Regulus: The Forgotten Weapon

The first successful flight of the Navy’s LTV-N-2 Loon took place on 12 April 1946 from Pt. Mugu, California. (Courtesy of Dzikowski Collection)

PART I

A NEW ERA IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS

CHAPTER ONE: THE GUIDED MISSILE - A NEW WEAPON SYSTEM

In the closing months of World War II, guided missile technology blossomed as a technological breakthrough for the delivery of offensive weapons. The German V-1 buzz bomb cruise missile proved to be a crude but potentially devastating weapon. Even more frightening was the technologically advanced V-2 ballistic missile. Given an equally advanced guidance system, the V-2 could well have changed the course of history. Submarine-fired unguided rocket weapons were used near the end of World War II when USS Barb (SS 220) and USS Seahorse (SS 304), using experimental 5-inch rocket launchers, bombarded both military and industrial targets on the Japanese home islands from ranges of approximately 4.500 yards.¹

At the end of hostilities with Japan, military planners in the U.S. armed forces, as well as around the world, believed with varying degrees of foresight that they had witnessed the twilight of conventional warfare. For the next fifteen years, the struggle within the United States armed forces for supremacy in the delivery of strategic as well as tactical nuclear weapons was waged primarily between the Navy and the Air Force.

From 1947 to 1953 the field of guided missile technology in the United States grew at a tremendous pace. with over 114 separate missile weapons systems contracted as development projects during this period. At the end of the Korean War in 1953. the list had been pared down considerably with only 25 guided missile projects reaching flight hardware stage.² The Navy had only one surface-to-surface guided missile (SSM) program, Regulus, which was well into its third year of flight testing and development.

With the multitude of nuclear weapon delivery systems potentially available, which one. or ones, would be most feasible, efficient or economical? In the Fall of 1954, President Eisenhower created the Technological Capabilities Panel, led by James R. Killian, a highly respected scientist, to review the many possible options and prioritized them for consideration by Congress and the Administration. The Killian Committee report was submitted in February 1955. The committee felt that Soviet ballistic missiles would soon be a nearly overwhelming threat to the security of the United States. Foremost in its suggestions was the recommendation to proceed with both intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles armed with thermonuclear warheads to counter the perceived near-term Soviet threat.

With the detonation of the first deliverable Soviet hydrogen bomb on 23 November 1955, one of the greatest fears of the Eisenhower Administration was realized. The Killian Committee’s findings assumed even more importance as both the military and political ramifications of U.S. strategic deterrence were debated by Congress, the intelligence community, the military and the Administration. The intermediate range ballistic missile would be easier to develop and build since its guidance system needed to be accurate over only a 1,500 nautical mile range rather than the 6.000 to 7.000 nautical mile range of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Utilizing already established Allied military bases in Europe and the Mediterranean on the perimeter of the Soviet Union or the Iron Curtain countries, these shorter range ballistic missiles would be able to reach the Soviet Union quickly but would be much more vulnerable to attack in their forward positions. Once developed and operational, intercontinental ballistic missiles would be safely based in the United States and augment the intermediate range missiles.

The Killian Committee had strongly recommended the development of a sea-launched intermediate range ballistic missile. In November 1955 the Department of Defense created a joint Army-Navy project to direct development of a sea-launched version of the Army’s liquid-fueled Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missile. The Navy preferred the use of a solid-fuel missile but had been unable to demonstrate that the timetable for its development would be faster for deployment then that of the Jupiter joint project. Nonetheless, the Navy realized that in order to keep in the mainstream of strategic nuclear weapon delivery, they would have to develop a fleet ballistic missile, liquid-fueled or not. With Regulus I already well into the development stage, the Navy had plans in place for building a longer range. Mach 2, follow-on to Regulus I, Regulus II. The Regulus missile family would thus be employed as an ancillary component to the Navy’s strategic weapons during ballistic missile development as well as provide a viable alternative should unforeseen problems arise in the fleet ballistic missile program’s development or basing phases.

THE NAVY IN TRANSITION

At the end of World War II, the United States Navy was the most powerful naval force in the world. The naval forces of Germany and Japan were destroyed or being dismantled: Russia, not yet perceived as a peacetime threat, was considered, due to her vast land mass, to be relatively immune to attack by sea and without need for a strong offensive naval force. Within this setting the Navy had to accomplish two fundamental tasks in order to retain its strong position within the military establishment. First, the Navy had to demonstrate that contrary to popular perception, the atomic bomb had not rendered naval tactics or basic naval strategic functions obsolete. Second, the Navy had to make a strong case for attaining an essential role in the delivery of atomic weapons, or face the function fostered by the Air Force of being merely an escort and support service.³

THE ATOMIC BOMB VS. THE U.S. NAVY

The tremendous devastation wrought by atomic weapons had been conclusively demonstrated on two densely populated land targets. Inconclusive attempts to extrapolate the blast effects of the atomic bomb on naval forces led the Navy in September. 1945, to propose an actual test of the effects of atomic weapons on an array of ships. After considerable debate and infighting as to which service would be responsible for overall control of the test, President Truman settled the arguments on 10 January 1946 by approving a joint task force of Army, Air Force. Navy and civilian personnel.⁴ Operation Crossroads, the official name for the test. was conducted by Joint Task Force ONE, commanded by Vice Admiral William Blandy, an experienced and widely respected ordnance officer. The original operations plan included three atomic weapons tests: Test ABLE. an air burst from a tethered balloon and Tests BAKER and CHARLIE, underwater bursts with the weapon suspended under an LCU-type amphibious landing craft for BAKER and a weapon placed much deeper, in a bathysphere, for CHARLIE. Once the Air Force was included. they made a strong case to change Test ABLE to bomber delivery since only three atomic bombs had been detonated to date with just two dropped from an aircraft. The aircrews and weapon assembly teams needed the practice. Practice. in one sense, was true, since the Nagasaki-type Fat Man implosion weapon, with a yield of 23 kilotons (KT. equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT). had to be assembled by a 38 man team working over a 48 hour period.⁵

Test ABLE was designed to evaluate the effect of air pressure shock waves and intense radiation on an anchored fleet. Radioactive contamination of the ships was not expected to be of major concern since the fireball would not touch the surface (an airburst is defined as a nuclear explosion where the fireball at its maximum expansion does not touch the ground or water surface). The 93 ships of the test array included the German cruiser Prince Eugen, the Japanese battleship Nagato and light cruiser Sakawa as well as U.S. ships including the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga (CV 3). the battleships USS Nevada (BB 36), USS Pennsylvania (BB 38). USS New York (BB 34) and USS Arkansas (BB 33), and a combination of destroyers. submarines, attack transports. landing ships of several types, barges and a floating dry dock. The ships were made as war ready as possible, including loading fuel and ammunition on board as necessary. By the time Operation Crossroads was prepared for the first detonation. Joint Task Force ONE was composed of 42,000 personnel, 156 aircraft, 10,000 cameras and 251 ships (both in the target array and the support fleet).⁶

Several classes of ships, notably destroyers, attack transports and landing craft, were arrayed in a radial manner from the intended ground zero target, the battleship Nevada. This disposition was designed to allow evaluation of the gradation of the blast effect using the same type of ship in each arm of the radial array. Twenty of the 65 ships were located within one square mile of ground zero. Normal naval doctrine at the time for anchorage of this many ships would have had only 4 to 8 ships in a one square mile area. Similarly, a tactical array for a carrier task force in the open ocean called for only one capitol ship per square mile.⁷

The Test ABLE took place on 1 July 1946. The bomb was dropped from 28,000 feet by the B-29 Dave’s Dream of the 394th Strategic Bomb Wing, Rosewell, New Mexico. The weapon detonated at an altitude of 520 feet and between 1,500 and 2,000 feet west of the target. The only capital ships within one-half mile of the actual ground zero were the battleships Nevada and Arkansas and the heavy cruiser Pensacola. Little damage was done to the hulls and turrets of these ships, but the superstructures suffered considerably. At three quarters of a mile from ground zero there was little physical damage to the anchored vessels. Trucks and planes placed on the decks of the various ships were still recognizable, even on the Nevada. Five ships sank, six ships were seriously damaged, eight ships suffered seriously impaired efficiency and nine ships were moderately damaged. Several of the ships beyond 750 yards were reboarded on I July 1946 and used for crew quarters by 2 July.⁸

Test BAKER, detonated on 25 July 1946, at a depth of 90 feet, was designed to test the effect of the underwater shock wave on ship hulls as well as the ability to decontaminate the ships that were doused with radioactive water and other debris. Ninety-two ships were used, most of which were survivors of Test ABLE and arrayed in a similar manner. The atomic blast generated a column of water 2,200 feet in diameter and 6,000 feet in height, containing an estimated 10 million gallons of highly radioactive water. The largest ship near ground zero, the battleship Arkansas, was lifted vertically in the water column and sank moments later. Several smaller ships nearby also sank immediately. The stern of the Saratoga was lifted 130 feet into the air and she sank eight hours later. The battleship Nagato sank after four days. The second underwater test, Test CHARLIE, was canceled due to engineering difficulties with the bathysphere hardware.⁹

Evaluation of the results from these two tests indicated that no ship within a mile of either an underwater or air burst of an atomic weapon with a yield of 23 KT would escape serious structural damage or serious radiation injury to the crew. The Air Force and other critics pointed out that only 10% of the ships used in the test were left unscathed, indicating that massed surface fleets should be considered highly vulnerable to atomic weapon attacks and hence were obsolete. The Navy countered that the ships were massed, anchored and defenseless. Furthermore, the artificial arrangement of the ships in both tests yielded inconclusive results since tactiral deployment formations were completely different. The Navy, however, did delay and eventually cancel the construction of the large battlecruiser USS Hawaii (CB 3) and battleship USS Kentucky (BB 66). Much to the surprise of the Navy and the consternation of the Air Force, the public and political opinions from the test results were that the Navy had dramatically proven that it still had a strong role to play in the atomic age.

Just what was this role to be? Determination of possible strategic directions had begun well before Operation Crossroads and were reaching their culmination as it became evident that the probable major menace to the United States was to be the Soviet Union. The Soviet Navy did not yet have a major naval presence of capital ships, most notably aircraft carriers, but was feared to have a significant and growing fleet of modern submarines due to the capture of advanced German U-Boat designs. The U.S. Navy focused its attention on naval aviation and anti-submarine warfare based on killer submarines. The aviators desired large super carriers for projection of naval tactical and possible strategic nuclear capabilities. Anti-submarine warfare advocates requested improved submarine technology and anti-submarine weapons.

USS Cusk (SS 348) prepares to launch LTV-N-2 Loon missile on 7 July 1948. The missile container could hold one missile with wings detached. This long launch ramp was soon replaced by a shorter launcher which greatly improved Cusk’s underwater performance. (Courtesy of Christensen Collection). Sequence continued on pages 14 and 15.

SUBMARINES AND THE PROJECTION OF UNDERSEA POWER

At the conclusion of World War II, submariners understood that the days of convoy busting, anti-shipping attacks were over. The perceived enemy, the Soviet Union, had only a rudimentary need for a merchant marine and had no major naval forces to protect shipping or to project power. Indeed, the initial major emphasis in construction for the Soviet Navy was that of submarines for use in protecting the Soviet mainland by forcing American aircraft carriers far from the Soviet coast. Naval strategists, both American and Allied, realized that anti-submarine warfare using submarines was going to be an arduous task.

Aside from the defensive anti-submarine warfare and submarine radar picket roles, a group of submariners led by Captain Thomas Klakring, a World War II submarine hero, saw an opportunity to combine the covert capabilities of a submerged submarine with the over-the-horizon projection possibilities of guided missiles. This idea moved from a conceptual stage in 1946 to the contract stage in 1947. Two options were possible for such a system; a cruise missile and a ballistic missile. The ideal submarine cruise missile was considered to be one that could be launched from a torpedo tube while submerged but the submariners realized that such a capability was considerably in the future, so surfaced launch was selected. The ballistic missile option was shelved temporarily in anticipation of development of necessary missile propulsion, decrease in atomic warhead size and improvement in long-range guidance capability.

THE NAVY’S GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM BEFORE REGULUS

PROJECT DERBY

In April 1945, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) established Project DERBY at Pt. Mugu, California. Its mission was to train personnel in the assembly, operation and launch of the Air Force JB-2 cruise missile, an Americanized version of the German V-1. The Navy version was named Loon and had both KUW-1 and cruise missile LTV-N-2 designators. Modifications made in the missile from the German production version included radio command control to permit left, right and dive commands as well as the use of a radar beacon to assist in tracking the missile. Since mid-1945 the Navy had been observing the Air Force program in Florida with the JB-2 and had plans to utilize the missile as a bombardment weapon during the invasion of Japan. Fifty-one missiles had been purchased from the Air Force with another 100 to be built and delivered by Republic Aviation.¹⁰ With the end of the war in the Pacific, the program was reoriented towards an intriguing concept, the development of submarine cruise missile launch capability.

Project DERBY launch activity began with the first Loon launch on 7 January 1946 from the beach at Pt. Mugu, California.¹¹ The pulse-jet engine died during the take-off run up the launch ramp and the missile splashed into the ocean one mile offshore. On 12 April 1946, the first successful launch took place and the Navy to authorized conversion of two submarines, one as a combination launch and guidance submarine and the other as guidance only. Slightly more than one year later, on 7 March 1947, USS Cusk (SS 348), launched and successfully guided a Loon missile.¹² Three months later USS Carbonero (SS 337) joined Project DERBY as a Loon guidance submarine.

Loon flight operations rapidly became routine but not without a steep learning curve. During the early launches the missile would frequently pitch up violently upon leaving the launcher guide rails. Dr. Wilhelm Willie Fiedler, a German V-1 scientist who was working at Pt. Mugu on other projects, pointed out the solution to the concerned project officers. The alignment of the multiple jet-assisted take-off bottles (JATO bottles) thrust had to be through the center of gravity of the combined launch sled and missile assembly, not just through the center of gravity of the missile.

Seconds after booster ignition, the booster rockets exploded, bursting the missile fuel tank. (Courtesy of Berry Collection)

Parts of the launch ramp shoot by the missile as it tumbles off the launcher onto the deck. (Courtesy of Berry Collection)

The original 40 foot long launcher rails installed on Cusk were cumbersome and caused considerable drag while submerged. A much shorter 12 foot rail launcher was installed on Carbonero and proved very successful. Cusk was also modified by the addition of an on-deck missile hanger aft of the conning tower to permit transport of one Loon missile.

PROJECT POUNCE

In May 1949, OPNAV directed the Commander, Submarine Force. Pacific Fleet, to determine the operational capabilities of the Loon missile. This task was given to Commander, Submarine Division FIFTY-ONE and code named Project POUNCE.¹³ While the technical assistance of the NAMTC staff was still available. this program was to be self-sustaining if at all possible in order to make it a valid test. Project POUNCE would evaluate equipment used for launching, tracking and guiding missiles launched from submarines as well as evaluate the current maintenance and launching techniques for use in locations remote from major support facilities.¹⁴ Project POUNCE program efforts culminated six months later in a combined fleet exercise, Operation Miki. conducted in the Hawaiian Islands fleet operating areas in November 1949. The submarine-tender USS Sperry (AS 12) deployed to Pearl Harbor with four LTV-N-2 missiles and associated support equipment. Cusk and Carbonero deployed from Port Hueneme under simulated wartime conditions.

The weather on the day of the test was far from optimal with 20-30 knot winds. The first launch by Cusk was successful but the missile splashed 25 miles downrange. Carbonero launched a second Loon that flew untouched over the fleet as they tried to shoot it down with anti-aircraft fire. With these attempts unsuccessful, aircraft were directed to shoot the missile down as it cruised at 10,000 feet and 300 knots. The missile was not shot down, finally splashing into the ocean due to fuel exhaustion.

The final report on Project POUNCE was cautiously optimistic. On the one hand, the submarine force had achieved a remarkable 83% launch success, 90% guidance control and 100% tracking record. Forward deployment had been demonstrated to be feasible. The short rail launcher concept had proven to be reliable and could easily replace the 40 foot launcher on Cusk. On the other hand, the Loon was found not to be acceptable as a tactical missile. If absolutely necessary, they could be made into tactical weapons but their best use would be as test vehicles for further research and development programs in support of newer, more up-to-date missiles.

The report finished with a ringing endorsement of the submarine launched guided missile concept by Commander John S. McCain, Jr.:

...operations conducted during this period definitely have proven that the use of guided missiles from submarines as an offensive weapon is a progressive step in the expanding study of naval warfare.¹⁵

The report further recommended that an interim submarine guided missile program be continued. This would serve to retain the nucleus of technical support personnel in the submarine force and permit continued evaluation of newer guidance and launching equipment as it became available. Specific improvements were also listed in the report. These included: improved guidance, especially for submerged submarines; evaluation of a single booster rather then the cluster of boosters currently used; missile launch operations in rough weather to understand the difficulties that might develop; and, finally, inclusion of even this interim system in fleet exercises to further test the ability of the surface navy to combat such a new weapon system. After submission of the report, Loon launch operations continued on a reduced scale of approximately one launch per month.

PROJECT TROUNCE

On 17 May 1950 OPNAV established Project TROUNCE within Project DERBY.¹⁶ Project TROUNCE was tasked with the preparation submarine personnel for operational evaluation of the new Regulus missile which had just begun its test and development program. Manned drone aircraft were used to evaluate and improve submerged guidance techniques for use in the tracking of Loon. Project TROUNCE was also the beginning of a new guidance system that used paired-pulse radar signals for transmitting guidance commands to the missile. The primitive radio command control guidance system of Loon, while a distinct improvement over the original German guidance system used in the V-1, was considered too vulnerable to electronic countermeasures. The new radar command control system was given the name Trounce.¹⁷

Loon launches continued, albeit at a slower pace, and the Phase I Trounce guidance system was ready for testing in June 1951. Phase II was the Phase I system modified to prevent interference by electronic countermeasures and was to be ready in time for use in the Regulus program by the middle of 1952. Phase I tests indicated, however, that the Trounce system was sufficiently secure from electronic countermeasures so that the Phase II program could be reduced. Of all the new developments proposed in the Phase II portion of the program, the radar bearing and range accuracy as well as the strength of the radar transponder beacon were the most critical. The guidance computer could be no more accurate than its inputs and the range of the radar beacon signal return would be the deciding factor in the missile’s maximum tracking range.

Commander Walter P. Murphy was Officer-in-Charge of Project DERBY during the beginning of the Trounce development program. The Trounce guidance system was more or less designed in the field by Paul Fiske and the civilian engineering staff of the Naval Electronics Laboratory (NEL), San Diego, working in conjunction with the officers and men of Cusk and Carbonero. The technical hurdle that had to be overcome was the reliable and reproducible generation of paired-pulse radar signals as well as reception and decoding by the guidance system on board the missile. This required electronic time delays of reliable and consistent length. The time delays used were O.15, 0.2 or 0.25 seconds. Thus, a pulse pair with a time delay of 0.15 seconds was the command to turn 2.5 degrees to the right, a time delay of 0.2 seconds commanded a 2.5 degree turn to the left and the time delay of 0.25 seconds commanded the terminal dive to target. Murphy recalls that the encoder and decoders were designed to tolerate no more than plus or minus 0.025 seconds in the spacing between signals. This was pushing the state-of-the-art with the balky vacuum tubes available at the time.¹⁸

Flames engulf Cusk as the missile fuel is ignited. Lieutenant Commander Fred T. Berry, CO of Cusk, submerged the boat to extinguish the fire. As the smoke cleared, everyone thought Cusk had sunk. (Courtesy of Berry Collection)

Cusk surfaces much to the relief of all concerned. This photo sequence is probably the best remembered of the Loon program. (Courtesy of Berry Collection)

USS Carbonero (SS 337) preparing to launch a Loon LTV-N-2 missile on 19 May 1949. Note the short rail launcher compared to the earlier ramp launcher. Carbonero was not fitted with a missile hangar. (Courtesy of G. Peed Collection)

The submarine SV-1 air-search radar antenna was a source of many of the early problems with range and bearing accuracy using Trounce guidance. The SV-1 had not been designed with this kind of tracking in mind. The modifications were not trivial and further complicated the maintenance of the system. First, the radar had been modified to permit sector scanning of a 10-20 degree arc. Second, magnetron radar signal sources had to be carefully hand-matched to permit effective control by more than one guidance control station. This proved to be a continuing problem until the beginning of the Regulus program. The early solution was to burn-in a large number of magnetrons to eliminate the unreliable ones. Tubes were then selected whose characteristics matched closely enough to permit dual-station control of the missile.¹⁹

Two major problems with Trounce were soon evident. The transponder beacon signal was present in only the center seven to eight degrees of the twenty-degree sector scan. Since the pulsed radar command would only be properly received if it was sent when the beacon was essentially centered within the radar beam, coordination and training on the part of the Trounce operators was crucial, almost an art. Clearly this feature or deficiency would have to be rectified before the Trounce guidance system could become operational. The other major difficulty was the requirement that the radar system’s magnetron be modified such that the system, which was not intended to send paired-pulses, could both transmit the guidance pulses and also work as a normal radar when required.²⁰

On 4 May 1951 Cusk and Carbonero participated in Operation REX, a simulated Loon missile attack on San Diego. One escort aircraft carrier, three destroyers, five destroyer escorts and all aircraft available in the Southern California Sector of the Western Sea Frontier conducted anti-submarine operations to locate the two submarines but were unsuccessful. The simulated attack included surfacing, readying the missile for launch and having a manned Lockheed P-80 drone aircraft fly the simulated missile flight path while under Trounce control from the submarines. Cusk simulated the launch, controlled the aircraft for the first 55 miles and then transferred control to Carbonero. Neither the aircraft nor either submarine were detected even though Cusk had spent 18 minutes on the surface. Yet again, the covert potency of such a weapon system was demonstrated and, yet again, much to the chagrin of the surface naval forces, a submarine-launched guided missile proved to he extremely elusive.²¹

After one year of evaluation, the Trounce I guidance system was installed in Loon #622 and launched from Cusk on 28 June 1951. The launch and initial guidance was successful but 15 miles down-range the engine failed and the missile splashed. Twenty-two days later, Loon # 1071 was launched from NAMTC and successfully guided by both Cusk and Carbonero as well as the flight test control center at NAMTC. While the dive command from Carbonero was not received by the missile, the NAMTC Trounce system successfully commanded a dive to impact. ²²

The Trounce I guidance system continued to evolve as refinements were made in the field to make the system more reliable. By 1952 all Loon flights were controlled by the Trounce I guidance system and the twenty-five war reserve Loon missiles were configured for Trounce I. Electronic countermeasures tests conducted at the end of the Project TROUNCE indicated a low susceptibility.²³ The Phase II test and evaluation process resulted in recommendations for modifications to the SV-1 radar. The new system would be designated as the SV-5 radar. This included the associated CP-98 guidance computer for automatic calculation of course corrections to the missile. The SV-5 radar was fabricated by Stavid Engineering of Plainfield, New Jersey, and permitted more accurate range and bearing information for input into the computer. Field tests began in late December 1952. The submarine community felt that the Trounce system was now co-equal to the rival, bipolar navigation system which required a launch submarine and two picket signal boats near the target. Combining the high performance of the Regulus I missile with Trounce guidance would result in a much more formidable weapon than Loon.²⁴

PROJECT SLAM

With the completion of the Phase II objectives of the Project TROUNCE program, OPNAV replaced Project TROUNCE with Project SLAM (Submarine Launched Attack Missile) on 10 September 1952. Project SLAM was to continue readying fleet personnel for Regulus missile operations, while launching Loon missiles to maintain proficiency and testing operational tactics.²⁵

On 1 January 1953, Project DERBY was formally disestablished and Guided Missile Unit FIFTY (GMU-50) formed in its place under Commander Submarine Squadron FIVE at the Naval Air Missile Test Center.²⁶ GMU-50 was further expanded in late 1953 with the addition of the personnel from Guided Missile Training Unit FIVE who were training in Regulus flight operations at Pt. Mugu and Edwards Air Force Base, California.

Project SLAM was organized to maintain Loon assets in such a state that they could be used as an interim tactical weapon prior to Regulus becoming operational. The remaining Loon missiles would be launched at a rate projected to expend them by June 1954, approximately five missiles per quarter. With the introduction of Regulus into the Operational Development Force program, projected for the 1954 time frame, Loon operations were curtailed nine months early. The last launch of a Loon missile took place 11 September 1953 when LTV-N-2 #121 was lost due to the misalignment of the single booster rocket.²⁷

Cusk and Carbonero were converted to Regulus guidance submarines, operating in the West Coast Regulus program as well as deploying to Pearl Harbor during the Regulus strategic deterrent program of 1959-1964.

Endnotes

1

Sink’em All, Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, 1984, Bantam Books New York, page 327.

2

How We Fell Behind in Guided Missiles, Trevor Gardner, 1958, Air Force Historical Foundation 51:3-13.

3

While technically still the Army Air Force at this time. Air Force is used throughout the book for consistency.

4

Operation Crossroads- 1946. Defense Nuclear Agency Report Number i 1984, page 18.

5

US Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950. David Alan Rosenberg, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists May 1982, page 29.

6

Operation Crossroads-1946. Defense Nuclear Agency Report Number 6032F. 1984, page 94.

7

Ibid., page 90

8

Ibid. pages 191-192.

9

Ibid., page 19.

10

The History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles, Rear Admiral Delmar S. Fahrney. 1958, Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives; pages 586-596; 798-818.

11

The Pt. Mugu facilities were part of the field test program from the Naval Air Modification Unit, Johnsville, Pennsylvania. Pt. Mugu did not become the Naval Air Missile Test Center until 1 October 1946. Days of Challenge, Years of Excellence: A Technical History of the Pacific Missile Test Center, 1989, page 5. United States Printing Office.

12

The first successful launch of a Loon from Cusk had taken place on 18 February 1947 but crashed three miles down range (History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles, Rear Admiral Delmar Fahey, pages 586-596).

13

Project POUNCE, CNO sec Itr OP3420/nr(sg)s78; ser 0092P34 of 9 May 1949. Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, COMSUBDIV 51.

14

Ibid.

15

Project POUNCE: Final Report, FB-51/ A1(POUNCE) ser0017GM, page 2; 16 January 1950. Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives. COMSUBDIV 51.

16

TROUNCE was considered to be the acronym of Terrain Radar Omnidirectional Underwater Navigational Computing Equipment. There is no historical evidence for this. TROUNCE was simply the name of the project and it was used as the name of the guidance system, Trounce.

17

CNO sec Itr ser 00258P34 of 17 May 1950

18

Personal communication with Captain W. Pat Murphy, USN (Ret.), November 1990.

19

Ibid.

20

Ibid.

21

Submarine Guided Missile Program (phrase II-Project TROUNCE). Semi-Annual Report for April-September 1951. FB4-11/51:AARF:jms A1. Ser 004, 16 October 1951, page 2. Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, COMSUBDIV 51.

22

Submarine Guided Missile Program (Phase II-Project TROUNCE) Semi-Annual Report for April-September 1951. FB4-11/51:ARF:jus A1, ser 004, 16 Oct 1951, page 3, enclosure (1). Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, COMSUBDIV 51.

23

Semi-annual report on Submarine-Launched Attack Missile Program (Project SLAM) - period I Oct 1952 to 31 March 1953; page 4. (enclosure 2). Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives. COMSUBDIV 51.

24

Semi-annual report on Submarine-Launched Attack Missile Program (Project SLAM) - period 1 Oct 1952 to 31 March 1953; page 1, (enclosure 2). Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, COMSUBDIV 51.

25

CNO sec Itr OP511/jek ser 0036P37 of 10 September 1952. Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, COMSUBDIV 51.

26

Ibid.

27

"Semi-annual report on Submarine Launched Attack Missile Program (Project-SLAM) - period 1 Oct 1952 to 31 March 1953; page III-C; Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives COMSUBDIV 51. The History of Pilotless Aircraft and Guided Missiles by Delmer S. Fahrney, 1958. Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives, page 1126.

TM-1146 is launched on 11 October 1956 from Norton Sound. This was the first long range flight, and guidance was successfully passed between Tunny and Carbonero during the 47 minute flight. (Courtesy of Wilkes Collection)