Borderline Warfare:: Unc Forces in Korea, 1954-1974 (A Historical Chronology)

Copyright 2020 Robert V. Hunt Jr.

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ISBN:

978-1-4907-9536-2 (sc)

ISBN:

978-1-4907-9607-9 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019906579

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CONTENTS

Preface

Introduction

Chapter 1 War By Another Name

Chapter 2 A Permanent Enemy

Chapter 3 Hardening The Lines

Chapter 4 Raising The Ante

Chapter 5 Intermittent Warfare

Chapter 6 Chaos In South Korea

Chapter 7 A New Level Of Conflict

Chapter 8 Quasi War

Chapter 9 Approaching The Precipice

Chapter 10 A Major Escalation

Chapter 11 A State Of War

Chapter 12 Korean Battlefield

Chapter 13 Conflict Zones

Chapter 14 War Scare

Chapter 15 Battle Of The Commandos

Chapter 16 Indecisive Warfare

Chapter 17 Communist Brinkmanship

Chapter 18 To The Brink And Back

Chapter 19 A Series Of Close Calls

Chapter 20 Crushing The Insurgency

Chapter 21 Stalemate

Chapter Notes

PREFACE

Borderline Warfare is heavily reliant on primary sources, particularly The New York Times and Pacific Stars and Stripes. Both newspaper, along with the Christian Science Monitor, covered the events in Korea in considerable detail.

Documents produced by the United Nations General Assembly have also been utilized, as have U.S. government sources––including TAGCEN casualty records from the National Archives covering the years 1966-1974. Other material came from interviews with individuals who had first-hand knowledge of the events in Korea during this period. Also used to a very limited extent were the author’s own military memorabilia dating from 1969-1971.

MAP OF KOREAN PENINSULA

INTRODUCTION

BORDERLINE WARFARE

United Nations Command Forces Korea

1954-1974

The Korean War of 1950-1953, sometimes called the Forgotten War, ended in a stalemate that saw the principal belligerents: North Korea, Communist China, South Korea, and the United States, cease overt military activity following the signing of the Armistice Agreement on 27 July 1953. The intense fighting (often World War II-scale) that witnessed United Nations Command (UNC) and Communist armies fighting the length and breadth of the Korean peninsula produced grim statistics indeed: the war claimed the lives of some 36,516 U.S. military personnel; South Korea lost an estimated 850,000 soldiers and civilians killed, wounded or missing. The other fourteen nations that fought under the United Nations banner suffered an estimated 17,000 casualties. On the other side, Communist China had some 900,000 men killed, wounded or missing. And North Korea, the country that began the war when it invaded South Korean on 25 June 1950, lost more than a half millions soldiers and civilians. And according to recent study by the Wall Street Journal, North Korea was the most bombed country in the world after Cambodia.

At the Geneva Accords held in the spring of 1954, both the Indochina War of 1946-1954, and the Korean War were addressed by diplomats representing the belligerents, including Communist China, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain, and North Vietnam. The United States and South Vietnam were present as observers. As far as the Indochina War, a temporary political settlement was reached. But in the case of Korea, no political settlement was ever reached, and the terms of the armed truce were violated openly and repeatedly, first by North Korea and then by the UNC. According to U.S. Army Gen. Mark Wayne Clark, who signed the Armistice for the UNC, the Communists began to violate it before the ink was dry.

Quickly realizing that overt North Korean belligerence was only in abeyance, the U.S. opted to keep two infantry divisions deployed immediately south of the misnamed demilitarized zone (DMZ) that stretched 160-miles across the Korean peninsula from the Yellow Sea in the west to the Sea of Japan in the east. The continuing U.S. presence insured that the United States would remain committed to the defense of South Korea for an indefinite period of time.

Because North Korea was not interested in signing a peace treaty to officially end the war, and in fact was more determined than ever to complete the communization of Korea, military activity continued in the years after 1953––slowly at first, but by the late 1960s and early 1970s, it reached a level of armed conflict that threated to spiral out of control. This work is an account of the hostilities that ebbed and flowed in Korean between 1954 and 1974, and which on a half-dozen occasions threatened not only to reopen full-scale warfare, but to escalate to the point of igniting a major confrontation between North Korea, Communist China and the Soviet Union on one side, and South Korea, the United States and Japan on the other.

CHAPTER ONE

WAR BY ANOTHER NAME

The American military posture in Korea in 1954 was premised almost entirely on a defensive mindset. This was understandable, perhaps, given that barely five months earlier the unpopular police action that had resulted in an estimated 2.5 million dead, wounded and missing had ended in an unpalatable ceasefire.

While actress Marilyn Monroe visited U.S. troops early in 1954, American did its best to forget about Korea. But a war as brutal and indecisive as Korea could not easily be forgotten. Indeed, for all practical purposes, the war was far from over. Death in various forms still lurked over the devastated front lines. In a Pacific Stars and Stripes article published early in the year, a correspondent visited a portion of the recently lethal battlefield. The correspondent, accompanied by a U.S. Army Military Police patrol, arrived at an area that included a view of the infamous battles of Old Baldy and Pork Chop Hill.

All around was the detritus of war: rusted tanks, 105mm shells, small-arms ammunition, a medic’s stretcher with two shrapnel holes in it. Further on they encountered a jeep trailer––wheel-less and bullet-ridden. Nearby was a .30 cal. machine-gun pointed north, with ammunition belts still attached and reaching down to rotting sandbags. They crossed a small steam and saw the wreckage of a U.S. jet. The once proud bird was now denuded of wings and tail section, with its power-plant partially submerged in the moist creek bed. And miles of black twisted commo wire, still on posts with identifying tags tied to the strands, lay everywhere. From atop Pork Chop Hill a lone Communist sentry watched from 700 yards away. As the correspondent and his MP escort departed the area, he summed up his experience: It’s deathly quiet on the DMZ. Alas, the quiet would not last long.

In the immediate aftermath of the armistice, U.S. ground forces consisted of some 240,000 men, while other members of the United Nations Command (UNC) totaled some 31,000 personnel. On the other side, the combined North Korean and Chinese Communist military strength stood at roughly 500,000 personnel, with the Chinese providing 384,000 of that total.¹ ²

And even though the fighting had stopped––at least on paper––American casualties continued unabated. The U. S. Navy listed the names of 10 officers and men classified as missing in action when their Neptune patrol plane disappeared off the southwest coast of Korea. Apparently not related to hostile action, the men were never found, but were nevertheless casualties of war.³

The U. S. Marine Corps, which suffered 29,272 casualties, including 4,000 dead during the war, endured some of the hardest hits in 1954. In January, a landing craft filled with Marines was swamped in treacherous Inchon harbor west of the South Korean capital of Seoul in the Yellow Sea.

The Marines, assigned to 3rd Bn. 4th Regt., 3rd Marine Division, had been posted for escort duty aboard 15 LSTs, taking more than 14,000 anti-Communist Chinese to Formosa. Twenty-nine Marines drowned or were listed as missing, while 17 survived, as did two Navy corpsmen, two Army personnel and a Korean civilian.⁴

Several days after the loss of the Marines, a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance bomber was attacked while patrolling in area northwest of Sokto Island along the west coast of South Korea, some 45 miles north of the 38th parallel, whose demarcation roughly separated North and South Korea, and the 160-mile-long and two and one-half-mile deep demilitarized zone (DMZ). The RB-45 plane was attacked by a large formation of MiG-15 jet fighters. The aircraft was escorted on a routine training mission by F-86 Sabre jets, which promptly counter-attacked. One Communist MiG was shot down. All the U.S. planes returned safely to base.

As noted by the Associated Press, the attack was the first by enemy aircraft since the signing of the armistice. In a formal statement, American officials noted that both the UN and Communist forces agreed in the Korean armistice not to violate each other’s territory or the air above it. This was in international waters, so that would not apply.⁵

In a follow-up, the Air Force reported that the RB-45 had definitely been over international waters when attacked. Whether the enemy pilots were North Korean, Chinese or Russian was not known, but the MiGs were identified as Soviet-built.⁶

In what would become a regular pattern of diplomatic denial, U.S. authorities decided that the air attack did not actually qualify as a violation of the armistice. But a week later an enemy plane flew 15 miles into South Korean territory and returned across the DMZ before U.S. aircraft could be scrambled.

Unnamed military sources reported that an undisciplined Communist pilot had touched off the confrontation and said they did not believe it necessarily foreshadowed other similar attacks in the area. The New York Times reported that the air battlefield marked the first time U.S. airmen scored a kill in a long string of ‘incidents’ in which Communist planes had attacked U.S. planes. It noted that Soviet fighters had shot down a U.S. Air Force B-50 reconnaissance bomber off the coast of Siberia in six days after the Korean armistice was signed. The fate of the crew was apparently unknown.⁷

Meanwhile in Seoul, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Eighth Army Commander, said he felt that he should send congratulations to the USAF for shooting down the Communist MiG. In a broadcast monitored in Tokyo a week after the attack, North Korea accused the U.S. of blatant provocations in violation of the armistice. The recriminations came in a message from Premier Kim Il Sung, the North Korean Stalinist dictator who had launched the invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, on the occasion of North Korea’s Army Day. Kim, as premier and Army commander, both praised the Korean Communist forces and warned against any further provocations. By way of response, the U.S. Air Force staged operation Candy Counter, labeled the biggest test of allied defense since the shooting ended last year." The goal of the exercise staged the 5th Air Force was to uncover weaknesses in the allied defensive armor.

Preliminary feedback indicated that, given an all-out North Korean air assault on South Korea, both sides would sustain heavy losses. Units of the 5th Air Force, as well as a squadron of Australian jets took part in the exercise. The ROK Air Force, however, was grounded for the day.⁸

Then, U.S. Air Force Maj. Michael Brezas, a member of the 58th Fighter-Bomber Wing and a World War II ace who shot down 13 enemy planes, and who had only been in Korea for a month, was killed when his F-84 Fighter jet crashed. Another Air Force pilot died in the crash of his F-86 Sabre jet near Inchon, and four ROKAF Mustang fighters disappeared off the east coast. The only evidence of the ill-fated planes were several large oil slicks.

. . .

In addition to the Marine casualties sustained in the swamped landing craft, six Marines were killed and 30 wounded in March 1954 when a live 82mm mortar round exploded in a classroom conducted by members of the 1st Marine Division. The explosion occurred near the front lines when an NCO teaching a Mine Warfare School class inside a Quonset hut dropped the device. Some of the casualties were airlifted to military hospitals, while others were airlifted to the Navy hospital ship Haven in Inchon harbor.⁹

Then the pilot of a Marine dive bomber was lost. The aircraft had been flying air cover for a landing operation near Sokcho-Ri on the east coast. "The Skyraider was participating in the amphibious landing exercise of the 1st Marine Regt. The pilot had flown from the carrier Saipan, completed his mission and was returning to the carrier when lost. A Navy spokesman said the plane was ‘presumed to be down,’ with slim hopes for the pilot."¹⁰

And datelined Osan, Air Base, a USAF pilot, identified as 2nd Lieu. Clarence B. Gaesser, was killed when his F-86 Sabre jet went down during a training flight. Gaesser was assigned to the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing of the Fifth Air Force.

The UNC then charged the Communists with smuggling military aircraft into nine North Korean airfields––a direct violation of the armistice agreement. The ROK government also announced that an estimated 600 Red guerrillas were operating in the Chiri-san Mountains in south-central South Korea.¹¹

Another source claimed that nearly 5,000 underground Red agents were arrested in South Korea last year. The chief of home security, Sung Joo Lee, said that National Police also killed or captured more than 1,740 Communist-led guerrillas during the past year, including top bandit Hyon Sang Lee, killed last Sept. in a combat operation southwest of Taegu. . . .¹²

Also, ROK Marine intelligence officers arrested 24 alleged Communist underground agents. The ring was believed to be headed by a former Lieu. Col. in the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) who posed as anti-Communist and was released in South Korea. He was suspected of being the number one man in Communist underground organizations in two southern provinces. The 24 members of the ring had planned to partake in various sabotage and espionage activities and help supply Communist-led guerrilla operations in South Korea. . . .¹³

Meanwhile, the North Koreans responded to the UNC claims. They accused the latter of sending two armed guards into Communist territory. They claimed that on consecutive nights five-man teams infiltrated the North with the mission of attacking and kidnapping North Korean military personnel. The attacks resulted in the death of one South Korean and the capture of another.

According to Pacific Stars and Stripes, the chief Communist delegate, Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Ho, said that the (South) Korean captured … had confessed that he and others were ordered by ‘an American officer’ at the U.N. base at Munsan, to infiltrate into Red territory. Two of the men who allegedly landed on the North Korean coast were also captured.¹⁴

Next, the UNC criticized the United Nations Supervisory Commission, supposedly composed of four neutral countries––Switzerland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. In reality, the first two were partial to the UNC, while the latter two were Communists in good standing. In mid-April, the UNC complained that the supervisory commission had on numerous occasions neglected "to investigate Chinese-North Korean violations of the armistice. At least five UNC protests had not been investigated.¹⁵

Also in April, the UNC suffered more casualties when two planes crashed on training missions. Four members of the Fifth Air Force died when their B-26 Invader crashed off the coast of Kunsan, South Korea. Ten days later an Army light observation plane crashed into a Korean house––killing two women. The pilot and his passenger survived. The latest fatalities added to the growing list of military and civilian casualties in Korea.

According to Eighth Army, from July 1953 to January 1954, 181 deaths were reported, with the leading cause being small arms fire, followed by mine detonations, ammunition explosions, and vehicle accidents.¹⁶ In research conducted by Marty O’Brien, among those ground troops killed in combat-related incidents in 1954 were members of a 25th Inf. Div. tank crew commanded by Sgt. Ronald J. Phair. All the men aboard the tank were killed when it struck a mine. And the following day three members of the 3rd Inf. Div. were also killed by mine explosions.¹⁷

In May, the UNC asked the North Koreans to release or account for 55 foreign nationals last reported in Communist hands. They also sought information about 3,405 allied servicemen who were prisoners of war. The Communists ignored the request, responding that all foreign nationals who wanted to return had done so.¹⁸

As the U.S. began a partial withdrawal of troops from Korea––an additional 3,000 during April 1954––the enemy seemed not to be impressed. An unidentified aircraft, presumably Communist, caused UNC forces to go on alert during a visit by Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson to a front-line U.S. Army unit. Undeterred, the North Koreans continued their campaign of harassment against UNC forces. On 8 July, enemy troops opened fire … on an allied patrol boat that ran aground in the Han River while patrolling … in west Korea.¹⁹

. . .

The Military Armistice Commission (MAC), headed by Rear Admiral T.B. Brittain, accused the Communists of a serious truce violation. He brought with him five witnesses to the truce village of Panmunjom on the border that separated North and South Korea. The soldiers testified that . . . two communist soldiers approached their beached patrol boat from the north side of the Han River estuary and fired about 25 rounds of automatic weapons fire at the vessel. No one was hit.²⁰

Early in August, North Korean troops opened fire on a UNC patrol, killing two ROKA soldiers and wounding a ROK policeman. The particulars were sketchy, but the attack allegedly occurred near the village of Taeyaja in the western sector of South Korea. According to the Communist version, . . . the UNC soldiers crossed the line illegally and ‘refused to answer a challenge and opened fire.’ The Communists declined to identify the bodies or allow the UNC to view them. Nor would they allow them to question the wounded ROK policeman.

As evidence, the Communists produced two foreign-made machine-guns, two magazines of ammunition, and several other miscellaneous pieces of equipment.²¹

The Fifth Air Force reported that two officers were killed when their F-94 Starfire all-weather interceptor jet crashed into a railroad station near Chunju. The pilots, members of the 319th Interceptor Fighter Squadron, were on a routine training mission when the crash occurred. In December, U.S. jet fighters intercepted three unidentified aircraft near the northwestern DMZ, but the intruders retreated northward before any contact occurred.

CHAPTER TWO

A PERMANENT ENEMY

Communist provocations increased in 1955. Early in the year, Communist China and North Korea signed a protocol that extended aid in the form of ‘funds and material.’ Essentially, the Chinese were supplying North Korea with the means to rebuild its war-shattered economy. The aid was worth an estimated $122 million.¹

The new year was only a few days old when Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that the United States would be ready to use atomic weapons, if needed, to counter renewed Communist aggression in Korea. He also informed the South Koreans that there would be no further reduction in U.S. forces in Korea. At the time, the Army’s 7th Inf. Div. and the 1st Marine Div. were the forward-deployed combat units. However, the Marines were shortly to be replaced by the Army’s 24th Inf. Div.

Meanwhile, leaders of both North and South Korea broadcast messages calling for the peaceful reunification of the country. Dr. Syngman Rhee, the South Korean president, told his countrymen that the withdrawal of Red Chinese troops from North Korea would be matched by the withdrawal of U.S. and other allied forces from South Korea. Elections would then be held to unify the country.

However, the next day the UNC accused the Communists of four air violations––with enemy planes twice penetrating as far south as Seoul between 22 and 30 December 1954. And the same day South Korea accused the North of building more than forty air bases and bringing in 110,000 new troops and 200 Soviet-built tanks in violation of the armistice.²

General Maxwell D. Taylor, in his role as Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC), assessed in a confidential memorandum the situation in Korea. He bluntly reminded his superiors that:

The armistice agreement was never intended to apply for an indefinite period of time in the manner of a treaty or mutual defense pact. Its highly restrictive provisions were acceptable to the UNC as a means of insuring that the Communists did not use the period of respite provided by the ceasefire to reinforce and re-equip its forces. In this respect the armistice agreement has been an utter failure.³

That any talk of peaceful reunification was largely propaganda on both sides was quickly established when the U.S. Air Force was soon deployed on a full scale war basis … in the Asian theatre. Believing that the Communists were preparing to strike at Formosa or again in Korea, the Air Force has deployed it strength in the Far East, including the dispatch of a potent fighter-bomber wing to beleaguered Formosa. Allied planners reasoned that:

Since the Red Chinese Air Force would have to operate largely from the complex of airfields surrounding Shanghai, it occurs to an American flier that the thing to do in the event of hostilities is to strike with atomic weapons from South Korea, the nearest places from which to hit Shanghai and other Communist targets. Short of using atomic weapons, veterans foresee another long, hard war with conventional weapons. It is estimated that the United States Far East Air Force, consisting of fourteen wings, has immediately at hand nearly 900 fighters and 120 bombers, or 1,000 battle types.⁴

But also to be tallied for the U.S. forces were from 300 to 400 planes on Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers. Conversely, Communist forces in Northeast Asia had more than 5,000 fighter jets.⁵ Not a week later, U.S. jet fighters shot down two of eight attacking Communist jets in the old MiG Alley in the Yellow Sea between Communist China and North Korea. The enemy planes were identified as MiG-15s. In a follow-up report, The Air Force reported four of the Communist fighters had attacked a United States RB-45, a four-engine jet bomber converted into a reconnaissance plane. The other four MiGs engaged the Sabre jets that were flying ‘top cover’ for the reconnaissance craft.⁶

In a subsequent dispatch from Tokyo, the Air Force placed the battle site 10 miles off the coast of North Korea and 40 miles west of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. The enemy planes attacked first, and the six surviving MiGs then returned to Communist territory. The American aircraft were based at Osan AB, 40 miles south of Seoul. The U.S. State Department announced an investigation to determine the nationality of the MiG fighters––although they were thought to be Chinese. The Sabre jets that came under attack belong to units recently deployed from Japan to forward bases in the area in light of the current situations in the Far East.⁷

It also recognized that the clash demonstrated that Air Force pilots in the Far East were carrying out their orders to ‘defend themselves if and when attacked.’⁸ The following day more details of the MiG-kill were released. Four MiGs attacked the U.S. RB-45 aircraft while it was on its usual reconnaissance mission. The hostile aircraft were first sighted by the tail gunner of the RB-45. As the four MiGs swept in on a firing run, Airman f/c Noel H. Horrigan of Seattle, WA., opened fire. He said he believed he had damaged one of the MiGs.⁹

In his first-person account, dateline Tokyo, 1st Lieu. Charles E. Salmon of Fort Jarvis, NY, related his adventure: I saw the tracers streaking past our planes. They were far away. They dove past my flight and attacked the bomber. I rolled over on my back, slipped down to the left and rolled out on the tail of one of them. I fired five or six bursts and he started to smoke. He burst into flames and slipped down to the sea.¹⁰

Captain George F. Williams, of Austin, TX., Salmon’s wingman, added: I broke to the left and got into position. I opened up and hit him. He began to burn. The other six MiGs made a brief firing pass and then fled north.¹¹

The Air Force disclosed that the Sabre jets belonged to the 335th Squadron of the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing, based at Chitose, Japan, but was now on TDY or temporary duty in Korea. The squadron has been credited with destroying 200 enemy planes during the Korean War.¹²

(According to records complied by the History Channel, 78 F-86s and 560 MiGs were shot down during the Korean War. And according to Wikipedia, the U.S. claimed to have shot down 792 Chinese aircraft and 270 North Korean aircraft. Russians piloted 319 of the lost aircraft. Among the 2,300 U.S. aircraft lost were 34 B-29 Super Fortresses.)

A week later, the Communists charged that four allied jets and one propeller-driven plane had intruded into North Korean territory near the mouth of the Yalu River––the boundary between North Korea and Communist China. The UNC then formally charged the Communists with violating the armistice by bringing MiG-15 jet fighters into North Korea. According to Maj. Gen. Leslie D. Carter, the chief UNC delegate to the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), there were no MiG-15s in North Korea when the armistice was signed. General Carter wrote a letter to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, in which he accused the Reds of operating MiG-15s from six North Korean air bases. He specified Uiju, Namsi, Taechon, Pyongyang East (or Mirimni) Sunan and Pyongni.

And in yet another clarification, the U.S. State Department disclosed in late February that the air battle earlier in the month had not, as previously reported, taken place over the Yellow Sea; rather, it . . . had ended over North Korean territory. The Americans defended the action as in keeping with a policy of hot pursuit.¹³ The UNC then accused the Communists of hastily pulling out more than 150 Soviet-built jets from six bases to hide them from the eyes of inspection teams. The presence of the jets was detected by continuous radar surveillance employed by the UNC.¹⁴

Concurrently, the Chinese Communists accused the U.S. of preparing to attack China from three fronts. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had said earlier that the Communists had apparently intended to challenge the United States in Korea, Indochina and Formosa. He warned that . . . the United States must meet hostile forces with the greater force that we possess. In response, an official Chinese Communist radio editorial monitored in Tokyo stated that with regard to Korea, the United States had . . . consistently violated the Korean armistice commission, equipped and expanded the Syngman Rhee Army and worked unilaterally for abolition of the Korean Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.¹⁵

. . .

The military situation in Korea remained relatively static until the morning of 10 May. In a dispatch from Tokyo, the UNC reported that U.S. Air Force Sabre jets had shot down two enemy MiGs, and had probably destroyed another in an air battle over the Yellow Sea. Eight U.S. jets were attacked . . . over international waters by twelve to sixteen Communist fighters.

All the American planes returned safely to base. The planes were on a patrol mission off the west coast of North Korea when attacked. Two Communist pilots bailed out and the third was last seen diving straight down trailing smoke.¹⁶ The battle took place some fifty miles southwest of Sinuiju, a city on the Yalujiang River between China and North Korea. It was the third major air battle in the same general area in sixteen months. According to the UNC, the air battle brought the MiG kill total to five, with an additional one probable kill.

Reacting to the rising level of hostilities, the Chinese Communists accused the U.S. of provoking the air battles. A Peking broadcast alleged that . . . the United States planes had violated China’s territorial air,’ and claimed that one American jet had been shot down and two others damaged.

The Chinese broadcast stated that U.S. fighters had passed over two Chinese islands southwest of Antung, Manchuria, thus committing a grave military provocation. The broadcast claimed that the incident began some three miles west of the islands.¹⁷

The U.S. Air Force Far East Command reiterated that the American Sabre jets had been attacked by twelve to sixteen MiG-15s about 50 miles southwest of Sinuiju, North Korea, well over international waters. The Americans said that the Chinese allegations were just the usual Communist propaganda, and denied that any American planes had been shot down or damaged.¹⁸

In a subsequent press release, the Far East Command amended the earlier estimated of Communist planes. Now they said that there were at least 32 MiGs in the attacking force. In addition to the confirmed kills, another two enemy aircraft were probably downed.¹⁹

At the Panmunjom truce site, the UNC formally protested the Communist air attacks. Major General Harlan C. Parks, chief UNC delegate, warned that the United Nations . . . will not be deterred by such hostile and illegal acts from continuing reconnaissance flights over international waters.

A day earlier at Panmunjom, the Communists presented the UNC with a gruesome gift: the bodies of six mutilated Asian soldiers. The North Koreans said that they were the remains of a South Korean Army patrol killed in the past week while attempting to cross into North Korea.

The UNC refused to accept the bodies, saying that they were in such bad condition that it was impossible to determine their nationality. The UNC also refused to accept a live Korean––an individual who the Communists insisted was the only surviving member of the annihilated ROK patrol.²⁰

The next incident in the bizarre borderline warfare between the belligerents occurred in June. A six-man Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) patrol was fired on by enemy soldiers as they stopped to load an old aircraft engine on a truck. Two of the soldiers were killed. The UNC insisted that the soldiers had not entered Communist territory.²¹

Meanwhile, the South Korean Office of Public Information released a fourteen-page document stating that North Korea was under direct Soviet control. Furthermore, the North Koreans were making plans for another invasion of the South. Much of the information was provided by two North Korean Air Force defectors. The men claimed that the North Korean Air Force had 580 combat planes, and that the new planes were arriving from the Soviet Union regularly.²²

In what would evolve into a consistent pattern of threat and counter-threat, the South Koreans ever––and for good reason––the more militant of the anti-Communist partners, repeatedly requested that they be provided with the military wherewithal to counter the ongoing threat from the North Korean Communists.

Ever sensitive to the perceived bias of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the South Koreans demanded that it be disbanded. Warning that the North Koreans had been . . . steadily increasing their air fleets and bases, the South Korean Air Force Command estimated that the Communists now had 3,850 planes, half of them jet fighters and bombers, within easy striking distance of South Korea. Most of the Communist planes were located near Shanghai and in the Chintao-Dairen areas in southwestern Manchuria and in North Korea.²³

An unidentified South Korean officer said . . . that more than 300 jet fighters had been shipped into North Korea illegally since the armistice two years ago. He added that the Communists in all areas near South Korea are quietly but steadily building up air and ground strength, and I understand they are in other areas too, like Formosa and Southeast Asia. He said that North Korea had twenty-two airfield, ten of them operational for jets, and two of them were within a few miles of the DMZ. People don’t build fighter bases that close unless they intend