Freedom of expression and defamation

Introduction

Background

The present study is a continuation of previous work on the relationship between the right to freedom of expression and defamation by the Media and Internet Division of the Council of Europe.

In 2012, the secretariat of the Steering Committee on Media and Information Society (CDMSI) prepared a Study on the alignment of laws and practices concerning defamation with the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on freedom of expression, particularly with regard to the principle of proportionality.[2] The study was itself an update and revision of the working document prepared by the CDMSI’s forerunner, the Steering Committee on the Media and New Communication Services (CDMC), published on 15 March 2006.[3]

The 2012 study investigates, among other things, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) on freedom of expression in the context of defamation cases, and it reviews Council of Europe and other international standards on defamation. It contains information on the legal provisions on defamation in various Council of Europe member states. It also attempts to identify trends in the development of rules on defamation, both in national legal systems and in international law.

Structure and scope

The present study examines the voluminous case law of the Court relating to freedom of expression and defamation, but not the other focuses of the 2012 study. This shift of emphasis has facilitated an examination of the Court’s case law that is much more detailed than that of the 2012 study. As such, a different structure has been chosen, in order to organise the expanded material in an appropriate manner. It remains in line with the 2012 study, though, not least by retaining the principle of proportionality as one of its central focuses. It also draws on the original text of the 2012 study in places, as appropriate.

The study starts by clarifying the concept of defamation and positioning it in relation to freedom of expression and public debate. It explains how defamation laws that are overly protective of reputational interests and that provide for far-reaching remedies or sanctions can have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and public debate. The principle of proportionality in respect of defamation laws and their application is therefore very important when it comes to preventing such a chilling effect.

The study then identifies the key principles governing that relationship and traces patterns in how the Court has applied those principles in its case law dealing with defamation. In doing so, it explores a range of substantive and procedural issues that have been considered by the Court in its relevant case law. The substantive issues include the scope of defamation (law), its application to different subjects, the responsibility and liability of different actors, and defences to defamation. The procedural issues include procedural safeguards, civil measures and remedies, and criminal sanctions.

As the Court’s expansive jurisprudence on freedom of expression and defamation continues to grow, in both volume and complexity,[4] the main aim of this study is to provide a detailed, yet accessible, analysis of this body of jurisprudence.

Chapter 1

Defining and positioning defamation

1.1. Freedom of expression

Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (The Convention) is the centrepiece of the Council of Europe’s system for the protection of the right to freedom of expression. It reads:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

Article 10 § 1 sets out the right to freedom of expression as a compound right comprising three distinct components: the freedom to hold opinions; the freedom to receive information and ideas; and the freedom to impart information and ideas. Article 10 § 1 also countenances the possibility for states to regulate audiovisual media by means of licensing schemes.

Article 10 § 2 then proceeds to delineate the scope of the core right set out in the preceding paragraph. It does so by enumerating a number of grounds, based on which the right may legitimately be restricted, provided that the restrictions are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society. It justifies this approach by linking the permissibility of restrictions on the right to freedom of expression to the existence of duties and responsibilities that govern its exercise. The scope of those duties and responsibilities varies, depending on the situation of the person exercising the right to freedom of expression and on the technical means used.[5] The Court has tended to explore the nature and scope of relevant duties and responsibilities not through broad principles, but on a case-by-case basis. It tends to distinguish among different professional occupations, such as journalism, politics, education and military service. The relevance of such distinctions from the perspective of public debate will be explored in section 1.3, below.

Article 10, as interpreted by the Court, provides strong protection to the right to freedom of expression. The Court consistently describes the right as one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment.[6] As the Court affirmed in its seminal judgment in Handyside v. the United Kingdom, freedom of expression is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic society’ (§ 49). This principle creates the necessary space for robust, pluralistic public debate in democratic society. Section 1.3 explores the interplay between robust debate and reputational interests because, as the Court has pointed out, in this field, political invective often spills over into the personal sphere; such are the hazards of politics and the free debate of ideas, which are the guarantees of a democratic society.[7]

The Court has developed a standard test to determine whether Article 10 of the Convention has been violated. Put simply, whenever it has been established that there has been an interference with the right to freedom of expression, that interference must first of all be prescribed by law (that is it must be adequately accessible and reasonably foreseeable in its consequences). Second, it must pursue a legitimate aim, that is correspond to one of the aims set out in Article 10 § 2. For the purposes of this study, the protection of the reputation or rights of others is of central importance. Third, the interference must be necessary in a democratic society, that is, it must correspond to a pressing social need and be proportionate to the legitimate aim(s) pursued.

Under the margin of appreciation doctrine, which takes account of how the Convention is interpreted at national level, states are given a certain amount of discretion in how they regulate expression.[8] The extent of this discretion, which is subject to supervision by the Court, varies depending on the nature of the expression in question. Whereas states only have a narrow margin of appreciation in respect of political expression, they enjoy a wider margin of appreciation in respect of public morals, decency and religion. This dichotomy is usually explained by the long-established acceptance of the importance in a democracy of political expression in a broad sense and by the absence of a European consensus on whether/how matters such as public morals, decency and religion should be regulated. When exercising its supervisory function, the Court does not take the place of the national authorities, but reviews the decisions taken by the national authorities pursuant to their margin of appreciation under Article 10 of the Convention. Thus, the Court looks at the expression complained of in the broader circumstances of the case and determines whether the reasons given by the national authorities for the restriction and how they implemented it are relevant and sufficient in the context of the interpretation of the Convention. The Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards that were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.[9]

In examining the particular circumstances of the case, the Court takes the following