernatural way, either directly by God or through the mediation of the spirits, the prophets, the Apostles, the Holy Scriptures, etc. This knowledge may teach us either about the invisible reality or about the material world. God is the proper object/subject³ of theology. Theology (in this case Christian theology) informs us about facts: God is a Trinity, God became incarnate in Jesus Christ, there are different choirs of angels, there is a hell and a heaven, and so forth. The material world is the secondary object of theology. Theological knowledge about the material world informs us about, for instance, the creation of the universe, the consummation of the world at the end of time, the final judgment, the miracles, etc. Theological knowledge may also confer many moral and spiritual truths, such as God’s expectations regarding human actions or divine influence on man through grace. The goal of theology is to give an ultimate explanation to reality (both visible and invisible) in the context of human final destination and the meaning (the sense) of all reality. Theology thus is the knowledge that brings man to salvation.

Philosophy is knowledge acquired by human reason reflecting upon nature or the mind (or self, i.e., self-reflection) without the help of supernatural revelation. Philosophy is not isolated from the two other domains. This means that both facts revealed supernaturally and facts discovered by science can become the object of philosophical reasoning. Nevertheless, philosophy remains a separate discipline because philosophy’s main object is being as being (being per se), that is, being taken in the most abstract sense. Its proper method is reasoning according to the first principles of being and thought (prima principia cognitionis), with the use of logic and intellectual tools, such as analogy and abstraction. The philosophical method is different from the theological method because it does not adopt supernatural premises, and it is also different from science because it does not ponder particulars but rather seeks generalization on a more abstract level. The goal of philosophy is to find ultimate causes of reality by means of natural reasoning.

Finally, we have natural science. We have added the word natural to science in order to make it clear that we understand science according to the modern rather than the medieval sense of the word. In scholasticism, science (Lat. scientia) was considered the highest form of knowledge because it represented knowledge that was certain. This referred primarily to philosophy and theology. In the modern era, the domains of philosophy and theology were no longer considered certain because modernity considers certain only what can be empirically demonstrated. Consequently, the meaning of the word science changed, to signify empirical or natural sciences. Regardless of whether that shift was justifiable or not, for the sake of clarity and communicability we use the word science according to its modern meaning. The proper objects of science are empirical facts, and the method is observation and experimentation. Science, in contrast to philosophy, is focused on particulars and details. Its goal, therefore, is not to look for an overall picture of reality or the first cause of everything. Instead, it ponders upon the natural and proper causes of physical phenomena. Unlike theology, but similarly to philosophy, science does not resort to any supernatural knowledge (e.g., from Holy Scriptures or supernatural revelations).

We need to notice that all three domains (or disciplines) of knowledge are intertwined to some degree, and there are some in-between areas of inquiry that can be claimed by two or all of them. We could also identify more disciplines and subdisciplines within each domain, thereby creating more harmonious transitions between the three levels of knowledge. But this is not the important or controversial issue. Our diagram suggests something more, namely, that the disciplines are ordered in such a way that theology, being highest, seems more important than the two other domains, and science, being lowest, seems somehow subordinated to philosophy and theology.

There are at least three reasons why we should arrange the three domains in the following descending order: from theology, to philosophy, to natural science. The first reason is the dignity of the object. God is a more noble object/subject of investigation and knowledge than the created universe. Even unbelievers could agree on this, as long as they understand God in the way believers do—as an absolute and perfect Being. The object of philosophy, in turn, is being as being (being per se). Studying being is like studying everything, because everything that exists is being. In contrast, the object of science is only material being, and even this in a very limited aspect. Philosophy looks for the causes of all reality, whereas natural science looks for a cause of a particular phenomenon at a particular time. Consequently, philosophy finds the ultimate causes of everything, while science ends up with a number of particular causes that explain only some parts and aspects of reality. This is why we are justified in recognizing philosophy as higher than science with respect to their objects. In contrast to theology, philosophy informs us about reality only to the extent that human reason can reveal. Theology reaches God through divine revelation, which is a much more powerful source of knowledge. So, even though philosophy can possibly recognize the existence and some attributes of the perfect and immaterial Being, she is unable to reveal what exceeds natural reasoning. This explanatory power makes theology superior to philosophy.

The second reason to establish the descending order between the three domains is the profundity of their statements. Surely it is important to understand how the particles interact in a given compound or how amino acids are arranged in proteins, but all of this seems meaningless in comparison to death, afterlife, happiness, or salvation. Theology addresses those most profound questions that no man can shun. Philosophy also speaks about ultimate causes and ends. So, even if most people are not concerned with those issues on a daily basis, every human ultimately faces them. For example, everybody wants to be happy, and the knowledge about how to become happy belongs to philosophy and theology rather than natural science.

Finally, the third reason to place the disciplines in the descending order is the level of certitude that each of them provides. We should not confuse a degree of certitude of a given assertion with the degree of voluntary assent (Lat. assentio) granted by a given person to a given assertion. The former is objective and is inherent in the very assertion, whereas the latter is subjective and resides in the human will. Inherent certitude belongs only to true assertions. If an assertion is false, then it can entertain only the voluntary assent of a person holding to it, not inherent certitude. The problem is that inherent certitude does not say which theological, philosophical, or scientific proposition is true, yet it belongs only to true statements. For this reason, true and false statements may look similarly convincing. It may even happen that someone grants greater voluntary assent to an untrue scientific claim (e.g., a majority of DNA is junk⁴) than to a true theological claim (e.g., God is a designer), as well as lesser assent to a true scientific claim (e.g., life contains irreducible complexity) than to an untrue theological claim (e.g., there is no hell).

The degree of certitude is implied by the source of knowledge. Since the source of knowledge in theology is God, theological assertions entertain the highest degree of inherent certitude. This certitude is even higher than that of self-evident (Lat. per se nota) truths, such as mathematical equations. The reason is that God is never wrong and never lies, while human reason may err. This is also why theological statements are more certain than philosophical ones. When it comes to the sciences, their statements are of the least certitude because they describe changing reality and are based on empirical observations that may be mistaken. Note that this view does not lead us to support the relativistic idea of science, whereby it is just an interplay of ever-evolving postulates and a never-finished enterprise. This idea is common among some philosophers of science who are probably influenced by a broader trend of skepticism present in today’s culture. Science does provide knowledge, both objective and in some cases even permanent. But the goal of science is not to provide ultimate knowledge about reality because the very reality which is the object of science is neither permanent nor ultimate. In our opinion, scientific propositions, by themselves, are reliable and convincing; their limited certitude is evident only when compared to those of philosophy and theology.

b. Knowledge and Truth

Before we elaborate upon Diagram 1 in more detail, we need to introduce another idea—a threefold cognitive model. This can be represented in the following way:

(

1

) Mind—(

2

) Different cognitive disciplines—(

3

) Reality

Reality (3) is being that is objective and external to the mind. It is an object of cognition for different cognitive disciplines (2). The being may be the physical universe, God, the invisible universe, or whatever else exists in whatever form. Reality is captured by the mind (1) through the mediation of different cognitive disciplines (2), such as theology, philosophy, and science in their broadest sense. The treasury of cognitive disciplines (2) contains things like scientific postulates and theories, dogmas, adages, philosophical concepts—everything that is communicable by means of an understandable language. Through intersubjective communication, the treasures of human knowledge become accessible to all people, and all people can potentially possess the same knowledge.

In order to understand what truth is, we need to go back to Diagram 1. We see that knowledge is in the mind (represented by the middle rectangle). There are different levels of knowledge according to different cognitive disciplines, such as theology, philosophy, and science. The human mind acquires knowledge from reality. In Diagram 1, on the right there is physical reality (the visible or natural world), and on the left there is the invisible or supernatural realm, that is, God, angels, heaven, hell, etc. Both sides are connected to the human mind by arrows. This symbolizes a correspondence between mind and reality. If the mind is properly shaped by reality, then it contains true knowledge. This is a classic philosophical understanding of truth. Thomas Aquinas defines it as adaequatio rei et intellectus, which means that there is a correspondence between the thing itself and the mind’s concept of it. In other words, truth is some kind of conformity of the mind to external things. It follows that the arrows in Diagram 1 represent only true knowledge (not any knowledge). The correspondence takes place only when the mind is properly shaped and the equality is actually present. Conversely, when knowledge in the mind does not match reality, then the knowledge is false.

The arrows in Diagram 1 point in both directions to show that even though reality is what primarily shapes the mind, there is also some influence of preconceived ideas that somehow shape our cognition of reality. Examples of this are scientific theories that fill in the gaps of our understanding of the visible world. We receive particular data and facts from reality, but to make sense of them we need theories and other generalizations. This is also why we need different cognitive disciplines that help us see one object from different perspectives.⁵

This does not mean, however, that we have no access to things themselves. It was Immanuel Kant who proposed that the mind has no access to reality and there are some inherent categories in our minds that are necessary for making sense out of empirical perceptions. In our model, it is reality external to the mind that is recognized by the mind, and reality decides what kind of knowledge the mind contains. This is also why truth is primarily in things and only secondarily in the intellect. For Kant, categories of the intellect shape our knowledge about reality, whereas in our model categories are produced in the intellect through experience and interaction with reality in the first place. The participation of the mind in the production of knowledge does not distort reality but only helps to abstract universal ideas and make coherent notions out of perceptions. We can say that the mind uses the previous knowledge to make sense out of anything new it encounters.

Next, we need to explain why there are multiple arrows in Diagram 1. The meaning of this is pretty straightforward: there is correspondence between the two different realities (visible and invisible) on the one hand and the three levels of knowledge on the other. Reality is linked to the mind according to different levels of knowledge. Hence, we can speak of philosophical knowledge about God, theological knowledge about God, scientific knowledge about the material world, and so forth. There are, however, two types of knowledge that require some explanation. These are theological knowledge about the material world (t2) and scientific knowledge about the immaterial world (t5). We will address these two in the following subsections.

c. The Two Books

There is a deep conviction in Christian tradition that God revealed himself in two ways: naturally through creation, and supernaturally through revelation. We can therefore speak of two books in which humans read the divine message: the book of nature (that is, the entire visible order), and the book known as the Bible. The first type of revelation is not as clear as the second. It speaks about God only through his works, and therefore it gives only partial knowledge that needs to be supplemented by faith. The Bible itself confirms the ability of man to know God from his creation as the Creator and ultimate cause of everything.⁶ Since there are two books through which God speaks to man, there are also two truths about God and the universe; one is acquired by natural reason, and the other is revealed supernaturally and exceeds the abilities of human reason. These two truths have one and the same ultimate source, namely God. This is why they cannot contradict each other. The Catholic Church has on multiple occasions confirmed that nature and the Bible constitute two ways in which one God revealed one coherent message about Himself. Therefore, it is both against reason and against Catholic teaching to claim that knowledge from natural science or sound philosophy (sana philosophia) can contradict any truth belonging to faith.⁷ Similarly, revealed truth cannot contain anything against facts of nature soundly recognized by science or philosophy. Truth cannot contradict truth—as the popular Catholic adage goes.⁸ This is why, when an apparent conflict arises, a believer should assume that either theology or science is understood improperly. The believer should investigate both disciplines in order to resolve the apparent conflict.

In Diagram 1, supernatural knowledge about the physical universe is represented by arrow t2, and natural knowledge about the physical universe is represented by arrows t3 and t4 (corresponding to philosophical and scientific knowledge, respectively). Lack of conflict means that these three truths are entirely compatible, even if practically speaking they sometimes seem to be in tension.

There is, however, some asymmetry between the competencies of science and theology. Theology provides a positive knowledge about visible reality (t2), whereas science does not provide any positive knowledge about God or the invisible universe. For instance, the temporal beginning of the universe and God’s works in history are known from theology, but they cannot be known by science. Similarly, science cannot say anything about God or the supernatural world except for purely negative statements. For example, when a miracle takes place, science can only say that it does not know how this event occurred based on current scientific knowledge. As another example, when science inquires into the beginning of the universe, it can go back to the initial singularity, that is, the phase immediately preceding the rapid expansion called the Big Bang. It cannot, however, say what preceded the initial singularity. The most it can do, without exceeding its scope, is to suspend its judgment. Positive knowledge about the occurrence of a miracle or the creation of the universe out of nothing belongs to theology. For science, speaking about God is like us speaking about nothingness. We cannot think about nothing, because whatever we think of is already something. We can think about what nothingness is only by not thinking about something. Similarly, science can speak about God, immaterial things and their actions only by speaking about something that they are not. If science says anything positive about a thing, this means that the thing is neither God nor part of the invisible realm. Arrow t5 in Diagram 1, representing scientific knowledge about invisible reality, is broken. This is because this knowledge has no positive content; it can only reveal the limitations of the scientific method regarding supernatural phenomena. Science speaks about immaterial reality only in a negative way, i.e., by saying what it is not.

d. Faith and Reason vs. Faith and Science

In the contemporary debate about origins, there is confusion regarding three different intellectual planes: one of these is faith and reason, another is faith and science, and the third is the question of origins. Though these three are connected and even overlap each other, they should not be conflated or confused.

First, we need to realize that faith, properly understood, is rational. Faith without reason turns into fideism or fundamentalism. Neither of these is the Christian approach to faith. When St. Anselm of Canterbury speaks about faith seeking understanding (fides quaerens intellectum), he does not mean a science–faith relation, but rather a relation between human reason and divine revelation. In Christianity, faith and reason are always combined in a synthesis, and this is why we cannot isolate the two. Faith is rational, and reason—in order to know the truth—has to be enlightened by faith (intellectus quaerens fidem). Christianity has always considered faith and reason two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth.⁹

However, it is completely justified to separate and compare the conclusions of rational faith on the one hand and the claims of different scientific disciplines on the other. This is possible because faith and science have different sources of knowledge, different methods, and different primary objects (for theology, the physical universe is only a secondary object). Hence, in matters that are common to both, they may either peacefully supplement each other or remain in tension. To resolve an apparent conflict belongs to the so-called dialogue between science and faith.

Some participants in the science-faith dialogue propose, however, that science and theology have nothing to do with each other. This position is called NOMA (non-overlapping magisteria). According to the advocates of NOMA, science and faith are so distant that it is an error to even compare them. Since there is no common ground between them, there can never be a conflict—thus affirm NOMA proponents.¹⁰ However, if conflict is not possible, the dialogue is not real either, and a science-faith synthesis is not attainable. NOMA ignores the fact that God revealed some truths about the physical universe that cannot be known by purely human cognitive effort. These truths (at least) are intertwined with our scientific perception of the visible reality and cause the two magisteria to overlap. Indeed, as is shown in Diagram 1, natural science and theology do have a common object, namely, the physical universe. God not only revealed some things about the visible order (t2); he also works supernaturally in the visible order, and consequently some events in the visible order are inexplicable without resorting to theology. NOMA, therefore, is not compatible with the Christian understanding of the relation between faith and science. For nonbelievers, however, NOMA is an easy way to remove faith from any rational investigation and relegate it to the realm of mythology, emotions, or values alone. This is why NOMA proponents usually end up in scientism, which claims that only science gives useful, objective, or true knowledge, whereas religion is reduced to morality and/or subjective, personal convictions that can never claim any universality. Ultimately, faith appears irrational because rational investigations can take place only in science. It is true that if all faith were irrational then the dialogue between faith and science would boil down to the dialogue between faith and reason. Some NOMA proponents actually believe that this is the case, and this is why they confuse the faith-science dialogue with the faith-reason dialogue.

Both faith and science may address the question of origins (of the universe, species, and the human race) while remaining entirely within their own fields and using their own methods. This is why the dialogue between faith and science is not the same as the faith and origins or science and origins problem.

There are only two principal answers to the question of origins—creation or evolution. Hence, the possible problems are the compatibility of faith and evolution and the compatibility of science and creation. These problems, however, are not identical to the dialogue between faith and science as such; they constitute just two out of many possible issues within this dialogue. Those who confuse the science-faith dialogue on one hand and the problem of origins on the other typically believe that faith has nothing decisive to say about origins. They usually claim that faith tells us only that things were created or that the universe ultimately comes from God, but it does not tell us anything about how things were created or formed. They deem this latter question to belong entirely to science. If this were the case, the question of origins would be settled by science, and after science had established how things began to